

Understanding the Public Dimension of the Cyprus Peace Process

An in-depth investigation of Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot public opinion

SECTIONS

- **SECTION A:** **Modelling Intended Vote in a Future Referendum**

- **SECTION B:** **Explaining Attitudes to Cross Voting and Rotating Presidency**

- **SECTION C:** **Public Participation in the Peace Process: Options for moving forward**



SURVEY PROFILE

- **Sample Size:** 500 Greek Cypriots and 500 Turkish Cypriots
- **Sampling Process:** Multi-stage Random Stratified Sampling
- **Method of Data Collection:** Face to Face Interviews with a Structured Questionnaire at Homes of Respondents and in their Native Language
- **Period of Data Collection:** 29 February – 07 March 2012
- **Field Work:** CYMAR Market Research for Greek Cypriots and Prologue Consulting for Turkish Cypriots



interpeace

International Peacebuilding Alliance
Alliance internationale pour la consolidation de la paix
Alianza internacional para la Consolidación de la Paz

SECTION A

Modelling intended vote in a future referendum



interpeace


International Peacebuilding Alliance
Alliance internationale pour la consolidation de la paix
Alianza internacional para la Consolidación de la Paz

We would now like to ask you to consider a hypothetical scenario where the negotiations between the two leaders conclude, a solution plan is drafted and a referendum is organized. In such a future referendum, how do you see yourself voting? (*Select one response only*)

1. I would certainly, or almost certainly vote 'No'
2. I currently lean towards a 'No' vote, though I might at that time sway towards a 'Yes' vote
3. I am currently just as likely to vote 'Yes' as to vote 'No'
4. I currently lean towards a 'Yes' vote, though I might at that time sway towards a 'No' vote
5. I would certainly or almost certainly vote 'Yes'


Vote in a potential future referendum, over time

Greek Cypriots



- Trending towards a 'No' vote
- ▲ Just as likely to vote 'Yes' as to vote 'No'
- ▲ Trending towards a 'Yes' vote

Turkish Cypriots



- Trending towards a 'No' vote
- ▲ Just as likely to vote 'Yes' as to vote 'No'
- ▲ Trending towards a 'Yes' vote

Strong 'No' trend among Greek Cypriots, ambivalence among Turkish Cypriots

In both communities the “trending towards a no” category is ascendant as the formerly undecided move toward voting “no” in a future referendum. The trend among Greek Cypriots is most clear where a majority (51%) now declare that they are likely to vote “no” should a referendum be held. Meanwhile, “yes” votes (18%) are at the lowest level since tracking began. Turkish Cypriot intentions appear to fluctuate more, but the current trend is toward “no” (42%) versus “yes” (31%).

What is driving referendum vote intention?

- **Demographics**
 - Level of Education?
 - Level of Income?
 - Age and Gender?
- **Risk Assessment**
 - Comfort with the Status Quo?
 - Fear of the other side?
 - Risk Aversion?
- **Identity**
 - Ethnocentrism?
 - Willingness to reconcile?
- **Social Influence**
 - Guidance from political parties?
- **The Peace Process itself**
 - Lack of knowledge?
 - The actual content of the Plan?



MODELLING A FUTURE REFERENDUM

- A comprehensive set of potential drivers of referendum vote were separately investigated in the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot sample. Specifically, the following variables were included in the predictive model:
 - Demographics: Age, Gender, Level of Education, Level of Income, Urban / Rural Residence, Refugee Status, Settler Status, Injured/Missing/Dead in the Family
 - Political Affiliation: DISY Supporter, AKEL Supporter, Centrist Party Supporter in the Greek Cypriot Community, UBP Supporter, CTP Supporter, DP Supporter in the Turkish Cypriot Community
 - Acceptability of Substantive Aspects: A composite measure comprised of questions on the acceptability of commonly discussed parameters for Governance, Property, Territory, Economy, Citizenship, Security, Guarantees and the overall framework
 - Several indicators of personality, attitudes and values, as follows: Risk Aversion, Materialism, Mistrust, Ethnocentrism, Religiosity, Openness to Reconciliation, Fear of 'Out-Group', Fear of Deadlock, Knowledge of the on-going Peace Process
 - 'Interaction Terms' to explore how some of the above parameters might be working in tandem to influence intended referendum vote.
- The variables were entered in the model 'one block at a time'. Results are presented in the slides below.



