Pillars of Peace
SOMALI PROGRAMME

In Pursuit of Peace
Challenges and Opportunities in the Central Regions
July 2012
In Pursuit of Peace

Challenges and Opportunities in the Central Regions

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Programme Coordinator : Abdiyaye Osman Garad

Researchers : Fatima Abdallahi Abdi
Farah Abdi Hassan
Hassan Qadi Ahmed
Mowlid Ali Osman
Mariam Mohamed

Assistant Researchers : Su’ad Yusuf Salad

Editors : Jabril Ibrahim Abdulle and Sabhita Raju

Senior Research Advisor : Abdirahman Osman Raghe

Photographs : Yassin Salad Elmi and Mohamed Ahmed Hassan

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Back cover photo : Women’s groups celebrating a CRD facilitated ceasefire between communities in Galmudug and Himin and Xeeb, ©CRD

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List of Acronyms

AIDS • Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
AOGs • Armed Opposition Groups
AMISOM • African Union Mission in Somalia
APD • Academy for Peace and Development
ARPCT • Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism
ARS • Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia
AS • Al-Shabaab
ASWJ • Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jamaah
AU • African Union
CAPA • Christian Association for Prison Aftercare
CISP • International Committee for the Development of Peoples
CRD • Centre for Research and Dialogue
CSO • Civil Society Organisation
DIID • Department for International Development
DRC • Danish Refugee Council
DDG • Danish Demining Group
EC • European Commission
HH • Himan and Heeb
HI • Hizbul Islam
HSM • Harakat Al-Shabaab Mujahideen
GA • Galmudug Authority
ICRC • International Community of the Red Cross
ICU • Islamic Courts Union
IDEA • Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance
IDP • Internally Displaced Peoples
IGAD • Inter-Governmental Agency on Development
IMC • International Medical Corps
INGO • International Non-Governmental Organisation
Interpeace • International Peacebuilding Alliance
IOM • International Organisation for Migration
IRC • International Rescue Committee
IULA • International Union of Local Authorities
JVA • Jubba Valley Alliance
LNGO • Local Non-Governmental Organisation
Merlin • Medical Emergency Relief International
MCH • Mother and Child Healthcare
MP • Member of Parliament
MSF • Medecins Sans Frontieres
MUDAN • Mudug Development Associations Network
NGO • Non-Governmental Organisations
NRC • Norwegian Refugee Council
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<td>OPD</td>
<td>Out-Patient Department</td>
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<tr>
<td>PDRC</td>
<td>Puntland Development and Research Centre</td>
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<tr>
<td>PAR</td>
<td>Participatory Action Research</td>
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<tr>
<td>SC</td>
<td>Steering Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>SNM</td>
<td>Somali National Movement</td>
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<td>SPM</td>
<td>Somali Patriotic Movement</td>
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<td>SRCS</td>
<td>Somali Red Crescent Society</td>
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<td>SSDF</td>
<td>Somali Salvation Democratic Front</td>
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<tr>
<td>SYL</td>
<td>Somali Youth League</td>
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<tr>
<td>TFC</td>
<td>Transitional Federal Charter</td>
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<tr>
<td>TFG</td>
<td>Transitional Federal Government</td>
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<td>TGS</td>
<td>Traditional Governance System</td>
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<tr>
<td>TIS</td>
<td>Transition Initiatives for Stabilisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>TNG</td>
<td>Transitional National Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Program</td>
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Preface

The Pillars of Peace Programme seeks to advance and underpin the consolidation of peace in the Somali region through consensus-oriented, integrated approaches to state building and peacebuilding.

The Pillars of Peace Programme

The Somali region often sensationalised as the ultimate ‘failed state’. This description, however, obscures the richness of the peace dynamics within and between Somali communities throughout the region. Rebuilding a country is primarily about restoring people’s trust and confidence in governance systems and rule of law, rebuilding relationships at all levels and providing the communities with greater hope for the future.

The Somali regions have and continue to face many challenges as they emerge from protracted conflict and seek to rebuild the state and society. A number of Somali-led initiatives have made significant progress towards establishing viable political and administrative arrangements to manage conflict, and to provide durable security and rule of law – this is particularly advanced in Somaliland, is emerging and progress is being consolidated in Puntland, and great efforts towards stabilisation and recovery are being made in South Central Somalia.

Interpeace launched its Somali programme in the north-eastern part of the Somali region, now known as Puntland, in 1996. The programme was extended to Somaliland in 1999 and South-Central Somalia in 2000. Interpeace assisted in the establishment of the Puntland Development Research Centre (PDRC) in Garowe (Puntland), the Academy for Peace and Development (APD) in Hargeysa (Somaliland) and the Center for Research and Dialogue (CRD) in Mogadishu, which have each developed into respected research institutions and agents for constructive change. Interpeace worked with the teams to advance and support interlinked and mutually supportive and reinforcing processes of peace building and state formation using Participatory Action Research (PAR).

Interpeace’s experience in the Somali region has shown that the understanding and trust developed through PAR methodology can help resolve conflicts directly, while at the same time building consensual approaches to address the social, economic and political issues necessary for durable peace. In conjunction with the three Somali partners, Interpeace launched its latest region-wide initiative ‘The Pillars of Peace’ Programme in 2009. This consensus-oriented, integrated approach to peacebuilding builds upon Interpeace and its partners’ experience in the region. This is predicated on the approach which has been tested and proven to show that dialogue can be translated into positive and progressive action with a high degree of local ownership.

The aim of the Programme is to transfer peacebuilding capacity to Somalis in general, and to civic leadership, women and youth in particular to ensure popular engagement in peacebuilding and democratisation processes, with a view to building relevant and sustainable peace and development.
The three partners have met regularly with Interpeace’s Somali programme team to reflect, plan and coordinate their respective activities throughout the Programme’s lifespan. A ‘Pillars Support Group’ comprising of the Programme’s donors at the European Commission, Denmark, DFID (UK), Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and USAID, has also provided timely support to the programme over the period.

Methodology of the Pillars Mapping Exercise

The Pillars Mapping Exercise provided the foundation for the Pillar of Peace Programme, and was carried out by the Centre for Research and Dialogue in the central regions of Somalia, the Academy for Peace and Development in Somaliland and the Puntland Development Research Centre in Puntland from April 2009 as part of the Pillars of Peace Programme. It contributes to sixteen years of work in the Somali region and compliments the previous achievements of the post conflict programme in the 1990s, and two subsequent phases of the Dialogue for Peace Programme.

The aim of the Pillars of Peace Programme was to bridge gaps between peace and state building by all relevant stakeholders through dialogue and consensus building. Cultivating this inter-community and government-community understanding and agreement on the necessary and sustainable mechanisms and actions needed to address critical peace and statebuilding needs, was based on the outcomes of the mapping exercise which enabled key stakeholders at all levels to collectively identify the way forward.

The overall aim of the mapping exercise was to offer a space for dialogue on the challenges on the three key thematic areas (Pillars) which formed the core work of Interpeace’s partner institutions, namely:

- For South Central Somali and CRD: Social and Political Reconciliation; Decentralisation and Governance; Strengthening of Civic Actors, Diaspora and Business Community.

- For Puntland and PDRC: Security and Rule of Law (including a Social Reconciliation component); Democratisation and Decentralisation; and

- For Somaliland and APD: Democratisation; Decentralisation and Social Reconciliation.

The three partners’ institutions engaged in extensive consultations, using Interpeace’s Participatory Action Research (PAR) methodology, with all sectors of society. Stakeholders ranged from national-level political and business leaders, leading civil society actors, traditional elders, and representatives of youth, women groups, IDPs, minorities groups, professionals, and NGOs. Literature reviews, interviews and focus group discussions were conducted to develop a thorough overview and understanding of the achievements, challenges and opportunities in their respective Pillars. In parallel,

1A preliminary Mapping Exercise was also carried out in Hiraan region.
the Audio Visual Units of the three organisations captured the discussions in order to prepare films to accompany the research and provide a resource for communities as they engaged in these areas and sought to shape the Programme’s actions on the ground.

Several key areas of focus per pillar, or ‘entry points’, were agreed upon at the Puntland Stakeholders’ Meeting held in Garowe in May and September 2010 by PDRC, and at APD’s National Programme Group Meeting in Hargeysa in October 2010. Further action-research required to support efforts to bring the solutions identified or indicated in the consultations were agreed, with a practical aim shape Interpeace and the institutions’ actions on the ground to target and support specific interventions to achieve action, change and impact in the three Pillars. PDRC and APD were also mandated to establish action-oriented Steering Committees comprising key stakeholders – representatives of government, local authorities, media, civil society, women, youth and vulnerable groups - that will identify, and analyse solutions, and support efforts to bring those solutions into action – through policies and practical programmes on the ground – to achieve change.

This report (and accompanying film) is designed to capture the findings of CRD’s Pillar Mapping Exercise as a record for those who were involved in the South Central regions, as part of the overall Somali Pillars Mapping Exercise. It presents the mapping exercise’s findings, including the identification of issues around which divergences remain and further research and action was required by the national and regional authorities and the related communities. It also highlights opportunities and recommendations for CRD/ Interpeace as well as the wider regional/ national and international communities to adequately and in a timely manner engage in social reconciliation and emerging local governance.
Executive Summary

The overall changing dynamics in south-central Somalia and Mogadishu as a result of military gains made by TFG/African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) troops during 2011 and 2012 gives rise to cautious optimism that Somalia may be on the verge of a breakthrough to peace. The threat from radical religious armed factions such as Al Shabaab, however, cannot be discounted as a continued and serious threat to peace. Even the liberators themselves increase insecurity in some areas with some civilians. The military successes recorded are already being transformed among all actors into heightened interest in leadership and governance issues. Local and international Somalia actors and stakeholders are currently debating the transition in south-central Somalia and the way forward for the TFG, the constitutional development process and the restoration of governance and stability throughout the region.

The positioning and accommodation of the Galmudug, Hiran and Heeb and Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jamaah structures, Hiiraan Regional Administration and authority, and the Galgudug Regional Administration nominated recently by the TFG President, which evolved through local initiatives independently of Mogadishu based politics in the new and changing dynamics of the south, should be watched closely as a barometer of the health of a national dialogue and constitutional development processes. How, for example, will those administrations that have emerged during recent outside the ambit of the TFG and the international community be accommodated in the new Constitution? Is it possible for facilitated reconciliation processes to take place in these (and other regions as they are recovered), as envisioned in the various competing stabilisation strategies proposed by the TFG, IGAD, other UN and other actors? Any constitutional model that is produced as a result of the transition must find a way of balancing national and sub-national power structures and enabling resource sharing, either through a federal model, or through the recognition of decentralised autonomous regions, or some other model that is acceptable to local actors.

The Center for Research and Dialogue in partnership with Interpeace is currently providing support for the consolidation of peace and state building through a number of supportive dialogue and reconciliation initiatives. This work advances further and builds upon twelve years of engagement in the region. Building on previous research and community engagement undertaken through the Dialogue for Peace Programme from 2004 to 2009, which focused on providing opportunities to support the consolidation of peace and better governance in south-central Somalia, the current Pillars of Peace Programme underway since 2009 seeks to consolidate progress made, and to open further the space for dialogue and reconciliation in support of establishing community responsive governance and security in three key areas identified by communities themselves: Social and Political Reconciliation; Decentralisation and Governance; and Strengthening of Civic Actors, Diaspora and Business Community.

This Pillar Note presents the findings of a mapping exercise undertaken by CRD through focus groups discussions, public forums and debates, and individual interviews with key actors in the central regions of Galgaduug, South Mudug and Hiiraan with the direct participation of over five hundred ordinary Somalis, as well as key traditional and political figures. The mapping sought to gather the views of the communities within these regions on key issues relating to the obstacles to peace, as well
as possible success factors and solutions that could facilitate or deepen peace if and when obtained within the thematic areas highlighted. As a result of the evolving political-security dynamics in south-central region of Somalia, the geographical scope of the work was constrained to those areas in which access and safe movement was possible. Consequently, the areas of intervention were reduced to the central regions of Somalia, originally South Mudug and Galgaduud, and broadened to include Hiraan region in late 2011 and early 2012, once the TFG and AMISOM military operations succeeded in opening up districts in this area in 2012.

Current Context and Unfolding Dynamics

At the time of writing, the Somali Republic is poised at the cusp of an opportunity to make significant progress towards stabilising a troubled region and rebuilding the state and society. The military advances achieved by the combined AMISOM and TFG push since 2011 to flush out radical groups and recapture regions outstripped the political preparations and framework required to ensure the replacement of autocratic and unpopular rule with a democratic model of governance acceptable to the recovered districts.

As more areas are recovered, there appears to be a proliferation of stabilisation strategies and approaches being championed by various actors – individually or together - ranging from the TFG led security and stabilisation strategy and USAID’s collaborative TIS programme, to the UK led multi-donor Stability Fund and IGAD and AMISOM’s emerging stabilisation strategy. In addition, there are a number of more localised initiatives that are promoted by a host of INGOs and local partners through specific interventions and short-term projects.

While each proposed intervention from each actor may have some merit, the likelihood of failure of most if not all approaches is high should the various actors and initiatives be set down in competition with each other. Rather, a cohesive, multi-faceted and coordinated approach which is rooted in the needs identified by communities themselves, and through processes that respond to the changed dynamics on the ground and appropriate to the differing needs of different regions and districts, may prove more effective and successful.

Key Findings

As argued in the three thematic chapters, the most successful and durable reconciliation and peace building strategies have been those led by local communities themselves at the local level, with little or no external engagement. With the retreat of radical groups and the restoration of a basic level of security, a number of community leaders from the recovered areas are beginning to explore possible opportunities to form local reconciliation processes leading to the establishment of local governance structures, such as Beletweyne. Furthermore, ASWJ is seeking to revive old suspended structures in Dhusamareed, Gureceel and Abdudwak Districts in Galgudud region despite the failure of the TFG and the international community to provide timely assistance and support.
There are of course some regions that were not controlled by Al Shabab, but the prevailing environment effectively limited the ability of the local administration to operate effectively. With the improving general environment delivered by the retreat of Al Shabab, administrations in central regions, such as Galmudug and Himan and Heeb, are now better able to consolidate the local peace that they helped to create as early as 2007 and 2008 respectively. Initial efforts to strengthen basic service delivery including health, education and basic security are beginning to revive these areas. The resulting improved environment is also attracting diaspora groups and local and international NGOs with the promise of being able to operate freely. If these administrations are able to secure external support, they could begin to strengthen and broaden their capacity to deliver services across the districts.

_Making Social and Political Reconciliation Processes Effective_

As presented in Chapter One, the successes of some local social and political reconciliation processes have helped to reduce violence, build trust and confidence across communities and provided – albeit in mosaic form – some bases for further building stability and political and socio-political development. Locally Initiated and driven reconciliations ended in success were shown to be the most successful of all such interventions. Where local dialogue and agreements have resulted in the establishment of a common administration, they have proven to be the most durable – even in the face of multiple constraints.

The role of women, youth and business groups of central regions when engaged positively was shown to be important in stopping hostilities among clans at different levels. Following clan and political conflicts and their battlefields, frontlines and fake borders emerged among communities in central regions that had previously resided together peacefully, particularly those of the Hawiye, Dir and Darood Clans. To overcome such fighting along borders, women in central Community advocated for reintegration and security development. The capacity of women, in particular, to push a constructive and reconciliatory agenda which encouraged robustly actors to find accommodation was invaluable and is explored in chapter one. Likewise, the role of business groups can be disruptive in pursuit of commercial gain, or constructive in terms of supporting processes seeking stability which then aides commercial activity.

The consultations’ findings show clearly that it can be very tempting for well-meaning external actors who wish to support the consolidation of peace and provide development assistance to by parachuting into local reconciliation processes. When doing so, however, it is shown how such intervention oftentimes can smother these processes and lead to their failure. To rush into a situation assuming one has the cooperation and blessing of all sides is to run the risk of not understanding local dynamics and power plays, and potentially be drawn into local struggles for supremacy, and could potentially undermine ongoing efforts. External actors should build upon existing structures rather creating new public dialogue that can cause further division among communities in the central regions. Local communities need support to consolidate local peace through community based strategies.
The trend towards regionalism in Somalia has emerged from the conflict. The most successful Communities who had traditionally invested in Mogadishu as a capital city decided to return to their respective ancestral regions in an attempt to establish regional administrations. This was mainly due to the continued failure by the central government to provide basic governance and administrative functions and also the inter-clan conflict that followed the collapse of the state.

A classic example is the creation and on-going evolution of the Somaliland and Puntland administrations. The emergence of three main models of local administration is explored in Chapter Two, highlighting how communities sought to obtain some order and cohesion for both security and socio-political needs through reliance on traditional structures predicated on custom, Islamic movements and authorities in specific districts, or new administrations created as a result of greater cooperation achieved through reconciliation processes and the identification of common needs.

The success of the administrations established in the central regions, is demonstrated clearly by the achievements of the Galmudug, ASWJ established and Himan and Heeb administrations. They were borne of local community reconciliation which drew rival communities together to seek common understanding and accommodation to provide security, stability and social and economic order. Some of these administrations were able to partially transform and mobilise freelance militias as their ‘new forces’ with payments of incentives collected from taxes. Though not without some challenges and negative elements, the involvement of local community leaders, traditional elders and the application of customary practice, and the significant involvement of the Somali diaspora were identified as key success factors. This engagement using processes which were known and acceptable to local communities, but infused with the drive, financial support and additional skills set drawn from the diaspora proved a successful combination.

The agenda, actions and drive of the Somali diaspora hailing from the central regions were massively influential in the formation of local administrations; furthermore, all of the senior figures in these administrations are occupied by diaspora returnees. The agendas of the TFG and international actors will have an equally important influence on their survival and role in the transitional dynamics that accompany advancing military successes against radical groups and the sudden focus and attention of international actors in the central and southern regions.

Despite of the largely positive views among many people on the trend of regionalisation, a number of negative outcomes were also identified centred upon the ethnic exclusivity within geographical locations with various clans and sub-clans developing institutions in rural and urban ‘homelands’. The towns commonly shared by various clans disappeared as clans concentrated on specific regions. Some districts in the central regions further divided communities along clan lines resulting in even further limited interaction with each other, increasing mutual suspicion and mistrust which often are the precursor to escalating tensions and conflict. The need for locally rooted and acceptable
governance structures that address and provide services and support for local communities cannot be disputed, and all participants in the Mapping Exercise agreed on the need for appropriate authority to ensure security, and social and economic opportunity.

**Harnessing the power of civil society**

The history and performance of civil society actors – including traditional and religious leaders, the business community but especially NGOs and community based organisations – has been variable, as I explored in chapter three. Largely ignored or ineffectual during the Barre regime, those civil society organisations that continued to operate during the conflict were embattled and constrained by security. Other than traditional elders which continued to hold a central albeit largely diminishing role in communities, many formal NGOs were forced to cease operations, and the business community often took advantage of prevailing conflict dynamics for commercial gain. Chapter three explores the evolution of organised civil society groups in the central regions, and the myriad challenges they faced, and continue to face, particularly in the twin arena of peacebuilding and statebuilding.

The majority of NGOs active across the central regions had historically focused on humanitarian and social welfare services including the health and education sectors. Their role in providing crucial services in the absence of a strong central or local government and administrative capacity, and in light of limitations of international actors’ ability to be present on the ground due to prevailing security considerations, proved invaluable throughout and beyond the conflict. Sustained international support to the civil society sector generally has been necessary and critical in ensuring that those that did stay could operate, and to enable the regeneration of NGOs and community based groups now that territory is being recovered. The support of the Somali diaspora proved critical in ensuring the provision of financial support, drive and skilled personnel to push forward programmes designed – sometimes for public good and at other time for profit – to ensure health and education services were available to local communities.

Civil society is shown in Chapter Three to have engaged in only limited activity in peacebuilding and the promotion of human rights, gender equality and stability. The business community has flourished in the regulation-free conflict and post-conflict context, but did sometimes actively contribute to peace building primarily through an ability to provide much needed economic opportunities to and in at risk communities. Some of the challenges facing civic actors and their engagement in peace and statebuilding activities were explored in Chapter Three and included a crisis of legitimacy for some, lack of skilled human and financial resources, lack of external support and reluctance on the part of the TFG and international community often times to include them in dialogue and statebuilding processes. *The recaptured areas: reconciliation, rehabilitation and reconstruction*

Great interest and optimism has been generated at the local, regional, national and international levels with the enhanced prospects for peace in Hiraan and nearby regions which are becoming accessible. The views and determination of local people in the pursuit of peace and establishment...
of peace and stability in the region was reflected in many of the mapping exercise’s discussions, and a strong desire to reject radical groups and reclaim the political and physical space. The plethora of international organisations rushing to the region pledging financial and capacity building support demonstrates the enthusiasm of these actors also in ensuring the space for such groups is closed down permanently.

This presents an important yet problematic opportunity for consolidating peace and re-establishing governance structures and processes that could meet the real needs of the people, and be part of the reinvigorated Somali Republic (whatever model is adopted as part of the transitional process in Mogadishu). There is a danger, however, that so many supporters may stray into insisting that a model of governance which more meets their ideas of democratic practice and persons they wish to see take control of the region, rather than listening to the views and choices of local communities. It is imperative that the local communities’ voice is heard and responded to. Equally there is a danger that local politics and fears could shape the selection of a local administration that could simply recreate injustices of the past and exacerbate enduring divisions. A middle ground should be found which meets local aspirations and needs sensitively, but as part of a national model that is able to provide further financial, security and developmental support from the central government and international supporters should be found. The issues highlighted above could help to point the way.

A preliminary conflict analysis of the Hiiraan region is presented in chapter four, looking at various issues and factors including underlying factors that are the source of or contribute to the conflict. The primary analysis, however, will focus on the on-going political and civil conflict, together with a set of recommendations that could help in mitigating the conflict and help to create a conducive environment for the implementation of political and social reconciliation processes, and for governance and developmental projects.

It will also set out information on the challenges and the immediate needs of the people and the local economy which could help to speed up and enhance the peace and reconciliation processes, as identified by communities and secondary consultations with key actors outside of the immediate area. It presents as much information as is currently available on the existing situation and condition of the local population, and includes a limited survey of existing schools, health and educational facilities, and the state of the agricultural sector.

**Conclusions and Possibilities**

At the time of writing, the Somali Republic is poised at the cusp of an opportunity to make significant progress towards stabilising a troubled region and rebuilding the state and society. The military advances achieved by the combined AMISOM and TFG push since 2011 to flush out radical groups and recapture regions outstripped the political preparations and framework required to ensure the replacement of autocratic and unpopular rule with a democratic model of governance acceptable to the recovered districts.
As more areas are recovered, there appears to be a proliferation of stabilisation strategies and approaches being championed by various actors – individually or together - ranging from the TFG led security and stabilisation strategy and USAID’s collaborative TIS programme, to the UK led multi-donor Stability Fund and IGAD and AMISOM’s emerging stabilisation strategy. In addition, there are a number of more localised initiatives that are promoted by a host of INGOs and local partners through specific interventions and short-term projects. While each proposed intervention from each actor may have some merit, the likelihood of failure of most if not all approaches is high should the various actors and initiatives be set down in competition with each other. Rather, a cohesive, multi-faceted and coordinated approach which is rooted in the needs identified by communities themselves, and through processes that respond to the changed dynamics on the ground and appropriate to the differing needs of different regions and districts, may prove more effective and successful.

As argued in the thematic chapters, the most successful and durable reconciliation and peace building strategies have been those led by local communities themselves at the local level, with little or no external engagement. With the retreat of radical groups and the restoration of a basic level of security, a number of community leaders from the recovered areas are beginning to explore possible opportunities to form local reconciliation processes leading to the establishment of local governance structures, despite the failure of the TFG and the international community to provide timely assistance and support.

**The Way Forward | Opportunities for peace**

Despite the challenges explored throughout the Report, a number of success factors were also identified that did and could further support constructive interventions or supportive action in the central regions, and help to point a possible way forward for the work of local and external actors alike. It is shown that some successful reconciliation processes that reduce violence, build trust and cooperation, and provide fertile soil for the emergence of locally legitimate and accepted administrations, is possible.

To consolidate gains made in the area and advance the reconciliation process to helper-establish local governance, CRD/Interpeace intends to facilitate a number of informal meetings with key stakeholders in the central regions. The aim of the engagement is to assist communities to address the issues remaining from the earlier intervention that will hopefully help to permanently end conflict. It is also intended to promote and facilitate a broad-based inclusive process involving other clans in the regions as the basis for the emergence of viable local and regional governance structure. We also hope to facilitate dialogue between the two existing local governance entities in an effort to amalgamate them into one single regional/state administration. Peacebuilding and statebuilding in the central regions of Somalia could and should be mutually reinforcing. Creating a stable and peaceful environment should enable statebuilding initiatives in the form of the strengthening of existing, or creation of new, local governance structures and processes which in turn helps to create a virtuous circle which consolidates stability and enables the provision of services to local communities.
As presented in Chapter One which set out views, experiences and key issues related to reconciliation, locally rooted and sustained social and political reconciliation processes can help to reduce violence, foster inter-community and inter-clan understanding and cooperation, and help to create a stable environment more conducive to supporting democratisation and sustainable development. A key benefit from successful reconciliation processes, as shown in the central regions, is the emergence of local administrations that grow from the greater understanding, cooperation and commonality of purpose in seeking to better respond to the needs of local communities (resources permitting).

The role of a strong and vibrant civil society in both raising awareness and stimulating interest and debate among communities on key peacebuilding and statebuilding challenges, needs and opportunities is important. Furthermore, the ability of civil society groups to act as a conduit for ensuring communities voices are articulated and taken account of in policy formulation, is critical. The absence of this voice of the people in the development of evolving reconciliation and stabilisation strategies, the development of local governance structure and processes, and of development interventions seeking to shore up peace through socio-economic progress, will undermine the legitimacy and efficacy of democratisation and development programmes - as has been demonstrated in twenty years of failed peace and statebuilding initiatives in Somalia.

As set out in Chapter Three, the emergence of civil society groups in the central regions historically has focused primarily on humanitarian needs, but significant work and progress has been made in recent times of strengthening existing or establishing new local groups which have sought to advance peacebuilding and conflict sensitive approach to state building. This emerging and potentially powerful role must be supported to ensure that the various high level political processes that seek to deliver peace and development to the regions, and the country as whole, do in fact serve the needs of the people, and not just the ambitions of political leaders.

**The Way Forward**

**The new constitution and beyond the transition**

Process is paramount - to improve the legitimacy of the constitution, it is imperative that the framers of the document seek actively to engage accepted community representatives and ensure the voice of the people is truly reflected in it. As related processes such as the operationalisation of the TFG’s security and stabilisation strategy, the planned for selection of elders, the selection of the national constituent assembly, and the subsequent selection of parliament are implemented, the need for local engagement grows ever more important. Beyond the question of the nature and structure of the larger Somali state, the manner in which local governance and security needs can be accommodated, the debate over the relative strengths and responsibilities of the central and local governments, and how best to ensure inclusive and fair representation for each of the groups within Somalia – including groups/clans which have historically been singled out for discrimination and under-representation, must be addressed if it is to have a chance of acceptance and durability.
To ensure a sensitive approach which helps mitigate not escalate harmful competition and conflict, the first step is to better understand the changed and still changing cast of players and dynamics on the ground. The outcomes of the mapping exercise in the central regions, and the preliminary mapping of Hiiraan region, set out in this Report are offered as a modest contribution to facilitating the building of this knowledge base. Further research to deepen this analysis, particularly in the newly recovered areas – and those that it is expected will be recaptured in the coming months – is required, and will be a key focus of the ongoing Pillars of Peace Programme implemented by CRD/Interpeace.

The outcomes of these studies provide a critical guide in our work in seeking to support conflict sensitive state building approaches, and will shape the specific interventions we undertake to support local reconciliation and peacebuilding. We commend these research findings and possible areas of focus as identified by the people of the central regions to the TFG and the international community, to help them to also shape their work as they seek to genuinely help the people of Somalia emerge from over twenty years of devastation, and rebuild itself as a nation.
In the Somali conflagration that has unfolded since 1991, the south and central regions of the country have experienced a revolving version of civil war. In the last two decades, the region has seen power and dominance shifting among various powerbrokers and interveners including clan militia, warlords’ armed factions and armed religious groups – with the occasional foray by external state forces into specific areas.

Despite military advancements made by the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) in 2011 and 2012 which has enabled the recovery of some areas, the radical religious armed factions such as Al Shabaab continue to pose a serious threat to peace. Even the liberators themselves increase insecurity with civilians caught in the cross-fire between Transitional Federal Government (TFG)/AMISOM working with some moderate Islamic factions against Al Shabaab insurgents supported by foreign jihadists. The number of internally displaced persons who have fled the battle grounds and the refugees who have fled across the borders of neighbouring countries and beyond has slowed since the exodus by victims of the 2011 drought and famine, but still continues. Many questions as to whether gains made can be translated into a durable peace remain.

Local and international Somalia actors and stakeholders are currently debating the transition in south-central Somalia and the way forward for the TFG, the constitutional development process and the restoration of governance and stability throughout the region. As these new approaches and strategies are being developed in the wake of military advances and the recovery of districts and regions from Al Shabaab, there is a window of opportunity where an incremental and progressive approach to managing reconciliation and peace processes based on lessons learned in the Somali context can be developed and implemented.

The Center for Research and Dialogue (CRD) working with Interpeace are currently providing support for the consolidation of peace and state building through a number of supportive dialogue and reconciliation initiatives. This work advances further and builds upon twelve years of engagement in the region. Building on previous research and community engagement undertaken through the Dialogue for Peace Programme from 2004 to 2009, which focused on providing opportunities to support the consolidation of peace and better governance in south-central Somalia, the current Pillars of Peace Programme underway since 2009 seeks to consolidate progress made, and to open further the space for dialogue and reconciliation in support of establishing community responsive governance and security in three key areas identified by communities themselves:

• Social and Political Reconciliation;
• Decentralisation and Governance;
• Strengthening of Civic Actors, Diaspora and Business Community.

Rebuilding a country after conflict and reaching sustainable peace is fundamentally about rebuilding relationships at all levels, restoring the people’s trust and hope in the future. Peace cannot be reached
without the active participation of the population at all levels and all the stakeholders engaged in
the society. Indeed, reinforcing participation and dialogue is key to democratic decision-making
processes.

The vision of the Pillars of Peace Programme is to build upon more than a decade’s experience
of peacebuilding and support for institutions in order to continue to advance and strengthen the
consolidation of peace throughout the Somali region through consensus-oriented, integrated
approaches to state building and peacebuilding.

**Pillar Mapping Exercise**

The first phase of the Programme, the Pillar Mapping Exercise, forms a collective framework where
people actively contributed to the research on key obstacles to the three identified pillars.

The specific objectives were to:
- Validate the three Pillars;
- Document the existing governance and decentralisation structures and practices, their achievements
  and challenges;
- Gather primary data on the basic social services available and the role of civic actors;
- Collectively identify the concerns and perceived challenges pertaining (i) sustainable social and
  political reconciliation, (ii) effective local/ regional decentralised system of governance; (iii) the
  strengthening of civic actors, Diaspora and business community;
- Assess local security situations and the political and socio-economic implications;
- Advance the transfer of ownership of the research to the various stakeholders across the regions
  and districts consulted;
- Promote inclusive dialogue among the communities in the regions of South Mudug and Galgaduud
  and
- Facilitate public dialogue on critical issues effecting people in the central regions.

As a result of the evolving political-security dynamics in south-central region of Somalia, the
geographical scope of the work was constrained to those areas in which access and safe movement
was possible. A thorough security assessment of south-central Somalia was carried out jointly by
CRD and Interpeace in order to assess areas where the Pillar Mapping Exercise could be conducted
with exploration of potential alternative and innovative ways to circumscribe areas that were
unreachable. Consequently, the areas of intervention were reduced to the central regions of Somalia,
originally South Mudug and Galgaduud. The span of intervention was broadened to Hiraan region
in late 2011 and early 2012, once the TFG and AMISOM military operations succeeded in opening
up further areas, and provided some relative security to the community. Considering the still fragile
and volatile environment with different factions struggling for power, it was however only possible
to conduct a preliminary Mapping Exercise in that region. As security improves, initial findings and
areas identified for further research can be advanced.
The data presented in this report and used as the basis of analyses was collected from community members of the Galgaduud and South Mudug regions by CRD researchers, through direct participation in general open public discussions and consultations, focus groups or representative groups from within and across communities as well as individual interviews. Additional information was obtained through a thorough desk research or relevant reports and other secondary sources.

The selection of participants and resource persons was one of the most difficult steps in the process, but essential, and determined through a gradual and deliberate process. After a series of assessment trips conducted in March 2010 aimed primarily at identifying and meeting community leaders to ensure the needed space for dialogue was available, CRD identified in each location visited credible and qualified resource persons to undertake the work on the ground. These persons were selected based on their familiarity with the local context, security considerations and consultations with key people in the community able to help the team identify the focus group participants and mitigate any potential security risks that could emerge. The participants were selected according to specific criteria that respected political, regional, social, religious, gender and age sensitivities.

Over 500 people took part in direct dialogue and consultations throughout the Mapping Exercise. The team visited both regions of South Mudug, Galgaduud and Hiiraan regions. CRD Team also held informal meetings and public fora with key stakeholders and political leadership within the region and outside of the central regions. (See list of participants with age and gender disaggregation presented in Annex 1)

**Participation of Women, Youth and Minorities**

Women and youth actively participated in all discussions held. They focused mainly on the definition of their roles in community. Their main concern was the failure of the system recognising their usefulness when it comes to political dialogues and settlements. However, the youth, women and minorities acknowledged their growing participation in local (social) reconciliation processes, and indicated that other stakeholders were beginning now to recognise the weight and importance of their inclusion in the process. This paper captures the participation of youth and women. Much of which is highlighted in the quotes and footnotes presented throughout. Minorities were invited and did attend, though it was difficult to identify them during discussions; there was significant reluctance among minority groups to identify themselves and articulate on behalf of their communities in the open discussions, though their views were sought separately through more direct means.

CRD researchers facilitated debates and the collation of ideas from the diverse range of stakeholders both in the region, and persons of the region in Mogadishu, to feed into the central analysis presented in this Pillar Note. The facilitation of all discussions was non-directive, using open-ended questions

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2 See Preface – Methodology of the Pillars Mapping Exercise.
in order to ensure that the participants were not unduly influenced and to allow for diverse opinions. Participants were able to exchange views and information and provided basic data and more complex analyses of recurring themes and social and security trends and processes. All community components participated fully while particular emphasis was placed on ensuring the participation of elders, local administration officials, and representatives of the business sector and vulnerable groups.

Focus group discussions and interviews organised for the three pillars were filmed. The audio-visual recordings are an integral part of the research as it captures the views expressed as well as the environment in which the discussions occur. Films also constitute a powerful means of stimulating discussion and linking populations that are separated, whether geographically or psychologically due to the culture, tradition or history.

This Pillar Note summarises the challenges and opportunities to the Pillars of Peace, changing dynamics and actors on the ground, and opportunities and needs identified by communities themselves in relation to possible solutions or constructive areas for action as identified through widespread consultations carried out over a year in the central regions of Somalia (Galgaduud and South Mudug), with a preliminary assessment and mapping of Hiraan region. It provides an overview not only of the current economic, social and political situation in the respective regions but also of the findings in terms of the main concerns and perceived obstacles to the Pillars of Peace as experienced and expressed by the people through interviews and focus group discussions. Moreover, this Note presents the outcomes of a preliminary Mapping Exercise carried out in Hiraan region in terms of the political and socio-economic status of the region. Finally, together with the accompanying documentary film, it is hoped that the recommendations and emerging opportunities highlighted in this publication will provide a platform for discussions for action-research on achievable and sustainable solutions adapted to the Somali context; solutions that would be sought by all actors, whether local, regional, national and/or international.
Chapter One

Laying the Foundations for Peace – Implementing Social and Political Reconciliation

1.1 Introduction

1.1.1 Current Context
Somalia’s conflict in the central regions is rooted in clan and sub-clan level competition and tension which arose from politically motivated resource and land based conflicts that erupted in greater force after the collapse of the Somali state in 1991. Despite the long running violence and destruction, however, the overall presence and good will among some key actors and local people in their desire for and pursuit of peace and rebuilding the state should be acknowledged, and regarded as an opportunity and basis for consolidating stability and re-establishing governance and order at the present time. The imminent defeat of Al Shabaab as an authority in most of the country and the changing dynamics at the local and national levels all add up to a new and positive opportunity for progress in the central regions. There is a visible need and a locally led call for fresh reconciliation and stabilisation initiatives both here and in the recently recovered areas of south-central Somalia. As will be shown in this chapter, peace and state building processes which evolve incrementally through local commitment and drive often prove to be more sustainable; when supported with strategic international intervention and engagement, reconciliation, stabilisation and development are more effectively addressed and mutually reinforcing.

The overall changing dynamics in south-central Somalia and Mogadishu in particular, are already showing renewed interest among all actors in leadership and governance issues. The various processes connected to the pursuit of the TFG transition in 2012 as agreed in the Kampala Accord have already impacted directly on these local authorities and structures. The positioning and accommodation of the Galmudug, Himan and Heeb and Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jamaah structures and authority which evolved through local initiatives independently of Mogadishu based politics in the new and changing dynamics of the south should be watched closely as a barometer of the health of a national dialogue and constitutional development processes.

Key issues to consider in the current transitional process include how Governors, appointed in Banadir, Hiraan and Bay/ Bakool regions, and “ Presidents’ in other regions, and the structures they head, will be accommodated in the new Constitution? Is it possible for facilitated reconciliation processes to take place in these and other regions as they are recovered, as envisioned in the various competing stabilisation strategies proposed by the TFG, IGAD, other UN and other actors? Any constitutional model that is produced as a result of the transition must find a way of balancing national and sub-national power structures and enabling resource sharing, either through a federal model, or through the recognition of decentralised autonomous regions, or some other model that is acceptable to local actors.
CRD/ Interpeace will continue its efforts through its Pillars of Peace Programme to support the new peace and state building processes in south-central Somalia which are in line with the TFG strategy and sensitive to sub-national emerging administrations, building on past experience, the PAR methodology and a track-six approach which helps facilitate safe political space management and greater cooperation among key stakeholders at the various levels which links peace building initiatives to state building processes. Further research and mapping processes that identify key local, regional and international actors and the changing dynamics on the ground will be undertaken to ensure agencies and organisations are better able to understand and engage with realities on the ground, as key Focal Points will be established to facilitate local reconciliation initiatives that can support and feed into larger stabilisation and development processes led by the TFG and international agencies.

1.1.2 Objectives of the Reconciliation Pillar Mapping Exercise

The reconciliation pillar mapping process is part of a larger Pillar Mapping Exercise established to identify current trends and actors in the context of Somalia. Given the constraints to the scope and scale possible for the Pillars Mapping Exercise in the south and central regions generally, as discussed earlier, the purpose and specific objectives of the reconciliation Pillar Mapping Exercise in Galgaduud, Hiiraan and South Mudug were to:

- Identify the obstacles to social and political reconciliation mechanisms;
- Validate the social and political reconciliation pillar;
- Stimulate and facilitate dialogue within the different stakeholders through discussions on the reconciliation pillar of peace.

In the south and central regions of Somalia, there has been a total collapse of the central government for over two decades. This has resulted to stubborn and politicised clan violence leading to the disintegration of social norms, public service delivery, and general societal and administrative rules and regulations. Different approaches have been pursued to restore order within and among communities, enhance the provision of services and promote amicable co-existence between governmental bodies and state institutions.

In Galgaduud and South Mudug, local initiatives facilitated by CRD have led to relative success in restoring peace and order in the region. Since the inception of these initiatives no signs of a relapse with large numbers of killings has been reported, although revenge killings do occur from time-to-time. Equally, there have been some successful local social reconciliation initiatives which have flourished and bore fruit without any help from outside the local concerned communities. The Guri-el-Balamballe reconciliation initiative covering Marehan and Ceyr reconciled in 1997 has been the cornerstone and model of such initiatives, as seen in later processes. In 2007, for example, the Maxaas Reconciliation conference between Sub-

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3 See Case Study 1 and 5 of this paper.
4 Darod sub clan resides in north Galgaduud.
5 Habar-Gedir of Hawiye sub-sub clan resides in central Galgaduud.
clans of Hawadle and Murursade led to the formation of a peace committee between the two communities. The successful Moqokori Reconciliation conference involving Hawadle and Abgaal and Sa’ad and Suleiman sub-clans in the Galmudug peace process paved the way for the creation of Galmudug and Himin and Xeeb Administrations.

Despite great difficulties, lasting peace and stability is possible in south-central Somalia, and Somalis know it. Incredible efforts have been made over the years to foster dialogue, conflict resolution, democracy, and social cohesion. Moreover, as found in earlier Interpeace research findings, in the Somali context state building means “achieving nominal agreement on power-sharing, revival of governmental institutions, and the establishments of security and law enforcement agencies. These are identified as real measures of success, rather than reconciliation, good governance and welfare provision”.

The communities and sub-clans resident in South Mudug, Galgaduud and Hiraan regions have made great strides in addressing recurrent causes and triggers of tension and violence. Sustained support to comprehensive and multi-layered traditional reconciliation processes have resulted in achieving and maintaining stability in the regions which, in turn, has reduced the incidence of clashes and violence. This has enabled local governance structures to be established which are beginning to assume a primary role in providing basic services and protection in the regions.

Though these emerging administrations and traditional governance structures have yet to assume the full authority and acquire the resources required to ensure security and basic service provision, they have been accepted as legitimate and representative governance structures which enjoy the support of local communities. Community leaders in these regions have successfully managed a local conference with little support. The prospects for peacebuilding and recovery in these fragile regions ultimately rest significantly on local traditional leaders and other civic actors as a catalyst for social, political and economic change. At this critical time, communities in central regions face enormous challenges in the current context with the absence a viable political transition. Nevertheless, it appears there is positive opportunities opening up at community level – and it is essential that both external and local actors maximise these opportunities.

This chapter presents research findings which identify the obstacles to political and social reconciliation in central regions, especially Galgaduud, Hiraan and South Mudug. The purpose is to present and analyse the challenges that hinder political and social reconciliation processes, as identified by the communities visited during CRD’s Mapping Exercise.

1.1.3 Concepts of Reconciliation in this paper

The term and notion of reconciliation within the Somalia context is widely defined as a process through which bitter memories are healed, broken relations are mended and trust is restored.

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Through this process, people may demonstrate capacity to admit past mistakes, repent and forgive at the individual and collective levels. In essence, reconciliation is a point of encounter where concerns about both the past and the future can meet. Here, in the central regions of Somalia, the term reconciliation means an effort to restore community coexistence, end hostilities and accept each other politically and socially.

1.1.4 Actor Analysis

As noted earlier, within the Galgaduud and South Mudug regions, the purpose of reconciliation processes was largely to bring communities together to promote mutual understanding, acceptance and to restore and rebuild relationships to resolve past and prevent future conflict. In the rebuilding of these relationships, a number of key actors played a key role – either as principal protagonists between whom the conflict had occurred, or as key actors that could influence the process to a greater or lesser extent. Across the central regions, the form, authority and legitimacy of these actors varied, and the complex interconnections between them and the communities, as well as between key actors within the communities, shaped the form and speed at which reconciliation was possible, and how robust it will prove to be. A summary of these key actors and some of the dynamics surrounding them is presented below.

**Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jamaah (ASWJ)**: this group is well known, and regarded as a leading group with political, ethical and spiritual agendas active in the central regions. It is considered a relatively moderate religious group which inadvertently assumed an administrative role as a result of ‘military’ gains made in specific areas in the central regions against Al Shabaab. ASWJ was successful in frustrating the proliferation of Al Shabaab forces in the regions. The group provides humanitarian advocacy and other limited public services such as security forces (police) through old police stations and Sharia based courts, which have recorded some support and appreciation among local communities. Provision of service delivery was limited, however, and incapacitated through chronic infrastructural and financial constraints. The group is thus weak in terms of governance as they have not developed viable local administrations. Nevertheless, they appointed a basic local administration in areas under their control. The group is also sensitive to external interference and reluctant to allow the empowering of any other organisation in what they perceive as their territory, though they do deal directly with some local socio-political bodies in the area.

