



Peace is a process

Annual Report
2007 - 2008



International Peacebuilding Alliance
Alliance internationale pour la consolidation de la paix
Alianza internacional para la Consolidación de la Paz

www.interpeace.org

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This young man covered his body with tattoos when he belonged to the infamous Central American Mara Salvatrucha gang a few years ago. He left the gang to join an evangelical church, and now works as a street organizer and counsellor that reaches out to gang members. Because employers tend not to hire youth with tattoos, he is now applying an acidic cream every day to burn the tattoos off his face, arms and chest.

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In partnership with the United Nations

Interpeace

Interpeace is an international peacebuilding organization, based in Switzerland with offices and programmes in 19 countries.

Interpeace was created by the United Nations in 1994 to assist war-torn societies in building sustainable peace.

Interpeace became an independent organization in 2000, but maintains a strategic partnership with the UN.

The Mission

Interpeace aims to reinforce the capacities of societies to overcome deep divisions and to address conflict in non-violent ways.

We are rooted in local realities. We believe in the wisdom of listening, the power of participation, and the strength of informed dialogue to build trust - the foundation of peacebuilding.



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Peace is a process

Message from the Chairman and the Director-General



Peace is always a work in progress.

In societies suffering from instability or the legacy of war, the potential for renewed conflict is an ever-present danger. State institutions, judicial frameworks or traditional mechanisms for conflict resolution - natural buffers against violence – tend to be weak or altogether absent. In many cases, such fragility is compounded by bad governance, corruption, poverty, economic stagnation or collapse and a shared lack of hope in the future.

Trust is one of the most important victims of conflict. Trust between people. Trust between the population and their authorities.

Building trust is at the core of the process of building peace. It takes time and persistent work to strengthen relationships, to identify common priorities among conflicting groups and to walk the long path towards common solutions. Peace is not an agreement. Peace is a process.

Many countries that start down that path never make it. During the first five to ten years after a successful peace process, when institutions remain fragile and mistrust is pervasive, a country remains vulnerable to relapsing into conflict. Idle youth and demobilized-but-not-reintegrated former soldiers and rebels become the ready tools of political manipulation and bloodshed.

Across 15 countries and regions, Interpeace and its local partners are working to strengthen the ability of societies to manage their own conflicts in non-violent ways. We focus on building trust between the major groups and to reinforcing the relationship between people and their authorities. As the following example of youth gang violence in Central America will demonstrate, addressing the root causes of instability is a complex, dangerous and long-term effort.

The stability of the Central American region is at risk. More than a decade since the signing of peace accords that brought an end to brutal civil wars in Guatemala and El Salvador, these countries are gripped with a staggering level of insecurity. Public confidence in democratic institutions, not to mention in law enforcement, the judiciary and armed forces, is being seriously challenged. A comprehensive study (“Democracy in Latin America: Towards a Citizen’s Democracy”) carried out in 2004 by the UN Development Programme shows that a majority of people in Central America would welcome the return of iron fist dictatorships over their democratic alternatives if their security could at least be guaranteed.

One of the primary phenomena terrorizing Central America today is violent youth gangs, or “maras” in local slang. The youth gang issue is hotly debated and poorly understood. Even the number of membership of these gangs is much disputed. Many experts estimate the figure to be between 70,000 and 120,000, spreading across the three countries most affected: Guatemala, El Salvador and Honduras. A similar debate rages on the true links between Central American gangs and criminal gangs operating in some 40 US states, with particular concentrations in Los Angeles and Washington, D.C. as well as parts of Canada.

The seeds of the gang phenomenon in Central America are an unintended export of the United States. With the advent of the peace accord in El Salvador, the US deported large numbers of Salvadoran refugees. Many of those sent home brought with them the gang culture of Los Angeles’ streets and prisons. The gang networks spread rapidly from there.

The crimes attributed to youth gangs include murder, torture, kidnapping, theft, drug trafficking, extortion and other violent behaviour. The scale of this problem is evidenced clearly in the case of Guatemala, where there are more murders today than at the height of its civil war.

Youth gang violence has reached proportions that generate desperate and violent reactions from the governments of the region. Iron fist strategies to wipe out the gangs in the streets are official policy. Human rights violations are commonplace and under-reported. The battle taking place is one of survival for both sides.

Interpeace has recently launched one of its most challenging programmes to date to address the youth gang problem in Central America. In December 2007, seven Presidents from Central America signed onto a regional strategy that Interpeace will develop in the context of the Central American Integration System or SICA in Spanish. The goal will be to create a transnational approach to deal with a transnational source of insecurity.

At a national level in Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador, Interpeace is initiating country-specific processes bringing all relevant groups together to analyze, coordinate and refocus their strategies to break the vicious circle of violence and to develop strategies of prevention. A holistic approach is envisaged, bringing to the table the crucial social and economic factors that make the youth gang phenomenon so complex and so much more than a problem of criminality. These include the need for young people to find structures in the absence of stable families, social exclusion, failure of the educational system and the illegal emigration of parents to the US in search of income.


The scale of the insecurity in Central America and its impact on the stability of the region are strong reminders that the absence of open war is a poor indicator of peace. We need to broaden our understanding of conflict to be able to anticipate newly emerging threats to internal stability, be they driven by gang violence, weak democracies, corruption, human rights violations, exclusion, environmental factors or the fight over natural resources.

If we are serious about bringing about peace and stability, leaders must also stop seeing peace processes as “hit-and-run” negotiations and understand that one must invest in building an infrastructure of national peacebuilding capacities that can accompany these fragile societies over the long-term.


Interpeace is doing what it can to help build understanding of the process of peace. We do this by demonstrating the importance of the core principles of peacebuilding that you will find outlined in this Annual Report. We do this by respecting local cultures, local ownership and by working on the ground exclusively with people in their own societies. We do this by working with all sides to a conflict and by remaining engaged for the long-run.

We are honoured to work with such dedicated teams and partners across 15 conflict and post-conflict contexts. Their achievements and challenges in 2007 and 2008 are captured in this report. The tragic loss of our colleague Mohamed Hassan Kulmiye in Somalia in June 2008 is a strong reminder that these peace teams are risking everything for an opportunity to help their fellow men and women prevent a return to violent conflict and to build a more stable future.

We sincerely hope that this Annual Report will inspire you to join us in our efforts to help build more stable societies around the world and to help others understand the process of peace.



Martti Ahtisaari
Chairman of the Governing Council



Scott M. Weber
Director-General

Interpeace Around the World


Interpeace is operationally active in some of the most difficult conflict situations in the world.



- Interpeace has its headquarters in Geneva, Switzerland. A Regional Office for Eastern and Central Africa in Nairobi, for Latin America and the Caribbean in Guatemala City, and Representation Offices in New York and Brussels.
- In 2007-2008 Interpeace supported peacebuilding efforts through 15 programmes, 4 of which are implemented through the United Nations.

Interpeace works at the request of governments, civil society, donor countries, UN agencies and other international organizations.

- Interpeace's programme budget has grown from US\$ 3 million in 2002 to over US\$ 16.7 million in 2008.
- In 2007 programme costs accounted for 80 percent of the expenses.
- Interpeace is funded by contributions from governments and increasingly, from private sources. In 2007, Interpeace support rose by 36 percent with 95 percent coming from government donations.
- Interpeace works through local partners. Programmes are carried out in collaboration with roughly 300 team members.
- Maintaining strong and diverse donor support is critical to preserving Interpeace's independence and neutrality.



The Joint Programme Unit for UN/Interpeace Initiatives (JPU) is a unit of the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS). It was created by Interpeace and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) to implement peacebuilding projects using Interpeace's approach in support of UN field operations around the world. The JPU runs its projects as part of the local UN programme in each country and in collaboration with other UN agencies, with ongoing projects in Israel, Liberia and Cyprus.



INTERPEACE PROGRAMMES

Programme Highlights

In May 2007, members of the group that facilitated the “Future Vision of Palestinian Arabs in **Israel**” document met with Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and his office to conduct a serious discussion on the conclusions reached through the process.



Interpeace partners joined **Somali** elders and women’s groups in on-going reconciliation initiatives and peace processes.



An innovative joint preventative strategy addressing gang-related violence in **Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador** was developed through the Interpeace supported Youth Gang Programme. The Youth Gang Programme is a collaborative effort between the Central American Integration System (SICA), governments, civil society, and organisations in the region.

In **Guinea-Bissau**, a country-wide peacebuilding infrastructure composed of more than 100 influential persons has been organised through intensive village-level consultations.

In **Liberia**, Interpeace, through its Joint Programme Unit, partnered with UNMIL and the Liberian Ministry of Internal Affairs to develop a reconciliation plan for Nimba county. This effort received financial support from the UN Peacebuilding Fund.

“Peace is a process, not a goal.”

David Hearst, The Guardian (2008)

Based on local concerns about the weakness of democratic processes, the Interpeace partner in **Rwanda** facilitated initiatives which lead to: enhanced dialogue between local people and their senators; an internal protocol requiring senators to visit their constituencies at least once a month; and an amendment of national law allowing political parties to work at the community level.

Interpeace's partner in **Burundi** conducted intensive consultations throughout the country's 17 provinces to gather the views of the population and its leaders on the primary obstacles to peace.



Individuals from all walks of life confirmed their commitment to sustaining participatory peacebuilding efforts as part of a broad consultative process in **Aceh**. Interpeace is also facilitating the two-party talks on the further implementation of the Helsinki MoU “Peace Accord”.

In **Guatemala**, Interpeace programming included holding forums and seminars involving political parties, civil society organizations, geographically targeted population groups, and international experts on security sector reform.


Interpeace developed an innovative programme in **Cyprus** aimed at promoting and sustaining a constructive social dynamic that promotes engagement between and within Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot communities.

“The job of national reconciliation and national reconstruction is not for the leaders alone.

It must be carried out in every neighborhood, village and hamlet of the nation.”

Kofi A. Annan

Former United Nations Secretary-General







CORE PRINCIPLES OF PEACEBUILDING

Local Ownership

Building local ownership begins by ensuring that priorities are determined locally and not imposed through outside agendas. It ensures that local concerns, which are often fueling the conflict, are at the center of peacebuilding.

Interpeace assists in creating spaces and processes in which consensus-building and dialogue can take place. If local people and groups participate in defining the problem, they can begin to take ownership over the solutions.

