CSO Platform for Peacebuilding & Statebuilding
Joint submission to consultation on shared indicators
January 2013

Our key messages:

- **The CSO Platform strongly welcomes the efforts the group has made to identify shared indicators**
- **Indicators should not be built up from already existing data in all cases. Investment in better capacity for independent, impartial and confidential collection of data in fragile contexts needs to be more prominent in IDPS discussions.**
- **No single indicator can in every context tell a full, fair story about progress: changes in capacity are not the same as better outcomes – and better outcomes are not enough unless they generate confidence among all social groups. Across the PSGs, a more accurate picture of peace- and statebuilding progress can be gleaned by combining 'baskets' of Capacity, 'Objective' Situation and Public Perceptions Indicators.**
- **It is positive that the draft document recognises the need for disaggregation of indicators, but should go further in explaining how disaggregation will work in practice. Identifying differences in access to resources, services and benefits between racial, ethnic, religious, class, caste, clan, gender, age and income groups can enable these differences to be addressed as potential drivers of conflict.**
- **The indicators should incorporate a more direct focus on women's empowerment and access to security, justice and services. The working group should explore how the shared indicators on PSGs could be linked to or incorporate results from ongoing efforts to monitor implementation of UNSCR 1325.**
- **The shared indicators should measure progress towards peace that does not relate to the building of the state – including dimensions such as reconciliation of conflicts between groups within society, or of contradictions between formal and informal systems of security and justice, as well as the development of institutions at the subnational level.**
- **Shared indicators should be applied in conflict sensitive way: in each context, a good conflict analysis/fragility assessment should help to identify the specific indicators and disaggregation methods that are needed to track success in addressing the specific drivers of conflict that are most significant. Understanding the interaction of indicator areas and the implications for the choice of indicators is also critical for assessing overall peacebuilding and statebuilding progress.**
- **Some indicators that could be progressive in one context could have unintended, harmful impacts in another: these must be avoided in the shared indicator list.**

1.   General comments on the indicators (section I of the consultation template)

1.1   **The CSO Platform strongly welcomes the efforts the group has made to identify shared indicators** that balance the concerns raised by different stakeholders in the process and take us some way towards fulfilling the criteria and parameters for peacebuilding and statebuilding indicators that have been developed and shared through the indicator development process of this international dialogue.

1.2   **The apparent consensus reflected in the draft document that indicators should be built up from already existing data, we believe, may need to be more strongly challenged.** Since the commitments made in the PSGs are new, it follows that measuring progress towards them may require us to measure new things in new ways. Developing capacity to monitor the right things will require changing what we measure, how we measure, and building capacities to do this. Country ownership of monitoring may be desirable, but independence and credibility of monitoring is essential.

1.3   The value of any monitoring process will depend on data quality. More data is available on key peace-related issues than is often assumed, but there is also broad consensus in existing literature on common weaknesses of available data and indices.

Investment in better capacity for independent collection of data – particularly in fragile contexts – needs to be more prominent in IDPS discussions.

Getting the list of shared indicators right will be difficult: **changes in capacity are not the same as better outcomes – and better outcomes are not enough unless they generate confidence among all social groups. Therefore no single indicator can in every context tell a full, fair story about progress**. Peace-related commitments in the new framework will need to be monitored with a combination of three indicator types:

- **Capacity Indicators** – is the capacity developing to address the key issue?
- **'Objective' Situation Indicators**[1] – do statistical measures of actual societal situations show that improvements are being achieved?
- **Public Perceptions Indicators** – does the public
- feel that an improvement is occurring? Public perceptions indicators are particularly important for peacebuilding purposes.

Of these three types, the perceptions-based indicators are particularly important for monitoring progress in peace- and state-building processes. Perception-based

Common weaknesses of available data and indices
• Measures that rely on expert opinion carry the risk of subjective bias;
• Survey data can be inconsistent across contexts due to factors such as linguistic and cultural difference;
• Many existing surveys do not ask the same questions consistently, are not conducted at regular intervals and are not sufficiently disaggregated by identity group;
• Cross-country comparison of official data can also be misleading depending on capacity, definitions under which different phenomena such as crimes are recorded, differences in reporting rates, political factors etc;
• Some existing aggregated indexes on fragility, peacebuilding, statebuilding or governance have been criticised for questionable weighting of different sub-indicators, over-reliance on expert opinion and arbitrary cut-off points in the data;
• At the same time any set of indicators that aims to measure such a complex process as peacebuilding and statebuilding based on too few indicators is likely to present a partial or skewed picture.

measures can support governments in particular in developing peacebuilding strategies and measures that build confidence by focusing on what the public wants delivered. However, none of the three indicator types can present a full, reliable picture – but **when combined each indicator type can validate the other – helping to avoid misleading results and perverse incentives**.

1.4 In many cases in the draft indicator list, it is exceedingly difficult to select one (of two) measures that represent a particular issue, i.e. elections, or natural resources – when in fact two measures (one objective, one perception based) are really needed to get an accurate picture of progress. In such cases, 'objective' and perception-based sources of data could be combined to measure a single indicator based on mutual validation of the data from the two sources.

1.5 Given the need for a *short*list, it will be useful to capture indicators that have cross cutting relevance to the PSG areas, to maximize impact of the shortlist. For example, disaggregated indicators addressing the diversity and/or quality of representation across institutions working in different sectors are important and could capture concerns for peacebuilding and statebuilding across PSG areas. Similarly, indicators on justice and corruption (see 1.6) are potentially cross cutting.