While ASWJ may accept if approached a role in supporting security, good governance and local administrative capacity building initiatives, it should be noted that the group has sought with limited progress to mutate into a political body but still lacks advanced administrative infrastructure and competent cadres to realise this role. Consequently, it remains weak in managing local political process. ASWJ is divided into factions with affiliations to various entities;

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10 For a more detailed description see Chapter Two: II – Reconstructing Peace – the Challenges of Creating Legitimate Local Governance.
some are close to the TFG President while others are supporting regional administrations. ASWJ is a very important actor in the central regions with military and political leverage. They have recently expanded their influence to other areas such as El-Bur and El-Dher districts.

**Traditional Leaders**: The term traditional leader refers to the clan chief, a title historically and traditionally inherited, and or selected/appointed by particular clan, sub-clans or sometimes by co-residents. Their role has historically and traditionally been to exercise local intra-clan authority and deal with social events and relations, which may or may not include an explicitly political role. In the past, traditional leaders were fully legitimate and recognised representatives of their community as demonstrated most overtly in particular inter-community relations, and in relations with the previous colonial authorities. These leaders usually use customary or traditional norms law and adjudicate on matters before them in accordance with this and Sharia law.

“Culturally, the Somali community has some sort of clan-based dialogue democracy”

As noted in previous Interpeace/ CRD researches, before the emergence of modern governance systems, such leaders were the only legitimate solvers of conflicts. The role of elders was not only to negotiate local differences and needs in the process of solving conflict, but also to effectively administer a system of governance with hierarchical structures. This role was reduced and almost replaced by western style administration. Traditional leaders once more assumed a very important role after the collapse of the central government in early 1991. In south-central regions, the traditional elders played a vital role in addressing the intractable violence in the early 1990s. During this period, their focus was mainly on the cessation of hostility among communities. They did this through encouraging dialogue that resulted in consensus building and peaceful co-existence among communities. Though these locally initiated efforts by local community elders did not fully realise their goals, the gains were nonetheless commendable given the magnitude of the problem. The efforts supported both local initiatives and supported and facilitated internationally backed social and political reconciliation processes in the country.

They increasingly played greater mediation and conflict resolution roles within and between communities. The administration vacuum left in the wake of the central state’s collapse resulted in their extended role to fill the gap – whilst so doing, and drawing authority from their respective clans and sub-clans, their actions were usually based on attitude of their clans in light of how it had been affected by the government or warlord-style politicians.

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11 For a more detailed description see Chapter Two: II – Reconstructing Peace – the Challenges of Creating Legitimate Local Governance.
12 APD/IP, peace Somaliland, refers the patrol democracy loan Lewis, 1961/1999, page 12
13 The Sultan (aka Boqor (king), Ugas, Malaaq, Isim, Wabar, and others based on culture and lifestyle) is the highest traditional rank held by the Darod, Dir, etc. clans or their sub-clans based on population. The Nabadoon (chief of small clan or sub-clan) is the deputy of Ugas or Sultan whereas Samaddoon (leader of lineage) is the last nominated position and he supports both Ugas and Nabaddoon. There are also Aqils or other – not listed above – clan elders other who work with them.
As highlighted in a previous Interpeace/ CRD study, within the post-state collapse and post-conflict Somali context, it is the traditional leadership that became formalised into institutions encompassing governance and managing the social activities of some clans. Communities in Somaliland and Puntland formalised these structures, organised as Guurti houses (or Aqalka isimada in Somali), thus extending their roles and responsibilities. In addition to retaining some social and moral authority among their communities, the Elders were also able to ensure their prominence in political matters. As a male dominated process, only males inherit such a position which is predicated on trusted leadership. This belief makes traditional elders highly respected and easily obeyed by their ‘subjects’, and Somalis’ fear of curse (habaar) from traditional leaders. Though traditional leaders had come under attack with the alternate ideology of Al Shabaab, in most central regions traditional elders have begun to reclaim their position as important players in local and regional politics.

The authority and legitimacy of the traditional leaders was historically strong as their number was restricted and their selection/appointment derived directly from the sub-clans and clans they represented. However, as the number of community elders grew as a result of successive colonial and centralised government initiatives, their role and capacity to effectively deliver community services such as reconciling warring clans and sub-clans, and the related collection and payment of the blood reparations (Diya), began to diminish. The decline of these services in turn swiftly and negatively contributed to repeated conflicts among clans. Subsequently, some political leaders sought to isolate the traditional leaders, while others used them as tools for propagating civil war.

“The number of Sa’ad lineages of Habar-Gedir sub-clan chiefs was only thirteen before the civil war; now they are 25 (...). This reduces the capacity and efficiency of community elders, diffuses the connection between lineage sub lineages and diminishes the work of elders as well”.

Ximan & Xeeb (Himan & Heeb) Administration: This administration is made up of Reer Hajji Suleiman (Suleiman sub-clan of Habar-Gedir of Hawiye), and administers the areas where this sub-clan resides in central regions. It covers Harardhere of South Mudug region and Adaado in the north east of the Galgaduud region. Its capital is Adaado town. It was established by community members in the Diaspora, professionals, local NGO owners and elders. It provides political representation, humanitarian support, advocacy and minimal security through local and clan based police forces and community elders. Though the administration does impose and collect taxes, the revenue is barely enough to cover all its expenses.

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16 Ibid, p. 12.
17 Interview with an elder, South Galkayo, 23 March 2010.
18 For a more detailed description see Chapter Two “Reconstructing Peace – the Challenges of Creating Legitimate Local Governance”.
**Galmudug Authority**: This is an administration unit composed of local community groups with mixed leadership including Diaspora members. Its area of control is principally the South Mudug region’s districts from south Galkayo to Harardhere. It does not collect tax, but provides humanitarian advocacy and political representation for the largest parts of the communities in South Mudug, Hobyo and Galinsoor districts. Moreover, it claims to legitimately represent the communities of this area in international forums and meetings. The authority commands moral influence in the area despite not being able to provide the practical services required by the community. The Galmudug authority was recently accepted as a full regional state by international actors with the privilege of being part of a national dialogue, enjoying equal status with the Puntland Government.

**Regional States**: There are a number of regional states recently announced by Somalia Diaspora and local communities. Though these states have no physical presence on the ground they tend to respond to the aspiration of local communities. These virtual states include Central Regions State launched for North Galgaduud region in areas dominated by the Marehan-Darood clan; El-Bur state basically covering El-Bur District and surrounding areas; Mareeg State announced in Mogadishu with the support of the Diaspora, covering El-Dher districts and its environs; and Cowl region as part of Masagaway and El-Ad districts.

**Piracy**: Piracy groups are considered as powerful actors in the central regions as they command powerful militia with financial resources that influences local and regional dynamics.

### 1.2 Summary of the Obstacles Identified by Communities

#### 1.2.1 Challenges to Social Reconciliation

This section focuses on the challenges facing social reconciliation as identified through the Pillars of Peace Programme and Mapping Exercise by communities from the central regions. It should be noted that the community’s perception toward a particular issue and their role in participation and ownership of the reconciliation processes experienced had a direct and critical influence on their views on whether or not obstacles identified could be overcome. In the reconciliation Pillar Mapping Exercise, participants identified some of the challenges that have either halted or affected the outcomes of these processes. The challenges facing social reconciliation can be characterised in relation to the way locals perceived the process and the way it was organised.

#### 1.2.2 Factors Hindering People to Reconcile

- **Mistrust Among Communities and Spread of Arms**

Mistrust among the communities is quite high and is compounded by heavy inter clan fighting which complicates and hinders disarmament efforts. The mistrust resulting from repeated such
conflict leads to a situation where each group/clan often tries to benefit from the problems of the others. In recognising and giving continued prominence to past criminal acts committed by groups fighting against each other, the trust between them is entirely undermined.

When faced with internal threats to their security, Somalis generally sought support from kinship networks who traditionally offer all forms of necessary support. However, when the multiple threats came from many external and internal forces, the primary and effective mobiliser that could galvanise the different clans to organise collective security, was an appeal to their religion. This is still true in current Somali society within the modern nation state. Traditional conflict resolution mechanisms are still valid and attractive, within the traditional context, but the process of effective peace has been made harder by the addition of a contemporary political dimension led mainly by leaders whose personal and political agendas resulted in Somalia being trapped in an endless cycles of conflict.

“A catastrophe between two lineages favours me”\(^{20}\).

The lack of mechanisms that provide for recognition and restorative justice prevents the resolution of the root causes of recurrent conflict; no clan is ready to lay down its weapons, especially when there is no trusted third party available to mediate. The immediate neighbouring countries that could have assumed this responsibility are already involved in the civil war and tarnished to varying degrees. Consequently, few effective and legitimate dialogue programmes led by and for Somalis have been instituted specifically to build trust among warring factions, which could have led to voluntary community disarmament (and still could).

“Even though peace accords have been signed in many parts, there are still complexities and mistrusts, which need proper healing”\(^{21}\).

In addition, the importation and sale of arms is a highly lucrative business in Somalia. This ignites conflicts as the ease of access to and proliferation of arms and ammunition is facilitated by a flourishing trade defended by a number of business people. This is clearly evident in the central regions where people are highly equipped with different kinds of arms as noted by the United Nations which argued that the arms embargo (UN Security Council Resolution 751 in 1992 and UN Security Council Resolution 1907 in 2009) on arms sales to Somalia had not worked properly.

“The present report, based on a thorough monitoring effort over the past six months, shows a disturbing picture of a continue influx of small quantities of weapons and ammunition that feed the local open arms markets and faction leaders’ warehouses in Somalia”\(^{22}\).

\(^{20}\) A professional lady, Focus Group Discussion, 3 May 2010 – “laba beelood ba’ooda beertaydii oo baxday dheh” (in Somali).

\(^{21}\) Focus Group Discussion, Buula, Burte District, 25 January 2012.

As long as people are armed, security and stability will not be achieved. Locals argued that the international community does not sensibly or effectively implement the UN arms embargo, as they repeatedly highlighted:

“Are the arms and ammunition Somali products? The country is a market for internationally produced arms”.

“Weapons shipments destined for Somalia tend to originate in or are routed through Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, the United Arab Emirates and Yemen. From these countries, transporting arms to Somalia is straightforward. The main entry points are the ports that serve Puntland (Bosaso), Mogadishu (Marka and El Ma’an) and Kismayo, together with the airstrips around Mogadishu. The preferred method of sanctions-busting is to transport weapons in a small fishing vessel or concealed in an aircraft’s cargo hold. The merchandise is then redistributed throughout Somalia via a long chain of brokers.”

Despite these challenges, when Somali clans leaders are supported and given the opportunity to deal with local conflict they are able to manage local issues as they have done for hundreds of years. The deeply rooted and widely accepted traditional conflict resolution mechanisms based on Somali customary laws (Xeer Soomaali) can provide handy solutions, as, an elder in Beletweyne, expressed:

“If conflict erupts between two clans, the elders of the other neighbouring clans rush into the scene, meet with the elders of the fighting clans, broker a ceasefire (Waran Jiifis) and bring the parties together in a peace conference (Shir nabadeed), where all accounts are settled peacefully on the basis of Xeer”.

- Poverty and Unemployment

The Somalia economy suffers from a lack of proper infrastructure. Since 1991, public services, job opportunities and development projects are virtually non-existent. As noted in other studies, poverty in Somalia has become a prominent and continuing affair. People in Somalia, have acclimatised to the consequences of poverty. Approximately, 43% of Somalia’s populations live below the poverty line (share of the population with per capita income less than $1 Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) per day). It is more pronounced in the rural areas than in the urban regions.

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23 Youth member, Focus Group Discussion, Abudwaq, 21 April 2010.
25 Yusuf Maxamed Xiirane, Focus Group Discussion, Beledweyne District, 28 January 2012.
The southern part of Somalia is comparatively poorer and suffers from unstable economic conditions. With respect to population growth, density of manpower and other factors such as lack of basic and formal education, skill-training programs, and limited formal recruitment, unemployment are at a peak level. As the UNDP and World Bank reported in 2001/2003, the rate of unemployment was estimated at 47.4%\textsuperscript{28}. The income level of many Somali people has been declining as the economy continued its downward spiral from the on-going civil strife and the prolong famine in some parts of the country. Most of the limited and sporadic economic growth which has been recorded is only noticeable in urban centres and provincial capital cities, while smaller villages see continued economic stagnation.

In the central regions, historically and traditionally the main economic resource is livestock. Due to successive droughts and a shortage of natural resources, coupled with swift urbanisation, unemployment has increased dramatically and hit the highest levels ever seen. As an apparent result of this, the militarisation of youth also increased and they became a readily available tool for use in conflict and are used in other economic activities which in turn fuel on-going tension and conflict. Unemployment and widespread poverty contributed also to high internal displacement, which results in shortage of facilities in urban areas, which lead to further insecurity as an increasing number of youth resorted to arms as a means of gaining a livelihood. Large sums of money are raised from various sources at whatever costs, such as roadblocks, which are used to purchase Miraa (Khat), arms, and ammunitions.

\begin{quote}
“The Somali factional leaders pay for the arms and ammunition with cash sent by foreign sponsors or raised from fees levied at ports and roadblocks, with the stimulant leaf called Khat, or with counterfeit shillings printed abroad”\textsuperscript{29}.
\end{quote}

In addressing these issues and challenges, the people of the central regions received scant attention and support through international\textsuperscript{30} peace engagements or interventions. The only reconciliation processes that took place were a small number of inter/intra clan initiatives; such efforts need to be advanced further and sustained through a revival of public services. It is necessary to ensure that supportive projects which create employment opportunities and provide an alternative route for persons affected by natural and conflict-related challenges are implemented through the reinstatement of governance and basic public service delivery.

\begin{quote}
“The Galmudug and intra-Sheikhal processes in the central regions were concrete step for community reintegration, unfortunately both processes did not get community support projects to help them build up the administrations, to develop job opportunities, to resume public services and rebuild infrastructure. Due to the absence of public services and infrastructure, conflicts may re-start any time”\textsuperscript{31}.
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{28} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{29} UN Security Council, Arms Embargo against Somalia constantly Violated, Report, UN News Centre, 7 November 2003.
\textsuperscript{30} CRD and Interpeace supported the Galmudug and intra-Sheikhal reconciliation processes for Sa’ad/Suleiman and Sheikhal lineages respectively in these regions.
\textsuperscript{31} Youth member, Focus Group Discussion, Adaado, 2 May 2010.
Despite this crisis, elders have tried to manage local conflict using traditional mechanisms. The absence of economic development initiatives tends to push people to engage in conflict and fight over scarce resources.

- **Limited Resources (natural and human resources)**

One of the problems faced by central regions is brain drain as people with much needed skills and experience leave to escape conflict or search for new opportunities. Intellectuals and business people are constantly moving to the southern regions or abroad. Analysts note that this may not benefit the southern regions as it may contribute to a new, or intensify existing, resource-based conflict.

> “The elite migrated from the region, the area is hot and dry, and it has no access to resources, this in turn affects community development and regional stability”\(^{32}\).

Many locals complained that Somali governments repeatedly undermine the interest of central regions, a situation echoed and reinforced by the actions of the international community. It was believed that the many programmes of international relief agencies and UN organisations were not working effectively, though their organisational profiles and mandates in these regions were supposedly designed to support local communities to rebuild and reconstitute a functioning state, and uplift people out of poverty and conflict. A shortage of natural resources and facilities such as clean water points, basic health services, basic formal education and other infrastructure have continuously resulted in routine civilian conflicts; much of these conflicts were mainly and directly due to increased competition for evermore scare grazing areas and potable water.

> “Civil war started in the central regions as there were not enough resources and public infrastructure; all previous governments and donors ignored the regions and therefore intellectuals and businesses shifted to the southern regions or fled abroad”\(^{33}\).

Participants argued that the absence of intellectuals and wealthy individuals in the central regions prolong the conflict, delay the recovery of vital public services, hinder the cessation of hostilities, undermine the preservation of peace accords, and cumulatively delays development. The locals also indicated that social conflicts and disputes in central regions based on clan vendetta, resources (watering and grazing), require the support from intellectuals and wealthy investments which could have helped mediate between competing clans, as well as support the development of basic services.

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\(^{32}\) Intellectual, Focus Group Discussion, Balamballe, 3 April 2010.

\(^{33}\) Diaspora member and former military colonel, Focus Group Discussion, South Galkayo, 25 March 2010.
“Endless conflicts are the results of shortage of natural resources, especially droughts; pastoralists look for water and grazing for their livestock, migrating to other areas, which engender conflict among migrants and residents of that area.”

1.3 Challenges to the Sustainability of Social Reconciliation Processes

- Absence of Follow-up and Information Dissemination Strategies

There are a number of social reconciliations which have not materialised or have not been properly implemented due to the lack of follow up, or lead responsibility for so doing being invested in any one recognised body with the ability and the authority to ensure compliance. As highlighted strongly in the consultations, sustained commitment to the process including through appropriate follow-up work was critical.

“The Galmudug reconciliation process among Sa’ad and Suleiman sub-clans seems neither to have been completed nor fully implemented; the agreement stalled at a level where there was an absence of follow-up body to see through the process.”

“What do reconciliations provide if there are no follow-up authorities, no community elders safeguarding it, no existing mediation committee which works effectively post process proceedings?”

In the past, community elders, with the help of central, regional and/or district administrators used to ensure the communal security, mitigation of conflicts and proper implementation of any reconciliation agreement. They would also penalise whoever broke the agreement and worked to prevent any expected or predicted confrontations between reconciled groups in the wake of the processes. Currently, as discussed earlier, the role of community elders has greatly diminished due to a number of factors. In addition to this, and partly as a consequence of this, there is an absence of rule of law and government-backed security institutions which has enabled disagreements between clans to ignite into active violence and conflict. This lack of judicial authority on the part of the Government, generally and increasingly seen among elders, has also limited their ability to monitor agreements, ensure compliance and prevent a return to violence where this does not happen.

“What there is no Culimo (sheikhs or clerics) there is no halal, where there is no country (land) there is no asset, where there is no government there is no order and law.”

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34 ASWJ representative, Focus Group Discussion, Abudwaq, 20 April 2010.
35 Professional lady, Focus Group Discussion, Adaado, 2 May 2010.
36 Intellectual member, Focus Group Discussion, Adaado, 2 May 2010 and ASWJ head of civic services, Focus Group Discussion, Abudwaq, 20 April 2010.
37 Elder, Focus Group Discussion, Abudwaq, 22 April 2010. (Culimo la’aan waa la xalaal waayaa, dal la’aanwaa la duunya waayaa, dowlad la’aannawa la xukun iyo kala dambeyn waayaa).
• **Weakness of Information Dissemination Strategies**

Though inter clan reconciliation agreements have been signed, they are usually not widely and effectively disseminated and understandable and are not directly relevant to the communities. The reasons for this are diverse and range. Among other things it is due to the lack of technical and financial capacities on the part of the elders or communities to facilitate the implementation of the agreements. It was argued that this resulted in the past in further unforeseen killings. Sometimes it happens that soon after the accord is settled killings took place, most of which due to misinformation around the accords, or a desire among parties or individuals who benefitted from the conflicts to scuttle/spoil the process.

“As there is no safeguard and follow up, authorities are given little incentive to reach accords or honour them”.

Many locals highlighted the use of peace caravans (mission or convoy), or traditional ways of propagation of information as the most recognisable and effective way of ensuring communities are aware of the outcomes of reconciliation processes, and the actions, responsibilities and expectations emerging from them. Such means identified included the need to empower elders and sheikhs through awareness rising and a better understanding of agreements reached and expectations raised; organizing the widespread coverage and discussion of the reconciliation outcomes through media (TV, radio, monthly gazettes, etc.). Locals recommended the utilisation of neutral media channels and other means that are free from politics and group interests to ensure that the right information and messages are disseminated about the accords.

“Broadcasting of accords through existing media houses twists the accord into partiality. Much of the existing media is owned and organised by political or religious groups, particular clans and/or interest groups whom locals believe do not espouse their views”.

The use of existing politically inclined media for peace propagations was seen as dangerous as they often were partisan favouring a particular group, policy, or ideology and could undermine the entire process.

• **Improper/ Inadequate Ways of addressing Root Causes of Conflict and Clan Revenges**

*The peace sessions are eased conflicts*. (Somali saying)

The lack of effective ways of addressing and managing of the root causes of conflict was identified by many participants as one of the primary factors that prolonged social conflicts.

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38 Intellectual, Focus Group Discussion, Abudwaq, 21 April 2010.

39 The Peace Caravan was one of the schemes used by CRD and Interpeace after some reconciliation accords in south-central regions. It was used as a parameter to assess if the locals fully owned the process, if the aims were achieved, if the information provided were sufficient and if the outcomes were accepted.

40 Galmudug Minister, Interview, 12 May 2010. (Isticmaalka warbaahinta jirta hadda oo ay samaysteen koox siyaasadadeed, qabiilo gaar ah, koox diimeed and dowlado shisheeye iyo hay’ado caalami ah oo aan la agoon danta ay ka leeyihiin waaddanka waxay u ekaysiinaysaa heshiiska mid ay leedahay cid gaar ah, lamina dhegaysanyo marka faga reebo cidda leh laantaas warbaahineed).

41 Saying: “gogal nabadeed madaxaa lagu kala qaadaa”
among the clans, lineages or groups. Revenge killings\(^{42}\) are a common phenomenon in Somalia. Instead of solving and discussing the root causes of the conflict/dispute, and as a result of misunderstanding arising from inadequately involving the victims in the discussions, parties usually fail to grasp or address the key underlying drivers of the conflict.

“To solve problems things have to start from their roots”\(^{43}\).

In the reconciliation process, factors identified that triggered the conflicts are often not properly addressed due to a number of reasons including unfavourable timings (short deadlines for the settlement of accords) and restrictions from donors; misleading\(^{44}\) or confusion of donor and/or misinterpretations about the conflict, the key parties to the dispute and their agendas. It was noted that the handling of the proceedings can also directly alter, mislead (sometimes deliberately) and shorten the time and processes considerably which, in turn, sets up the reconciliation to ultimately fail. Participants expressed frustration over the manner in which many reconciliation efforts had been pursued which, they argued, actually hindered the reparation of victims.

“What is wrong during reconciliation processes is the undermining or the ignorance of the root causes of conflict to focus only on causalities; this prolongs problems, no one can solve dispute or conflict unless the causative factor is solved\(^{45}\).”

“Are you here for a project based process or for a genuine reconciliation among Sheikhal lineages? If you want to do what NGOs often do, then take some pictures, sign vouchers and leave us to our private business; but if you are willing to pursue a genuine process, then we will commit with you to do so\(^{46}\).”

Concluding conflicts and propagating agreements that only partially address the root causes of the conflict, and therefore do not satisfy either party, engender further suffering for the rest of the community, and can intensify and lead to even more complicated consequences than the original conflict discussed.

“The consequences of unfinished reconciliations are more deaths”\(^{47}\).

\(^{42}\) “Dismiss head per head” – which literally means that when a conflict erupts and many people are killed, at the negotiation table, each clan will present the number of dead. As a part of the healing process, each death that occurred on one side will be dismissed by the death that occurred on the other side.

\(^{43}\) Elder, Focus Group Discussion, Abudwaq, 22 April 2010. “Weel guntaa laga unkaa”.

\(^{44}\) Elder, Focus Group Discussion, Abudwaq, 22 April 2010. “Weel guntaa laga unkaa”.

\(^{45}\) Sometimes the exact root causes of the conflict are not the main focus.

\(^{46}\) CSO representative/ Businessman, Focus Group Discussion, Abudwaq, 21 April 2010. (maxaاجن lahu khaligamaa xallinta isku dhacyada, waxaa lahu mashquulaa dhibka dhacay ee lagama hadlo waxa sababay, lama xallin karo dhibka dhacay haddaan laga hadlin waxa sababay)

\(^{47}\) Elder participating to the Intra-Sheikhal Reconciliation Process, 16 September 2009.

\(^{48}\) Elder, Focus Group Discussion, Dhabat, 27 April 2010.
• Non-consensual (incomplete) Accords
Participants argued that signing and propagating incomplete or non-consensual agreements lead to more problems and causalities.

“I hate frustrations after an unjust accord”\(^{48}\). “It is an NGO business”\(^{49}\).

It was argued that the politicising of social reconciliation processes by political groups/persons or warlords who simply sought to advance their selfish interests, also hindered the success of the process.

“The Guri-el/ Balambal process between Marehan and Cayr in 1994-1996 succeeded while Sa’ad and Suleiman is still unsettled. The former process was free from any political involvement. In the Sa’ad and Suleiman process, however, some politicians took part, as it happened with the Cammaara/Bacaadweyn conflict among Qubays of Dirr and Suleiman of Habargedir. It’s politicised, so it is not easy to intervene”\(^{50}\).

• Effects of Clan Revenges on Peace Accords
Revenge killings were described as one of the most critical problems facing reconciliation initiatives in Somalia. The victims carry forward the grudges which in turn lead to an endless cycle of revenge. In addition, during the reconciliation process, parties often refuse to admit their past wrong doings, which often provokes fresh conflicts, challenges and misunderstandings among the groups, and has the potential to ignite new or fuel existing conflicts.

“Revenge killings took place in 1993 when a man over 80 years old was killed. This was in revenge of a murder that took place over forty years ago when the father of the current offender was killed. The pursuit of revenge is a prime factor that hinders conflict resolution in Somalia”\(^{51}\)."

Incomplete peace processes and the absence of implementation of reached accords were identified as factors contributing to the continuation of conflicts and revenge killings. This has setback steps taken to sustain or promote community coexistence and reintegration. Participants indicated this as the starting point of endless killings, vendetta, revenge and social conflicts.

“Incomplete interventions results in more endless problems”\(^{52}\)

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\(^{48}\) Elder, Focus Group Discussion, Dhabat, 27 April 2010. “Guddoon Jaban dabadii guuguu baan nacay”.

\(^{49}\) Focus Group Discussion, Dhabat, 27 April 2010.

\(^{50}\) Elder, Focus Group Discussion, Guri-el, 24 April 2010. He compares local initiatives to donor supported initiatives with political involvement.

\(^{51}\) Elder, Focus Group Discussion, Dhusamareb, 26 April 2010.

\(^{52}\) ASWJ head of civic services, Focus Group Discussion, Abudwaq, 20 April 2010.
Deviation from Traditional Way of Conflict Resolution

War customary laws: traditionally there is acceptance of the principle that in any conflict specific members of the community would be spared from spear (biri-ma-geydo). It was widely accepted that if such persons were harmed, the potential resolution to that conflict would become much harder. Therefore, violating war customary laws undermines order and intensifies the conflicts. Targeting of biri-ma-geydo, worsens situation, makes it difficult to stop, solve and mitigate the conflicts. Being a pastoral society, vendetta and revenge killings were the easy and common response in addressing such situations.

“The killing of two biri-ma-geydo members in Abudwaq resulted into one of the worst fighting in Galgaduud region between two communities which had no historical conflicts. The endless conflict between of Sa’ad and Suleiman refers to the killing of some elders”.

Historical role of elders on conflict resolution: In the past, elders had a recognised and respected role to stop, mediate and reach peace accords between communities in conflict. Under the Somali culture, locals get together, frankly discuss and solve disputes under trees. The pattern is compatible absolutely with community relations and methods of bolstering community resilience, which is why it was always a highly efficient method of conflict resolution.

The Somali traditional manner of Diya payment differs slightly from that of the Islamic Sharia, but was known and accepted by communities. Among other mechanisms used to solve disputes, it included Godobtir (marrying a girl of the victim’s brother, father or any relative male to replace the deaths), handing over of the gun/s used to kill a victim to the victim’s family, paying of extra diya or sorrow to the victim’s family.

Current influence of elders: The current dynamics in the country undermines the genuine elders’ roles and resorts to the empowerment of militia leaders and warlords. Furthermore, the self-appointed clan elders inflate the leadership and wrangles. In the Somali community, the elders were either selected using well-defined and known criteria, or their positions were inherited. Thus, the appointment or nomination of an elder by interest groups dilutes the meaningful role and efficacy of clan elders.

“The number of Sa’ad lineages of Habargedir sub-clan chiefs was only thirteen before the civil war erupted in the area; now they are twenty five. This loses the capacity and efficiency of community elders, and diffuses the connection between lineage sub lineages and omits the work of elders”.

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53 Sheikhs, women, children, elders, captives in the war (enemy members), peace delegates, relative in laws, intellectuals, wealthy individuals, guests, etc.
54 Xeerarka dagaalka ee dhaqanka soomalida.
55 Elder, Focus Group Discussion, Abudwaq, 22 April 2010. The two birimigeydo members are: (a) Sheikh Macruuf from Dirr clan in 1993 and (b) Dr. A/hakim Dahir Dirir from Marehan clan, in 2004.
56 Warlords and clannish politicians also inflated the elders as the appointed new elders can facilitated their intra-clan interests.
57 The diminishing role of elders in the community and lack of rule of law, the weaknesses of community cohesion and the increase of the number of communities benefited the self-appointed elders.
58 Elder, Interview, South Galkayo, 23 March 2010.
“To be chosen and crowned as an elder, one should be God-fearing and fair. Fear of God tends to make an elder considerate and do the right things with a sense of justice. There is a saying: ‘men without justice scatter as deer’! With such qualities, the good elder becomes a ‘father’ to all men under him, irrespective of their political affiliation or religious beliefs”.

Sultan Said Garasse – Traditional titled elder from Puntland.

Therefore, it indicates that it is up to the elder to solve and overcome community problems with the help of all stakeholders, and that the position and role and person of the elder should not itself be part of the problem.

“It is up to elders to solve whatever culprits and other gangs do”\(^{59}\).

Deviation from the traditional ways of conflict resolution and the undermining of the traditional\(^{60}\) role of the elders contribute to the re-emergence of social conflicts and the rising of political vacuums. Elders enjoy the direct communication and immediate feedback from all stakeholders, so organising, empowering and supporting the appointed and genuine elders could be a simple way of contributing toward the recovery and the peaceful co-existence of the Somali people.

“Customarily, solving killings through diya payment (reparations) used to go along with the exchange of girls\(^{61}\) and return of the arms used by culprits; nowadays, none of these steps are taken and it is not easy to forget the past vendettas\(^{62}\).

Participants identified a number of other traditional interventions which also affected the dynamics and success or failure of reconciliation processes, as presented below.

**Face-to-face dialogue between parties to the conflict:** locals used to discuss their differences and disputes face to face to solve them. It was regarded as unacceptable for either party not to acknowledge its mistakes. This phenomenon was also identified as being weakened with many parties to the dispute not being willing to accept any culpability, thereby undermining the basis and traditional mechanisms for reconciliation.

**Mediation by a third party:** for third party mediation to be effective and useful, both the parties to the dispute must accept and respect the role and authority of the mediating party. In the Somali society, this role has often been assumed by a mediation committee which listens, records and draws upon Sharia and customary law to solve problems. In this manner, no party

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\(^{59}\) Elder, Focus Group Discussion, South Mudug, 18 March 2010. “Waxii ardaal halfeeyo akhyaar baa hagaajiso”.

\(^{60}\) The first priority of community elders within the community is to solve conflicts, disputes, and managing their lineages. Both clannish politicians (warlords) are undermining it.

\(^{61}\) Expecting new-borns to replace the victim.

\(^{62}\) Elder, Focus Group Discussion, Herale, 28 April 2010. “Meel xinjiri ku daadatay xab ayaa lagu daadiyaa” meeye gabdhiihii godob tirka ahaa ee la bixin jiray si loo illaawo dhibkii dhacay”.

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can reject the decision of the committee; if one does so, the committee and opposing party are allowed to take a common position which often tips the balance in favour of the decision made by the committee.

“If conflict erupts between two clans, the elders of other neighbouring clans rush into the scene, meet with the elders of the fighting clans, broker a ceasefire (Waran Jiifis) and bring the parties together in a peace conference (Shir nabadeed), where all accounts are settled peacefully on the basis of Xeer”.

\[63\] Focus Group Discussion, Beledweyne District, 28 January 2002.
A reconciliation process in Mudug region took place among two sister lineages of Sheikhal-Lobogay-Aagane, the Samatar and Mohamed, prompted by the death of more than 100 people (including some prominent business people, sheikhs and other biri-ma-geydo64 members) as a result of a 7-year on-going conflict. The conflict was conducted from Mogadishu to Mudug region, where the most acts of violence had taken place. The reconciliation process was a locally led initiative implemented by CRD/Interpeace in late 2009, and enjoyed some donor support. Conflicting parties appointed a committee that started handling the proceedings and mediation. It was an inclusive process in which all stakeholders of the community participated.

Outcome: the disputing clans signed an accord which all Mudug communities were invited to witness. Particular arrangements were organised by women to re-integrate militias in Galkayo, with a number of reinforcing and supportive ceremonies conducted by prominent sheikhs, with prayers done collectively by lineages. After that, a peace caravan (tour) to popularise the accord and disseminate information on the same was undertaken. Community reintegration exercises were also carried out in Afbarwako district, the location of some of the most ferocious conflict.

Case study focus:
1. Success of the process: The process ended in success with the appreciation of both locals (directly65 and indirectly) and donors. There was however a significant constraint from the shortage of public services, natural resources and the absence of a recognised and equipped administration, which lead into an accepted but very fragile accord;
2. Impact of the absence of a safeguard authority: Within a short time (roughly six months), revenge killings between the two lineages took place. Sensitivity and tension peaked; the already damaged and weakened accord was nearly broken; there was no authority which could take action against this violation, communities were not fully integrated and there was not enough trust leading to more resistance realised. The mediation committee formed as part of the local reconciliation process voluntarily decided to intervene to try to stop violation of the accord; it met the two parties and convinced them to exercise what was agreed in the accord. The mediation committee acted as an authority though they lacked an official identify as such, which resulted in the absence of donor support.
3. Difficulties in diya payment: In this process, it was agreed that Sharia law would be followed by the payment of diya, but the form of the payment raised problems. In Somalia, the traditional way of diya payment is different from Sharia law, and diya is paid by all lineage members. In the Mudug case, the lineage agreed to make the payment but within the receiving community the victim’s families refused to share the diya with the others - as would usually happen - arguing that they would take revenge if not fully compensated. In the end, the lineage that received the diya decided to pass on the full payment to the victim’s families but openly stated among the same lineages and sub-sub lineages that this step was a violation of the way to pay diya, and weakened the connection of sub lineages. This potentially dangerous discrepancy arose from the contradictions between sharia law and Somali traditional way of diya payment.

Submission and concession: The surrender of one party to the dispute was a step often used to stop hostilities among communities, and would happen in a variety of ways:
- One party taking responsibility for the dispute helps stop the fighting and/or commence dialogue between the two parties to resolve the dispute(s);

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64 Spare from spear.
65 Direct beneficiaries mean two lineages while indirect beneficiaries are other co-resided clans.
66 The sons of one of the conflict victims (probably last victim, peace delegate and prominent sheikh) killed a man of another lineage to revenge for the loss of his father.
• Self-reparation: diya payment to the victim’s family and lineage is another means of surrendering and stops the violence;

“We ourselves agreed to compensate our victim to avoid further combat among us and the other clan. We gave the victim’s family, seven hundreds camels as a diya and asked that they do not undertake any action against the culprit’s/offender’s lineage”\(^{67}\).

• Sending delegates to stop the hostilities and pinpoint the root causes of a particular argument, avoiding the generalisation of misunderstandings, ensuring stronger linking to others are made.

As discussed above, shortages in natural resources and vendettas are regarded as the most common causes of social conflict in the central regions, followed by the looting of livestock and other mobile properties. Acknowledging this recurring source of tension and conflict, elders set and instituted rules on how to share resources communally such as watering points and grazing zones. They sought to empower, sustain or restore the community to a peaceful coexistence as result of such an unwritten but well understood regulatory framework.

“Somalis record no documents, particularly not the cultural norms and attributes inherited. Consequently, in recollection, the interpretation of various unwritten accords may lead to misunderstanding, misinterpretation and new conflicts. The point decided as a solution to a problem may change from generation to generation and from location to location. Unrecorded agreements have no widely known and commonly understood references and this affects implementation and follow-up. A way should be developed to produce legal and formal customary laws which match the community culture and obviously faith”\(^{68}\).

As noted in a previous Interpeace/ CRD study, traditionally, Somalis adopted their customary law (Xeer Somali) based on lifestyle and culture\(^{69}\). The problem is that the customary laws changes with socio-political and security changes, depending on geographical location and with the imported civilisation from neighbouring countries. Traditionally, disputes and conflicts in Somali society were solved through recourse to an unwritten code of conduct or social contract called Xeer\(^{70}\). The new patterns of conflict resolution and reconciliation methodologies deviate to some extent, however, from this tradition. Currently, it tends to generalise the disputes and use resolution mechanisms which do not, in any way, match with the culture of society.

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\(^{68}\) ASWJ member, Focus Group Discussion, Balambal, 3 May 2010.


\(^{70}\) APD/ Interpeace, Peace in Somaliland: An indigenous Approach to State Building, 2008, p. 11. Traditional law agreed upon by the clans in each area and dependent on the deliberations of elders who gather to resolve specific problems with in a clan or between clans.
Some participants argued that current methodologies used are subject to the wishes of donors, and that the particular process ownership is therefore situated in external bodies, specifically when its time and budget dependent, and not within the communities themselves.

“The monitoring and handling of reconciliation processes by donors, desensitises the processes’ efficiency and local ownership. If the processes could be free handling of donors they would be more meaningful”71.

On the contrary, traditionally, elders used to take enough time to solve a problem and delegate to other Guurti (elders) if not solved. Their goal was to solve the problem, to revive the cultural and traditional ways of conflict resolution and team it up with local faiths and habits. There appears to be a strong need to work on adapting the current intervention strategies to better fit within the traditional, recognisable and understood Somali resolutions mechanisms.

“A social based conflict is part of the Somali culture; it used to be solved under a tree, based on Somali customary laws”72.

71 Elder, Focus Group Discussion, Guri-el, 24 April 2010. “Shirarka dib u heshiisinta waa fiicnaan lahaayeeyn haddii ay ka madax bannaanaan lahaayeeyn cidda dhaqaalaha ku caawinaysa, waxaa lagu maahmaahaa ninkii heli kara inuu maalgashado ayaa taladiisana yeelan kara, marka wuxtar badan ma lhaanayaan inta dad aan aqoon dhaqanka ummadda ay talada wax ku leeyihiin”.
72 Elder, Focus Group Discussion, South Mudug, 18 March 2010.
### Table 1: South Mudug and Galgaduud Peace Initiatives 1991-20012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Stakeholders</th>
<th>Nature of Reconciliation</th>
<th>Reconciliation Date</th>
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<tr>
<td>Galkayo</td>
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<td>Clan Reconciliation</td>
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<td>Gelinsor</td>
<td>Sa’ad and Wagartha</td>
<td>Sub-clans Renovation / revival of Hobyo Districts</td>
<td>Oct 2006</td>
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<td>Hobyo</td>
<td>Various Clans</td>
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<td>Saleman and Dir Qubays</td>
<td>Clan Reconciliation</td>
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Laying the Foundations for Peace

Case Study 2: Success of locally driven reconciliation
(Guriel/ Balamballe Accord in April 1996/ February 1997)

The accord between Marehan of Darood and Ayr of Habargedir-Hawiye clans in Galgaduud region processed in 1996/1997 was an initiative of a group of youth supported by sheikhs, elders, business people and militia leaders, free from external and political interventions which received no donor support. The overall agenda of the accord was:

• To stop longstanding hostility between the two clans, to rebuild the loss of trust between the communities;
• To stop livestock theft and encourage the return of stolen livestock to the owner;
• To share natural resources such as grazing land, watering points etc.;
• To start new trade exchange between the two communities;
• To resume social interactions such as marriage and correlations;
• To gradually solve the past conflicts and impacts resulted.

Success Indicators

• Hostility and killings stopped, and communities re-integrated fully for more than a decade as shown, among other things, by the resumption of intermarriages;
• Natural resources shared without fear;
• Resumption of trade and business exchange between the two communities soon after the first conference took place in Guriel. Livestock traders from Mogadishu arrived in Balamballe to encourage trade and social exchange among sub-clans;
• Militias of two sub-clans co-stayed for some time in Balamballe as those from Guriel arrived to build up the trust among communities.

After its initial success in the central regions, the reconciliation process developed into a political phase, which resulted in the following:

• They collectively withstood and supported the TNG set in Djibouti with leadership of Dr. A/kassim Salad Hassan as he hailed from one of the communities;
• Organisation of a political ally, the Jubba Valley Alliance (JVA), to back and support the retake of power of Kismayo sea port by Barre Hirale who was from one of the communities.

Two incidental conflicts were reported among these communities after this accord was struck; these were immediately stopped by elders, sheikhs and other stakeholder who successfully minimised the differences that had flared up:

• In 1999, the first incident took place when a group from the Guriel community bought a battlewagon (Beebe) from Marehan and returned home with it. The Marehan elders followed to forcibly retake their vehicle, which resulted in death and injuries on both sides. Soon after this incident, the Ayr elders and other stakeholders solved the standoff with Marehan elders through dialogue;
• On 4 April 2010, the second incident took place at a water point in a reserved area. The ASWJ and elders of both clans stopped it soon after the first two face-to-face combats.

“Amazingly, the assumption was that both communities believed that they could never reconcile among themselves; elders of both clans downplayed the common belief and sought and agreed on a mechanism on how they could co-stay as they had been fighting for generations”.

73 Intellectual, Interview, Garowe, 14 September 2010.
1.4 Political Reconciliation Processes

“Violence should not be used as a political tool.”

The central regions are often described as the epicentre of the Somali conflict, reflecting the importance of stability and good governance in these regions for the wider Somali community, including Mogadishu. A number of outstanding conflicts, inherent and enduring conflict dynamics, and competing interests in the area present significant challenges for sustainable conflict resolution, peacebuilding efforts, and support for local governance.

Participants in the Mapping Exercise expressed a range of views on how political dialogue processes could be better and more effectively initiated, identified why they had failed to-date, and indicated how they could be made more successful. In exploring these issues, the reason for the existence of political differences among communities in the central regions was highlighted. It was noted that the presence of political differences had led to a lack of mutual understanding between residents and communities of the region, resulting in the absence of peaceful co-existence.

1.4.1 Contextual Challenges

Participants in the Mapping Exercise looked at local reconciliation initiatives, and explored the perceptions of local people, sought to highlight the interests of political groups’ behaviour outside of national and international Somali peace conferences, and to identify international actors’ objectives. They also focused on the level of trust within and between communities, political groups, international actors and political groups. The issues identified and areas under focus have remained largely unchanged in the past decades.

Since the collapse of the state, more than a dozen reconciliation attempts were attempted. Most of these were externally driven processes with little local input. One of the key features of the political reconciliation processes was the representation, ownership, venue (abroad), background and participation in the peace conferences. The selection process was always determined by the external sponsors, thus giving rise to cries of unfairness in the aftermath of every process. Besides the dissatisfaction over the issues of participation and representation, the ground was never sufficiently prepared through preliminary discussions and pre-negotiations to ensure greater cooperation and success at the conferences.

These conferences were focused on seeking short-term quick fixes. Therefore, every participant brought to the conference table a package of perceived injustices, mistrust, prejudice and predetermination and did not come with a constructive attitude and openness to compromise
genuinely. Most of the actors had very localised interests, based on temporary clan alliances and the pursuit of unrealistic political ends. Accordingly, every conference simply created further confusion and fragmentation that in turn derailed the implementation of the agreed accords. In addition, the localisation of political interests is a product of past injustices and the unequal distribution of economic, social and political resources, thus causing fear of victimisation and possible abuse by the incoming government.