Local ownership decreases the likelihood of a return to conflict. When people are able to participate in shaping their future and are able to voice their concerns, they may develop a weighted interest in ensuring

that peace lasts. If they own the peace, they will defend it as their own.

In addition, local ownership ensures the sustainability of peacebuilding efforts. External interventions are usually time bound. Local actors are better placed to have long-term commitment to peacebuilding activities. Peacebuilding requires




“Interpeace is truly in the vanguard of peacebuilding, especially with its focus on building local ownership.”

Elisabet Borsiin Bonnier, Former Chair of the Interpeace Advisory Council
and Former Ambassador of Sweden to the United Nations at Geneva

partnerships based on respect for the lead role that the local partner must assume in the design and implementation of the peacebuilding strategy. Conflict can seldom be resolved by local parties

alone; international support, expertise and funding are also part of the equation. This requires long-term meaningful and sustained partnerships between local and international entities.

Level of Ownership of the Interpeace Programme Over Time



Early on, Interpeace seeks to strengthen the capacity of a local partner team/organization to take the lead in a peacebuilding process. Interpeace's role evolves over time to become a long-term and supportive partner to the local team. The local team implements a strategy that engages national stakeholders to take an increasing ownership of the programme. That ownership is what confers legitimacy and sustainability to the process.



CORE PRINCIPLES OF PEACEBUILDING

Engagement of all Groups

Interpeace supports processes that engage all groups that matter in society.

Ensuring that all relevant groups are involved in the process of building peace, including marginalized women and youth, extremists, minorities, and the diaspora, assures legitimacy and ownership of the agreed upon results.

Excluding groups or individuals from the process of peace can deepen their resentment and give them an opportunity to undermine the process from afar. Inclusion, however, begins to build bridges of understanding and communication and draws all parties into a

process of change. This, in time, enables the society collectively to move towards moderation and compromise, diluting extremist discourses.

In addition, engagement of a wide range of actors helps to compress vertical space (the distance between authorities and the population).

Involving all parties in the peacebuilding process, the identification of issues and the design and implementation of solutions, helps to build a democratic relationship in society and between governments and their constituencies. For engagement to be meaningful it

“Making peace, I have found
is much harder than making war.”

Gerry Adams, President, Sinn Féin

is essential that participation is taken
seriously and that local voices are heard
and taken into consideration.





CORE PRINCIPLES OF PEACEBUILDING

Building Trust

Conflict parties almost always have a long history of interaction and may live in close proximity to each other. Restoring, healing and restructuring the relationship between conflict parties and building trust is at the core of building sustainable peace.

Interpeace helps conflict parties and divided communities re-establish trust through collaborative identification of problems and the implementation of solutions to common concerns.

To do so, trust and communication must be built between those who hold power and those with less power.

Trust cannot be imposed, imported or bought. It is built slowly and reluctantly through collective engagement and commitment to a common vision. Building trust is the most difficult aspect of peacebuilding but the most crucial. More than the revitalization of infrastructure or the economy, trust is the intangible ingredient that helps to prevent a relapse into conflict. Trust is the glue that holds societies together. It gives institutions lasting legitimacy and helps individuals and groups remain engaged in the long and arduous process of building lasting peace.

“It’s amazing what you can
accomplish, when you don’t
care who takes the credit.”

Former US President Harry Truman





CORE PRINCIPLES OF PEACEBUILDING

Long-term Commitment

Building lasting peace takes time. The road to peace is bumpy, long, unpredictable and anything but straight. Support of local efforts must be patient, adaptable and consistent. There are no short-cuts or quick-fixes. External engagement, often understandably hoping for quick fixes, must be persuaded to ensure predictability and long-term financial commitments. Otherwise, sustaining peacebuilding processes becomes impossible.

The Interpeace approach puts the local people in the driver's seat—allowing them to dictate how their society reshapes itself and moves forward. To

these ends, Interpeace works with local partners who involve all sectors of society in identifying key issues and common solutions. This process is not only focused on tangible progress on conflict issues but also the intangible reconstruction of society (building trust, relationships, etc.). This holistic approach to rebuilding society and institutions takes time and long-term commitment.

To facilitate the long-term sustainability of the peacebuilding process, Interpeace works to ensure that there are local peacebuilding institutions committed to continuing the peacebuilding process

“There does not exist a
conflict in this world that
cannot be solved.”

Martti Ahtisaari, Former President of Finland and
Chairman of the Interpeace Governing Council

and that they are equipped with the necessary training, human and financial resources, and networks. These institutions become a national resource to

sustain peace and stability. They must be able to continue to build trust and to effectively respond to new challenges long after external support has ended.





CORE PRINCIPLES OF PEACEBUILDING

How not What

Conflict tears apart the fabric of societies. Mistrust colors all relationships, including between the people and their leaders. In such contexts, even small problems can escalate into wide-scale violence.

Due to the perceived urgency of conflict environments, top-down technical solutions are often favoured over holistic approaches that reflect the complexity of the situation.

In post-conflict countries, everything is urgent, everything is controversial and resources are scarce. It is precisely in such situations that broad consensus-building is needed to root compromise in a wider dialogue and trust building process. How this process is managed

and how groups are engaged is critically important to the success of peacebuilding efforts.

The following questions can help to ascertain the quality of a peacebuilding process:

How were the priorities determined?

Top-down solutions imposed from the outside rarely work. Priorities should emerge from a process of compromise across a broad cross-section of society.

Who was involved? Excluding key groups undermines legitimacy and creates spoilers. One must involve all groups that matter to local people in the process.

“Peacebuilding through the soles of your feet.”

Anthony Travis

How much do the main groups feel ownership of the process and its results?

If they are involved in setting the priorities, they will own the results.

How broadly are the solutions considered legitimate? In a context of weak institutions and pervasive mistrust, the legitimacy of solutions will determine their success. Legitimacy comes from broad involvement in setting priorities and a sense of ownership of the process.

Interpeace supports a peacebuilding approach which is holistic, long-term and reflective. It places major value on ‘how’ decisions are made, ‘how’ priorities are determined, and ‘how’ the peace

process is managed to ensure decisions are contextual and consensual.

For peace to be sustainable, Interpeace believes it must be locally owned. Interpeace operates on the understanding that if people feel that the peace belongs to them, they are most likely to take personal responsibility for protecting it and preventing its collapse.



Tel Aviv, Israel 2005

“True peace and real security will never come from the barrel of a gun. Peace and security come because all enjoy justice and freedom. Peace and security come because it is acknowledged that people matter.”

Archbishop Emeritus Desmond Mpilo Tutu





INSIGHTS ON PEACEBUILDING

Negotiated Peace

Peace negotiations are a critical step between open conflict and peace. Unfortunately, many peace accords do not address the root causes of the conflict. They often focus on reaching agreement on power-sharing. Peace accords also tend to be elite-driven processes with little ownership among the people.

An inevitable result of peace negotiation processes is that they change the playing field and, in some cases, plant new, unforeseen seeds of conflict that may emerge only years later. It is not surprising that, according to the UN, over half of all countries emerging from civil war relapse into violent conflict within five years.

Just as conflict engages all levels of society, peacebuilding must reach out to society in its entirety. Building sustainable peace entails changing patterns of governance and economic policies as well as transforming relationships and building trust. This process often begins, rather than ends, once the peace accord is signed.

Building trust takes time. There are no quick-fixes.

“In a time of historical crisis, it is the reproduction of society, not states, which is at stake.”

Deiniol Jones, Online Journal of Peace and Conflict Resolution, (2001)



A Step-by-Step Guide to the Interpeace Process

Every context is unique.

Interpeace adapts its approach to each and every context.

**The following chart outlines the typical phases of an
Interpeace peacebuilding process.**

The Typical Phases of an Interpeace Peacebuilding Process

Interpeace monitors a range of conflict and potential conflict situations around the world. Requests for assistance come from Governments, Civil Society, the UN, and donors as well as Interpeace's Governing Council and Advisory Council. The organization turns down over 70% of requests. Specific criteria are used to select countries for further exploratory work.

Multiple visits and consultations are undertaken as well as a process of mapping a country's political and social landscape. The purpose: assessing the need for a framework to bring together diverging groups to overcome obstacles to peace, while gauging the readiness of national stakeholders to partake in and own such a process. Interpeace also assesses its own added-value and the financial viability of a possible programme. A decision is then taken in favour of, or against, future engagement.

MONITORING

EXPLORATION

If the decision is taken to engage, Interpeace conducts round after round of consultation with as broad a network as possible to identify a small group of individuals or institutions in which all groups can place their trust. This process can take up to 2 years, but it is absolutely essential to the success of the process to follow.

**IDENTIFICATION OF
PEACE TEAM**

Interpeace works in a close partnership with the United Nations (UN), formalized through a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) and a structured UN-implementation capacity called the Joint Programme Unit for UN/Interpeace Initiatives. This enables us to implement programmes either as an International NGO or as a UN initiative – a strategic decision that depends on an analysis of the best prospects for success.

**DESIGN OF
STRATEGY**

**CONSULTATION
AND RESEARCH**

**SETTING
PRIORITIES**

**DEVELOPING
RECOMMENDATIONS**

The local team then moulds the Interpeace methodology and approach to the particular political context, culture and social dynamic of their society. A strategy for peacebuilding is developed by the local peace team, together with Interpeace. The programme is now formally launched. A local institutional structure to house the programme is identified or established to enhance its local identity.

Over the next six months to a year, the main phase of the work involves very broad consultations of citizens from all walks of life, from the villagers around the country to the authorities in the capital, from civil society to fellow compatriots living in the diaspora. All are consulted in order to produce a detailed Country Note or "Self-Portrait" of the society as it understands itself and its conflicts. Key obstacles to peace emerge through this process and become the agenda for the work to come.

The local team convenes a National Group meeting drawing together the major stakeholders from government, civil society, academia, media, religious authorities, members of political groups/parties and representatives of the diaspora. This National Group, the highest validating and mandating entity for the programme, debates the findings contained in the Country Note and selects the 5 or so most important obstacles to peace. It provides the mandate to the local team/partner to conduct Participatory Action Research to understand those problems further and identify possible solutions. National ownership is growing.

A Working Group is formed around each priority area selected. Facilitated by the local team, these Working Groups are composed of the most relevant individuals and institutions for the problems being addressed. These groups develop consensus recommendations for change and present them once again to a National Group for validation.