Predicting Intended Vote in a Future Referendum – Greek Cypriots

Model No	1			
Model Description	Demographics only			
R-square	0.092			
	<i>Beta</i>			
Age	0.126*			
Male Gender	0.162***			
AKEL Supporter	0.176**			
Centrist Party Supporter	-0.117*			

Dependent Variable: Intended vote at a future referendum

Non-significant variables have been omitted

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

The role of age, gender, and party affiliation

Greek Cypriot men are more likely to vote “yes” than women. Independent of this, older people are also more likely to vote ‘yes’ than younger people. Party affiliation also helps predict vote intention. However, the overall predictive power of this model is low (R-square = .092) suggesting that demographics alone cannot adequately explain variability in intended vote.



Predicting Intended Vote in a Future Referendum – Greek Cypriots

Model No	1	2		
Model Description	Demographics only	Plus Substantive		
R-square	0.092	0.202		
	<i>Beta</i>	<i>Beta</i>		
Age	0.126*	0.113*		
Male Gender	0.162***	0.139**		
AKEL Supporter	0.176**	0.099		
'Centrist' Party Supporter	-0.117*	-0.086		
Acceptability of Substantive Aspects		0.345***		

Dependent Variable: Intended vote at a future referendum

Non-significant variables have been omitted

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Acceptability of Substantive Aspects a critical factor

Support for the substantive elements of the potential settlement package (i.e. a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation based on political equality) proves to be a highly significant independent variable in the model. Partisanship indicators fall from statistical significance with the introduction of “acceptability of substantive aspects”, suggesting that the role of parties is to contribute a framework of interpretation by which the substantive aspects are judged. Age and gender remain significant variables. Meanwhile, the model is more robust (R-square = .202)

Predicting Intended Vote in a Future Referendum – Greek Cypriots

Model No	1	2	3	
Model Description	Demographics only	<i>Plus</i> Substantive	<i>Plus</i> Attitudes	
R-square	0.092	0.202	0.249	
	<i>Beta</i>	<i>Beta</i>	<i>Beta</i>	
Age	0.126*	0.113*	0.086*	
Male Gender	0.162***	0.139**	0.117**	
AKEL Supporter	0.176**	0.099	0.054	
'Centrist' Party Supporter	-0.117*	-0.086	-0.071	
Acceptability of Substantive Aspects		0.345***	0.279***	
Trait Mistrust			-0.126**	
Openness to Reconciliation			0.079*	
Fear of Out-Group			-0.112*	
Fear of Deadlock			0.082*	

Dependent Variable: Intended vote at a future referendum

Non-significant variables have been omitted

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Fear of Out-Group and Trait Mistrust partially responsible for negative evaluations of Substantive Aspects

Trait Mistrust emerges as the most significant attitudinal variable explaining intentions to vote “no”. Other attitudes, especially ‘fear of out-group’ reach statistical significance.

Substantive aspects remains a strong predictor of referendum vote, but the reduction of its coefficient suggests that Trait Mistrust and Fear of Out-Group contribute to the judgment on the acceptability of Substantive Aspects.

Predicting Intended Vote in a Future Referendum – Greek Cypriots

Model No	1	2	3	4
Model Description	Demographics only	<i>Plus</i> Substantive	<i>Plus</i> Attitudes	<i>Plus</i> Interactions
R-square	0.092	0.202	0.249	0.290
	<i>Beta</i>	<i>Beta</i>	<i>Beta</i>	<i>Beta</i>
Age	0.126*	0.113*	0.086*	0.081
Male Gender	0.162***	0.139**	0.117**	0.085*
AKEL Supporter	0.176**	0.099	0.054	0.029
'Centrist' Party Supporter	-0.117*	-0.086	-0.071	-0.069
Acceptability of Substantive Aspects		0.345***	0.279***	0.249***
Trait Mistrust			-0.126**	-0.154**
Openness to Reconciliation			0.079*	0.074
Fear of Out-Group			-0.112*	-0.121**
Fear of Deadlock			0.082*	0.086*
Knowledge of the Peace Process X Acceptability of Substantive Aspects				0.091*
Acceptability of Substantive Aspects X Fear of Out-Group				0.082*

Dependent Variable: Intended vote at a future referendum


Non-significant variables have been omitted

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Knowledge, Fear, and Acceptability: Interaction Effects

The final model explores potential interactivity between substantive aspects and attitudes. Specifically, acceptability of substantive aspects was found to significantly interact with knowledge of the peace process and fear of out-group. The role of these interactions will be elucidated in later slides.