As has been noted by various commentators, in most of the conferences, traditional/community/religious leaders and civil society organisations were not accommodated, or their role was limited to that of observers only. The emergence of new warlords was almost guaranteed as a result of such conferences given that the criteria for participation for many was simply to be or have been an armed faction leader active militarily; the emergence of new warlords with a religious background that would sustain the conflict was implicitly encouraged. Consequently, the ever-increasing number of faction leaders, having the clan as their only political identity, became the major actors in the Somali peace process. Hence, most of the Somali reconciliation conferences actually succeeded in creating the very actors whose actions were designed to derail attempts at peace. An elder who became desperate from the Somali peace conferences captured the frustration and despair of many:

“As long as we are waiting for peace from the armed people, it will not be achieved because they took the guns to attain their personal interest and ambition rather than our common wellbeing”75.

This phenomenon was acute in central regions of Somalia where national and international conferences have had negative effect on local community. Local traditional leaders or civil actors have never been invited to national and international conferences. Instead, people in Mogadishu and within the Diaspora who claimed to represent the central regions attended these meetings, limiting the opportunity for the actual people in and of the central regions to air and present their concerns to national/international authorities, platforms or conference participants, thus keeping the regions isolated from the rest of the country. Such conferences also exacerbated and inflamed tensions as the key actors and communities were not part of the discussions. Examples include the escalation of conflict following the 1991 Djibouti Somali Reconciliation Conference, the March 1993 Somali Reconciliation Conference held in Addis Ababa, and the 1997 National Reconciliation Conference held in Sodare, Ethiopia.

During the Mapping Exercise, communities identified specific challenges facing reconciliation processes, and compared reconciliation processes at national level and local reconciliation success.

75 Focus Group Discussion, Baydhabo District, 23 March 2012.
• Incompatible Interests

The public views on political reconciliation processes were varied, and centred primarily on the ownership of the processes, linked directly to interests of groups beyond them. Criticism focused on two areas: representation and the role of genuine stakeholders. They also criticised the empowering of warlords who were given recognition by external forces in externally driven peace and reconciliation processes as representatives of locals without any real or legitimate mandate from the communities they supposedly represented.

“At the same time representation tended to be based on a mixture of clan, military and financial power. Externally sponsored peace conferences have generally served to strengthen the prestige of ‘warlords’ and political elites. Indeed, with the possible exception of Arta, the same elite are recycled at each conference, providing little opportunity for alternative leaders to emerge. Many of these delegates have in fact lacked strong constituencies and had only tenuous control or influence over the territories that they claimed.”

It was noted that some political groups/individuals claimed that they are representing their communities, even while recognising that they could not go back to their regions to meet the locals. During the Mapping process, there were such political elements who sought information from the research team members in order to find out what actually was happening on the ground.

“We as parliamentarians represent the regions. Although they didn’t appoint us to represent them, we are here (in Mogadishu) for them. For Galgaduud region only there are more than seventy parliament and cabinet members, unfortunately we cannot go to the regions, we have no facilities to be able to serve them.”

Participants criticised the fact that reconciliation processes rarely considered the need for reconciliation with neighbour clans with whom the communities usually had common interests (such as residents sharing natural resources, local administrations sharing the same political interests) with a view to establishing greater common governance structures.

“Why are we not reconciling the nearby towns and clans to share administrations and from the bottom up to build the national institutions instead of focusing on complex reconciliations held outside, inviting those not representing the locals?”

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77 TFG Parliament Member, Interview, Mogadishu, 8 February 2010.
78 Elder, Focus Group Discussion, Balamballe, 3 May 2010.
The adequacy and relevance of externally organised conferences as well as the interests of the different groups involved in them were questioned. It was recognised, however, that without having the warlords on board - especially in the high level political conferences – finding the anticipated positive outcome would always be a challenge.

“Locals have no problem to co-reside, share administrations and resources, the problem is that, exile pseudo-politicians are only after their interests, representing no one though they have influences in the region and take advantage of the bad events that occurred in the past within the communities.”

The goals of political reconciliation processes were questioned, and the lack of progress and positive change resulting from these processes, as compared with locally led and locally situated lower level processes was cited.

“Why don’t we focus on local level reconciliations and peace building, rather than on national or large scale reconciliations which end with no outcome? It’s better to support the nearby clans to reconcile and have a local administration than try to combine these representatives’ role at the regional level and national level administrations.”

While reviewing different peace initiatives, it was noted that the locally led peace processes organised inside Somalia realised more of their objectives than others (externally driven) did. It was suggested that it may be a misunderstanding of the Somali context or the pursuit of other interests that led to the failure of these other initiatives.

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79 Marehan Ugas, Interview, Balamballe, 4 May 2010.
80 Elder, Focus Group Discussion, Dhusamareb, 24 April 2010.
Case Study 3: Mudug Peace accord on 1993

Background: The Galkayo conflict was one of the worst situations in central regions. Hundreds of ‘spare from spear’ (biri-ma-geydo) members were killed within a very short time; widespread destruction took place and the area was fully evacuated. The conflict was purposefully orchestrated and led by warlords from communities residing in the area - the Habargedir and particular Sa’ad and Darood sub-clans of Majeerteen, Leilkase and Marehan at different levels. The main conflict actors were the Sa’ad of Habargedir and Majeerteen of Harti-Darood, while the rest were indirectly involved.

The roots of the conflict lay in the overall differences among Hawiye and Darood clans around a power struggle, resources and clan identities, exacerbated by revenge killings, disputed ownership of various resources and locations within the area. This peace accord was socio-political in the sense that social and political accommodation was sought, although signatures focused mainly on the political elements of the accord. The accord was struck between A/hi Yusuf and Gen Aided, both from Galkayo communities, and focused on the following:

- Cease fire and militia withdrawal from the town;
- Social reintegration and cessation of hostilities among Galkayo communities, particularly Sa’ad and Majeerteen sub clans; this was achieved to a certain extent and communities did come together in Galkayo town;
- Opening of trade lines that connected south and central Somalia to Puntland, Somaliland and Ethiopia;
- Sharing of power at the national level with each grouping representing their respective clans; this was used as a foundation for an attempt to form the Salballaar government in Mogadishu but did not gain traction.

The success factors

- Locals came together; this cooperation continued and obtains still today;
- Hostilities and active combat among communities was minimised or stopped, although past grievances and war mistakes were not wholly solved;
- Some infrastructural facilities and public services were revived by locals, local administrators and donors;
- The once destroyed town of Galkayo became a business centre of central regions; it connects south-central regions with Puntland and Somaliland and forms a strong business bridge between zone five of Ethiopia (Somali west) and the greater Somalia.

As noted in a previous Interpeace/ CRD study, a total of six different peace conferences were held in Somaliland from February 1991 to May 1993 and they did not achieve their goals. Signatories, included groups which positioned themselves in opposition to the organised ‘government’, reinforcing the view expressed by locals regarding the recognition of warlords or persons unrepresentative of them being given a significant place at the international negotiating table.
“Clean hands can clean dirt from the rest; the international community repeatedly invites the spoilers, those in the Diaspora and warlords, they are part of the problem, which is why outcome of such efforts are useless; we know it more than anyone else. Are these reconciliations or concerts?”

History shows that locally initiated and led political initiatives are more likely to be fruitful and achieve a greater degree of success. In this regard, it was noted that the international community’s efforts largely ignored the importance of local ownership of the process and inclusiveness. The variation in understanding of Somalia and its socio-political and cultural dynamics by members of the international community problem was also described as another reason for the failure of political conferences at the national level.

“We are confused about what the international community wants in and for this country; they are supposed to tell us and finish the hostility.”

Locals questioned the vision of international community towards Somalia, arguing that diverse interest groups manipulated the internationally sponsored initiatives which led directly to the repeated failure.

In contrast, some participants did highlight the proposition that it was Somalis themselves that failed to re-establish their nation’s institutions due to their own weakness, and that Somalis therefore could not lay the blame on the international community.

“To blame the interventions of foreign countries or so called external actors is baseless, it is the Somalis’ failure, no need to deny the failure, Somali people have to accept their faults.”

Other supportive arguments suggested that the international community played its role well by accommodating millions of Somalis who fled from civil war, and provided some services to those residing in Somalia and are ready to stand with the country in the reconstruction of the national institutions.

“One cannot prepare a meal and force you to eat.”

In other words, the international community can provide the resources and the platform but it is up to Somalis to do the task of rebuilding their country.

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86 Youth Member, Focus Group Discussion, Guri-el, 24 April 2010.
87 Successive reconciliations in Somaliland and Puntland ended successfully and led to the establishment of the Somaliland and Puntland administrations respectively.
88 Community Leader, Interview, South Galkayo, 24 April 2010.
89 Youth member, Focus Group Discussion, Guri-el, 24 April 2010.
90 Women, Focus Group Discussion, Abudwaq, 21 April 2010.
91 Diaspora Member, Focus Group Discussion, South Mudug, 25 March 2010.
Fears of Power Abuse

The country’s continued instability contributed to enduring fears amongst warring communities and parties. The worry was that the leading group may abuse power and use it as a tool for oppression and suppressing others. Discussions revealed that people are worried about the national political reconciliation as powerful groups assume leadership of the country with perceived intention of subjugating others.

Despite a widespread desire among the Somali people for a return to a state of peaceful coexistence, the restoration of a Somali national government is a prospect that continues to divide people more than it unites them. This is in part because of a profound public mistrust of political institutions and leadership who in the past have used power accorded to them for clan manipulation and political gain.

“As a result of the country’s political failure communities are fearful of the possible abuse of power by their opponents if they came to power, that is why groups are trying to oppose when others come to power, and are organising their regional or autonomous administration units if they do not have access to central power”.

As noted in a previous Interpeace/CRD study, politicised clan interests are fundamental and when imbued with chronic instability and fluidity it makes the process exceptionally difficult to hold together. Views expressed through the Mapping Exercise discussions highlighted that the fear of abuse of power was focused on two areas of contention: fear of authority and fear of abuse of power among clans.

Fear of authority: this was rooted in the historical abuses power perpetrated by past governments. Based on this, a particular clan may fear domination and control by its opponent.

“The central government’s military arrived in Adaado once with its battle vehicles and supported the Marehan clan; they killed more than thirty civilians”.

Fear of abuse of power among clans as locals had long running and deep clan conflict with cycles of clan revenges and targeted killings which led to the fear of one clan towards another. There was also a history of continued heavy fighting among political groups in a bid to capture power and leadership; as such, locals believed that the first consideration of these groups is the taking of power to either gain or take revenge on others, not to lead a peaceful society for all people. In addition, it was argued that many key persons in the group elites used the clan as a protection and safe haven from past war criminals.

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92 Elder, Focus Group Discussion, Adaado, 2 May 2010.
94 Elder, Focus Group Discussion, Adaado, 2 May 2010.
95 Please refer to section on community mistrust in the above sections of social reconciliation challenges.
96 Warlords and other war criminals take power for the sake of protection while others continue fighting to avoid having to account for them.
“To stop on-going conflicts and establish administrations for the regions, consideration must be given to addressing the warlord’s case against humanity in order to solve and discuss what to do; otherwise, Somalis will remain hostile to each other.”

- **Misunderstanding of Political Context at the Regional Level**
  The course of the regional conflict took a long path from a basic power struggle through to the emergence and dominance of radicalism. It was argued that the changing dynamics were complex and ever changing resulting in repeated misunderstanding and misdiagnosing of Somali problems, inappropriate proceedings and mediation techniques which desensitises the reconciliations.

  *Mistakes from the scratch (starting) cannot be corrected at the end. (Somali saying)*

**Knowledge on governance:** Locals argued that the participants in the political reconciliation processes knew very little about the role of, and even the very need for, having local and national administrations. They saw the processes often more as a way for the powerful clans/ parties working to defend their interests, which gave opportunities for those who want to retain the status quo and not re-establish functioning state services, institutions and the rule of law. On the other side, those elite leaders which possessed militias and external support were regarded as worried about the impact any new governance structures may usher in and have on their power base. In addition, it was noted that the majority of the armed militia are youth under the age of thirty years who lack any real concept or experience of governance and rule of law, and may prove difficult to be brought into any such new dispensation.

  “In the world youth are educated and taken care of by both communities and administrations. We didn’t meet any administrations and our society is in civil war, the only thing that we know is how to handle the Kalashnikov, we are proud of possessing automatic machineguns and it’s up to the stakeholders to resume what they have seen before.”

This category of the populace has no conception or experience of the important role a government plays in supporting people and communities since they were born and/or grew up in the civil war.

  “I am twenty years old, I was born and brought up in a place full of civil war; I have never seen a legitimate administration, I know nothing about rule of law; the only authority I saw are clan elders, no one taught me what administration

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97 Intellectual, Interview, Abudwaq, 21 April 2010.
98 Female Youth Representative, Focus Group Discussion, Dhusamareb, 25 April 2010.
does for societies. I got an AK 47 (Kalashnikov or other automatic machinegun) at the early age of 13 years due to that situation; I feel I have all what I need and what I have been dreaming to achieve; what can an administration and governance do for me?"  

1.4.2 Challenges in approaches for political reconciliation processes

- **Absence of Inclusiveness and Ownership**

  **Absence of inclusiveness:** Participants argued that stakeholders at the grassroots community level had not been able to play a significant role in most of the processes. Moreover, those processes organised by the international community did not include them at all. Overall, the invitees of most of the political reconciliation processes were seen as pursuing different interests, and the different political groups were neither equally represented, nor dealt with equally by the organisers of reconciliation conferences.

  “All existing politico-interest groups need to be on board in the reconciliation processes, giving an opportunity for all stakeholders to air specific views. Denying or thinking to dismiss others worsens the situation so reconciliation processes has to be inclusive with all concerned parties involved and treated equally; those not welcomed by the international community have the right to participate as they are Somalis - it’s not reconciliation if all concerned parties are not brought on board and if it has not promoted dialogue among different groups”.  

  **Participants’ selection:** Locals questioned the process used for the selection of representatives at reconciliation conferences, arguing that organisers always invite warlords and preselected or known members of the Diaspora. They argued that consultation meetings prior to the selection of participants should take place.

  “A stolen camel does not deliver halal calf”.

  **Absence of ownership:** here locals indicated there was overall an absence of local ownership for many reconciliations processes, due to two things:

  - Financial constraints – Locals could not invest in reconciliation processes, as they lack both technical and financial capacity; this resulted in the ability of investors and warlords dictating the overall process and ensuring the safeguarding of their interests in the process;
  - Misguiding of the processes – Locals expressed high levels of frustration at the thrust of most reconciliation processes being at a too high level with many disparate stakeholders, which in turn ignored, squeezed out the space, or undermined such processes at the local level. It was argued that not supporting such local processes with neighbour communities with whom

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99 Youth Representative, Focus Group Discussion, Guri-el, 24 April 2010.
100 Youth Representative, Focus Group Discussion, Abudwaq, 21 April 2010.
101 Sheikh, Focus Group Discussion, Balamballe, 3 May 2010. “Hal booli ahi niriig xalaal ah ma dhasho”. 

36 Pillars of Peace: In Pursuit of Peace
there could have a strong common political interest in making reconciliation processes work, and focusing only on larger more remote, unproductive and costly processes, prolonged the conflict.

“It’s unfortunate that locals couldn’t offer to organise and support a conference to resettle the regions and administrations due to lack of financial capacity. Those conferences that are organised are misguided.”

Locally organised reconciliation processes organised and implemented by organisations also tended to fail to engage with local communities and consult them. Thus, key actors were not brought on board in support of a process leading to difficulties in the implementation of any accord then reached.

Logistics, Venue and stakeholder’s accessibility: participants in the focus group discussions pointed out how processes held inside regions and districts are best for them as they ensure that they can contribute to peace processes. In contrast, large-scale conferences benefitted only small elite groups who were capable to reach the meeting sites in terms of communication and logistics.

“The conferences held outside are for the Diaspora, warlords and agents of other countries, who can get the financial capacity from the international community and are working for particular interests.”

Locating the venue of such processes within local communities was recommended so as to ensure locals could both participate in and facilitate meetings. It was argued that this would give a sense of sovereignty for those who then attended and also ensure local communities could better apply pressure on others who often acted as pressure groups or spoilers. As noted in a previous Interpeace/ CRD study, the choice of venue can be for practical, political and symbolic reasons. In 1993, Borama was offered as a ‘neutral venue’ by the Gadabursi who were mediating the talks at Sheikh between the SNM factions. In the northeast, Garowe was chosen as the venue for the Constitutional Conference, because of its central location among the Harti clans.

• Lack of Forgiveness among Conflicting Parties

“To forgive those who have wronged one is an act of highest sovereignty and great inner freedom. In forgiving and reconciling the victims are superior to the perpetrators and free themselves from compulsion to evil deeds.”

Jurgen Maltmann, German Theologian

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103 Elder, Focus Group Discussion, Dhabat, 27 April 2010.
In the Somali context, the restoration of justice and acceptance (recognition) of past crimes constitute a crucial step for minimising community differences and maximising reintegration. Some participants insisted that there would be no political and social reconciliation or community get together to restore their co-existence without it. It was suggested that some form of Justice Restoration and Truth Commission for Somalia along the lines used in South Africa could be a useful way to bring locals together.

“In the Somali culture, elders don’t know how to compromise or give in one each other; there is no acceptance of past events; therefore Somalis needs a better strategy to develop an honest and realistic commission for harmonisation and truth recovery.”

As the civil war hit its peak, no steps have been taken to bring to justice any of those who committed war crimes. Instead, participants believed, the warlords and other war criminals continued to be recognised locally and internationally and given a prestige and role to in fact represent those whom had suffered at their hand. Within the existing governance structures, such leaders were invited to attend political processes. It was acknowledged that if these individuals fear the rule of law which could deliver some justice to those that suffered, they would try very hard to spoil the process and keep themselves from being brought to account.

**Challenge of Power-Sharing (4.5 Formula)**

As noted previously, those in favour of using the clan as a basis for political power-sharing during the transition government from prolonged conflict to a more democratic political system argue that it is the only form of social association to which all Somalis belong and which can provide checks and balances in the political system. This view dominated at Arta due to the realities on the ground and the ‘4.5 formula’ was adopted as the basis for representation. Participants in the Pillar Mapping described the formula as the tactic to legitimise existing clan supremacy and prolong conflicts. They argued that the formula classified and segregated Somalis, encouraged incompetence, undermined the rights of some Somali communities, weakened every government as it encourages the splitting of Somalia into small authorities, which in turn increases conflict around inter-regional borders and territorial arguments.

“Clan supremacy is the sensible factor that led to clan conflict and provocations against central government, the battle lines were drawn on: which clan had less right than others? Who did any demographic census for Somali clans?”

It was suggested that the 4.5 formula exacerbates the existing clan differences and complexities, it divides the community as major and minor clans, or as some participants argued, it shows that clans have different rights or it divides people into classes. The 4.5 formula has direct and
indirect effects on political reconciliation processes as some clans believe that their weight in the community has been undermined through this formula. Several community elders indicated that to undermine or deny some of the communities their rights and opportunity of taking leadership role threatened the possibility of building peace and stability in the region.

“The 4.5 formula is a collective crime against Islam and communal rights. I am calling the public to turn to Allah and ask for forgiveness and stop this useless formula”\(^\text{109}\).  

1.4.3 Achievements in Reconciliation Processes

Despite the range of obstacles and challenges explored above, participants also highlighted a number of reconciliation processes that were successful and sought to identify the factors that contributed to that success, some were locally initiated and facilitated, others received external donor support.

Locally Initiated Reconciliations: it was noted that most locally driven reconciliations ended in success. These initiatives are viable to date and records from central regions of which the Guriel/Balamballe\(^\text{110}\) is part can attest to this claim.

Donor supported interventions: In central regions, the Galmudug (for Sa’ad and Suleiman of both Habargedir-Hawiye clan) and Intra-Sheikhal\(^\text{111}\) (for two sister lineages of Aagane-Reer-lobogay-Sheikhal) reconciliation processes are among donor supported interventions held and finished successfully. However, due to the absence of a clear follow-up strategy, authority and rule of law, target communities observed that these processes stopped, also partly due to heavy causalities and active combats amongst civilians.

In the political or socio-political reconciliations domain, central regions held no particular conference other than for the Mudug\(^\text{112}\) (Galkayo) accord in 1993 between Majeerteen and Sa’ad communities. It was a socio-political conference with a mix of social and political aims; it succeeded in facilitating social reconciliation while political differences among communities were unresolved. Participants argued the importance of another Galkayo socio-political intervention to address outstanding issues.

• Roles of Women, Youth and Business in the Reconciliations\(^\text{113}\)

Hostilities cessation role: The women, youth and business groups of central regions played important roles to stop hostilities among clans at different levels.

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\(^{110}\) For briefing, see the Case Study 3 - Social reconciliations challenges section.

\(^{111}\) For briefing, see the Case Study 1 - Social reconciliation section.

\(^{112}\) For briefing of this accord, see Case Study 4 - Political reconciliation challenges section.

\(^{113}\) In the subsection, the community role will be mentioned but for more detailed data see Chapter III on the role of civic actors in promoting peace and local governance.
Barrier’s breakdown role: Following clan and political conflicts and battlefields, frontlines and fake borders emerged among communities in central regions that had previously resided together peacefully, particularly those of the Hawiye and Darood Clans. To overcome such fighting along borders, women in central regions played an important and effective role to reduce or stop the heaviest clan differences in early nineties. They led efforts in breaking down political-clan barriers among fighting groups; they boldly crossed perceived hot frontlines and battlefields between clan based armed groups. Women also took advantage of the community’s cultural reality, which dictates against killing a woman. Women are literally ‘spared from spear’ (birimageydo).

Women and youth actively participate in the reconciliation processes at the social level in central regions; they sometimes act as pressure groups in the dialogues. The simple example is the role of women in Intra-Sheikhal and Galmudug processes between two sister-sub lineages of Sheikhal and Sa’ad and Suleiman of both Habargedir respectively.
Case Study 4: Role of Militia and youth on peace

The conflict between the Balamballe and Guri-el communities was one of the most intractable and longstanding in the central regions. The root causes for the conflict were grazing, watering and other social issues, which later transformed into political-clan aspect. Its effects were devastating: deaths of uncountable lives, destruction of properties, livestock theft and escalating hostilities among locals. The civil war in the late eighties in which communities fought against central government precipitated a large-scale displacement of communities belonging to the Marehan and Ceyr of Habargedir clans.

A group of youth were prepared to sacrifice themselves in the pursuit of peace and decided to cross the battle lines at the peak of the conflict in early 1996. It was a surprising and very risky move and as they reached Guri-el town, the stronghold of other group, the opponents wanted to kill them all. Fortunately, the Salihiyah sheikh[^14] in Guri-el protected the group of youth and defused the situation on the ground. Through that, negotiation fully supported by business leaders began. The youth group with peace delegates from the Guri-el community (mostly business people) returned to Balamballe. Thus started a process which culminated in the Guri-el peace accord in late 1997.

“We decided to go Guri-el without prior communication and by the time we reached, we faced much threat from militias and people of Guri-el. We decided to enter the Salihiyah centre and asked the sheikh to provide a safe haven for us, he accepted and finally called the community leaders to ask us why we were there. Deep discussions with our opponents started and fortunately they welcomed our calls for peace”[^15].

In the Galmudug process between Sa’ad and Suleiman of both Habargedir sub-clans, the women play brilliant role of both pressure group and mediator of the process whenever obstacles and opposed interests arouse in the process. They were also having role of technical and financial support as they organised and prepared part of the logistics on the ground.

“We communicated with women of other parties/clans through radiophones; asked them to think of ways to stop hostilities among clans we belong to. We then decided to cross-battlefields using business tricks - we exchanged business items imported from Berbera and Bosaso against cooking salts from other site. The aim was to break down the barriers erected as a result of the battle among political-clan groups, mainly among the Hawiye between Habargedir and Marehan of Darood Clan. We succeeded and through that we were able to continue communication and information exchanges ending in groups unanimously deciding to resume peaceful co-existence”[^16].

[^14]: Sheikh Mohamed Mo’alim belongs to Shekhal sub-clan.
[^15]: Youth Representative (currently an intellectual and teacher at the Puntland State University (PSU)), Interview, Garowe, 15 May 2010.
[^16]: Member of Abudwaq Women Group, Interview, Abudwaq, 25 April 2010.
In September 2009, CRD/Interpeace successfully facilitated the reconciliation process that ended the Intra-Sheikhal conflict. The conflict was triggered by a revenge killing that took place in Mogadishu in late 1997. The assassination triggered revenge killings in different areas across the central regions from Mogadishu to Buqras, over 70 kilometres east of Galkayo, to Galkayo town, to Afbrwakoko village southeast Galkayo. In total, over forty people including women were killed and three dozen suffered serious injury. The success of the reconciliation process has inspired others clans to work on similar processes, and was aided by the active participation of women and youth groups.

In addition to their participation in the proceeding stages of the process, women played two important roles:

- **Pressure Group** – In the various preparatory stages of the process, women groups clarified their position on conflict and peace. They also lobbied other stakeholders to put aside their differences and without condition, and to reconcile communities arguing the conflict directly affected them.

  “You are here, in the dialogue talking for nothing among you while you kill our husbands, our boys and our brothers. We will not let you do whatever you want anymore, forget your fake arrogances’ among you and tainted images and reconcile before you leave this place”.

- **Technical & Financial Supporters of the Process** – Women of two the parties contributed financially to the process, both through money and in-kind, food and meat for participants, particularly in the spiritually commemoration & peace caravan stage. Soon after signing the accord, ceremonies to mobilise the clan residents in Galkayo town and militia reintegration were held. They also prepared food for participants in the peace caravan; gathered and called for elders and militia members put aside the conditions for the peace caravan to take place.

- **Impact of Community Achievements on Peacebuilding**

  **Community reintegration and security development**: The success of the locally driven and donor-supported reconciliations at the community level directly and indirectly contributed to the region’s overall slow recovery. Most areas in the region observed peaceful sharing of natural resources, particularly when water and grazing shortages occurred during droughts; business and trade exchange flourished and community intermarriages resumed. Clan hostilities ceased with the help of both elders and local administrators in some areas. The frequency of social conflict grossly reduced with unfinished disputed business being mostly of a political-ideological nature, rather than competition for scarce resources.

  **Hope for local administrations**: one of the goals of local people is to establish structures of local administration with a different face. As such, clans in an Al Shabaab free zone of the central region developed their own clan based administration units.

  Himan and Heeb (Ximan & Xeeb) of Reer hajji Suleiman of Habargedir tried to control the area’s residents by clan. Galmudug Authority was established by a wider net of clans in the South Mudug area, and anchored on different supportive measures such as power sharing.

  

Others want to have zonal administrations, which may not be as easy to establish and sustain, such as the one set up by the Marehan clan, which recently established the Somali Central State (SCS) Administration.

Apart from the clan administrations, other missions propose to set up autonomous administration structures for the region. Overall, the central regions face a number of obstacles such as ongoing conflict between the ASWJ and Al Shabaab, the presence of different clan-based and ideological leanings, a shortage or absence of financial and technical assistance, and a fear of power domination among clans.

Despite the achievements, some of which are presented herein, the aforementioned obstacles continue to hinder reconciliation efforts, restoration of the rule of law, and the setting up of active local administrations with common or regional targets set by locals.

1.5 Next Steps in the Reconciliation Process: Building Local Governance

The Sa’ad - Salebaan reconciliation process provided an important basis for constructive trends in the regions. It encouraged the communities to seek further progress towards creating/re-establishing local governance structures and processes to sustain the peace initiative. This reflects a growing trend locally and in the Diaspora for support for local and regional governance: Interpeace and CRD assess that it is important to encourage and build upon the already demonstrable goodwill and increasing momentum in this regard.

From early 2006, CRD with Interpeace’s support facilitated a peace process between the Sa’ad and Salebaan118 sub-clans in South Mudug and Galgaduud to end violent hostilities that had begun in mid-2004 and caused an estimated 200 deaths, mass displacement, disruption of livelihoods and trade, and destruction of property. The three phase process was convened under the auspices of the Transitional Federal Government and implemented locally. After agreement had been reached on a cessation of hostilities (phase one), CRD facilitated a conflict resolution training for militia leaders, two mini-conferences, and peace caravans to disseminate the outcomes. The process was suspended in September 2006 due to fluctuating political-security dynamics in central Somalia, which impacted – inter alia - on the political framework in which the reconciliation had been undertaken.

During this period, the affected communities succeeded in sustaining the local peace accords that had already been reached, demonstrating their commitment to the resolution of the conflict. After extensive consultations in early 2007, the process resumed with CRD/ Interpeace

118 Alternative spellings include Saleman, Saleemaan etc.
support. The concluding conference was convened successfully in Adaado in February 2007 with neighbouring clans attending as observers. Subsequent follow-up monitoring activities confirmed that the joint security committees established during the process were effective in monitoring potential clashes and intervening to sustain the peace. The successful reconciliation enabled people fleeing the fierce fighting in Mogadishu from February 2007 to seek refuge in these previously highly insecure areas.

Women played key roles in pressuring for the resolution of the conflict and reinforcing the peace. Business, political leaders and the Diaspora of the communities were consulted, briefed and engaged throughout. Subsequently, the Diaspora funded a school, hospital, radio station, etc., in south Galkayo and has remained actively engaged. The Galmudug Administration and subsequently Himan and Heeb emerged out of the last stages of the reconciliation process but need to be adjusted to become more inclusive, facilitated through a tacit but recognised social contract among key players in the region that can support a functioning administration. The political and security trends in the area also warrant such an intervention.

To consolidate gains made in the area and advance the reconciliation process to help re-establish local governance, CRD/ Interpeace intend to facilitate a number of informal meetings with key stakeholders in the community. The aim of the engagement is to assist the two communities to address the issues remaining from the earlier intervention that will hopefully help to permanently end the conflict. It is also intended to promote and facilitate a broad-based inclusive process involving other clans in the regions as the basis for the emergence of viable local and regional governance structure. CRD also hopes to facilitate dialogue between the two entities in an effort to amalgamate them into one single regional/state administration. In this spirit CRD has proposed three different phases of intervention:

**Phase I – Confidence Building and Preparatory Mini-conferences**

In this phase each community will appoint selected members to be part of the preparatory committee. The preparatory committees would be tasked with identifying the subsequent stages in the respective process: mobilising and engaging support from the local communities, Diaspora, and business, religious and traditional leaders; and carrying the processes forward. The committees will also facilitate initial intervention by identifying and addressing unfinished business from the 2007 accord. They will establish a mechanism to deal with grievances emanating from revenge killings and begin to consolidate the relative peace in their respective regions.

**Phase II – Public Dialogue and Community-based Reconciliation**

Reconciliation process and peace meetings with the support of CRD/ Interpeace will take place in the respective regions. The initial reconciliation meeting will take place between the Sa’ad and Salebaan sub-clans to consolidate the Galmudug Peace accord. The process will be
incremental. Prior to a larger reconciliation gathering, a series of local meetings will be held to prepare the ground for the two communities to come together for the main reconciliation conference.

**Phase III – Political Reconciliation and Amalgamation of the two Administrations**

The conference is expected to generate a goodwill that will allow the two regions to merge into one single regional/state administration. During this phase, CRD/Interpeace will facilitate wider regional consultation that extends to the neighbourhood clans. A technical committee will be appointed by the two existing administrations to draft a regional charter, and identify ways to set up district councils and other appropriate administrative structures.

**Recently recovered areas**

Despite the enormous challenges facing the central regions, some progress has been made which offers some hope; substantial and sustained local and international support is required however to realise further progress. The security situation, though by no means stable, has improved substantially in the last few months as fewer areas are now under Al Shabaab control. Some recovered districts such as El-Bur and El-Dher have no outstanding clan conflict both within themselves and with other neighbouring districts or clans. Business seems to be recovering. However, without local government structures in place, gains made thus far on the ground will not be consolidated. Communities in these districts identified two key areas to be assisted: consolidation of peace through community-based dialogue through which potential conflict can be resolved; and the establishment of local governing institutions that will maintain peace/security and start delivering basic essential services.
2.1 Introduction

2.1.1 Geographical Context and Historical Background

Post-independence Somali governments adopted the centralised governance system inherited from the colonial powers, continuing to marginalise traditional governance systems. Though the centralised system kept was able to maintain the country together as a unitary state, it also generated clan mistrust, and abuse of resources and power which eventually led to the collapse of the Somali state in 1991.

Today, one can distinguish five different systems of authority or governance structures in operation across the central regions of Somalia; each system operating with varying degrees of effectiveness and acceptability - particularly in Galgaduud, South Mudug, and the North-West parts of Hiraan. Some of these structures are emerging from the regional and district councils that the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) had established in early 1993/4. These local districts represent the most common systems of authority. Various political factions and militia leaders have also established a number of administrative structures, while others have been established by local communities based on traditional governing mechanisms. Since the collapse of the Somali state in 1991, there has been an effort made by various local and external actors to build local institutions that meet the specific needs of these regions.

Following the civil war and collapse of the central government, the prevailing insecurity, armed clashes among the Somali clans/sub-clans, nepotism, and warlordism forced many people to move back to their ancestral homes/regions. The migration was triggered when the conflict and polarisation between clans/sub-clans and mutual hostilities resulted in the inability of ordinary Somalis to continue to live independently in regions where their clans/sub-clans were in the minority, and subjected to marginalisation, personal insecurity, fear of revenge, lack of resources, and lack of a central administration to maintain security and social protections. The campaign of violence by warlords designed to capture national leadership created more mistrust among the sub-clans which were employed to propagate the violence which led to more retaliations and counter-violence.

The trend towards urban regionalisation grew as local inhabitants migrated from cosmopolitan urbanised centres, including Mogadishu, to less urbanised areas; this began to change the traditional patterns of settlement whereby clans/sub-clans began to concentrate in ancestral areas and the presence of a multiplicity of clans in the same area was reduced. In light of this development, the new administrations and governing structures now emerging are based to a greater degree on more homogenous ownership and are likely to be localised, decentralised and
working together as a community in mutual support. As such, these administrations are likely to have a greater chance of success than alien structures imposed by the central government. Good examples are the fairly stable breakaway states of the Republic of Somaliland and the Puntland State of Somalia, both of which were initiated locally and under the dominance of major local clans.

The emergence of new and fragmentary regional administrations (below the level of the Somaliland, Puntland and south-central administrations) has resulted in more competition for power and resources which has further complicated an already complex political landscape. Following the recent military achievements by the Somali army and the AMISOM forces against Al-Shabaab and other radical groups’ strongholds in Mogadishu, Beletweyne (Hiraan) and Bay/ Bakool as well as the Juba valley regions, opportunities for reconciliation and re-establishing governance have emerged and are receiving growing attention from locals, TFG and international actors. The on-going efforts to end the transition by August 2012 in conformity with the Kampala accord, the outcomes of Garowe I and II, the Galkayo meeting of the principals of the road map late March 2012 and the London Conference of 23 February 2012, have increased the opportunities for new and positive approaches to the conflict and towards reconciliation and governance in the Somali context – and the recovered areas of the central regions in particular.

Expectations among stakeholders within and outside Somalia and the region for a successful transition are therefore high. The fulfilment of transitional tasks such as security sector development, reconciliation, institution-building and continuation of the constitutional process remain as key challenges, and are critical to ensure a more effective transition towards the establishment of enduring peace and a viable state. Mindful of this experience and noting the need for order and stability to enable peace and development to flourish, there has been a recent trend by the Somali Diaspora to adapt and utilise this approach and model somewhat to establish (or attempt to establish) administrations in the central regions.

As experienced in Somaliland and Puntland, opportunities available for reconciliation and re-institution (local governance), as well as convergence between emerging sub-regional administrations and TFG-led national roadmap efforts, can only succeed if they are inclusive, participatory and recognise the need for a strong bottom up approach.

With this context in mind, the Centre for Research and Dialogue (CRD) conducted a Mapping Exercise in the central regions to examine the nature of decentralisation and governance structures in light of changing dynamics on the ground, working with communities to identify opportunities and challenges in seeking to develop local governance structures and processes in the central regions of Somalia.
2.1.2 The Decentralisation Pillar Mapping Exercise

- Objectives
  From April to May 2010, CRD in partnership with Interpeace carried out a Mapping Exercise in south-central Somalia. The objectives of the exercise were:
  - To identify the challenges to an effective decentralised system of governance in south-central Somalia;
  - To map out the existing governance structures, and practices; and
  - To examine how governance and decentralisation structures were transferred from urban centres to less urban towns and villages in central regions (Galgaduud, South Mudug, North-west parts of Hiraan) which were divided into five different local administrations.

- The Focus and Objectives of the Chapter
  In the south-central regions, and the central regions in particular, the need to establish decentralised governance structures is regarded by resident communities and many commentators alike as key to strategically promoting and building peace. From the findings of the Pillar Mapping Exercise, it was evident that sustainable peace could not be achieved, especially in the central region, without the presence of viable local governance structures. Communities linked the lack of legitimate local governance structures to continued violence, identifying the lack of an authority to oversee the implementation of inter-clan agreements as partly responsible for the recurrence of clan conflicts.

Other factors identified as having contributed to this recurrent pattern of conflict included the lack of a common administration, unpaid blood compensation (Diya), limited blood compensation to the families of victims, lack of or limited water, competition over grazing land and other natural resources, weak or inadequate traditional customary laws that protect criminals under the insurance of clan system, unresolved disputes over territorial boundaries in both the regional and grazing lands, and clan revenge attacks. Further research into these specific triggers of conflict and potential solutions rooted in legitimate decentralised governance apparatus and processes at federal state, regional, district and village levels is required to better understand the needs, structures, types of governance and other contributing dynamics in the on-going change in the governing systems of the current Somalia context. This chapter presents the findings of a consultative process that was limited in its geographical reach, but offers valuable initial insights and feedback from local communities on this issue.

The objectives of the Mapping Exercise on decentralisation and governance were to:
  - Identify local administrations in central regions, particularly in Galgaduud, South Mudug;
  - Assess the basic social services provided by the local administrations and the community participation in decision-making;

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118 Alternative spellings include Saleman, Saleemaan etc.
Highlight collaborations/common goals between the administrations and the publics;
Identify the major achievements of the local administrations since their establishments Identify local administrations’ major challenges; and
Identify challenges facing local administrations and ways in which they can be supported.

Scope and Limitations
The scope of work was constrained by the availability and reliability of quantitative data, particularly regarding population numbers and movements, the geographical areas regarded as legitimately belonging to each evolving administration, their borders, etc. Some of the areas researchers had sought to conduct the research in were not accessible due to insecurity which limited the team’s movements. Therefore, CRD teams visited South Galkayo, Hobyo, Wesil, Addaado, Abdudwak, Guriceel and Dhusamareeb.

2.1.3 Concepts of Governance and Decentralisation in Somalia

Governance is defined as the delegation of powers to all administrative levels through which the affairs of a state can be managed efficiently and effectively in a manner acceptable to all stakeholders. Decentralisation on the other hand is defined as a process of dispersing decision making and governance closer to the people and/or citizens.120 As it will be discussed in this chapter, Somali governments at independence in 1960 continued the centralised system of governance inherited from colonial rule. Under this system, state powers and decision making authorities were concentrated in the capital city, with the regional, district or village levels having little real influence on what was happening in the management of the local affairs. The central government determined all functions at all levels of governance. Provincial/regional, district and municipal officials were appointed to areas where their clans/sub-clans were not present.121 In that sense, the centralised system was considered as promoting nationalism, patriotism and national identity, but failed to give people the power to manage their local affairs.

2.2 Governance Structures in South-Central Somalia

2.2.1 Introduction

Historical Context
The two parts of the Somali territories (British Somaliland Protectorate and Italian Somaliland, a UN trust territory) attained their independence on 26 June and 1 July 1960 respectively, and formed the Somali Republic. The newly born republic inherited public service cadres who were
trained and served the two centralised systems of the former colonial government, both of which were European/alien, intolerant of Somali culture, and different in language and administrative practices. The new Republic politically followed a multi-party parliamentary system with a highly centralised administrative structure of governance.

The early civilian governments were mired in corruption and electoral malpractices. Political competition soon degenerated into clannism and gave rise to kinship based political parties and a tribalised political culture as demonstrated with the participation of more than eighty clan-based political parties for the 1969 elections. Immediately after the elections, all the parties merged into the ruling party, the Somali Youth League (SYL). This demonstrated a lack of distinct ideology or party platforms, and a lack of a national vision among the then politicians. Somalia became a one party “democratic” state in which the powers of state became concentrated further in the hands of the few leaders who effectively appealed to clan sentiments to get re-elected.

Without any ideological or political bonds to unite them against the government, opposition politicians flocked to join the ruling party in a bid to capture cabinet appointments and a share of the national pie. Grievances from the elections coupled with the assassination of the President, however, escalated steadily preparing the way for the eventual outbreak of civil conflict. Military leaders took advantage of popular discontent to grab power by staging a bloodless coup d’état led by Siyad Barre on 21 October 1969. Instead of introducing a system better suited to Somali sensibilities, the military regime adopted a political philosophy more authoritative than the previous systems of governance.

Power imbalances among clans and sub-clans in the regions had resulted from the centralised system of governance adopted. In addition, corruption and abuse of the citizens’ rights by the state apparatus, particularly during Barre’s regime, made the people lose confidence with the existing leadership and governance structure. Consequently, fighting against the state ensued with disregard to the state security forces. The government responded to this rising resistance with force which precipitated further violence with more communities joining the fight against the state. Much of the violence took place in the south central regions, especially in the latter years of the military regime. After 21 years of military governance, pressure to overthrow the regime was intense and had reached an optimum.

• **Regionalisation Trends**

Since the collapse of the Somali state in the early 1990s, a new phenomenon emerged with trends towards regionalisation taking deep root in all the regions of Somali. Communities who had traditionally invested in Mogadishu as a capital city decided to return to their respective ancestral regions in an attempt to establish regional administrations. This was mainly due to the
continued failure by the central government to provide basic governance and administrative functions and also the inter-clan conflict that followed the collapse of the state. A classic example is the creation and on-going evolution of the Somaliland and Puntland administrations.

In the early 1990s, communities from these regions moved out of the capital Mogadishu, which was dominated by the Hawiye clan, and formed regional autonomies in their respective regions of origin. Communities from the northern regions also began to concentrate on developing their autonomy following the collapse. While these regions managed to successfully set up local administrations, the central regions remained stagnant since most of their residents were involved deeply in ‘Mogadishu politics’, unlike the northern (Puntland) area residents that focused and flourished in investments.

Over the years, the central regions have come to articulate a desire to follow a model similar to that used by the north and are now starting on this process. This view was captured by an elderly man from Galkayo:

“Before the civil war, everybody used to aim at building a house in Mogadishu. However, today, everyone decided to re-settle in his/her area of origin. The Diaspora from our areas of origin would like to return home one day and build luxury houses and participate in the development of their ancestral land. Moreover, Mogadishu today is a ‘ghost’ city with unforeseen stability and there is no more building of the capital since some of the residential assets left were destroyed while others remain as ‘ghost’ - abandoned houses. There is no need to build where endless fighting persists on a daily bases”

Today, new urban areas and rural villages are being seen all over south-central Somalia, for example in South Mudug. Other administrations have emerged as a result of serious dialogue among the clans, and existing districts have expanded into new ones such as Abudwaq district, which was divided into urbanised ‘new districts’ such as Dabat with investments from the Diaspora from the region. An elder from Abudwaq who was interviewed during the Mapping Exercise expressed the following views regarding how these trends would continue:

“It has become necessary to form new districts and villages for our regions due to the fact that in Somalia it has become compulsory for every person to come back to his/her ‘homelands’ after the shared cities became ‘clan cities’. They are dominated and resources allocated to only individual clans while others are forced to move to their original homelands, either due to personal safety or lack of resources and the only option is to share with your clan mate whatever there is in your grandfathers or ancestral homelands. These have also increased

122 Elderly man originally from South Galkayo who lived in Mogadishu and worked for the central government for nearly 30 years.
Despite the generally positive participants’ views on the trend of regionalisation, there have been some negative outcomes with various clans and sub-clans developing institutions in rural and urban ‘homelands’. The towns commonly shared by various clans have disappeared as clans have concentrated on specific regions. For example, Adaado is an old district that used to be commonly shared by many clans such as Sa’ad, Suleiman, Saruur (Habargedir), Duduble, and Marehan (Darood). Today, however, it is dominated by the Suleiman in which the newly formed Himan and Heeb administration (HH) has its base. This trend can be seen across districts in the central regions which have further divided communities along clan lines resulting in even further limited interaction with each other.