1.6 It is also **crucial to look at the interaction between PSG indicators**, as we have emphasized throughout the process.[2] Trends in indicators under one PSG will prove important for interpreting trends in others, and for preventing potential harm (see below under section H). For example, under dimension 4.3 (natural resource management), there are indicators regarding the existence and quality of regulatory framework

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[1] The inverted commas here indicate that the definition of some indicators as 'subjective' and others as 'objective' in the draft list of indicators is problematic. All quantitative measures have an element of subjectivity, and the potential for bias and imperfect recording of phenomena. Public perceptions indicators can be more reliable than other types of indicator, depending on capacity and impartiality of data collection systems.

[2] Guidance for this is documented in the paper we delivered at the October 2012 meeting on the South-South Knowledge Exchange on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Indicators "Guidance for Developing Indicators with a Peacebuilding Lens."

for natural resource management, and perception of participation in and benefits from natural resources. If these aren't looked at in conjunction with indicators for the effectiveness of justice and service delivery, then the story might be incomplete at best, and misleading at worst.

Likewise, when considering how to create holistic measures of progress towards PSG3 (Address injustices and increase people's access to justice), there is ample survey data that demonstrates the close interrelationship between perceptions of injustice and experiences of political exclusion, in security and economic marginalization or exclusion from revenue and services. In this light, it is very difficult to separate progress on justice under PSG3 from progress on the other PSGs – particularly those related to PSG2 on security.

1.7   **It is positive that the draft document recognises the need for disaggregation of indicators**. This is crucial: tackling group based or horizontal inequalities is central to achieving fairness and tackling what are too often drivers of violent conflict. It should therefore be clarified that all indicator data will be disaggregated to the fullest extent possible and critically, following a conflict/fragility analysis that identifies vulnerable and disadvantaged groups that are caught in social cleavages. The draft's suggested indicators in many places highlight the intention to disaggregate by "region, gender and social groups". Civil society strongly supports this, and would encourage the working group to **go further in explaining how disaggregation will work**. Doing so would help ensure that PSG monitoring helps all actors to **identify both objective and perception-based differences in access to resources, services and benefits between racial, ethnic, religious, class, caste, clan, gender, age and income groups, and work to address these differences as potential drivers of conflict.** Disaggregation according to refugee/IDP status can also provide important insights.

In conflict-affected contexts, disaggregation of indicators to examine the experiences and perceptions of conflict parties and key people/groups relevant to the conflict is particularly important. For example, the overall security situation, as measured by number of assaults or victimization, might improve, but only for one group—a trend that could signal lack of progress or worsening of conflict. As disaggregation may carry political sensitivities/risks for vulnerable groups, **confidential and impartial data gathering mechanisms are preferable**.

1.8   Civil society shares a wide consensus that indicators that offer a **more direct focus on women's empowerment and access to security, justice and services** should factor into the draft more prominently. It is worth highlighting that indicators highlighting any single disadvantaged group may detract from the emphasis on all the other groups whose marginalisation underpins conflict/violence. An option could be to **explore how the shared indicators on PSGs could be linked to or incorporate results from ongoing efforts to monitor implementation of UNSCR 1325**.

1.9   Generally civil society has a shared concern that the indicators do not sufficiently recognize that peacebuilding and statebuilding are not the same thing. In some cases, for example, peace may not entail expansion or strengthening of the state, but reconciliation of conflicts between groups within society, or of contradictions between formal and informal systems of security and justice. The lack of attention to transitional justice concerns in the draft indicators illustrates this point, discussed in further detail below. In general **the shared indicators document should seek to ensure that the focus on the state and its institutions is well balanced with concerns for society, and the state-society relationship**. Equally, efforts should be made through the document to ensure development of inclusive, responsive, fair and accountable state institutions at different levels - thus indicators should specify the intention to **measure progress at both 'central and sub-national' levels** where relevant (for example in indicator 5.1.i).

1.10   As articulated in previous Indicator Working Group and CSO Platform documents, sound monitoring of peace- and statebuilding progress should build on a strong conflict analysis/fragility assessment. The standard of fragility assessment has been uneven throughout pilot countries, and as suggested in various guidance notes, the CSO Platform encourages learning and improvements to be made in all future assessment processes. Both shared and country-specific indicators need to be based on **a good conflict analysis/fragility assessment**. This will **help to identify the specific indicators and disaggregation methods that are needed to track success in addressing the specific drivers of conflict that are most significant in each context** (e.g. tracking whether land disputes are addressed in some countries, or disaggregating results by clan and sub-clan in another).

The importance of a strong conflict and fragility assessment should be underscored in the chapeau of this shared indicator document, alongside the recognition of the need for country specific indicators going hand in hand with the shared. It goes without saying that there are limits to shared indicators in providing a full or necessarily accurate picture of what drives conflict and fragility, and conversely, strong, resilience and peaceful states and societies, in a particular country. It may well be the case that **some indicators that could be progressive in one context could have unintended, harmful impacts in another: these must be avoided in the shared indicator list**.

1.11   **No set of indicators can be effective if it does not link to a broader peacebuilding strategy that links together all relevant sectors and PSG areas, is based on a rigorous and up-to-date conflict analysis/fragility assessment and is backed by credible theories of how change will be achieved.** It may be useful to develop process indicators that track these aspects of New Deal implementation as well as the interaction of indicator areas across PSG areas. The CSO Platform has developed and shared guidance on this with the International Dialogue process.

1.12   In order to ensure that they reflect the substance of the PSGs, the final list of indicators should include the exact wording of the PSGs as stated in the New Deal – and the definitions of the PSGs in the Monrovia Roadmap should be recalled when considering the relevance of each indicator proposed.