Synopsis of Voting Intention Model for the Greek Cypriots

The above graph, a Structural Equation Model with very good fit to the data, summarizes the most important relationships between variables as shown in previous slides. It is important to note the critical role of party affiliation in shaping relevant attitudes and positions. AKEL supporters are characterized by a broad array of underlying attitudes and evaluations which make them very strongly in favour of the Peace Process. Centrist Party supporters are fearful of the Turkish side and at the same time unconcerned about the consequences of a deadlock. DISY supporters are more likely to vote Yes in a future referendum, but without necessarily being characterized by openness to reconciliation or approval of the contents of a Peace Plan. Younger people and women are less open to reconciliation, while women are also more fearful of the Turkish side.

Predicting Intended Vote in a Future Referendum – Turkish Cypriots

Model No	1			
Model Description	Demographics only			
R-square	0.131			
	<i>Beta</i>			
Urban Residence	-0.120**			
UBP Supporter	-0.111*			
CTP Supporter	0.113*			
Settler Status	-0.240***			
Injured, Missing or Dead Relatives	-0.146**			

Dependent Variable: Intended vote at a future referendum

Non-significant variables have been omitted

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Demographic Parameters and a Future Referendum: The Turkish Cypriots

Among Turkish Cypriot respondents, age and gender do not emerge as significant predictors of referendum vote intention, as had been the case with the Greek Cypriot sample. Rather settler status and being a relative of the missing or those killed in inter-communal violence emerge as significant. Additionally we note the significance of partisan affiliations.



Predicting Intended Vote in a Future Referendum – Turkish Cypriots

Model No	1	2		
Model Description	Demographics only	Plus Substantive		
R-square	0.131	0.201		
	<i>Beta</i>	<i>Beta</i>		
Urban Residence	-0.120**	-0.116**		
UBP Supporter	-0.111*	-0.052		
CTP Supporter	0.113*	0.120*		
Settler Status	-0.240***	-0.159**		
Injured, Missing or Dead Relatives	-0.146**	-0.118**		
Acceptability of Substantive Aspects		0.282***		

Dependent Variable: Intended vote at a future referendum

Non-significant variables have been omitted

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

For Turkish Cypriots also, Substance matters

As with the Greek Cypriot sample, the addition of “acceptability of substantive aspects” affects the overall model. R-square increases to .201 and ‘substantive aspects’ emerges as the most significant independent variable. Against this, settler status and having injured, missing or dead relatives remain significant predictors of vote intention. The significance of ‘UBP Supporter’ and ‘Settler Status’ drops, suggesting that these affiliations exert their influence by shaping the way in which the substantive aspects are judged.

Predicting Intended Vote in a Future Referendum – Turkish Cypriots

Model No	1	2	3	
Model Description	Demographics only	<i>Plus</i> Substantive	<i>Plus</i> Attitudes	
R-square	0.131	0.201	0.307	
	<i>Beta</i>	<i>Beta</i>	<i>Beta</i>	
Urban Residence	-0.120**	-0.116**	-0.066	
UBP Supporter	-0.111*	-0.052	-0.014	
CTP Supporter	0.113*	0.120*	0.067	
Settler Status	-0.240***	-0.159**	-0.100*	
Injured, Missing or Dead Relatives	-0.146**	-0.118**	-0.068	
Acceptability of Substantive Aspects		0.282***	0.208***	
Trait Mistrust			-0.132**	
Religiosity			-0.116**	
Openness to Reconciliation			0.263***	

Dependent Variable: Intended vote at a future referendum

Non-significant variables have been omitted

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Trait Mistrust, Religiosity, Openness to Reconciliation

The introduction of attitudes strongly affects the overall model. R-square increases to .307. Demographics fall from statistical significance, suggesting that the demographic groups matter only insofar as they differ in the prevalence of critical attitudes. “Openness to reconciliation” emerges as a highly significant predictor. “Acceptability of substantive aspects” remains highly significant. Trait Mistrust and religiosity emerge as significant predictors of the ‘no’ vote.