Following a successful Interpeace process, the local team/partner has built a strong reputation as a trusted facilitator of peace in society. The local partner is often called upon by national stakeholders to engage in a new round of problem-solving. This can involve new Participatory Action Research on other emerging obstacles to peace, or punctual efforts to prevent crises. A positive result of the process is precisely the establishment of a capacity for peacebuilding where few or none existed previously, a result of Interpeace's initial and sustained investment in capacity-building of the local partner organisation. Around this stage, the local team/partner and Interpeace put forth proposals for the next stages of their peacebuilding engagement. Peace is a long-term effort. It is critically important to accompany a fragile society along the long and winding path to lasting peace. The process continues...

**THE PROCESS
CONTINUES...**

**FACILITATING
IMPLEMENTATION**

The local team then facilitates the process of helping national stakeholders and particularly the State to implement the recommendations, and monitors progress to keep this on track.

What is Participatory Action Research (PAR)? Participatory action research is a consultative research methodology. "Research" is not conducted in the traditional sense of the term where outside experts are sent to conduct research, study their subject and then take their findings home to write a report. Rather with participatory action research, local people are both the researchers and the subjects of the research. The research is carried out by local people, for local people. The research process brings people together to examine common problems, empowering them to develop and be a part of the solution.





INTERPEACE COUNTRY PROGRAMMES

Africa



“In response to post-conflict situations,
Interpeace’s work represents an essential
part of a coherent peacebuilding approach
which the United Nations seeks to ensure.”

Mohamed Sahnoun, Former Special Advisor to the UN Secretary-General on Africa
and Vice-Chairman of the Governing Council of Interpeace

INTERPEACE PARTNERS IN AFRICA

EASTERN AFRICA

Academy for Peace and Development (APD), Somaliland
Puntland Development Research Center (PDRC), Puntland
Center for Research and Dialogue (CRD), South-Central Somalia

CENTRAL AFRICA

Institute of Research and Dialogue for Peace (IRDP), Rwanda
Centre d’Alerte et de prévention des Conflits (CENAP), Burundi

WEST AFRICA

National Institute of Studies and Research (INEP), Guinea-Bissau
Kofi Annan International Centre for Conflict Transformation at the University
of Liberia (KAICT), Liberia
Liberia Democratic Institute (LDI), Liberia
Foundation for International Dignity (FIND), Liberia
Interreligious Council of Liberia (IRCL), Liberia
Women NGO’s Secretariat of Liberia
Peacebuilding Resource Centre (PBRC), Liberia
West Africa Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP), Liberia
Initiatives for Positive Change (IPC), Liberia
United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL)



FOCUS ON

Liberia

Over the past 25 years, ongoing conflict in Liberia has led to the collapse of political institutions, pillaging of national resources, and destruction of infrastructure. Today, Liberia needs to develop social processes and political institutions—both formal and informal—that effectively address its post-conflict challenges and tensions.

In collaboration with the Government of Liberia and the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), Interpeace seeks to support the process of building social and political cohesion to enable improved governance and prevent the re-emergence of armed conflict.

Liberia's current instability dates back to the 1980s, when tensions between the dominant settler community, the indigenous communities, and the Americo-Liberians who had controlled the state since its establishment in 1847, led to the overthrow of President Tolbert by Sergeant

Samuel Doe. By the late 1980s, Liberia was experiencing political decline resulting from an inept government based on a patronage system and authoritarian rule. The political reality coupled with a deteriorating economy resulted in civil war that claimed an estimated 200,000 lives.

“...all the investment in the country
will fail if the peace is not safeguarded.”

Honourable Ambulai B. Johnson, Minister of Internal Affairs and
Director of the Cabinet of the President of Liberia

During the civil war, Charles Taylor’s National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) took control of much of the countryside. A peace agreement was signed in 1995 and Charles Taylor was elected president in 1997. After a brief period of respite, in 1999 anti-government fighting broke out in the north. Over the course of the civil war, approximately 200,000 people were killed, 800,000 were displaced, and 1,000,000 became refugees.

In 2003, Charles Taylor—under international pressure—stepped down and went into exile in Nigeria. A transitional government steered the country towards elections.

The election of President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf in 2005 is considered by many to be an opportunity for Liberia to break the cycle of violence and establish foundations for political and economic reform. However, there is recognition that the state has not yet developed sufficient capacities to address social tensions resulting from the country’s experience of prolonged conflict.

Without the development of constructive mechanisms for cross-cultural confidence building and communication, there is little chance that the Liberian government can move towards reconciliation, institutional reform and economic development.

Interpeace Programmes

- The Nimba Project
- The National Dialogue Programme

Collaborative efforts between the Joint Programme Unit for UN/Interpeace Initiatives, the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) and the Liberian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA) target local and national issues. These programmes were implemented in collaboration with key Liberian civil society organizations.

The Nimba Project

Launched in 2008, the project aims to:

- foster reconciliation;
- create conditions for the return and reintegration of refugees;
- develop a strategy for continued reconciliation in Nimba County;
- identify mechanisms to prevent the re-emergence of conflict;
- promote property dispute resolution.

Instability in the Nimba region continues to delay repatriation of many Liberian refugees stranded in Guinea and has become an obstacle to economic recovery. The project builds on the Liberian government's efforts to resolve conflicts in Nimba and focuses on property disputes and ethnic, communal, and intergenerational tensions.

Interpeace teams facilitated a series of visioning workshops with a range of



key persons and conferences focused on reconciliation. These processes support the government and local groups in the development of strategies for continued reconciliation and conflict transformation.

In parallel to these dialogue and consultation activities, two separate projects were developed under the leadership of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. First, a consultant was hired to undertake a county level study on customary law and national legal procedures for property dispute resolution. Secondly, in Ganta, a drainage system for two recently completed roads was built. These two roads were opened in late 2007 following recommendations from a commission set up by the President of Liberia to look at the ethnic conflicts in Ganta.

2008 and beyond: The National Dialogue Programme

In 2008, Interpeace will engage Liberians across the country in the National Dialogue Programme, a dialogue process which will lead to the identification of a common vision for peace consolidation. Like the Nimba project, this programme will involve extensive research and dialogue at the local and national level to identify key actors, priority issues and policy recommendations.

In the initial phase, the programme will devote itself to building the capacity of key civil society organisations to carry out participatory action research and facilitate social and political dialogue.

In the second phase, the teams will engage the rural and urban population of Liberia in the identification of fundamental peace-building issues and key stakeholders. Four teams will be created to map the perceived needs and goals of different social, religious, ethnic, and political groups at the local and national levels. The programme will emphasise participation of vulnerable groups in government decisions and policies.

In its third phase, the programme will facilitate a nationwide dialogue through a process of consensus-building and shared visioning with key stakeholders. The process will be complemented by dialogue circles focused on regional or county specific issues.

In phase four, the team will facilitate development of consensus-based strategies for mainstreaming and institutionalising dialogue in social and political structures.

The programme is expected to: strengthen conflict transformation capacities of state and non-state actors, to facilitate the creation of effective channels of communication within and across different segments of society, and to develop local expertise in the design and implementation of research-based dialogue strategies.

Civil Society Collaborators

- Kofi Annan Institute for Conflict Transformation (KAICT) of the University of Liberia
- Liberia Democratic Institute (LDI)
- Foundation for International Dignity (FIND)
- Interreligious Council of Liberia (IRCL)
- Women's NGO Secretariat of Liberia
- Peacebuilding Resource Centre (PBRC)
- West Africa Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP)
- Initiatives for Positive Change (IPC)

Burundi

Burundi has experienced periods of political infighting marked by the massacre of civilians since 1965. While initially related to power and resource control, the conflict has progressively taken an ethnic turn. The cycle of violence between Hutu and Tutsi ethnic groups culminated in massacres in 1972 and in a civil war in 1993 claiming the lives of an estimated 300,000 people.

Although peaceful elections led to the establishment of a democratically elected government in 2005, the last few months of 2007 and the first months of 2008 saw the security situation deteriorate. The May 2008 cease fire agreement signed between the government and the Palipehutu-FNL, the last remaining rebel group, restored hope of improved security and peace. However the Palipehutu-FNL's demands for integration into the political and military arena appear to be a stumbling block in the peace negotiations.

Continuous inter and intra-party tensions led to the paralysis of the parliament for most of 2007 and the first half of 2008. Political tensions have increased in early 2008 as the parties begin to position themselves for the 2010 presidential elections. Efforts to build lasting foundations for peace in this fragile country must address the growing disappointment of those yet to see the economic and security improvements anticipated by the 2000 Arusha peace accord.

“If this kind of dialogue had been initiated in the 1970s, the war of 1993 would have never happened”

Participant in the focus group discussion organized by CENAP in Kamenge, September 2007

Key Issues

- Weapons circulation;
- Land issues;
- Reintegration of refugees and displaced people;
- Ethnic divisions;
- Sense of exclusion from political and judicial processes.

Cultivating a Culture of Dialogue and Trust

In 2006, Interpeace began an association with the Centre of Alert and Conflict Prevention (CENAP). The joint Interpeace-CENAP programme supports collaborative efforts to address peacebuilding challenges.

Between October 2007 and May 2008, the views of 1,300 Burundians were collected on key obstacles to building peace in focus group discussions implemented by the CENAP team. The findings will be validated by focus group discussions at the provincial and national levels.

Guinea-Bissau

Guinea-Bissau has continued to be affected by recurrent violent conflict since its independence from Portuguese rule in 1974. The 1998-1999 civil war deepened mistrust between Bissau-Guineans and political authorities, alienated investors, and weakened state institutions. Recurrent confrontations and growing uncertainty may lead to a renewed cycle of political instability and violence, despite the presidential elections in 2005 and the formation of a national unity government in 2007.

Identifying Critical Issues

In order to support the identification of critical issues, Interpeace programming seeks to stimulate informed public debate among all sectors of society around the country, and to support the participatory identification of critical issues. In 2006, Interpeace supported the National Institute of Studies and Research (INEP) in conducting extensive national consultations to develop a national strategy for the restructuring and modernisation of the defense and security sector.

The joint Interpeace/INEP “Voice of Peace” programme conducted participatory research and developed spaces for dialogue between national authorities and civil society through the creation of a national network of representatives.

“This initiative will allow for the participation of a broad section of Bissau-Guinean society in the identification of structural causes of the conflict.”

