

**External Evaluation of the IRDP/Interpeace
Rwanda Peacebuilding Programme**

4th phase (2009 – 2011)

FINAL REPORT

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List of abbreviations and acronyms

ALAC	Advocacy and Legal Advice Center
CCM	Centre for Conflict Management
CEJP	Episcopal Commission Justice and Peace
CLADHO	Federation of Leagues and Associations for the Defence of Human Rights in Rwanda
CNLG / NCFG	National Commission for the Fight against Genocide
CNUR / NURC	National Unity and Reconciliation Commission
DFID	Department for International Development (UK)
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
FAR	Rwandan Armed Forces (army under former regime 1960-94)
FARG	Genocide Survivors Support and Assistance Fund
FAWE	Forum for African Women Educationalists
FDLR	Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda
IA	International Alert
IPAR	Institute for Policy Analysis and Research
IRD	Institute of Research and Dialogue for Peace
IDRC / CRDI	International Development Research Centre (Canada)
LDGL	Human Rights League for the Great Lakes Region
LIPRODHOR	Rwandan League for the Promotion and Defense of Human Rights
LogFrame	Logical Framework
MCC	Millennium Challenge Corporation (US)
MDR	Democratic Republican Movement
NDI	National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (US)
NFPO	National Consultative Forum of Political Organisations
NPA	Norwegian Peoples' Aid
NPIA	Noyau de Paix – <i>Isoko ry'Amahoro</i>
NUR	National University of Rwanda
OECD-DAC	Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OM	Outcome Mapping
PAR	Participatory Action Research
RDR	Rwanda Demobilisation and Reintegration Commission
RCSP	Rwanda Civil Society Platform
RISD	Rwanda Institute for Sustainable Development

RPA	Rwanda Peace Academy
RPA	Rwandan Patriotic Army
RPF	Rwandan Patriotic Front
RPP	Reflecting on Peace Practice
SIDA	Swedish International Development Agency
TR	Transparency Rwanda
ULK	Independent University of Rwanda
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
VUP	Vision 2020 Umurenge Programme
YPLA	Youth Political Leaders Academy

Map of Rwanda



0. Executive summary

This evaluation was carried out between mid-September and mid-October 2011. Its main focus was the 4th Phase of the IRDP/Interpeace Rwanda Peacebuilding Programme (2009-2011), but it also looked at the cumulative results that have been achieved during the full 10-year period that the Programme has been running. Its findings, conclusions and recommendation are based on semi-structured interviews with 29 people, study of relevant documentation (incl. audio-visual materials) and direct observation of and participation in some activities. The approach adopted did not follow a specific framework or ‘model’, but was based on the OECD-DAC parameters for evaluation, the criteria for effective peacebuilding developed by the *Reflecting on Peace Practice* (RPP) project, and the general principles of *Outcome Mapping* (OM).

Given their importance for properly assessing the strategies and outcomes, the strengths and weaknesses of IRDP and its Peacebuilding Programme, two chapters briefly sketch the socio-political and institutional contexts, in which IRDP and its Peacebuilding Programme operate.

The evaluation concludes that the IRDP/Interpeace Peacebuilding Programme continues to be of great strategic relevance for the prospects of peacebuilding in Rwanda. It has succeeded in bringing into the open a number of highly sensitive and controversial issues, yet of crucial importance for the future of peace in the country; in the process, it has engaged a broad range of people in growing numbers, from youth in schools and universities and ordinary “people on the hills” to local authorities and the main decision-makers at national level. In particular, it has uniquely succeeded in bringing groups of the Rwandan diaspora around the world into this ongoing and ever widening dialogue. Its approach of participatory research and action, its inclusiveness, its moral authority and credibility, its constant search for viable solutions based on a broad consensus – all these elements together have made it possible for IRDP to break new ground in opening up spaces for debate and dialogue in Rwandan society and make concrete and constructive contributions to official policymaking.

In addition, the Programme serves as a useful channel of communication, ‘vertical’ as well as ‘horizontal’, between its different constituencies, slowly yet certainly contributing to higher levels of trust in society, of citizen’s participation in democratic governance and of public authorities’ accountability. By carefully monitoring and navigating the political space, IRDP has succeeded in safeguarding its neutrality and independence and thus remaining a legitimate interlocutor for all stakeholders and a credible advocate for its evidence- and consensus-based proposals for constructive changes towards a more just and peaceful Rwanda.

One of the major challenges remains the wider dissemination of the “culture of debate” beyond the protected spaces of the Programme.

Other conclusions of this evaluation and recommendations for its next phase concern the following more specific issues, which should be seen in the light of this general and overall positive assessment:

- IRDP should make a renewed effort to focus the Programme more closely on those issues, factors, people and dynamics that are drivers of potential violence and conflict and not dilute its resources (people, money, time) by dealing with too many other subject areas and activities; other issues and concerns emerging from the participatory action research and dialogue forums should, where possible, be passed on to other, more specialised, institutions or organisations – the exception possibly being the issue of youth (un)employment.
- Strengthen efforts to disseminate the “culture of debate” beyond the protected spaces of the Programme by reviving the District Forums and possibly decentralising further to sector level.
- The assessment of the wider societal impact (“peace writ large”) remains a big challenge as does the question of *attribution*: How far have the changes in question – opening of space for dialogue among individuals and groups, breaking of taboo around certain subjects, improving relationship between base and top – permeated society as a whole and to what extent are they sustainable? IRDP should explore the possibility of conducting a nationwide “social audit” in order to provide the beginning of an answer to these questions, as well as to the one about the degree to which the Programme has contributed to such changes.
- Reinforce ‘vertical’ communication in society and cross-fertilisation between the components and constituencies of the Programme, e.g. by inviting Dialogue Club members, including women from *Biba amahoro*, as speakers in Schools of Debate, and as participants in the National Group and other national discussion forums.
- Use more analytical and theoretically inspired approaches to research, adequate to the issue at hand and to the specificities of the Rwandan context, as a complement to the PAR which should remain the main and unique approach of the Programme as it constitutes the basis for the legitimacy and credibility of its advocacy.
- Without compromising its strict neutrality and impartiality, strengthen outreach and dissemination by forging stronger links and synergies with organisations and programmes that have access to a wide audience “on the hills”, including radio stations; by putting on more radio broadcasts; by exploring the possibility of mounting a mobile screening unit for its audio-visual materials; by helping to create small off-shoots of its Peace Centre facilities in other parts of the country (library, audio-visual equipment, meeting facilities); and by improving the quality and accessibility of written documents and a more consistent use of terminology.
- Review and explore some issues relating to organisational structure, relationship to Interpeace and staff capacity, in particular the creation of a small and more proactive Executive Board, the balance between higher management, programme staff (researchers) and support staff, and the elaboration and implementation of a Staff Development Policy.

1. Introduction

This external evaluation of the 4th phase (2009 – 2011) of the IRDP/Interpeace Rwanda Peacebuilding Programme was commissioned by Interpeace and conducted by a team consisting of two consultants, viz. Guus Meijer (teamleader) and Dr. Théogène Bangwanubusa, in the period between mid-September and mid-October 2011.

Guus worked for eight years as a university lecturer and researcher on issues of language and education in Mozambique and has close to 20 years experience in the field of conflict transformation and peacebuilding, working for various organisations in England and Northern Ireland and since 2001 as an independent consultant and trainer based in The Hague, He has conducted numerous evaluations on peacebuilding programmes, mainly in Africa. Théogène is a Rwandan sociologist and lecturer at the National University of Rwanda (NUR) in Butare, specialising in development and peace; he has published on the genocide in Rwanda and on various social and development issues, and conducted evaluations and other consultancies for a range of Rwandan agencies and organisations.

For a short background and history of the IRDP/Interpeace Rwanda Peacebuilding Programme, as well as for the full Terms of Reference for this assignment, see Annex A.

The evaluators wish to thank the Directors of IRDP as well as all the employees who have helped to make this evaluation possible by providing logistical and administrative support, arranging meetings and field visits and, no less important, providing a friendly and hospitable environment to work in. They also wish to thank Interpeace staff in Nairobi and Geneva for their support. Finally, our thanks go to all people who were willing to be interviewed for this exercise and in particular to Jean-Paul Mugiraneza at IRDP and Maud Roure at Interpeace in Geneva who each in their own way accompanied our work from nearby and provided us with valuable feedback on an earlier draft of this report.

Kigali and The Hague, October 2011

2. Socio-political context

This chapter aims to provide a brief overview of the socio-political context and dynamics of post-genocide Rwanda, with a special emphasis on the period since the start of the IRDP/Interpeace Peacebuilding Programme in 2001 and even more particularly, the years 2009 to 2011 (4th phase of the Programme).

IRDP was primarily set up to provide answers to the central question – ‘How to deal with the aftermath of genocide?’ This all-encompassing question reflects the total distrust that prevailed after the genocide and the problem of coexistence of Rwandans returning from different cultural backgrounds, with different identities and life experiences. Disregarding such a question would have perpetuated the seeds of conflict that escalated into the 1994 genocide.

These seeds translate the grassroots thinking about the ‘other’ that has remained an important factor explaining the spread of genocidal violence, at least theoretically. Strong emphasis is put on the dichotomy between ourselves, the ‘we-group’, or ‘in-group’, and everybody else, or the others-groups. As some authors put it: ‘We are what we are because they are not what we are.’ It is through this theoretical lens that we can explain the root causes of genocide, the consequences of which have been the central interest of IRDP from its inception in 2001 onwards.

At the root of this dichotomy lies the fact that the colonial authorities came out in sympathy with the Tutsi, who were the nominated leaders in society for some time, until in 1959 the colonial authorities transferred favouritism to the Hutu. This move created enmity among two social groups that had historically coexisted in relative harmony. It shaped each camp’s views of the world and of themselves; their values, and norms of conduct; their myths and conceptions of one another. The 1994 genocide against Tutsi can only be viewed as a result of the fact that each group “nourishes its own pride and vanity, boasts itself superior, exalts its own divinities, and looks with contempt on outsiders”. The politicisation of ethnicity is increasingly understood as a strong catalyst for the increasing polarisation from the late 1980s onwards, as a result of two important events, viz. the move to pluralist democracy which aimed to topple African dictators, on the one hand, and the outbreak of war by the RPF against the Habyarimana regime in 1990, on the other.

This discussion does not intend to concentrate on ethnic dichotomies from the pre-genocide era. It rather aims to reflect on post-genocide identities, as connected to difference in cultural backgrounds. The major argument is that the style of handling these identities was likely to determine whether or not they would be conflict-prone in the aftermath of genocide, as it would shape people’s behaviour and perceptions in politics and governance, as well as socially and economically.

A. Politics and governance

Governance is counted among the strong pillars for peacebuilding. It involves things such as the relationship between the leadership and the population, the degree of participation in decision-making, fundamental rights and freedoms, the separation of powers and the rule of law. As IRDP noted in its 2011 Country Note on the state of peace as perceived by Rwandans 17 years after the genocide against Tutsi: “People have the impression that quite often a strong leadership may become a dictatorship that creates a possible gap and does not take into consideration the citizens’ aspirations. This may occur if there are no mechanisms to establish a balance between various powers and to establish efficient control strategies. In theory, Rwanda has developed power control mechanisms including power separation and the multiparty system, which are mentioned in the Constitution. However, people have different opinions on the effectiveness of these control mechanisms”.

Lack of space for real opposition or choice

Space for real political opposition or alternative choice is a concern that has been made a challenge to Rwanda since the 1980s. Since this time, democratic values were considered as one of the criteria to qualify for the support by the international donor community – that is, political legitimacy and financial support, among other things. Some African regimes collapsed after this support was denied or suspended. The Government of Rwanda, under Habyarimana, has probably suffered strongly from the denial of this support as the opening up to democratic values was increasingly made impossible. At the same time, real political opposition or alternative choice failed to emerge to the benefit of the then ruling party. What does the post-genocide regime learn from the past?

The Rwandan Constitution states that “Freedom of thought, opinion, conscience, religion, worship and the public manifestation thereof is guaranteed by the State in accordance with conditions determined by law.” Thus Rwanda complies with the international legal framework. Both international and national legal provisions provide all possible space to set up political parties that compete for the support from the electorate or to express an alternative political choice. Yet, some restrictions may apply and the practice is not always conform the theory.

The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights sets some restrictions in the following words: “The exercise of the rights may therefore be subject to certain restrictions determined by the law”. Such an article is likely to be used for the pretext of protecting the national security and public order. Each context defines the circumstances under which this international provision applies coherently with national norms and regulations. Discrimination, sectarianism, and ideology of genocide, among other things, have shaped the context under which political competition operates in Rwanda. The law regulating the multiparty system has probably emerged from this perspective. Since 2008, as a result, the political parties collaborate in the forum of political organisations to serve a certain purpose. During the post-genocide period, to illustrate, “people were sceptic and reluctant about the role the political parties could play in stabilising or destabilising the society. This scepticism among the local population was due to the harmful role of political organisation in manipulating and teaching ethnic division since the independence” (IRDP 2011 Country

Note). This law, among others, leads to an important implication closely linked to the space for alternative political choices.

There has been a risk of subjective interpretation of these circumstances to the extent that the multiparty system is perceived as not being functional enough for healthy democratic competition. For instance, nine political parties are registered and working according to the law. But it is obvious that the RPF remains the dominant political party with clearer political agenda. The other political parties are not perceived by some in the Rwandan diaspora and in the international community as providing an alternative choice – they are not considered as real opposition. The political parties which failed to comply with the existing legal framework are denied permission to operate in the Rwandan political environment. Their leaders have faced imprisonment or decided to go to exile.

According to the same 2011 Country Note, “Rwanda is still reluctant towards a contradictory debate in a post-genocide context”. At the same time, “An increasingly dangerous opposition is growing abroad together with signs of disagreements among top government officials. These can be perceived as a threat to long lasting peace in the country”. The obvious way to counter this threat is to strengthen the multiparty system and the fundamental rights and freedoms; involves three main principles – that is, political parties, the media, trade unions and other stakeholders within the civil society, which are still perceived as weak. Only a properly functioning multiparty system is able to serve as a conflict management mechanism and help to avoid political crises.

Non-transparent and pre-arranged elections

The first elections in Rwanda took place in 1960, a date that characterised the shift from the monarchy to the republican regime. The foundations for a multiparty system were laid but the dichotomy between majority Hutu and minority Tutsi made it a strong means for political manipulation and a “catalyst to obtain power and country resources more easily” (IRDP 2005). The most striking feature of this shift has been that the electoral process was in most cases driven by ethnic divisions: “Instead of choosing the leaders on the basis of their ideas and political agendas, the election results depended on the number of voters from various ethnic groups and the idea behind is that the winner should come from the majority ethnic group who should always win” and “elections become a delicate political issues in the sense that it can mislead the democratic process in terms of counting members of ethnic groups like in other strongly divided societies” (IRDP 2011).

Since the 1993 Arusha Accords, power sharing has been the guiding principle for good governance at both central and local levels. Both the Constitution and the electoral law have taken into consideration the fragile context of the Rwandan society in its process of selecting high ranking authorities such as the President of the Republic, members of parliament and senate as well as local authorities.

There is, however, a general feeling that the system is not always functioning properly and citizens have repeatedly expressed their desire for changes and improvements. In some cases, to illustrate, “citizens have denounced some behaviours where they saw the risk of

imposing a particular candidate” (IRDP 2011). This malpractice is mostly associated with the grassroots level but there is a growing risk for it to expand. Flawed democracy ensues. There is no competition, one student told IRDP researchers, “and quite often, those who are elected are not competent. This is a great challenge ... During elections we noticed that many candidates withdrew their desire to compete. We could notice that the candidates have been forced to do so. You understand what I am talking about” (IRDP 2011). These quotes hint at pre-arranged elections, reflecting the idea of power sharing as a means to ensure social and political stability in the aftermath of genocide.

Decentralisation-in-progress

From its launch in 2000, decentralisation was adopted as a response to weak popular participation in decision-making processes. Many of the studies carried out by IRDP clearly document low levels of popular participation at both central and local level. Theoretically, the decentralisation policy is considered as a governance system that carries a number of advantages. In the words of IRDP, it “is the best as far as the quality of the services provided to the citizens by the government, the responsibility to manage development activities, and the involvement of the citizens in the decision-making process is concerned”.