**Governance Systems in the Wake of the Crisis**

Today one can distinguish four different authority systems with varying degree of effectiveness and acceptability in the south central regions:

- **Regional Administrations** – Two viable administrations have emerged in the central regions: Galmudug and Himan and Heeb;
- **Islamist Authority** – Islamic authorities also hold sway at a number of localities within central Somalia, parts of Mudug, Galgaduud and Middle Shabelle;
- **Traditional Elders** – There are a few areas in which local traditional elders managed local issues communities through traditional method of governance. In most local communities, traditional elders provide community-based governance. Every village and district, excluding the district capital, is managed through traditional governance mechanisms. Local and regional administrations do not have the same capacity to reach out to the local community – for example, Galmudug Administration is limited mainly to the city of Galkayo; similarly HH governance is limited to Adaado district.

None of the structures above have succeeded in providing even the basic services that would be expected from a government. They exist more in name than in function. A few of these collect taxes, but the purposes for which the collected taxes are used are not evident. An exception can be found for Galmudug and Himan and Heeb, where the local administrations have rehabilitated a few buildings and created a more secure environment where local and international NGOs can provide services.

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123 Former Businessman based in Mogadishu in the early 1980s, Galkayo, 27 May 2010.
Chapter 2

2.3 The Emergence of New Governance Structures in Central Regions

2.3.1 Galmudug Administration

- **The Administrative Structure**

  Galmudug regional state was formed in August 2006 through combined efforts from members of the Diaspora originating from this area, and the local community. From 2006-2012, the Galmudug area has been a promising oasis of emerging peace, security and stability and a model of moderate politics distinct from the other volatile south-central regions.

  Galmudug is a secular Regional State in Central Somalia with the dominance of the Said sub-clan. The administrative capital is in the south of Galkayo city. The northern part of the city is under Puntland State. To the west is Ethiopia and to the south and east is Himan and Heeb (HH) regional administration. Unlike the Somaliland region in north-western Somalia, Galmudug, just like Puntland, considers itself a regional state within the larger federal republic of Somalia that is defined by the 2004 Transitional Federal Charter (TFC), under the Transitional Federal Government (TFG).

  The formation of Galmudug regional state was approved in a constituent assembly conference held in southern Galkayo in July-August 2006. It constitutes the following institutional structures with a three-year term of office:
  - Traditional Council of titled elders – 21 representatives from various sub-clans;
  - Council of Representatives – 25 representatives selected by elders from the same sub-clans;
  - A President; and
  - Court system.

  The selection process and approval of the leaders and members of these institutions were undertaken through an all-inclusive conference held on 14 August 2006, attended by all important stakeholders from the local community and from the Diaspora. A selection process through an election was not feasible due to the lack of a conceptual and administrative infrastructure to manage it. During the conference, members from different clans living in South Mudug and parts of Galgaduud regions were invited to present their list of candidates and consensually select Galmudug Administration’s representatives based on clan. The traditional leaders including Sultans, Isins, Ugases and other prominent figures from the Diaspora, politicians and traditional elders finally endorsed the list of those who would form part of the administrative council and would then elect senior positions in the administration, including Mohamed Warsame Ali ‘Kiimiko’ and his deputy, Ambassador Abdisalaam Haji Mohamed Liiban (Dhaban Cad). The President was then entitled to appoint his cabinet.

  Although the Administration enjoys overwhelming support by the people, it lacks the capacity to secure taxes and allocate other income available for the day to day running of administrative
affairs, with the exception of very limited taxes at checkpoints manned by clan militias. The administration was sustained through the support and contributions of the business community and Diaspora groups promoting peace and stability in the regions. However, it was mentioned in the focus group discussions in Galkayo that the political crisis within the administration has discouraged the local community to contribute to the administration through taxation.

Without revenue and the support of external actors, the regional administration has been unable to pay its security forces regularly which limited its ability to manage local security. The administration was forced to rely heavily on an income generated from checkpoints and support from Diaspora groups. This limited the influence of the local administration as it was therefore unable to deliver many basic services to the people. Despite these setbacks, the administration did succeed in providing security in the regions.

“The local administration does not collect tax and has no budget that allows it to run the affairs of regional state. This is not unique to Galmudug state; even the TFG does not collect tax other than from ports and the airport. Our problem here is that no effort has been made to establish a tax collection process. Galmudug is a small entity and it should be easy to do such task but there is a lack of political will on the part of the leadership”.

Student, Galkayo

The Galmudug Administration has enjoyed some success in bringing other sub-clans and clans inhabiting parts of Galgaduud and Mudug regions on board in support of the administration, although some of the smaller clans argue that they are not fully represented in the administration. Addressing such concerns a senior Galmudug administration representative said:

“We are welcoming our brothers and sisters from other sub-clans in Mudug and Galgaduud regions to join Galmudug. The Administration is for all of us regardless of which sub-clan you belong to.”

Since its inception, the administration has made substantial progress in a number of areas including the security sector, which has been acknowledged by local traditional elders:

“Before the establishment of Galmudug regional state in 2006 there was a chaotic situation of high insecurity – frequent armed conflicts, illegal extortive road-blocks and robbery, livestock wrestling, inter and intra sub-clan killings, lack of basic public services, limited trade activities and almost lack of investment

124 The few police and other security personal depend on staffing payment by the senior administration officials; others secure temporary jobs through haven links with the administrators in the private sector, including telecommunication companies, Hawala - Remittance companies, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), the provision of escort to the business conveys, etc.
125 Interview, Galkayo, May 2012.
126 Senior Galmudug Administrator, Interview, 19 July 2010.
and presence of international humanitarian agencies. But during the three years of the existence and functioning of Galmudug regional state significant progress has been achieved”.127

This positive contribution was also evident in the north of Galkayo under the Puntland Administration, as one elder confirmed:

“[There has been a] relative improvement in peace and security within Galmudug territory and with neighbouring regions. Since the Administration took over the number of security incidents including clan clashes, kidnappings, assassinations of prominent businessmen, etc. has drastically decreased. Also, the neighbouring Puntland, especially the local district administration in north Galkayo, experienced reduced criminal cases”.128

In recent years, the presence and relatively active engagement of NGOs have returned. This has been attributed to factors such as relative improvement of security, the impact of peace and reconciliation initiatives (for example, between the rival sub-clans of the Sa’ad and Saleban which was supported by Interpeace and CRD early in 2006), a greater willingness among local people to wage attacks against criminals, and the unification of many illegal checkpoints to few controllable legal barriers.

Local traditional elders and local administration representatives, including the President, have repeatedly appealed to the international community for supportive intervention. On several occasions, specific appeals have been sent to humanitarian organisations and the UN agencies across north Galkayo to consider re-establishing their operations in the southern regions. Some international organisations have responded positively, with a number of humanitarian organisations acknowledging and noting the progress made by the visible governance structures, and consequently moved back to south Galkayo.

Due to the relatively secure environment provided by the Galmudug Administration, several INGOs have also established an office in south Galkayo. This includes the Danish Refugee council (DRC), International Committee for the Development Peoples (CISPI), International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), International Rescue Committee (IRC), Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF) Holland, Norwegian Refugee Committee (NRC), the World Food Program (WFP) and 18 local NGOs which provide vital humanitarian and relief aid and services. Two FM radios (Voice of Mudug and Hobyo Radio) are currently broadcasting and one newspaper, ‘Galkayo Publishing’ is operating, while two new universities have been launched in south Galkayo. According to the Minister of Education, there are has also been growth in social service sector:

127 Traditional Elder representing Galmudug administration, Focus Group Discussion, Galkayo, 23 April 2010.
128 Traditional Elder, Focus Group Discussion, South Galkayo, 6 May 2010.
“(There has been a) significant growth in the number of schools and student population; primary schools went from 7 in 2006 to 22 in 2009, primary students from 700 in 2006 to 6,000 in 2009, secondary schools from zero in 2006 to 3 in 2009; secondary students from zero in 2006 to 600 in 2009 plus a several vocational schools”\(^{129}\).

Under the Galmudug Administration, the region has seen growth in some sectors of the economy as the Mayor of south Galkayo highlighted:

“The social and economic developmental projects and activities have inspired job opportunities and income generation which have had positive impact on the livelihoods of thousands of people. However many more important public social services and economic infrastructures like increasing quantity and quality of schools, healthcare centres, and rehabilitation of roads, airfields, and hope of reactivating import and export of Hobyo port are needed”\(^{130}\).

A hospital, established in south Galkayo by MSF and the community in 2006, has gradually developed despite the limited number of beds, doctors, staff, and quantity and quality of service. It has become the referral hospital not only for South Mudug and Galgaduud regions but also for adjacent central regions. Moreover, a private hospital and 9 Mother and Child Healthcare (MCH) and Out Patient Department (OPD) centres were set up in south Galkayo city, and in a number of districts including Hobyo, Harardhere, Ceel-buur, Adaado, Galinsor and many other villages.

Since the Administration was established, considerable growth and rehabilitation through the re-construction of Galkayo city (south) as reflected in the springing up of modern private houses/hotels and an installed tap water supply system. Most of these developments have been undertaken by private investors most of whom are Diaspora from the area. There has also been drilling and repair of dozens of wells (boreholes) within the rural areas through private investment from local people, international aid agencies and more so the Diaspora. The Mayor of south Galkayo iterated:

“There is significant freedom of people’s movement and goods and an increase of trade flow within and outside Galmudug areas since 2006”\(^{131}\)."

• Institutional Crisis

Despite the substantial achievements of the new regional administration, progress has been setback somewhat due to internal political disagreements that resulted in the young

\(^{129}\) Minister of Education, Galmudug Administration, Interview, 18 April 2010. Further details are presented in Chapter III on The Role of Civic Actors in promoting Peace and Local Governance.

\(^{130}\) Mayor of South Galkayo, Focus Group Discussion, 16 March 2010.

\(^{131}\) Mayor of South Galkayo, Interview, 17 March 2010.
administration facing an early institutional crisis. As the end of the three-year term and date for the re-election of Galmudug institutions on 14 August 2009 drew near, a sudden and serious constitutional disagreement between the President and the Council of Representatives emerged at the beginning of April 2009 over the management of the election process, and who has the right to elect whom.

Many concerned Galmudug stakeholders including the Council of Traditional Elders, the traditional religious leaders, and the Diaspora tried to solve the dispute through peaceful means. During this conflict members of the Council of Traditional Elders, the cabinet and the population of Galmudug polarised into two camps – one supportive of the newly elected President and the other one of the former and still alleged sitting President. As a traditional leader explained:

“The main cause of the current political crisis in the Galmudug state can be ascribed to the ambiguity and related confusion over the Charter provisions, namely the roles and responsibilities of the various institutions. These provisions could have been reviewed and clarified during the three years of existence of the Administration, but the top leaders failed to do so. On the contrary they seem to have chosen to fish in such ambiguity and confusion for their personal advantages in their electioneering campaign for the approaching re-election.

The unscrupulous deeds of the main contenders in triggering the crisis and their recalcitrant behaviour of refusing to discuss and resolve the issues under dispute laid bare their selfishness and irresponsibility in putting the Administration in disarray and letting down their community\(^{132}\)."

With the help of the TFG leadership the crisis was brought to a peaceful resolution. Between September and November 2009, the TFG managed to resolve the Galmudug political crisis under the leadership of President Sheikh Shariif Sheikh Ahmed with the support of the TFG Prime Minister, Ministers and MPs from central regions including General Abdi Qaybdeed, Ibrahim Ahmed Adow (who was later killed in Hotel Shamow), Osman Hassan Ali aka Atto, and others. The TFG officials later resolved the Galmudug disputes by convincing Ahmed Sharif Ali to be appointed as the Deputy Minister in the TFG while Mohamed Ahmed Alin was legitimised as the President of Galmudug Administration.

### 2.3.2 Himan and Heeb Administration

The Himan and Heeb Administration (HH) was formed by the elders and members of Diaspora groups of the Reer Haji Suleiman (Saleban) sub-clan of the Habargedir – Hawiye clan. The inauguration event took place in 2008 at a ceremony held in the administration capital, Adaado.

\(^{132}\) Traditional leader, Focus Group Discussion, South Galkayo, 18 March 2010.
Adaado is located along the main tarmac road that connects north Somalia with the south. The Administration was formed as a result of extensive consultation within the community. In response to the formation of Galmudug Administration spearheaded by the Sa’ad sub-clan in South Galkayo, the Saleban initiated the Himan and Heeb (HH) Administration in Adaado.

The initiative was fully supported by the Somali Diaspora which originated from the region. It was spearheaded by a group of Somali Diaspora led by Mohamed Aden ‘Tiiceey’ who returned to Somalia in 2008 with funding from fellow clansmen in the Diaspora. The formation process began in 2007 when the Somalia Diaspora met in various cities across Europe and America in an effort to build consensus among this constituency, and to secure financial support for the project. Initially, the proposal was rejected by members of the community who felt it would be better to establish an all-inclusive regional administration that encompassed all constituencies in the Galgaduud region. It became apparent, however, that such a process required extensive time and resources. It would also only be possible if an intensive social reconciliation process was successfully able to pave the way for the setting up of such a regional administration - something in which organisers could not have done in such short period of time. Nevertheless, the process used eventually successfully unified the sub-clans of Reer haji Suleiman as a local entity.

“We knew that Himan and Heeb cannot be separated from the large community in Mudug and Galgaduud, but time was not on our side. As we initiated the process, we always had in mind that Himan and Heeb would eventually be part of a large regional state that is viable and able to deal with the multiple challenges facing people of the central regions”.

President Mohamed Aden ‘Tiiceey’

• Institutional Structure
The Himan and Heeb (HH) Administration consists of the President, the Cabinet, legislature (Council of Elders - Guurti), Regional Governors, District Commissioners (DC’s), judiciary system (Courts), Police Commanders, City Councils and traditional elder’s governance systems. Its Council of Elders (Guurti) that comprises elected/selected traditional elders from various sub-clans represent the legislature, which appoints the President who, in turn, appoints the Cabinet, Regional Governors, DC’s, the Judges, Police and Military Commanders in consultations with the Traditional Elders acknowledging their professions and educational backgrounds. The positions are shared fairly among the sub-clans – a determinant which is a major factor in securing the approval of the short listed members for the administration before the Council of Guurti.

The HH Council of Elders (Guurti) represents their sub-clans through a power sharing process initiated at the grassroots levels, and that has existed in the Somali traditional governance

133 Interview, Adaado, May 2010.
mechanisms for decades. This has been used for the councillor’s selection process as it was largely acceptable to all as a governance structure.

The local administration’s term is 5 years with the exception of the Council of Elders (Guurti); the Guurti has the power to re-appoint new or retain the old members of the administration. In early October 2010, the Council of Elders (Guurti) in Adaado renewed the term of President Mohamed Adan ‘Tiicey’ and his administration for another five years.

Mohamed Aden ‘Tiicey’, was credited with transforming Adaado town and its surrounding villages between 2008 and 2011 by promoting peace through instituting a functioning police force, establishing many new business enterprises, new schools, and new rules on self-governing structures that included Islamic courts, police stations, jails, legal checkpoints, municipal council’s offices, and revenue collection centres. More recently in 2010 and 2011, the President and his governing Council of Elders also rehabilitated the airstrip and the parliamentary buildings, which is still on-going through Diaspora funding. The President’s standing and credibility among the communities as been cemented as a result of the visible progress he is regarded as having driven forward.

“Since his return from the United States and election as President, Mohamed Aden ‘Tiicey’ has been seen on the forefront in promoting development in Adaado; he won accolades and trust from the local people”134.

The President’s success has been attributed to his strong support to private business entrepreneurship, the establishment of new schools, his advocacy for peace and stability within the region, for Diaspora investment, for the rule of law, and the continuous consultation with traditional elders, intellectuals, businessmen, women groups, youth and minorities to establish local authority. Tiicey was able to achieve such tangible development, in part, because of his sub-clan’s domination in Adaado district. Tiicey’s ability to keep various conflicting groups within Adaado such as Al Shabaab and piracy sympathisers were also major elements that made his candidacy more acceptable to local inhabitants. However, his critics argue however that he has failed to halt inter-clan conflict instigated by his own sub-clan. The absence of strong opposition voices or spoilers and the widespread perception that he was a natural, acceptable and established leader, was another factor that helped him keep peace within the sub-clan.

“Initially we were concerned about the arrival of a bunch of Diaspora people in the community with no military background or history in the conflict. But in fact that worked in their favour; it actually helped being outsiders as it assured everyone that they were our children who had come to help with no political agenda. Another factor that helped the team led by President Tiicey, was their guts to take such risk to come to a place like Adaado which is perceived as such dangerous place”135.

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134 Tradition Leader from Adaado, Focus Group Discussion, Abudwaq, 2 May 2010.
135 Traditional Elder, Interview, Adaado, January 2012.
The Administration invested heavily in the security sector since without a strong and armed security force, the viability and existence of the authority would be undermined by the neighbouring armed clan militias, neighbouring local administrations including Galmudug, and radical Islamist movements such as Al-Shabaab (AS), Hizbul Islam (HI) and Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jamaah (ASWJ). The former clan militias that were manning illegal checkpoints along the tarmac road were transformed into administration security forces. The selection and recruitment criteria were based on clan linkages – the dominant sub-clan in Adaado district, the Saleban, also dominating the administration forces.

• **The Economy**

The economy of Himan and Heeb Administration is heavily dependent on monies derived from taxation of the Khat trade and remittances from the Diaspora. The strategic location of Adaado as a crossroad between Dhusamareb, Galkayo, Harardhere and Hobyo also enables the administration to collect taxes from goods transiting the territory. Himan and Heeb Administration is entirely organised and built up as a single clan-based administration resulting in full acceptance by the members of this clan at local, national and international levels. Consequently members of the clan accepted the authority of the administration to secure taxes from all the areas under its jurisdiction without difficulty. Taxes are collected from door to door by local revenue collectors with escorts of police personal assigned to assist and keep law and order during this exercise at the end of every month.

The already existing revenue centres including checkpoints along the main roads in the district and new revenue centres, together with the new municipal councils established to collect taxes, are now the main income generating sources for the administration. A large portion of the collected revenues is invested in the security sector.

The Administration claims that local municipal council have revenue collectors in all the areas under HH administration control, but there is no evidence that the administration collects beyond Adaado district. Even within Adaado there is a lack of consistency on the tax collection. According to the Minister of Information, the collected money is spent in supporting the security forces, administration, judicial, and municipal council staff. For example, the Adaado airport that was financed and constructed by Diaspora members from the district stands as one of the best airstrips in central region managed well with safety/security apparatus functioning and the income taxes collected managed by the administration. The security guards and other staff in the airstrip are paid at the end of every month without any delay.

There are on-going locally initiated projects, such as luxurious private houses, privately owned health centres, and private schools, which were heavily invested in by the Diaspora from the area. The number of successful local business entrepreneurs has also increased drastically following the establishment of the Himan and Heeb Administration and on-going assurances of an improving security situation. Diaspora investors have shown serious interest to come and
invest huge amounts of foreign currency, with vast expertise and experience acquired from Europe, Africa, Asia, America and other parts of the world.

*Local Businessman*

Although attempts by the revenue collectors to maximise revenue collections are done, a significant number of tax defaulters exist. Some of the businesses that have complied with taxation requirements include small business enterprises, Hawala and telecommunications companies. Tax defaulters are not subjected to any judicial acts. According to Adaado District Commissioner, the tax payment is on a voluntarily basis although the tax collectors sometimes threaten to take actions against defaulters. He further explained that the Adaado people are willing to pay the taxes without much pressure due to the fact that they have considerable trust in the local administration which they believe have regional duties to implement and the money is required for payment of the staff and security forces. One Elder in discussions stated that “we do not know who much money is collected, the administration have not disclosed to the public amount generated via tax”\(^{136}\).

The administration has a local bank account where these revenues are deposited and managed by the council administrators including the President, vice President, two chairpersons of Himan and Heeb administrators, together with the Guurti – the local sixty member council parliament. Contributions from the Diaspora are also managed well and are a significant proportion of the revenue received by the administration. So far, how much the Diaspora contributed and how much the local administration collects is yet unclear. However, it was clearly explained by Adaado DC that the larger portion of the revenue is collected locally. The police are well organised, dressed and armed and can be easily identified under their commander.

*Security Issues*

The risk of insecurity in the region remains high since the occupation of Harardhere by Hizbul Islam and an element of Al Shabaab, and an expressed intent by Al Shabaab to take over Hobyo. The build-up and movement of forces in the area by the Galmudug Administration, ASWJ and armed opposition groups (AOGs) raises concerns over possible future conflict. ASWJ accused the HH administration of harbouring Al Shabaab members within it; furthermore, the HH leadership failed to halt on-going piracy and the kidnapping of expatriates working for international NGOs - all kidnapped people were taken to the areas supposedly under HH’s jurisdiction. Although HH succeeded in releasing a number of hostages through negotiation and ransom payment, they were unable to prevent the kidnappings themselves.

The location of Adaado makes it vulnerable to those forces that oppose the administration, including some factions of ASWJ, Al Shabaab and Hizbul Islam. There are about seventy armed militia groups in the administration and they reportedly support Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jamaah (ASWJ) under Abdi Shukri who facilitated short term takeover of Adaado by the ASWJ forces in

\(^{136}\) Interview Addaado, May 2012
late October 2010. Although the situation of Adaado is relatively calm following series of events involving the kidnapping of aid workers and the capture of the town by Ahlu Sunnah forces on 25 October 2010. Now that ASWJ forces have withdrawn and the aid workers are freed, the Administration of Himan and Heeb has beefed up its security.

One key issue that the young administration continues to deal with is inter-clan conflict - the Saleban sub-clan has had continued clashes/disputes among themselves and with other sub-clans, including within areas under Galmudug Administration. This has exposed the lack of capacity of the HH to deal with its militia and its clan fighting across regions. Currently the Suleiman sub-clan is engaged in conflict with four major clans in the regions. There has not being any formal reconciliation process initiated thus far and these border towns remain volatile. The Administration has recruited approximately 200 former militiamen, and opened paramilitary training centres in the outskirts of Adaado through financial support provided by the Diaspora. The intention of HH is to have security forces that can provide local security for the areas under its administration. It is important to note, however, that HH has very little military capacity to address external threats, in which case it would depend on freelance clan militia which do not have any loyalty to the HH administration.

• **Achievements of the Himan and Heeb Administration**

Prior to its establishment, areas under the current Himan and Heeb (HH) Administration had been insecure, volatile, and unpredictable with frequent clan clashes being witnessed and robbery with violence cases being reported. Other frequently experienced incidents included organised assassinations, killings linked to clan revenges, mounted illegal checkpoints along main roads by freelance militias, cattle rustling, clan clashes, piracy, kidnappings of expatriate aid workers for ransom and many other insecurity related operations.

However, after Himan and Heeb administration took over the mandate of the local clan council and became the legitimate authority, the security situation improved drastically. The freelance militias were transformed and mobilised as the ‘new forces’ for the administration with payments of incentives collected from taxes. Many illegal roadblocks were removed and replaced by a few legal administrational checkpoints. Police forces were established with police stations functioning, law and order was reinforced within major towns and surrounding villages. The education, health, business entrepreneurship, water and sanitation sectors have equally improved since the establishment of the HH administration. Reconciliations with the neighbouring sub-clans also improved due to the fact that the administration acted to facilitate and advocate for peaceful co-existence among the clans with its limited power and resource.

“Peace, stability and security prevailed after the establishment of Himan and Heeb Administration. We now have an administration that is responsible for the security of the areas under Himan and Heeb, collecting revenue for the development of the other infrastructure including education sector, health, etc.
for the betterment of our people. They have the acceptance of the local people and traditional council leaders and the support of the Diaspora elites.\textsuperscript{137}

Despite these successful interventions, some areas under HH remains volatile as the Administration was unable to consolidate peace in border areas where the Saleban sub-clan share grazing land with other clans.

\subsection*{2.3.3 Community-based Efforts in Mudug and Galgaduud}

The Somali society in the central regions employed an effective traditional governance system (TGS) appropriate to manage usual issues affecting communities in the absence of a formal administration. The TGS handled all societal relations between communities, conflicts, resource sharing, and the provision of the rule of law through the traditional customary laws, which were largely observed. A traditional system of governance and contracts (Xeer) defines the rights and responsibilities of the individual within a kinship clan-based group. A similar set of agreements regulates the clan’s relationships with the neighbouring communities.

The traditional governing system manage issues relating to security, blood compensation (Diya), appeal for ceasefire in case of inter-clan clashes; it takes the lead on peace negotiations among warring clans, resolving family disputes within and among sub-clans, in some cases appealing to the international community for relief assistance on behalf of the communities, raising funds for the needy families on behalf of the communities, assisting the local administration to raise revenues, and acting as the local parliamentarians in the local administrations locally known as the Guurti.

While defending the traditional governing system, an elder in Abudwaq stated the following:

\begin{quote}
\textquote{The traditional governing system has been in existence among the Somali sub-clans for a long time. For example, the Sa’ad –Saleban sub-clans, which have had a long standing dispute used it to resolve existing inter-clan clashes that existed even before independence in 1960. Other neighbouring sub-clans including Ayr, Marehan (Darood), Diir, Waisle (Abgal), Murursade, Duduble and Sheqal have also had a traditional governing council that mainly attended inter-clan disputes, blood compensation among others.}\textsuperscript{138}
\end{quote}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{137} HH Traditional Elder from Adaado, Focus Group Discussion, Abudwaq, 1 May 2010.
\textsuperscript{138} Traditional Governing Council Member, Interview, Abudwaq, 20 May 2010.
\end{flushright}
Reconstructing Peace

Case Study 6: Harardhere District Traditional Governance System

The district of Harardhere is located in Mudug region along the coast of the Indian Ocean. There are six sub-clans of the Hawiye clan living in harmony Sheqal, Suleiman, Ayr, Saruur, Sa’ad and Waisle of Abgal clan.

Over the years the district enjoyed peaceful coexistence among the groups due to the traditional governance mechanisms that have been functional for many years, and notably since the collapse of central government 1990. Most of the local conflicts that have occurred has mainly been land-based/inter-clan rivalry, revenge killings, and fighting over grazing land, and have been resolved through traditional structures. In addition, the conflict resolving mechanism has power-sharing mechanisms agreed by all clans residing in the districts. This arrangement of power-sharing was initiated in the 1950s.

Through TGS, communities agreed on power sharing and resources allocations known locally as ‘heerhosad’ which stated that the three major clans of Suleiman, Saruur and Ayr each have a portion of the above mentioned items while one portion is shared by Sheqal and Waisle clans. For example if there are 120 bags of maize to be shared among the communities its divided into four portions - each major clan of Suleiman, Saruur and Ayr will get 30 bags while Sheqal and Waisle will each get 15 bags.

Equally if they are to pay, for example, USD120 compensation for each incident, the three major clans will pay each USD30 while Sheqal will pay USD15 each.

An elder in the community asserted that “We had traditional governing mechanisms in Harardhere among these clans based on agreements initiated early in the 1950s and there is evidence that power sharing governing mechanisms have worked till today despite recent interference by new phenomena including piracy, and Islamic insurgents fighting, among others. Yet up to now, with all these constraints, the traditional governing mechanisms are visible in governing hospitals, schools, and public infrastructures including the seaport among others. Teachers, recruitments of NGOs staff, hospitals staff, interventions of clan clashes and many others are still managed under the traditional governing mechanisms.”

Each clan is responsible for building/managing/protecting key infrastructure including the police station, defunct veterinary buildings, a district hospital and other government owned buildings so that these assets are not looted or damaged by unscrupulous elements of the communities.

The decisions to hold or be responsible for certain infrastructure are the sole responsibility of the traditional governance system (TGS) committee on behalf of the sub-clans. The main reason is to secure power sharing mechanisms through this governing system and eventually to avoid disputes among the sub-clans.

2.3.4 Islamist Movements in Central Regions

Over the past few years, the influence of the Islamic movement in the central region has grown. At the time of the original research in 2010 and 2011 three groups were fighting in the central regions: Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jamaah, Harakat Al-Shabaab Mujahideen - HSM and Hizbul Islam.

Each entity controlled specific areas of the region, but none of these entities were able to set up viable governing structures that provide basic social services. The situation has changed since then, with Al Shabaab and Hizbul Islam having been forced out of the regions which are now either under the control of Galmudug, HH or ASWJ.

139 Traditional Leader, Telephone Interview, Harardhere, 20 July 2010.
Chapter 2

2.4 Key Actors and their Role in Local Governance and In/Stability

2.4.1 Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jamaah

Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jamaah (ASWJ) which is the main religious group in the region has managed a significant proportion of the Galgaduud regions. It became prominent in 2008, when it took up arms against Al Shabaab after the Al Shabaab group began destroying the tombs of the country’s Sufi saints. They succeeded in taking over a number of districts across central Somalia including Mudug and Galgaduud and parts of Hiraan. Traditional elders in central regions in particular authorised the formation of ASWJ in June 2009 as a local administration in areas under their control. Despite limited capacity, these administrations have made no effort to improve security and protection against Al-Shabaab who frequently attempted to take over the regions under ASWJ. ASWJ also imposed a kind of governance that improved general security, including the strengthening of police forces to enforce law and order within the local communities under their jurisdiction.
Case Study 7: Abudwaq district

In an attempt to set up a limited administrative structure, Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jamaah initiated serious consultations in 2009 with traditional elders on how to defend the infiltration of radical groups, Al-Shabaab and the Sufia, in the community. The meetings continued for some weeks with intensive discussions of issues such as how to strengthen sustaining peace and security. Discussions focused mainly on security issues, the rule of law, removal of checkpoints and establishment of district administration. The overall discussion was led by respected religious leaders and ASWJ was eventually able to convince the traditional elders of the need and benefit of establishing an effective local administration. At the end of the discussion, the Sufia and elders came to an agreement that such an administration should be established, and the elders should be informed when this was done.

ASWJ set up the Administration through a nomination process: they nominated the District Commissioner and his Deputy, Community Policing Commander, the Chairman of the Court and engaged Security Forces. The Administration imposed instructions that an independent militia cannot carry a gun in the city and its surroundings; the instruction was welcomed by the community and was fully implemented.

To generate income, again the Administration imposed taxes on the business trade between Central Regions, Ethiopia and Somaliland, they rehabilitated the former government buildings.

There are some specific determinants that contributed to the sustainability of peace and stability in Abudwaq:

- The community of Abudwaq naturally supported the Sufia ideology, as opposed to the Al-Shabaab ideology;
- A residence of one dominant clan which neighboured other varieties of clans but who were not large enough to be a destabilising force within the area;
- It was less than 20km to the to the Ethiopian border, therefore, the Ethiopian forces could intervene immediately if required;
- It was the headquarters of ASWJ;
- It was easy to recognise strangers, because the population is small and familiar to one another.

Considering all these factors, Abudwaq succeeded in bringing peace and stability in its area and defended itself against their enemies. The difference between the Galmudug, HH and ASWJ administrations is that in ASWJ, the local community led the entire process, whereas in Galmudug and HH, the Diaspora had a big influence in the establishment of the administration.

“ASWJ has restored law and order in areas under their jurisdiction showing a level of commitment to improve the quality of the lives of the people in the region. ASWJ won the hearts and minds of the local population, ultimately proving their capacity to guarantee security to the locals. They also eliminated local criminal groups, freelance militias, removed illegal checkpoints, prevented clan based clashes, rehabilitated former government infrastructures including jails, police posts, courts buildings and other apparatus to keep law and order”\(^{140}\).

Such praise and support is not wholesale throughout the community. According to views of another traditional elder in Abudwaq who participated in the focus group discussion, the ASWJ

\(^{140}\) Traditional Elder, Interview, Abudwaq, 30 May 2010.
administration was perceived as an uncommon and partisan administration among the multi-ethnic clans within these regions:

“In the inter-clan-based conflict, ASWJ was accepted and seen as ‘peace-brokers’. The forces of ASWJ and its senior officials were often allowed to intervene in the mediation of inter clan clashes in these regions. They are not accepted as a locally initiated administration, but as another just religious group that is slightly moderate compared to Al-Shabaab and Hizbul Islam in other parts of the south-central region. They are perceived as a foreign backed religious group supported by Ethiopia which is our national enemy”¹⁴¹.

However a youth leader explained that as a result of the improved security in areas under ASWJ, there was visible economic improvement, as discussed above¹⁴².

2.4.2 Harakat Al-Shabaab Mujahideen (HSM) and Hizbul Islam

The Al-Shabaab Hizbul Islamic controlled a sizeable area of the Galgaduud region, mainly Ceeldhere, Masagaway, Ceelbur and a few other villages along coastal areas. Although the CRD team was unable to visit these areas during the Mapping Exercise, the local residents interviewed on telephone confirmed that the authority of the traditional governance systems (TGS) in the area was fading because the radical groups discouraged this type of governance and imposed strict Sharia laws managed by paramilitary commanders. Traditional elders stated that the armed opposition groups (AOGs) acted similarly to a dictatorial regime, an opinion that was also echoed by the women and youth interviewed. For example, nearly all the commanders were identified as non-locals from these regions, with most of them hailing from other parts of Somalia, including Somaliland and Puntland with no single family/clan linkage in the area. The administration structure was invisible as nobody knew who commanded whom, with the exception of a few visible administrators, including the district officers.

However, since their takeover the security situation had calmed down with less inter-clan clashes, revenge killings, criminal operatives, mostly due to the fact that local people perceived the AOGs as a no nonsense administration with strict rules. Their willingness to kill, arrest, kidnap, detain, and the canning of persons in public for alleged offences without consideration for the status of individuals at the local levels was seen as an effective determent. Criminals, thieves, drug leaders, Sultans, Boqors, Malaqaqs, other traditional elders, intellectuals and other stakeholders were equally treated in judging of offences that lead to punishment.

¹⁴¹ Traditional Elder, Focus Group Discussion, 26 May 2010.
¹⁴² Youth Leader, Focus Group Discussion, South Galkayo, 21 April 2010.
2.4.3 The Role of the Somali Diaspora in the Emerging Governance in Mudug and Galgaduud

As new administration structures emerged in the central regions, the role of the Diaspora became more visible both in financing and in facilitating public consultation on the scope, scale and role of the emerging administrations. The Diaspora took part in the development of institutions such as infrastructure in education, health, small-scale business, investment in the telecommunication, remittances, and the running of local non-government organisations that in turn provide humanitarian assistance. Without their support, these administrations may not have been successful in providing services they are catering. For example in Galkayo, ten out of twenty-one schools were Diaspora initiated and funded; two out of the four healthcare facilities were initiated and funded by Diaspora members from the area according to a humanitarian coordinator for Galmudug administration.

Equally, according to a member of the traditional governing council (Guurti) in Adaado under HH administration where the investment of the Diaspora is particularly high, at least eighty per cent of the primary and the few secondary schools in existence are Diaspora funded and initiated, as it is the case in the health sector and in the promotion of small scale businesses. Today, in Abudwaq district nearly ninety per cent of the schools, health facilities and other communal service delivery activities are funded and supported partially by the Diaspora and also provide employment for the locals.

“The Diaspora members from the area have shown interest in participating in the local administration’s affairs including the promotion of education, agriculture and health sectors, in addition to investing in their homelands by building luxury houses, investing in business enterprises including in the telecommunication and Hawala companies, etc.”143.

Elders who represented Adaado district in Abudwaq further explained that:

“The Diaspora from this area came back home and invested locally in the education, health and business sectors not only to benefit them, but also to support the other locally initiated projects. They brought, encouraged and implemented humanitarian assistance operations. However, a major challenge to the Diaspora embedded in the local administrations is that they are very emotional when it comes to starting to do the work but cannot sustain their development motives.”144.

The Diaspora is also quite visible in the leadership of these emerging administrations. In Galmudug and Himan and Heeb for example, many key figures present are from the Diaspora.

143 Businessman, Interview, South Galkayo, 28 May 2010.
144 Elder, Focus Group Discussion, Adaado, 23 July 2010.
while the local leadership of ASWJ is also from Diaspora groups. Many people in the regions believe that the presence of the Diaspora in the regions is a sign that the region is becoming stable.

2.5 The impacts of Piracy in Emerging Local Governance

- **Resources – Impact of Money**

There are millions of US dollars that are infused into the local markets as a result of pirates receiving ransom from hijacked foreign ships within, or sometimes outside, Somali waters. This has had many negative as well as a few positive effects. As a result of the infusion of millions in foreign currency, the demand for the local currency increases and the purchasing power of the local people equally increases, while the security situation deteriorates with limited control by the local administrations.

The local administrations, in particular Galmudug and Himan and Heeb (HH), are challenged when this influx of foreign currency floods the local markets. For example, it is hard for local administrations with no or little funds to compete with the millions of dollars available to the pirates – they make the rules for the local administrations through the influence of hard currency. The senior military commanders, administrators and other officials are tempted by the hard currency and sometimes ‘a friendly environment’ due to this influx of hard currency.

‘The pirates are a problem to us in relation to issues of security, immorality including the promotion of prostitution, drug trafficking and smuggling, discouraging fishing among the youth and other fishermen. For example, in Hobyo there were more than one hundred fishing centres between Hobyo and Harerdhere up to Denodha coastal lines before the pirates activities increased. Today there are less than ten bases that are weakly operating since most of the fishers have joined pirates’ operatives groups along the Somali waters’\(^\text{145}\).

In Galmudug and Mudug regions since 2006, piracy has become one of the major sources of insecurity, which affects the policy, economy and the society as a whole. Sea gangs are armed with the latest weapons and boats, are not organised along tribal or clan lines, but rather on individual mutual interests.

“‘There is widespread poverty and unemployment in Galmudug, young generations have no job opportunity, the only business they know is the gun, checkpoints, or the piracy’\(^\text{146}\).”

\(^{145}\) Fisherman from Hobyo, Focus Group Discussion, Galkayo, 19 April 2010.

\(^{146}\) Minister for Fish and Marines, Galmudug State, 14 April 2010.
According to a representative from Galmudug administration:

“The security sector cannot operate effectively in areas where pirates have strongholds including areas under Galmudug and HH administrations due to the fact that the administrations have limited financial and human resource capacities. The pirates are the ‘respected tycoons’ in the local communities and the administrations members look helpless without any or only limited capacity”\(^\text{147}\).

There are hundreds of young people involved in the piracy activities in the central regions including South Mudug and parts of Galgaduud regions. The exact number of persons engaged in piracy is unclear, however it is estimated that between 70 and 150 are active, and board speedboats to hijack the ships, with a similar number sponsoring such activities. The latter includes businessmen locally known as investors, speedboat owners, gun owners, ‘coastguards’, Khat businessmen, pirate restaurant owners and so on. There are also drug dealers who sell their drugs to the pirates. All these stakeholders are paid following the payment of the ransom. The debtors keep on engaging until the pirates hijack a ship and a ransom is paid. The biggest share normally goes to the business ‘investor’, who provide fuel, food, arms and ammunition, family and personal bills, provide four wheel drive cars to facilitate inland activities, communication equipment, translators salaries and much more. All these networks has drastically affected the operation of the administrations and the security sectors including police force, paramilitary forces, militias and other arm groups. Furthermore some of the local administrators, police personnel, and youth are recruited directly or indirectly in the networks of pirates operatives. The security situation is always undermined by these ‘interested’ networks operatives.

“We are losing our families and communities to piracy; many decent people are lured to quick cash but the majority of the people see the problem of piracy in our community and are trying their best to deal with it. We have recently held community meetings or public forums in Adaado with the support of a local NGO, Rajo, and openly discussed the negative impact of piracy in our community. This is a new phenomenon; people used to fear talking about piracy but we are openly discussing it”\(^\text{148}\).

Pirates are causing political instability through opposition to the establishment of local administrations and authorities. This opposition to such authorities in the areas they operate stems largely from the disapproval and condemnation of piracy by such administrations, religious leaders and traditional elders as an ‘immoral and illegal’ way of earning a living. The piracy threat to security and political stability came out clearly during consultative meetings with community leaders when a long term resident of the pirate town of Harardhere, said:

\(^{147}\) Representative of Galmudug Administration, Interview, Galkayo, 24 April 2010.

\(^{148}\) Businessman, Interview, Adaado, November 2011.

\(^{149}\) Telephone Interview, Harardhere, August 2010.
“No one dares to speak about the formation of a local administration, piracy groups do not want to see any authorities in the areas in which they operate. We live in a state of fear and violence.”

Equally, local administrations’ functions have been affected by the pirates, who have huge influence in the security, economic and social affairs in their areas of bases. Mostly the pirates have hindered the functions and abilities of the local councillors to administer the local administration affairs. For example, in Harardhere some local pirates have the biggest number of battle wagons with the largest amount of money to be spent compare to that of the local administration. At certain levels the pirates are believed to have taken roles in the establishment of some local administration to safeguard their personal interests, or appoint their persons of choice. This again works against the interest of the local public that the administration needs to serve. Allegations have also been made against some local councillors who are believed to have ‘shares’ in the piracy operations that works on the favours.

“The pirates here are everything; they are the administrators, local councillors, business men, security personals and power of all sorts.”

Funds received through ransom payments are helping to fuel local conflict as it is a major source of funding. In addition, there have been constant clashes between pirates and other armed groups such as clan militia, as well as clashes between local youth and piracy groups - especially in Harardhere and Hobyo. Hostages of hijacked ships live in constant anxiety and fear of being killed by the pirates or cross-fire during rescue attempts - 60 foreign hostages have been killed in Somalia in the last four years. The pirates have also been harassing local people including clan elders and respected religious leaders. The fragile security situation in the southern and central regions of Somalia is further threatened by the increased flow of small arms that is associated with the Infusion of a large amount of ransom money, as well as the very presence of many armed pirates in the coastal towns of central Somalia. Local administrations have failed to address these on-going piracy related problems, often citing a lack of resources to fight back.

2.6 Major Challenges of Emerging Local Governance in Central Regions

2.6.1 Economic Marginalisation of Central Regions

During the military regime and subsequent administrations, the central regions, in particular Mudug and Galgaduud, were neglected and marginalised due to inadequate local service delivery and infrastructural development. This forced most of the residents to migrate to the

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149 Telephone Interview, Harardhere, August 2010.
150 Elder, Telephone Interview, Harardhere, 2 August 2010.
151 Andrew Mwagura, Coordinator of Seafarers’ Assistance Program (SAP), Interview, Kenya, December 2011.
urban towns such as Mogadishu. Others migrated to other ‘fertile’ farming zones including lower Shebelle, Hiraan, Middle and Lower Juba regions and other parts of Banadir region.\textsuperscript{152}

Inaccessibility is another factor that contributed to the economic marginalisation. The area has long coastal lines that are undeveloped including the inaccessible natural harbours of Hobyo and Harardhere. The roads to these coastal towns are nearly impassable due to sand dunes. The Mudug and Galgaduud residents returned to their ‘ancestral’ regions after the leaders from the regions failed to capture the national leadership, putting greater pressure on limited available resources. The regions are also most of the year dry and the only source of income is livestock and camels that fetch ever lower prices in the regional markets due to a livestock embargo applied by Saudi Arabia and governments of other Arab states. Inter clan clashes have also contributed to the isolation of the regions.