*João Bernardo Honwana,
Former Representative of the UN Secretary-General*

Accomplishments

- Formation of a national steering committee, chaired by a representative of the Presidency of the Republic;
- Development of core management capacities;
- Establishment of a national infrastructure for public debate;
- Establishment of a public awareness strategy;
- Selection of dialogue topics from identified local priorities;
- Production of documentary on the debate process.
- Use of short videos at local debates to provide comparative perspectives from around the country;
- Creation of a permanent forum for dialogue which includes local and national representatives.



FOCUS ON

Rwanda

The violent conflict experienced by Rwanda, characterised by political and socio-economic instability and by the manipulation of ethnic division for political ends, began in the 1950s and climaxed with the genocide of Tutsis in 1994. Following the cessation of hostilities in 1994, the new government has progressively re-established law and order, and has increased security and the provision of basic services.

Economically, Rwanda has made tremendous progress with an average economic growth between 1994 and 2004 of over 7.4 per cent per annum. However, in 2008, a deep mistrust remains within the population. Unresolved issues including conflict in neighbouring eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, a malfunctioning multi-party political system and growing urban-rural economic disparities continue to threaten stability.

Following the period of genocide, several justice and reconciliation mechanisms were developed. In 1994, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) was established in Tanzania to prosecute persons responsible for genocide and other serious violations of international law. In 1999, the Rwandan Parliament created a

Commission for National Unity and Reconciliation (NURC). In 2001, the Gacaca court system was established to try alleged *génocidaires*.

While functioning justice mechanisms have served to increase the trust that the Rwandan people have in government institutions,

Rwanda External Evaluation, 2007

“The IRDP-Interpeace programme made a significant and strategic contribution to the possibility of building peace in Rwanda. It has selected activities, participants and strategies which have real influence, and a combined impact greater than any one of its elements.”

Sue Williams and Serge Rwamasirabo, External Evaluators

it will take years to rebuild the mutual trust and tolerance needed for sustainable peace and security. In this context, a continuing focus on the intangible dimensions of peace remains essential. Interpeace and its local partner, the Institute of Research and Dialogue for Peace (IRDP), encourage research, dialogue and the development of a strategy to reinforce social cohesion from both a political and interpersonal perspective.

Cultivating Dialogue

Interpeace and IRDP seek to reinforce a culture of dialogue in Rwandan communities and support the growth of a relationship of trust between the population and decisions makers. Interpeace has provided technical assistance and support to IRDP on methodological programme management and fundraising.

IRDP and Interpeace facilitated 9 months of debates on political parties which contributed to the political decision to amend the law allowing political parties to work at the grass-roots level. The amendment answers the need expressed by the population and by members of the IRDP dialogue platforms, who wanted parties to visit their constituencies more frequently and not only before elections.

2007 and Beyond

Building on the positive results and the credibility achieved over the past years, the team continued activities aimed at strengthening dialogue mechanisms, disseminating research and dialogue findings throughout the country, undertaking additional participatory research, and further facilitating the implementation of consensus-based solutions.

Support for Dialogue Clubs

During the consultation phase from 2002-2003, the rural population identified the absence of spaces for neutral dialogue as an issue that limited possibilities for peace-building. In response to this identified need, IRDP helped to create five “dialogue clubs” in rural areas, bringing together Rwandans from different ethnic and political backgrounds, including: genocide survivors, families of alleged génocidaire, youth, elders, and Rwandans returning from exile. Over the past few years, dialogue clubs have provided space for people to come together—overcoming suspicion and mistrust—to rebuild the social fabric that continues to be stretched by ethnic tension.

Reclaiming the Media for Peace

The scope of the reconciliation process is in part dependant on developing permanent debate platforms at the national, provincial, and local levels, as well as those capable of engaging the Rwandan diaspora abroad. To address this challenge, IRDP and Interpeace have supported the use of print, radio, and film to disseminate findings throughout Rwanda. Talking to ordinary people in towns and rural areas, many of whom were victims of genocide propaganda and the ensuing violence has emphasised that reclaiming the tools of the media as instruments of peace has become a vital part of broadening the impact of peacebuilding processes.

IRDP openly films many of its dialogue events and screens the productions for other stakeholders in both urban and rural areas. In a country where the majority of the population is illiterate, the video screenings are an important tool in disseminating the messages emerging from the dialogue process. In 2007, IRDP’s audiovisual service produced several films covering a number of issues:

- **“Words to Say It”**: dealing with the denial of the genocide of the Tutsis;
- **“People and Power”**: about power sharing;
- **“Crossroads”**: showing IRDP’s research process, achievements, and vision;
- **“Dialogue Clubs”**: explores the clubs and their activities;
- Three ten minute films on democratic principles used to jumpstart debates in secondary schools.

In December, IRDP organised a film festival at Kigali Novotel Hotel. It was the first documentary film festival ever organized in Rwanda. The event was attended by 200 people, including representatives of school dialogue clubs. The festival was an opportunity for IRDP to present the findings of its research. The audience was encouraged to participate in a discussion and to give feedback.

IRDP also used radio as a mechanism for facilitating dialogue. Throughout 2007, IRDP produced monthly radio pro-

grammes focused on key issues: taxation, the role of political parties in a democracy, reparation of the genocide's victims, and the gap between population growth and economic growth and employment opportunities. Each month a panel of guests were invited to speak from alternative points of view and the audience was encouraged to participate via phone calls.

Since 2001, IRDP/Interpeace programming in Rwanda has **brought together more than 10,000 Rwandans** to examine the events of the genocide. It is estimated that 10 per cent of the population—roughly 900,000 people—know about the work of IRDP/Interpeace as a result of attending meetings, participating in dialogue clubs, listening to IRDP's monthly radio broadcast debates, or viewing video screenings.

Establishing a Peace Center

The establishment of a Peace Centre has become an important goal in the programme's strategy for ensuring the sustainability of Rwanda's fragile, young culture of open debate and dialogue. The creation of a Peace Centre that attracts, houses, and integrates peace initiatives will help to strengthen and consolidate Rwanda's peacebuilding. Comprised of a conference room, a library, and an audiovisual resource centre, the Peace Centre will be the crossroad of peace initiatives where Rwandan and regional actors

engaged in peace efforts will be able to meet and have access to peace-related documentation. The Peace Centre will also be a place where the people who participate in IRDP's dialogue process (i.e. dialogue clubs, school clubs, and national, provincial and district fora) will have opportunities to meet each other, to share their experience, and to create a peacebuilding network.

In 2007, the IRDP/Interpeace team undertook additional participatory research on controversial issues, such as:

- Legal culture vs. arbitrary power in Rwanda;
- Power sharing;
- Mechanisms to fight negationism of the genocide of Tutsis;
- The political events of the 1946-1962 period;
- Job creation and poverty reduction.

The results of this research will contribute to discussions and debates, and a report will be presented to the National Group in 2008 for validation.

Key Issues

Sustaining the dialogue and research processes and supporting the use and dissemination of media productions are key aspects of the programme's strategy to reduce the mistrust between Rwandans living inside and outside of the country. While the Rwandan people continue to deal with issues related to the genocide, there is an eagerness to work together to re-build society.

Somali Region

In its 16 years as a collapsed state, Somalia has faced ongoing challenges. In October 2004, the Inter-Government Authority on Development (IGAD) led Somalia National Reconciliation Conference (SNRC) concluded with the formation of a Transitional Federal Government with a five year term of office. While there are significant threats to peace and considerable challenges for the current transitional structures to bring about the recovery of the Somali state, the transitional process remains the only viable option for the recovery of Somalia as a nation.

Dialogue for Peace – Phase II

Over the past 12 years, Interpeace and its partners have been able to generate and maintain neutral political spaces while engaging all sectors of society on key issues. Despite the exceptional volatility of the political-security dynamics, the vision of the Dialogue for Peace – Phase II programme is the continued consolidation of peace throughout the Somali region using consensus-oriented, integrated approaches to state building. The focus of Interpeace's partner in south and central Somalia, the Center for Research and Dialogue (CRD), includes engaging civic and business actors on local reconciliation initiatives and formation of local governance structures.

Focus Activities in Phase II

- Monitoring political context and social reconciliation processes;
- Facilitation of topical forums;
- In-depth mapping and research of Somali peace processes for publication and dissemination;
- Increasing peacebuilding initiative engagement by women, youth, and diaspora;
- Pursuing democratisation and decentralisation processes, with an increasing focus on institution building;
- Partnering with Somali institutions and regional/global field teams.



Interpeace's partner in Somaliland, the Academy for Peace and Development (APD), has played a fundamental role in helping to resolve the political impasse through a consensual agreement on the electoral timetable. APD has also engaged communities in a series of mediation processes focused on averting conflict in disputed areas of Sool and Sanaag.

The Puntland Development Research Center (PDRC), Interpeace's partner in the northeast region of Somalia played a key role in supporting Puntland's democratisation process towards a referendum on the revised constitution as well as working with key stakeholders to improve local security.

Signs of Hope

- Honest political brokering with emerging power structures;
- Collective Somali goodwill;
- Buy-in from the international community.

Challenges facing the Transitional Government whose mandate ends in 2009

- Establishment of a legitimate transitional governance process;
- Lack of a stable environment for the re-creation of a state;
- A growing humanitarian crisis that is approaching catastrophic proportions;
- Accommodating the presence of an opposition voice;
- Establishing a permanent constitution;
- Preparation for democratic elections;
- Revenue collection/management.

Dialogue for Peace – Engagement of Somali Women in the Dialogue for Peace

The past several years have seen opportunities for the advancement of Somali women but remain very challenging. In 2004, the national reconciliation process resulted in the Transitional Federal Charter, which specified that 12 per cent of all seats in Parliament should be allocated to women. Similar initiatives in Puntland and Somaliland aimed at increasing women's participation in decision making are making very gradual progress.

Cross-Cutting Engagement of Women in Peacebuilding

- Training women's institutions in participatory action research;
- Exploring societal issues of concern for women through research by women;
- Engagement of stakeholders on issues of concern for women.



Programme Focus

- Enhancing women's role in decision-making processes;
- Partnering with women's organisations and networks to build capacities for participatory approaches to peacebuilding and state building;
- Establishment and promotion of mechanisms to promote efforts to include women in significant roles in peacebuilding initiatives.

A TRIBUTE TO SOME OF THE ACHIEVEMENTS OF A SOMALI PEACEMAKER

Mohamed Hassan Kulmiye



“My son was a man of peace and no one should be harmed on his behalf, including those who murdered him”

an emotional appeal by his father against any revenge killing, at a tense meeting of his sub-clan the day after Kulmiye was assassinated.