However, the effectiveness of this policy is still questionable. Many officials of the post-independent regimes never believed in democratic values and hardly tolerate discussion or debate. Unlike in the past, nowadays officials are elected (directly or indirectly), but many constraints still hamper the proper implementation of the decentralisation policy. Among others things, the Mayor’ accumulation of responsibilities as the chairperson of the Council is most pointed out. As representing both the legislative and executive powers, the Mayor is perceived as a strong obstacle to the implementation of the decentralisation policy: the chairperson “of the council should be another person who is not the chairman of the executive committee” to “allow the council to play its role as supreme authority and ... oppose subjective decisions a powerful mayor can make.” Challenges of similar scope are identifiable in other fields of governance.

Decentralisation came to be considered “as a new governance system and the commitment to fight effectively against corruption”. Statements such as “Corruption is decreasing in comparison to the neighbouring countries” are not, however, very significant, since corruption has become common practice in some of those countries. Some interviewees came up with the concept of ‘invisible corruption’ to denote its presence in Rwanda as well.

It is true that improvements have been made in this specific area over the last decade. The illustrative empirical statements and perceptions remain, however, an indication of gaps in social justice that might fuel conflicts in the long run.

Upward versus downward accountability

Accountability supposes those in power reporting to the people who gave them the mandate to govern. This responsibility involves elected officials as well as appointed heads of institutions. To carry out this responsibility, those in power have to show, explain and justify their decisions, how their respective institutions are delivering, the strategies and

methods, etc. In practice, the executive is accountable to parliament under the assumption that it represents the citizens' views. In this context, representation is relative since the parliamentarians "may express what they like without expressing the citizen's will". The same goes for performance contracts – known as *imihigo* – that involve local authorities and the national government. Accountability works more upwards, from local to national level, than downwards, from higher to lower levels and to the citizens,

The decentralisation policy was designed as a way of involving local communities and citizens in the decision-making process. It was put in place to achieve a more balanced distribution of resources among central and decentralised levels of government and to promote citizens' participation in decision-making at the local level. However, one of the major findings of IRDP's research on 'Citizen's participation in democratic governance in Rwanda (2009-2010)' was "that 74% of people who have been interviewed said that they are not involved in the development of policies and programmes while 61% of people who have been interviewed at the central or local level revealed that they do not consult the local population in the decision making process". Citizens mainly "complain for non involvement in money allocation", declaring that "major decisions are often taken by a limited number of ministers and civil servants with a minimum consultation of the concerned population".

Dominance of security forces and intelligence agencies

Under the post-genocide regime, new security-related initiatives have been put in place, among which community policing – by which community members jointly with the police identify crime suspects and solve security problems. Among other areas, it helped to manage unexpected consequences of the *Gacaca* jurisdictions as set up in 2001. The NURC annual opinion survey for 2005-07 unearthed the following: "Although it contributed to the revelation of the truth in the community, bringing the criminal suspects to justice and punishing the guilty ones ... revealed that the *Gacaca* jurisdictions have opened the wounds and other conflicts which need to be solved. According to NURC 54% of people interviewed in 2007 believed that the testimonies given during the *Gacaca* trials have worsened the tensions among families".

The historical background of current security concerns, especially in relation to external threats, dates back to the military invasions by the RPA in the early 1990s, after the genocide followed by repeated invasions by *Interahamwe* militia from neighbouring countries. With this background, security involved mainly the physical security of people and their assets. In other words, it implied "neutralising armed rebels from DRC who hide themselves among the local population, particularly in the Northern part of the country, without causing too much destruction". Until to date, it evolved dealing with the FDLR which is operating in the Eastern parts of the DRC and is seen as a serious threat to Rwanda. Following the military defection of some high-ranking officers in 2010, Rwanda faced new threats to its security, including some grenade attacks in Kigali during the 2011 presidential elections.

The combination of internal tensions and perceived external threats have incentivised the regime to mount a considerable intelligence apparatus and to strengthen the visible presence of security forces on the streets of Kigali and in the country.

B. Social dimensions: consequences of genocide

One of the major post-genocide challenges in Rwanda is to cope with the deep cracks in interpersonal relations between different social categories, the healing of which might take longer than expected. In the aftermath of genocide, revisionism, negationism, the controversy of ethnic identity, psychological trauma, the survivors' poor living conditions, and the security of genocide witnesses constitute a non-exhaustive list of challenges Rwanda is facing. "Living together' in the post genocide context remains a day-to-day challenge not only for local authorities but also to every community member". Given the above, the rebuilding of social cohesion has been, still is and will remain for the years to come, one of the crucial components of Rwanda's reconstruction process.

As a matter of fact, 'unity and reconciliation' remained a controversial phrase not only among Rwandans but also among the international community. Genocide and mass atrocities left Rwanda with deep wounds and broken relationships to the extent that this phrase was perceived as a dream or, at least, a utopian ambition. "How can we ask the genocide survivors to live with the criminals?" is an illustrative question that was normal to put at the start of the post-genocide period. In order to restore social cohesion, however, it was seen as a necessity since "there was no other solution than creating favourable conditions for peaceful coexistence" (IRDP).

The 2010 *Rwanda Reconciliation Barometer* developed by the NURC claims the relationship between the ethnic groups to "have improved since the end of the genocide". At the same time, empirically-driven observers perceive Rwanda as making tremendous progress as regards unity and reconciliation. Rwanda is on the track towards adopting a consensus among the "citizens who trust one another, lead by principles of tolerance, mutual respect, equality, complementary roles/interdependence, truth, and healing one another's wounds caused by our shared history, people sharing the common objectives of laying the foundation of sustainable development". The philosophy of *Rwandanity* – referring to 'national identity' – ensues.

Despite the progress noted, there are still limitations the Rwandan society needs to deal with. In actual practice ethnicity still plays a huge role in Rwanda. Job distribution is one of the areas in which it is most in evidence. The Government is Rwanda's biggest employer, but everywhere jobs are scarce and there is stiff competition for the few jobs available in both Government and the private and non-governmental sector, and accusations of favouritism on ethnic grounds are common. Ethnicity is also still prevalent in other domains: as one interviewee said, after elections the question is often "How many are 'ours'? How many 'theirs'?", rather than "How many competent people?" or "How many people sharing my views?" have been elected.

C. Economic dimensions

Concentration of wealth

It is clear that Rwanda has registered tremendous positive changes since it pulled out of genocidal violence, especially in economic development and social reconstruction. The “economic miracle” has however not been matched by an equitable and fair distribution of wealth. Studies reveal that ordinary people are seen as “not benefiting fairly enough from the national cake”. Some government-led initiatives have tried to remedy this trend by addressing social justice issues. For instance, they “integrate and extend the cash programmes that are currently part of the *Vision 2020 Umurenge Programme (VUP)*, *Genocide Survivors Support and Assistance Fund (FARG)* and *Rwanda Demobilisation and Reintegration Commission (RDRC)*”. The initiatives are mainly concerned with subsistence allowances for genocide survivors, disabled ex-combatants and vulnerable groups of different social categories. Poverty is being addressed by a number of special programmes, such as the *Ubudehe* programme which, among other things, has financially assisted poor households to invest in income generating projects, and enabled communities across the country to undertake priority projects. Several programmes provide or subsidise assets to rural households, including *Girinka, the One Cow Per Poor Family Scheme* in which poor families with more than 0.7 hectares are provided with a cow; a programme *providing small animals* (goats and rabbits) to poor households with little land; and *fertiliser subsidies and seeds*. Finally, Savings and Credit Cooperatives, known as SACCOS, are being implemented at sector level nationwide.

Despite all these initiatives and programmes, a 2007 UNDP report came to the following conclusion:

Rwanda’s recent growth has largely bypassed the rural poor, leading to a concentration of wealth at the top of the income distribution, and increase in the country’s Gini coefficient from 0.47 to 0.51 from 2001 to 2006 ... The average income of the top 20% of the population has almost doubled since 1996, while the income of the bottom 20% has remained stagnant in the past 10 years ... Inequality in Rwanda is not only rising, it is changing nature: it is becoming increasingly rural and increasingly detrimental to the poorest and most vulnerable groups in society. Since then, two new features of Rwandan income distribution have emerged very strongly. First, the top income quintile has distanced itself very sharply from the rest of the population, with incomes taking off as the rest of the population have seen only modest rise income. Secondly, we observe that the bottom quintile seems to be falling behind the rest of the population: the poorest of the poor are becoming poorer in relative and sometimes even in absolute terms.

Observations such as these point to the fact that economic policies are more about “the management of the growth” than about “the development and the redistribution of wealth”. On the one hand, Government policies have been relatively policies successful in “the improvement of health services, increasing the household income, put in place partnership and cooperative strategies, introducing modern agriculture and reinforcing

decentralised entities so that they can monitor efficiently the socio-economic development of their citizens". On the other hand, poor people easily fall prey to manipulation of selfish and opportunistic political actors. The history of genocide carries many lessons from which to learn: "Leading people in a miserable life and utter poverty is one of the factors which contributed to dividing the citizens". Hence, democratically-established institutions need to transform into "a creator of a better world, striving to transform the economic structures" in a way that "re-examines the right to own properties, the working conditions, the way jobs are distributed, and the remuneration system" (IRDP).

Graduates and unemployment

Until the post-genocide era, unemployment did not seem to be a very severe problem. The principal reason is the fact that the level of education remained rather low, as attested by the 2002 census:

Some 60% of the population aged 15 years and above in Rwanda can read and write a text in at least any one language (which was not specified). Another 4.4% can only read while 35.6% can neither read nor write. In the urban areas of the country the proportion of literate residents are higher than those in the rural areas (76.7% as against 56.6%). Men are more literate than women (66.5% as against 54.7%)...Overall, 31% of the resident population in Rwanda has never been to school, those who have attended but are now out of school constitute 45% ... As expected, the proportion of residents who have never been to school is higher in the rural areas (33%) than in the urban areas (21.1%). Furthermore, more than half (53.6%) of the urban residents have ever attended school as against 43.1% of rural residents.

There was thus a relative balance between job creation and skilled human resources – the last element kept low by the quota system. After 1994 the end to discriminatory practices opened the way for a paradigm shift and Rwanda adopted the 'Education For All' policy as one of the national priorities. As a result, education became a right but also compulsory at primary level and free in public schools. In the eyes of IRDP, it "was a major contribution to the reinforcement of the peacebuilding process. The system put in place in previous regimes established percentages for various ethnic groups and areas in the country".

According to a 2010 report from the Ministry of Education:

Considerable progress has been noticed in education in terms of skilled human resources, infrastructure and number of students over the last six years. For instance, the number of primary teachers has shifted from 26,944 in 2005 to 36,352 in 2010 which is 35% increase. The same progress has been observed in secondary education where the number of teachers has shifted from 7,610 in 2005 to 14,477 in 2010 and where the number of schools has doubled over the same period. The number of primary schools has shifted from 2,295 to 2,510 which is 8% increase. The number of primary school pupils has shifted from 1,857,841 to 2,299,326 which is an increment by almost 24%.

However, the balance formerly established between available jobs and the number of graduates rather degenerated into a strong imbalance over the last decade, resulting in higher unemployment levels. This imbalance also has two major implications. Since the Government is the largest employer, political and/or ethnic clientelism in recruitment procedures is more likely to occur. Secondly, there is a risk for the unemployed youth to mobilised by criminal gangs or armed rebel groups, especially since the Great Lakes Region is

still socio-politically fragile. While accessibility to education was regarded as a contribution to unity and reconciliation, it might turn into a threat to peace if absorption strategies are not properly put in place. One of these strategies has been the emphasis on regional integration, which could offer a number of opportunities for job creation.

Already in 2008 IRDP stated that “in order to benefit from the opportunities of a common market, the laws and regulations should facilitate the free movement of qualified labour. Currently, the major problem lies in the lack of technical skills. That is why various jobs are currently done by [a] labour from the sub-regional countries: mechanics, various construction activities, hairstyle, electricity and plumbing”. Part of the solution would lie in an educational system better geared towards the requirements of the job market, both in Rwanda itself as in the wider region.

3. Institutional Context

The two main challenges in evaluating peacebuilding programmes or interventions (as in many other areas) are the assessment of *results and impacts*, especially at a broad societal level, and the issue of *attribution*. Even if it were possible to find reliable indicators or markers to assess results and impacts, the complexity of social reality makes it extremely unlikely that those results or impacts can positively and uniquely be attributed to the programme or intervention in question. There are simply too many variables at play. One of those is the simultaneous implementation of other programmes or interventions addressing the same or related issues. In order to navigate this dilemma and increase the likelihood of making valid or at least plausible judgments in this regard – not to solve the dilemma – it is useful to have an overview of the other programmes and interventions or, in other words, to describe the institutional context of the programme under evaluation. That is exactly what this section aims to do.

The following brief overview is compiled on the basis of the respective websites or other publicly available sources, plus some oral information. It is rather uneven and far from exhaustive and it *definitely not an analysis*. However, even in this rudimentary form, it may not only help to shed some light on the attribution question, but also provide background for the assessment of IRDP's potential interactions and alliances with other actors and, therefore, of potential synergies.

« Les changements positifs qu'il y a eu ne sont pas seulement attribuables à l'IRDP. Il a plutôt contribué en tant qu'acteur actif. Par exemple, l'IRDP a eu l'avantage d'engager la diaspora dans le processus de la reconstruction de la paix relativement au même titre que d'autres intervenants. La direction de la diaspora au Ministère des Affaires Etrangères (MINAFET), les parlementaires, et le programme 'Come and See', parmi tant d'autres, sont des initiatives qui emboîtent le pas à l'IRDP »
The positive changes that have occurred cannot only be attributed to IRDP. Rather it has contributed as an active actor. For example, IRDP has had the advantage in engaging the diaspora in the rebuilding of peace as much as other interveners. The diaspora department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MINAFET), parliamentarians, and the 'Come and See' programme, among many others, are initiatives that have followed in the steps of IRDP
(member of IRDP Board)

➤ GOVERNMENTAL AND GOVERNMENT-LINKED BODIES AND ORGANISATIONS

The **National Unity and Reconciliation Commission (CNUR/NCUR)** was established by the Government of Rwanda in March 1999. According to the 2003 Constitution, the mission of the NURC includes the following, among other things: Preparation and coordination of reconciliation programmes; education and mobilisation; research; organisation of debates and dissemination of ideas and publications relating to peace, national unity and reconciliation; denounce and fight against acts, writings and utterances intended to promote discrimination, intolerance or xenophobia; monitoring public institutions, leaders

and the population in general with regard to unity and reconciliation principles and policies. The NURC has worked on the causes of violence since 1994, on the origin of conflict in Rwanda, on social cohesion, on the role of Rwandan women in peacebuilding and reconciliation, and on community conflicts. In collaboration with IRDP and others it has developed a *Rwanda Reconciliation Barometer* in 2010, following a model developed in South Africa. The NURC convenes meetings and organises conferences on the themes it is focusing on.

Like the NURC, the **National Commission for the Fight against Genocide (CNLG/NCFG)** is an organ foreseen in Rwanda's 2003 Constitution. It organises the annual commemorations of the 1994 genocide against Tutsi and other activities such as conferences on the genocide, genocide ideology, negationism, etc.

The **Rwanda Peace Academy (RPA)** is a project of the Ministry of Defence to offer training and research programmes relevant to post-conflict challenges in Africa. Drawing from the Rwandan experience, the academy aims to enhance regional capacity for conflict prevention and management, including post-conflict recovery and peacebuilding by employing international best practice. The Academy is an initiative of the Government of Rwanda with support from the Japanese Government through UNDP. RPA has entered into partnerships with a range of international institutes, including the *United Nations Institute for Training and Research* in Geneva (UNITAR), *Kings College London*, the *University for Peace* (UPEACE) in Costa Rica and the *Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces* (DCAF) and started its short course programme in 2011. The RPA partnership with UNITAR and Kings College includes creation of an e-learning and e-library platform laying the foundation for the RPA research programme with a capacity to deliver post-graduate Diploma and Masters programmes. RPA's training is directed at civilians, police and military personnel from Rwanda and other African countries. IRDP has contributed to curriculum development in the area of conflict analysis and peacebuilding. Other specific themes addressed in RPA's training and research programme include peacekeeping operations; security sector reform; women, peace and leadership; human security and the protection of civilians.