Predicting Intended Vote in a Future Referendum – Turkish Cypriots

Model No	1	2	3	4
Model Description	Demographics only	<i>Plus</i> Substantive	<i>Plus</i> Attitudes	<i>Plus</i> Interactions
R-square	0.131	0.201	0.307	0.367
	<i>Beta</i>	<i>Beta</i>	<i>Beta</i>	<i>Beta</i>
Urban Residence	-0.120**	-0.116**	-0.066	-0.079*
UBP Supporter	-0.111*	-0.052	-0.014	-0.039
CTP Supporter	0.113*	0.120*	0.067	0.038
Settler Status	-0.240***	-0.159**	-0.100*	-0.098*
Injured, Missing or Dead Relatives	-0.146**	-0.118**	-0.068	-0.036
Acceptability of Substantive Aspects		0.282***	0.208***	0.220***
Trait Mistrust			-0.132**	-0.189***
Religiosity			-0.116**	-0.099*
Openness to Reconciliation			0.263***	0.259***
Openness to Reconciliation X Trait Mistrust				-0.165***
Knowledge of the Peace Process X Acceptability of Substantive Aspects				0.076*
Acceptability of Substantive Aspects X Fear of Out-Group				0.100*


Dependent Variable: Intended vote at a future referendum

Non-significant variables have been omitted

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Interaction Effects: Openness, Mistrust, Fear and Acceptability


Interactive effects are strongly evident in the Turkish Cypriot sample, particularly the interaction between reconciliation and mistrust. The interaction between knowledge of the peace process as well as fear of out-group with acceptability of the substantive elements also reaches statistical significance. The role of these interactions will be elucidated in the next few slides.



Synopsis of Voting Intention Model for the Turkish Cypriots

The above graph, a Structural Equation Model with very good fit to the data, summarizes the most important relationships between variables as shown in previous slides. Importantly, several demographic characteristics contribute to a combination of high fear towards the Greek side and low openness to Reconciliation: These include Settler Status, UBP Supporter, and being family to victims. Older age is associated with increased religiosity and more fear towards the Greek side, while being a CTP supporter is associated with decreased religiosity and less Trait Mistrust. CTP supporters are also likely to vote 'Yes' in any case, regardless of their attitudes towards Greek Cypriots or towards the contents of a Peace Plan.


Interaction between Acceptability of Substance and Fear of Out-Group, in predicting future referendum vote



Acceptability of the Plan especially important to those exhibiting high fear of the other side

Among Greek Cypriots, ‘fear of out-group’ moderately interacts with ‘acceptability of substance’. People exhibiting lower levels of fear are more likely to vote ‘yes’ in any case, regardless of the way they evaluate the substance of the Plan. In contrast, Greek Cypriots exhibiting high fear are more strongly influenced by the perceived acceptability of a plan in deciding what to vote. In other words, they are more carefully evaluating the content of the Plan in order to judge whether their fears are being adequately addressed. The Turkish Cypriot sample represents an even better illustration of the same underlying dynamic.


Interaction between Knowledge of Peace Process and Acceptability of Substance, in predicting future referendum vote



More knowledge of the peace process does not always translate into more support of the peace plan

“Knowledge of the peace process” consolidates tendencies to vote yes or no. This is true of both electorates. Where voters have more knowledge of the process and accept the substance of the settlement package they are more likely to vote yes. Conversely, when voters have more knowledge but do not accept the substance of the package they are more likely to vote no.

Interaction between Openness to Reconciliation and Trait Mistrust, in predicting future referendum vote



Turkish Cypriots: Openness to Reconciliation is not necessarily associated with support of a peace plan

Among Turkish Cypriots exhibiting low Trait Mistrust, the expected association between openness to reconciliation and intended referendum vote is evident: The more open to reconciliation between the communities a person is, the more likely that person will vote 'Yes'. In contrast, among Turkish Cypriots exhibiting High Mistrust openness to reconciliation does not necessarily translate into willingness to endorse a federal settlement: We can hypothesize that this group would prefer to experience reconciliation in the context of alternative constitutional models, such as a negotiated two state solution. Among Greek Cypriots, no such interaction is evident: Openness to reconciliation and Trait Mistrust independently predict referendum vote.

Summary of Findings

- Independent of all other factors, evaluations of the content of any particular plan matters: Citizens in both communities will make a judgment about the substance, and vote accordingly.
- Nonetheless, several personal characteristics and group affiliations are influencing how such judgments are being made.
- As for group affiliation, party membership certainly does matter: Parties seem to be operating as ‘interpretive communities’ in which information about the peace process is converted into final evaluations.
- Other group affiliations that seem to be playing a role include: Age group and Gender in the Greek Cypriot community, Settler Status and familial association with conflict victims (missing, injured, dead) in the Turkish Cypriot community.