The local administrations lack a unified police force capable of enforcing law and order. In addition, the absence of an effective judicial system to compliment the rule of law and the presence of paramilitary forces that are mainly clan based militias, undermines the prospects of establishing security. The threat posed by piracy is sustained by the pirates’ heavy weaponry, battle wagons and huge hard currency, obtained as ransoms. The few police and paramilitary forces are frequently recruited in the pirate’s networks as they are lured by the promises of handsome salaries which the existing clan based administrations cannot afford.

Endless inter-clan clashes notably that of Sa’ad and Saleban, Diir-Marehan, Intra- Sheikhal, a lack of a common administration, poverty, unemployment, limited resources including water and pasture for the animals, political interference by the central government (TFG) and many other factors contribute to the challenges of insecurity and lack of viable security forces in central regions.

\textit{“I’m twenty years old and have not seen a Government, even I can’t understand, the only thing I know is money and bullets, and if I receive these two things I do not need anything else\textsuperscript{153}.”}

On-going conflict and the absence of a viable administration have had a negative impact on economic growth which has in turn escalated local conflict. Livestock and trade were brought to halt as the main transport route was closed due to inter-clan conflict. The absence of a national government compounded an already fragile environment. For example, El-Bur and El-

\textsuperscript{152} This has further deteriorated during the civil war from 1991 to 2006 when nearly all the warlords in Mogadishu were defeated by Islamic Courts Unions (ICU). Majority of the warlords in south-central regions since the collapse of the central government in 1990 were from Mudug and Galgaduud regions. The locals from this area had to migrate for safety reasons to their ‘ancestral’ regions to be under the insurance of their clans. For example the 24 warlords who signed in Embagathi Somali peace conference accord were either from Mudug or Galgaduud regions including Osman Hassan Ali aka Atto, Col. Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed, Col. Barre Hirale, Mohamed Qanyare Afrah, Hussein Aideed etc. However, the area produces the largest number of livestock, goats/sheep and camels, with a major tarmac road that connects south to north regions of Somalia.

\textsuperscript{153} Youth Representative, Focus Group Discussion, Dusamareeb, 26 April 2010.
Dher districts focus group participants identified the main challenge as severe environmental degradation and the deterioration caused by acid salt which is produced when digging holes and ditches in search for gypsum stones. During the rainy season, water flooding in different areas carries out the highly acidic salt and spreads it on the surrounding earth compromising the quality of land and water for human and agricultural use.

Environmental safety and the health of local people must be addressed through the establishment of an effective drainage system or, alternatively, planting selective varieties of trees that can tolerate and absorb the excess salt and at the same time reduce the high grade harmful salt contents. Another challenge identified was the presence of sound dunes which cover about five kilometres on the entrance of main road into the town. It was estimated that about USD 74,000 will be needed to repair the sanded road. It is also important that fig and desert cactus trees should be planted in the area to stop sand dunes expansion.

2.6.2 International Community Perception

Today, Galkayo is split into south and north, each controlled by Galmudug and Puntland respectively. Furthermore, the city is recognised as a ‘hot spot’ where political assassinations, clan revenge, kidnappings, and other criminal incidents occur on a daily basis. This has created a perception in the minds of the international community that the central regions are a no go zone whereas they would have provided humanitarian assistance.

Representatives from local authorities, women and youth groups and other stakeholders consulted during the Mapping Exercise argued that the international community has not supported local government and developmental needs, despite the existence of some kind of authority in the regions. This is believed to be a result of many factors that include endless inter-clan clashes, for example between the Sa’ad - Saleban, Marehan - Diir, Ayr - Saleban and Inter-Sheikhal, as well as a lack of a common administration, unified police and security forces that would have intervene.

Meanwhile, many residents believe that the neighbouring Puntland state is fairly developing and stable. UN agencies and other international organisations are fairly concentrated in this area due to the common administration that controls this vast territory with unified police unlike the central regions.

“We do not really know the reasons why the international community do not intervene and support the local administrations here in central region like they did in Puntland. This is due to the fact that Puntland has a unified police which can keep law and order. They equally have paramilitary and special police unit (SPU) who are paid and are responsible for the security of UN agencies and other international organisations”\textsuperscript{154}.

\textsuperscript{154} Member of Parliament, Galmudug Administration, Focus Group Discussion, South Galkayo, 16 March 2010.
Local communities requested the international community to help establish local administrations through the provision of technical and financial support, and institution building. Communities expressed a fervent wish to be able to elect their own local government rather than accepting someone appointed from Mogadishu.

2.6.3 External Political Interference from Mogadishu

As local people began putting together local administrations there was and continues to be constant interference from external actors which is hampering the smooth running of the administrations. At the national level, many prominent TFG politicians who hail from these regions have vested interests that sometimes directly or indirectly affect the smooth functioning of local administrations. For example, the appointment of Ministers from ASWJ in the TFG was influenced by the local political dynamics yet these individuals were not endorsed by the people and none of the local administrations were consulted. The TFG leadership listened to MPs and Ministers who are from central regions without taking into account the voices of the local people thus undermining its locally initiated authority and their representatives. This has undermined the spirit of local governance as expressed by an elder in Abudwaq:

“Most of the TFG MPs and Ministers are selected without the consent of the local people although all of them are from central regions by vague of clanship linkage yet some of them may have not even seen central regions for nearly 20 years - or were not even born here - they do not represent us at all”

Community leaders suggest that they should appoint/elect their own representative in the national government. They want people regarded as legitimate representatives of their communities able to present local grievances and other issues to a national platform. Focus group participants also urged the national government to review its working relationship with local administrations – it was believed that the Mogadishu based politicians tend to dictate what happens at the local level, and they argued that this old model is no longer viable as communities now want greater freedom to manage local issues themselves.

2.6.4 Absence/ Lack of Common Administration/ Collaboration

There are significant concerns from stakeholders about the absence of a common administration for South Mudug and Galgaduud within the region, and with other administrations including HH and ASWJ. Moreover, despite the existence of these administrations, collaboration among them is very limited. South Mudug, under Galmudug, controls few districts and at times has no collaboration with ASWJ officials from the same region. Apparently, Galmudug controls South Mudug and some parts of Galgaduud yet ASWJ and HH also claim to control large portions of these regions, yet with limited collaboration.

155 Traditional Elder, Interview, Abudwaq, 17 May 2010.
The absence of strong collaboration is also evident between the Puntland and Galmudug Administrations. Despite the regular correspondence between these two administrations, very little significant mutual cooperation and progress has been achieved. The Administrations however do at least acknowledge the need for collaboration in order to address common concerns, as was highlighted by a member of the Galmudug Administration:

“What we need is collaboration on security issues with Puntland, living in peace as neighbours, fighting the criminals together and all other factors that can eliminate volatile security situation within our neighbourhoods”.

Most of the Mapping Exercise participants mentioned the need for collaboration among the existing administrations for better promotion of peace and tranquillity. The presence of militias, piracy, illegal charcoal trading, ‘hide outs’/ strongholds for kidnappers, and other criminal operations point to the inadequate or lack of collaborations among the local administrations who collectively are unable to reign in such illegal activities or cooperate in limiting the freedom of criminal actors to operate across the administrative borders.

2.6.5 Disconnection between Local Administration and Public/ Communities

Lack of collaboration among the administration officials’ leads to insecurity and weak and unreliable services. Some critics argue that the administrations were merely set up as ‘just’ names used for personal interest and as ‘sell out’ to international donors. Others believe that the administrations were established as ‘umbrellas’ to dominate clan supremacy at local and national contextual levels.

Deep concern was expressed among some members of the Galmudug community on the perceived disconnection between the local administration and communities living in these regions. Members within the administration confirmed that the administration was newly established with limited resources and manpower, and hence unable to meet the expectations of the public.

A comparative analysis of feedback and views expressed through the Mapping process indicates that. Of the three administrations under scrutiny in central regions, Galmudug is the least effective service provider and less connected to the public as compared to the other two administrations. This view was expressed by many of the participants in the focus group discussions in Galkayo.

Officials from ASWJ claimed that they are fully connected to the communities in the area, but some traditional elders indicated that the administration of ASWJ did not include representatives from all communities. Members from ASWJ are selected on the basis of ideological status, and this is where the gap for inclusiveness seems to appear.
Local communities under HH administration confirm that HH closely cooperate with clans leaders in the area. It appears that the local communities have confidence with this local administration. The dominancy of one sub-clan, the limited geographical coverage (two districts), the financial support from Diaspora members from the area, and a determination to compete with the neighbouring Galmudug Administration are some of the factors that strengthen the HH Administration. The strategic location of the capital city, Adaado as a cross-road for Dhusamareb, Galkayo, Harardhere and Hobyo also enables the Administration to collect taxes from goods transiting the territory.

2.6.6 Weak Capacity of the Local Governments

Concerns were expressed by the local administrations in regard to their weak capacity to provide the required services to the public. Without the expected service provision, local administrations lack the legitimacy to represent the multi-ethnic clans living in central regions. Moreover, the challenges faced by the newly established administrations such as unmet high expectations, insecurity, presence of freelance militias, clan dynamics and supremacy, influence of piracy operations, migration of local intellectuals, poor infrastructure, limited income, and lack of inclusivity (women, youth, minorities clans) deteriorate the capacity of the administrations in the central regions. In addition, further concerns were expressed regarding a perceived neglect by the international community of the central regions as expressed by two officials from the Galmudug administration:

“The international community has neglected us; look at how they assist our neighbours of Puntland and Somaliland”\textsuperscript{156}.

“The humanitarian organisations have equally neglected these regions; their presence is large in Puntland assisting the local government with capacity building and creating income generating activities”\textsuperscript{157}.

• Taxation without Service

Revenue collected through taxation for provision of the required services is an issue that affects the management strategy of locally initiated administrations in the central regions. It has been claimed by many in the local communities that most of these local administrations, notably HH and Galmudug, misappropriate the revenue. This sentiment was expressed by many of the elders, youth, women and businessmen interviewed during the Mapping Exercise. They claim that the taxation collected is not used for service provision but has instead gone to the pockets of a few corrupt individuals. This has created mistrust and discouragement by many from paying any more tax since the expected social services are not met. These services include paying the security forces to enforce law and order, garbage collections, rehabilitations of administrative infrastructures including police stations, prisons buildings, courtrooms, etc.

\textsuperscript{156} Government Minister, Focus Group Discussion, Galmudug, South Galkayo, 17 March 2010.
\textsuperscript{157} Official from the Galmudug Administration, Focus Group Discussion, South Galkayo, 16 March 2010.
• **Lack of Institutional Support**

Many participants in the focus group discussions with local administration members, women and youth groups’ representatives, businessmen and the local NGO stakeholders, expressed a concern that the local administrations lacked institutional support. Such support included capacity building for administrators and subordinates, lack of financial systems including tax collection system, lack of sufficient offices for the ministers, assistant ministers, daily office equipment, lack of or limited law enforcement capacity, lack of municipal council centres, a shortage of district administrations offices, lack of security forces trainings, etc.

In the words of a former District Officer:

“Ministers, assistant ministers and other senior officials are working without supportive officers including Ministerial Director Generals (DG’s), deputy DG’s, Managers and other related supportive officials. Most of the governments’ ministers and other officials operate in either rented or private premises especially in Galmudug state where former central government infrastructure is located in Puntland controlled Galkayo. Moreover, HH in Adaado and ASWJ administrations have equal or similar challenges in urbanised centres including Dhussamareeb, Guriceel, Balanbal, Mataban and Abuwaq where all the former central government’s infrastructures have been destroyed during the civil strife - unfortunately the UN agencies and other international organisations have assisted only Puntland and Somaliland”\(^{158}\).

• **Limited Service Delivery by the Local Administrations**

Many traditional elders in central regions have accused the local administrations of not providing vital services - for example, Galmudug Administration has not developed decentralised local level administrative staff. This is due to the fact that most of the administrations have no financial capabilities to offer competitive employment packages. Moreover, the administrations emerged recently with the absence of required managerial skills. Most of those engaged including ministerial posts have little knowledge in regard with sourcing income tax mechanisms and the corresponding service deliveries required to achieve the acceptance of the taxpayers and management planning strategy.

“We have the top level (politicians) running around without local administrative support - so services cannot be delivered”\(^{159}\).

• **The TFG Stabilisation Strategy**

On 26 January 2012, the TFG Steering Committee (SC) adopted a national policy for reconciliation and stabilisation in newly liberated areas of south-central Somalia, and developed a strategy that showed in broad terms how the TFG intended to operationalise this policy. This strategy laid

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\(^{158}\) Former District Officer in the Central Government in 1990, Focus Group Discussion, Abudwaq, 22 May 2010.

\(^{159}\) Civil Society Activist, Focus Group Discussion, Galkayo, 27 April 2010.
out the overall approach and committed the TFG SC to implement the policy through a series of operational plans, one for each of the three zones that had been identified: south, south west and central. A concept note was then produced outlining the next steps.

Accordingly, the TFG SC, along with a representative of civil society from each zone, met in Mogadishu on 14 and 15 March to develop these plans. The plans were built on the principles outlined in the policy document: genuine reconciliation, inclusivity and democratic and participatory processes; dialogue and traditional Somali conflict resolution; local ownership and responsibilities; tailored approaches in different parts of the country; and coordination and partnership between domestic, regional and international actors. They were built on previous experience and are in full support of the Roadmap and the Garowe Principles.

The need for urgent action was recognised, especially in areas that had been liberated and should not be left with a power and security vacuum. At the same time, it was understood that the process of reconciliation cannot be rushed. The TFG subsequently sought to develop specific zonal plans for each region to be developed with inputs as far as possible with parliamentarians from the liberated areas, civil society actors and groups from Mogadishu and the regions, seeking to identify appropriate entry points for reconciliation, strategic communications, the consolidation of security and meeting humanitarian needs.

Discussions on how this strategy can best be implemented continue with local actors as well as potential donors.

2.7 Conclusions

The unique situations on the ground in each of the sub-regions must be understood noting the complexity and vulnerabilities that come with varying post conflict dynamics, actors and vested interests. The power plays of the key actors of TFG, IGAD, international community and local interest groups are equally varied and different and must be factored into the development of stabilisation strategies and the setting up of viable local governance structures. Potential and inevitable spoilers and proxy interventions must also be taken into account and appropriate strategies to address these challenges should be embedded in the planned reconciliation and re-institution processes on the ground and abroad. The emergence of a TFG stabilisation strategy, with which Interpeace has been involved, as well as a proposed IGAD strategy and the views articulated by AMISOM indicating their need for support in facilitating immediate post-violence stability measures, need to be understood and accommodated as part of a larger conflict analysis and local government capacity building process for these key regions.

The relative strength of the local administrations that have been set up in the central regions varies, but all suffer from significant technical capacity and resource constraints. The crisis of legitimacy which has dogged all previous and some current attempts to re-establish local
government also challenges even the successful structures set up in the central regions as they come under increasing pressure to conform to stabilisation strategies and demands articulated by the TFG and various other external actors. As explored above, the need to strengthen the administrative capacity and broaden the resource base of the existing and future locally established administrations is imperative if current attempts to embed locally acceptable and credible structures are to be successful. Without such support and the resulting ability of the administrations to meet the basic needs and demands of local communities, there is a danger that security, political and social tensions could increase and unravel the progress made.

As more districts are recovered from radical groups, the pressure and expectation among local communities for the re-emergence of security, the rule of law and provision of basic services will inevitably increase. Any failure to meet these expectations could potentially undermine the wider statebuilding project, and provide openings for a return to local powerbrokers or radical elements to regain popular support and control.
Students attending in daily classes in a Galkacyo school supported by the Diaspora - ©CRD

A local Somali woman seeking medical assistance in Abudwak in Hadia Hospital which is funded by the Diaspora - ©CRD
Building local Security: Galmudug Police Recruitment - ©CRD

Beletweyne district’s road maintenance enabled by the local business community - ©CRD
Galmudug Reconciliation Processes – elders/community consultations on the ceasefire - ©CRD

Hiiraan traditional Council of Elders meeting attended by a CRD team - ©CRD
Inter-Shiikhaal reconciliation and public dialogue - ©CRD

Late Abdihaye Garaad, former CRD Programme Coordinator, with students at a consultation for the mapping exercise - ©CRD
3.1 Introduction

The role of civil society in peace and state building is increasingly being recognised widely as a critical and integral component in ensuring the establishment of a stable, just and enduring peaceful and democratic state. As the very nature and composition of the Somali state is being debated and shaped through the current, and latest, constitutional development process as part of the transition set out in the Kampala Accord and related processes, the need to ensure the voice of local communities and ordinary Somalis is heard and addressed cannot be overstated. Once the Constitution is finalised and subsequent processes to establish a representative national and local governance bodies is pursued, it is important to ensure that citizens are aware and understand the democratic framework and goals being established, how it affects them, and enable them to help shape and influence the kind of state and governance model they wish to see.

The ability to access public opinion and interests and find appropriate ways to feed these views into statebuilding processes is difficult in any country, but significantly more so in a conflict and post-conflict society. As government are often reluctant or unwilling to seek out and include civil society in high level constitutional and political negotiations, the role of civil society – and particularly through organised civil society in the form of NGOs, community based organisations, professional and commercial networks – is critical in capturing public views and advocating for their inclusion in such processes. As will be shown in this chapter, the role of civil society in peacebuilding and statebuilding processes in Somalia generally, and in the central regions in particular, has been curtailed severely as a result of the changing but on-going conflict.

Since the collapse of the Somalia state in 1991, the political process at both the national and regional level of south-central Somalia has slowly continued overall to work towards peace and state building. During this process, the many valuable efforts made by civil society to advance this process were often frustrated by spoilers in pursuit of narrow individual, group and clan interests. Somalia was not lucky enough to have a solid international and regional commitment that helped and supported such civil society processes beyond inadequate and unsuccessful rounds of reconciliation conferences held abroad. Such conferences lacked inclusivity for all communities, legitimacy, local ownership and support; the continued implicit promotion of warlordism and divisive clan politics was an inevitable by-product of such gatherings and processes as demonstrated by the fresh outbreak of armed hostilities and further fragmentation of factions and actors which usually followed immediately after the conclusion of such conferences.
Similar scenarios subject to the powerful influence of external forces were also evident at the regional level. The Somali Diaspora was instrumental on all sides of the conflict—both in genuine initiatives for peace and in the politicking of the failed conferences and outcomes highlighted above. The role of external actors engaging locally through proxy politics and/or military interventions helped to fuel the war. In the face of such forces, Somali civil society was unable to develop strategic approaches to mitigate their influence locally. The personal risks involved were serious, and the support and understanding forthcoming from the international community did not often go beyond their key immediate concerns such as anti-terrorism and anti-piracy.

Though the role of civil society in shaping the political, social and security leadership and control of the regions has been limited in the past, the retreat of radical groups and opening up of political space in recovered areas presents an important opportunity for civil society to be strengthened and be more engaged in governance processes. Innovative ways must be found to support organised civil society groups and networks as a conduit to support and promote public views and interests, and ensure that political and security considerations reflect the needs of the people. Given the greater emphasis on social and humanitarian needs among those civil society groups active in the central regions, the TFG and other actors becoming increasingly active in the central regions must seek to identify what civil society capacity does exist (or indeed how to support new organisations and networks that are emerging), and how they can best support reconciliation, stabilisation and statebuilding initiatives. For outreach and Somali buy-in, civil society should be engaged in both the process and implementation of the Roadmap.

For successful revival of the central regions, it is critical that civil society groups are fully engaged. In the absence of viable governing structures in these regions, civil society and Diaspora groups have been key actors that sustained basic social services including education and health. They led the process to revive local administrations with funds from the Diaspora. Newly revived civic actors in central regions have the capacity to become a force that can bridge many issues/groups and can both initiate and energize meaningful and relevant civilian involvement, particularly areas recently recovered. Over the past few months Somali civil society and intellectuals from central regions held meetings, conferences and forums in Diaspora, Mogadishu and Kenya in an efforts to create unity among civic actors and explores ways in which they consolidated local peace in their respective communities. Their voices clearly show great concerns about the absence of international and national government (TFG) support for local processes. They are committed to local initiatives and ready in identifying options and ways forward that can unify the voices of communities in the central regions.

The maturity of the Somali people can be seen in the present dialogue around the development of a new Constitution and articulated aspirations for peace, and a call for the genuine and robust re-establishment of governance and reconstruction on the national and sub-national levels. Civil society in south and central Somalia is itself in transition and must re-emerge as
more effective and dedicated to supporting the end of the transition and supporting citizens’ needs in shaping what comes after. The challenges ahead to work out a concerted civil society voice and platform for peace, development and democratisation must now be emphasised in a new strategy beyond the transition.

3.1.1 Background

Civil society, business groups and the Diaspora have historically played roles in both exacerbating and resolving violent conflict situations in certain countries, including Somalia. Recently there has been renewed interest in the potential peacebuilding roles of civil society (herein used as an inclusive term comprising also the business and Diaspora communities) because of increased intrastate conflicts in the developing counties, particularly in Africa. This chapter seeks to review the myriad challenges/obstacles experienced by civil society in relation to strengthening peacebuilding in the Galgaduud and South Mudug regions of Central Somalia, based on the findings of the Mapping Exercise conducted by the Centre for Research and Dialogue (CRD) research team in these regions in 2010. The chapter will first provide short definitions for the term civil society and briefly examine the history and peacebuilding roles of Somali Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), including the current situation and roles of civil society organisations, the business community and Diaspora groups in Galgaduud and South Mudug regions. Secondly, it will identify and explore the specific challenges for engaging these groups in the process of strengthening their peacebuilding roles. These include:

- Weak public support and recognition
- Unsustainable initiatives
- Weak cooperation
- Weak inclusiveness in local reconciliations
- Impact of insecurity on civic actors (the civil society, business community and Diaspora)
- Weak community cohesion

3.1.2 Definitions, History and Roles of Civil Society, Business Community and Diaspora

- Civil Society

Although there is no consensus or a single definition of what constitutes civil society and its function, a widely accepted modern notion of civil society refers to “a web of social relations that exists in the space between the state (political parties and parliamentarians), the market (companies and markets) and the private (family)”.

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160 In this report the term civic actors is used for the civil society, business community and Diaspora groups.
Civil society refers to the arena of collective action around shared interests, purposes and values. In theory, its institutional forms are distinct from those of the state, family and market, though in practice, the boundaries between state, civil society, family and market are often complex, blurred and negotiated. Civil society commonly embraces a diversity of spaces, actors and institutional forms, varying in their degree of formality, autonomy and power. Civil societies are often populated by organisations such as registered charities, development non-governmental organisations, community groups, women’s organisations, faith-based organisations, professional associations, trades unions, self-help groups, social movements, business associations, coalitions and advocacy groups.162

The definitions presented above capture the function and various actors of modern civil society groups. It should be noted however that other social actors - such as traditional elders in Africa - function in areas similar to those occupied by modern civil society, and in areas of conflict resolution and peacebuilding in particular. Though not formal institutionalised groups, traditional elders should be considered a vital and vibrant element of civil society in the Somali context.163

In relation to modern notion of civil society, Merkel and Lauths present a model of five specific functions of civil society as follows:
1. Protection
2. Intermediation between state and citizens
3. Participatory socialisation
4. Community-building and integration
5. Communication

Undertaking these functions is often very challenging for civil society organisations in developing countries. In totalitarian regimes, civil society groups are often subjected to constant harassment, imprisonment and torture by state authorities. The situation is even worse for civil society organisations who work in countries that are either in the midst of violent conflict or in post-conflict situations. Members of civil society organisations are often tortured, kidnapped and killed.

In addition, civil society groups in many developing countries often face substantial problems such as lack of legitimacy and insufficient organisational development skills, which contribute to organisational sustainability problems. Somali civil society organisations and groups face all these challenges, sometimes in extreme ways.

162 Definitions of Civil Society Centre for Civil Society London School of Economics.
163 This could warrant further research on whether both traditional elders and other social entities that do not function institutionally could be considered as part of the modern civil society.
3.1.3 Methodology

A Pillar Mapping Exercise comprising 22 focus group discussions with 386 representatives from the communities of Galgaduud and South-Mudug regions was undertaken to record the number, nature and focus of civic actors in the central regions. Participants were asked through focus group discussions, public forums, and individual interviews to identify which organisations were or had been active in the regions, achievements made and obstacles and challenges faced by civil society organisations and actors in pursuing their work in each of their areas of focus.

3.1.4 Historical Context

The history of modern Somali civil society began with the Somali Youth League (SYL) in early 1940. A major theme of the SYL was the struggle against colonialism and pursuit unity of a greater Somalia. After Somalia’s independence in 1960, the SYL movement ended operationally due to its inability to transcend the discourse of liberation from the colonial powers. Over subsequent years, the civilian governments that ruled the country after Somalia gained independence in 1960 did not recognise the importance of the role of civil society groups in relation to good governance (for example, in the fight against corruption, to uphold the rule of law, and to safeguard human rights).

In the twenty-one years that followed Siyad Barre’s military take-over in 1969 the military regime undermined the conditions for genuine civil society organisations to emerge and operate in Somalia. Only government-controlled associations, which in essence were government apparatus, were allowed to flourish. After the Somalia-Ethiopia war in 1977/8 the Somali Trade Union Executive Committee expressed its dissatisfaction with the ways things were deteriorating. The background of the famous play of Mufo was rooted in that untold story. The men and women of the culture continued their struggle up to the last minute to highlight the needed change in the Somali context.

A new era of mayhem began in the early 1990s. As a direct result of the Somali civil war, a full-scale humanitarian crisis and mass starvation began and Somalia received the attention of the world media. The sudden attention and intervention of the international community had profound implications for the evolution of civil society in Somalia. The United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I and II) started in April 1992 and in March 1995 respectively, and UNOSOM started to sub-contract relief service delivery to newly established local relief organisations. Dozens of relief, advocacy, protection and developmental organisations were then established including civil society organisations.

Most of these newly formed organisations delivered substantial relief services; in addition they also highlighted the significance of human rights such as equality of women, promoted child protection and engaged in tangible peacebuilding efforts. Unfortunately, some were
opportunistic and appeared to focus more on accessing resources but not delivering services or assistance. Over the years, numerous NGOs were created to get access to resources or to protect clan interest, known as “suitcase NGOs”, with no physical space to operate from. Unlike mainstream credible NGOs who secured permanent status in the community, these suitcase NGOs had a short term lifespan on average one or two years with limited operations.

“Although Somali civil society engaged in community activities that promotes peace and social service delivery, there were a few members of civil society who had political agendas intended to promote their clan interests while others engaged project for personal gain. Unfortunately these NGOS under the cover civil society are supported by external actors without checking their background. (…) We, the community leaders, know who is genuine and seek to really help the community. There are those who have formed public associations or organizations who go beyond clans with a wider public acceptance or trust.”

When UNOSOM I left Somalia in 1994, many local organisations could not sustain themselves, particularly those organisations which had primarily or exclusively been funded by western aid agencies. In contrast, organisations funded mainly by various Arab countries were sustained and kept functioning, even if with considerable difficulties.

The operation ‘Restore Hope’ was intended to secure the trade routes and humanitarian delivery in southern Somalia so that food could get to the people. As it is widely known, in March 1993 the humanitarian operations turned to nation building within Somalia, including the failed pursuit of General Aideed and killing of first Pakistani then US soldiers, which led ultimately to the withdrawal of US troops in October 1993. Upon the withdrawal of US forces, western NGOs also hastily left the country for fear of reprisal. Only Arab and Islamic NGOs were able to remain in the country filling in the vacuum left by western NGOs. This increased the visibility of and support for Arab/Islamic NGOs.

Since then, organised civil society organisations have been working with different mandates. Current civil society actors in Somalia are broadly categorised into the following three main groups:

• Community-based organisations, comprising traditional elders, religious leaders and social and community groups;
• Local non-governmental organisations;
• Professional associations such as teachers, medical personnel, lawyers, journalists, performing artists/composers associations.

164 Abdi Muse (Abdi Dhere), Interview, Guriceel, April 2010.
Over the years some vibrant local Somali NGOs and civil society networks, coalitions, and umbrella bodies have emerged. Some of the main networks are presented in Table 2.

Table 2: **Major Regional Networks**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Network Name</th>
<th>Region</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Hiraan Business Association</td>
<td>Hiraan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>South-Central Non-State actors</td>
<td>South-central</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Mudug Development Associations Network (MUDAN)</td>
<td>Mudug</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>INXA</td>
<td>Somalia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Karaama Women Group Organization</td>
<td>Abudwaq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Galgaduud Youth Development Organization</td>
<td>Mudug</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Hiraan Ecological Society</td>
<td>Hiraan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Badbaado Youth Network</td>
<td>Mudug</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Most civil society organisations are currently engaged in the following main areas:

- Education – schools, universities, and other institutions;
- Health – hospitals and maternal/child health care centers;
- Peacebuilding – reconciling between warring parties; removal of militia checkpoints;
- Human, women, and child rights – advocacy in media and public forums; reporting human rights violations; awareness-raising on FGM, HIV/AIDS and child labour; and
- Humanitarian assistance – providing shelter for Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs).

In addition to the humanitarian services, human rights, public health and education advocacy work first initiated by local groups in the early 1990s, civil society groups have also achieved tangible peacebuilding achievements. Examples include relaying peace messages between rival groups, advocating for lasting peace in Somali reconciliation conferences, highlighting civilian protection in violent confrontations, and resolving some of the longest clan resource-driven violent conflicts.

Somali civil society organisations have varied strengths and challenges in engaging in peacebuilding initiatives. The summary below outlines the common situations that are shared by most of the civil society actors working in peacebuilding areas.

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Somali CSOs share most of the above strengths, weaknesses and challenges with civil society organisations elsewhere, and face a particularly acute threat with the enduring volatility and insecurity across the south-central regions of Somalia. Targeted killings against Somali civil society activists and workers has been particularly challenging, and a serious threat and disincentive to all those working towards the creation of a stable and peaceful Somali community. In 2008 alone, 36 aid workers were killed in Somalia\textsuperscript{169} while between 16 November 2009 and 31 July 2010, a businessperson and an aid worker were assassinated\textsuperscript{170}. The number of killings in 2009/2010 however as reported by human rights defenders based in Somalia appears to have decreased compared to 2008.

The chart below shows a summary of staff of organisations involved in relief/development and/or peacebuilding activities sectors that were assassinated between 16 November 2009 to 31 July 2010 by groups who object to humanitarian and developmental work being undertaken.

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3.2 Emergence and Influence of Civil Society in Central Regions

In central regions (Galgaduud and South Mudug regions), the emergence of vibrant civil society actors has been slower than in the southern parts of the country, and their current status can best be described as fragile. This was identified during the civic actors Pillar Mapping Exercise carried out by CRD. At the time of the original research, there were only a few organisations conducting tangible/sustainable projects, mainly in the areas of education, health, humanitarian issues assistance, and youth and women empowerment.

Although, the conflict between the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) and the Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism (ARPCT) that began on May 2006 in Mogadishu and later spread to other regions, including Galgaduud and South Mudug regions increased humanitarian needs, it did not create a widespread humanitarian crisis. Nevertheless, civil society groups in Galgaduud and in South Mudug regions were preoccupied with delivering basic humanitarian emergency needs and tended to neglect peacebuilding activities, and nexus addressing of peace and development.

Figure 1: Killings and Kidnapping of Civic Actors in Somalia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Incident</th>
<th>Number of Incidents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aid Worker Killed</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assassination of Business People</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assassination of Expat Staff</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Journalist Killed</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Killings in Mosque</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious Killings</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The increase in number of INGOs may be in part because INGOs have limited or no access for implementing humanitarian activities in major parts of southern Somalia due to the unprecedented security challenges. In addition, local administrations\textsuperscript{171} in South Mudug and some parts of Galgaduud regions offer encouragement for INGOs and local organisations to freely conduct activities with limited restriction. The table below shows the INGOs operating in South-Mudug and Galgaduud regions at the time of the Pillar Mapping in May-March 2010.

\textbf{Table 4: INGOs in the Central Regions}

\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|}
\hline
\textbf{Region} & \textbf{International Non-Governmental Organisations (INGOs)} \\
\hline
South-Mudug & 1. Medicins Sans Frontieres (MSF) Holland \\
& 2. World Food Program (WFP) - warehouse only \\
& 3. Danish Refugee Council (DRC) \\
& 4. International Committee for the Development Peoples (CISP) \\
& 5. CESVI Cooperation and Development \\
& 6. International Rescue Committee (IRC) \\
& 7. Mercy Corps \\
& 8. Danish Demining Group (DDG) \\
& 9. UNCHR \\
\hline
Galgaduud & 1. Medicines Sans Frontieres (MSF) Holland/Belgium \\
& 2. Somali Red Crescent Society (SRCS) \\
& 3. Solidarities \\
& 4. International Committee for the Development Peoples (CISP) \\
& 5. Concern Worldwide \\
& 6. Medical Emergency Relief International (Merlin UK) \\
& 7. World Food Program (WFP) \\
& 8. Finnish Refugee Council \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{center}

\textsuperscript{171} Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jamaah, Galmudug and Himan and Heeb Administrations.
The above INGOs are involved in varied sectors, such as health, education, relief and development, including support for the main hospitals in Galkayo, Dusomareeb, Adaado, etc. while many local Non-Governmental Organisations (LNGOs) are also engaged in varied sectors of service delivery. For instance, in South Mudug the network Mudug Development Associations Network (MUDAN) consists of eleven LNGOs\(^\text{172}\) involved in relief and development (the only network up to now that draws together various organisations).

Most civil society organisations in South Mudug and Galgaduud regions are engaged in education, health, relief and development. In the education sector for example, the civil society in South Mudug region is playing an important role and, as security improved after the peace accord in February 2007, the education sector has been improving and the number of schools increasing with thirty-three primary/intermediate schools (sixteen of which are in Galkayo) and three high schools (three in Galkayo)\(^\text{173}\). In contrast, before 2007 there were no high schools

\(^{172}\) MUDAN Recently Updated Profile, Interview, January 2012.
\(^{173}\) CRD Pillar Mapping Exercise, March 2010.
in South Mudug region and students had to travel elsewhere, such as Mogadishu. This was an obstacle to those who could not afford it financially.

Currently, a substantial number of humanitarian International Non-Governmental Organisations (INGOs) are conducting situational analyses and/or are in the process of opening offices in Galgaduud and South Mudug regions, to join those INGOs already located in these regions. Health sector services have improved. In south Galkayo, there is one fully operational hospital with different departments and specialist doctors, currently supported by Medecins Sans Frontieres - Holland. There are also seventeen Mother and Child Healthcare centres (MCHs) in the region174.

Case Study 8: Round-the-Clock Care: Galkayo Hospital

In 1997, a group of local doctors and Diaspora communities of South-Mudug reopened Galkayo hospital. Doctors Without Borders (Medecins Sans Frontieres - MSF) has been supporting it ever since, providing free consultations, surgeries, and distributing free medicines.

Galkayo hospital started with only four rooms and on 3 July 2006 expanded to five big rooms, each 60 meter square175. Currently it is the only hospital in the region with different departments, such as general illness, mother and child care, and tuberculosis treatment, as well as several outpatients checking rooms, laboratory, pharmacy, X-radiation room, etc. Approximately 140 MSF local staff and number of non-Somali MSF staff work in the hospital carrying every month 4,000 outpatient consultations, 40 operations for people with abdominal injuries, 120 inpatient care, and delivering more than 100 babies176. People travel from as far away as inside Ethiopia177 seeking free medications/operations.

The work of the hospital would not have been possible without the engagement of Somali Diaspora communities of South Mudug region. For example on 21 June 2006 a group of six Diaspora women working in Mayo Clinic of Minnesota USA donated different medical materials to Galkayo hospital178. This type of contribution has inspired pride in local and international MSF staff in demonstrating what Diaspora communities are doing for the development of the region – as well as serving as an example of the overall positive roles that can be played by Somali Diaspora communities.

176 MSF, Somalia: Round-the-Clock Care Saves Countless Lives in South Galkayo Hospital, 16 November 2009; available on http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/news/article.cfm?id=4066&cat=field-news
177 NGO Worker, NGOs and Youth Focus Group Discussion, Galkayo, South Mudug, 24 March 2010.
178 Available on: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=upeQDiMr45c
In Galgaduud there are nine hospitals\textsuperscript{179} and several MCHs/OPD/OTP\textsuperscript{180} (see annex 5) supported by MSF, Merlin, SRCS/ICRC, WHO, UNICEF, CISP and IRC with medicine, emergency, first aid supplies, and other (fuel, vehicles and security). In both South Mudug and Galgaduud, local communities and the Diaspora initiated the major health services – see examples in the table below of public health initiatives owned by the community and Diaspora.

Table 7: Hospitals Present in Central Regions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hospital</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2 Hospitals in Abudwaq</td>
<td>Abudwaq/Galgaduud</td>
<td>Initiated/funded/run by Diaspora</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Galkayo Hospital</td>
<td>Galkayo/South Mudug</td>
<td>Initiated by Diaspora and local doctors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adaado Hospital</td>
<td>Adaado/Galgaduud</td>
<td>Business community, Diaspora</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Istarlin Hospital</td>
<td>Dhusomareb/Galgaduud</td>
<td>Diaspora and civil society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Eilbur Hospital</td>
<td>Eilbur/Galgaduud</td>
<td>Diaspora and local communities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harardhere Hospital</td>
<td>Harardhere/South Mudug</td>
<td>Diaspora, local communities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eil-dher Hospital</td>
<td>Eil-dher/South Mudug</td>
<td>Diaspora, local communities</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In Galgaduud region the education sector has about 54 operational schools, some run for profit while others are supported by UNESCO/UNICEF and run by local organisations and the Somali Diaspora originally from the region. For instance, UNICEF covers the monthly salary of USD 50 for fifty teachers.

In the recently recovered districts of El-Bur and El-Dher, there are few international and local NGOs operating. Hornlink is one of the few local NGOs operating in Elbur working on water, sanitation and health issues. Merlin is an INGO that works and supports local people particularly in the health sector (MCH) and some micro development projects. Concern Worldwide (Ireland) assisted in development projects and WFP sought to ensure continued supply of food to help local people, but were banned by Al Shabaab. Both El-Bur and El-Dher districts have a weak organizational structure, with limited outreach due in part to the Al Shabaad control of the two districts until recently. The two districts do however have powerful Diaspora groups and business community based in Mogadishu. Once these districts are fully recovered, it is likely that they will see a speedy revival of civil society as many businessmen from the area are ready to commit financial to support local projects.

\textsuperscript{179} Two in Abudwaq, 2 in Elbur, 1 in Adado, 1 in Harardhere, 1 in Eilder, 1 in Dhusomareb and 1 in Gal’ad.

\textsuperscript{180} Outpatient Therapeutic Program (Nutrition).
Some of the local organisations operating the Mudug and Galgaduud regions are:

Table 8: **Local Organisations based in Galkayo**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Name of the Organisation</th>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Activities (mandate area)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Somali society and development association</td>
<td>SOSDA</td>
<td>Education, Health, Peace building</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Somali Development and rehabilitation organisation</td>
<td>SDRO</td>
<td>Food distribution, Wash, Health, Construction and rehabilitation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Mudug Peace and Human Development Organisation</td>
<td>MPHDO</td>
<td>Peace building, Human rights, Capacity building, Advocacy, conflict resolution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Hormuud Concern</td>
<td>HC</td>
<td>Wash, Peace building, Health, nutrition, Human rights, Advocacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Badbaadio Youth Network</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Youth empowerment, peace building, human development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Horseed Women Association</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Capacity building, advocacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Somali Relief and Rehabilitation Development Organisation</td>
<td>SDDRO</td>
<td>Relief, Health, Wash</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Mudug Youth Development Centre</td>
<td>MYDC</td>
<td>Youth development, Peace awareness, sports club</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>General Service Agency</td>
<td>GSA</td>
<td>Wash, peace, women empowerment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Mudug Community Dev. Organisation</td>
<td>MCDO</td>
<td>Peace building, good governance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Second Chance Organisation</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Education, conflict, awareness of peace</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 9: **Local Organisations based in Adaado**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Name of the Organisation</th>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Activities (mandate area)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Centre for Peace and Democracy</td>
<td>CPD</td>
<td>Peace building, Capacity building, Advocacy, conflict resolution, Nutrition, water holes, rehabilitation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Save Somali Women and Children</td>
<td>SSWC</td>
<td>Peace building, conflict resolution, Women education, Women empowerment, Advocacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Tanaad Relief and Development Organisation</td>
<td>Tardo</td>
<td>Rehabilitation, Water and sanitation, construction, capacity building</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Horseed</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>A partner with WFP for food distributions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Sojeed Relief and Development Organisation</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Wash, Peace building, Health, nutrition, Human rights, Advocacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Alkheyraad Relief and Development Organisation</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Relief and development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Bini,aadam</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Water, boreholes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Rajo community association</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Conflict resolution, community awareness on peace building</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 10: Local Organisations based in Abudwaq

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Name of the Organisation</th>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Activities (mandate area)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Galgaduud Youth Development Organisation</td>
<td>GAYDO</td>
<td>Youth development, Peace awareness, community mobilization, Education sector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Women Development Organisation</td>
<td>WDO</td>
<td>Women empowerment, Advocacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Somali Association of Health Care Development &amp; Fight against Illiteracy</td>
<td>SAHED</td>
<td>Health care, nutrition, education sector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Karaama Women Group Organisation</td>
<td></td>
<td>Women empowerment, women training, awareness of peace, Capacity building</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Himilio Relief and Development Association</td>
<td>HIRDA</td>
<td>Relief and Development</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 11: Local organisations based in Dusamareb

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Name of the Organisation</th>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Activities (mandate area)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Towfiq Centre for Peace and Development (Towfiq umbrella Network)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Relief, capacity building</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Galmudug peace and Democracy</td>
<td>GPD</td>
<td>Peace building, awareness of peace, capacity building, training centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Brothers Relief and Development Organisation</td>
<td>BRADO</td>
<td>Minority farming communities and associations, advocate, and enhance coordination between them</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Women Development Organisation</td>
<td>IIDIA</td>
<td>Women empowerment, women advocate, relief and rehabilitation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Women Child Initiative</td>
<td>WCI</td>
<td>Child support</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 12: Local organisations – El-Bur and El-Dher

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Name of the Organisation</th>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Activities (mandate area)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Center for Education and Development</td>
<td>CED</td>
<td>Local NGO working in Masagawa and Galcad, Humanitarian, Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Hornlink</td>
<td></td>
<td>Water, sanitation and health</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Warda</td>
<td></td>
<td>Health and Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Somali Development and rehabilitation organisation</td>
<td>SRDO</td>
<td>Humanitarian, Education and WASH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Mareeg Foundation</td>
<td></td>
<td>Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Somali Red Crescent Society</td>
<td>SRC</td>
<td>Education and health</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Despite these tangible achievements, some civil society representatives of Galgaduud and South Mudug regions consulted in the focus group discussions indicated that they were not aware of the significance of the peacebuilding concept and the role civil society groups play in peacebuilding, let alone the actual peacebuilding achievements and networks in general. That is, people can recognise school and health clinic benefits, because these are tangible, but peacebuilding is not as visible or immediate for them. Other factors are that each organisation works individually and they do not gather to discuss how to establish effective networks towards peace and security restoration of their regions (see section on challenges below). This can partly explain why most of the civil society illustrated in the above table focus more on humanitarian issues as opposed to peacebuilding.

3.3 Role of Somali Business Community

The business community constitutes another non-governmental social and economic entity in Somalia. The most distinctive difference between business groups and the civil society is the profit-making objective of the former (and in this report, business community refers to the profit making groups). Historically, the Somali business sector pre-dates the colonial period, mainly based on commercial activities centred upon trade along and from the Somali coastlines of Red Sea and Indian Ocean connecting with the Arabian, Asian and African countries. In recent history, Somali business groups developed modern business structures and wider business visions.