The **Centre for Conflict Management (CCM)** of the National University of Rwanda (NUR) sees itself as a bridge between research findings and policymaking regarding peace and conflict in the African Great Lakes Region. It was created in 1999 with financial support from UNDP. Its mission is to address the knowledge gap in the field of genocide, peace and conflict studies, and post-conflict reconstruction and reconciliation through conducting research, teaching as well as community services in the form of policy research. CCM offers short courses as well as an undergraduate course on Civic and Peace Education and a Master's Degree programme in Genocide Studies and Prevention. In May 2011 CCM hosted for the 4th time in a row an International Conference in Kigali on the 2006 ICGLR Pact (Security, Stability, and Development in the Great Lakes Region), with the theme "Democratisation Process in the Great Lakes Region: Progress and Challenges". Priority themes for the conference were: Electoral Experience; Gender Issues in Peace and Stability within ICGLR; Conflict Resolution within ICGLR: domestic solutions and international mechanisms; Peace and Civic Education as mode of lasting Peace and Stability; and Social

Sciences in Conflict Transformation and Peacebuilding. The proceedings of a previous international conference (on “Transitions and Peace Processes in the Great Lakes Region”) were published as Vol. 1 No. 1 of the *Peace & Conflict Management Review* (Feb-Mar 2008). CCM publishes the *Journal of African Conflicts and Peace Studies*; in September 2009 a special issue was devoted to “Genocide: Critical Issues”. Besides its academic endeavours, CCM organises Community Dialogue Programmes (CDPs) in three districts of the Southern Province and works with three local associations in a programme called “Democratic Citizenship”.

➤ **DOMESTIC NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS**

The **Rwandan Civil Society Platform (RCSP)** was created in 2004 with a view of serving as a framework of discussion and dialogue on common challenges or actions; exchange of information, mutual support and as a valid interlocutor between members and different partners of the Civil Society. It comprises 15 member organisations. Among its activities are the monitoring of elections. Many don’t regard it as a sufficiently credible, strong and independent body – a proper reflection of the state-of-affairs of civil society as a whole.

The **Rwanda Initiative for Sustainable Development (RISD)** is an NGO dealing with land reform. Since the new land law of 2005 it has focused on sensitisation of the rural population and monitoring of the law’s effects. In this context it has also provided training to local institutions and community organisations in conflict transformation and peacebuilding related to land conflicts.

The **National Consultative Forum of Political Organisations (NFPO)** was established in 1994 after the war and the genocide to serve as a consultative framework in the composition and management of Transitional Institutions. Its founding principles were confirmed by the Constitutional Referendum of May 2003, which advocated dialogue and consultation as a way of carrying out political action and promoting multiparty democracy in Rwanda. The NFPO currently comprises all 10 registered parties officially recognised in Rwanda and is a platform for dialogue and exchange of ideas on the country’s problems and national policies. It is also a permanent framework for capacity building for member political organisations in the field of political organisation and activities, and is also used as a framework for conflict mediation and for the promotion of the code of conduct, which should characterise the political leadership in Rwanda.

The **Rwandan League for the Promotion and Defense of Human Rights (LIPRODHOR)** is a non-profit organisation that has been active since 1991, documenting and disseminating information about the human rights situation in Rwanda. It has 16 members of staff and six branches in the country with a large pool of volunteers. It provides training and publishes reports, and has a newsletter *Le Verdict*. Its programme is divided into the six following components: (i) Documentation and information on the genocide, (ii) Human rights sensitisation of local authorities, (iii) A mobile human rights education team, (iv) Monitoring of detention centres and prisons, (v) Human rights monitoring, intervention and advocacy,

and (vi) Promoting research, information and documentation of human rights. In 2004, harassment by the authorities and internal frictions caused a big crisis, which has considerably weakened the organisation's critical edge and brought it more in line with officialdom.

The **Human Rights League for the Great Lakes Region (LDGL)** is a regional umbrella organisation with its headquarters in Kigali. It counts 27 member organisations, of which nine in Rwanda. LDGL has worked on a number of sensitive issues in Rwanda, such as the reintegration of former prisoners, election monitoring and freedom of expression, agricultural policy and land disputes, and enlarging political space. The reports it publishes frequently cause controversy. As part of a media capacity-building programme implemented with financial support from the EC Delegation in Rwanda, within the framework of the *European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR)*, LDGL published in 2007 a *Guide for the Rwandan Journalist*. LDGL is one of the civil society organisations that have increasingly come under pressure and criticism on the part of the Rwandan authorities. Several of officials have been harassed and/or briefly detained for questioning, it feels threatened by infiltration and it had problems in renewing its registration. It has been weakened by internal disputes, but is generally still seen as the more critical human rights body in the country – as against the more docile LIPRODHOR.

The **Federation of Leagues and Associations for the Defense of Human Rights in Rwanda (CLADHO)** is an umbrella organisation gathering five organisations. CLADHO is leading the Civil Society Policy Monitoring group, responsible for monitoring, research and analytical documents related to public policy issues, broadening the understanding of the public in the government's budget and public expenditure process. Each year CLADHO analyses and publishes a social audit of the Rwanda annual budgets, monitoring the government's pro-poor spending.

Transparency Rwanda (TR) is dedicated to fight corruption and related offenses in Rwandan society as well as promoting good governance. It has 20 members of staff, both in Kigali and in a number of districts. TR publishes a quarterly magazine "The Transparent", directed at opinion leaders in government, private sector, civil society and international organisations in Rwanda, as well as reports on specific issues. Other activities include citizens' mobilisation through the media, exposing acts of corruption, injustice, and bad governance through sketches on radio and TV, and other publicity materials like T-shirts, posters, etc.; receiving complaints from citizens, victims or witnesses of corruption and other related offences and provide them with legal assistance through their ALAC (*Advocacy and Legal Advice Center*) focal points in various districts; establishing, training and supporting anti-corruption clubs in universities and secondary schools as well as in other youth communities; and conducting research as a basis for advocacy. In 2010 TR published a *Rwanda Bribery Index* and it intends to start with a yearly *Rwanda Corruption Barometer*. Since end 2009 TR has a three-year partnership with *Norwegian Peoples' Aid (NPA)*.

FAWE-Rwanda (Forum for African Women Educationalists) was created in 1997 as the Rwanda chapter of a pan-African initiative bringing together African women, Ministers of

Education, officials in charge of Education and other decision makers on matters of education. FAWE's core mission is to work, together with its partners, to create positive societal attitudes, policies and practices that promote equity for girls in terms of access, retention, performance and education quality, through influencing the transformation of education systems. One of its many activities in Rwanda is setting up debating and theatre clubs in schools, following an approach developed by FAWE called *Tuseme* (Swahili for "Let's speak out"). The objective is to empower especially girls to identify, analyze, discuss and find solutions to problems that hinder their academic and social development.

The **Institute for Policy Analysis and Research (IPAR)** is an independent, non-profit think-tank created in 2008, guided by the values of Prosperity, Opportunity and Inclusiveness. It has some 20 members of staff and undertakes policy-oriented research mainly on economic and social themes, such as private sector development, rural lives and livelihoods, skills for tomorrow (education and training for a knowledge-based economy) and citizen-centred services (strengthening of the contract between citizens and the state to ensure citizens receive better quality services and have more chance to hold the government accountable). Its evidence-based findings are put at the service of government, civil society and development partners. Its mission statement contains the promotion of a "culture of debate and dialogue by hosting public events, workshops, seminars, conferences and other discussion forums". IPAR also provides skills training in policy analysis and is building up a documentation centre. It has established partnerships with a range of national and international agencies and institutes. Its core funding comes mainly from the *African Capacity Building Foundation (ACBF)*, and to a small amount from the Government of Rwanda (as a sign of commitment). Additional funding comes from the *Canadian International Development and Research Centre (IDRC)*.

SaferRwanda became operational in 2002 and aims to contribute to peace, security and development in Rwanda by acting as a forum for research, dialogue, analysis and by facilitating the implementation of comprehensive peace, security and development policies in Rwanda and the Great Lakes Region. Its activities include training and facilitation, community empowerment, advocacy, networking and interaction, research and information sharing. One of its main themes is small arms and light weapons.

The **Episcopal Commission for Justice and Peace (CEJP)** has active commissions in all nine dioceses of the Catholic Church, dealing mainly with peace and reconciliation at grassroots level. The activities include local conflict management, peace training for young people and the integration of disadvantaged population groups. CEJP's central office in Kigali has five members of staff.

Isoko ry'Amahoro - Noyau de Paix (NPIA) is a network of local peace actors and groups in Kibuye District (Lake Kivu) that was founded in 1994. It was formalised into an association in 2007 and works on community development and peace education, with support from the Swiss Peace Foundation (KOFF) and of Caritas-Switzerland and Luxembourg. An example is the workshop conducted by KOFF in September 2011 with 22 participants. Results were a detailed peace and reconciliation analysis: Who are the decisive actors supporting peace in

Rwanda today? What does sustainable reconciliation really mean? How relevant are the main concerns of the network – creating awareness of human rights (family/land/inheritance rights); ethical „education“; the promotion of public debate on the question of peace in Rwanda? Participants also applied the RPP criteria of effectiveness to their projects, reflecting on the following questions: do those who live between Byumba and Butare truly feel safer today, are they immune to provocations to violence, do they launch their own peace initiatives, have they improved relations between the various groups and social strata in a sustainable and crisis-proof manner, and has the state created institutions capable of resolving conflicts in a non-violent way? These are all questions that involve major difficulties, not only in Rwanda. Finally, the participants took a look at the indicators which constitute a special challenge in peacebuilding. NPJA edits a newsletter in French and Kinyarwanda: *Éclats de Paix – Imirasire y’Amahoro*.

➤ INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS AND PROGRAMMES

International Alert (IA) is a London-based international peacebuilding NGO that started working in Rwanda in 1996 with two women organisations (the Women MP Forum and *ProFemmes*). In 2001 it started work on justice issues and the Constitution and in 2007 it began a programme on reconciliation at community level in three districts (Gasabo in Kigali City, Gisagara in the Southern Province and Ngororero in the Western Province), in collaboration with five local partner organisations. The components of this programme are: community dialogue, social integration, economic integration, and advocacy. The programme provides space for interaction for groups most affected by the genocide and its consequences: survivors, ex-prisoners, ex-combatants and young people, thus building up trust and confidence between them. The programme enables them to identify common ground for cooperation and co-existence through dialogue and microfinance. In this way, these often conflicting groups can better understand and appreciate one another and how to resolve conflicts peacefully. IA is a member of the IRDP Support Group, which consists of donor countries plus two international NGOs, the other being *Norwegian Peoples Aid (NPA)*.

The American **National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI)** aims to help Rwandese people develop the tools to compete for power in a peaceful way. It has build up a solid partnership among the 10 registered political parties of Rwanda and offered trainings on the functions of a political party in a democracy – how a political party becomes an avenue to aggregate interests, to unify visions, to compete for power, to train members for government. NDI’s first programme in Rwanda intended to foster political party dialogue in support of the country’s political transition. An international assessment team was sent to analyze Rwanda’s political environment on the eve of the 2003 elections; the mission’s report was widely distributed and discussed at a two-day post-election roundtable, the first neutral forum for Rwandan political party representatives since the election. In 2008–10, NDI implemented a USAID-funded political party strengthening programme, in collaboration with Rwanda’s Consultative Forum of Political Organisations (NFPO), supporting and reinforcing mechanisms that promote inter-party dialogue and developing the

organisational, communication and outreach capacities of Rwandan parties, especially at a grassroots level. Since 2009, NDI assists political parties to further develop the capacity of young party members through a Youth Political Leadership Academy (YPLA), first in Kigali and later outside the capital. The curriculum provides youth with practical political skills through three months of intensive political training sessions. The 2011 round of YPLA provided four young leaders from each of Rwanda's 10 registered political parties with training in a variety of practical subject areas, including party organising, political communication, fundraising, training techniques, campaign skills, use of technology in campaigns, and more. The aim is to enhance emerging party leaders' ability to advance the development of their respective parties.

La Benevolencija – Radio La Benevolencija Humanitarian Tools Foundation (La Benevolencija) is a Dutch NGO that empowers groups and individuals forming the target of hate speech and ensuing acts. It takes as its role model La Benevolencija Sarajevo, a local organisation that played a unique humanitarian role during the Bosnian war (1992-1995). La Benevolencija broadcasts radio soaps, discussions and educational programmes, in combination with grass roots activities that provide citizens in vulnerable societies with knowledge on how to resist manipulation to violence and how to heal trauma, encouraging them to be active bystanders against incitement and violence. Its Rwanda programme started in 2002 with a radio soap opera to counter possible violence and threats in the wake of Gacaca trials. *Musekweya* (New Dawn), a highly popular radio programme airs weekly since 2003, spreading messages of reconciliation and how to recover from trauma. The new factual *Kuki* programme deals with the same themes as the soap: deepening reconciliation, free speech and hate speech, empathy for others and equal justice. La Benevolencija also works with a group of some forty grassroots organisations: Originally set up to give feedback on the radio drama, they have gradually been transformed and trained into active change agents. The groups have received knowledge and training in conflict evolution, trauma healing, rendering appropriate justice and finally genuine reconciliation.

In September 2008 the Rwandan Government signed a contract with USAID and the **Millenium Challenge Corporation (MCC)** for a three-year Threshold Programme to an amount of almost 25 million USD. The programme was designed to improve Rwanda's MCC Ruling Justly indicators, specifically political rights, civil liberties and voice and accountability. It has been implemented by USAID, the US Department of Justice, and the Government of Rwanda and consisted of three components: (i) Strengthen the Judicial Sector, (ii) Strengthen Civic Participation, and (iii) Promote Civil Rights and Liberties. It provided training, technical support and grants to local and national civil society organisations and expanded citizen engagement by supporting independent community radio stations. In addition, the programme reinforced Rwanda's efforts to improve the capacity of the judiciary and helped enact legislative reforms that strengthen civil liberties, human rights and civic participation. Finally, the programme boosted training and technical assistance to journalists and the Rwandan National Police in an effort to further transparency and professionalism.

4. Sources of information and approach of the evaluation

The information on which this evaluation exercise is based has come from the following sources:

- (1) Interviews with 29 people, individual (most) or in a small group, both Staff and Board of IRDP, Interpeace staff, people participating in the Programmes' activities and external people. See Annex C for a full list of people interviewed.
- (2) Study of relevant reports, book publications and other materials (audio-visual documentaries) produced by IRDP or in some cases, by others. See Annex D for a list of documents and other materials consulted.
- (3) Direct observation and participation in some selected activities, viz. one Dialogue Club session, one School of Debate session¹, and the Peace Centre – the last one a natural consequence of the fact that the evaluation team was working out of IRDP's offices, part of the Peace Centre.

All interviews were conducted in a semi-structured format, for which a list of questions had been elaborated (see Annex B). This 'questionnaire' served as a rough guideline and checklist for the evaluators themselves rather than as a formal list of questions to be strictly followed. The interviews thus had the character of a semi-open conversation and discussion. With a few exceptions, all interviews were recorded, with the permission of the interviewees. Their duration was normally around 1,5 hour, with some extremes on either side of one and two hours. Five interviews were conducted in English and the remainder in French. To illustrate and give some flavour of life to the findings, literal quotes from interviews have been interspersed in the text, yet no specific attributions have been made. Where possible quotations have been attributed to the profile of the interviewee in question; in some cases, this was impossible, as it would unambiguously have identified the person.

With respect to the people interviewed, several observations are in order. In the first place, virtually all people interviewed were selected from a long list compiled by IRDP, and the two sessions visited were the ones that took place during the time of the evaluation. The tight schedule didn't allow for identifying and interviewing people who were at some more distance from IRDP and the Programme. In the short time available, the evaluators weren't able to locate such people who also would have sufficient knowledge of IRDP and the Programme to make an interview meaningful. They have tried to diminish the potentially resulting bias, by keeping this fact in mind in conducting the interviews and in their subsequent processing and interpretation. Secondly, due to time constraints, it has not been possible to interview some real outsiders, people without any direct connection to IRDP or a history of membership in one of its forums or participation in its activities, but with sufficient knowledge of the Programme to serve as informant, or independent (including international) experts on Rwanda and peacebuilding.