1.13   If only one or two indicators from the IDPS are transplanted in isolation into the post-2015 framework, they will likely serve little meaningful purpose. Instead, **indicators that are fed into the post-2015 framework by the IDPS should offer a coherent and rounded set of interconnected indicators that represent global best knowledge and insight into what drives sustainable peace and development**. Combining Capacity Indicators, 'Objective' Situation Indicators and Public Perceptions Indicators will support this, providing a combination of measures capable of illustrating objective conditions, as progress and priorities of societies and the groups of people that comprise them.

2.   **Three indicators from the proposed list that we consider to be the best proxies for measuring progress against each of the PSGs** (section E of the consultation template)

For each indicator, our preferred three indicators are bolded and italicised. In many cases these remain imperfect measures. Therefore, further thought and dialogue will be needed needed to ensure that the 'basket' of indicators chosen for each PSG area provides the best possible combination of indicators (illustrating complementary changes in capacity, the objective situation and public perceptions). Strategies to promote maximum impact of any shortlist should be considered, e.g. 1.4 and 1.5 above. To support this thinking and dialogue, this document captures the key suggestions of a diverse group of civil society experts on how specific indicators from the current list can be improved.

PSG 1: Legitimate Politics

Good potential	*1.2.i Participation in elections and political processes by region, gender and social groups* *1.2.ii. Level of satisfaction with the quality of the election process and the possibility to participate in the political process*
Potential if improved	*1.3.i Number of intergroup disputes resolved by various dialogue and/or mediation mechanisms (including traditional mechanisms)[3]* *1.3.ii Level of trust among people and between formerly conflicting groups* *1.1.ii. Perception of representation (and its effectiveness) in government* 1.1.i. Diversity in representation (by gender, region and social groups) in key decision-making bodies (legislature, government, military, judiciary)

Limited potential	1.1.iii % of provisions of the political settlement (e.g. peace agreement, power-sharing agreement)

The proposed indicators we feel are most relevant and promising for PSG 1 are 1.2.i (Participation in elections and political processes by region, gender and social groups) and 1.2.ii. (Level of satisfaction with the quality of the election process and the possibility to participate in the political process), and 1.3.i. (Number of intergroup disputes resolved by various dialogue and/or mediation mechanisms (including traditional mechanisms)) and 1.3.ii (Level of trust among people and between formerly conflicting groups), although these important indicators need improving. ***Civil society also believes it is vital to have an indicator capturing objective and perception-based measures of quality representation in government institutions. We believe this can be a cross cutting (across PSGs) indicator – see 1.4 in general comments above.***

These first two suggested priority indicators would function best as a combined pair (one 'objective', the other perceptions-based) and not as stand-alone indicators: this can help to guard against unreliable official electoral data and/or survey data. They also do not measure inclusiveness outside election time (the IDPS was ideally aiming to develop annual indicators), nor do they consider the views of specific actors whose satisfaction with the political settlement may be crucial to lasting peace regardless of the public's overall faith in the electoral process. These indicators will be substantially more useful for peacebuilding purposes if disaggregated by identity group to show which specific groups are not participating as much as others or feel excluded from political processes. With 1.2.ii the use of ICT platforms such as Ushahidi to map incidences of electoral violence could be useful.

PSG1 was originally conceived in the Monrovia Roadmap to promote legitimate politics in the sense of both inclusive decision-making structures and capacity for dialogue, conflict resolution and reconciliation. Indicators 1.3.ii (Level of trust among people and between formerly conflicting groups) and 1.3.i (Number of intergroup disputes resolved by various dialogue and/or mediation mechanisms (including traditional mechanisms)) are attempts to measure progress in this important area. Indicators in this area are important as they move attention beyond the more formal political processes to the informal, where many people in conflict affected and fragile countries lay their trust. 1.3.ii has strong potential to provide a useful insight, although civil society prefers the wording 'Among society and between different social groups'. However, further work may be needed to find a stronger indicator than 1.3.i to track capacity development within dialogue and/or mediation mechanisms, as measurement of the overall number of disputes resolved says very little about the relative capacity of a society to reconcile its differences in a proportionate, relevant and lasting way. Thus more work is needed to develop a credible shared indicator that measures success in bridging cleavages between different social groups and actors that are and have been in conflict. Quality of these processes and the sustainability of resolutions achieved, need to be considered alongside quantitative measures. Measuring specifically women's grassroots peacebuilding efforts could be particularly valuable based on the catalytic effect that this has been documented as having in many contexts.[4] DRC civil society has suggested a rewording of 1.3.i to the following: "Number of resolved and unresolved conflicts and number of agreed compacts between groups through various dialogues/mediation mechanisms". More work is needed to identify how to monitor this meaningfully.

Indicators 1.1.i (Diversity in representation (by gender, region and social groups) in key-decision making bodies (legislature, government, military, judiciary)) and 1.1.ii (Perception of representation (and its effectiveness) in government) are critically important indicators as they take attention beyond elections, towards issues of inclusion and exclusion in institutions. ***This is vital, given the importance of measuring the substantive inclusion of societal stakeholders in politics and the wider goal of building a social contract at the heart of peacebuilding and statebuilding.*** As formulated in the draft document however, they give the impression that representation alone will ensure greater peace, while it is crucial that the quality of representation and participation is crucial. Ideally an objective and perception based pairing of indicators would be useful here, that captures *all PSG areas.*

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[4] See for example CDA Collaborative Learning Projects, 'Women, Gender and Peacebuilding: Do Contributions Add Up?', (2011)

PSG 2 - Security

Good potential	***2.1.vi Perception of security conditions (by region, gender, social groups)*** ***2.1.i Violent deaths per 100,000 population (including homicides, mob violence, violence against civilians*** ***2.3.i Level of confidence in police/security (%, disaggregated by gender, region, social group***
Potential if improved	***2.1.v Internal displacement (# of IDPs, by conflict)*** 2.3.iii Perception of corruption of security forces
Limited potential	2.1.iii Incidence of rape and sexual violence 2.1.ii Major and minor assaults per 100,000 population 2.3.ii Average response time to distress call and/or response rate to distress calls 2.1.iv Incidence of cross-border violence

In PSG 2, we feel that the above four bold indicators are all crucial.