Summary of Findings

- As for personal characteristics, the most important factors in the Greek Cypriot community are trait mistrust and fear of the 'out group', i.e. fear of Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots. The most important factors in the Turkish Cypriot community are Openness to Reconciliation, trait mistrust and religiosity.
- In both communities, the more fearful citizens seem to be relying on the substance to decide what they will vote, much more so than the less fearful citizens who are likely to vote Yes in any case.
- Increased knowledge of the Peace Process doesn't necessarily contribute to support of the Peace Process: Instead, increased knowledge works to confirm existing stereotypes and consolidate trends.
- Finally, in the Turkish Cypriot community, increased openness to reconciliation doesn't necessarily translate into increased support of the Peace Process, particularly among those with high trait mistrust.



Recommendations

- The priority in both communities is to shape the substance, and disseminate knowledge about the substance, so that it is perceived as more acceptable. The challenge in achieving this, is that knowledge so far has tended to operate as a polarizing factor. Thus, new mechanisms of balanced and objective dissemination of knowledge are required.
- In the case of the Greek Cypriot community, it is of critical importance to address the high levels of fear towards the Turkish side, as this seems to be driving intended referendum vote while also affecting the evaluation of the content of the plan.
- In the case of the Turkish Cypriot community, the priority should be to increase openness to reconciliation with the Greek Cypriot community, which is currently at low levels and also influencing intended referendum vote.
- Trait mistrust, though not directly related to the Cyprus Problem, is in fact influencing intended vote in both communities. This should be addressed more broadly, by encouraging values of multi-culturalism in each community.



SECTION B

Explaining Attitudes to Cross Voting and Rotating Presidency




interpeace

International Peacebuilding Alliance
Alliance internationale pour la consolidation de la paix
Alianza internacional para la Consolidación de la Paz

On the issue of the Federal Presidency, to what extent would you support the following proposal, seen as one whole package?

- Presidency would rotate between a Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot, where the Greek Cypriot would serve as the President for a longer period than the Turkish Cypriot's term as President.
- The Presidency would be elected through cross voting, which would mean that each community will have a say in electing the candidate of the other community, but only up to a specific small ratio.
- The executive decisions would be made by majority of the Council of Ministers, which majority must include representatives from both communities.


Overall support for a package which would include Cross Voting, Rotating Presidency and Consensual Decision Making



The package of cross voting and rotating presidency has strong opponents but also a basis of support in both communities

About half of the Greek Cypriots consider the package 'unacceptable', while most of the rest are willing to tolerate it as a solution which they understand to be necessary. Turkish Cypriots are similarly aligned, but slightly more positive towards the proposal than Greek Cypriots.


“Presidency would rotate between a Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot, where the Greek Cypriot would serve as the President for a longer period than the Turkish Cypriot’s term as President”



Turkish Cypriots, surprisingly, are more skeptical over Rotating Presidency than Greek Cypriots

Despite the fact that support for rotating presidency is normally considered a Turkish Cypriot negotiating position, in fact a large majority of Turkish Cypriots – but not of Greek Cypriots – rejects rotating presidency as this has been discussed in the talks. What is probably influencing their assessment is the fact that the Greek Cypriot representative would serve a longer term as President.


“The Presidency would be elected through cross voting, which would mean that each community will have a say in electing the candidate of the other community, but only up to a specific small ratio”



Cross Voting more of a concern to Greek Cypriots

Similarly in defiance against official positions and narratives, it is the Greek Cypriot public that is more skeptical over Cross Voting, while a majority of Turkish Cypriots is open to the idea.

“The executive decisions would be made by majority of the Council of Ministers, which majority must include representatives from both communities”



Consensual Decision Making is less controversial

Both communities agree with the principle that executive decisions will be made by majority in the council of ministers, but that the majority would have to include representatives from both community.

What explains support or opposition towards the Presidency package?

- **Demographics**

- Level of Education?
- Level of Income?
- Age and Gender?

- **Risk Assessment**

- Comfort with the Status Quo?
- Fear of the other side?
- Risk Aversion?
- Assessment of Consequences?

- **Identity**

- Ethnocentrism?
- Willingness to reconcile?

- **Social Influence**

- Guidance from political parties?

- **The Proposal itself**

- Lack of knowledge?
- Acceptance of Specific Components?