¹ The Schools of Debate are sometimes referred to by their French designation *École de Débat*.

Given the time constraints referred to above and the short time for preparations, the evaluators had no other choice than to follow IRDP's guidance. Having said that, there are some clear gaps in terms of the categories of persons that the evaluators had identified for inclusion at the start of their work. On the list of people interviewed there are no representatives of the private/business sector. Equally, despite efforts made, it has not been possible to meet with more people who are part of or connected to other peacebuilding organisations in the country, either at national level or more locally – the two exceptions being the *Centre for Conflict Management* at the National University of Rwanda and the international NGO *International Alert*. Finally, it has not been possible to interview Rwandans in the diaspora nor foreign experts on the country, who might have provided observations and interpretations from a different angle.

Before and after the fieldwork visit to Rwanda, the first mentioned evaluator had a briefing resp. debriefing meeting at Interpeace Regional Office for Eastern and Central Africa in Nairobi.

With respect to the 'approach' or 'model' the evaluators have followed in their assignment, the following can be said. The first structuring element has been the well-known criteria for evaluating development interventions as developed by the OECD-DAC in the 1990s, which were to a certain extent also used in the ToR, viz. Relevance, Effectiveness, Efficiency, Impact and Sustainability.

Secondly, in addition to these widely accepted evaluation parameters, the evaluators have let themselves be guided by some of the main principles of two approaches to evaluation, the first developed specifically for peacebuilding initiatives, the second for evaluation in the wider field of development. First and most important is the framework developed by the *Reflecting on Peace Practice* (RPP) project of CDA Learning Projects – as set out and applied by the previous (2007) evaluation and also e.g. in the 2007 OECD-DAC publication *On Encouraging Effective Evaluation of Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Activities: Towards DAC Guidance* (authored by some leading RPP/CDA people). These principles concern principally the question of effectiveness and may be summarised as follows:

- (i) RPP assesses peacebuilding initiatives along two dimensions (plotted into a matrix): engaging *more people* vs. engaging *key people*, and aimed primarily at *individual/personal* change vs. aimed primarily at *structural/institutional* change.
- (ii) A programme promotes peace *effectively* when:
 - The effort addresses the *driving factors, people and dynamics* that are key to the conflict.
 - The effort results in a meaningful *improvement in relations* among groups in conflict.
 - The efforts contributes to a momentum for peace by causing participants and communities to develop independent initiatives that reduce *dividers*, increase or support *connectors*, or address *causes* of conflict.

- The effort prompts people to increasingly *resist violence* and provocations to violence.
- The effort results in the creation or *reform of political institutions* or mechanisms that deal meaningfully with grievances or injustices when these are key to the conflict. To reform or build institutions that are unrelated to the actual drivers of a specific conflict would be ineffective.
- The effort results in an increase in people's *security* and in their sense of security.

The current evaluators have used the RPP approach in particular as a yardstick for assessing IRDP's Peacebuilding Programme's *effectiveness* and *strategic relevance*.

A third and less central reference has been an approach to monitoring and evaluation that originated outside the peacebuilding field, called *Outcome Mapping (OM)*, developed by the Ottawa-based *International Development Research Centre (IDRC)*. Some of the central tenets of this approach are:

- (i) *Focus on people and on observable changes*: Outcomes are defined as changes in the behaviours, relationships, activities, or actions of the people, groups, and organisations with whom a programme works directly (called *boundary partners*). The outcomes can be linked to a programme's activities, although they are not necessarily directly *caused* by them.
- (ii) *Moving away from evaluating wider societal impacts*: OM is not claiming the achievement of development impacts at the societal level; rather, the focus is on progressive contributions to outcomes as defined above (therefore it prefers to talk in terms of *dynamic progress markers* rather than *static indicators*). Developmental changes in the wider society may be assessed (e.g. poverty alleviation, reduction of conflict), but one should be extremely careful in establishing a causal link with a programme's activities and/or its outcomes (i.e. to consider them as its impacts). OM does not belittle the importance of changes in the state-of-affairs (such as cleaner water or a stronger economy) but instead argues that for each such change there are correlating changes in behaviour (by people).

Without fully adopting these and other principles of the OM approach, the evaluators consider them to provide an important *cautionary tale* in dealing with the complex realities of peacebuilding, especially when assessing wider societal impacts ('peace writ large' or 'reconciliation').

5. Findings of the evaluation

5.1. Relevance and added value

Overall, interviewees were in agreement about the continuing relevance of the IRDP programme within the current context of Rwanda. In particular, the following elements were highlighted:

- (i) IRDP has opened a neutral, free and inclusive space for debate and dialogue, “not always evident in post-genocide situations”;
- (ii) IRDP addresses very sensitive, contentious and controversial issues (Citizen’s Participation for Democracy; Ethnic Identity and Social Cohesion) *that nobody else is dealing with*;
- (iii) IRDP searches for research-based solutions and concrete proposals;
- (iv) IRDP attempts to get those proposed solutions implemented by the relevant decision-makers (advocacy through the Steering Committees);
- (v) The real influence IRDP’s lobbying has, in some cases, proven to have had on the decisions taken (e.g. Law on Political Parties; Legal Provisions on Negationism; History Curriculum; blocking a change in the Constitution with respect to official languages, among other things; interventions concerning student allowances and health care provisions for the less economically equipped – *Mutuelle de Santé*).
- (vi) IRDP attempts with some success to engage the Rwandan *diaspora* in its research and dialogue process – a unique component of its programme, which others are not even trying.

« La diaspora a tendance à écouter la société civile plutôt que le gouvernement »
The diaspora tends to listen to civil society rather than to the government
(most interviewees, in one form or another)

IRDP has the confidence and trust of both ordinary citizens – as they know it is not part of the political domain – as well as public authorities. It thus constitutes a valuable link and channel of communication, both horizontally (between various sectors of society) as well as vertically (between ordinary citizens and decision-makers). Above and beyond that, IRDP succeeds in engaging many different sectors and layers of society as potential *agents of change*. Decision-makers are represented in many of IRDP’s groups and committees, such as the Steering Committees, which include political office-holders, political party leaders, private sector and other influential people within society.

As added value of IRDP, interviewees mentioned its methodology and approach, in particular its consultative and participatory aspect, its non-confrontational and constructive style and its focus on finding solutions, the way any criticism is always backed up by research (“evidence-based”) and its high level of inclusiveness. Its approach puts IRDP in the position

of intermediary between ordinary “people on the hills” and government bodies, able to capture the gaps and shortcomings of government policies and channel them upwards (“acting as people’s real spokesperson”). In the eyes of the members of the Dialogue Club visited by the evaluators, this capacity of IRDP compared favourably e.g with that of senators and deputies. Another added value mentioned is the model IRDP provides of how people can constructively participate in public affairs (*citizenship*).

« L’IRDP a développé des stratégies pour faire les gens parler en vue d’un consensus.
Il est attentif aux détails qui feraient l’objet de discussion en vue d’un consensus »
IRDP has developed strategies to make people talk towards a consensus.
It is paying attention to the details of the issue under discussion in order to reach consensus
(civil society member)

With respect to the themes selected for the 4th phase (i.e. Citizens’ Participation for Democracy, and Ethnic Identity and Social Cohesion), it was remarked that they are still highly relevant; in fact, as someone said, the problems of democracy in Rwanda today are the same as they were when IRDP started in 2003. Demystifying so-called taboo subjects such as ethnic identity is mentioned as one of IRDP’s added values.

« L’une des forces de l’IRDP consiste à engager toutes les couches dans l’espace de débat, dialogue, la patience. Il y a une hypothèse que ce débat produit des effets avec le temps »
One of the strengths of IRDP is that it engages all layers in the debating space, in dialogue, patience.
The hypothesis is that with time this debate will produce results
(member of IRDP Management Team)

« IRDP a combattu l’idée de globalisation du crime de génocide vis-à-vis de l’ethnie Hutu »
IRDP has fought against the incrimination of all Hutus in the crime of genocide
(former member of Democratic Republican Movement – MDR)

The political climate in Rwanda and the country’s history of excessive violence and dictatorship, make that many people feel censored and exercise self-censorship when addressing sensitive and politically controversial issues such as ethnicity and democratisation. The inclusion of political actors in many of IRDP’s forums and discussion groups is a valuable way of beginning to break through these barriers, albeit still only *within the secured space provided by IRDP*. A more generalised “culture of public debate” as envisaged by IRDP (i.e. openly and freely expressing opposing positions and opinions and attempting to find common ground) beyond this safe space is as yet rather limited.

By helping to overcome existing suspicions, setting up spaces for dialogue and for reaching consensus, and tackling the issue of co-existence, IRDP might be contributing towards the creation of a *national identity*. Its research could help to establish a new paradigm for looking at interethnic relations in Rwanda.

« L'IRDP apporte une nouvelle dimension qui aide à démystifier certaines choses – des thèmes tabous dont la méfiance totale qui a prévalu après le génocide, rendant ainsi la cohabitation un problème difficile à surmonter. Avec le travail de l'IRDP, on construit davantage l'identité nationale »

IRDP brings a new dimension that helps to demystify certain things – taboo issues such as the total mistrust which reigned after the genocide, making co-existence a difficult problem to overcome. With the work of IRDP, furthermore, a national identity is being constructed

(civil society member)

One of the strengths of IRDP identified by the interviewees is the way it manages its relationship with the Government of Rwanda (*'le pouvoir'*), keeping its distance on the one hand to safeguard its impartiality and objectivity, while fully engaging it as a partner in all aspects of the programme. This delicate balance remains a challenge that needs permanent attention and maintenance, as IRDP is sometimes perceived as close to Government (especially by certain parts of the diaspora as well as the political opposition within the country, and sometimes by donors as well), which may threaten its acceptability to all. On the other hand, some Government circles were in the beginning suspicious of IRDP, seeing it as an instrument in the hand of foreign donors. Its inclusiveness and participatory approach have been among the main assets enabling IRDP to respond to this challenge; other important elements are the diversity of IRDP's sources of revenue, the reputation and credibility of its directors and the international standing of Interpeace, which doesn't have the political legacies associated with some donors (as a matter of fact, it is an unknown entity for the majority of Rwandese). More concretely, Interpeace is regularly present at IRDP to help in "navigating the political space" and in monitoring this fragile balance.

A strength of IRDP has been its capacity to stay loyal to its mission and to defend its interests vis-à-vis those who might have had suspicions, doubts or interests of their own, whether within Rwanda or in the diaspora. Generally, people have more confidence in interlocutors who are not directly involved in politics, which still has a bad name in Rwanda. IRDP is such a trustworthy interlocutor.

Another aspect of IRDP's balancing act is the "gymnastics" that is sometimes necessary in order to find the "politically correct language" for expressing sensitive issues. On the one hand, IRDP's reports and publications need to truthfully express the points-of-view and arguments of their sources, on the other hand they need to be acceptable and convincing to their higher-level audience, in order to constitute effective lobbying tools. The fragility of Rwanda's post-genocide society, which lies at the basis of this linguistic dilemma, might also lead to self-censorship and hence dilute and compromise the quality of research findings. IRDP's strategies to get around these dilemmas are to *focus on issues rather than on individuals*, and to *include potentially obstructing individuals* into the process from the beginning.

The solutions sought by IRDP are not "miracles", but realistic, achievable measures towards reconciliation, and it sees its peacebuilding programme as a work-in-progress. "Peace" is not treated as something abstract, but as linked to very real and tangible issues that emerge from the research.

*« En tant que réalisation, la qualité des 'documentaries' produits par l'IRDP est inestimable »
As an output, the quality of the documentaries produced by IRDP is invaluable
(academician)*

*IRDP makes use of audio-visual tools to spread all over the country ideas collected
from Cyanzarwe. It gives us confidence that people can learn from our experience
(Dialogue Club – Cyanzarwe)*

The innovative use of audio-visual tools as (i) triggers of debate, (ii) for cross-communication between different layers and sectors of society (including the diaspora as a crucial element) and (iii) in the advocacy work through the Steering Committees, is also considered an added value. It was suggested that the AV-registrations could also serve as a means for people themselves to assess their evolution as a result of certain activities or interventions, as they enable one “to see how one has lived in the past” and improved since.

*« Les films documentaires sont publiquement présentés et, au lieu d'intimider la libre expression des participants, ils dissipent la peur. Les institutions publiques commencent à s'inspirer de la méthode audio-visuelle »
The documentaries are screened in public and, instead of intimidating the free expression of the participants, they dispel the fear. The public institutions begin to draw inspiration from the audio-visual method
(politician, member of Steering Committee)*

« IRDP comes and questions about socio-political events (e.g. elections, the issue of the Journalism Law). IRDP challenges decision-makers through audio-visual tools (documentary films) »

The IRDP Programme – though not primarily geared towards an academic understanding of conflict dynamics in Rwanda and despite its reliance on story-telling as a basis of knowledge creation and the corresponding alleged lack of analytical rigour – has made a valuable contribution, in particular through its two Country Notes (produced in 2003 and 2011, respectively), which address the sources and actors of conflict and the pillars of peace, as seen through the eyes of ordinary people.

The Programme has equally contributed, especially through its creation of and ongoing support to the Dialogue Clubs and also through its training sessions for other peace actors, to the strengthening of local capacities, in terms of organisation, mobilisation, facilitation and dispute resolution.

Weaknesses and risks

Although the creation of space for debate was highlighted by many interviewees as IRDP's most relevant achievement, there are clearly some limits to it as well: there is a general feeling that it is possible to say anything within this IRDP-created protected space, but it is not necessarily the same beyond its borders, in the public domain (“I can say things there I cannot say anywhere else”). In order to discuss the sensitive issues raised by IRDP and in its wake by some other peacebuilding organisations, such safe spaces are still necessary, as are highly skilled and experienced facilitators. As noted above, a wider “culture of debate and dialogue” is still far off.

« *On n'a pas l'habitude de contredire le pouvoir* »
We are not used to contradict those in power
(civil society member)

« *Le temps semble ne pas casser la tradition de silence* »
Time doesn't seem to break the tradition of silence
(other civil society member)

A potential weakness or risk that was mentioned concerns the perception by some donors that IRDP's original mission has been fulfilled after 10 years, and that therefore funding is no longer necessary. IRDP's concept of peacebuilding, however, is a broad one, meaning that its original objective of finding ways of how people could live together after the genocide has not yet been achieved, despite the fact that the country has made tremendous progress in many domains and is seemingly "at peace". There is still an element of mistrust among people, the Government still needs to reinforce its ability to listen to the people, and the fundamental principles of democracy are not fully applied, so IRDP's work on the themes of Governance, Citizens' Participation and Ethnic Identity and Social Cohesion remains highly relevant.

IRDP's relationship with Interpeace is seen as at the same time a strength and a potential weakness. On the one hand, IRDP benefits enormously from Interpeace's know-how and experience, international reputation and contacts. On the other hand, some people feel that IRDP might be more incentivised to strengthen its own organisational capacity if it became a fully autonomous structure, without jeopardising its partnership with Interpeace.

According to some, IRDP's Peacebuilding Programme, although still relevant in the current context, should be more forward-looking and pro-active, adapting itself to the new challenges to peace in Rwanda and fine-tuning its research and dialogue themes. E.g. although the general theme of genocide memory is still valid, specific issues have come up such as reparations beyond *Gacaca*, social inequalities/social justice, overpopulation, land conflicts between big business and ordinary people (expropriation) and between generations (inheritance). See also below.