Violent conflict, assassinations and shrinking civic space have rendered peacebuilding increasingly dangerous in the complex political-security context of south-central Somalia over the past year or more. On 22 June 2008, Engineer Mohamed Hassan Kulmiye, the head of the CRD Belet Weyne office, was killed by unidentified gunmen in Belet Weyne, central Somalia.

Kulmiye had facilitated a series of local peace processes in central Somalia. His imaginative approach included support for the famous “Hiran peace caravan” in 2007, enabling traditional leaders to tour remote communities to promote local reconciliation. One of Kulmiye’s great strengths was his fundamental understanding of the principles of participatory action research, ensuring ownership of the process was always with the stakeholders. This enabled him to work effectively with the local administration as well as traditional leaders, who recognised his genuine respect for their ability to mediate local conflicts. Kulmiye fostered strong links with local civic and business groups, supporting their development of networks for peace. At their request, he was engaged in community mobilisation to establish democratically elected local councils in the area, following the achievements of communities supported by CRD in two neighbouring regions.

The condolences received from people throughout Somalia and beyond reflect the immense regard in which Kulmiye was held for his ability as a peacebuilder and his outstanding achievements in facilitating peaceful solutions. They also affirm the widespread desire of ordinary people to find a way forward through dialogue, not guns.



INTERPEACE COUNTRY PROGRAMMES

Asia



“...coming together is the beginning,
working together is progression, and
staying together will be a sign of success...”

Aceh field staff

INTERPEACE PARTNERS IN ASIA

ACEH, INDONESIA

Indonesian Peace Institute (IPI)

TIMOR-LESTE

Programme of Research and Dialogue for Peace (PRDP),
currently hosted by the Peace and Democracy Foundation (PDF)

Aceh, Indonesia

Historically, the population of Aceh has strongly resisted attempts to colonise the northern province and have maintained an uneasy relationship with the Indonesian state, resulting in armed resistance and attempts at forceful repression by the central government. The most recent cycle of tension and violence started in the late 1970s, followed by several periods of intense confrontation, most recently following the breakdown of the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement in 2003. Peace has held since the signing of the Helsinki Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) in 2005, a peace accord facilitated by President Martti Ahtisaari, and the departure of the EU-ASEAN led Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) in 2006. However, this is the early stage of a process leading to normalisation and sustainable peace.

Implementation of the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU)

The joint Indonesian Peace Institute (IPI) - Interpeace Aceh Programme (IIAP) was conceptualised in 2005-2006, and was established soon after the AMM concluded its mission in Aceh in mid-December 2006. The primary goal of the IIAP is to contribute to an enabling environment for the continued implementation of the MoU while bringing about social reconciliation and good governance in Aceh.

The programme was designed to facilitate formal dialogue, to reinforce institutional responsibilities and commitment to the peace process, and to move the MoU forward. In addition, informal dialogue engaging key persons in the peacebuilding process continue on a regular basis.

Since its inception, the IIAP has reinforced and broadened its political acceptance in Aceh and Jakarta. Interpeace/IPI representatives, as trusted and non-partisan interlocutors, have created the impetus for the resumption of formal two-party meetings between the Government of Indonesia and the former GAM rebel movement, to discuss and resolve MoU-related matters. IIAP has been able to elicit the signatory parties' commitment to maintain the dialogue process at least until the end of 2010.

Issues In Focus

- Formal political processes;
- Establishing channels of communication;
- Participatory Action Research (PAR) methodology pilot testing;
- Responding to requests for facilitation of local reconciliation efforts.

Timor-Leste

“Bringing people together on the mat.”

Timorese Proverb

Timor-Leste gained independence in 2002 after 455 years of Portuguese occupation and 23 years of Indonesian rule, during which over 300,000 people were killed, roughly a third of the population. During its transition from UN-held Popular Consultation (1999) to independence, nearly 70 per cent of its infrastructure was destroyed and 75 per cent of the population was displaced.

Periods of violent civil conflict continue to jeopardise its future. Outward calm, imposed by the presence of international forces, has been disturbed by major upheavals throughout 2006-2008, and resulted in further damage to local infrastructure and the internal displacement of thousands of people. On the 10th of February 2008, President Ramos Horta was seriously wounded in an assassination attempt. Localised outbreaks of violence occur on a regular basis.

The Programme of Research and Dialogue for Peace (PRDP)

As a joint programme between Interpeace and the Peace and Democracy Foundation (PDF), with support from both President Ramos-Horta and Prime Minister Xanana Gusmão, the Programme of Research and Dialogue for Peace (PRDP) aims to enable all levels of Timorese society including local peacebuilding coordination groups, NGOs

Communication Products

- Voices of the Poor, a film documenting views of Dili's poor;
- Poem for a Conflict, a film documenting women's ideas about peace.

and government initiatives, to address conflict in a non-violent and sustainable manner.

Preliminary findings of the PRDP's focus group discussions raised a broad spectrum of issues. Participants identified overlapping themes such as the need for good leadership, employment, stronger judicial institutions, improved quality of education, and better management of state resources. Focus group participants also identified the need for adequate mechanisms to combat corruption, nepotism, and favouritism within existing state institutions.

The people's unfulfilled socio-economic expectations in the post-independence period and the impunity of the leaders have been cited as major causes of frustration—expressed through recurring acts of organized violence. A 'self portrait' of Timor-Leste, drawn from recorded dialogues, will be presented at a National Forum in 2008.



INTERPEACE COUNTRY PROGRAMMES

Europe and the Middle East



“If you want to
make peace, you don’t
talk to your friends.
You talk to your enemies.”

Moshe Dayan

INTERPEACE PARTNERS IN EUROPE
AND THE MIDDLE EAST

OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES
UN Development Programme

CYPRUS
Partnerships are being explored

ISRAEL
The National Committee of the Heads of Arab Local Authorities in Israel
SHAS social movement
UN Development Programme

Palestine

Over the past year, deteriorating political, economic, and social conditions imposed by Israeli occupation have continued to affect the Palestinian people. From April 2006 to April 2007, the number of Palestinian people living in poverty jumped by an estimated 30 per cent and dramatic internal political changes resulted in deep divisions between the two leading parties—Fatah and Hamas. These divisions have repercussions for the Palestinian political map as well as intra-Palestinian dialogue; most analysts assert that sustained peace will require engagement with Hamas.

The situation on the ground remains unstable and Gaza is politically isolated from the West Bank. Political, generational, social, and geographic rifts remain deep and there is a lack of space for neutral political discussion.

Mustakbalna (Our Future)—the joint Interpeace/UNOPS programme in Palestine has been engaging influential representatives from the political, social and economic strata in Palestinian society since 2004. Mustakbalna aims to create a neutral forum in which to address local concerns and articulate long-term aspirations. In 2007, the deteriorating situation on the ground resulted in the project taking a low profile, as security and political risks were high.

Programme Outcomes

- Documentation and dissemination of 15 needs assessment papers;
- Strengthened internal linkages between political parties, civil society, and religious, gender, and age groups;
- Initiative coordinated by the project to revitalize the Old City in Hebron (in which large areas are deserted and several main shopping streets are closed by Israeli military order). This resulted in over 550 shops opening by September 2007 for the first time in years.
- Implementation of violence reduction interventions, a civic peace conference, and expansion of a youth campaign against violence;
- Exploration of key issues through research-based dialogue and strategic workshops in Hebron, Ramallah, and Jenin.

Cyprus

Conflict between Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities over political representation and authority began in the 1950s. The conflict erupted into violence at the end of that decade and again in December 1963. Greek interference combined with Turkish military intervention led to the division of the island in 1974.

Deployment of UN forces along the division line has prevented direct military confrontation and continues to mitigate the level of violence. Ongoing conflict resolution efforts—including a number of UN Security Council resolutions, the 2004 Annan Plan, and the UN-promoted Gambari process—have been unable to bring these communities together.

Following the February 2008 elections, direct contact between the authorities from both communities has resulted in the decision to resume formal negotiations; at the same time, the need to address social rifts within, and tensions between, the communities—has been recognized.

The overall goal of Cyprus 2010—an initiative of the Joint Programme Unit for UN/Interpeace Initiatives and the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary General in Cyprus—is to develop a social dynamic that promotes constructive

Guiding Principle

Effective linkage of political negotiations with social processes is necessary to find a sustainable solution to the Cyprus conflict.

engagement between and within Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot communities.

Between 2008 and 2010, programme plans include research, dialogue, and dissemination activities including opinion polls, formation of sectoral working groups, and commissioned academic research.

These activities will involve various segments of Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities. Issues emerging from these processes will contribute to a public debate to promote understanding and trust, necessary for successful political negotiations in Cyprus.

Programme Activities

- Exploratory consultations;
- Identification of a team;
- Development of a strategy.

Israel

Due to ongoing conflict, the optimism generated by the 1993 Oslo peace process has been all but destroyed. Israeli public opinion regarding the nature of the Israeli state has become increasingly polarised. There is increasing recognition that on-going efforts to promote rapprochement between the Israeli and Palestinian peoples has been limited due to the non-representative nature of peace efforts and resulting proposals.

Contact between the various socio-political groups has mostly involved the minority “peace camps” on both sides, who may be sympathetic to reconciliation but are not representative of the broader Arab/Israeli society. This situation has highlighted the need for intra-group processes focused on promoting convergence around shared goals and principles that can shape a viable resolution to the conflict.

Engaging Diverse Communities

Since September 2004, under the UN Development Programme/Interpeace Joint Programme Unit, Interpeace has supported the engaging of communities that have traditionally been left out of the peace process. These include ultra-orthodox Israelis, the Arab-Israeli minority, settler communities in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and the core of Israeli society, which is not inclined towards political activism. The programme aims to help groups within Israeli society form a shared vision for the future of Israel and the peace process.

The ‘Base for Discussion’ (B4D) participation of key groups

- ‘Peace Camp’;
- Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel;
- The settler community;
- The traditional religious population;
- ‘The Core’: Israel’s “silent majority”.



Key Achievements

- Working with the traditional religious population through SHAS (the Association of Torah-Observant Sephardis) to bridge internal divisions;
- Organizing a panel of Israeli mayors from the different sides of the political spectrum as part of the World Economic Forum's Middle East Regional Meeting in Sharm El Sheikh, Egypt, that took place on May 20, 2008;
- Working with the Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel to publish the "Future Vision" document in December 2006.