MODELLING SUPPORT FOR CROSS VOTING AND ROTATING PRESIDENCY

- A comprehensive set of potential drivers of support for a package including Cross Voting and Rotating Presidency were separately investigated in the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot sample. Specifically, the following variables were included in the predictive model:
 - Political Interpretations of Cross Voting and Rotating Presidency. This includes positive interpretations such as “Cross Voting will encourage moderation” and negative interpretations such as “ Rotating Presidency will expose us to dangers whenever the President is from the other community”
 - Demographics: Age, Gender, Level of Education, Level of Income, Urban / Rural Residence, Refugee Status, Settler Status, Injured/Missing/Dead in the Family
 - Political Affiliation: DISY Supporter, AKEL Supporter, Centrist Party Supporter in the Greek Cypriot Community, UBP Supporter, CTP Supporter, DP Supporter in the Turkish Cypriot Community
 - Several indicators of personality, attitudes and values, as follows: Risk Aversion, Materialism, Mistrust, Ethnocentrism, Religiosity, Openness to Reconciliation, Fear of ‘Out-Group’, Fear of Deadlock, Knowledge of the on-going Peace Process
 - Component-by-component acceptability of the Presidency package.
- The variables were entered in the model ‘one block at a time’. Results are presented in the slides below.

Predicting Support for a Rotating Presidency / Cross Voting Package – Greek Cypriots

Model No	1	2	3	
Model Description	Views of Rotating Presidency and Cross Voting	Plus Demographics	Plus Attitudes	
R-square	0.168	0.247	0.349	
	<i>Beta</i>	<i>Beta</i>	<i>Beta</i>	
Rotating Presidency prevents the domination of one community over the other	0.232***	0.218***	0.196***	
Rotating Presidency exposes us to dangers when the President is from the other community	-0.178**	-0.148*	-0.113*	
Cross voting will remove the right of each community to elect its own representatives	-0.165*	-0.157*	-0.141*	
Cross voting will encourage moderation in politicians who will have to take into account the concerns of both communities	0.210***	0.176***	0.155***	
Age		0.145**	0.096*	
Male Gender		0.127**	0.072*	
Level of Education		0.128*	0.041	
Level of Income		-0.096*	-0.107*	
AKEL Supporter		0.169**	0.085	
Centrist Party Supporter		-0.123*	-0.088*	
Trait Mistrust			-0.079*	
Trait Risk Aversion			-0.091*	
Trait Materialism			0.131**	
Ethnocentrism			-0.110**	
Openness to Reconciliation			0.113*	
Fear of Out-Group			-0.169***	
Knowledge of Peace Process			0.120**	

Dependent Variable: Support for Presidency Package

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Non-significant variables have been omitted

The addition of attitudes and the role of fear

The introduction of attitudes into the model greatly increases predictive power (R-square = .349). Views on the elements of the package remain significant. However, demographics largely fall from statistical significance, suggesting that different demographic groups display differing levels of these underlying attitudes. Fear of out-group in particular emerges as a significant attitudinal variable. Alongside fear we note risk aversion, materialism, ethnocentrism and knowledge.

Predicting Support for a Rotating Presidency / Cross Voting Package – Greek Cypriots

Model No	1	2	3	4
Model Description	Views of Rotating Presidency and Cross Voting	Plus Demographics	Plus Attitudes	Plus Support for Aspects of the Package
R-square	0.168	0.247	0.349	0.643
	<i>Beta</i>	<i>Beta</i>	<i>Beta</i>	<i>Beta</i>
Rotating Presidency prevents the domination of one community over the other	0.232***	0.218***	0.196***	0.086**
Rotating Presidency exposes us to dangers when the President is from the other community	-0.178**	-0.148*	-0.113*	-0.057
Cross voting will remove the right of each community to elect its own representatives	-0.165*	-0.157*	-0.141*	-0.125**
Cross voting will encourage moderation in politicians who will have to take into account the concerns of both communities	0.210***	0.176***	0.155***	0.036
Age		0.145**	0.096*	0.044
Male Gender		0.127**	0.072*	0.032
Level of Education		0.128*	0.041	0.051
Level of Income		-0.096*	-0.107*	-0.079*
AKEL Supporter		0.169**	0.085	0.011
Centrist Party Supporter		-0.123*	-0.088*	-0.069*
Trait Mistrust			-0.079*	-0.022
Trait Risk Aversion			-0.091*	-0.050*
Trait Materialism			0.131**	0.065*
Ethnocentrism			-0.110**	-0.018
Openness to Reconciliation			0.113*	-0.035
Fear of Out-Group			-0.169***	-0.073*
Knowledge of Peace Process			0.120**	0.098**
Support for Rotating Presidency				0.178***
Support for Cross Voting				0.411***
Support for Consensual Decision Making				0.163***

Dependent Variable: Support for Presidency Package

Non-significant variables have been omitted

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Including support of individual package elements as a control

Finally, in model 4 we introduce support for package elements separately in order to identify which component is more critical in deciding overall support. It appears that, to the extent Greek Cypriots support cross voting, they are likely to support the overall package.