2.1.vi (Perception of security conditions (by region, gender, social groups)) is an important and relevant measure of security conditions, as it reflects people's experience of security. However, security is more than feeling comfortable walking home at night. Thus the indicator would need to be based on a multi-question survey (i.e. NOT a single question) identifying trends in a range of different types of insecurity – including those affecting women and girls as well as men and boys.[5]

The most useful 'Objective' Situation indicators are 2.1.i (Violent deaths per 100,000 population (including homicides, mob violence, violence against civilians)) and 2.1.v (Internal displacement (# of IDPs, by conflict)). However, these indicators should not be used in isolation, as they do not reflect the main security issues for most people. Close attention would need to be paid to ensuring data quality: 'administrative data' from official sources will probably need to be triangulated with victimization surveys. For example, although 2.1.v (Internal displacement (# of IDPs, by conflict)) would be a good proxy measure of security conditions (displacement/unwillingness to return may reflect the presence of continuing violence or threats of violence, or people's sense of insecurity and fear), collecting direct data on perceptions of security from IDPs would be more direct.

2.3.i (Level of confidence in police/security (%, disaggregated by gender, region, social group)) is relevant, feasible and coherent, if appropriately disaggregated by religion, region, social group, age, etc. It should be noted that police are not the only relevant actor determining levels of people's security – thus it is important to capture confidence in all security-related forces (such as the army, militias, homeguards, special units as well as the range of traditional/informal providers of policing services that can be very important in fragile contexts, etc). As above, the indicator would need to be based on responses to a cluster of survey questions in order to be meaningful.

PSG 3: Justice

There are some important general observations and potential problems associated with the current approach to the proposed justice indicators for PSG3. At the heart of the proposed approach is an ***almost exclusive focus on the administration and delivery of justice*** and a prioritization of the functional capacity of justice institutions. This reflects an institutional approach to ***statebuilding which presumes that formal justice systems serve the goal of peacebuilding, instead of needing to be designed to do so.*** Indicators which address the delivery and administration of justice without considering perceptions and experiences of *injustice* would be in danger of becoming detached from the broader peacebuilding goals associated with fragility and resilience in conflict-affected societies (see also our General Comments, especially 1.9, on the indicators above). In other words, these indicators prioritize service

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[5] A list of relevant research/survey questions can be found in, for example, Annex C of UN CASA, 'International Small Arms Control Standard 05.10: Conducting small arms and light weapons surveys'.

delivery and accessibility of the formal justice system (and in particular the criminal justice system), but fail to uphold the wider objective of building 'just societies' and addressing civil, political, social, cultural and economic experiences of injustice in a broader sense. Yet it is these latter experiences which have widely been recognized as underpinning fragility and the potential re-emergence of conflict. The original wording of the PSG and the evidence presented in the World Development Report 2011, clearly suggest that the PSG indicators need to measure and reflect progress in addressing the major injustices that combine with other factors to drive conflict or fragility.

The proposed indicators for **PSG3** are ***heavily focused on the status of the formal justice system at the relative neglect of the informal/societal dispute settlement/justice systems (although this can potentially be addressed in a cross cutting manner with the relevant indicator in PSG1), as well as transitional justice mechanisms (see critical missing elements, below).*** However, in fragile societies in which the reach of the state and state institutions are often limited, it is actually these informal or traditional systems which are depended upon by many people. There is a serious danger in presuming the inherent inclusiveness or assuming that formal state justice systems are the most accessible and uniformly effective deliverers of justice. In fact, there are a very wide and diverse range of mechanisms – from international courts and tribunals, hybrid tribunals, traditional and informal justice mechanisms, to various civil (rather than criminal) justice and dispute settlement instruments – which appear to lie almost entirely outside of the purview of many of the proposed PSG3 indicators. This is all the more important because there are often also implicit and explicit tensions between these various mechanisms and systems of justice within any given country.

Good potential	***3.1.i % trust in customary justice system, % trust in formal justice system*** ***3.2.iii % of population who perceive they have affordable access to justice system (by region, gender, income, identity)***
Potential if improved	3.3.i Perception of overall performance of the justice system 3.3.ii % population with awareness of legal and human rights
Limited potential	3.1.ii Ratio of lawyers to total cases 3.2.ii % of overall budget allocated to justice sector and actual expenditures on justice as % of total government expenditure 3.2.iii Number of judges per 100,000 population 3.2.i Ratio of public officials tried and convicted to reported cases

Notwithstanding the critical comments above, we felt that 3.1.i (% trust in customary justice system, % trust in formal justice system) and 3.2.iii (% of population who perceive they have affordable access to justice system (by region, gender, income, identity)) were the most promising from amongst those listed, bringing out issues of civic trust in and access to the justice system in useful ways.