In the same spirit, some doubts were raised in relation to the dependency of IRDP's approach on story-telling and group discussions, taking for granted people's views and perceptions as a solid foundation for their research and further action; as such, it sometimes misses objectivity and the higher-level overview of an issue. For some subjects, such as writing history, more academically inclined interviewees consider a validation process that is based on large discussion forums as limiting and potentially compromising the credibility of the research findings. On the other hand, they acknowledge the need to find a balance between academic and political credibility and expectations, as referred to below:

« Dans quel sens l'IRDP traduit-il authentiquement les idées de la population sans en être un traître?
Les données présentées souffrent de filtration, sélection. Par exemple, le choix fait pour
mettre sur pied un documentaire réfère à une censure, quel que soit le niveau »
In what sense does IRDP truthfully translate the ideas of the population without betraying them?
The data presented undergo filtering, selection. For example, the choice made to realise
a documentary implies censorship, whatever its quality
(academician)

« Un travail en équipe implique un compromis: sur le plan académique c'est limitatif;
sur le plan social c'est bon pour un pays déchiré par le génocide »
Working in a team implies making compromises: at the academic level, it is limiting;
at the social level, it is good for a country that has been torn apart by genocide
(academician)

« What people told IRDP is taken as biblical truth they use to challenge decision-makers »

As an example, if IRDP would make a study of the *Imidugudu* (villagisation and resettlement) programme, it should not exclusively base its finding on what the “people on the ground” say but first approach the responsible Ministry, which will have a broader knowledge of and deeper insight into the underlying policy issues. In this view, IRDP should endeavour to complement its participatory methods with a *more analytical approach*, based on theoretical models appropriate to the issue at hand and to the actual state-of-affairs in Rwanda and its dynamics.

One of the suggestions in this context is to serve as an early-warning mechanism and to focus more, in addition to more general target-groups, and on the basis of such an independent analysis, on *specific drivers of conflict* or *potential conflict actors*. In order to effectively prevent violent conflict and to foster peace, one has to address the “bad guys” and the structural factors that have a direct link to the emergence of violence.

One of the weaknesses of IRDP emerging from the interviews is the dissemination of its research findings, in other words: external communications. Generally, according to some interviewees, the materials IRDP produces do not sufficiently take into account the differences between the audiences it aims to reach (key decision-makers; academia; media; students and other youth; rural population; etc.). Although costly, IRDP could and should organise more radio debates, as well as TV screenings of its documentaries; especially radio is a powerful means to reach the Rwandan people at large, most of whom are illiterate and live in remote rural areas. Even the summaries in Kinyarwanda that are often produced on the basis of larger reports, have therefore severe limitations in terms of reaching out to one of IRDP's main audiences and constituencies (“the people on the hills”). According to one of the interviewees, IRDP's contributions (opening up space for debate, demystifying taboo issues) have generally been more noticeable in intellectual circles, rather than at the level of ordinary people, particularly the majority of peasants.

« L'IRDP n'a pas beaucoup de séances à la radio et TV, pourtant il est facile à voir
plutôt que consulter la bibliothèque »
IRDP doesn't have many radio and TV emissions while it is easier to watch than to consult the library
(religious leader)

Two other aspects of IRDP's external communication, in particular in its written form, that could be improved upon are the great inconsistency in the terminology being used and the English, which is sometimes poor. Both aspects cause unnecessary confusion and thus jeopardise the accessibility and comprehension of reports and other publications, including the website. For people who are not intimately familiar with IRDP and the Peacebuilding Programme (i.e. the wider public, newcomers, people potentially interested in IRDP and peacebuilding, etc.) it would help if the research themes, sub-themes, the various groups, committees, forums and other bodies would consistently be referred to with the same name, in each of the three languages in use (French, English, Kinyarwanda). For the drafting of English-language materials a professional editor would be advisable.

5.2 Effectiveness

The project document for the 4th phase of the Programme formulates its Ultimate Goal as that of “engaging the Rwandan population and key stakeholders in the search for solutions to peacebuilding challenges related to governance mechanisms, persistent weaknesses in economic reconstruction and social cohesion”. The three Expected Outcomes are given as:

- Adoption of policies, laws and public programmes that take into account the solutions suggested by the population and key stakeholders in the fields of governance, strengthening of social cohesion and developing a conducive environment to business and entrepreneurship;
- A culture of debate that is adopted by the Rwandan society as an effective way to consolidate peace;
- A synergy between the actors engaged in the peacebuilding efforts.

As evidenced by the sections above, the overall goal has certainly to a large extent been achieved. Through all the components of its Programme IRDP has over the years succeeded in engaging a growing group of Rwandans, both inside the country and outside, and including key stakeholders, in identifying the main challenges to peace and in the search for viable solutions. In terms of expected outcomes, the picture is somewhat more mixed. The first outcome (“adoption of policies, laws and public programmes”) has been the most successful one, as evidenced by the examples referred to above and in more detail in IRDP's published reports and other documents. The second and third expected outcomes (“culture of debate” and “synergy”) are much less in evidence. A more detailed picture with respect to Outcomes is presented in Annex E, which tracks the results obtained for each of the indicators identified in the LogFrame.

Some further observations on the Outcomes are in order. Firstly, the adoption by the Rwandan society of a culture of debate can, in the eyes of the present evaluators, only be a long-term outcome, while it remains an open question how such an ambitious outcome could ever be verified beyond reasonable doubt (see Chapter 4). The jump from verifiable indicators to such an outcome is simply too big. Secondly, as demonstrated above, the culture of debate still proves to be limited to the safe spaces created by IRDP (not just in the

forum discussions, National Group meetings and other national gatherings convened by IRDP, but including the Dialogue Clubs and Schools of Debate) – a not inconsiderable achievement in itself given the recent history and current socio-political context of Rwanda, yet a far cry from the stated ambition. This seems a clear case where an evaluation in terms of *dynamic markers*, tracking the gradual progress towards a certain outcome, instead of *static indicators* might be more meaningful (see Chapter 4). With respect to the synergy between different peacebuilding actors, there are some signs of a beginning of collaborative relationships (mostly with the NURC, but also CEJP and CCM), which can also be seen as markers of progress. Yet, probably the strongest examples of collaboration and potential synergies have been in the consultancy sphere and were not directly related to the Peacebuilding Programme (support to the design and elaboration of the *Rwanda Reconciliation Barometer* for the NURC and curriculum development for the RPA).

In the eyes of virtually all interviewees, IRDP's Peacebuilding Programme has been successful in creating and maintaining a neutral space for dialogue and in positioning itself as an impartial interlocutor that is accepted by everyone. As observed above, it has kept its distance to the government while at the same time ensuring it has the government's ear, even when critical or opposing views are being expressed. This perception of *neutrality*, *impartiality* and *acceptance* is largely due to the personalities and reputation of its Directors; their values of inclusiveness, openness, integrity and tolerance of difference have permeated the whole organisation and are reflected in the way the different components of the Programme are being implemented.

« Prof. Rwanyindo is respected, which is a strength. There is a trust in IRDP. The argument is based on the evidence that IRDP has full support of the government. The opposition might make use of this support »

« The government accepts completely what IRDP is doing. Hence, it opens up;
it feels having the support of the population »
(former researcher IRDP)

« L'IRDP est devenu de plus en plus une autorité morale dans la société Rwandaise »
IRDP has increasingly become a moral authority within Rwandan society
(academician)

One of the “secrets” of IRDP's success is its *inclusiveness*. After the war and the genocide against Tutsi it managed to bring people of different origin, background and life experience together, despite the mistrust prevalent among them (survivors and perpetrators; repatriated refugees and those that stayed in Rwanda before the genocide; repatriated refugees from different countries; Francophone, Anglophone and those who only speak Kinyarwanda; released prisoners or those suspected of genocide and others; Hutu, Tutsi and Twa; people from different parts of the country). The definite lack of trust between these different groups has gradually diminished, although it is not always clear to what extent this is also due to the factor time. As noted above, the inclusiveness applies equally to different layers of society, such as people in decision-making or leadership positions and “ordinary people”.

IRDP makes an explicit effort to engage women in all its Programme activities and has established a specific component for training, supporting and accompanying women leaders (*Biba amahoro – Planting the seed of peace*). Over the last few years, the women participating in this project have successfully created and led Dialogue Clubs and income-generating activities for women in their respective communities and they have made several visits to neighbouring countries and other peacebuilding programmes initiated and accompanied by Interpeace in order to exchange experiences and learn.

IRDP has created a forum where former infiltrators, ex-FAR, genocide survivors and refugees come to live together while it was formerly not possible. Through IRDP, women have gained a say
(Dialogue Club – Cyanzarwe)

« L'IRDP écoute tout le monde, la diaspora incluse. Il est accepté de tous même s'il peut y avoir différence de perception entre les Rwandais de l'intérieur et ceux de la diaspora ...

L'IRDP fait un trait-d'union entre les autorités et la population »

IRDP listens to everybody, including the diaspora. It is accepted by all even if there can be a difference in perception between the Rwandans inside the country and those in the diaspora ...

IRDP establishes a linkage between the authorities and the population
(member of Steering Committee)

5.3. Influences, impacts and sustainability

On the level of national government and policies, some of the main influences IRDP's Peacebuilding Programme has had were listed above – see 5.1 (v). Equally, it was noted that wider societal impacts are extremely difficult, if not impossible, to gauge, while the question of attribution remains a crucial stumbling block in trying to establish a causal link between programme and impact (see Chapters 3 and 4). As referred to in 5.1 (Relevance and added value), the freedom of expression, of disagreement and debate found within the protected orbit of the IRDP programme is generally not experienced outside and beyond its boundaries. In other words, a generalised “culture of debate” is not yet noticeable.

However, two examples of some wider impact of the IRDP Peacebuilding Programme are the discourse used during the September 2011 campaign for the Senate which in many cases reflected IRDP's approach in terms of the need for consultation, participation and accountability, and the unhampered debate in December 2010 on Freedom of Expression and Media, live on TV and National Radio. Another influence mentioned is the adoption by some other civil society organisations (e.g. *Transparency Rwanda*) of IRDP's approach, albeit at a rather technical level such as the use of audio-visual tools.

As far as the relationship between national, intermediary and local levels of society is concerned, some interviewees maintained that the authorities have become more susceptible to views from the public, possibly as a consequence of IRDP's work:

*« Les débats publics suscitent des mécanismes de redevabilité de l'autorité face à la population rwandaise »
The public debates create mechanisms that make the authorities more accountable vis-à-vis the Rwandan population*

(member of Steering Committee)

« Des fois, certaines autorités pourraient s'en prendre à l'IRDP qui crache la vérité, laquelle les met en position inconfortable »

Sometimes certain authorities could blame IRDP when it exposes the truth, which puts them in an uncomfortable position

(member of Steering Committee)

On the other hand, there is a perception with some that IRDP's main effort is directed at higher-level decision-makers rather than at the population at large and that its positive impact has largely been on more intellectual circles (cf. 6.2 above). This view is considered somewhat flawed by the present evaluators – the impact “on the hills” and in schools (through the Dialogue Clubs, *Biba amahoro*, and the Schools of Debate) is less visible for people who themselves are not in contact with these realities but could well be significant, albeit restricted to those relatively few people directly engaged in the Programme. The two field visits conducted by the evaluators certainly convinced them that the two groups in question of around 30 people each are benefitting greatly from the opportunity to freely exchange and debate different points-of-view offered by the IRDP programme. Another question, as noted several times above, is whether and if so, to what extent, such a learning experience and behavioural change has a sustainable impact outside the specific time and space and beyond the limited group of participants. Unfortunately, this remains in fact an open question (cf. the comment above on *progress markers*).

Irrespective of concrete results obtained so far, many interviewees felt that IRDP could and should increasingly focus on youth, as well as on women. A majority of Rwandans today are under 25 years or age, which means that they did not live through the years of war and genocide or only as a small child, although they are part of a society heavily marked by these events and still trying to deal with its consequences. While many older people are inflexible and cannot easily overcome their divisions, mistrust and hatred (in particular the diaspora was mentioned in this context), the younger generations, both in Rwanda and abroad, are more open to change and to new ways of living together. Yet, as a matter of fact, at the time youngsters constituted the principal actors of the genocide and it is of utmost importance to inform the youth of today about Rwanda's violent past and the dangers of marginalisation and divisionism.

One interviewee stated that “Rwanda is pretending making progress in the unity and reconciliation area”. It was suggested that IRDP, as it has the competence and credibility for doing high-quality research, could address the issue and assess to what extent the official discourse and the widely shared conviction that Rwanda has made tremendous progress in this respect since the genocide against Tutsi is a true reflection of the state-of-affairs or an exaggerated “pretension”.

One unexpected and potentially negative consequence of IRDP's work was illustrated during the evaluators' visit to the Cyanzarwe Dialogue Club:

Les membres du Club de Dialogue sont fortement impliqués dans la résolution des conflits. Dans certains cas, par exemple, ils négocient la libération des personnes arrêtées par la police afin d'entrer dans le processus de résolution des conflits responsables de leur incarcération. Lorsque l'argent constitue l'objet d'incarcération, nous avons toujours racheté pour arranger l'affaire avec lui plus tard, suite à la solidarité qui nous marque. Cela fait que l'harmonie soit un signe distinctif de notre Club de Dialogue. Cependant, le Club de Dialogue a encouru le risque de suspicion à se substituer aux institutions de base formellement mandatées à la tâche de résolution des conflits

(Club de Dialogue – Cyanzarwe)

The members of the Dialogue Club are heavily involved in the resolution of conflicts. For example, in certain cases they negotiate the release of people who have been arrested by the police in order to embark on a process to resolve the conflicts that triggered their imprisonment. When money is at stake, we have always redeemed the sum to solve the issue later with the person in question, due to the solidarity that characterises us. That makes harmony one of the distinctive features of our Dialogue Club. However, the Dialogue Club has run the risk of raising suspicions since it puts itself in the place of the local structures that have the formal mandate for resolving conflicts

(Dialogue Club – Cyanzarwe)

To solve this issue and avoid such suspicions, the Dialogue Club suggested for IRDP to issue some papers explaining the context within which the Club works.

IRDP has made many efforts in establishing a working relationship with other organisations and programmes in the peacebuilding or related fields (see Chapter 3 for a non-exhaustive overview of other actors). At least 10 Memorandums of Understanding were signed, which however have largely remained a paper reality. IRDP has organised training and other capacity-building activities for members of other organisations and it has opened the doors of its recently established Peace Centre to them. Many organisations are in one way or another involved in IRDP's Peacebuilding Programme, taking part in meetings and forum discussions. Yet, despite all this, there is a general perception that IRDP is operating in a relatively isolated manner and that there is little real cooperation and limited synergy among peacebuilding actors in Rwanda. How come?

One explanation offered centres on IRDP's relative lack of effective external communications. Others focus on IRDP's outstanding and exceptional position in Rwanda, in terms of its reputation, capacity, resources and relationship with the authorities, which may provoke feelings of marginalisation and inspire some jealousy and fear on the part of smaller organisations. In particular other civil society organisations sometimes feel their peacebuilding contribution is not being acknowledged, e.g. because they exclusively work at the community level rather than also at the national political level, such as IRDP. Because many domestic civil society organisations, including their official coordinating body (*RSCP – Rwanda Civil Society Platform*) are seen as weak and either not fully trusted by the authorities or by their fellow activists, any real collaboration remains difficult. From IRDP's perspective, it might also contain some risks. A specific coordinating body for peacebuilding organisations does not exist.

Yet, reconciliation, the promotion of a “culture of debate” and the strengthening of citizen’s participation in democratic governance are goals of several other organisations and programmes, including church-based ones such as the *Episcopal Commission for Justice and Peace* and international ones such as the three-year programme *Strengthening Civic Participation* funded by the *American Millenium Challenge Corporation* and implemented by USAID in collaboration with the Government of Rwanda (2009-11). Although some light form of collaboration has been realised with several of IRDP’s “sister organisations” (*Transparency, ECJP*), probably the closest relationship exists with the *National Unity and Reconciliation Commission* (NURC) – labeled “governmental” rather than “national” by one of the interviewees.

5.4. Learning points for the future of the Programme

The main learning points from the 4th phase of the Programme relate to the various issues, positive and negative, identified in previous sections, in particular the following:

- Using quantitative research methods in addition to qualitative ones constitutes an enrichment of the Participatory Action Research paradigm; the results and conclusions from the research are more reliable and more convincing to the audiences that matter.
- A semi-independent consultancy service is viable and can in the medium-term constitute a partial solution to IRDP’s dependency on foreign donor funds.
- The exclusive emphasis on participatory and consultative approaches has limitations in two respects, viz. (i) it makes IRDP’s agenda too dependent on the specific and immediate needs and concerns of the constituent groups in question, resulting in an ever-growing range of themes and issues to be addressed, without necessarily a direct connection to conflict, violence and peace; (ii) it may miss a broader and more forward-looking perspective that transcends these specific and immediate needs and concerns and for which a more critical, theoretical and analytical approach is needed.
- The relative failure to build constructive, mutually enriching relationships with other peace actors should lead to a strategic rethink on this matter: Either the ambitions have to be adjusted downwards (and the current level of cooperation and synergy is assumed as acceptable in the given circumstances), or more resources should be allocated to this aspect of the Programme and a specific plan of action should be put together.
- A more consistently used terminology (with respect to the themes and components of the Programme as well as to the range of forums, groups, committees and other bodies and meetings) will increase the accessibility of reports and documents and thus improve external communications.