INTERPEACE COUNTRY PROGRAMMES

Central America & The Caribbean



“A conflict does not begin when the trigger is pulled. It begins in the heart and mind of the person who pulls the trigger.”

Dermot Ahern, Former Foreign Minister of Ireland

INTERPEACE PARTNERS IN CENTRAL AMERICA & THE CARIBBEAN

GUATEMALA (FOSS)

Asociación de Investigación y Estudios Sociales (ASIES)

Asociación para el Estudio y Promoción de la Seguridad Democrática (SEDEM)

Centro de Estudios de Guatemala (CEG)

Fundación Myrna Mack (FMM)

Incidencia Democrática (IDEM)

Instituto de Enseñanza para el Desarrollo Sostenible (IEPADES)

Instituto de Estudios Comparados en Ciencias Penales de Guatemala (ICCPG)

Universidad Rafael Landívar (URL)

ORGANIZED YOUTH GANGS GUATEMALA, EL SALVADOR, AND HONDURAS

Instituto de Estudios Comparados en Ciencias Penales de Guatemala (ICCPG) (Guatemala)

FESPAD (El Salvador)

Centro de formación y orientación Padre Palacios (El Salvador)

Unidos por la Vida (Honduras)

Organización JHA-JA (Honduras)

CIPRODEH (Honduras)



PROGRAMMES IN FOCUS

Youth Gangs in Central America

The spread of gang-related violence in Central America has increasingly challenged the stability and well-being of the population throughout the region—specifically in Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador. The gang phenomenon has proven to be disruptive to the cohesion and development of fragile democracies. Existing policies have not sufficiently addressed the growing problem of gang membership and violence.

For the first time, regional governments came together in 2007 and agreed on a method to develop policies and prevention mechanisms that address the root causes of gang violence. In this context, Interpeace was invited to facilitate the creation of dialogue platforms in which key persons at the local, national, and regional levels meet to discuss their respective experiences and to develop consensus-based policies.

In recent years, the growing number of youth involved in violent gangs has become a major public concern in many countries in Central America, notably Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras. Factors contributing to the emergence of youth gangs are numerous and complex.

The most famous Central American gangs emerged in the 1980s among Central American youth who immigrated to the cities along the West coast of the United States. Following the end of the Salvadoran war in the early 1990s, these youth began to return to the region (often due to U.S.

“I lost my best friend, and my own gang killed her. That’s when I realized that if they killed her, they could kill me, too.”

“Abuse Trails Central American Girls into Gangs”, Mark Lacey, New York Times (2008)

deportation policies). However, many of the youth had limited cultural and social ties to their communities of origin and attempted to maintain an identity modelled after gangs in Los Angeles.

Political and socio-economic factors in Central America have contributed to the attractiveness of gang membership and spread of the gang phenomenon. This phenomenon is linked to, and exacerbated by, unresolved dynamics lingering from former conflicts, the emergence of democratic governments, and the confluence of illegal migration and drug trafficking. Regional trends that perpetuate the gang problem include: income inequality, extreme poverty, highly urbanized populations, growing youth populations facing social exclusion, lack of education, and job opportunities.

Studies have shown that although the creation of identity, group solidarity, and the need for respect remain the strongest incentives for gang membership, criminal activities such as drug trafficking have gradually become the main focus of gang activity. In response to this dynamic, the governments in the “Northern Triangle” (Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala) have taken a hard-line approach—also known as the ‘hard hands’ or ‘iron fist’ plans. These strategies were mostly due to the growing levels of violence, sensational media coverage, and an intensified sense of insecurity among the general population.

Gang membership is estimated to be between 70,000 - 120,000 in Central America.

On the ground, these policies have translated into both the involvement of the army in anti-gang security activities and suppressive measures such as massive detention of young people for gang membership, relaxed evidentiary standards, and harsh prison sentences.

The states' frustrated efforts to mitigate gang activity has led to paramilitary groups undertaking, with impunity, extrajudicial killings and "social cleansing" of gang members. This has contributed to the development of divisions in society and undermined state institutions, threatening the fragile democratisation process in the region.

In this context, many local, national, and regional actors have stressed the need for developing and implementing integrated and holistic public policies that address the social, political, and economic issues at the root of the gang phenomenon.

Government and non-governmental institutions have conducted research and suggested policy on the issue of gangs. One problem, however, is the remaining absence of space for dialogue. In this context, in 2006, the President of the Central American Integration System (SICA) invited Interpeace to develop a programme aimed at filling this strategic gap.

Programme Overview

Drawing on Interpeace's integrated, holistic and participatory approach, this

programme aims to create a platform of dialogue to encourage a common understanding of the root causes of gang violence and to identify consensual public policies at a local, national, and regional level.

The combination of integrated policy frameworks within each of the three countries and a committed regional network of state and civil society representatives will constitute a solid basis for sustained collaborative action on this issue.

Programme Achievements 2007

In 2007, the Youth Gang Programme, although in its initial phases, achieved considerable results, namely the widespread acceptance of, and participation in, the programme.

Benefiting from the strong support of the SICA and its Member States, the Latin American Office (LAO) and its partners facilitated consultations and dialogue between government representatives and civil society actors towards the development of a holistic and integrated Regional Strategy to address the problem of youth gangs. By so doing, the programme supported the formulation, drafting, and validation of a consensus-based and locally owned document. This new Regional Strategy was approved in December 2007 at the Regional Summit.

In addition, in Guatemala, a programme was established in collaboration with

Benefiting from coordination with the Guatemala Ministry of Interior, Interpeace's Latin American Office successfully supported the development of a strategic and consensual proposal on youth violence prevention for Central America. The Regional Strategy was approved by seven Heads of States at the SICA Summit (Central American Integration System) in December 2007.

The combination of integrated national policies and a committed regional network of both state and civil society representatives will constitute a solid basis to approach the youth gang issue.

“Mesa de Municipalización”, a pre-existing programme developed by UNICEF-Guatemala. The purpose of the programme is to strengthen the Municipalities' capacity with regards to the formation of public policies on juvenile violence prevention through workshops, dialogue circles, and the development of required instruments. As a result, 66 experts and municipal leaders have been trained in 71 municipalities (21 percent of municipalities in Guatemala). In addition, the Youth Gang Programme designed a model of prevention adapted to the social protection system of the Law on Youth and Adolescents.

In the three selected countries, the creation of inter-sectoral platforms and channels of communication between government and non-government actors has developed a solid basis for further collaboration in the

area of youth gang prevention policies. This will encourage local actors to develop and propose common responses to the gang problem in line with democratic and human rights principles.

Way Forward

In 2008, the LAO and the Youth Gang Programme will consolidate the advances made in 2007. In particular, they will continue training and facilitation activities in the framework of the “Mesa de Municipalización” with UNICEF. Particular attention will be paid to finalising the cooperation agreement with the SICA and to further developing local and national public policies in Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador.

Guatemala

More than ten years after the signature of the Peace Accords, Guatemalan society continues to be challenged by violence. With one of the highest murder rates in the continent, there is not a Guatemalan household that has not been directly or indirectly affected by crime. Organized crime, narco-trafficking, and kidnapping are rampant, and social dislocation has led to the appearance of youth gangs that engage in petty criminal activity using brutal and unrestrained violence.

Governmental institutions have been so far unable to tackle the problem: weakened by the long civil war and mired with corruption, the state has been easy prey for criminal networks that have succeeded in penetrating and co-opting its structures. Trapped between criminal violence and an ineffective state, a fearful society resorts to violence. Small arms proliferate; private security companies have now more men than the army and the police combined; and mob justice is carried out in cities and towns all over the country. But more than the security of the citizens is at stake: uncontrolled violence and crime erode the basis of trust that is necessary in a democracy, and deny the legitimacy that political institutions need to thrive in a democracy. Weak democratic institutions and a violent society are good predictors of conflict.

Programme Results

Interpeace has been working in Guatemala since 1999 supporting the process of modernization and democratization of security sector institutions as a key element for consolidation of peace. It does so by fostering consensus among state, civil society and political actors, and by creating channels of communication between civil society and the state. The results of its different projects on issues such as demilitarization, citizen's security, and civil society capacity-building, are contributing to the development of more effective and democratic security institutions.

The current Interpeace programme in Guatemala –“Forum of Social Organizations Specialized in the Field of Security” (FOSS)- maintains a permanent presence in Guatemala's Congress. Through it, civil society organizations provide technical assistance on specific issues and lobby for the necessary legislation. This collaboration has resulted in several pieces of legislation that address critical security issues. Among these, the Frame Law of the National Security System approved on March 2008 represents an important achievement. Born out of the initiative of civil society and lobbied through Interpeace's FOSS, the Frame Law establishes the legal parameters upon which effective modernization and transparency of the security sector can be achieved, thus strengthening the capacity of the state to address its challenging security agenda.

Haiti

Haiti has experienced recurring crises over the last 20 years. Networks of corruption and illegal activities continue to directly profit from the lack of effective governance and stable institutional performance. The plan for a progressive build-up of government institutions that was laid out in the 1987 Constitution has not been implemented.

Eighty per cent of the population lives on less than two dollars per day. The government proved unable to adequately contain food riots that broke out in April 2008, resulting in the dismissal of the Prime Minister. Large sectors of the population, mainly in the countryside, do not have access to basic services.

The formation of the new government has been stalled by successive congressional rejections of presidential appointees for key political positions. While in some respects President Préval has shown skill and resolve in addressing major problems in Haitian society and governance, there is a sense that despite the absence of a current political crisis, the chances for a return to disarray and violence are high.

Opportunities for Engagement

- Exploratory discussions with civil society organizations, International NGOs, UN agencies, members of the Haitian diaspora, and government representatives have all revealed possibilities for collaboration.

Visits Support Programme Initiation

After initial visits to Haiti and extensive discussions with UN agencies and members of the Haitian diaspora, Interpeace is in the process of initiating a programme in Haiti.

The dialogue process will depend on the success of the programme to build support for a process where all the relevant actors participate and jointly commit to the process, even in the event of government changes or recurring crisis.



INSIGHTS ON PEACEBUILDING

Peacekeeping to Peacebuilding

Peacekeeping helps to prevent open armed conflict, but it does not address the root causes of the violence. Peacekeeping missions stop the bullets from flying. Peacebuilding addresses the reasons people *want* to shoot each other.