Indicator 3.1.i offers a public perception lens on a potentially important fragility or resilience factor in conflict-affected societies. However, the indicator is potentially too narrowly framed in its reference to the "customary justice system" instead of including and disaggregating the range of informal justice vehicles, as well as traditional, non-judicial, or local mechanisms that all operate outside of the formal justice system – and outside of the criminal justice system in particular. This is an important distinction which broadens the base of access to justice perspectives as well. Trust in the range of justice actors could be well captured with a perceptions-based indicator asking a question such as 'From whom would you seek help if you became the victim of an injustice?' in which the public could indicate which justice sector actors are more accessible to and trusted by them. All indicators on trust of these different justice vehicles (both formal and customary – which in some cases is part of the formal system, as well as the wider range of informal systems and practices that may at times have varying degrees of legitimacy and legality) must be disaggregated by reference to specific marginal or vulnerable groups: youth, women, displaced people, victims of past violations, etc. It is also important to assess the extent to which these mechanisms are themselves inclusive or not, as well as whether they uphold fundamental human rights norms and standards. So, this indicator dovetails importantly with indicators which measure access to justice, as well as indicators that assess human rights commitments within the wider justice system. This basket of indicators needs to be considered in combination to give a meaningful insight into the justice sector in a given country.

Indicator 3.2.iii (% of population who perceive they have affordable access to justice system (by region, gender, income, identity)) fits less well under Dimension 3.2: Capacity and Accountability of Justice Institutions, than it does under Dimension 3.3: Performance and Responsiveness of Justice Institutions. The access to justice indicator also needs to be further disaggregated, and has to look at particular needs of specific societal groups. In particular, in addition to the broad categories set out within the indicator as its currently framed, this should specifically assess access by: victims, women, displaced people, youth, indigenous groups, etc.

There is some debate over whether or not indicator 3.3.i (Perception of overall performance of the justice system) is distinctive enough to warrant support. On the one hand, this indicator is important in principle and if it were effective, it would add a measure of 'performance of the justice system' to measures of civic trust in and access to the institutions. In theory, measuring trust, access and performance would be important, but the current framing of this list of indicators does not adequately meet this need. On the other hand, for some, indicator 3.3.i adds little to 3.1.i. Indicator 3.3.i therefore certainly needs to be more clearly honed and is currently too broad as a measure of performance. If this was just about performance of the criminal justice system, it might be better measured by reference to conviction rates, but even then, the 'dark figure' of unreported crime and violations (for example sexual or domestic violence, crimes of "shame", etc.) tends to skew the results and disguise a lack of confidence in the system. In any event, the challenge here must be to measure performance of the justice system as a whole, reflecting the more diverse spectrum of justice mechanisms discussed above. In short, this notion of an objective service delivery and performance criterion is inextricably linked to both trust and access factors, but also can only be monitored or measured if it is significantly disaggregated instead of summarized in this fashion.

Indicator 3.3.ii (% population with awareness of legal and human rights) has some promise, but only really if the public awareness component is matched with a wider demonstration of state commitments to **human rights norms and standards** through integration of these commitments into government policies and programmes. A more credible measure of citizen empowerment and respect for human rights (both within and outside of justice and security institutions) than draft indicator 3.3.ii offers, would therefore be valuable as a signifier of resilience. There are further viable options that can and should be explored here.[6] .

Civil society stakeholders generally see little value in indicators 3.1.ii (Ratio of lawyers to total cases), 3.2.ii (% of overall budget allocated to justice sector and actual expenditures on justice as % of total government expenditure) and 3.2.iii (Number of judges per 100,000 population). These are all proxies at best that explain little or nothing about whether the lawyers, expenditure and judges in question actually provide greater justice, more confidence in the system, more affordable access, or a greater prospect for redress of past and present injustices. Furthermore these indicators all serve to entrench a narrow perspective on the centrality and assumed primacy of the formal justice system at the expense of more diverse and complex justice mechanisms (for example, the central role and function of civil society para-legals, especially in situations where the reach of the state is constrained).

Success in tackling corruption, both within and beyond the justice sector, is critical to peace- and statebuilding – playing a crucial role in determining civic trust in, access to, and the delivery capability and performance of the justice sector. However, proposed indicator 3.2.i (Ratio of public officials tried and convicted to reported cases) is unpromising as it currently stands because it would be unable to measure fairness and due process (and could at worst even lend itself to political and other scapegoating). However, an indicator on levels of corruption is essential to help assess the perceived legitimacy of the government of the day more generally, and the integrity of the rule of law in fragile societies. Beyond indicators on institutional performance, a corruption indicator can offer an important perspective on the vital problem of impunity for past and present crimes. This **assessment of impunity** offers high risk/reward value for fragility and resilience. Within the human rights field and from

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[6] Freedom House's Freedom in the World Survey measures political rights and civil liberties; the World Bank's World Governance Indicators measure voice and accountability; the Economist Intelligence Unit's indices on Political Democracy measure political culture and civil liberties; the Institute for Social Studies (ISS) measures civic activism; Gallup World Poll has a survey question on ability to express political opinion without fear; the UN's Human Development Index indicator has an indicator on internet access; and the Cingranelli-Richards Human Rights Data Project and Escola de Cultura de Pau's Human Rights index may provide further options for empowerment / justice indicators.

organizations such as Transparency International or Corruption Watch, there are comparative indexes etc. which should be adaptable to the concerns of the PSG3. At very least if indicator 3.2.i was retained, it should be complemented by an indicator on perceptions of how often people believe officials go unpunished/evade justice – a critical indicator of judicial independence.