- External communications will also greatly benefit from a professional editor, particularly as far as the use of English is concerned.

As noted above, the most remarkable innovation of IRDP's Peacebuilding Programme has been its practice of video-taping all focus-group discussions and other consultations, the editing of these recordings into short documentary films and the use of these films for cross-communication between different constituencies (e.g. peasants and national authorities; people inside the country and in the diaspora) and as triggers for debate in other contexts.

6. Conclusions and recommendations

On the basis of the findings and their interpretation within the socio-political and institutional context of present-day Rwanda, the evaluation comes to the following conclusions and recommendations:

➤ RELEVANCE AND EFFECTIVENESS

The IRDP/Interpeace Peacebuilding Programme continues to be of great strategic relevance for the prospects of peacebuilding in Rwanda. It has succeeded in bringing into the open a number of highly sensitive and controversial issues, yet of crucial importance for the future of peace in the country; in the process, it has engaged a broad range of people in growing numbers, from youth in schools and universities and ordinary “people on the hills” to local authorities and the main decision-makers at national level. In particular, it has uniquely succeeded in bringing groups of the Rwandan diaspora around the world into this ongoing and ever widening dialogue. Its approach of participatory research and action, its inclusiveness, its moral authority and credibility, its constant search for viable solutions based on a broad consensus – all these elements together have made it possible for IRDP to break new ground in opening up spaces for debate and dialogue in Rwandan society and make concrete and constructive contributions to official policymaking.

In addition, the Programme serves as a useful channel of communication, ‘vertical’ as well as ‘horizontal’, between its different constituencies, slowly yet certainly contributing to higher levels of trust in society, of citizen’s participation in democratic governance and of public authorities’ accountability. By carefully safeguarding its neutrality and independence, it succeeds in remaining a legitimate interlocutor for all stakeholders and a credible advocate for its evidence- and consensus-based proposals for constructive changes towards a more just and peaceful Rwanda.

One of major challenges remains the wider dissemination of the “culture of debate” beyond the protected spaces of the Programme.

The following conclusions and recommendations should be seen in the light of this general and overall positive assessment.

➤ Focus

Since its start in 2001-02, the Rwanda Peacebuilding Programme of IRDP has taken on, with varying degrees of intensity, a number of issues that are only loosely related to its central mission of peacebuilding. Although it can always be argued that these issues (e.g. environmental concerns, income generation in rural communities, health care, student allowances, taxation, arbitrary legal decisions) have a bearing on peace and reconciliation, the likelihood of the programme making a substantial contribution to the achievement of these goals in Rwanda will increase when its resources (people, money, time) are not being diluted by dealing with too many other subject areas and activities, whatever their

importance may be from other perspectives (e.g. in the eyes of the people directly concerned or from a purely economic development perspective). With respect to the income generating projects of the Dialogue Clubs, the question is more one of sustainability: as people “cannot eat peace”, the material support is very much linked to the functioning of the Clubs. Would the Clubs collapse, also as forums of debate, if the support would stop?

Recommendations:

1. *IRDP should concentrate its efforts on those issues identified as absolutely crucial to peacebuilding and try and channel other issues – which from another angle may be considered as equally important – to other, more specialised organisations. IRDP should focus on the sources, drivers and/or actors of potential violence and conflict in Rwanda (potential peace spoilers), in the first place those already targeted during the 4th phase, viz. issues related to (i) governance, citizen’s participation and democratic space, and (ii) ethnic identity and social cohesion. In order to remain relevant in the changing socio-political context, a second priority should be to investigate ways of addressing newly emerging and highly sensitive threats to peace and stability.*
2. *Besides the newly emerging threat of the country losing part of its foreign aid, the only issue in the economic sphere that currently merits attention from a peacebuilding perspective is youth (un)employment. Given the complex and contingent relationship between youth employment opportunities, on the one hand, and peace and stability on the other, an in-depth study, combining analytical and participatory approaches, might be a fruitful investment.*
3. *IRDP should make efforts to gradually diminish its support to the income generating projects of the Dialogue Clubs and have the Clubs themselves take responsibility for this aspect (possibly by finding substitute sources of funding).*

➤ **RESEARCH APPROACHES**

As was highlighted in the previous evaluation and equally observed by several people interviewed for the current exercise, the fact that IRDP has over the years taken on more and more issues, and thus increasingly diluted its resources, is partly due to the consultative and participatory approach to research, in which the participants in the various forums and activities identify their concerns and priorities. A better balance between participatory and more analytical approaches to research is desirable, without losing its action-orientation.

Recommendation:

Don’t take for granted that all issues considered important for the people concerned, necessarily have a relationship to peace and conflict. Develop a stronger analytical approach, based on theoretical models appropriate for the issue at hand and for the Rwandan context and combine this with the strong emphasis on consultation and

participation that is the hallmark of IRDP and Interpeace. Examples of issues which might benefit of a more in-depth analysis in this sense: In the Rwandan context, does more or better democracy contribute to peace(building)? Probably there is no simple, linear or causal connection. Possibly same for youth (un)employment, as mentioned above.

➤ **'VERTICAL' COMMUNICATION AND DECENTRALISATION**

IRDP is making a valuable contribution to the improvement of two-way 'vertical' communications, i.e. the channelling of concerns and issues from the base to the top, and the information flow from the top to the bottom, including downward accountability. Still, an element of mistrust remains on the side of many ordinary people vis-à-vis the political domain and public authorities, reason why IRDP often plays this role of spokesperson and go-between.

Recommendation:

Reinforce 'vertical' communication and contribute to the building of trust and mutual accountability between ordinary citizens and the leadership at various levels by incorporating more local authorities and e.g. Presidents of Dialogue Clubs in the National Group and other national forums. This might initially cause some culture shock and problems of communication, but in the middle- and long-run could constitute a catalyst for better relationships and more solid bases for the policy of decentralisation.

➤ **CULTURE OF DEBATE**

IRDP has made great progress in creating a 'culture of debate' within the confines of its Peacebuilding Programme. People feel free to confront and discuss sensitive and controversial issues, yet this freedom is still weak beyond the protected spaces of the Programme (National Forum, Dialogue Clubs, Schools of Debate, etc.).

Recommendation:

As a possible way of strengthening the dissemination of the 'culture of debate' beyond the protected spaces of the Peacebuilding Programme, IRDP should try and revive the District Forums. If possible, it should gradually expand the number of districts and also decentralise further to sector level.

➤ **YOUTH AND SCHOOLS OF DEBATE**

Poverty might not on its own and as such be a cause of violence and conflict, nor will young men necessarily become perpetrators of violence, young people without real future or opportunities and with nothing to lose can become candidates for inciting conflict and

practicing violence. The youth component of IRDP's Peacebuilding Programme, manifested principally in the Schools of Debate in schools and universities, adds a valuable and strategic element to its peacebuilding repertoire, yet is principally directed at relatively privileged groups. More marginalised youth deserves a bigger share in IRDP's overall programming and in the allocation of resources.

Recommendations:

1. *In addition to focusing on the sources, drivers and/or actors of potential violence and conflict (see above), the Programme should develop a stronger focus on youth, including in its work with the diaspora, but also e.g. integrating young people in Dialogue Clubs, forums at different levels and young women in Biba amahoro.*
2. *Enrich the Schools of Debate by inviting speakers (e.g. 'experts' from IRDP or elsewhere, politicians and public authorities, but also Dialogue Club members) for short talks introducing a theme for debate. Advantages: (i) varies the format of debating sessions, (ii) reinforces cross-fertilisation between different components/audiences/constituencies of the programme.*

➤ **EXTERNAL COMMUNICATIONS**

IRDP and its Peacebuilding Programme are partly known by a broader section of Rwandan society through its reports, publications and other productions, including audio-visuals (documentary films) and programmes on radio and TV. Yet, this area could be quantitatively and qualitatively improved. While the audio-visual tools are of very high technical and editorial quality, the same cannot be said of the written materials. The structure of many publications leaves much to be desired and especially the English is sometimes poor (in both respects, IRDP sadly doesn't differ from some governmental bodies such as the NURC). Given the limited access of the majority of Rwandans to printed materials and the wide accessibility of radio, including community radio stations, IRDP should try and find resources for more airtime.

Recommendation:

IRDP should take measures to reinforce the dissemination of its work and improve the quality of its external communications ('public relations'), in particular of its written materials, by:

- *Hiring (or entering into a standing contract with) a highly qualified professional Editor for all reports and publications, including the website – especially English language, but preferably perfectly bilingual.*
- *Being more consistent in the labelling of its many activities, meetings and forums (National Group, Forum Discussion, School of Debate, District Forum, etc.) – in all three languages in question.*
- *If possible, producing more radio programmes (including for community radios).*

- *Exploring the possibilities of setting up its own Radio Station or forging a close working relationship with an existing station (finances/opportunities/risks). A station of its own could be a bridge too far in the current circumstances, but might be something to consider for the medium- or long-term, also as a potential source of revenue.*
- *Exploring the possibility of mounting a mobile screening unit for its audio-visual materials.*

➤ **COOPERATION AND SYNERGIES**

Despite considerable efforts, IRDP has so far not succeeded in forging strong relationships with other organisations and programmes in the peacebuilding and related areas (see Chapter 3 for as non-exhaustive overview), with the possible exception of some governmental or semi-governmental bodies (NURC and RPA). This state-of-affairs is partly due to the difficult socio-political environment in which especially civil society organisations are operating, and partly to IRDP's rather exceptional and outstanding position within this field of forces ('it is lonely at the top'). Given these circumstances, there is a risk of IRDP jeopardising its reputation of neutrality and impartiality, so these issues of cooperation, alliances and synergies need to be handled with the utmost care.

Recommendations:

1. *IRDP should explore in more depth the institutional context and selectively try and forge closer working relationships with organisations and programmes with a similar focus (i.e. citizen's participation and ethnicity/social cohesion). Such relationships won't necessarily entail collaboration, should be seen in a pragmatic light and at least result in a better exchange of information, mutual learning from experiences and better division of labour (in order to avoid duplication of effort).*
2. *The Peace Centre should be more actively promoted as a unique national resource (library, audio-visuals, internet, meeting and conference facility) for individuals and organisations working on peacebuilding and related issues.*
3. *As the Centre is obviously mainly benefitting people and organisations based in or near Kigali, IRDP should explore the possibility of creating (or helping others to create) some off-shoots in other parts of the country (small centres with documentation and other facilities at the service of peacebuilding) or having mobile units that may help disseminate its Programme more widely.*

➤ **SCOPE, SOLIDITY AND SUSTAINABILITY OF RESULTS**

As noted in other Chapters of this report, IRDP's Peacebuilding Programme has achieved considerable results, yet mainly in relatively protected spaces for debate. The assessment of the wider societal impact ("peace writ large") remains a big challenge: How far have the

changes in question (opening up space for dialogue among individuals and groups; breaking the taboo around certain subjects; improving the relationship between base and top) permeated society as a whole, how solid or deeply anchored are those changes, and to what extent are they sustainable? An extra obstacle for answering such questions about changes in society is the lack of baseline data, although the NURC's *Rwanda Reconciliation Barometer* published in October 2010, on which IRDP collaborated, might be of some help in this regard.

Recommendation:

Explore the possibilities for conducting (or incentivising others to conduct) a nation-wide "social audit" to gauge the observable changes in attitudes, relationships and behaviours that might have occurred over the last decade, including if possible establishing a link with the activities of IRDP's Peacebuilding Programme. Such a project could be presented (and submitted to potential funders) as marking IRDP's 10th anniversary.

➤ **RELATIONSHIP TO INTERPEACE**

It is clear that IRDP's partnership with Interpeace carries a number of important advantages. First of all, given Interpeace's international standing, high-level personalities serving on its Board and proximity to UN structures, it provides an additional layer of credibility and protection – additional to IRDP's own strengths in this regard, as remarked elsewhere in this report. Secondly, IRDP greatly benefits from Interpeace's standing and reputation in a more tangible sense, in that it provides preferential access to the international donor community. Thirdly, given Interpeace's numerous programmes in other countries using a similar approach and methodology, it opens up unique possibilities for comparative analysis and mutual learning – something that could, in the case of IRDP, be further developed.

The partnership with Interpeace also implies some potential risks and weaknesses. It could keep IRDP more dependent than necessary (and desirable?), and doesn't provide a strong incentive to further develop its own internal capacities for organisational governance.

Recommendations:

1. *Strengthen the comparative learning possibilities deriving from more intensive contacts with Interpeace programmes in other countries (see also below on staff development policy).*
2. *Create an Executive Board that is more closely involved in organisational governance. Beyond receiving and approving activity and financial reports, such a Board should play a more pro-active role in areas such as planning, accountability, supervision, sounding board for Directors. In order not to overload the organisational*

structure, such an Executive Board could possibly be composed of 3 or 4 members from within the existing Board (possibly recruiting some new members with experience in these matters and sufficient availability), creating a two-tier governance system. This will force IRDP to strengthen its governance capabilities and gradually make it more autonomous from Interpeace, without jeopardising any of the benefits that emanate from this partnership.

➤ **STAFF CAPACITY AND DEVELOPMENT**

IRDP's research and other staff are of high quality, demonstrate great commitment to the mission of the organisation and sensitivity to the concerns of its constituents as well as to the complex socio-political environment in which IRDP must operate. There is, however, little attention on the part of the governing structures of the organisation for the individual and collective needs of members of staff for further training and development. This might be a flaw of many Rwandan organisations, based on the fear that staff after receiving training and obtaining higher qualifications will look for better remunerated employment elsewhere, it is in the long-run a self-defeating approach. As any other organisation, IRDP has a prime interest in retaining its experienced and committed staff and in further developing its capacities and improving quality, and one of the means to these ends is to offer non-material incentives to individual members of staff in the form of opportunities for relevant training and other capacity-enhancing activities. Capacity not only refers to quality but also involves number of staff.

Recommendations:

- 1. IRDP should design and instate a Staff Development Policy, in such a way that staff can be retained and the quality of research and action can be maintained and improved. Staff development can be realised through (academic and/or other) training courses, short exchange visits and/or secondment to Interpeace programmes in other countries, taking part in seminars and conferences, and the like. Another element of such a policy should be a "career path" for employees, insofar as possible within the constraints of a relatively small organisation.*
- 2. IRDP should review its organisational structure in terms of the balance between higher management, programme staff (researchers) and support staff, in order to ensure that existing resources are allocated in a way that fits the plan and the workload of the next phase of the Programme.*
- 3. IRDP should consider allocating (part of) the revenues from its incipient Consultancy Service in the actual implementation of such a Staff Development Policy (i.e. in the consolidation and improvement of the quality of its research and action, as well as its internal organisation). Another part could be invested in the further development of this Consultancy Service itself.*

Annex A: Terms of Reference

External evaluation of the IRDP programme in Rwanda Interpeace-IRDP

I. Presentation of the Interpeace-IRDP peacebuilding Programme

a. Short Background

After the genocide, the government of Rwanda did its best to build a new nation founded on democracy, respect of Human Rights and promotion of socio-economic values. In this dynamic of reconstruction, the IRDP-Interpeace Programme has been contributing to the creation of an environment, conducive to the social transformation hoped for.

The Institute of Research and Dialogue for Peace

IRDP is a non profit making organization registered in Rwanda in January 2003. It was first established in late 2001 as the office of WSP International in Rwanda, with the intention of becoming an independent national NGO. After that independence was achieved, the very strong linkage with WSP International / Interpeace has remained unchanged. IRDP's mission is to contribute towards building a nation based on mutual understanding, trust and peaceful cohabitation of its people.