Peacekeeping interventions are temporary and very costly military processes that create a crucial space for peacebuilding to take place. Peacebuilding aims to address the social, political, and economic root causes and consequences of conflict. Peacekeeping may make possible the reconstruction of the state; peacebuilding aims to repair the social fabric damaged in the conflict. Interpeace's approach to peacebuilding aims to transform modes of conflict (from violence to dialogue), rebuild trust, and identify and implement local and consensual solutions.

“Peacebuilding involves a range of measures targeted to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening national capacities at all levels for conflict management, and to lay the foundations for sustainable peace and development.”

Carolyn McAskie, Assistant Secretary-General for Peacebuilding Support, United Nations and Representative of the UN Secretary-General on the Governing Council of Interpeace

INTERPEACE PROGRAMMES

Constitution-Building Programme

In post-conflict situations, constitution-building is an important element of peacebuilding as it establishes a new social contract. Traditionally, post-conflict constitutions have been seen essentially as legal documents developed by political elites behind closed doors. Today there is increasing acknowledgment that constitution-building can contribute to lasting peace if approached as a participatory process which includes conflict resolution, reconciliation, consensus-building, increased legitimacy and sustainable peace.

Policy makers and practitioners often underestimate the time, space and resources required for constitution-building as a peace building process. Much is to be gained by reviewing of successful processes in constitution-building.

Programme Objectives

The goal of the Interpeace Constitution-Building Programme is to promote peace building by enhancing the capacity of national constitution builders, their local advisors and international partners. The programme aims to build capacities to de-

sign, implement and support constitution-building processes in ways that promote national dialogue and consensus building, conflict management and transformation, reconciliation and the strengthening of democratic institutions.

Achievements 2007 and 2008

The Constitution-Building Programme was formally launched in 2007. Initial financing for the project was secured, key human resources engaged, and strategic partnerships put in place. To support this effort a partnership has been established with International IDEA to establish a website, and develop a handbook. To leverage knowledge and in-kind support, partnerships have been established with the international law firm Cleary, Gottlieb, Hamilton and Stein, with the Bobst Center for Justice at Princeton University, and with the US Institute of Peace (USIP).

Four consultative workshops were held on constitution-building from January 2007 to April 2008. These workshops were planned and executed in accordance with

the underlying principles of inclusion, participation and national ownership. Each workshop brought together a diverse group of constitution builders, practitioners, policy makers and academics. They were selected to be geographically representative and gender balanced which led to dynamic discussions and improved north-south and south-south dialogues on the issues.

Programme services are under development. A dedicated website, or virtual library, on constitution-building is under construction. Over 300 articles have been assembled on related topics; most have been scanned and also loaded onto a CD with an accompanying index. Authors for the development of a handbook on constitution-building have been identified and contracted. An outline of the handbook has been developed and revised on the basis of feedback from the workshops, and the drafting of chapters has started. Advisory services on constitution-building is available on an on-going basis to Interpeace field offices and international institutions, including the United Nations.

Programme Results

- Four consultative workshops with practitioners and leading academics;
- A handbook on Constitution-Building;
- ConstitutionNet, a web-based resource centre with constitution building tools, a network of practitioners, an “Ask the practitioner portal,” a bulletin board and a virtual library;
- An awareness raising and dissemination Programme;
- Advisory and capacity building services.





INTERPEACE

Reflective Practice

Reflective Practice: Learning Tools

For Interpeace, learning is an institutional priority. Reflective practice is a method of experiential learning based on an analysis of practice, experience and feedback. Interpeace has identified the need to be reflective on a wide spectrum of organizational issues; including orientation for new staff, foundational learning for new programme teams, ongoing learning-on-the-job, and periodic reviews and evaluations. Reflective practice is implemented throughout the organisation in several ways.

Foundational Learning: The primary objective of the 'foundational learning seminar' is to acquaint new teams with the Interpeace process of peacebuilding. In 2007 and 2008, such seminars were held in

Guinea-Bissau, Aceh, Indonesia, Burundi, Liberia, and Timor-Leste.

Learning Modules: Interpeace's rich collective experience over the past 14 years provides the basis for the on-going development of a series of 'learning modules' on fundamental aspects of our distinctive approach to peacebuilding. The modules have provided rich 'food-for-thought' at various learning events, while each event in turn contributes new ideas to the further refinement of the modules.

Cross-team Learning: Interpeace has found that allowing practitioners to learn from each other is one of the most effective learning methods. A seminar in

Two sets of criteria that Interpeace seeks to introduce in the terms of reference of evaluations are those developed through the Reflecting on Peace Practice project of The Collaborative for Development Action (CDA) Inc. (2003), and those of the DAC Guidance “Encouraging Effective Evaluation of Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Activities” (2007).

February 2007 brought approximately 20 colleagues from the Interpeace family together in Geneva and provided them with an opportunity to share their rich experience. Similarly, colleagues from teams with more experience in the Interpeace approach provide coaching and mentoring. Notably, our colleagues from the Institute for Research and Dialogue for Peace in Rwanda have gone to Burundi and to Liberia to share their experience and expertise.

Intranet: Provides access to information and resources for the Interpeace family.

Review and Evaluation: Interpeace is committed to the evaluation of our work. In 2007, a multi-donor external review was conducted by the United Kingdom, Sweden, Switzerland and Norway on programmatic and organizational development issues. Interpeace carried out a

self-evaluation to complement this process. These reviews examine our strengths and weaknesses and the recommendations made therein are being implemented and provide the rationale behind decisions on where to concentrate limited resources.


Interpeace also commissioned an external evaluation of the IRDP/Interpeace programme in Rwanda. The primary purpose of the Rwanda programme evaluation was to serve strategic management.

Interpeace is strengthening its own capacity and that of its partners to commission and manage external reviews and evaluations. Internal guidance notes have been developed to help us and our partners build pro-active quality control in the process.

Reflecting on and learning from experience will allow the ‘lessons learned’ to become practice.

Interpeace Actual Expenditure Growth

US Millions



INTERPEACE SUPPORT


Finances 2007

Support

Interpeace's income rose by 36 per cent in 2007 to US\$ 13.8 million, compared with US\$ 10.1 million in 2006. 14 governments, the European Commission and United Nations agencies supported Interpeace in 2007. Government donations accounted for almost 95 per cent of Interpeace's income (or US\$ 12.9 million), and originate from either public sector agencies such as ministries of foreign affairs or development cooperation agencies. Interpeace is very grateful to the governmental donors and their continued confidence and support of the organisation.

In 2007, Interpeace received a total of US\$ 4.8 million (35 per cent) of unrestricted funding while US\$ 9 million (65 per cent) of the funding was earmarked for specific projects. Unrestricted funding sustains Interpeace's core units, enables programme flexibility and the development of new country programmes. However, as noted in last years' report, a continued drop in unrestricted funding as a percentage of overall income is anticipated, while direct programme income is expected to grow. Because of this, Interpeace continues to work on diversifying its funding base by seeking funding from private and other sources.

Interpeace Expense Ratios



Diversification of Funds

Interpeace is continuing its efforts to expand its base of governmental donors in order to create a stronger foundation of support for its work. In 2008, Spain joined the list of supporters with funding for Interpeace's youth gang programme in Central America.

Building on last year, Interpeace is also continuing to expand efforts to diversify funding sources and build a constituency of private support. Flexible, multi-year support from private sources can play a crucial role in the initiation and sustainability of peacebuilding processes in countries struggling to overcome the legacy of conflict. Private support also gives Interpeace much-needed independence and neutrality.

Interpeace's private fundraising efforts in the USA have funded a start-up phase of the project in Liberia. Building on this initial "seed money", the Liberia programme then secured over US\$ 750,000 from the UN Peacebuilding Fund. In 2008, support is also being used to initiate Interpeace's programme in Haiti.

In addition to the US, Interpeace is building constituencies of support across the Gulf region, France, Switzerland and the United Kingdom.

Financial Statements

Income and Expenditure (US\$)

Full audited financial statements are available on Interpeace's website: www.interpeace.org

Income

United Nations	377 587
Governments	12 874 412
Trusts & Foundations, NGO and Others (Individuals)	186 534
Bank Interest and Exchange Gains	200 353
Income Revealed Directly to the UNDP TF / MSAs ¹	0
In-kind	129 132

TOTAL INCOME 13 765 018

Expenses

Personnel (incl. consultants)	8 331 892
Travel and Related Expenses	1 346 466
Equipment Purchases	659 411
Office, Communications, Vehicle and Finance	1 575 775
Workshops, Reporting and Professional Services	1 246 167
UN Management Fees	129 403

TOTAL EXPENSES 13 289 114

NET INCOME/EXPENSES 475 904

CARRYFORWARD FROM PREVIOUS YEAR 512 525

CLOSING BALANCE DECEMBER 31ST² 988 429

Balance Sheet (as of 31 December)

Assets

Current Assets

Cash and Bank	4 989 504
Project Income Receivable	1 436 667
Other Receivables and Payments	141 317
Advances to Partners	185 272
Unspent Funds in UNDP Trust Fund / MSAs ¹	1 390 388
Deposits	41 904

TOTAL ASSETS 8 185 052

Liabilities

Payables, Personnel Liabilities and Accruals	736 569
Donor Income Received in Advance	6 222 003
Amount Due UNDP Trust Fund ¹	135 352
Short Term Credit Line	0
Provisions (short term)	102 699

TOTAL LIABILITIES 7 196 623

NET ASSETS² 988 429

Notes

1. The UNDP – Trust Fund and Management Services Agreements (MSAs) constitute part of Interpeace's accounts.

2. The closing balance in 2006 includes an unrestricted reserve of \$875, 904; the remainder is the balance of the Interpeace Bridging Fund, established in 2002 as a restricted project. The closing balance in 2006 includes an unrestricted reserve of 400,000; the remainder is the Interpeace Bridging Fund.



**KPMG Ltd
Audit**

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Report on summarized financial statements to the management of

International Peacebuilding Alliance (Interpeace)

We have audited the financial statements of International Peacebuilding Alliance (Interpeace) as of and for the year ended December 31, 2007 from which the summarized financial statements were derived, in accordance with International Standards on Auditing. In our report dated May 29, 2008, we have issued unqualified audit opinion on the financial statements from which the summarized financial statements were derived.

We recommended that the financial statements submitted to the Council be approved.