The consecutive Somali civilian governments from 1960-68 adopted business policies based on the free-market concept, but did not establish an effective business structure that could unify various Somali business groups. On 30 July 1970\textsuperscript{181} under Siyad Barre’s regime, the Somali Chamber of Commerce and Industry was established under Article 30 of the old Somali Constitution. However, obtaining government business contracts, such as import and export, was difficult unless one had connections with people working in government. For example, political cronies were given contracts while other genuine businessman and women were kept out the lucrative import and export business. The rampant corruption of Somalia consecutive government has being recorded by Transparency International which ranked the Somali Republic at the top of the list of most corrupt countries for fifth year\textsuperscript{182}.

\textit{As reported by the ‘Enough Project’, “since its establishment in 2004, the TFG has squandered hundreds of millions of dollars of foreign assistance. While donor governments pay the TFG’s bills and African Union forces do most of the fighting on its behalf, corrupt government officials have made off with as much loot as they possibly can”\textsuperscript{183}. The transitional Government official denies such allegations and called it fabrication.}

\textsuperscript{181} Available on: http://www.Somalicci.com/files/about_us.htm
\textsuperscript{182} Available on: http://www.forbes.com/sites/danielfisher/2011/12/01/somalia-tops-most-corrupt-countries-list-for-fifth-year/
\textsuperscript{183} Matt Bryden, Enough Project, October 2011.
After the collapse of the central government and all other institutions in 1991, including the Somali Business Chamber, individual or small group business initiatives emerged. In 2004 under the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), the former Prime Minister Ali Mohamed Gedi issued the Decree OPM/589/06\textsuperscript{184} that was meant to revive the former Somali Chamber of Commerce but the rejuvenation did not take off, primarily due to lack of unified business principles. The business communities were divided along clan identities and lacked common business ethics\textsuperscript{185}.

Since the collapse of the Barre regime in 1990, the Somali business community has flourished enormously. Due to the lack of business policy restrictions, business groups have been the only social group which benefited directly from the civil war. Some business groups were indirectly fuelling the Somali conflict through associations with certain warlords, mainly for protection reasons\textsuperscript{186}. The absence of a strong government not only resulted in serious neglect of public services, but also allowed room for antisocial and unethical business behaviours to take place. Such behaviour included importing of expired drugs and foodstuffs, arms trade, tree cutting for charcoal among others.

Countries where government is either non-existent or too weak to deliver public service and to protect public interests may be described as follows:

“\textit{A fragile state is one where government cannot or will not deliver core functions to the majority of its people. Some states are fragile because of weak capacity or lack of political will – or both\textsuperscript{187}.}”

In countries experiencing violent conflict or in post-conflict situations where business groups operate freely, established transitional governments usually have great difficulty to exert their regulatory powers. In extreme cases the concept of authority in these societies becomes irrelevant altogether.

The fragile environment in which businesses often operate in developing countries is usually the result of a host of challenges and decisions taken by local governments, and the presence of multinational corporations in such countries can either prop up unpopular governments, or diminish the role of governments in difficult and transitional environments.

\textsuperscript{184} Available on: http://www.somalicci.com/files/about_us.htm

\textsuperscript{185} Businessman, Focus Group Discussion for Business Community and Diaspora, Galkayo, South Mudug, 22 March 2010.

\textsuperscript{186} International Alert, Local Business, Local Peace: the Peacebuilding Potential of the Domestic Private Sector, 2006, p.479.

\textsuperscript{187} DfID, Why we Need to Work more Effectively in Fragile States, January 2005, p.8.

\textsuperscript{188} Pearson Peacekeeping Centre, Business, Conflict, and Peacebuilding, 2005, p.11.
The Somali business community has established many successful telecommunication and remittance businesses, which in many ways assists communities by providing services while at the same time creating job opportunities. There are also significant examples where Somali business groups have made remarkable and positive contributions towards building peace or reconciling violent confrontations between clans. However, they lack coordination towards a holistic and systematic peacebuilding initiative.

- Telecommunications company Nationlink partnered with UNICEF and a local NGO to provide vocational training and employment to demobilised child soldiers, 2000-2002;
- Facilitators of the peace process involved business people in a high level conference to secure their buy-in and commitment to a peace agreement and reconstruction of the country;¹⁹⁰
- Businesses supported the Mogadishu Security and Stabilisation Initiative that sought to address security concerns in the capital, including removal of roadblocks (2005);
- Business people supplied investment and goods for the running of local social services such as hospitals, and themselves provide essential public services such as electricity from mid-1990 onward.

The business communities situated in South Mudug and Galgaduud regions of Somalia are mainly affected by business problems common in the rest of the country. The leading business figures left these regions and relocated to neighbouring countries like Kenya, Djibouti and in Arabian Gulf countries in particular the United Arab Emirates. Some went as far as far-east countries such as Malaysia, Japan and China.

Business communities in South Mudug and Galgaduud regions are disconnected and lack common agendas or joint initiatives whether in business or towards the common good of the society. Instead, most businesses focus on their daily business activities. Major business movements in those areas and particularly south Galkayo, bordering Puntland, have direct business transactions with Somaliland, Puntland, south-central regions and even regions bordering Ethiopia. Women in Galgaduud regions have significant role in business, yet lack formal and structured cooperation.

This is in part because women in the central regions have no access to capital and other necessary support such as investment or macro-economic support. Businesswomen often engaged in micro or small business involving low-level local trade and did not require a large capital investment. For the most part the low-level trade consisted of borrowing small quantities

of commodities from whole sellers or retail-store owners and reselling these products with a minimum profit margin. After the sale, the lender is paid back the cost of the product and another set of commodities is borrowed. This limits business growth and the capacity of women groups to go beyond day-to-day survival mood. Unfortunately there is no available statistics of how many women are in business in central regions or south Galkayo, but it is common knowledge that women constitute the largest portion of the trade business.

“Nin kaa naag fiican kaa nasab fiican”\textsuperscript{191} Somali saying

Despite all the challenges, some of the remarkable changes made by the business community in Galgaduud and South Mudug are in the telecommunication sector (telephones/internet) and fast service of remittances in each district of the above regions, in addition to other services such as utilities (water and electricity system). Successful infrastructural development initiated by Galgaduud business sector also includes Adaado airport, currently used to export lobster and fish, and several functioning airstrips as in Dhusamareb, Elbur and Eldher districts.

Other significant community business achievements include:
• Creation of thriving new market in Guri’el, Abudwaq;
• Job creation schemes especially in the fishing industry;
• Financial support for reconciliation processes of Inter-Sheikhah conflict and Murusade - Hawadle conflict\textsuperscript{192}.

Some of the challenges that hinder initiatives by the business community in Galgaduud and South Mudug regions are the lack of sustainability and structured cooperation towards sustained peace and the improvement of the security situation of their regions. These will be elaborated upon later in the chapter.

3.4 Somali Diaspora

The term Diaspora refers to Somali expatriates outside Somalia. Following the violent conflict in Somalia in the early 1990s, waves of refugees not only moved to neighbouring countries, but also migrated to other countries in Africa, Europe, America, or Australia among others. Although there is no reliable Somali census data, the overall Somali population is estimated at 7.4 million people with 14% of them living outside of the country as part of the international Diaspora community\textsuperscript{193}.

The Somali Diaspora constitutes a powerful group and has had both negative and positive impacts on the Somali conflict and the peace agreements reached. While many contribute to

\textsuperscript{191} Whoever has a better wife has the nobler descent also.
\textsuperscript{192} Ahmed Nur Jimale, a well-known Somali businessman based in Djibouti alone funded reconciliation effort between Murusade and Duduble, 2004/5.
the economy of the host countries and in Somalia as well, the majority of recent immigrant households are dependent on government monthly-based allowances in most western countries. There is little documentation on how well Somali Diaspora communities living in western countries are integrated economically and socially, and no reliable studies are available. This is partly because each country has different immigration and resettlement polices. Some countries have a speedy process of allowing immigrants to become citizens which can enhance their economic well-being more effectively than countries with a longer process immigration processes.

A clear and identifiable contribution by the Somali Diaspora to the economy of Somalia is reflected in financial remittances to Somalia. According to a UNDP report, the Somali Diaspora, estimated up to 1.5 million living abroad, annually remits an estimated amount of USD 1.3bn - 2bn a year; this makes it the largest contribution to Somalia, larger than the funds provided by donor countries.\(^{194}\)

The Somali Diaspora faces challenges common to the Somali business and Somali civil society groups in developing a common vision of a better Somalia and an overall sense of solidarity. Their accessibility to and provision of resources has at times had a negative impact on Somalia, especially when some provide support to radical groups engaged in the armed political power struggle\(^{195}\). This has raised the concern of the international community which has responded by limiting the movements of Somali Diaspora to and from their country. This can be seen through the intensive questioning encountered when facing migration officials which many view as a factor that increases the appeal of the radical ideologies.

The Diaspora who originally came from Galgaduud and South Mudug regions have conducted several developmental projects supporting their communities or clans in their home regions. These include support given to education, health and some infrastructural development (as indicated above). For instance, the Diaspora community from South Mudug initiated several education developments, including the latest success story of Alshacab high school, which includes separate boarding areas for both boys and girls\(^{196}\). Another example is the opening of Galkayo University in South Galkayo, on 10 October 2010 for studies in medicine, education, computer science and health science\(^{198}\).

In the health sector, the Diaspora worked with local doctors and civil society to initiate the main hospital of South Galkayo, now supported by MSF Holland. South Mudug Diaspora with the cooperation of the well-known businesspersons originally from that region have the ambitions to open – or make operative - Hobyo seaport in South Mudug. This would be of particular

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\(^{194}\) UNDP, Cash and Compassion: The Role of the Somali Diaspora in Relief, Development and Peacebuilding in Somalia, 2011.


\(^{196}\) CRD South Mudug Pillar Mapping Exercise, March 2010.

\(^{197}\) See Galkayo University website on: www.thegu.org

\(^{198}\) See above Case Study 9 – Round-the-Clock Care: Galkayo Hospital.
significance since currently South Mudug and Galgaduud have to rely mainly on Bosaso seaport in Puntland state for their business import/export.

The Diaspora communities in Galgaduud have also initiated several health and education projects. One great example is Hadia Medical Swiss-Somalia in Abudwaq, initiated by Doctor Abdirisak Abdullahi Warsame, who is the manager and only doctor working in that hospital. The hospital is supported by Somali Diaspora and the Swiss government.

The main challenge of these important initiatives by the Diaspora is ensuring sustainability, particularly as normally the local people cannot provide the necessary financial and management support to keep them going. This limits the intended positive impact on the communities in terms of development and improvement of security in the area. Diaspora initiatives that are sustained are mostly in the major districts like Galkayo of South Mudug. *(This is elaborated further in the later section on challenges)*

### 3.5 Challenges/Obstacles to Engaging Civic Actors in South-Mudug and Galgaduud Regions

Civil society in the central regions of Somalia is in fact structured around single entities and not well organised. Many CSOs suffer from poor institutional capacities, and little support for institutional development is available for local people, organisations and their staff. In addition, there are no effective/strong networks and platforms operational in the local context that can promote the needs and role of civil society groups, or able to communicate with other such bodies in the other areas of Somalia so as to facilitate benefits through the interchange of knowledge and experience of service delivery, and to source funds. Despite these limitations, civil society helped and continues to promote local needs and voices in a progressive way. For instance civil societies operating in ASWJ controlled areas have successfully carried out peacebuilding activities and efforts to reconcile local conflicts. For example they implemented a successful and mutually beneficial peace dialogue and reconciliation process between the Dir and Marehan and Marehan and Ayr clans in 2009/10.

The following challenges and constraints were raised by participants from the communities of Galgaduud and South Mudug regions during the Pillar Mapping Exercise. They identified the following challenges hindering the civil society, business community and Diaspora to engage in meaningful peacebuilding activities, which could yield lasting peace.

#### 3.5.1 Weakness of Public Support and Recognition (Civil Society, Business Community and Diaspora)

For South Mudug and Galgaduud regions, some local NGOs claimed that they are not capable of meeting the community’s high and sometimes unreasonable expectations. They added that once organisations are not capable of fulfilling certain demands, communities withdraw the
needed contributions (whether in-kind or financial) and would not value the potential local NGOs services.

Local NGOs can often face harsh public criticism and are labelled with all kind of accusations. Lack of public legitimacy is a major challenge that most Somali NGOs face, mainly created by negative perceptions that some Somali people have about both the nature and intentions of civil society organisations. Factors contributing to these negative views about NGOs and in particular local NGOs have several dimensions.

“We might see a man in the clan doing something for his clan/community; we insult him and accused him that he looted some organisation”\(^{199}\).

The management style of some local NGOs which are profit-oriented have made matters worse to the extent that some organisations are called ‘briefcase organisations’ since these organisations misuse assets of the organisation and do not implement funded programs as required. The long isolation of both local and international NGOs from South Mudug and Galgaduud regions due to widespread insecurity has also produced negative impact on the development of the region.

“This region was intentionally isolated for a long time and both International/National NGOs did not venture into the region to assist the needy”\(^{200}\).

Some communities in the central regions, particularly in the Galgaduud region, complained about being abandoned by local and international NGOs for a long time. Many stated their communities were categorised as “No-Go Zones”. There are two key factors contributing to the absence of international and local NGOs in these regions. First, there is the insecurity of the above regions, including kidnapping and killings of workers of international/local NGOs. Second, there have not been proper and effective administrations in these regions for the past decades.

“In this district, Abudwaq, there are no signs showing the existence of effective working NGOs and forget about a government - this has not been seen for decades”\(^{201}\).

In addition, the remoteness of Abudwaq from the capital and the poor infrastructure for transportation also restricts humanitarian flights by the UN or EC that most of the local and international organisation workers depend on.

\(^{199}\) Elder, Focus Group Discussion, Dhabad, Galgaduud, 27 March 2010.
\(^{200}\) Elder, Focus Group Discussion for Elders and Religious Leaders, Abudwaq, Galgaduud, 21 March 2010.
\(^{201}\) Businessman, Focus Group Discussion for NGOs, Youth and Business Groups, Abudwaq, Galgaduud, 21 March 2010.
Another contributing factor to the absence of international and local organisations in most of Galgaduud and South Mudug regions was the myth that communities in these regions are the ‘trouble makers’ of Somalia. This was reinforced by diverse clans living in the central regions associated with the prolonged and unsolved clan based conflicts.

Some international organisations had recently visited for the first time some districts in Galgaduud region, such as Abudwaq, for surveying purposes, but at the time of the Pillar Mapping Exercise (March to May 2010), none of these international relief or development organisations had established an office. Since January 2011, there has been steady increase of international NGOs setting up operation in Abudwaq district. Over 7 international NGOs have now some presence in the district (see table 9 above).

This participant’s comment captures best the level of frustrations felt by communities of these regions:

“Every day some local and international organisations arrive in Abudwaq, they question and picture the Internally Displaced People (IDP) in camps, but unfortunately none return. I hope that you are not like those organisations”

South Galkayo is the exception since, unlike other districts in South Mudug or Galgaduud regions, it hosts several international organisations including: Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF) Belgium, International Rescue Committee (IRC), International Organisation for Migration (IOM), Mercy Crops, World Food Program (WFP) among others.

3.5.2 Unsustainable Initiatives

• Lack of Human and Financial Resources
Since the concept of organised civil society is relatively new to the Galgaduud and South Mudug regions, it is not surprising that local NGOs experience sustainability problems. In turn, this contributes to the difficulties in attracting and retaining qualified and experienced workers. This may partly explain why the implementation of humanitarian, developmental and peacebuilding projects or programs has been non-existent or on a downward spiral.

A participant in the focus group discussions held in Galgaduud expressed his view on the capacity of the civil society organisations and proposed a way forward:

“The existing NGOs in our area lack the financial or human resource capacities and these are the areas in which they require support”

203 Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jammah Administration Member, Focus Group Discussion, Dhabad, 27 March 2010.
A major factor in civil society not achieving or engaging in relief, development and peacebuilding tasks is the lack of capacity and adequate financial resources. One way of addressing this could be for Diaspora and civil society in Galgaduud and South Mudug regions to work together and build cooperative endeavours towards development and achieving durable peace in these regions. For instance, Somali Diaspora communities from these regions might cover the financial needs of the civil society.

Problems of raising sufficient funds and hard criteria to match donor funds are also a challenge to the sustainability of local organisations in Galgaduud and South Mudug regions. The vast majority of these local organisations depend on donor funds which require massive fundraising activities, however, this is an alternative option that they are not engaged with.

Lack of financial resources was indicated during the focus group discussion as a major factor for not having sustained programs/projects in South Mudug and Galgaduud regions. Furthermore, the resource competition among local organisations\(^\text{204}\) may create a conflict of interest especially among those who receives small grants. This aggravates the lack of cooperation among the civil society, increases mistrust and creates an atmosphere of ‘survival of the fittest’.

“There are some of the civic actors are aware of these challenges but they do not have strategies to overcome it”\(^\text{205}\).

Due to the prolonged violent conflict, the culture of voluntarism disappeared and as result Galgaduud and South Mudug civic actors are severely underdeveloped.

“No one does something for the community unless he/she is paid, because they cannot even cover their daily survival needs”\(^\text{206}\) said one woman activist expressing her sorrow about communities only waiting for external intervention instead of coming-up with their own solutions.

The majority of civil society members in both regions also indicated that they lack necessary skills and said they need lots of capacity building/ trainings and not only financial resources in order for the organisations to be sustainable. For example, one participant in Galgaduud expressed his view on the need to build the capacity of the civil actors

“The majority of the organisations who come to this region might help us with our stomach needs, but there are no organisations that could build our intelligence capacity.”\(^\text{207}\)

\(^{204}\) NGO Worker, NGOs and Youth Organizations Focus Group Discussion, Galkayo, South Mudug, 24 March 2010.

\(^{205}\) NGO Worker, NGOs, Focus Group Discussion for Youth and Business Groups, Abudwaq, Galgaduud, 23 March 2010.

\(^{206}\) Woman, Focus Group Discussion for NGOs, Galkayo, South Mudug, 24 March 2010.

\(^{207}\) Elder, Focus Group Discussion, Dhabad, Galgaduud, 27 March 2010.
Lack of structured formal education and functioning universities for both Galgaduud and South Mudug regions was seen as another main factor contributing to the lack of qualified/educated individuals. One member of the local administration noted: “The lack of a proper educational system in the region is critical”\(^{208}\).

Historically during the central government of the Barre regime, the educational quality of the region was weak and most educated individuals originally from these regions (particularly South Mudug) fled in fear of persecution by former government officials. However, some of them are now returning to take part in development of their region, after witnessing dramatic positive changes in the area. This may partly explain why few local people are not able to manage NGOs.

### 3.5.3 Weak Cooperation

- **Within the Organised (NGOs, Networks, Coalitions, Associations) and Non-organised (Traditional Elders and Religious Leaders) Civil Society Actors**

Civil society in Somalia faces numerous constraints and challenges arising from insecurity and violence, the socio-political situation, and the internal capacity problems. The constraints include a lack of strong and unified structures among civil society organisations, a profound mistrust between civil society institutions and authorities (initially the warlords, later the transitional national and local institutions), and limited financial and moral support by external actors involved in the Somalia crisis. Civil society in Somalia also finds itself in a difficult political environment, fractured by clan and other divisions – which puts CSOs in difficult, sometimes dangerous situations\(^{209}\).

The overall state of civil society groups in South-Mudug, Galgaduud regions experiences similar difficulties faced by Somali civil society in the country as a whole, but they may be considered more fragile compared with regions such as Benadir, Lower Juba, Middle and Lower Shabelle (with a few noted exceptions). During the focus group discussions and the pillar mapping survey, several major obstacles were apparent to adopting a unified position on political and security dynamics in these regions.

One of the major obstacles mentioned by participants in the Pillar Mapping Exercise was the lack of effective networks to enhance the cooperation among the civil society actors particularly NGOs.

> “It is highly important that the civil society have networks, unity, and cooperation and have one common vision so as to engage developments in their regions”\(^{210}\).

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\(^{208}\) Galmudug Administration Member, Focus Group Discussion for Regional and District Authorities, Galkayo, South Mudug, 18 March 2010.


\(^{210}\) Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jammah Administration Member, Focus Group Discussion, Galgaduud Region, 27 March 2010.
For South-Mudug region major challenges raised by those consulted for the lack of cooperation and networks among the local NGOs include:

- Prioritising personal interests rather than common interests;
- Not having common vision towards the political, security and economic dynamics in the region and for supporting varied political actors and views;
- Lack of capacity or not having enough awareness of the significance of their peacebuilding;
- High dependence on clan and clan ideology;
- Lack of third party motivation to establish networks;
- Absence of meetings amongst civil society organisations in South-Mudug to develop strategies for strengthening their roles in restoring peace and security211.

In Galgaduud region, those consulted indicated that they shared similar obstacles with South Mudug and also identified the critical factors contributing to the absence of one common network or coordination strategies as follows:

- The local organisations were still at a fragile stage and did not reach a mature age;
- No capacity building programs for civil society organisations, such as the importance of networking;
- Weak financial resources;
- Lack of common understanding on the important roles of the civil society on restoring security for their regions212;
- They do not know each other, which means they do not share with one another about common challenges;
- The insecurity of the region limits the movement of the civil society between districts or regions213.

While analysing discussions during the focus groups, the social groups and organisations became more convinced of the reality that weak cooperation among them was a key challenge for civil society engagement in the process of peacebuilding. However, as indicated above, there is no coordination body to assess relations between the different actors of the civil society and share in finding solutions to the existing challenges. Collaboration is absent or weak.

“People don’t dislike each other wherever they are, but collaborations and sharing are absent”214.

Lack of awareness of religious and scientific concepts – and instead the preponderance of a clan-based perspective – limits patriotic perspectives which could otherwise strengthen
collaboration among different actors of the civil society. Instead weak cooperation has resulted in a lack of unified vision among the civic actors, as well as in a lack of recognition of the benefit of such networks.

“People do not understand the value and the importance of the network.”215

As Somalis move increasingly away from clan loyalty and become or join professional associations, they tend to achieve increased and more effective cohesion. The business community can serve as classic example of such relationship as it works across clan lines and is unified as a result of business ventures, and is therefore more successful. Equally, universities across Somali regions are collaborating for maximum impact.

Case Study 9: Bandiiredleey Civic Actors Meeting
Bandiiredleey, South-Mudug, 11 September - 11 November 2007

The Civic Actors in South-Mudug consisting of women, NGOs, youth, business and Diaspora, held a meeting in Bandiiradleey with the support of Galmudug regional administration to negotiate security improvement in South Mudug. In line with culture tradition, the meeting was held under a tree named “Shimbirale”, meaning ‘birds’, with a broad range of participants from different sectors.

The meeting continued for two months with intensive discussion of varied issues such as how the regional government could be strengthened and better sustain peace and security. Discussions mainly focussed on security issues, management and lack of law and order, particularly the way to clear checkpoints from the 95 km stretch between Galkayo and Galinsoor.

The approach of reconciliation, negotiation, and conflict resolution was led by respected sultans and religious scholars and reached fruitful decisions on how to remove the checkpoints and develop peace after two years of confusion on that route. A 36-member committee was established, consisting of a reference committee, legislative, security and economic committees for the implementation and protection of the agreements reached. The civil society, with the support of the technical skills and forces of the regional state, succeeded in eliminating 47 illegal militia check points.

The major obstacle for sustaining this type of constructive engagement between civic actors and the local administration is lack of follow-up on the agreed decisions.

215 Youth Representative, Focus Group Discussion for NGOs and Youth Groups, Galkayo South-Mudug, 24 March 2010.
Business Community - Weak Cooperation towards Peacebuilding and Community Development Initiatives

Though there has been some successful collaboration within the business community, overall the weak cooperation among business community in Galgaduud and South Mudug regions is a challenge they share with the civil society and Somali Diaspora communities. The business community has been successful however in making strong connections for business dealings. Business activities transcend clan interest thus facilitating cross-clan engagement. Since they in fact control the engine of the local economy, their influence cannot be separated from the internal dynamics of south-central Somalia. However, the business community lacks the support and infrastructure that facilitates business growth.

During focus group discussions with varied business actors in South Mudug and Galgaduud, business people explained on several occasions that the types of business transactions in their respective regions are mainly based on small and weak trade with an inadequate capital investment. They rationalised this in terms of business people with substantial investments having left these regions. They also said that those business groups that remained in the regions have neither the skills nor financial capability to initiate and sustain peacebuilding activities.

“Business’s role is unseen, because what we are is a group of business people who are essentially doing small and duplicated commercial activities. Our commercial activities are defined by big business owners and suppliers of the goods we trade.”

In addition, the business community shares the challenge with civil society and Somali Diaspora communities in lacking a unifying common political and social agenda other than profit making.

“The business community has varied business visions and business ethics. For instance, there are those believing that printing fake money or importing expired medicine are normal business value and therefore would not have one common network/chamber of commerce or even vision.”

Business groups may be unified at times by the social network in the absence of a viable local and regional administration to manage violence between them and between clans with which they are affiliated. For instance, if some militia commit a crime against another individual, almost immediately the business people who are related to the perpetrator pays all associated costs and blood money. Often the motive may be protecting business interests and keeping peace within the two clans. Another example is in the event of car accident involving two vehicles; in the absence of any insurance company, often the business community manages the

216 Businessman, Focus Group Discussion for Business Community, Galkayo, South Mudug, 22 March 2010.
217 Businessman, Focus Group Discussion for Business Community, Galkayo, South Mudug, 22 March 2010.
situation through a mutually agreed compensation involving a sophisticated investigation and counter investigation process that eventually settles the issues.

The opposite can also be true, where business people can ignite violence for business interests. One participant expressed concerns about this:

“I think the business community should be removed from being part of the civil society, because they have business competition among them and they are capable of doing anything for their business achievements, even if they have to harm the closest partner in business”\(^\text{218}\)."

It is conceivable that at least some of the disruption by different militia groups in these regions was related to business rivalries in which the intention was to confine certain business individuals to certain districts or regions for fear of revenge killings.

“I am owner of a transport track that operates within the central regions – Mudug, Galgaduud Hiraan and Puntland. A few years back I decided not to travel to certain parts of central regions as my clan committed killings against another clan. Despite settling the intern-clan killings through payment of Diya, I used to receive threats by certain individuals who do not want me to operate in these regions by using inter-clan hostiles, to keep me out of the region. Many businesses lose business opportunities through such tactics, but by and large, the business community works together to maximise their profit”\(^\text{219}\).

The issue is complicated by the absence of legal or regulatory bodies such as a strong administration or Chamber of Commerce that could punish criminal related business activities and offences in Galgaduud and south-central regions.

**• Weak Cooperation between Civic Actors and Regional/ Central Administrations**

Currently there are several local administrations in South Mudug and Galgaduud regions. While most of South Mudug region is under the administration of Galmudug self-administered regional government (with the rest under militia control), in Galgaduud region, Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jamaah controls most of the region, with Himan and Heeb controlling Adaado and surrounding villages. Harkat Al shabaab Al- mujahidin controls some districts such as Elbur, Eldher, etc.\(^\text{220}\)

Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jamaah Administration came into being as the result of local communities initiatives in Galgaduud region.

\(^{218}\) Traditional Elder, Focus Group Discussion, Herale, South Mudug, 28 April 2010.

\(^{219}\) Truck Owner, Interview, Galkayo, November 2011.

\(^{220}\) For more detailed information, see the Chapter II on The Challenges of Creating Legitimate Local Governance.
"The Galgaduud civil society had helped Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jamaah Administration in this region in various ways."\textsuperscript{221}

These include allocating funds, providing consultations and legitimacy for the administration in their region. However, currently Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jamaah is expanding its influence on neighbouring districts and increasing cooperation between ASWJ and other civic actors\textsuperscript{222} in the region, apparently as a result of several factors such as the inability of civil society to sustain its efforts in relief, development or peacebuilding (as mentioned earlier)\textsuperscript{223}.

The Diaspora from Galgaduud region did not return in significant numbers and do not have substantial ties with members of ASWJ administration, in contrast with the Diaspora of Himan and Heeb administration where the President, Mohamed Adan ‘Tiiceey’, is from United States of America and has a positive relation with the rest of the Diaspora in the area.

Galmudug regional administration is based in South-Galkayo and its President, Mohamed Ahmed Alin, and a number of his cabinet ministers are from the Somali Diaspora. Some members of civil society expressed dissatisfaction with perceived domination by Somali Diaspora of the regional administration:

"These government officials come to the country while they are aged and have lots of money, as their main purpose is to dominate us. They should be retiring instead of letting us (the youth) become idle."\textsuperscript{224}

Galmudug regional administration did not emerge through consultations with civil society and the business community and therefore some tensions were present from the beginning about the process through which Galmudug regional government was established, with some complaining that the selection was based on clan and not an election.\textsuperscript{225} Some South Mudug traditional elders agreed with these criticisms made by civil society and business groups, stating regional administrative officials were selected according to the wrong criteria mainly based on clan representation and not on merits.

"The government commenced its structures on clan representatives and as result became a corrupt father for corrupting part of his family."\textsuperscript{226}

Some members of civil society and the business community did not see the regional administration as serving them:

"Civil society and business groups do not see their interests in the existing administration.”

\textsuperscript{221} Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jammah Administration Member, Focus Group Discussion, Abudwaq, Galgaduud, 20 April 2010.  
\textsuperscript{222} Focus Group Discussion for Civil Society, Business Community and Diaspora, Abudwaq.  
\textsuperscript{223} ASWJ Administration, Focus Group Meeting, Abudwaq.  
\textsuperscript{224} NGO Worker, Focus Group Discussion for NGOs and Youth, Galkayo, 24 March 2010.  
\textsuperscript{225} Focus Group Discussion for NGOs and Youth, Galkayo, 24 March 2010.  
\textsuperscript{226} Elder, Focus Group Discussion for Elders and Religious Leaders, Galkayo, 18 March 2010.  
\textsuperscript{227} Focus Group Discussion for Elders and Religious Leaders, Galkayo, 18 March 2010.
During the drafting of its Constitution, administrative officials excluded both civil society and some members of business groups from the process.

“Administrative officials have low capacity in governance and political maturity. At the beginning and while drafting the Constitution, the administrative members did not consider the civil society in the region”228.

Civil society members consulted during the Pillar Mapping Exercise described the dissatisfactions of the civil society and business community with Galmudug administration particularly with the security issue of the region as follows229:

- The community believes that the security restoration is an issue that should be handled by the government or local administrations;
- The administration does not motivate civic actors on establishing community policing initiatives;
- Galmudug administration could also see a challenge if the civil society and business get involved in security issues and fear losing power on this matter;
- They are failing to provide enough community awareness so that they could get the support of communities towards community policing;
- The civil society and the business community representatives of South Mudug region expressed disappointments about the planning and selection processes of top-level individuals within regional government administrations.

The participants, and particular the youth, elaborated further that none of the regional government was selected through community consultations.230

As already discussed, the involvement of the international community including the UN on vital programmes such as relief operations, promotion of good governance, developmental and peacebuilding initiatives are either limited or non-existent for communities in Galgaduud and South Mudug regions and cooperation between the civic actors and the international NGOs is also somewhat lacking due to the weak capacity of local NGOs in these regions.

3.5.4 Weak Inclusiveness Participation at Local Level Reconciliation Processes

Since the central government collapse, there have been fourteen national reconciliation meetings. Most were held outside the country while several regional reconciliation efforts among conflicting clans took place inside the country231, including some peace processes facilitated by CRD, such as the Sa’ad and Saleban and the Intra-Sheikhal reconciliations.

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228 NGOs and Youth Focus Group Discussion, Galkayo, 24 March 2010.
229 Group Discussion, NGOs and Youth Focus Group Discussion, Galkayo, 24 March 2010.
230 NGOs and Youth Focus Group Discussion, Galkayo, 24 March 2010.
The organised civil society and business community from South Mudug and Galgaduud regions did not play key roles in the national reconciliation meetings, although individuals or groups originally from these regions but living in Mogadishu or Benadir region did participate actively at national level reconciliations. This was raised as a particular concern by representatives of the civil society and business community consulted in South Mudug and Galgaduud regions\(^{232}\) (for further details see the chapter on reconciliation).

- **Sustaining Local Reconciliation Process**

  From 1991 to 2007, nine locally-initiated reconciliation processes have been conducted in South Mudug and Galgaduud regions\(^{233}\), with some reconciliation agreements sustained while others have not\(^{234}\).

Organised civil society and business community in South Mudug and Galgaduud regions have not been prominent at local reconciliation meetings, which are mainly directed towards resolving resource driven conflicts. Traditional elders are the usual experts, as demonstrated by the traditional elders of Galgaduud and Mudug regions at the clan reconciliation processes in their area.

  “*Since 1991, traditional elders played a critically important role in mediating and regulating the interactions within and between local communities*”\(^{235}\).

Their conflict resolution capacity is recognised and has had more space in the years of absence of strong government at either local or national level, leaving communities to rely on themselves to resolve clan conflicts. The main instrument employed by traditional elders to resolve conflicts is customary law (*Xeer*) and also the Sharia Law, or a combination of the two. In line with this, generally women and youth in South Mudug and Galgaduud are not considered as key actors in the different phases of the reconciliation processes, particularly during decision-making.

Women are amongst the main victims of inter-clan violence and the conflict that has torn the country apart for nearly twenty years, being killed, raped, or losing their husbands, children or parents\(^{236}\), yet they have traditionally been excluded from both war councils and peace talks\(^{237}\). One factor is that Somali women are seen as having ambiguous clan affiliation (being born into one clan and often marrying into another). This also provides women with critical opportunities for mediating, as expressed by a participant at the Mombasa conference:

  “*Our tribe is women and our aim is peace*”\(^{238}\).

\(^{232}\) For more detailed information, see the Chapter II on The Challenges of Creating Legitimate Local Governance.


\(^{237}\) Women Representative, Focus Group Discussion for Women, Galkayo, South Mudug, 17 March 2010.

\(^{238}\) Marian Ali Omar, Somali Diaspora from Columbus, Ohio, USA speaking at the Mombasa conference, December 2009.
However women expressed that their mediation roles are often not recognised or appreciated. Women have been very effective at forming pressure groups to encourage resolution of conflict without violence. They identified the challenges as follows:

- Weak acceptance of their participation in conflict resolution meetings\textsuperscript{239};
- Restricted participation, for example only able to follow the discussions from behind the scenes at the meeting venue;
- Struggling with cultural expectations that women should be shy and not speak out in front of men;
- Not being part of the decision-making process of the reconciliations or signing agreements even though these affect their lives;
- In some cases not receiving their rights to blood compensation, such as when her husband or one of her family members has been killed.

Women's participation in peace and security issues is hidden in line with cultural values of women being weak, which women themselves have internalised and which are transmitted through generations. This perspective is highlighted by an elder when he was questioned by a female researcher:

\begin{quote}
“I am 80 years old and the transformation of the culture can be felt from the change of women’s attitude. In earlier times, a woman used to run away if she saw a man coming, and women used to only talk behind doors. Also, there was never at that time a lady talking at a chair and table and shaking her legs in front of men. This is a challenge and a sign of how the culture is changing for the worse”\textsuperscript{240}.
\end{quote}

Aside from cultural perceptions, other factors limiting women's effectiveness in the public domain include weak cooperation or lack of unity of their efforts and limited education and financial resources.

Despite the challenges, many consider that women have made tremendous achievements. Below is one of the success stories of women's participation in a reconciliation process\textsuperscript{241}.

Youth suffer some of the worst impacts of violence and are often recruited in violent conflicts, resulting in severe injuries and permanent body damages or death\textsuperscript{242} (see also section 5.3 below). Youth in South Mudug and Galgaduud regions share many similar challenges as women in terms of cultural barriers to their effective participation in the reconciliation initiatives. They are often regarded as lacking wisdom and intellectually inferior.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{239} Women Representative, Focus Group Discussion for CSOs and Business, Abudwaq, 21 April 2010.
\item \textsuperscript{240} Traditional Elder Leader, Focus Group Discussion for Elders and Religious Leaders, Galkayo, South Mudug, 18 March 2010.
\item \textsuperscript{241} CRD, Role of Women in Inter-Sheikhal Reconciliation Peace Process, Unpublished Report, Galkayo, September-October 2009.
\item \textsuperscript{242} Youth Representative, Focus Group Discussion for NGOs and Youth, Galkayo, South Mudug, 24 March 2010.
\end{itemize}
“A young man, jumps from decisions, the way he jumps from a fence”\textsuperscript{243}.

This Somali proverb is usually used by elders to imply young people do not have enough capacity to analyse and see problems coming and make hasty decisions, judging the youth to be fast and not thoughtful. Therefore they are consciously prevented from attending reconciliation processes and meetings. On the rare occasions where they took part, their views were ignored or even worse, ridiculed. The youth groups supported by Somalia Diaspora are pushing a youth agenda in the regions. Recently a group of youth from the region have organised sports and a football tournament in Adaado and South Galkayo. Through workshops and sports events, youth groups are becoming a force to reckon within the central regions.

Youth are trying to play an active role in reconciliation and peacebuilding processes in the regions; unfortunately many are not given the opportunity to facilitate reconciliation among clans as most these tasks assigned for elders.

\textsuperscript{243} Elder, Focus Group Discussion for Traditional and Religious Leaders, Galkayo, South Mudug, 18 March 2010.
Women participating as clan delegates in the *Inter-Sheikhal* reconciliation peace process could indeed provide a historical opportunity to break long standing cultural barriers of restricting women participation in solving traditional conflicts. During this event, women were included in the clan delegates freely and were appointed by reconciling sub clans to attend the peace negotiation meeting.

Major participants of this reconciliation were important and respected members of the society consisting of both traditional elders and religious leaders. The Mediation Committee was composed of active and knowledgeable sheikhs from neighbouring clans (*Sa’ad, Dir, Majerteen* and other *Sheikhal* sub-clan that were not involved in the fighting). In addition, influential business people and well-known intellectuals within the community and from adjacent communities also participated. Uniquely, women delegates from the actual fighting sub-clans were also present. Of a total of fifty participants, eight were women.

The reconciliation conference was an astonishing scene. For the first time - and contrary to traditional Somali cultural practices - women were accepted as active participants alongside men in a clan reconciliation gathering. This represented a huge practical step towards removing the cultural barriers to women’s active engagement in such an important process.

When asked his views on women’s engagement at the conference, Sheikh Abdulqadir Sheikh Yusuf (Gabyaa), one of the religious leaders participating, stated: “In religious terms there is nothing wrong with women sitting with and taking part in discussions with men in all affairs”. He added that Prophet Mohamed (SAW) used to consult with women and take their views into account.

The women spoke powerfully at the conference on the effect of violent conflict and the need for reconciliation, as the examples below show:

“We are the ones now caring for the families, orphans, the wounded and displaced from both sides. We do not belong to one particular clan but we belong to both clans”. Hawa Hussein Nur (Hawa Barwo)

“The two reconciling sub-clans of Sheikhal are the same to me. They are like my right and left eye and I need both my eyes equally – I do not want to lose either one”. Woman speaking at the reconciliation conference.

At the closing ceremony, women peace activists played a brilliant role in promoting peace and highlighted the importance of safeguarding the accord. They assured the communities they would fulfil their role in upholding the agreements because they are continuously made aware of the importance of peace in their lives.

This case study shows that every situation can be changed for the better, if there is enough effort, developing and using the best mechanisms, and applying the method carefully.
“We (youth) have a stake in what is happening in our regions but we are not given the opportunity to play a role in contributing to on-going peacebuilding. I personally participated in inter-clan fighting and lost friends in the process; I do not want to go back to that role but want to be an activist to promote peace. I have witnessed what conflict can do to young people; some died, others became drug addicts, while others joined either radical religious groups or piracy. Youth are now forcefully taking their space in the community; the Somali Diaspora and others are helping us to become forces for positive change”244.


3.5.5 Insecurity and its Impact on Civic Actors

- Targeted Killing and Kidnapping of Civic Actors

The insecurity and prolonged conflicts in the country have had serious developmental setbacks throughout the country. South Mudug and Galgaduud regions experienced widespread violence and killings including target killings and kidnappings of the civic actors. This has profoundly discouraged both national and international relief, developmental and peacebuilding organisations to implement durable projects. The kidnapping of international and local NGO workers has become more frequent and a considerable source of income to those who carryout these type of criminal actions.

“Although the number of kidnappings of aid workers in 2009 was less than half of the twenty six abductions in 2008, overall the phenomenon of taking hostages has increased over recent years. It is fundamentally motivated by financial gain through ransom demands, analogous to piracy, and only secondarily ideologically based”245.

The targeted killings have also terrorised many civic actors, damaging their engagement overall including in peacebuilding activities by those who have no interest in ending violence.

“We have been killed and terrorised. As a result we lost the ambitions we had and remained silent, now we have to regain our self-confidence and courage”246.

Consequently, civic actors who could bring about some change in their communities are today afraid and discouraged.

“The person who is active and does positive contribution to his community is always killed, once the active members of the community gather for the purpose of bringing change, during their first meeting they are assassinated by those who do not want positive change to happen”247.

244 Youth Activist, Interview, Dhusamareeb, February 2012.
246 Focus Group Discussion for NGO Workers, CSOs and Business Groups, Abudwaq, Galgaduud, 21 April 2010.
247 Elder, Focus Group Discussion, Dhusamareb, Galgaduud, 26 April 2010.
However, since Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jamaah started taking control of the central regions, particularly Galgaduud region, the assassinations and abduction in Galgaduud reduced. Nevertheless, violence could erupt anytime and the situation could change rapidly as confrontation between Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jamaah and Harkat Alshabaab Al-Mujahideen is taking place from time to time in some districts of Galgaduud.

**• Clan-Based Conflict and Ideologies-Based Conflict**

The continued violent clashes between Al Shabaab and Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jamaah, which took place regularly in certain districts of the Galgaduud region, caused great security uncertainties in the region, as well as undermining the works of the civic actors.

“A massive displacement occurs, and most of the people from affected districts suffer because of weak health facilities or lack of any other service delivery” \(^{248}\).

The violent confrontations have also weakened the capacity of local CSOs and have a negative impact on program sustainability, as well as physical destruction of their offices or working sites. Constant shifting security dynamics also creates great deal of frustrations among civic actors since operating in these areas requires registering organisations mandates to whoever is in control.

Apart from that, clan conflict in Galgaduud and South Mudug regions causes displacement, mostly starting from pastoral areas for animal grazing and water resource-based conflicts, and quickly spreads to urban areas. However some people also gain from conflict and destruction.

“Allwelcome clan/resource based conflicts as a way of earning materials through looting and family displacement, as well as social disintegrations, trauma, anxiety and mistrust” \(^{249}\).

Once again, the cooperation and trust between the civic actors is often further weakened, particularly when the business groups support their clans financially during the clan/resource based conflicts. Once the conflict ends or is suspended, their business cooperation with other clans/regions/districts might not be the same. In some cases he/she might be killed as revenge result, while he/she was in business trip to the areas controlled by other clan\(^{250}\).

**• Civil Actors Contribute to the Insecurity: Youth, Insecurity and Piracy**

“Once you have money, you can easily recruit youth for any mission. All you need to do is to give them some incentives” \(^{251}\).

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\(^{248}\) Elder, Focus Group Discussion 1, Dhusamareb, Abudwaq, Galgaduud, 26 April 2010.

\(^{249}\) Women Representative, Focus Group Discussion for Women, Galkayo. South Mudug, 17 March 2010.

\(^{250}\) Businessman, Focus Group Discussion for Business and Diaspora, Galkayo, South Mudug, 22 March 2010.

\(^{251}\) Elder, Focus Group Discussion, Balambale, Galgaduud, 3 May 2010.
Piracy represents additional challenges for the civic actors. Although, pirates are not a direct threat to the security of civic actors or wider community, pirate activities are indirectly affecting communities including members of civil society groups in South Mudug and Galgaduud regions. In a sense, piracy brought communities a new social habit by bringing a new culture of easy money replacing incentives to search for legal and decent work. This is also bringing a large increase in the consumption of illegal drugs and other addictive substance by the youth and an unprecedented increase in violence amongst the youth, including homicide. This represents a significant social instability because the youth are the most important productive organ of any community.