Interpeace

Interpeace is a Swiss-based peacebuilding organization working in close partnership with the United Nations that assists societies torn by conflict to build sustainable peace. It does this by promoting locally owned and internally driven processes of consultation, dialogue and analysis with all sectors of society. Building on more than a decade of field experience, we have learned that peace is sustainable only if all parties involved in a conflict forge it, with local actors playing the main role. Moreover, lasting peace cannot be built by force, but must be based on understanding, trust and a common vision for the future. Its peacebuilding programs are implemented by national teams in 15 countries which are supported by Interpeace. It has worked in Rwanda since 2001.

The IRDP positions itself as a facilitator for the debate and as a catalyst for change and believes in a participative approach as a fundamental aspect in the decision making process on national interest issues. The choice of this methodology in the search for sustainable peace is based on the deep conviction of the two partner organizations that peace and trust need to be founded on sharing and mutual understanding and collaboration capacities beyond social and political divisions.

The Rwanda Programme was set up in 2001 at a time when Rwanda faced a number of post genocide challenges:

- A context of suspicion and social tension due to the cyclical violence in Rwanda,
- The imperative of reconciliation due to the contention which arose from the genocide,
- Political, socio-economical and judiciary reforms which did not receive the consensus of the population,
- The lack of human and financial resources to implement all these reforms,
- The conflicts in the Region of the Great Lakes.

While the Rwandan authorities were working on rebuilding a country that had been battered and weakened by the genocide (institutional reforms, decentralization, setting up of gacaca jurisdictions, etc.), the IRDP-Interpeace Programme has done its best to engage Rwandans in a dialogue process which aims to address the needs of the population to rebuild a social bond, to think about what happened and to, together, come up with solutions for a better future. Indeed, faced with the importance of the task, it was essential that decisions and reforms adopted at the state level should be supported by efforts of the population in favor of lasting peace. Moreover, because of the depth of the post genocide wounds, it was crucial that the challenges towards reconstruction should not only be dealt with at the level of the capital, but should also be the object of debates in the rest of the country and among the Rwandan Diaspora.

b. Programme overview

It is within this context that Interpeace and IRDP launched the programme in March 2001. The fragile context following the genocide determined the choices of both organizations concerning the methodological approach and the work principles that are to characterize the programme:

- The legitimacy of the process which depends for a large part on the capacity to manage the political space and the amount of objectivity in dealing with and interpreting the data,
- The quality of the participation resulting from the representativity of the institutions and the diversity of those consulted.
- The progressive appropriation of the process by the Rwandans

After much thought was given to the structure of the programme and getting the right staff, the programme's activities began in March 2002. The main objective of the programme was to encourage, with the methodology inspired by that of Interpeace and adapted to the national context, participation of the population in the definition of political and socio-economic priorities, and in the search for solutions to the major problems of the country.

The process can be divided into 4 phases, each one an individual programme of activities but directly related to previous phases. These phases are the following:

In their first phase from 2001 to 2004, IRDP engaged in consultations with all sectors of the Rwandan population to determine issues that were likely to undermine the fragile peace in Rwanda after the genocide. Upon completion of these consultations, fourteen major challenges were identified. The National Group that met in November 2003, chose 5 themes that needed to be addressed in priority. The themes were; the role of history in successive and repetitive conflicts, the genocide and its consequences, democracy in the face of questions of ethnicity, the rule of law and the role of poverty in Rwanda's conflicts. The findings of these consultations were written up in the Country Note "Building Lasting Peace in Rwanda – Voices of the People" and presented in a documentary film "Umuryango Utazimuye Urazima". These findings inspired the work of IRDP in subsequent phases, as the research themes explored to date have always emerged from pending issues of the preceding phase. The participants in the focus groups at the grassroots levels also asked IRDP to work on setting up spaces for permanent dialogue on challenges to peace, be it at the community or national level.

During the second phase (2004-2005), IRDP conducted in-depth research on the five aforementioned themes and supported the creation of 5 dialogue clubs in various provinces. The latter played an important part in the research process in relation to the 5 themes. The research findings were presented to the National Group in 5 sessions organized between December 2005 and February 2006. During these restitution meetings, the National Group adopted solutions called "recommendations" to the challenges to consolidation of peace. These had emerged from the research conducted on the 5 themes and needed to be implemented in priority by the authorities and the different actors of reconstruction. The National Group also recommended that effective mechanisms to ensure the follow up of the implementation of recommendations that had emerged from the research and debates be set up. Indeed, it is important to remember that these recommendations are the answer to the preoccupations expressed by the population at different levels. Experience has shown that relevant research has always been conducted without necessarily having the policy makers refer to it when it comes to the conception of various society projects. Among the recommendations adopted by the National Group, the creation of a debate space « Urvugiro » was put forward. This is how the idea of creating a Peace Centre that would serve as a crossroads for peace initiatives and actors was born. Moreover, it was recommended to engage the youth in the debate process on democracy and governance so as to give them the opportunity to understand the challenges to peace from a young age and to develop their critical thinking and leadership potential.

The third phase from 2006 to 2008 was rich in innovations and in the implementation of the recommendations that emerged from research and debates of the previous phase, all the while pursuing the research around the pending questions of previous phases, namely the division of power as a challenge to democracy, arbitrary decisions as a challenge to the construction of a State of Law, negationism of the genocide of the Tutsis, history of the period between 1942 and 1962 as one of the most contentious periods, as well as job

creation as a strategy of poverty reduction.

The follow-up of the implementation of the recommendations was entrusted to the steering committees, made up of influential people chosen based on the criteria adopted by the National Group.

Debate forums were created and supported at all levels by IRDP including the School of Debate in the 25 secondary schools in order to develop a culture of debate in the society. The construction work for the Peace Centre also began during this period.

The fourth phase from 2009 to 2011 moved towards the consolidation of the strategies initiated during the previous phase. The programme focused on engaging the Rwandan population and key stakeholders in the search for solutions to the lack of public participation in governance and the issue of ethnic identity and social cohesion. It also concentrated on strengthening the dialogue platforms created in the previous phases and on launching the Peace Centre as a way to create a greater synergy and complementarity between actors engaged in peacebuilding efforts.

II. The evaluation's focus

a. Purpose of the evaluation

This will be the second external evaluation of the Programme since its inception in 2002. The first evaluation was carried out in 2007 and focused on explaining how the process was carried out in relation to the sociopolitical context. The evaluators recommended ways to improve efficiency and impact of the Programme and to insure its sustainability. The intention of this new evaluation is for the evaluators to follow up on the recommendations made in the previous evaluation, to assess the Programme's performances during its 4th phase from 2009-2011, as well as to help IRDP and Interpeace to better capture, measure and plan for impacts for the future of their Programme. The focus of the evaluation will be on the effectiveness of the 4th phase in terms of its design, relevance, efficiency, performance, impact and sustainability; but it will also look at the Programme's influences and impacts from its beginning as influences and impacts cannot be examined in the framework of one particular phase but should be seen as a cumulative and continuous process. 10 years after the launch of the Programme it is crucial that IRDP and Interpeace make sure that their intervention remains strategic and brings about positive change in the society. The two organizations have developed tools and strategies in that regards. However measuring peacebuilding impacts is not easy and remains a challenge for all actors, including peacebuilding NGOs and donors. IRDP and Interpeace would like the evaluation to contribute to their reflection and efforts to remain relevant and strategically positioned in the 5th phase of the Programme. The evaluation will identify key challenges, constraints and success factors and lessons learnt to inform future phases. The evaluation will explore a range of questions with the core IRDP programme team, Interpeace, participants and key stakeholders of the programme. Where the evaluation report refers to viewpoints, it will clearly state whose views these are and also clearly identify which views and recommendations are those of the evaluators.

Key questions

Relevance and added value

- Are the Programme and its methodology relevant regarding the overall goal of the Programme, which is to engage the Rwandan population and key stakeholders in the search for solutions to peacebuilding challenges related to governance mechanisms and persistent weaknesses in social cohesion?
- Has the Programme managed to remain relevant over the years and to adapt itself to the evolutions of the context? How?
- Does this programme, compared to previous or ongoing peacebuilding efforts in Rwanda, provides added value in terms of the
 - Understanding of the conflict dynamics in Rwanda?
 - Mobilisation of social actors in pursuit of ‘solutions’?
 - Identification of one or more strategies to address the conflict(s) that have or can get broad social and political support?
 - Strengthening of local capacities?
- What are or are seen to be strengths of the programme that contribute to its added value (if any)? What are the weaknesses or perceived weaknesses of the programme that either reduce its added value potential or deprive it from added value?
- The Programme has tried to respond to requests from the participants in the process and the National Group meeting (setting up dialogue clubs in rural areas; promotion of democratic principles and tolerance in schools, etc.): Do these responses and adaptations to demands and needs constitute an added value of the Programme? Are they consistent with the Programme’s objectives?
- Is there a sense of ‘ownership’ of the process so far among the Rwandans that have been actively engaged in the project (not just project staff but wider participants)? How does this express itself – or not?
- Were the 4th phase’s research themes relevant vis-à-vis the Programme’s overall goal?
- Did the use of quantitative research methods – in addition to qualitative methods – increase the quality of the research?

- What needs to happen beyond the fourth phase of the Programme to pursue effective conflict transformation and peacebuilding in Rwanda and create a sustainable dynamic to constructively address problems and conflicts in the country?

Efficiency

- Are the outputs as envisaged in the 4th phase programme proposal realized or to what degree? What explains possible variations to the original stated outputs? Were the original outputs realistic in light of the project time frame? Can the originally expected outcomes be expected to be realized in the medium-term given the current results?
- How efficient was the Programme in creating and maintaining a neutral space for dialogue?
- How efficient was the Programme in positioning itself as an impartial and acceptable interlocutor and in maintaining this position?
- How inclusive was the Programme and how efficient was it in integrating gender dimension in its work?
- How efficient was the Programme in bringing about positive changes in the society?
- How appropriate is IRDP's structure for implementing, monitoring, reporting the progress of the programme and sharing of information with key peacebuilding actors and change agencies?
- What was the role of the audiovisual tool in the dissemination of the programme's results and as a trigger for dialogue?

Influences, impacts and sustainability

When looking at the influences and impacts of the Programme, the evaluators will not only focus on the 4th phase but will also take into account the accumulation of influences and results throughout the Programme and what do they add up to.

- Has the Programme had influences and impacts on the relationships between the national, intermediary and local levels of the society? At what level does the programme have an influence (individual/sociopolitical level? Key actors/more actors?) Is this strategic with regards to the Programme's objectives and to the Rwandan context?
- Has the Programme had influences and impacts on strengthening the dialogue within the society and on peace and reconciliation?

- Regarding the Programme's work with the youth: Has the action initiated with the youth produced positive changes at the individual and/or community levels? Does this contribute to consolidating peace? Is IRDP well placed to do this?
- What effects, influences and impacts has IRDP had? (planned or unexpected) use illustrative stories
- How has IRDP's interactions and alliances with different actors shaped/created synergies with other programmes/organizations? Is this an area that could be further improved? If, so how could it be done strategically?
- What changes were brought about by the Programme? Are these changes sustainable?
- Were there unexpected results?
- Analyze the strengths and weaknesses of the IRDP/Interpeace partnership and its role in the Programme's sustainability

Learning points for the future of the Programme

- What can be learned from this fourth phase experience before starting the fifth phase?
- How efficient was the Programme in capturing and measuring results, influences and impacts? What strategies and tools can IRDP and Interpeace use to better capture and measure results, influences and impacts in the future?
- How can the Programme strategically use the Peace Centre in the future?
- Has the Rwanda programme developed examples of innovative praxis that can be of interest for other programmes?

b. Recipients of the evaluation report:

The recipients of the evaluation are IRDP, Interpeace and donors that support the Programme. IRDP and Interpeace will use the evaluation's findings in the design and implementation of the future phases. Interpeace will also use the findings to better support IRDP.

III. The methodology

The actual evaluation work will take place in Rwanda. It will be carried out by two evaluators. The international evaluator will bring a strong knowledge in evaluation of peacebuilding programmes and will be the team leader. He/she will be the team leader and will choose the most appropriate methodology, including the distribution of work with the Rwandan

evaluator after discussion with IRDP executive committee. The Rwandan evaluator will bring deep understanding of the context and the sociopolitical dynamics. Relevant people to be interviewed that are based outside of the country will have to be reached via phone or Skype.

- a. Study of key documents on the IRDP/Interpeace Programme in Rwanda which will be made available (including Programme Documents, quarterly and annual reports, research reports, internal workshop reports, etc.); viewing of video materials from the programme;
- b. Individual or group interviews with the IRDP team
- c. Individual or group interviews with Interpeace Regional Office team
- d. If and where possible sit in on meetings, focus group discussions, National Group meetings, etc.
- e. Individual or group interviews and discussion with people actively participating in the process, including administrative and political authorities, organizations working in similar fields, National Group members, focus group members, diaspora, IRDP Board and donors.

IV. Deliverables

Inception report: Following a detailed briefing but prior to fully engaging in the analysis and interviews, the reviewer will present an inception report of no more than 8 pages, detailing further how s/he will explore the major questions listed above, with a tentative list of the people to be contacted, the criteria for any choice of locations, and a tentative time table.

Draft report: A draft report will be presented to Interpeace and IRDP, and shortly thereafter discussed in workshop format.

Final report: The final review report will be in English and contain findings with analysis and supporting evidence and recommendations. An executive summary of no more than 4 pages will precede the full report. A map, a list of key documents consulted, a list of people interviewed, eventual longer case studies and other detailed materials will be attached in annex.

The report will :

- Provide very briefly the background to the conflicts in Rwanda, and review the efforts to address and resolve them prior to the initiation of this project;
- Separate sections with the findings, analysis and supporting evidence for the main domains of inquiry listed above (“key questions”).
- The final section of the report will provide a *reasoned and balanced appreciation* of

the overall relevance and performance of the programme indicating strengths and weaknesses. This overall assessment will then be complemented with lessons learned and *specific recommendations* on how to strengthen the fifth phase of the Programme.

- The annexes will include a list of people interviewed, list of key documents consulted, and possibly somewhat longer case studies. Illustrative case studies should be no more than 2-3 pages, succinctly spelling out the background context, what happened and what resulted from it. They should however also provide substantiating evidence, e.g. in the form of some quotes or testimonies, reference to documents relevant to the case, observable or observed changes in behaviours, relationships; apparent changes in trends etc.

V. Qualifications

Together the two evaluators are requested to have the following experience and skills:

- Previous consultancy and evaluation experience and a track record of delivering against ToR and deadlines;
- A background in peacebuilding / conflict transformation, including meaningful practical experience in one or more real-life contexts;
- Knowledge of Participatory-action research or other participatory methodologies;
- Fluency in French and English, demonstrated writing skills in English, knowledge of Kinyarwanda is an asset;
- First-hand familiarity with the recent and current context in Rwanda is highly desirable;
- Sensitivity to national-international actor dynamics;
- Ability to analyze the Programme with regards to the Rwanda context
- Tact and sensitivity: There are evident sensitivities in doing any kind of review: nobody, whether 'staff' or 'management', likes to be 'evaluated' and every person is typically concerned about criticism of her/his performance. In short, the evaluation has to be serious and robust, yet it is also of utmost importance that the overall process is *felt to be constructive by all concerned*. That will require significant tact and care of the evaluators in how the evaluation is presented, how questions are asked, how findings are presented.

VI. Tentative timeframe (preferably in September; or October)

- Day 1: Preliminary briefing on the Programme with Interpeace in Nairobi
- Day 2: Travel to Rwanda and Preliminary briefing with IRDP's executive committee
- Day 5: Inception report
- Day 6 to Day 14: Review of documentation and interviews, field visit
- Day 19: Draft report; presentation of the evaluation findings to IRDP and Interpeace
- Day 22: Comments sent by IRDP and Interpeace to evaluators
- Day 24: Presentation of research findings to IRDP, Interpeace and donors
- Day 26: Final report

Annex B: Guiding questions for interview

English:

Relevance and added value

- How do you assess IRDP's **continuing relevance** given the changing context?
- What is the **added value** of the IRDP Programme (focus on understanding conflict dynamics)?
- What are the main **strengths and weaknesses** of the Programme?
- Should IRDP scrupulously stick to its specific peacebuilding mission / objective, or respond to all **new concerns and demands** that may come up?
- As a participant in/member of X, do you feel IRDP takes on board your views and in turn makes itself **accountable** to you (explains why it is doing what it is doing, why it has taken certain decisions, etc.)?
- Taking IRDP's overall goal as that of "contributing towards building a nation based on mutual understanding, trust and peaceful cohabitation of its people", do you think the **three themes selected** to work on during the 4th phase are the right ones? (*1-Political*: Decentralization and participation in decision-making; *2-Social*: Issues related to ethnicity (social cohesion), and genocide ideology; *3-Economic*: Disparity / inequalities / poverty / unemployment)
- In your view, did the use of **quantitative methods** increase the quality of IRDP's research?
- Do you have any **suggestions** as to what IRDP should be undertaking in the years to come? (strategies? themes?)