Predicting Support for a Rotating Presidency / Cross Voting Package – Turkish Cypriots

Model No	1	2		
Model Description	Views of Rotating Presidency and Cross Voting	Plus Demographics		
R-square	0.082	0.150		
	<i>Beta</i>	<i>Beta</i>		
Rotating Presidency prevents the domination of one community over the other	0.128*	0.113*		
Cross voting will encourage moderation in politicians who will have to take into account the concerns of both communities	0.235***	0.183***		
Age		-0.108*		
UBP Supporter		-0.158**		
Settler Status		-0.152**		
Injured, Missing or Dead Relatives		-0.096*		

Dependent Variable: Support for Presidency Package

Non-significant variables have been omitted

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Introducing demographics

Certain demographic variables, including UBP partisan affiliation and settler status reach statistical significance. Age also matters, with older Turkish Cypriots being less likely to support the package. Despite this, the positive assessment on cross voting remains the most significant predictor.



Predicting Support for a Rotating Presidency / Cross Voting Package – Turkish Cypriots

Model No	1	2	3	
Model Description	Views of Rotating Presidency and Cross Voting	<i>Plus</i> Demographics	<i>Plus</i> Attitudes	
R-square	0.082	0.150	0.256	
	<i>Beta</i>	<i>Beta</i>	<i>Beta</i>	
Rotating Presidency prevents the domination of one community over the other	0.128*	0.113*	0.101*	
Cross voting will encourage moderation in politicians who will have to take into account the concerns of both communities	0.235***	0.183***	0.148**	
Age		-0.108*	-0.039	
UBP Supporter		-0.158**	-0.080	
Settler Status		-0.152**	-0.077	
Injured, Missing or Dead Relatives		-0.096*	-0.023	
Ethnocentrism			-0.097*	
Openness to Reconciliation			0.100*	
Fear of Out-Group			-0.240***	
Fear of Deadlock			0.112**	

Dependent Variable: Support for Presidency Package

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Non-significant variables have been omitted

Adding attitudes

Similar to the Greek Cypriot data, the fear factor is pronounced. Fear of deadlock also emerges as a significant predictor, alongside fear of the out-group, while similarly to Greek Cypriots ethnocentrism is playing a role. The reduction in the coefficient for the assessment of cross voting suggests that these underlying attitudes are contributing to how cross voting is being assessed.

Predicting Support for a Rotating Presidency / Cross Voting Package – Turkish Cypriots

Model No	1	2	3	4
Model Description	Views of Rotating Presidency and Cross Voting	<i>Plus</i> Demographics	<i>Plus</i> Attitudes	<i>Plus</i> Support for Aspects of the Package
R-square	0.082	0.150	0.256	0.615
	<i>Beta</i>	<i>Beta</i>	<i>Beta</i>	<i>Beta</i>
Rotating Presidency prevents the domination of one community over the other	0.128*	0.113*	0.101*	0.000
Cross voting will encourage moderation in politicians who will have to take into account the concerns of both communities	0.235***	0.183***	0.148**	-0.011
Age		-0.108*	-0.039	-0.055
UBP Supporter		-0.158**	-0.080	-0.056
Settler Status		-0.152**	-0.077	-0.057
Injured, Missing or Dead Relatives		-0.096*	-0.023	0.003
Ethnocentrism			-0.097*	0.004
Openness to Reconciliation			0.100*	0.003
Fear of Out-Group			-0.240***	-0.054
Fear of Deadlock			0.112**	0.115***
Support for Rotating Presidency				0.291***
Support for Cross Voting				0.380***
Support for Consensual Decision Making				0.183***

Dependent Variable: Support for Presidency Package

Non-significant variables have been omitted

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Including support of individual package elements as a control

As with the Greek Cypriot data, we note that cross voting has a larger coefficient than the other package elements, suggesting that support for cross voting is the critical factor in deciding overall support for the package. Fear of deadlock remains significant, suggesting that the perception of this package as a necessity in moving forward is also driving support, independently of how the package elements are being assessed.