Due to repeated cycles of violent conflict and insecurity, the youth of South Mudug and Galgaduud have not had opportunities for formal education (see also above section on social services). Instead many uneducated youth are sitting in teashops waiting for an opportunity to take part in the next pirate activity.

“The young man thinks if he is disarmed, he will lose dignity.”

There is neither a robust administration nor UN agencies or local NGOs to provide employment opportunities.

“Teenagers who committed crimes outside (at sea) need to be educated or have their capacity built so as to have skills for living among the community as a normal person.”

The lack of alternative employment opportunities, easy access to firearms, frequent resource-based clan violence, and diminished or ineffective peacebuilding roles of civic actors all contribute to youth turning to piracy. This statement by one of the youth expresses how miserable his life is:

“I am teenager, I would like to live a normal life, and I love to play football and even would like to get the chance to study. I am armed, and the gun that I have is my life now, because I never had another choice, and I have never seen peace or stability. From the time I was born, I was living in the midst of conflict.”

The Somali conflict created a desperate situation for Somali youth who found themselves in a situation with no school, no employment and a bleak future. The only alternative available for many became their active involvement and participation in the Somali conflict. It is important that the Somali government develops youth strategy that addresses the chronic problem facing youth in the nation.

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252 NGO Worker, Focus Group Discussion for NGOs and Youth Groups, Galkayo, South Mudug, 24 March 2010.
253 Youth, NGOs and Youth Groups Focus Group Discussion, Galkayo, South Mudug 24 March 2010.
254 Elders, Focus Group Discussion for Elders and Religious Leaders, Galkayo, South Mudug, 18 March 2010.
255 Youth Representative, Focus Group Discussion for Galgaduu Football Tournament Teams, Abudwaq, Galgaduud, 6 May 2010.
Somali youth, particularly in central regions. The absence of such engagement has facilitated the radical groups’ recruitment of youth for radical agenda. International and local NGOS need to develop and support programmes that help prevent youth from joining the armed conflict in their communities by providing them with meaningful alternatives. Community based programmes can play a critical role in providing continuity, restoring a sense of normalcy, and stimulating hope in the midst of despair. Specifically, meaningful projects in the form of skills training would enable them to sustain themselves productively in their local communities. Local authorities should engage with youth in the policy making exercise and implementation community project.

- Business Community Contributing to Conflict

The role of business in conflict areas has often been described in negative terms\(^\text{256}\) and, as previously indicated, some of the resource-driven violent conflicts in South Mudug and Galgaduud regions may be ignited by business people.

> “Business people have vested interests in both peace and conflict and are capable to initiate peace and to start violence. In our region having huge financial resources would make them ahead of the rest of the people\(^\text{257}\).”

The business communities in these regions do not have a common vision for sustainable peace and ways to stabilise their areas. Instead, they are dependent on their clans for protection. Being a businessperson and having or even entertaining ideas different from the majority of the clan members, would mean jeopardising business interests or worst, losing life. In most Somali communities, particularly in rural areas, voicing ideas that infringe on the solidarity of the clan is discouraged and individuals who speak out are often ostracised. Instead of risking their business interests, most business people tend to follow whatever the majority of the clan members are supporting. The idea that business people could use the power of wealth to lead their clan members towards more peaceful approaches is not often apparent.

> “In the current crises of Somalia, the business community are second group of the conflict creators\(^\text{258}\).”

Conflict between different business groups is common, mainly to secure business interests and attempt to drive out competitors. To avoid such a negative effect, it may be useful for the business community to form a regional chamber commerce that could help regulate local business, and protect business from external threats. This would also allow the local business community to network with national and other regions’ business networks for greater mutually supporting but positive opportunities.

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\(^{256}\) Nick Killick and Canan Gündüz, People Building Peace II, July 2005.

\(^{257}\) Businessperson, South-Mudug Business Community Focus Group Discussion, Galkayo, South Mudug, 22 March 2010.

\(^{258}\) Elder, Focus Group Discussion, Herale, Galgaduud, 28 April 2010.
3.5.6 Lack of Community Cohesion: Clan Diversity, Unsolved Conflicts and Lack of Trust

The fact that South Mudug and Galgaduud regions are home to different Somali clans provides the potential advantage of diversity linked to innovations. However, what is more apparent in the context of scarcity of natural resources and the negative impacts of prolonged violent conflict is that diversity represents a threat to stability.

Clan borders created by the prolonged clan/resource sharing conflicts had restricted and affected the movement and the ability of civic actors to rebuild confidence among themselves and among members of these regions.

“Between South and North Galkayo, there is no visible green line or dividing border, but the line was drawn in people’s hearts and minds”.259

“The Galgaduud community have faced lots of internal conflicts, and we have seen the sign of peace when ASWJ administration was established, yet the Galgaduud community is disconnected from one another, and they are deeply in need to be reintegrated.”260

The consultations undertaken through the Galgaduud Pillar Mapping Exercise provided an important opportunity for community reintegration in that region. For example, people who came from Dhusamareb to participate in a focus group in Abudwaq were very fearful before they came about unfortunate incidents happening to them while they were in Abudwaq. After their two-day visit, there were noticeable and dramatic changes in their negative perceptions of the other community. This demonstrated the prolonged impact of violent conflict between communities in terms of broken trust and relations and the need to re-establish confidence and ties between them.

3.6 Conclusion

Over the past few years the Somali civil society organisations in central regions have grown rapidly from small and inactive groups to viable institutions with greater capacity to deliver social services and promote peace and human rights. They emerged in significant numbers only in recent years. The growth of civil society organisations, despite a lack of co-ordination and varying levels of competence, has made serious contributions to public welfare from a wide range of perspectives including peacebuilding and mediation efforts; public rallies for peace and reconciliation; human rights advocacy; and direct provision of social services such as education, health care, and relief assistance. As the central regions move from isolation to greater interaction with others brought about by recent military successes, it is imperative that the role of civil society is promoted and supported.

259 Elder, Focus Group Discussion for Elders and Religious Leaders, Galkayo, South Mudug, 18 March 2010.
Civil society organisations in the central regions have now a far more positive and direct influence on the lives of people in the region than political leaders. They can contribute to education and social service delivery. In a region that lacks proper leadership in governance, civil society can also produce leaders with a more visible and deeper commitment to social responsibility, democratic values and respect for human rights than the current generation of political and military leaders has demonstrated thus far. Their role is even more important and urgent in areas recovered by Al Shabaab as they have the flexibility and external resources and support to more quickly help re-establish social services, build local capacity and manage local conflicts. They could also become the backbone for the newly emerging governing institutions that currently lack the capacity to govern and provide essential services.

While local civil society organisations are working towards helping local communities and shaping the newly emerging administrations, they face number of challenges:

- **Lack of coordination** – The lack of coordination among civil society across the regions limited their capacity to influence national and regional politics. Effort is underway to set up regional networks and umbrella organisations that will unify the voices of civil society.;

- **Limited Capacity** - While most of the civil society in Mogadishu received capacity building training, very little support was provided for civil society in the central regions. Local and international NGOs need to support the emerging civil society in these regions;

- **Absence of Coordination Mechanism** – National government often engages the so call civil society which hailed from the regions by birth but who had in fact never set a foot in their community. Civil Society in the region will be best represented by active local groups and individuals that are operating in this community on the ground;

- **Resources Mobilisation** – Most of the civil society organisations in central regions operate with very limited resources - mainly funds collected from local community. It would be useful for international NGOs to support local initiatives that have already being funded by the local community to ensure home grown initiatives are supported – local efforts are more likely to succeed as explored in Chapter II setting out success factors in reconciliation processes;

- **Insecurity** – Until recently the region suffered serious insecurity that affected the ability of civil society to work freely in the central regions;

- **The Diaspora Factor** – The Somalia Diaspora is beginning to return to the region to restart activities suspended during the fighting. Unfortunately many Diaspora groups are not coordinating with local civil society thereby creating duplication and, at times, competition. There is a need for proper collaboration and partnership between the Diaspora and local civil society. Focus group participants proposed a regional conference be held where civil society and Diaspora groups can exchange information and develop a common strategy.

**Opportunities**

In May 2012, the dynamics and stability of the central regions is more promising than it had been in some time for civil society’s wider engagement in peacebuilding and statebuilding processes.
• For the first time there was a sign of significant progress in political dialogue and security. Local communities and the Transitional Federal Government showed a willingness to work together for regional stability. The Somali civil society is a key factor that linked the two by providing platform where dialogue can take place;

• Most radical elements are defeated and local communities are embracing responsibilities by investing both resources and moral authority in maintaining local security. Civil society has an opportunity to lead the process of regional revival by facilitating public dialogue to help shape and implement these efforts by building bridges within and across communities and other actors to promote peace and reconciliation;

• There are emerging community-based governance institutions throughout the central regions. Civil society should take the lead in the promotion of good governance and institution building to assist these bodies assume greater responsibility;

• There are indications that the international community is now better informed about the progress made in the central regions and they appear to be more willing to engage in the peacebuilding process in the regions.
4.1 Background

In the past twenty years, the people of Hiraan region like their compatriots have suffered continuous instability, war, poverty, population migration, and internal displacement with only very brief periods of respite. The situation became progressively worse with each brief period of peace followed by a longer period of civil strife and famine, which devastated lives – and those of women, children, the elderly and those who were sick or in poor health in particular. From the fall of Siyad Barre’s military regime in 1991 to the present day, the region has been a battleground for various factions vying for control of the region and its main cities, especially the regional capital Beletweyne, which is strategically located as a trading gateway and social crossroad, being the main route which connects the country both from north to south, and to eastern Ethiopia.

Beletweyne and the Hiraan region as a whole are of great strategic importance. The recent military advances resulting in the opening up of several areas within the region, including the provincial capital, has presented an opportunity for both local and international actors to re-establish control, law and order. The importance of ensuring the vacuum left by the retreating radical groups is filled by a TFG appointed or locally developed and centrally accepted local governance structure which can meet the needs of local communities and contribute to the on-going democratisation process is critical. Any such administration would necessarily be an interim measure until such time a local election can be held to return a local governance structure and officials acceptable to local communities.

The process by which local governance structures are reintroduced and consolidated is as important as the need for re-establishing the rule of law and provision of basic services and administrative support to communities. The lesson of the many failed attempts of the past to develop leadership and governance apparatus in Somalia demonstrates graphically the need to ensure local communities and key stakeholders are fully engaged in developing a culturally sensitive and appropriate system which enjoys legitimacy in the eyes of Somalis. To parachute in and impose any alien structure – be that persons and a system promoted only by the TFG or external agencies – would likely unravel and be challenged quickly by local power brokers and actors who sought local solutions and leadership. The voices and needs of local communities should be taken into account in the shaping of administrative, security and governance structures to be put in place in recovered areas to ensure local needs are indeed addressed, rather than simply erecting vehicles for the self-promotion of individuals or specific groups.

Furthermore, the region has over the last two decades been subject to radically shifting dynamics on the ground as a result of several waves of violence and different powers and actors that assumed control and imposed different ideologies. Given this ever changing political and social
landscape, it is imperative that all actors seek to pause and understand these shifting sands rather than rush in and presume to understand the changes that have occurred, or to rely on an outdated picture of local dynamics. To do so may well confirm and consolidate emerging power brokers that are unacceptable to local communities and unable to meet their needs, or may simply impose external actors or structures without ensuring either action is sensitive to the needs of communities on the ground. As such, efforts to establish and consolidate a democratic culture and practice in the region which could help to build a durable and legitimate peace and local government mechanism would be undermined or simply rejected.

4.1.2 Objectives of the Chapter

This chapter presents the findings of a preliminary Mapping Exercise which focused on Beletweyne and several parts of the Hiraan region from October 2011 – April 2012. Information and preliminary analyses is based on consultations and interviews with small groups and individuals within the various accessible areas, undertaken by a CRD researcher. Key actors consulted in the region including traditional elders, members of previous local administrations, community leaders, TFG cabinet members from the region and the Somali Diaspora.

A preliminary conflict analysis will be presented, looking at various issues and factors including underlying factors that are the source of or contribute to the conflict. It will also set out information on the challenges and the immediate needs of the people and the local economy which could help to speed up and enhance the peace and reconciliation processes, as identified by communities and secondary consultations with key actors outside of the immediate area. It presents as much information as is currently available on the existing situation and condition of the local population, and includes a limited survey of existing schools, health and educational facilities, and the state of the agricultural sector. The primary analysis, however, will focus on the on-going political and civil conflict, together with a set of recommendations that could help in mitigating the conflict and help to create a conducive environment for the implementation of political and social reconciliation processes, and for governance and developmental projects.

Areas for further research and consultation are identified at the conclusion of the chapter. Key among them is the potential impact of the local economy on the peace process. Any improvement in the local economy will undoubtedly impact on the peace and reconciliation process and help in the initiative for peace and reconciliation. Any analysis and assessment of the local economy will be a useful tool. This chapter will present a preliminary assessment on the impact of the past destruction and the immediate needs and requirements of the city of Beletweyne in particular, and the whole region in general.

In addition to the secondary materials consulted, the researcher used data gathered from community based discussions held in many communities as part of the CRD research work in Hiraan region. CRD has utilised its extensive network of community leaders and opinion makers in the community. In the past CRD organised community forums, public dialogue across Hiraan region. The Centre also facilitated numerous mediation processes and the establishment of key active civic institution such as civil society and business community networks.
4.1.3 Methodology

Hiiraan region mapping process employed the PAR tools and methodology adopted for the other consultations and analyses presented in this Report and Interpeace’s mapping exercises across the Somali region. In addition to literature reviews to gather background data, consultations, public forums focus group discussions, individual and group interviews were held with a range of stakeholders including community and political leaders. CRD researchers facilitated focus group meetings held in Mogadishu and diaspora respectively. Over 120 people were consulted including 28 people who attended in focus group meeting held in Mogadishu. Through public consultation, CRD organised community forums and gather data on current political, economic & social reconstruction issues facing Hiiraan region.

4.2 Historical Background

Hiraan is one of the original 8 colonial administrative regions into which the country was divided, and that were retained by the democratically elected governments of the 1960s. The region has always been important in terms of population density, land size, economic output and value to the nation’s economy. In the period prior to Barre’s military regime, Hiraan occupied an influential position in Somali politics. Some of the major independence movement figures, as well as in the post-independence governments, hailed from Beletweyne, including the first President of the Somali Republic, Aden Abdulle Osman, and the first Prime Minister Abdullahi Isse.

The region is located in the middle-west of the Somali peninsula and was therefore historically important to the national economy as a transport hub connecting Mogadishu and the southern regions to the central regions, the north east, the north west and the Somali populated region of Ethiopia known as Kilinka Shanaad.

Hiraan, and the regional capital Beletweyne in particular, has been described by some as the foremost cosmopolitan city in the country where a multiplicity of clans co-existed in harmony for long periods prior to the civil war. The population of the city comprised Somali citizens from every region of the country who settled there, became part of the community without any friction or hostility from the indigenous clans, and who lived there for many generations. Historically, it benefitted from farsighted tribal elders who facilitated compromise, peaceful co-existence and reconciliation in managing the presence of so many different clans.

“Despite the region being diverse in clans, there has never being a time inter-clan conflicts went on more than a week, in part because we traditional elders have developed a council of elders consisted of 66 members who used their influence to help resolved inter-clan conflicts and disputes. The traditional clan elders who enjoy community support and are respected. The membership of the council is drawn from all sub-clan residing in Hiraan region”.

Traditional elder in Beletweyne, March 2010
4.3 Present Crisis and Instability

Unlike most other regions in the south, Hiraan’s descent into chaos, war and population displacement started in the late 80s and before the fall of the Siyad Barre regime. The control of the Hiraan region in general and Beletweyne in particular changed hands many times causing considerable suffering to the people and the city. No other region in the country has changed hands so often. When the rebellion against the government started in late 1989, the people of the region joined in but, unlike the central regions to the north of Hiraan, the region was within easy reach of the government forces which promptly sent troops to suppress the rebellion. Shortly afterwards in 1990, the region became a major staging post for the anti-government rebels, resulting in reprisals against the population of the region by the government forces. This was the beginning of the mass displacement of people, the destruction of people’s livelihoods and massive migration by the region’s population into Mogadishu and other parts of the country not yet affected by the conflict at that time.262

As the conflict escalated into civil war the violence spread to the capital and the rest of the country. Following the collapse of centralised authority in 1991, the Hiraan region enjoyed only a very brief period of peace as the rebellion against the government transformed into an inter-Hawiye conflict. The region descended into anarchy causing widespread destruction of the city and its people, causing further migration and displacement.

UNISOM’s arrival in 1992 facilitated the restoration of peace and security, and partial rehabilitation of the destroyed infrastructure. This was followed by a period of relative peace and stability, from 1991 to 1994 in which all the stakeholders in the region lived peacefully side by side, and the bridges over the Shabelle River were rebuilt and improvements made in the water supply system.263 The intervention of the US led multi-national forces (Operation Restore Hope) to alleviate famine in the Somali region further helped the local population to consolidate local peace. Canadian and German forces stationed in region from February 1993 to June 1994 assisted the local population in agricultural improvements and in the setting up of a provisional administration.

A significant regional peace conference amongst the Hawiye clan was held in Beletweyne from October 1998 to June 1999, organised and hosted by a well-respected titled traditional elder, the late Ugas Khalif of the Hawadle clan. Over 650 clan representatives participated, of which 150 represented the Hawiye sub-clans of Hiraan region. The aim was to foster reconciliation within the Hawiye clan and with other clans, as a fundamental step towards national reconciliation. In its final stages, politicians contested the leadership of the process and the initiative failed. Nevertheless, the conference succeeded in enhancing trade between the regions and between

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262 On 26 January 1991, Former President of Somalia Siyad Barre fled Mogadishu followed by widespread inter-clans conflict.
263 On 21 April 1992, the Secretary General of the UN recommended the establishment of United Nations Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM) to the Security Council.
sub-clans, building local capacity to organise and finance peace processes, and demonstrating
the potential of bottom-up reconciliation processes.

The improved security conditions prompted the return of some who had fled to other parts
of the country and abroad; with their return, the region’s economy improved, business began
to pick up, and a number of privately owned schools and small clinics opened. Numerous
western funded international and local NGO’s, primarily health and education sector provided
essential social services. For example, Beletweyne hospital was supported and financed by
international NGOs. The hospital was often used for eye surgery by medical teams from the
Kenyatta Hospital in Nairobi. There were medical doctors who conducted periodical visits
and medical consultations, and qualified nurses received refresher courses from International
Medical Corps (IMC). Somalis from the Diaspora also played an active role in efforts to revive
wider medical and education services, including by regularly dispatching essential medical
supplies. Despite these positive actions, the overall growth of the region was hampered by the
general instability of the country as a whole which created conditions unfavourable for peace,
investment and progress.

From 1992 to 2006, the region saw military and socio-political turmoil with power captured
and lost by a variety of power brokers assuming territorial control of the region. Among these
were the warlords and faction leaders who fought over control of Beletweyne district and its
environ. Between 1993 and 2006, for a brief period, various militia groups loyal to clans and
faction leaders took control of the city. From 2006 to 2012 the region, and Beletweyne district
in particular, became a battle ground for Islamic Courts Union (ICU), the TFG, Hizbul-Islam,
and Al Shabaab forces.

In the wake of Islamic Sharia court taking over much of the south-central Somalia, the region,
like other parts of the region had enjoyed relative stability and initiated a recovery process. This
was interrupted however when the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) were driven out of Beletweyne
by the Ethiopian Army on 24 December 2006. The presence of mechanised Ethiopian troops on
Somali soil incurred both the wrath and fear for local communities. ICU portrayed the incursion
as a breach of Somali sovereignty and called for widespread resistance under a nationalist
banner, while the TFG welcomed the arrival of Ethiopian forces as liberators. In reaction to
the ICU’s call to arms, many sectors of the Somali society, and the people of Hiraan region in
particular, supported a movement against Ethiopian incursion.

Within the wave of mounting opposition against the Ethiopian incursion, Al Shabaab was able
to consolidate and increase its religious and nationalist appeal, strength and leadership among
the various opposition groups that had emerged. It rode on the back of the wave of this popular
uprising without disclosing their radical agenda. Many fighters which rallied to Al Shabaab were
not in fact fully aware of the group’s radical agenda, which presented itself as liberators of the
country from the perceived danger of Ethiopian colonisation.
Eventually, as part of a negotiated agreement between the ICU Asmara wing and TFG in January 2009, Ethiopian troops withdrew from the region. Immediately after the Ethiopian withdrawal, the radical elements within the ICU declared themselves as an independent splinter group from ICU under the banner of Al Shabaab and pressed ahead to fill the vacuum left by the departing Ethiopian forces and defeat of the ICU. After consolidating absolute power across the entire region, they introduced strict interpretation of Islamic Sharia. As people realised the radical agenda and practice of the Al Shabaab regime, local residents began low-level resistance against Al Shabaab rule.

“When the ICU arrived, we’ve provided them with financial and logistical supports, as we thought they were true and genuine Muslims which respected Somali cultural values. Initially, security had improved and people felt a sense of pride, but within a few months it became apparent that the ICU had transformed into Al Shabaab with radical agenda. The local population led by traditional elders made an attempt to resist Al Shabaab’s new religious-based violence but our resistance was put down by Al Shabaab’s security unit known as Amniyaad. Many people were assassinated including prominent elders while other fled from the region.”

Al Shabaab maintained their control through the force of arms. They had a well organised, trained and disciplined militia. Al Shabaab’s fighters were able to blend into the communities through local connections and utilise local intelligence networks to rally round and defeat any visible opposition. Unfortunately, due to widespread unemployment, limited educational opportunity and sophisticated recruitment techniques of Al Shabaab many youth joined the insurgency. Despite the group’s dominance and attraction to some elements of Somali society, however, they were not able to secure the full community’s genuine commitment and support.

Historically, the Somali people never allowed their traditional leaders unrestrained authority and control of other essential functions in the community. They played a critical role primarily in matters concerning social contracts and mitigating local conflicts. The contractual ‘Xeer’ among clans and communities maintained peace and stability in the community and respect for the Islamic moral values. Upon the arrival of Al Shabaab, traditional elders lost their role in the community. Any elder claiming authority was either jailed or exiled. It became a crime to be an elder and they were punished; alternative leaders were cultivated with a cult of leadership being built around individuals who did not hail from traditional leadership lines or processes, and Amiirs and Wadis newly established by the Al Shabaab assumed local leadership roles.

Many intellectuals and aid workers left the region leaving behind broken social service sectors, thus stalling the progress achieved the previous years. While Al Shabaab provided limited security to areas under their control, they did not provide comprehensive social services. In

264 Businesswoman from Beletweyne, Focus Group Meeting, Mogadishu, May 2012.
rare interventions, they did organise local people to repair irrigation systems to agricultural channels. In other areas they collected Sakat from those few who were better off and had greater means of livelihood and income, which was used to support destitute families and individuals. One of the most noticeable social service undertakings was the rehabilitation of the Beletweyne bridge. The collapsed bridge was totality rehabilitated allowing the movement of people and goods across city and beyond. This was a major achievement during Al Shabaab’s rule.

4.4 Key Actors in the Political Transition

At the time of writing, Beletweyne had been liberated from Al Shabaab rule barely three months previously by Somali government and AMISOM forces (primarily Ethiopian armed forces). In the short time since then, inter-clan fighting erupted and cost a number of lives as the jockeying for political control of the city began in earnest among the clans and political groups. There are several major players contending for political dominance and control of the city and wider region including:

*The Transitional Federal Government*: the TFG seeks to install its own men or supporters in power. As the TFG’s mandate draws to a close with the August 2012 transition deadline, it has been suggested by many observers that key members of the TFG are seeking to cultivate a role, constituency and power base beyond this deadline and beyond the parameters of a central government in which they would no longer be eligible to serve.

*Ethiopian Forces*: in partnership with TFG forces, Ethiopian forces remain in the region providing security support to the city.

*Al Shabaab Forces*: despite losing Beletweyne city, Al Shabaab remains in the region and continues to pose a serious threat to the regional government; at the time of writing, three main districts remain under Al Shabaab control.

*Dohada Shabelle Militia*: this is a heavily armed militia group who fought along with Ethiopian forces when they entered the city. They consist of clan militia and the remnants of ICU forces and has influence in the region’s security and politics.

*Freelance Clan Militia*: there are various freelance militia groups who have no particular allegiance to any group or clan. They fight for any faction that provides resources. They tend to be associated with one of the main sub-clans in the region.

*Al Sunnah Wal Jammah*: although they are dormant at this stage, ASWJ is a powerful military force that operates across the central regions, though enjoys only limited influence in Hiraan region. There is conflict between Shabelle Valley Alliance and ASWJ in the region. They fought

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265 English translation of the Doha Shabelle is “Shabelle Valley Alliance”.
in Beletweyne, with five people killed in crossfire. Currently Mahas district is dominated by the faction aligned to the Hiraan Governor, but still ASWJ are still present in the outskirts of Mahas and security is fragile.

**Hiraan Elders Council:** despite the ban by Al Shabaab, an elders council remains as one of the most powerful authorities after the local government.

**Hiraan Civil Society:** the region has very vibrant civic actors, many of whom had left during Al Shabaab’s reign, but are slowly returning to region.

Clan elders traditionally played a key role in maintaining peace and facilitating mediation and reconciliation processes within and across communities when required. The deterioration in the standing of authority was compounded when Al Shabaab killed a number of well-known clan elders. Those that remained were degraded and humiliated by Al Shabaab’s denial of their role in the society, thus undermining the respect and the trust people had in them to act on their behalf. This is a general problem throughout the regions that have been under Al Shabaab’s control for a long time, but is particularly acute in Hiraan due to the fact that the elders in the region supported the clan militias who had resisted Al Shabaab rule, and were therefore more harshly dealt with than in other regions.

Despite the imposition of a night time curfew in Beletweyne since its liberation, fighting erupted between the Dohada Shabelle state militia and freelance militias. The fight was over the leadership of the Hiraan region.

In early February 2012 a group of TFG MPs and Ministers from Hiraan region went to the region to consult on the appointment of the new administration to take over the region. The TFG President nominated Governor Abdifatah Hassan Afrah (Hawaadle) of the Doohada Shabelle state faction, and the Governor nominated a District Commissioner, Osman Barre Mohamed (Gal-je’el), while the TFG Prime Minister and members of his cabinet nominated former Somali army Colonel Muhayadin Ahmed Roble from the Somali Diaspora. The administration which the TFG delegation sought to establish, however, was not acceptable to the local communities and influential actors. Critics accused the government of going against the letter and the spirit of the coming draft federal Constitution and of federalism as a principle.

Little consultation was conducted with the local people on the type of leadership they want. This created friction with the TFG as well as Members of Parliament hailed from the region. A consultative process would have allowed the local community to speak out on regional issues of reconciliation and the setting up of a community based administration which would have enjoyed broad-based support. People in the region believed that parachuting in a centrally imposed leadership would not bring a lasting solution to the region.
To accommodate political demands from various clans in the region, an all-inclusive new governing structure was purposed and approved. Under the new structure, four deputies were created in which each deputy hailed from and represented one of the four major clans: Badacade, Makane, Jajele and Galjecel, while regional secretary would be sought from the Ujeejeen sub-clan. The newly appointed Governor then nominated and appointed from his faction, a Mayor for Beletweyne district. He also appointed a District Commissioner for Mahas, one of the two free districts of Hiraan region.

The controversy over the nomination of the new governor and new District Commissioner made many other stakeholders and their leadership uneasy with TFG leadership. This resentment is shared by some parliamentarians and the ministers from the region. Some stakeholders in the regions believed that the TFG leadership decision was a hasty decision that could have negative ramifications for peace and reconciliation in the region as well as for the other regions to be liberated in the future. On the other hand, TFG leadership argued that installing unknown characters from Diaspora will not help the region. They said, the region needs strong leadership who can fight Al Shabaab and the forces varying for the regional influence.

On 12 March 2012, the TFG backtracked slightly. In a press release issued in the name of the National Security Committee, the government said that its nomination of Governor and District Commissioner for the newly liberated regions will be a 3-month temporary measure, after which local elections will be held for those positions. However, many experts are sceptical about the viability of this proposition.

The refusal of local stakeholders to accept the TFG candidates illustrates the continued influence of local actors and their agendas, and the relatively weak position of the TFG in the area, though it remains a key and influential player in the region.

4.5 Reconciliation

Despite the lack of a long-standing political settlement between various actors and clans, there is no major active inter-clan conflict in most of the districts in Hiraan region. The region is characterised by highly localised (clan/sub-clan-based) political activity, but also with relative security. Clan rivalry, insecurity, pressure on livestock systems, and a series of failed harvests all made the region vulnerable to conflicts, but most inter-clan conflicts have been resolved. From 1991 to 2007, nine major local peace initiatives took place in the Hiraan region. The high number of regional initiatives reflects the complexity of relationships between the clans and sub-clans, the relative wealth of resources, and the level of impact of national politics.
The traditional leaders continually engaged in resolving and managing local disputes in the Hiraan region through community based processes, many of which were supported and co-facilitated by CRD/Interpeace. As the moral authority of the traditional elders was historically significant, many were targeted and killed by radical groups to eliminate an alternate centre of power. Despite these killings, however, many elders continued to play a leadership role and successfully mediated a number of conflicts. One of the reconciliation processes that elders successfully mediated is the conflict between the Jijeele and Gaalje’el clans in Hiraan region. The clash took place between the two groups in Beletweyne town – the provincial capital and economic hub - and thus had an immediate impact on other clans. Elders played a constructive role in the process which they initiated and supported as respected honest brokers. Elders played a constructive facilitation role in a number of reconciliation processes as presented in the table below.
**Case Study 11: Conflict resolution process among Somalis – local level mediation processes**

Typically, a conflict resolution process is either mediated directly by the traditional elders of the two parties in conflict or by a third party, and would involve the following steps. The traditional elders of the respective groups make contact to share information on the crisis and take measures to contain the escalation. These may include a cessation of hostility (*colaad joojin*), disengagement of forces (*kala rariid/ kala fogeyn*) and ceasefire (*xabbad joojin*).

Once the immediate violent conflict is contained in this first phase, the elders from the confronting parties meet directly or through a third party to examine together the issues involved and the root causes of the conflict, and identify appropriate steps to be undertaken towards reconciliation, based on the existing customary laws between the two groups. If the elders have reached a common understanding, they propose mediation to the parties in conflict in a public meeting at which they present their views on the root causes and their grievances. But if the traditional elders fail to reach an agreement, then a third party accepted by both groups will propose a mediation process.

With the consent of the parties in conflict, the traditional leaders or the arbitrating leaders will appoint a neutral technical committee to examine the root causes of the conflict more thoroughly, investigate who instigated the violence, and ascertain the impact in terms of loss of lives and property. Once it has completed its fact finding mission to gather information and collect evidence, the technical committee uses the same traditional customary codes to prepare a proposal for appropriate remedial action, which typically include punitive penalties to the offending party and compensation to be paid for loss of life and property. This is presented to the traditional (arbitrating) leaders for their review and endorsement.

Then the parties in conflict are called again by the traditional elders and the technical committee and informed of the outcome of the technical committee’s fact finding mission and the decisions reached.

Table 13: Reconciliation Mapping between 1991 and 2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Clash</th>
<th>Reason</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hawadle Vs. Gaalje’el</td>
<td>Killing in road block and looting</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Buq-Aqable village in Burte district</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Murusade Vs. Hawadle</td>
<td>Blood vendetta and loss property</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Mahas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abgal Vs. Hawadle</td>
<td>Resource and blood vendetta</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Moqokori</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inter-Galjecel</td>
<td>Blood vendetta and rape cases</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Buq-Aqable village in Bule Burde district</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inter-Galje’el</td>
<td>Blood vendetta</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Mukeyle village in Bula Burde District</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Galje’el and Jijele sub-clans</td>
<td>Entity priority</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Beletweyne</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Badi’adde and Hawadle clans</td>
<td>Political priority</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Bulo-burde</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hawadle and Gal-Je’el</td>
<td>Phase 2 - final reconciliation</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Buq-Aqable village in B/Burte district</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inter Galje’el sub-clan</td>
<td>Road block and blood vendetta</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Raso village in Bulo-Burto district</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Murusade Vs. Hawadle Part II</td>
<td>Blood vendetta and loss property</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Mahas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hawadle Vs. Murusade</td>
<td>Phase 2, final reconciliation</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>El Bur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mahadle Vs. Baadiadde</td>
<td>Land dispute 2002</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Beletweyne</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Udejen Vs. Hawadle</td>
<td>Blood vendetta &amp; weapons dispute</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>2 phases, Beletweyne &amp; Ferfeer</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Hiraan region has one of the most dynamic and active Diaspora groups which have contributed substantially in local reconciliation processes. For example, in 2006/7 Diaspora groups from the Mahas and Elbur clans provided moral and financial support for the reconciliation process which brought the two disputing parties together. Diaspora members of the Murasade and Hawadle formed a group in London to engage the elders and Ugaasyo of the two sub-clans in Mogadishu, Beletwewayne, Elbur and London. Subsequently they sent two of their members to participate in a peace conference in October 2007 and also providing USD10,000 to cover the costs of the reconciliation process, and committed to support the implementation and consolidation of peace in the area. The constructive engagement of the Diaspora group had a substantial impact on the morale of participants and was identified as a key factor in the success of the talks. Similarly, Diaspora members of other clans in the region have contributed to local reconciliation processes.

4.6 Education

Prior to 1999 the region had a dynamic social service delivery system, including tertiary education and health services delivered through institutions supported the Somali Diaspora and privately funded local institutions. The region had enjoyed one of the most progressive education systems, in part due to the presence of diverse clans, and reflected the high number of local intellectual and political leaders from the region which held various senior positions in successive national governments.

In the past, region’s social services were delivered through the following categories:

- **External actors** – International NGOs had provided a limited amount of very basic services. They had operational hospitals assisted by the International Community;

- **Local community and Diaspora** – Hiraan region’s Diaspora continue to provide funding for essential services for their people. In some districts within the Hiraan region, the presence or involvement of traditional humanitarian organisations from the international community has been virtually non-existent and the local population has been depending on the support of the Somali Diaspora and business community;

- **Private institutions (profit making enterprises)** – In Mogadishu, a number of educational and health services are private individually owned enterprises which charge fees for access to education.

Despite the progress made in the region from the late-1990s, the advancement in education was halted by the arrival of radical religious groups. Most of the pupils in Beletwewayne left the schools. Some NGO staff remained but were no longer engaged in activities or education programmes in Beletwewayne. In 2011 key factors that were identified by educational professionals in undermining the education system in the regions, including the legacy of the radicalisation of education system were:

- A large number of the teachers and education professionals fled the city and the regions leaving schools without teachers resulting in severe and chronic under staffing;
Chapter 4

- Recruitment of pupils in the city by radical groups forced parents to send their children away from Beletweyne and towns and villages in Hiraan to other areas within Somalia not under the control of radical religious groups. Others sent their children to Sudan, Ethiopia, Kenya and even Yemen to study.

One of the tragic consequences of the recent war was the wanton destruction of the region’s progressive educational system. Many schools sustained physical damage and some were occupied by militias or were taken over as dwelling by internal refugees, thus bringing to an end education that the people used to enjoy and had taken for granted.

“During instability in the region, the modest infrastructure built in the past was destroyed. Violent clan militias and radical religious groups halted the ongoing developmental progress, mainly agricultural sector. Health and educational institutions, water and sanitation facilities also suffered destruction. Many schools and hospitals sustained physical damage and some were occupied by clan militias. Now people are returning and there is sense of cohesion among people in the region, we would like to ask international community help us revive the social service and agricultural sector.

Businessman, Beletweyne 266

Most of the teachers interviewed indicated that student enrolment in Hiraan region decreased noticeably between 2009-2012. Some districts in the region experienced lower enrolment than other districts, such Bula-Burde and Matabaan. Equally, school construction has decreased substantially as the Somali Diaspora suspended their support in district level school construction during period of particularly increased high insecurity. Though there is no available systematic data, there is much anecdotal evidence that there has been a substantial reduction of student enrolment across all districts of the Hiraan region. This has made a large number of youth available for recruitment for fighting. There are thousands of youth who found themselves with no school, no opportunities and facing a bleak future. The only alternative available for many was active involvement and participation in the ongoing regional conflict. Children as young as ten years old were recruited and served as combatants. These children were caught in the middle of this unfolding tragedy, both as the ultimate victims and as the perpetrators of the conflict. Those who had access to the few educational institutions still available have limited skills and are not disciplined or equipped enough to engage legitimate economic activities.

“(…) often people talked about young men who have being radicalized but there is also another dark side of the impact of war on youth. Use and abuse of young women has become the norm. There is widespread forced marriage of young girls as young as 11 years. I know families whose young daughter disappeared for

266 Businessman, Focus Group Discussion, Beletweyne, March 2012
months. It was later discovered that she was forced to marry a local militiaman. This phenomena forced many families to relocate their families outside the region”.

Mother who moved to Mogadishu from Beletweyne

Currently the region has 97 schools, with an estimate student population of anything between 3,000 and 5,000 – no reliable figures are available. Across the five districts of the region, there are 192 primary schools, but only 11 high schools currently open to students. Most of these schools are supported by Somali Diaspora and international NGOs. One of the critical issues facing the region is the quality of education. Most of the teachers are either not trained or academically unqualified with skills required to teach primary and secondary schools. Those trained before the civil war are in their sixties. Others have been absent from the profession for some time and have not received refresher courses before rejoining the occupation. The teachers’ situation is exacerbated by the lack of regular in-service programs to upgrade their knowledge of the subject matter and professional skills. The salary paid to teachers is also small compared with other professions and deters many potential qualified teachers to seek employment from other professions.

“We get paid as little as USD50 per month for six days a week for a teaching job, with no support. Many of my colleagues do not have the necessary incentive to fully commit to the teaching profession, and many rely on secondary jobs to meet their daily livelihood needs.”

Teacher in Beletweyne district

Another major factor that contributes to the low quality of education in addition to the lack of qualified teachers is the lack of textbooks and other supportive reading or teaching aid materials that would help the students better understand their subjects. Given the instability in the region and the concentration of youth that could end up in the hand of radicals, it is imperative that the education system in the region is fully restored. The role of education in lives of children and its critical impact in the early stages of their development is widely recognised.

According to UNICEF, education, even in its most rudimentary form, provides children with a sense of normalcy and continuity. UNICEF emphasises the significance of establishing local structures: “Education has a crucial and preventative role to play in fulfilling the needs and rights of children in conflict and post-conflict situations. Education can play a critical role in providing continuity, restoring a sense of normalcy, teaching survival skills, stimulating hope in the midst of despair”.

The focus should not only be formal classroom education but also the promotion of peace education.

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267 It should be noted that many schools exist as a building but do not have any students, others become make shift refuges. There is no reliable figure of how many functional schools exist in the region. The number presented here is an estimate of the overall number of schools that exist, even if some may not have students.
There should be a concerted effort to prevent children joining to army militia groups by providing them with meaningful alternatives to joining the war machine. Furthermore, peace education and conflict resolution training can play a critical role in building cross-communal understanding and facilitate bridge building. This kind of approach can be integrated into the normal educational curriculum of the schools.

“My biggest worry is my kids; not what they will eat tomorrow, Allah has granted their survival, but my deep concerns lies in whether they will join army groups through persuasion or coercion. There is no rehabilitation or vocational programmes in the region. There are no alternative options for kids. Unfortunately, many kids end up joining radical groups. Each parent in Hiraan region lives with fear. Any time a phone rings we ask ourselves what tragic news they will be relayed“.

Mother in Bula Burde District

The region is also a pioneer in establishing a university. The first university in central regions was created on 10 August 2005 when Ugaas Abdirahman Ugaas Khalif laid the foundation stone of the university near the airport. Landed dedicated to the university was donated by residents in Beletweyne.
4.7 Health Services

The health systems inherited from the previous military government were far from adequate in terms of both physical facilities and human resources. It had fully constructed hospitals and other medical facilities, especially in large cities such as Beletweyne district, with the required health professions planned for. With the opening of the Faculty of Medicine of the Somali National University in 1972, the acute shortage of Somali doctors was also partially addressed. Newly trained doctors were sent to the region to help address health needs for the people in the region. Prior to the civil strife, the region had 1 major hospital and 2 MCH across the region. During the civil war the region had a sophisticated hospital to which people would even come across from the Ethiopian border. The hospital was sustained by the Somali Diaspora and some international NGOs.
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Table 15: Medical Facilities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Medical Facilities</th>
<th>Administered By</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Beletweyne general hospital</td>
<td>Beletweyne</td>
<td>MSF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zamzam TB centre</td>
<td>Beletweyne</td>
<td>Zamzam NGO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCH</td>
<td>Beletweyne</td>
<td>Dove NGO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 MCH</td>
<td>Beletweyne</td>
<td>Gella NGO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCH</td>
<td>Bunda weyne/Beletweyne</td>
<td>Red Crescent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCH</td>
<td>Howlwadag/Beletweyne</td>
<td>Warda NGO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCH</td>
<td>Bula burte</td>
<td>Red Crescent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TB Center</td>
<td>Jalalaqsi</td>
<td>Techno Plan NGO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCH</td>
<td>Howlwadag/Beletweyne</td>
<td>Doonyaale NGO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B/Burte Com. Hospital</td>
<td>Bula Burte</td>
<td>Diaspora</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCH</td>
<td>Mataban</td>
<td>Gella NGO</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*above NGOs are financially and technically supported by international NGOs.*

From 2007 to early 2012 when the region was under Al Shabaab control, almost all major NGOs who had provided healthcare to the people of Hiraan were banned. Mercy (USA) which established clinics in the towns of Bula-burte and Jalalaqsi were forced out. Similar to the exodus of education professionals, health professionals also fled Beletweyne and the rest of the region leaving behind a radically reduced and wholly overwhelmed cadre of health workers with limited knowledge and experience to care for the entire population of the region. The region continues to suffer a chronic shortage of doctors and skilled nurses. Most of the patients, particularly critical cases, are taken to Guri-cail where MSF Belgium is operating a hospital.

Mother and child care services are non-existent in Hiraan, as it is the case in most parts of Somalia, with a high child and maternal mortality rate reported through anecdotal evidence (there are no recent or reliable statistics available). Similarly, there are no reliable statistics for the number of orphaned children or those being brought up by single mothers. Again, due to the ceaseless war in the region, it can be assumed that a large number of mothers and fathers died during the prolonged conflict. The death toll of male bread winners reported in the public consultations and interviews held indicate a very high rate, with female headed households and women as the primary breadwinners reported extensively.

“Every mother in the region has lost either sons or husbands in the conflict, there is very few facilities available for mothers or women at large. Each conflict cycle brought its difficulties and challenges with serious impact on lives of women. Hiraan region cannot recover without the support of women. We need programmes that assist us both socially and economically.”

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268 Sahara Abdi Gure, Interview, Beletweyne, February 2012.
Hiraan was the first region since the downfall of the central government in 1991 in which a veterinary program was started. Shortly after the arrival of the Canadian contingent of UNISOM in 1992, ICRC started a veterinary program by bringing medical supplies. Soon after Oxfam Quebec started a comprehensive veterinary programme in all the districts of the region. The work was done by many veterinary doctor and assistants. Before they left they established an organisation called Hiraan Privatational. Teams of doctors and veterinary auxiliaries under that programme are still working. There is also a functioning Professional Veterinary Organisation which covers Hiraan, Galguduud, and South Mudug which is called Central Regions Livestock Professional Association.