In our opinion, the accompanying summarized financial statements are consistent, in all material respects, with the financial statements from which they were derived.

For a better understanding of the organisation's financial position and the results of its operations for the period and of the scope of our audit, the summarized financial statements should be read in conjunction with the financial statements from which the summarized financial statements were derived and our audit report thereon.

KPMG Ltd

William D. Laneville
Auditor in Charge

Karina Vartanova

Geneva, June 13, 2008

Enclosure:

- Summarized financial statements

KPMG AG/SAAS is a subsidiary of KPMG Network Ltd, a Swiss corporation and a member firm of the KPMG network of independent member firms affiliated with KPMG International, a Swiss corporation.

Member of The Swiss Institute of Certified Accountants and Tax Consultants



INTERPEACE SUPPORT

Public and Private Donors

Government and Intergovernmental Organizations

Australia
Belgium
Canada
Denmark
European Commission
Finland
France
Ireland
Norway
Portugal
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
United Kingdom
United States

UN Agencies

UNDEF
UNDP
UNICEF
UNPBF

Foundations and Individuals

Lauren and Johanna Alpert
Carmine D. Boccuzzi
David Berg and Laura Butzel
The Browington Foundation
Giles Conway-Gordon
The Georgescu Family Foundation
Ford Foundation
Philip R. and Kathleen P. Forlenza
Christopher Heath
Robin Johnson
Paul Knight
Geraldine Kunstadter
Joseph Lamport
Andrew Levander and Carol Lowenson
Jeffrey Lewis
Howard and Clare McMorris
Ishtar Méjanès
Reverend James Parks Morton
Open Society Institute
Christian Rahn
William R. and Virgina F. Salomon Family Foundation
Melissa Salten
Joseph M. Sigelman
Mark Walker
The Clarence Westbury Foundation

Interpeace thanks the governments,
inter-governmental organizations, foundations and
individuals that supported its work in 2007-2008.

Interpeace USA

Interpeace Inc. (USA) is an independent non-profit organization in the US and is registered with the IRS as a 501(c)(3) organization.

Interpeace USA is also supported by a number of influential friends, also known as “board of governors” of Interpeace who champion Interpeace’s mission and raise funds for the organization. The members of the board of governors include:

Co-Chair Martti Ahtisaari
Ambassador Peter Maurer
Ambassador Robin Chandler Duke
Ambassador Richard Holbrooke
Ambassador Frank Wisner
Giles Conway-Gordon
Jeffery Lewis
Robin Johnson
Paul Knight
Howard McMorris II
Maurice Tempelsman

INTERPEACE

Governing Council 2007-2008



MARTTI AHTISAARI
Chairman

Former President of Finland; former Special Envoy of the United Nations Secretary-General for the Future Status of Kosovo; Chief Negotiator for the Aceh Peace Process; Chairman, Crisis Management Initiative.
FINLAND



PADDY ASHDOWN

Member of the House of Lords; former member of Parliament and leader of the Liberal Democrats; former High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina.
UNITED KINGDOM



MOHAMED SAHNOUN
Vice Chairman

President, Initiatives of Change International; former Special Advisor to the United Nations Secretary-General on Africa.
ALGERIA



ZAINAB BANGURA

Minister for Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, Government of Sierra Leone; former official of the United Nations Mission in Liberia.
SIERRA LEONE



MATTHIAS STIEFEL
Vice Chairman

Founder and former President of Interpeace.
SWITZERLAND



GEORGINA DUFOIX

Former Minister of Health and Social Services, Government of France.
FRANCE



HIND BINT HAMAD AL-THANI

Director of the Office of the Emir of Qatar, His Highness Sheikh Hamad Bin Khalifa Al-Thani.
QATAR



THOMAS GREMINGER

Representative of the Host Government on the Governing Council; Head of Political Division IV (Peace Policy), Federal Department of Foreign Affairs.
SWITZERLAND



**JOÃO BERNARDO
HONWANA**

Director, Africa I Division,
United Nations Department
of Political Affairs; Former
Chief of Staff, United
Nations Mission in Sudan;
former Representative of the
United Nations Secretary-
General for Guinea-Bissau.
MOZAMBIQUE



JAN PRONK

Currently affiliated with the
Institute of Social Studies in
The Hague; former Special
Representative of the United
Nations Secretary-General
in Sudan; former Minister
for Development Coop-
eration, Government of the
Netherlands.
NETHERLANDS



CAROLYN MCASKIE

Representative of the United
Nations Secretary-General
on the Governing Council;
United Nations Assistant
Secretary-General for Peace-
building Support.
CANADA



ANTHONY TRAVIS
Honorary Treasurer

Former Senior Partner,
Gainsbury and Consort;
former Senior Partner,
Pricewaterhouse Coopers.
UNITED KINGDOM



JONATHAN MOORE

Associate at Harvard Ken-
nedy School where he was
Director of its Institute
of Politics. Former US
Ambassador to the United
Nations.
UNITED STATES



HISASHI OWADA

Judge, International Court
of Justice in The Hague;
former President, Japan
Institute of International
Affairs.
JAPAN

INTERPEACE

Advisory Council 2007-2008

Advisory Council Troika

Chair	Norway (2007/8)
Outgoing Chair	Denmark (2006/7)
Future Chair	TBC (2008/9)

Advisory Council

Belgium	UN Department of Political Affairs (UN DPA)
Canada	UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN-OCHA)
Denmark	Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
Finland	United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)
France	United Nations Democracy Fund (UNDEF)
Ireland	United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
Japan (observer)	United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS)
Netherlands	European Commission
Norway	
Portugal	
Slovenia	
Sweden	
Switzerland	
United Kingdom	
United States	



Senior Management Team

SCOTT M. WEBER

Director-General

JERRY MCCANN

Regional Director for Eastern and Central Africa

ANA GLENDA TAGER

Regional Director for Latin America

DAVID WHITTLESEY

Acting Head of Programme Support

MIKE PEJCIC

Chief Financial Officer and Head of Administrative Support

BERNARDO ARÉVALO DE LEÓN

Director, Joint Programme Unit for UN-Interpeace Initiatives
(Ex Officio)



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Website

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Fax: +32 2 230 3705

Interpeace Partners


EASTERN AFRICA

Academy for Peace and Development (APD), Somaliland
Puntland Development Research Center (PDRC), Puntland
Center for Research and Dialogue (CRD), South-Central Somalia



CENTRAL AFRICA

Institute of Research and Dialogue for Peace (IRDP), Rwanda
Centre d'Alerte et de prevention des Conflits (CENAP), Burundi



WEST AFRICA

National Institute of Studies and Research (INEP), Guinea-Bissau
Kofi Annan International Centre for Conflict Transformation at the University of Liberia (KAICT), Liberia
Liberia Democratic Institute (LDI), Liberia
Foundation for International Dignity (FIND), Liberia
Interreligious Council of Liberia (IRCL), Liberia
Women NGO's Secretariat of Liberia
Peacebuilding Resource Centre (PBRC), Liberia
West Africa Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP), Liberia
Initiatives for Positive Change (IPC), Liberia
United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL)



ACEH, INDONESIA

Indonesian Peace Institute (IPI)



TIMOR-LESTE

Programme of Research and Dialogue for Peace (PRDP),
currently hosted by the Peace and Democracy Foundation (PDF)



Interpeace Partners

OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES

UN Development Programme



CYPRUS

Partnerships are being explored

ISRAEL

The National Committee of the Heads of Arab Local Authorities in Israel

SHAS social movement

UN Development Programme



GUATEMALA (FOSS)

Asociación de Investigación y Estudios Sociales (ASIES)

Asociación para el Estudio y Promoción de la Seguridad Democrática (SEDEM)

Centro de Estudios de Guatemala (CEG)

Fundación Myrna Mack (FMM)

Incidencia Democrática (IDEM)

Instituto de Enseñanza para el Desarrollo Sostenible (IEPADES)

Instituto de Estudios Comparados en Ciencias Penales de Guatemala (ICCPG)

Universidad Rafael Landívar (URL)



ORGANIZED YOUTH GANGS

GUATEMALA, EL SALVADOR, AND HONDURAS

Instituto de Estudios Comparados en Ciencias Penales de Guatemala (ICCPG) (Guatemala)


FESPAD (El Salvador)

Centro de formación y orientación Padre Palacios (El Salvador)

Unidos por la Vida (Honduras)

Organización JHA-JA (Honduras)

CIPRODEH (Honduras)



Constitution programme

International Idea



Acronyms

A

AMM: Aceh Monitoring Mission
 AWEPA: Association of European
 Parliamentarians for Africa

B

B4D: Base for Discussion

C

CENAP: Centre d'Alerte et de prevention
 des Conflits

F

FESPAD: Fundación de Estudios para la
 Aplicación del Derecho
 FIND: Foundation for
 International Dignity, Liberia

I

ICCPG: Instituto de Estudios
 Comparado en Ciencias Penales
 Guatemala
 IIAP: Interpeace-IPI Aceh Programme
 INEP: National Institute for Studies
 and Research, Guinea-Bissau
 IPC: Initiatives for Positive Change,
 Liberia
 IPI: The Indonesian Peace Institute
 IRCL: Interreligious Council
 of Liberia
 IRDP: Institute of Research and
 Dialogue for Peace

J

JHA-JA: Asociación Civil Jóvenes
 Hondureños Adelante Juntos
 Avancemos

K

KAICT: Kofi Annan Institute
 for Conflict Transformation,
 Liberia

L

LAO: Latin American Office

LDI: Liberia Democratic Institute,
 Liberia

M

MoU: Helsinki Memorandum
 of Understanding (Peace Accord)

N

NPFL: National Patriotic
 Front of Liberia

P

PAR: Participatory Action Research
 PBRC: Peacebuilding Resource Centre,
 Liberia

S

SHAS: Association of Torah-Observant
 Sephardis
 SICA: Central American Integration
 System
 SNRC: Somalia National Reconciliation
 Conference

T

TFG: Transitional Federal Government

U

UNDP: United Nations Development
 Programme
 UIC: Union of the Islamic Courts
 UNMIL: United Nations Mission in
 Liberia
 UNOGBIS: UN Peacebuilding Support
 Office in Guinea-Bissau
 UNOPS: UN Office for Project Services

W

WANEP: West Africa Network for Peace-
 building, Liberia

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www.interpeace.org

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If you would like to discuss making a donation,
contact Sarah Noble at noble@interpeace.org

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