PSG 4: Economic Foundations

Good potential	***4.3.ii Existence and quality of regulatory framework for natural resource management*** and/or: ***4.3.iii Perception of participation in and benefits from natural resources***
Potential if improved	***4.2.i Level of employment (by youth, gender, region)*** ***4.1.i % of population with access to useable and serviceable primary and feeder roads and affordable electricity (multiple indicators)[7]*** 4.2.iii Share of food in household expenditure 4.1.iii Level of economic diversification by productive sector 4.1.ii Income inequality among regions (GINI coefficient)
Limited potential	4.2.ii Number of new registered businesses and SMEs 4.3.i Ratio of local/foreign employment in natural resource sector 4.3.iv Ratio of natural resource production in country to total revenues to government

Indicators 4.3.ii (Existence and quality of regulatory framework for natural resource management) and 4.3.iii (Perception of participation in and benefits from natural resources) were both assessed to have particular value and to be feasible to measure. 4.3.ii could be referenced to the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative as a benchmark for regulatory framework quality. Although not all relevant countries are richly endowed with natural resource wealth, appropriate natural resource management and sharing is critical in virtually all developing countries, and a major factor in fragility. While they are both important indicators, there is need for a wider range of indicators to represent economic foundations, and thus one of these should be chosen as one of the three proxy indicators chosen.

The challenge for identifying relevant indicators for this PSG is to ensure that they are not simply development indicators similar to those of the existing Millennium Development Goals, but instead capture progress on key issues of peace- and statebuilding. Thus, although the overall percentage of achievement (of access to employment, education etc.) is relevant, even more important are trends towards equitable distribution of access to decent economic opportunities across relevant social divisions (and perceptions of increasing fairness), because these are proxies for capturing horizontal inequality. From the current list, CSOs were therefore positive about Indicators 4.1.i (% of population with access to useable and serviceable primary and feeder roads and affordable electricity (multiple indicators)) and 4.2.i (Level of employment (by youth, gender, region)). They need to be strengthened however by ensuring that the focus is on the growth in more equitable access for relatively marginalised populations. Disaggregation of data by identity group, coupled with an explicit policy focus on marginalisation, is important for addressing this. Civil society in the DRC has also usefully suggested adding communications and functional access to waterways to capture critical economic foundations in fragile states. Civil society in Nigeria further suggested adding mass transportation, i.e. railroads. This could suggest a modification of 4.1.i to cover access to communications, energy supplies and transport infrastructure.

Civil society strongly supports efforts to measure horizontal inequalities. However, it is not clear how 4.1.ii (Income inequality among regions (GINI coefficient)),[8] would serve this purpose, notably because regions cannot serve as a strong proxy for identity in many countries. More thought needs to be given to how to measure horizontal inequality in terms of income and income disparities amongst groups. Within civil society there is varying levels of support for other indicators in both the second and third level categories – potential if improved and limited potential categories. Indicator 4.1.iii (Level of economic diversification by productive sector) has

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[7] Potentially add elements to this, see narrative.
[8] According to the Institute for Economics and Peace there is no correlation between the GINI coefficient and levels of conflict.

some relevance, in terms of improved resilience of overall National GDP against shocks, which can be a driver of conflict and fragility. Civil society also feels that an indicator on food security is important, but is not sure what the right indicator would be. Civil society in DRC in particular supports 4.2.ii (Number of new registered businesses and SMEs), given the importance of investment for job creation.

Aside from measuring actual employment under PSG 4, a proxy for monitoring the level of effort by the government to ensure access to decent livelihoods would be indicators measuring access to education and vocational training – particularly for relatively marginalised social groups through disaggregation. Indicators on this area could be crucial to avoid giving the impression that the economic foundations for peace are exclusively achieved through macro-economic diversification and revenue management rather than schooling and training young people.

PSG 5 – Revenues and Services

Good potential	***5.3.v Public satisfaction with service delivery (ADD: disaggregated by gender, region, social group)*** ***5.2.i Quality of public financial management and internal oversight mechanisms*** ***5.2.iv Perception of corruption and bribery necessary to obtain a service*** ***5.1.i State control/monopoly over tax, customs and fee collection*** 5.3.iv Access to service delivery for marginalized and vulnerable groups
Potential if improved	5.1.iii Tax effort 5.1.v Capacity of tax administration 5.1.ii Tax revenue as share of total revenues
Limited potential	5.3.iii Distribution of services: Ratio of health personnel to 10,000 population (by region); Ratio of teachers per 100 students (by region) 5.2.ii Budget execution rate in line ministries at central and subnational level 5.3.ii Social spending as share of total spending 5.1.iv Perception of tax collection and fairness 5.2.iii Number of public officials sanctioned for corruption and bribery 5.3.i Existence of service delivery quality standards in government agencies

Overall, several of these proposed indicators are relevant and important; but they need to be adapted and combined to provide an effective combination of indicators that really capture key aspects of performance under this PSG. Importantly, we feel that disaggregation needs to be considered in a consistent way in this section, alongside the other PSG areas.

The public's perception of management of revenues and attainment of the end-goal of quality services being provided to them form an essential component of the indicator basket for PSG 5. As a critical component of state accountability, perception of service delivery is a valuable indicator with implications both for peacebuilding and statebuilding, and thus measuring public satisfaction with service delivery should be a core government activity. 5.3.v (Public satisfaction with service delivery) is clearly the most appropriate indicator of this. 5.2.iv (Perception of corruption and bribery necessary to obtain a service) and 5.3.iv (Access to service delivery for marginalized and vulnerable groups) are also useful and relevant. Such indicators would work well alongside other credible indicators assessing government capacity. Disaggregation would provide particularly valuable insights into inequalities between groups that can then be pro-actively addressed by the state and development partners. Health worker and teacher ratios (5.3.iii) would provide useful (and hopefully readily available) supporting data.