4.8 NGOs and Civic Institutions

Over the past twenty years, a number of international NGOs with their local affiliates have provided essential social services including health, education and humanitarian assistance. Most active international NGOs have been banned from, and/or forcibly driven out of the Hiraan region in the past few years by Al Shabaab. However, since the city was liberated from Al Shabaab, a few International NGOs have returned to the city including the Danish Refugee Council (DRC), WFP and ICRC. They provide humanitarian assistance, community based projects involving education and livelihood. The following table shows the number of international NGOs that operated in the region.
The main areas of work of the international and local NGOs include:

- **Health**: Hospitals and maternal/child health care centres;
- **Peace-building Initiatives**: Reconciliation between warring clans; conflict prevention campaign;
- **Human, women and child rights**: Advocacy in media and public forums; reporting human rights;
- **Advocacy**: Human right issues, awareness rising on FGM, HIV/AIDS, women’s right etc.;
- **Education**: primary, secondary schools, peacebuilding education and community-based capacity building programs;
- **Humanitarian Assistance**: Delivery humanitarian assistance providing shelter for internally displaced persons (IDP);
- **Agriculture and Veteran**: Technical and capacity building support.

### Table 16: International NGOs operated in the region

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The World Food Program (WFP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Save the Children Funds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICRC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Medical Corps (IMC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oxfam Quebec</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCHA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Care International</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African Muslim Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Danish Refugee Council (DRC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adventist Development and Relief Agency International (ADRA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norwegane Refugee Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamic Relief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP Somali Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finish Church Aid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interpeace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COE – Italian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BASE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mercy USA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Given the absence of capable or credible Somali institutions, mainly government institutions, the international development community rely heavily on local CSOs to reach out to marginalised and vulnerable parts of the populace. Following are some of the active local NGOs operating in Hiraan regions.

*Table 17: Local active NGOs in Hiraan Region*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Local NGO</th>
<th>Project</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HARDO</td>
<td>Nutrition, cash relief, dry food distribution, WASH, agricultural project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAMARADO</td>
<td>Nutrition, dry food distribution, WASH, agricultural project, and humanitarian delivery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOONYAALE</td>
<td>Nutrition, MCH services, out-patient treatment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mercy Group</td>
<td>Nutrition, MCH services - out-patient treatment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TECHNO Plan</td>
<td>TB program, prevention, anti-malaria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIJDOOR</td>
<td>Media</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIWA</td>
<td>Human rights, women program and informal education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hiraan Water Supply</td>
<td>Water related projects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HYBO Child</td>
<td>Child projection, education, HIV awareness, youth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baladweyne Black Smith Association</td>
<td>Artisan, livelihood</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GELLO</td>
<td>MCH services, agricultural projects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRLP Association</td>
<td>Veterinary programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hiraan Women Business Association</td>
<td>Business</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACRO CARE</td>
<td>Livelihood</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hiraan Journalist Club</td>
<td>Media</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hiraan Elders Council</td>
<td>Peace, reconciliation and governance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WAMEY</td>
<td>TB center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRD</td>
<td>Peacebuilding and research</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOADO</td>
<td>Livelihood,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XAQSOOR Human Rights</td>
<td>Human Rights Issues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hiraan Business Association</td>
<td>Business</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZAMZAM</td>
<td>TB center, bolt hole walls, humanitarian delivery, education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADSOM</td>
<td>Distribution of food, agricultural projects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hiraan Ecological Society</td>
<td>Environmental issues</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Despite the threat posed by Al Shabaab, the local NGOs continue to provide services in most of the districts of the regions. Services provided include humanitarian delivery, education, health and other essential services. A few NGOs that were banned during Al Shabaab’s control of the region have returned and resumed their services. Most of these NGOs work in the humanitarian, education and agricultural sectors.

4.9 Human Rights

Over the past two decades, and in recent years in particular, the people of Hiraan suffered from many human right abuses. A strict regime depriving people of any rights or freedoms was enforced by Al Shabaab, contrary to all Islamic laws and traditions, with torture, beating and beheadings as consequence if not obeyed. Children as young as eight years were initially brainwashed into joining the ranks of the clan militia and extremist, and once they did, they could not get out even if they wanted to or had a pressing family need to do so as all parental rights were denied. The choice was only to stay with radical groups or be killed by them.

“Initially they informed us (villagers) that any parent with older sons are encouraged to join the Jihad, few people volunteered, later they recruited youth without the family consent. My two sons were sent to other regions to fight on behalf of the Mujahadin”.

Traditional elders and religious scholars were not spared from the civil strife; in fact no one with education or religious knowledge could live in the Hiraan region or anywhere else under radical groups’ control; those who were not killed fled immediately. The situation in the Hiraan region was exacerbated by conflicts between the extremists themselves. There were clashes between Hizbul-Islam and Al Shabaab which added to the destruction of life and property. On 12 May 2010, Hizbul Islam and Al Shabaab insurgents had officially split into two factions. The breakup occurred following accusations of each group of the other undermining its effort to defeat AMISON and TFG forces. The spilt was followed by intensive infighting between the forces loyal to the both factions. Worse yet, the continuous war between government forces and local clan militia on one side against Al Shabaab and Hizbul-Islam on the other side took a heavy toll. Beletweyne changed rulers numerous times in the past four years. Each time one side or the other took control they meted out reprisals against real or imagined supporters of the other side that had controlled the city. Most of the time they killed people who just rented property or supplied merchandise or in one way or another had personal or business relationship with the other side, which incidentally the victims could not refuse.

“Beletweyne city has changed hands over the years; each time, people flee from the town in part because the new forces often conducted reprisals on the people”.

269 Father, Interview, Mahas District, February 2012.
270 VOA, Somali Section, 12 May 2010.
they thought were associated with those defeated forces. For example, when Al Shabaab took the town they did house to house searches looking for names and individuals they believed assisted the previous government forces. Many of those arrested have not been seen since. It is a repeated occurrence in the city. This is one of the reasons people did not come out immediately to show support TFG and Ethiopian forces.”

Member of local council, Beletweyne

Most journalists fled the region soon after its conquest by Al Shabaab. Some were threatened or killed, others took to their heels. The Hornafrik radio was taken over and looted. Music, sport and drama were banned and all cultural activity came to a halt. Recently, on 6 April 2012 a Mahad Salad Adan journalist of Shabelle Media Network was gunned down in the middle of Beletweyne town. There is only one radio station currently operating in the region with no newspapers or any other communications available to the public.

4.10 Business, Community Participation and Self-Help Schemes

The region is known for its vibrant business community that links up the Southern and Northern regions, engaged mainly in trade, agriculture and livestock export. Due to the fighting in the region many business people fled, suspending their businesses which had employed a substantial number of the local population. Very little of the former community owned businesses, projects and self-help schemes, such as, farming cooperatives, cottage industries, water wells and similar small scale businesses remain. Only small traders are currently left operational in the region.

The extensive businesses and cooperatives that existed and thrived during the period prior to civil war were almost completely destroyed. As the region spiralled into illegality, the assassinations of prominent business and civil society leaders’ increased and economic stagnation ensued as most of those with the knowledge and expertise to run businesses, projects and the social services that has been the life blood of the community fled the region, leaving behind those who were physically and financially unable to leave. As the TFG forces returned to the region and a new administration put in place, businesses community are returning to the region reviving their business.

“I just returned to the region. Since the TFG takeover, I see a lot of business opportunities, people are waiting for the right opportunity to reopen major business. The sooner a viable administration is set up, the better”.

Local trader in Beletweyne District

271 Interview, Focus Group Meeting, Mogadishu May 2012
4.11 Agriculture and the Shabelle River

The land and the soil of the Hiraan region, unlike the central regions to the north, is rich, fertile and suitable for both pastoral and agricultural production. The Shabelle river passes through Hiraan region primarily in three districts: Beletweyne, Bulo Burte and Jalalaqsi. It stretches an estimated distance of 265 km roughly from the Ethiopian-Somali border all the way to the Middle Shabelle region. The river has historically had a positive economic impact on local economy and the agricultural sector in particular. It aides agricultural irrigation projects; people and animals drink from the river; it helps the fishing communities around the river; it provides water and grazing to the local livestock within the vicinity. The river also facilitates local transport and communication activities in the region by way of locally-made boats that shuttle between and among major towns and villages along the Shabelle River.

Agriculture in Hiraan region had seen a continuous improvement in production, with many people migrating from the southern regions to the wet regions of Hiraan. The farmers in Hiraan, mainly Bula Burde and Beletweyne districts have seen record harvests of onions and lemons, which are sold throughout Somalia, in particularly Puntland, Somaliland and exported to Ethiopia. Production increased after 1990s civil war. This was contributed to by number of factors; 1) many people returned to their original clan region as Mogadishu became the epicentre of the Somali conflict; and 2) technical assistant was provided by the international NGOs that provided a source of livelihood.

While the river supports the livelihoods of the local population, it has negative impacts on the lives of the people in the region, and is also a major source of conflict between the nomadic pastoral clans and the settled agricultural communities. Investments in major water management projects could have – and could yet play an important role in the peace and the reconciliation of the clans in the region. Due to the on-going conflicts, the region agricultural sector declined as on-going violence destroyed agricultural focus, capacity and products. Investment and technical support in the agricultural sector vanished after Al Shabaab took over as they demanded a 30% surcharge on any developmental budget. Many international NGOs are now returning to revive agricultural section.

Flooding also has and continues to pose a serious challenge. People and livestock are regularly drowned and eaten by crocodiles. A number of water-related diseases are also found along the river and have a devastating impact on the local population, primarily as a result of diarrhea, malaria, and bilharzia. At times, the river also brings sour water which negatively affects the local farms. Also, during the floods, there is transport and communication disruption between and among the main towns and villages in the region.

The region had historically developed through key industry such as the formerly famous banana plantations of the Lower Shabelle and Lower Juba, but this decreased as a result of the civil
war. With the help of mainly agricultural support institutions and international NGOs, Hiraan region may well be able, as a benefit of increasing security, to resurrect its historical capacity for dynamic commercial agriculture by producing onions, bananas and mangoes. The region once more could become one of the great suppliers of vegetables to a large number of towns and villages in south-central Somalia.

4.12 Challenges and Moving Forward

A number of key issues - and suggested ways of addressing them by both local and external actors – were identified by participants in the Mapping Exercise as critical in ensuring the restoration and durability of a stable, peaceful region. Such actions could furthermore help to create or enhance local governance structures which are locally acceptable, legitimate and effective. These issues and possible responsive actions are presented below.

- The current political situation is very confusing and highly dangerous. The fact that immediately after liberation, the liberators themselves started fighting each other for the control of Beletweyne does not augur well for reconciliation and conviviality in the immediate future and serious effort has to be made to reverse and correct this trend;

- The absence of community-based governance - the question of who and how governors and district commissioners should be nominated has the potential of derailing the peace and reconciliation process and indeed the whole Roadmap through renewed inter-clan conflict if not tackled in a careful responsible manner. Communities expressed a desire for a grassroots process that will enable them to elect their own leadership;

- The challenge facing the people of the Hiraan region is how to capitalise on the current opportunity created by the withdrawal of Al-Shabaab from the city of Beletweyne and unite around the need and the necessity to establish a lasting peace and security and a system of governance fair to all the clans big or small and to all the people of the region. To achieve this, urgent public dialogue is needed where clan and community develop a sustainable peace;

- The immediate revival of the social services sector including through provision of health and education services so that people in the region see the benefit of liberation. This is particularly important with regard to the re-opening of public hospitals across the regions;

- The rehabilitation of canals which would improve the local economy, build good relationships between communities, and reduce possible potential tensions between clans/sub-clans;

- The communities also suggested that an agricultural development association be formed to enable them to carry out future technical studies, agricultural extension and training.
programmes, facilitate the provision of cheap labour, both skilled and non-skilled, and local materials;

- Reconstituting the civil society and the institutions destroyed in the past few years, such as clan elders, youth and women’s groups, educational, media, cultural, trade, agricultural, professional and economic institutions were also identified as a key mechanism to rebuild the social and economic fabric of the community;

- Provide technical support for the community to reconstitute the Council of Elders that kept peace in the regions. Many elders were killed during the civil war;

- Support community-based reconciliation processes where key community actors are consulted and encouraged to take the lead. To create a spirit of unity and encourage the people of Hiraan to consolidate the peace by capitalising on this window of opportunity and to set the foundation for a process that will pave the way for durable peace throughout the region and the country;

- The conflict in Hiraan is a microcosm of the general Somali conflict, in terms of its diversity and the number of clans competing for a share of the economic pie and for political power. If it can be successfully solved, its solution could become a template for the conflicts in all the other regions. In contrast to Hiraan, other regions are inhabited, generally, by two to four clans with very few exceptions;

- Hiraan is a region where pastoralist meet settled agricultural communities with all its inherent possibilities for clash of interests between the two. The pastoralist economic interest is the grazing of his herd on the grassland near the banks of the river, in contrast to the requirements of farmers who want to enclose it to protect their farms from incursion by the herds. A settlement equitable to both groups is a priority for the peace and the reconciliation process and for the implementation of the roadmap in the region;

- Building security infrastructure, not only security forces but other institutions such as jails and courts;

- Building a political consensus from the bottom up with the participation of civil society groups as well as clan elders;

- To support the reemergence of the role of traditional elders/authority of Hiraan who kept peace among communities in the region;

- Campaign to encourage the return of native professionals and experts from the Diaspora to help in the rebuilding of the region. This could eventually be enlarged for the Diaspora
professional to provide volunteer groups to advice, teach and assist the local community in various fields, such as agriculture, animal husbandry, simple water conservation and waste disposal methods as well as cheap alternative energy methods (e.g. solar panels);

- The formation of peace committees by the community;

- Focus group participants indicated that people in the region need development like water and sanitation, health, education, and river embankment, agriculture support infrastructure to repair and maintain the two bridges of Beletweyne town (Bundo weyn and liqliqato). Roads need rehabilitation.

Great interest and optimism has been generated at the local, regional, national and international levels with the enhanced prospects for peace in Hiraan and nearby regions which are becoming accessible now with the increasing retreat and military defeat of Al Shabaab and radical groups. The views and determination of local people in the pursuit of peace and establishment of peace and stability in the region was reflected in many of the mapping exercise’s discussions, and a strong desire to reject radical groups and reclaim the political and physical space. The plethora of international organisations rushing to the region pledging financial and capacity building support demonstrates the enthusiasm of these actors also in ensuring the space for such groups is closed down permanently.

This presents an important yet problematic opportunity for consolidating peace and re-establishing governance structures and processes that could meet the real needs of the people, and be part of the reinvigorated Somali Republic (whatever model is adopted as part of the transitional process in Mogadishu). There is a danger, however, that so many supporters may stray into insisting that a model of governance which more meets their ideas of democratic practice and persons they wish to see take control of the region, rather than listening to the views and choices of local communities. It is imperative that the local communities’ voice is heard and responded to.

Equally there is a danger that local politics and fears could shape the selection of a local administration that could simply recreate injustices of the past and exacerbate enduring divisions. A middle ground should be found which meets local aspirations and needs sensitively, but as part of a national model that is able to provide further financial, security and developmental support from the central government and international supporters should be found. The issues highlighted above could help to point the way.
Conclusions and Possibilities

At the time of writing, the Somali Republic is poised at the cusp of an opportunity to make significant progress towards stabilising a troubled region and rebuilding the state and society. The military advances achieved by the combined AMISOM and TFG push since 2011 to flush out radical groups and recapture regions outstripped the political preparations and framework required to ensure the replacement of autocratic and unpopular rule with a democratic model of governance acceptable to the recovered districts.

The recovery of several districts does not herald a wholesale recapture of the southern and central regions of Somalia, but does present an important opportunity to ensure that a robust foothold for a durable peace and the establishment and or strengthening of democratic forms of governance is planted in the troubled regions. It is critical that, as the country races rapidly towards the planned political transition set for August 2012 as agreed in the Kampala Accord of June 2011, the TFG and international community ensure that the successful stabilisation of recovered areas and the emergence of any local governance structure is mutually reinforcing. As history has demonstrated, the imposition of a model of governance and centrally selected political and administrative leaders unacceptable to local communities is unlikely to deliver a durable and effective environment to allow for both peacebuilding and statebuilding processes to take root and flourish.

As more areas are recovered, there appears to be a proliferation of stabilisation strategies and approaches being championed by various actors – individually or together - ranging from the TFG led security and stabilisation strategy and USAID’s collaborative TIS programme, to the UK led multi-donor Stability Fund and IGAD and AMISOM’s emerging stabilisation strategy. In addition, there are a number of more localised initiatives that are promoted by a host of INGOs and local partners through specific interventions and short-term projects. While each proposed intervention from each actor may have some merit, the likelihood of failure of most if not all approaches is high should the various actors and initiatives be set down in competition with each other. Rather, a cohesive, multi-faceted and coordinated approach which is rooted in the needs identified by communities themselves, and through processes that respond to the changed dynamics on the ground and appropriate to the differing needs of different regions and districts, may prove more effective and successful.

As argued in earlier chapters, the most successful and durable reconciliation and peace building strategies have been those led by local communities themselves at the local level, with little or no external engagement. With the retreat of radical groups and the restoration of a basic level of security, a number of community leaders from the recovered areas are beginning to explore possible opportunities to form local reconciliation processes leading to the establishment of local governance structures, such as Beletweyne. Furthermore, ASWJ is seeking to revive old suspended structures in Dhusamareed, Gureceel and Abdudwak Districts in Galgudud region despite the failure of the TFG and the international community to provide timely assistance and support.
There are of course some regions that were not controlled by Al Shabab, but the prevailing environment effectively limited the ability of the local administration to operate effectively. With the improving general environment delivered by the retreat of Al Shabab, administrations in central regions, such as Galmudug and Himan and Heeb, are now better able to consolidate the local peace that they helped to create as early as 2007 and 2008 respectively. Initial efforts to strengthen basic service delivery including health, education and basic security are beginning to revive these areas. The resulting improved environment is also attracting diaspora groups and local and international NGOs with the promise of being able to operate freely. If these administrations are able to secure external support, they could begin to strengthen and broaden their capacity to deliver services across the districts.

**Key Success Factors and Remaining Challenges**

(a) Reconciliation

**Success Factors**

As presented in Chapter One, the successes of some local social and political reconciliation processes have helped to reduce violence, build trust and confidence across communities and provided – albeit in mosaic form – some bases for further building stability and political and socio-political development. Locally Initiated and driven reconciliations ended in success were shown to be the most successful of all such interventions. Where local dialogue and agreements have resulted in the establishment of a common administration, they have proven to be the most durable – even in the face of multiple constraints.

Where external actors and donors provided limited but constructive support, such as in the Galmudug (for Sa’ad and Suleiman of both habargedir-Hawiye clan) and intra-Sheikhal272 (for two sister lineages of Aagane-Reer-lobogay-Sheikhal) reconciliation processes, success was underpinned and made more likely. The absence of a clear follow-up strategy, authority and rule of law, and the withdrawal of support, however, were shown to undermine progress made.

The role of women, youth and business groups of central regions when engaged positively was shown to be important in stopping hostilities among clans at different levels. Following clan and political conflicts and their battlefields, frontlines and fake borders emerged among communities in central regions that had previously resided together peacefully, particularly those of the Hawiye, Dir and Darood Clans. To overcome such fighting along borders, women in central Community advocated for reintegration and security development. An example is the women who demonstrated in the process which settled the conflict between the Balamballe and Guri-el communities. Their capacity to push a constructive and reconciliatory agenda which encouraged robustly actors to find accommodation was invaluable. The role of business groups which can be disruptive in pursuit of commercial gain, or constructive in terms of supporting processes and seeking stability to aide commercial activity, were also shown as important in influencing actors to reach accommodation.

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272 For briefing, see case studies 1 in social reconciliation section.
The success of the locally driven and donor-supported reconciliations at the community level directly and indirectly contributed to the region’s overall slow recovery. Most areas in the region observed peaceful sharing of natural resources, particularly when water and grazing shortages occurred during droughts; business and trade exchange flourished and community intermarriages resumed. Clan hostilities ceased with the help of both elders and local administrators in some areas, and the frequency of social conflict was drastically reduced with unfinished disputed business being mostly of a political-ideological nature, rather than competition for scarce resources.

**Challenges**

It can be very tempting for well-meaning external actors who wish to support the consolidation of peace and provide development assistance to by parachuting into such local processes. When doing so, such actors would be well served to ensure that they first investigate who and what is contributing to the decision making and delivery processes so as to ensure inclusivity. To rush into a situation assuming one has the cooperation and blessing of all sides is to run the risk of not understanding local dynamics and power plays, and potentially be drawn into local struggles for supremacy, and could potentially undermine ongoing efforts.

*In addition, there are many other challenges facing social and political reconciliation processes. After twenty-one years of conflict, the level of mistrust and cumulative grievances is high. With regard to social reconciliation, key challenges include:*

- A proliferation of actors in competition for ascendancy and control – with so many power brokers or would-be leaders seeking to establish their authority, at the regional and national levels, it is imperative to understand these different players, their motivation and agendas.

- Mistrust among communities developed from years of unresolved conflict and disputes, and the spread of readily accessible arms which makes violence an easy option in settling disputes.

- Poverty and unemployment creating a sense of hopelessness and encouraging a pool of young Somalis in particular to turn to violence, crime and radicalism.

- Limited resources (natural and human resources) limiting the opportunity for communities to build resilience within communities, and a lack of experienced and skilled individuals that can take a lead in facilitating dialogue and progress.

- Absence of follow-up and information dissemination strategies which can sometimes cause those peace accords and settlements reached to often unravel as few communities are fully cognisant of the terms of the settlement, and they are largely unenforceable with a lack of a recognised and accepted authority to uphold the terms of the accord.
• Improper/inadequate attention to addressing roots of conflict wherein shallow reconciliation processes that only address the symptoms of violence as a focus of peace accords rather than the underlying causes of the conflict.

• Incomplete accords with the range of actors that need to build consensus and cooperation not always included in the reconciliation process itself.

• Effects of clan revenges on peace accords with the traditional form of settling scores undermining the efficacy and authority of peace accords. There is a need for an agreed and accepted local authority to take responsibility for the implementation of peace accords and ensure that their application is not left to the interpretations of local clans, who often distort the agreement to benefit themselves. The failure of local authorities – where they exist – to take action on breaches of the accord or in response to acts of criminality such as revenge killings, further escalates tension and produces conflict.

• Deviation from traditional ways of conflict resolution, with the authority of elders and the form of compensation coming under increasing pressure, and not accepting older practices as legitimate and proportionate forms of securing justice. The diminishing of the recognised authority of traditional elders in the settling of disputes has a direct and significant impact on traditional dispute resolution mechanisms, requiring other creative ways to draw communities into dialogue and reconciliation.

Political reconciliation processes are critical in the pursuit of greater democratisation in Somalia, and was shown through the mapping exercise to be subject to further sensitivities and challenges in the central regions, including:

• Incompatible interests between competing actors and clans each of whom seek dominance and control, and a serious question asked about who leads reconciliation processes – the tendency for people at the centre to claim representation on behalf of communities without local support and for individual not local and communal interests was highlighted. Stakeholders at the grassroots community level had not been able to play a significant role in most of the processes. Moreover, those processes organised by the international community did not include them at all.

• Fears of Power abuse from centralised authority or specific dominant groups as a legacy of previous autocratic experiences and suffering, with little done to allay fears and build confidence.

• Misunderstanding of Political Context wherein the course of the regional conflict has transformed from a basic power struggle through to the emergence and dominance of radicalism. The complex changing dynamics resulted in repeated misunderstanding and misdiagnosing of Somali problems, leading to inappropriate proceedings and mediation techniques.
• Lack of forgiveness among conflicting parties demonstrates the changing social norms in the Somali context. The restoration of justice and acceptance (recognition) of past crimes had always been regarded as constituting a crucial step for minimising community differences and maximising reintegration, but was been observed less and less.

• Challenge of the power sharing 4.5 Formula; many participants argued that the formula exacerbates existing clan differences and complexities, divides the community as major and minor clans, or, as the some participants argued, showed that clans have different rights or it divides to classes. This perception of discrimination challenges the view that the formula can provide appropriate and proportionate representation. Continued perceptions and experiences of marginalisation will always undermine the legitimacy and efficacy of efforts to build a durable representative democracy.

• There is a significant legitimacy problem faced when local communities feel that they and their needs are not properly articulated at the national level, with Mogadishu based individuals with little or no real connection to the community presenting themselves, and being accepted by, national and international bodies as representatives of these districts.

(b) Governance

Success Factors
As shown in Chapter Two, the trend towards regionalism borne from the conflict. The most successful Communities who had traditionally invested in Mogadishu as a capital city decided to return to their respective ancestral regions in an attempt to establish regional administrations. This was mainly due to the continued failure by the central government to provide basic governance and administrative functions and also the inter-clan conflict that followed the collapse of the state.

A classic example is the creation and on-going evolution of the Somaliland and Puntland administrations. The emergence of three main models of local administration was presented in Chapter Two, highlighting how communities sought to obtain some order and cohesion for both security and socio-political needs through reliance on traditional structures predicated on custom, Islamic movements and authorities in specific districts, or new administrations created as a result of greater cooperation achieved through reconciliation processes and the identification of common needs.

The success of the administrations established in the central regions, is demonstrated clearly by the achievements of the Galmudug, ASWJ established and Himan and Heeb administrations. They were borne of local community reconciliation which drew rival communities together to seek common understanding and accommodation to provide security, stability and social and economic order. Some of these administrations were able to partially transform and mobilise freelance militias as their ‘new forces’ with payments of incentives collected from taxes. Though many illegal roadblocks were
removed and replaced by a few legal administration checkpoints in some regions, they persisted in others. Police forces were established with police stations functioning, law and order was reinforced within major towns and surrounding villages. The education, health, business entrepreneurship, water and sanitation sectors have equally improved since the establishment of the Himan and Heeb administration.

Though not without some challenges and negative elements, the involvement of local community leaders, traditional elders and the application of customary practice, and the significant involvement of the Somali diaspora were identified as key success factors. This engagement using processes which were known and acceptable to local communities, but infused with the drive, financial support and additional skills set drawn from the diaspora proved a successful combination.

The agenda, actions and drive of the Somali diaspora hailing from the central regions were massively influential in the formation of local administrations; furthermore, all of the senior figures in these administrations are occupied by diaspora returnees. The agendas of the TFG and international actors will have an equally important influence on their survival and role in the transitional dynamics that accompany advancing military successes against radical groups and the sudden focus and attention of international actors in the central and southern regions.

**Challenges**

Despite of the largely positive views among many people on the trend of regionalisation, a number of negative outcomes were also identified centred upon the ethnic exclusivity within geographical locations with various clans and sub-clans developing institutions in rural and urban ‘homelands’. The towns commonly shared by various clans disappeared as clans concentrated on specific regions. Some districts in the central regions further divided communities along clan lines resulting in even further limited interaction with each other, increasing mutual suspicion and mistrust which often are the precursor to escalating tensions and conflict.

The need for locally rooted and acceptable governance structures that address and provide services and support for local communities cannot be disputed, and all participants in the Mapping Exercise agreed on the need for appropriate authority to ensure security, and social and economic opportunity. The economic base and socio-political context in which each of the administrations discussed operate, was explored in the Chapter, highlighting both opportunities and constraints that affect the viability, effectiveness and possibilities for each of the administrations. The role of local and external actors in developing and shaping the form of local governance structures and practice, as well as the impact of various factors seemingly disconnected to the central regions which yet could change the whole structure, role and composition of the administrations.

The form and capacity of local governance structures that have emerged in the central regions during the conflict and in the aftermath of occupation by radical groups were identified as key issues and explored. Several challenges affecting the ability to both establish legitimate local governance
structures and practice, and ensure the administrations’ capacity to meet the political, security, social welfare and economic needs of the communities were identified as presented in Chapter Two and summarised below.

- External Political Interference from Mogadishu with national level prominent politicians hailing from these regions with vested interests that sometimes directly or indirectly affect the smooth functioning of local administrations, and do not necessarily enjoy credibility and legitimacy from communities from the central regions they were supposedly representing.

- Absence/Lack of common administration/collaboration for South-Mudug and Galgaduud, and with other administrations including HH and ASWJ. Moreover, despite the existence of these administrations, collaboration among them is very limited.

- Security remains an issue, and inter-clan conflict in particular, despite progress made through local reconciliation processes that have led to some improvement in cooperation between communities.

- Disconnection between local administration and public/communities was cited as a key challenge, though the extent of connectedness of each administration with their respective constituency varied.

- Weak capacity of the local Governments was identified throughout the regions and different administrative structures. The absence of international support to these administrations was identified directly as a cause of this lack of capacity as no financial assistance or skills training was available to build the strength and effectiveness of them.

- The challenges faced by the newly established administrations for which they had limited or no capacity to contain or respond to were identified as unmet high expectations, insecurity, the presence of freelance militias, clan dynamics and supremacy, influence of piracy operations, migration of local intellectuals, poor infrastructure, limited income, and lack of inclusivity (women, youth, minorities clans) which also in turn deteriorate the capacity of the administrations.

- Lack of institutional support was exacerbated by the lack of available skilled persons in the central regions to build a competent cadre of local officials. Many participants lamented that the central regions had been neglected, ignored even, by the international community which failed to provide much needed physical and financial support, despite the existence of some kind of authority in the regions and efforts to restore stability and governance.

- Limited Service delivery by the local administrations was identified as a severe criticism of local administrations, resulting in reluctance in some areas of providing taxes. The lack of services and perceptions of a lack of representation amplified criticism and dissatisfaction and disappointment in the performance of local administrations.
(c) Civic Actors

Success Factors
The history and performance of civil society actors – including traditional and religious leaders, the business community but especially NGOs and community based organisations – has been variable. Largely ignored or ineffectual during the Barre regime, those civil society organisations that continued to operate during the conflict were embattled and constrained by security. Other than traditional elders which continued to hold a central albeit largely diminishing role in communities, many formal NGOs were forced to cease operations, and the business community often took advantage of prevailing conflict dynamics for commercial gain.

With the arrival of the international community in 1993 with UNOSOM and subsequent waves of humanitarian relief efforts, the role of formal organised NGOs grew. As shown in Chapter Three, it was shown that in Galgadud and South Mudug regions, the emergence of vibrant civil society actors had been slower than their counterparts from the Southern parts of the country, and that their current status can best be described as fragile.

The majority of NGOs active across the central regions focused primarily on humanitarian and social welfare services including the health and education sectors. Their role in providing crucial services in the absence of a strong central or local government and administrative capacity, and in light of limitations of international actors’ ability to be present on the ground due to prevailing security considerations, proved invaluable throughout and beyond the conflict. Sustained international support to the civil society sector generally has been necessary and critical in ensuring that those that did stay could operate, and to enable the regeneration of NGOs and community based groups now that territory is being recovered.

The support of the Somali diaspora, again, proved critical in ensuring the provision of financial support, drive and skilled personnel to push forward programmes designed – sometimes for public good and at other time for profit – to ensure health and education services were available to local communities.

Civil society was shown in Chapter Three to be key players in the humanitarian and social welfare sectors, but their presence and activity in peacebuilding was shown to be limited with little activity seen in the promotion of human rights, gender equality and stability. The business community has flourished in the regulation-free conflict and post-conflict context, but did sometimes actively contribute to peace building primarily through an ability to provide much needed economic opportunities to and in at risk communities. Some of the challenges facing civic actors and their engagement in peace and statebuilding activities were explored in Chapter Three and included:
Challenges

• Weakness of public support and recognition (civil society, business community and diaspora) is borne of high expectations within communities of support they believe NGOs should deliver. Local NGOs faced harsh criticism and a lack of public legitimacy due to factors including the management style of some local NGOs which are profit-oriented, the perceived abandonment by some local and international NGOs for a long time (usually due to inaccessibility and security conditions)

• Lack of Human and financial Resources resulted in severe capacity and sustainability problems for local NGOs. This was especially acute with regard to the lack of recognition and support for women’s groups. The concept of organised civil society is relatively new to the Galgadud and South-Mudug regions, and it has proven difficult to attract and retain qualified and experienced workers. As a result of the prolonged conflict, the spirit of volunteerism has also been eroded severely. Despite this, women in particular often did engage in community and reconciliation initiatives, and their engagement should be further supported and strengthened.

• Problems raising sufficient funds and hard criteria to match donor funds are also a challenge given that the vast majority of these local organisations depend on donor funds which require massive fundraising activities. Resource competition among local organisations also creates a conflict of interest especially among those who receives small grants. This aggravates the lack of cooperation among the civil society, increasing mistrust and creating an atmosphere of ‘survival of the fittest’.

• Weak Cooperation Towards Peacebuilding and Community Development Initiatives is exacerbated by the lack of effective networks to enhance the cooperation among the civil society actors, particularly NGOs, with no coordination body to assess and facilitate relations between the different civil society actors in finding solutions to the existing challenges. Collaboration is absent or weak

• Weak cooperation between the civic actors and regional/central administrations which also lack a unifying common political and social agenda. While some local administrations were created with the integral engagement of civil society, others were not. The cohesion between the work of local administrations and NGOs therefore varied in success, and was compounded by the administrations’ additional failure to engage in dialogue and cooperation across administrative borders.

• The role of the diaspora was shown to be problematic in that it did not seek to engage with local civil society groups in the conception and implementation of the many important development and peace building projects it supported. Sustainability of these initiatives, such as continued service delivery in health and educational facilities set up by the diaspora, could benefit from engagement by local civil society. Greater cooperation and coordination should be pursued.
• Targeted killing and kidnapping of civic actors resulting from insecurity and prolonged conflicts in the South-Mudug and Galgadud regions. This has profoundly discouraged both national and international relief, developmental and peacebuilding organisations to implement durable projects. The kidnapping of international and local NGO workers increased for a brief period of time, and targeted killings terrorised many local civic actors, damaging their engagement overall including in peacebuilding activities

• Clan-based conflict and ideologies-based conflict and clashes in certain districts of the central regions caused great security uncertainties in the region as well as undermining the works of the civic actors. The violent confrontations weakened the capacity of local CSOs and had a negative impact on program sustainability, as well as physical destruction of their offices or working sites. Constant shifting security dynamics also created a great deal of frustration among civic actors since operating in these areas requires registering organisations mandates to whoever is in control

• Business community participants conceded that the business community often contributed to conflict as the types of business transactions in their respective regions were mainly based on small and weak but highly competitive trade. With a corresponding lack of a unifying common political and social agenda other than profit making, coupled with a lack of skills and financial capability to initiate and sustain peacebuilding activities, the role of business people was often negative or of limited value.

• Lack of Community Cohesion: Clan diversity, unsolved conflicts, lack of trust given that South-Mudug and Galgadud regions are home to different Somali clans. Clan borders created by the prolonged clan/resource sharing conflicts had restricted and affected the movement and the ability of civic actors to rebuild confidence among themselves and among members of these regions

The Way Forward | Opportunities for peace

Despite the challenges identified, a number of success factors were also identified that did and could further support constructive interventions or supportive action in the central regions, and help to point a possible way forward for the work of local and external actors alike. It was shown that some successful reconciliation processes that reduce violence, build trust and cooperation, and provide fertile soil for the emergence of locally legitimate and accepted administrations, is possible.

To consolidate gains made in the area and advance the reconciliation process to help establish local governance, CRD/Interpeace intends to facilitate a number of informal meetings with key stakeholders in the community. The aim of the engagement is to assist communities to address the issues remaining from the earlier intervention that will hopefully help to find sustainable solutions to reducing or better managing conflict. It is also intended to promote and facilitate a broad-based inclusive process involving other clans in the regions as the basis for the emergence of viable local
and regional governance structure. We also hope to facilitate dialogue between the two entities in an effort to amalgamate them into one single regional/state administration.

Peacebuilding and statebuilding in the central regions of Somalia could and should be mutually reinforcing. Creating a stable and peaceful environment should enable statebuilding initiatives in the form of the strengthening of existing, or creation of new, local governance structures and processes which in turn helps to create a virtuous circle which consolidates stability and enables the provision of services to local communities.

As presented in Chapter One which set out views, experiences and key issues related to reconciliation, locally rooted and sustained social and political reconciliation processes can help to reduce violence, foster inter-community and inter-clan understanding and cooperation, and help to create a stable environment more conducive to supporting democratisation and sustainable development. A key benefit from successful reconciliation processes, as shown in the central regions, is the emergence of local administrations that grow from the greater understanding, cooperation and commonality of purpose in seeking to better respond to the needs of local communities (resources permitting).

The role of a strong and vibrant civil society in both raising awareness and stimulating interest and debate among communities on key peacebuilding and statebuilding challenges, needs and opportunities is important. Furthermore, the ability of civil society groups to act as a conduit for ensuring communities voices are articulated and taken account of in policy formulation, is critical. The absence of this voice of the people in the development of evolving reconciliation and stabilisation strategies, the development of local governance structure and processes, and of development interventions seeking to shore up peace through socio-economic progress, will undermine the legitimacy and efficacy of democratisation and development programmes - as has been demonstrated in twenty years of failed peace and statebuilding initiatives in Somalia.

As set out in Chapter Three, the emergence of civil society groups in the central regions historically has focused primarily on humanitarian needs, but significant work and progress has been made in recent times of strengthening existing or establishing new local groups which have sought to advance peacebuilding and conflict sensitive approach to state building. This emerging and potentially powerful role must be supported to ensure that the various high level political processes that seek to deliver peace and development to the regions, and the country as whole, do in fact serve the needs of the people, and not just the ambitions of political leaders.

**The Way Forward**

**The new constitution and beyond the transition**

Participants in the study of the central regions welcomed the aim of developing a new constitution that could potentially provide a basis for peace. Noting the many previous attempts that failed to deliver a stable and durable peace for the Somali people, they argued that any new constitution should better reflect the needs and aspirations of communities – not those of a handful of politicians.
disconnected from the people, and not credible or legitimate representatives of these communities. This crisis of legitimacy and inclusion had further alienated local communities and engendered suspicion at the motivation of those in control of the constitutional process.

Process is paramount - to improve the legitimacy of the constitution, it is imperative that the framers of the document seek actively to engage legitimate community representatives and ensure the voice of the people is truly reflected in it. As related processes such as the operationalisation of the TFG’s security and stabilisation strategy, the planned for selection of elders, the selection of the national constituent assembly, and the subsequent selection of parliament are implemented, the need for local engagement grows ever more important. Beyond the question of the nature and structure of the larger Somali state, the manner in which local governance and security needs can be accommodated, the debate over the relative strengths and responsibilities of the central and local governments, and how best to ensure inclusive and fair representation for each of the groups within Somalia – including groups/clans which have historically been singled out for discrimination and under-representation, must be addressed if it is to have a chance of acceptance and durability.

The international community has an opportunity to tap into a renewed sense of cautious optimism and hope among Somalis as the threat of radical groups is being contained and their influence on the population is diminished. In so doing, not only must it listen to local communities, it must also look critically at its own historical agendas and approaches to Somalia and seek new and more effective ways of engagement. As set out in this report, the people of the central regions have pointed to specific entry points and areas in which the international community could and should play a constructive role. The building of institutions, supporting the apparatus of security and justice, and providing the space for the indigenous resolution of conflicts and shaping of a governance architecture which provides a robust framework for the delivery of services, have been highlighted as key issues in which international expertise and support could make a critical difference.

It is imperative that the International Community learn from the past and support an incremental process that seeks to build local and legitimate capacity. Vested individual and or group interests must not be allowed to dictate the form and scope of the peace and statebuilding processes in the Somali region as demonstrated over the years by the well-known syndrome of “loma dhamma” or non-inclusive approach to steering the political and developmental agenda in the region which has been abused and misused over the years by the spoilers. In a post conflict situation trust building and inclusiveness address and strengthen the legitimacy and sustainability issues of such processes. As a process, the peace and statebuilding processes in the central and other regions will likely suffer setbacks and not deliver the perfect solution through a ‘quick fix’ intervention. Sustained and sensitive support which addresses the issues set out in this Report may help to achieve a successful process in time.
Challenges and Opportunities

It should be noted well also that, the concerns of good will and aspirations of positive change by the Somali communities in south central Somalia should not be diverted such a long time to block the processes of peace and state building due to personal and group vested interests. The well-known syndrome of “loma dhamma” or not inclusive has been abused and misuse over the years by the spoilers and interest groups. In a post conflict situation trust building and inclusiveness address and strengthen the legitimacy and sustainability issues of such processes. However, The legacy of over twenty years of war in Somalia offers many frustrating lessons that indicates that strong and committed Somali leadership, with appropriate and sensitive support from the international community, offers possibly the only sustainable way forward. The constitution making process should be considered one step in a larger democratisation and developmental process, and not an end in itself, which requires the buy-in of Somali leaders and civil society at the national and sub-national levels.

To ensure a sensitive approach which helps mitigate not escalate harmful competition and conflict, the first step is to better understand the changed and still changing cast of players and dynamics on the ground. The outcomes of the mapping exercise in the central regions, and the preliminary mapping of Hiiraan region, set out in this Report are offered as a modest contribution to facilitating the building of this knowledge base. Further research to deepen this analysis, particularly in the newly recovered areas – and those that it is expected will be recaptured in the coming months – is required, and will be a key focus of the ongoing Pillars of Peace Programme implemented by CRD/Interpeace.

The outcomes of these studies provide a critical guide in our work in seeking to support conflict sensitive state building approaches, and will shape the specific interventions we undertake to support local reconciliation and peacebuilding. The participatory Action research methodology utilised by Interpeace and its partners in the Somali region offers a useful incremental Somali-led incremental approach and strategy that could effectively be used by other agencies and actors seeking to support the recovery of Somalia. We commend these research findings and possible areas of focus as identified by the people of the central regions to the TFG and the international community, to help them to also shape their work as they seek to genuinely help the people of Somalia emerge from over twenty years of devastation, and rebuild itself as a nation.
Details of CRD’s Focus Group Discussions in Douth Mudug and Galgaduud

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
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<th>Number of Participants</th>
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<td>Traditional and Religious Leaders</td>
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<td>Business groups</td>
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TOTALS: 373
### Women's Participation in CRD’s Focus Group Discussions, South Mudug and Galgaduud

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Youth’s Participation in CRD’s Focus Group Discussions, South Mudug and Galgaduud

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<td>28/04/2010</td>
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**Hiiraan/ El Bur /El Dhere Focus Group Discussions**

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<tr>
<th>No.</th>
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<th>Number of participants</th>
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<td>60% Elders, 40% youth/women</td>
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<td>El-dhere</td>
<td>16 People</td>
<td>70% Elders, 30% Youth/women</td>
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<td>Hiiraan</td>
<td>28 People</td>
<td>80% Elders/5% Politicians 15% youth</td>
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<td>18/2/2012</td>
<td>Dhusameeb</td>
<td>10 People</td>
<td>100% religious / Elders</td>
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### List of Civic Actors Killed/Abducted from November 2009 to May 2010

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<td>Asssination of Business People</td>
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<td>2 Aid Workers Killed</td>
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<td>December 2009</td>
<td>Asssination of Business People</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Journalist killed</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Killing in Mosque</td>
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<td>January 2010</td>
<td>Aid Worker Killed</td>
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</tr>
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<tr>
<td>February 2010</td>
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<td>March 2010</td>
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<td>Religious Killings</td>
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<td>April 2010</td>
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<td>Asssination of Business People</td>
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<td>Asssination of Expat Staff</td>
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<td>May 2010</td>
<td>Aid Worker Killed</td>
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<td>Journalist Killed</td>
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<td>2 Killing in Mosque</td>
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**TOTAL:** 19

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## Annex 3

### Schools in South-Mudug

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<td>Galkayo</td>
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<td>Abdullahi Isse</td>
<td>Primary/Intermediate</td>
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<td>Al-Beder</td>
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## Hospitals/ OPDs/ MCHs in Galgaduud Region

| No. | DIST. | HOSPITAL | MCH | FUNDING | OPD | FUNDING | CL
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Bibliography

Abdulle Jabril Ibrahim, *Civil Society in the Absence of a Somali State*.