Summary of Findings

- The model suggests that underlying evaluations of the consequences of rotating presidency and cross voting play an important role in support or opposition to the Package.
- Specifically, believing that cross voting will encourage moderation in politicians, or that rotating presidency will prevent domination by one community over the other, increases support for the Package. Greek Cypriots specifically are also sensitive to negative messages, such that rotating presidency increases risk when the president is from the other community or that cross voting will be an obstacle to fair representation.
- Among Turkish Cypriots, UBP affiliation, settler status, familial association with conflict victims and belonging to an older age group predict rejection of the Package. Among Greek Cypriots, male gender, high education and AKEL affiliation predict support of the Package, while younger age, higher income and 'centrist' party affiliation predict rejection of the Package.



Summary of Findings

- However, most of these demographics are significant only insofar as they account for differences in underlying traits and attitudes.
- Specifically, among Greek Cypriots key factors which underlie support of the Presidency package include knowledge of the Peace Process, while factors which underlie opposition include fear of the Turkish side and ethnocentrism.
- Among Turkish Cypriots, key factors underlying support of the Package include openness to reconciliation and fear of a deadlock, while factors underlying opposition include ethnocentrism and fear of the Greek side.
- Of the three components of the proposal, rotating presidency, cross voting and consensual decision making, it is support or opposition to cross voting that is most critical in influencing levels of support for the overall package. At the same time, consensual decision making has been found to be the least controversial aspect of the package, since it is acceptable to majorities of both communities.



Recommendations

- The Presidency package represents an example where more knowledge and better education is unambiguously helpful: The more citizens understand the rationale and mechanics of the proposal, the more likely they are to support it. Hence, an emphasis should be placed on exposing the public to this package proposal, especially so in the Greek Cypriot community where a clearer association between knowledge and support of the package has been found.
- It is important to note that people who tend to fear the other side are particularly concerned over this proposal. Their fears should be addressed by making such adjustments to the proposal as to reduce the perceived threatening aspects while highlighting and building on the more reassuring aspects, such as a consensual approach to decision making in the executive branch.
- Support or opposition to the Presidency package is clearly linked to specific demographics. Therefore, an outreach and dialogue campaign should focus on these groups, and specifically younger people and women in the Greek Cypriot community, older people in the Turkish Cypriot community, and more generally towards people who highly value their own ethnic identities.



SECTION C


Public Participation in the Peace Process: Options for Moving Forward



interpeace

International Peacebuilding Alliance
Alliance internationale pour la consolidation de la paix
Alianza internacional para la Consolidación de la Paz


“Those who participate in the actual negotiations should spend time to visit municipalities and villages, in order to discuss the peace process with the citizens directly”



Negotiating team should interact with citizens directly

Citizens of both communities, and particularly Greek Cypriots, strongly support the idea that a series of ‘town-hall meetings’ be organized, with the participation of the negotiating team, in order for the peace process to be discussed.


“The leadership should set up a system, using technology such as the internet and social media, to inform the public directly as to what is going on in the peace process and seek the public’s opinion”



Technology and social media should be part of the engagement strategy

Similarly, both communities strongly support the use of technology in the context of informing the public regarding the peace process and soliciting feedback.


“Whenever the two sides agree on a specific aspect of the Peace Process, this should be available for public review and feedback even as the remaining dossiers are still being discussed”



Convergences should be made available for public review

Both communities agree that whenever the peace process achieves convergences, these should be made available for public review and feedback even while the remaining dossiers are being discussed.

“Civil Society Organizations to become more representative of the wider public, and then be empowered to have a meaningful role in the peace process”



Civil Society Organizations should be empowered

Both communities agree that Civil Society Organizations should be empowered to have a meaningful role in the peace process, under the proviso that such organizations do in fact become more representative of the wider public.

The Take-Home Message

- Several factors will work together to decide the outcome of a future referendum. Chief among these are, level of fear of the other side, openness to reconciliation and the actual evaluation of the content of the plan. The public should urgently be engaged on all these levels, if a referendum is to be won.
- The case of a potential package on rotating presidency and cross voting is a particularly salient example of how fear of the other side is driving opposition to the proposal. This can be addressed by increasing awareness of the mechanics of the proposal and by making amendments to address concerns, such as by moving towards a more consensual model of decision making in the executive branch.
- To achieve these goals, increased citizens participation in the peace process is essential. To this end, the public in both communities is strongly supportive of several approaches that were tested, such as organized outreach through ‘town-hall’ type meetings, use of the internet and social media to disseminate information and receive feedback, making already achieved convergences available for public review, and empowering civil society to have a more meaningful role in the peace process.





International Peacebuilding Alliance
Alliance internationale pour la consolidation de la paix
Alianza Internacional para la Consolidación de la Paz



www.Cyprus2015.org