There is a fundamental benefit to adopting a pair of indicators on dimension 5.1 (revenues). Of the five indicators proposed (5.1.i-v), 5.1.i (State [Alternative: Central & Subnational] control/ monopoly over tax, customs and fee collection) is relevant to both peacebuilding and statebuilding: it assesses the presence of non state actors and their capacity to collect revenues – an important proxy for the potential for conflict,[9] overall security in the country, centre-periphery communications and inclusion, and the capability of the bureaucracy. However, 5.1.i is

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[9] Putzel J, Di John J, 'Meeting The Challenges Of Crisis States' (Crisis States Research Centre, 2012)

also limited in two respects: it may prove difficult to measure the taxation imposed by non-state actors; and by focusing on the state's *share* of revenue collection, 5.1.i also does not tell us enough about whether enough revenue is being collected overall. For this 5.1.iii (Tax effort) or 5.1.v (Capacity of tax administration) could have value if they could be measured effectively. 5.1.ii (Tax revenue as share of total revenues) is a proxy for relevant peace- and state-building issues (the state-citizen taxation relationship and natural resource dependency). It also seems the most feasible revenue indicator to measure, is straightforward to understand, and enjoys important support among g7+ members. Again, it should be combined with at least one other revenue indicator to be effective.

Indicator 5.2.i (Quality of public financial management and internal oversight mechanisms) sounds interesting, but would also entail drawing on an elaborate monitoring framework independent of the IDPS (the Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability (PEFA) methodology). Further discussion and clarification is needed as to whether this methodology provides a feasible monitoring tool for g7+ countries or whether conversely an indicator framework that examines trends and programmes for strengthening PFM and oversight in a more context-specific way should be adopted. 5.1.v (Capacity of tax administration) may offer a valuable alternative option. Similarly, in addition to PEFA, helpful datasets include the Open Budget Index, OECD/WB MAPS and the Budget Institutions Index (IMF 2010), which could all be used to assess transparency of government expenditure in line with 'TRUST' commitments. 5.2.ii (Budget execution rate in line ministries at central and subnational level) has potential as a proxy of public administration capacity – but there is a slight risk of misuse that makes it viable *only in combination with perceptions-based indicators 5.2.iv and 5.3.v.*

3. **Suggestions for indicators that could replace one of the proposed indicators, in order to better measure a particular aspect of the PSGs** *(section F of the consultation template)*

Existing indicator	*Suggested replacement*	*Comment*
1.1.i. Diversity in representation (by gender, region and social groups) in key decision-making bodies (legislature, government, military, judiciary) 1.1.ii. Perception of representation (and its effectiveness) in government	Diversity in representation (by gender, region and social groups) in all key institutions of government relevant to PSG achievement (including police etc).	Both objective and perception based measures are important here, but arguably the problems associated with perceptions of exclusion will be well known, while the facts can be used to solve conflict in and around inclusion and exclusion in institutions – a critical priority for peacebuilding and statebuilding across all PSG areas. If addressed in a cross-cutting manner, this could support integrated and conflict sensitive policy responses.
2.1.ii Major and minor assaults per 100,000 population	Theft/property/mugging victimization rate in the last 12 months	The existing indicator is relevant but it is harder to measure accurately given that deaths are more consistently recorded. Gallup has a good victimization proxy that reflects this indicator ("in the last 12 months, were you assaulted, mugged, property or money stolen?")
2.1.iii Incidence of rape and sexual violence	Rape/sexual violence victimization rate	This could be the most relevant indicator of the evolution of the overall security situation because of the number of elements that affect violence against women, but it is hard to measure and there is inconsistency in reporting. Nonetheless, there are ways of measuring it through victimization rates, rather than "incidence" rates, that could provide better data. NGOs and civil society are important actors in the collection of data on rape and sexual violence and should be included, in addition to UNODC and others, as sources in relation to this indicator.

2.1.iv Incidence of cross-border violence		Cross-border dimensions of conflict might better be measured by cross-border influences on conflict rather than incidence of cross-border violence.
2.3.ii Average response time to distress call and/or response rate to distress calls	% of public stating that they can get help from the police when needed or % of public stating that police or other state security providers are present and accessible in their locality	The existing indicator is partially but not completely relevant as an indicator of effectiveness of the police. It does seek to measure a factor that can help to reduce crime and increase public confidence. But there is considerable doubt as to its measurability in some contexts. If responsiveness of the police were to be measured, a perceptual measure would be better. The suggested questions could be complementary to Indicator 2.3.i
2.3.iii Perception of corruption of security forces	Perception of partiality/favouritism/reliability of security forces	It is relevant to track perceptions of corruption in the security forces. As such, Indicator 2.3.iii (Perception of corruption of security forces) is promising, but it may be more feasible to track perceptions of the partiality/favouritism/reliability of security forces because the public is more likely to feel confident to respond openly to questions framed in this way. This may better be integrated into an adapted 2.3.i.

4.   Critical elements that are currently not measured (section G of the consultation template)

Relevant PSG	Critical element currently not measured	Proposed indicator
2	Peacebuilding and statebuilding are not the same thing. In some cases, for example, peace may not entail expansion or strengthening of the state, but **reconciliation of conflicts between formal and informal systems of security and justice**. Similarly, there is a focus on police/law and order, while **the role of armed groups (armies and non-state armed groups) and National intelligence institutions and their role and actions in relation to National security is not addressed**.	Military expenditures (they may be inaccurate, as many military expenditures may be off-budget), # armed forces or # armed forces & security officers per 100,000 people (could be changed to 10,000 people) (available from SIPRI and UNODC)
2, all	The focus of the indicators is broadly on structural elements of statebuilding, and there is less focus on **social or cultural elements, such as media roles in promoting or mitigating conflict, reintegration of ex-combatants and IDPs, etc**	# media reports with negative portrayals of other group/# media positive reporting on other group (for cultural dimensions)
2.2 2.2.1.a Ratio of prosecutions/ number of cases identified by independent commission/ civil society. 2.2.1.b Ratio of prosecutions/ cases	None of the indicators measuring **capacity and accountability of security and justice providers** and **impunity** is sufficiently relevant, feasible or coherent. • The requirement to show high levels of prosecutions could lead to scapegoating. • Prosecutions are not convictions – an important distinction. • Even in a situation of high capacity and political will, misconduct-related offences in one year could not be successfully prosecuted in the same year, therefore the proposed 'ratios' could	There are two questions in Afrobarometer that ask about perceptions of how often officials who commit crimes go unpunished and how often citizens who commit crimes go unpunished. These are broader than the security sector, but would be better indicators how people experience the security and justice system with regard to impunity than the indicators in 2.2.

	not show a meaningful relationship.	
	• Proposed survey questions under Indicator 2.2.i.b seem to rely on respondents having an improbable level of education and knowledge of criminal justice procedures.	
	• In focusing on investigation and punishment of police misconduct, the indicators under dimension 2.2 do not capture anything about the capability of the police force or other security providers - and provide no measure of what government is doing to work towards lower violence/insecurity/injustice or to increase public confidence as measured by other PSG 2-3 indicators.	
	• Indicator 2.2.i.a. depends on the establishment and functioning of an independent commission, which, while a good idea, can be unsustainable in fragile environments, particularly as donor funding decreases over time (it essentially measures the effectiveness of one particular solution to police misconduct that may not be relevant or feasible in all contexts).	
2	Demobilization and strength/presence of armed groups (both government and non-state). The presence or absence of armed groups in society is not mentioned at all in the indicators, but is critical to understanding progress towards peace.	Number of men and women demobilized and effectively reintegrated into society. [The latter is hard to measure—one could look at # demobilized, # with jobs, perceptions of ex-combatants in community, etc.]
2	Human rights. Awareness of human rights is measured in PSG 3, but except to the extent that police misconduct indirectly (but overly broadly) might capture human rights abuses, there is no measure of the actual upholding of human rights (from policies and laws to behavior by security sector) or violence by the state against citizens.	# extra-judicial killings (CIRI measures) for human rights.
2	Types of insecurity more commonly suffered by women and girls as opposed to men and boys	Additional public perceptions indicator on perceptions of types of insecurity important to women and girls.
2.1, 2.2	Monitoring the full and meaningful equal participation of men and women in shaping security priorities and provisions.	% of women in peace and security related ministries, departments and agencies
3	The PSG3 indicators **neglect any reference to transitional justice measures** which are often explicitly designed to facilitate dealing with the past in societies emerging from violent conflict. The concern with **impunity for past violations** is a potentially critical factor in the establishment of credible rule of law, or alternatively may contribute substantially to fragility and cyclical conflict. In addition, transitional justice measures include non-judicial mechanisms alongside the criminal justice system, which are also explicitly intended to support	

	a victim-centred rather than offender-oriented approach, including alternative remedies such as reparations for those who have suffered, or the right to truth for those who survived.	
5	It would be helpful to compare MoF/MoPlanning data on service delivery against International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI) compatible standard data, including funding to the private sector and NGOs for service provision. It is currently very difficult to track aid/budget flows, but if this could be improved, this would enable states to have a more 'prominent role in setting the overall legal and policy framework and co-ordinating service delivery even if the state is not the direct provider.'	5.3.x Comparison of planned to actual service delivery funding provided through government, private sector and civil society channels.
5.2.iv/5.3.v	The distinction between legitimate charges for services and bribes.	Evaluation/scorecards should also distinguish 'user fees' from bribes, and therefore help distinguish fair from unfair treatment

5. Indicators that have the potential to cause harm or be misused at any stage in their collection, analysis or use *(section H of the consultation template)*

As highlighted in our "Guidance for Developing Indicators with a Peacebuilding Lens" it is critical to **pay attention to how particular sequencing decisions can inadvertently do harm.** It is well established that appropriate sequencing lies at the heart of good peacebuilding strategy. Examples of lessons in sequencing include the growing consensus that there is need for greater attention to the building of national institutions *before* rapid liberalization (both political and economic) in early post conflict settings.[10]

Specific indicator related concerns include:

Indicator	Comment
1.1.i. Diversity in representation (by gender, region and social groups) in key decision-making bodies (legislature, government, military, judiciary)	Although representation on the whole and in the long run increases prospects for sustainable peace, tackling domination of institutions by any particular group also has the potential to destabilise the existing political settlement and return any society to conflict. Therefore although the need for representative government is universal and the proposed indicator is useful, such reforms need to be pursued at a pace that is feasible given the existing political settlement and the actor relationships within it.
2.2.1.a Ratio of prosecutions/number of cases identified by independent commission/civil society. 2.2.1.b Ratio of prosecutions/cases 5.2.iii Number of public officials sanctioned for corruption and bribery	The requirement to show high levels of prosecutions/sanctions could lead to scapegoating.
5.2.ii (Budget execution rate in line ministries at	This indicator has potential as a proxy of public

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[10] For example, Paris, Roland. *At War's End: Building Peace After Civil Conflict,* Cambridge: CUP, 2004. Similarly, the notion of 'DDR sequencing flexibility', a term being promoted by DPKO, recognizes the need to adapt to the unique DDR needs of the context, so that the sequencing of *disarmament, demobilization and reintegration* will vary and adapt to emerging needs and changing dynamics. DPKO, *Second Generation DDR in Peace Operations,* 2010.

central and subnational level)	administration capacity – but because money can be spent without the people being served, and this can be a driver of conflict, this indicator could not be used in isolation.
5 [all indicators]	Pursuit of revenue collection could be a conflict driver in many places, if underlying disputes are not resolved or if perceptions of how revenues are used (and not only for service delivery) reveal unequal distributions across a context's lines of conflict (geographic, social, ethnic, class, urban/rural etc).