Effectiveness

- In your view, has IRDP succeeded in being **neutral** in setting space for dialogue and thus safeguarding its position as an interlocutor **acceptable to all**?
- Do you feel IRDP has succeeded in **engaging all social categories**, including **women**?
- What **positive changes**, if any, have taken place in the post-genocide period (e.g. more dialogue, peace, reconciliation, human rights, employment and other economic opportunities, etc.)? How sustainable are those changes?
- How does IRDP's work link to those changes? Have they been planned or were they **unexpected**? Were there any **negative** consequences of IRDP's activities?
- How well does IRDP **disseminate** its findings to a wider audience of peacebuilding actors, change agencies and the population at large?
- How important is the use of **audio-visual tools** in this dissemination? Does it work well as a trigger of dialogue and debate?

Influences, impacts and sustainability

- Is IRDP becoming an **effective two-way channel** between the central government, intermediary institutions and people at the grass-roots?
- Has IRDP achieved results mainly at the **level of individuals** (attitudes, perceptions, behaviour) or also at the **socio-political level** (institutions, structures)?
- How does this relate to IRDP's strategic objective/overall goal and to the Rwandan context?
- How does IRDP relate to **other programmes and/or organizations** in the broader area of peacebuilding (NCUR, CNLG, CCM, Int. Alert, LDGL, etc.)? Is there any productive interaction (**synergy**)?
- Which strengths and weaknesses do you see in IRDP's **relationship to Interpeace**?

Learning points for the future of the programme

- What **lessons** you think can be learned from IRDP's work of the last three years?
- How successful has IRDP been in **capturing and measuring the results** of its activities? What strategies and tools could be used to improve this?
- How can IRDP strategically use the **Peace Centre** in the future?
- Has the Rwanda programme developed examples of **innovative praxis** that can be of interest to other programmes (in Rwanda and/or elsewhere)?

French:

Pertinence et valeur ajoutée

- Comment évaluez-vous la pertinence continue de IRDP, donné l'évolution du contexte?
- Quelle est la valeur ajoutée du programme IRDP (accent mis sur la compréhension des dynamiques de conflit)?
- Quelles sont les principales forces et faiblesses du programme?
- Est-ce que l'IRDP doit respecter scrupuleusement sa mission / son objectif spécifique de consolidation de la paix, ou répondre à toutes les préoccupations et exigences nouvelles qui pourraient surgir?
- En tant que participant / membre de X, sentez-vous que l'IRDP prend à bord votre point de vue et à son tour, se fait rendre des comptes à vous (explique pourquoi il fait ce qu'il fait, pourquoi il a pris certaines décisions, etc)?
- Prise l'objectif global de l'IRDP comme celle de «contribuer à la construction d'une nation fondée sur la compréhension mutuelle, la confiance et la cohabitation pacifique de son peuple», pensez-vous que les trois thèmes choisis pour travailler pendant la 4ème phase sont les bons? (*1-politique*: Décentralisation et participation

- à la prise de décision; 2-*sociale*: Enjeux liés à l'ethnicité (cohésion sociale), et l'idéologie du génocide; 3-*économique*: Disparité / inégalités / pauvreté / chômage)
- A votre avis, l'utilisation de méthodes quantitatives a augmenté la qualité de la recherche de l'IRDP?
- Avez-vous des suggestions quant à ce que l'IRDP devrait entreprendre dans les années à venir? (stratégies? thèmes?)

Efficacité

- A votre avis, l'IRDP a réussi à être neutre dans la création de l'espace de dialogue et de préserver ainsi sa position comme un interlocuteur acceptable pour tous?
- Est-ce que vous sentez que l'IRDP a réussi à engager toutes les catégories sociales, y compris les femmes?
- Quels sont les changements positifs, le cas échéant, qui ont eu lieu dans la période post-génocide (par exemple: plus de dialogue, de la paix, de la réconciliation, des droits humains, l'emploi et autres opportunités économiques, etc)? Que durables sont ces changements?
- Quel est le lien entre l'IRDP et ces changements? Ont-ils été planifiés par lui ou imprévus? Est-ce qu'il a y eu des conséquences négatives des activités de l'IRDP?
- Dans quelle mesure l'IRDP diffuse ses conclusions à un public plus large d'acteurs de la paix, des agences de changement et de la population en général?
- Quelle est l'importance de l'utilisation des outils audio-visuels dans cette diffusion? Est-ce que ils fonctionnent bien comme déclencheur de dialogue et de débat?

Influences, impact et durabilité

- L'IRDP est-il devenu un canal effectif dans les deux sens entre le gouvernement central, les institutions intermédiaires et les gens à la base?
- L'IRDP a-t-il obtenu des résultats surtout au niveau des individus (attitudes, perceptions, comportements), ou aussi au niveau socio-politique (institutions, structures)?
- Comment cela est lié à l'objectif stratégique / but globale de l'IRDP et au contexte rwandais?
- Comment l'IRDP se rapporte à d'autres programmes et / ou organisations dans le domaine au sens large de consolidation de la paix (NCUR, CNLG, CCM, Int. alerte, la LDGL, etc)? Est-ce qu'il y a une interaction productive (synergie)?
- Quelles sont les forces et les faiblesses que vous voyez dans la relation entre IRDP et Interpeace?

Points à retenir pour l'avenir du programme

- Quelles sont les leçons que vous pensez peut être tirés des travaux de l'IRDP pendant les trois dernières années?

- A quel point l'IRDP a réussi à capter et mesurer les résultats de ses activités?
Quelles sont les stratégies et les outils que peuvent être utilisés pour améliorer cela?
- Comment l'IRDP peut utiliser stratégiquement le Centre de la Paix dans l'avenir?
- Vous pensez que le programme de l'IRDP au Rwanda a élaboré des exemples de la praxis innovantes qui peuvent être d'intérêt pour d'autres programmes (au Rwanda et / ou ailleurs)?

Annex C: List of people interviewed

Hon. AYINKMIYE, Spéciose	Senator, Member of IRDP Steering Committee (Economics)
BAZIGAGA, Gloriosa	Civil society activist on gender issues, Country Manager <i>International Alert</i> for Rwanda & Burundi
BUGINGO, Irénée	Researcher IRDP
BUKEYE, Ignancianne	Participant in <i>Biba amahoro</i> project
Hon. GASAMAGERA, Wellars	Senator, Member of the Standing Committee on Political Affairs & Good Governance, member of IRDP Steering Committee (Economics)
IYAMUREMYE, Régine	Executive Secretary <i>Unity Club</i> , based at First Lady's Office, member of IRDP Board
INGABIRE Marie Immaculée	Chair of the Board of <i>Transparency Rwanda</i>
INTERAYAMAHANGA, Révérien	Researcher IRDP
Hon. INYUMBA, Aloysie	Minister for Gender & Family Promotion (RPF), former Secretary General of the <i>National Commission for Unity and Reconciliation</i> (NCUR), Member of IRDP Board
JUSNES, Marie	First Secretary, <i>Embassy of Sweden, Development Cooperation</i> (SIDA)
KARAKE, Théogène	Secretary General, <i>Rwandese Association of Local Government Authorities</i> (RALGA), former IRDP researcher
Mgr. KOLINI, Emmanuel	Archbishop (ret.), Anglican Church, Chair of IRDP Board
MINANI, Faustin	Official at Ministry of Finance, member of IRDP Steering Committee (Economics)
Prof. MBONYINKEBE, Sebahire Déo	Anthropologist, Kigali Independent University (ULK)
Mgr. MBONYINTEGE, Smaragde	Bishop of Kabgayi, Roman Catholic Church
MOLANDER, Joakim	Councillor, <i>Embassy of Sweden, Head of Development Cooperation</i> (SIDA)
MOURE, Maud	Programme Officer for the Great Lakes, Interpeace
MUGIRANEZA, Jean-Paul	Senior Advisor IRDP/Interpeace
MUKASANO, Gaudance	Participant in <i>Biba amahoro</i> project
Dr. MUNYANDAMUTSA, Naasson	First Deputy Director IRDP
MUSHINZIMANA, Apollinaire	Former Coordinator <i>National Decentralization Implementation Secretariat</i> (NDIS), elected Senator September 2011, former IRDP researcher
MWAMBUTEZA, Jean Claude	Correspondent <i>BBC World Service</i>

MWIRIRIZA, Jeanne	Participant in <i>Biba amahoro</i> project
Maj. NYIRMANZI, Gérard	Ministry of Defence
Prof. RUTAYISIRE, Paul	Historian, Director <i>Conflict Management Centre (CCM)</i> , <i>National University of Rwanda (NUR)</i>
RUTAZANA, Francine	Civil society activist human rights and gender issues, Advisor to the Project on Violence against Girls and Young Women in Rwanda, Burundi & DRC of the <i>Centre for International Studies and Cooperation (CECI)</i> , former Secretary-General <i>League for Human Rights in the Great Lakes Region (LDGL)</i>
RWAGATARE, Claude	Embassy of the Federal Republic of Switzerland, Swiss Cooperation, Member of Steering Committee (Governance)
Prof. RWANYINDO RUZRABWOBA, Pierre	Programme Director IRDP

Other people met and spoken with

ACHESON, Rachel	Reporting and Information Officer Great Lakes, Interpeace Nairobi Office
BATUMIYE, François	President of Dialogue Club, Cyanzarwe
ERIKSSON, Josefin	Intern, SIDA
KABEGA, Émilienne	Administrator IRDP
MUKANKUBITO, Immaculée	Second Deputy Director IRDP
MUKANTANDA, Cécile	Researcher IRDP
NSABIMANA, Ruzege	President of Dialogue Club, Rubavu District
NYIANAWAGAGA, Claudine	SIDA, former employee and former Board Member IRDP
NIYONAGIZE, Germaine	Facilitator School of Debate
RAMIRA, Richard Lema	Documentation Centre Manager IRDP
SVENSSON, Johan	Regional Advisor Eastern and Central Africa, Interpeace Nairobi Office

Annex D: List of Documents Consulted and AV-materials viewed

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- Rwanda Programme, *Strategic Response to the Recommendations of the 2007 External Evaluation*. 29 October 2008. Pp. 7.
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- Rwanda Peacebuilding Programme 2009 – 2011*. December 2008. Pp. 41 [Programme Document 4th phase]
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- Rapport d'activités du projet “Bibamahoro” 2009-2010*. Juillet 2010. Pp. 20.
- Rwanda Peacebuilding Programme Annual Report 2009*. Pp. 31.
- Citizen's Participation for Democracy in Rwanda*. September 2010/08 May Draft. Pp. 79. [Research report]
- Ethnic identity and social cohesion in Rwanda: Critical analysis of political, social and economic challenges*. September 2010. Pp. 62. [Research report]
- Rwanda Programme Annual Report January – December 2010*. Pp. 25.
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- IRDP–Interpeace Program, *Quarterly Report April – June 2011*. Pp. 7.
- Rwanda Peacebuilding Programme 2012 – 2015*. August 2011. Pp. 70. [Programme Document 5th phase]

The state of peace in Rwanda as perceived by Rwandans: 17 years after the genocide against the Tutsi. Pp. 86 [Country note]

Audio-visual materials produced by IRDP

The Truth Heals. November 2003.

The Club. 2007.

Are My Priorities Your Concern? Citizen's Participation in Governance.

Hutu/Tutsi/Twa or Rwandan? Ethnic Identity and Social Cohesion in Rwanda.

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Other documents

Sarah Earl, Fred Carden & Terry Smutylo, *Outcome Mapping: Building learning and reflection into development programs.* IDRC, 2001. Pp. 139.

Marc Sommers, *Fearing Africa's Young Men: The case of Rwanda.* World Bank Social Development Department, Conflict Prevention & Reconstruction, Paper No. 32. January 2006. Pp. 30

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OECD/Development Co-operation Directorate, *Encouraging Effective Evaluation of Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Activities: Towards DAC Guidance.* 11 September 2007. Pp. 95.

Serge Rwamasirabo and Sue Williams, *IRDP/Interpeace Peacebuilding Dialogue & Research Programme: External Evaluation.* April 2008. Pp. 62.

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Annex E: Planned Outcomes and Results Obtained

Objectives	Intervention logic	Indicators (planned 2009 - 2011)	Indicators (achieved 2011)
<p>Outcome 1</p>	<p>Adoption of policies, laws and public programmes that take into account the solutions suggested by the population and key stakeholders in the fields of participation in governance, strengthening of social cohesion and developing a conducive environment to business and entrepreneurship</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 1000 people participating in the research and dialogue process • 30 resource people consulted by the researchers • 10 radio programmes each year • 1500 written and audiovisual reports distributed or sold • Four meetings with decision-makers per year on each theme • 150 people representing all sectors of the society attending the National Group meetings • National Group consensus on 6 action-oriented recommendations to address the 3 peacebuilding challenges • At least, 50 % action oriented adopted influence policies and laws • 50 % of decisions makers contacted by the Steering Committee are committed to the recommendations 	<p>> 1000</p> <p>> 30</p> <p>21 total (incl. TV)</p> <p>> 1500</p> <p>15 total</p> <p>170 to 200</p> <p>YES</p> <p>YES</p> <p>YES</p>

Objectives	Intervention logic	Indicators (planned 2009 - 2011)	Indicators (achieved 2011)
Outcome 2	A culture of debate that is adopted by the Rwandan society as an effective way to consolidate peace	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 18 meetings of each School of Debate every year • 3 meetings of the Schools of Debate at the provincial level every year • 20 meetings of each Dialogue Club every year • 4 meetings of each district forum every year • 4 meetings of each national forum every year • 2 meetings of each diaspora forum every year • 40 trained diaspora facilitators, 5 trained facilitators in new Dialogue Clubs, 15 trained facilitators of Dialogue Clubs initiated by women leaders, 5 trained School of Debate facilitators • 2 training sessions every year of experienced facilitators of the dialogue platforms set up in the previous phases • 20% increase of Dialogue Clubs' crops and cattle every year • 20 institutions use IRDP approach to analyze issues and to find strategies to resolve them • At least, 100 opinions leaders are committed to use IRDP approach 	<p>YES</p> <p>3 + 4 + 3</p> <p>> 20²</p> <p>20 total³</p> <p>6 total</p> <p>8 + 0 + 19 total for all countries</p> <p>0⁴</p> <p>5</p> <p>24</p> <p>25</p> <p>4 total</p> <p>?⁵</p> <p>unlikely</p> <p>?⁶</p>

² There were 12, 19 and 19 Dialogue Clubs in 2009, 2010 and 2011, respectively. Each Club meets twice a month, once to debate a specific topic, once to discuss their income generating project

³ The fora that were set up in 2007-08 in 5 districts during the 4th phase (2009-11) were only convened in the context of IRDP's research, in particular data collection and validation of findings. The reason for the discontinuation of the fora as debating platforms was the termination of funding for this specific activity.

⁴ No diaspora facilitators trained as the diaspora networks did not feel comfortable running discussions without IRDP facilitation

⁵ Unknown

⁶ Impossible to verify

Objectives	Intervention logic	Indicators (planned 2009 - 2011)	Indicators (achieved 2011)
Outcome 3	A synergy between the actors engaged in the peacebuilding efforts	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 2 training sessions in mediation, dialogue facilitation and conflict management for peacebuilding partners and actors every year • 2 conference meetings with other peace actors every year • 500 people visiting the Peace Centre every year • 1 yearly meeting of the Dialogue Clubs • 1 yearly meeting of the district fora members • 1 yearly meeting of the school clubs • 12 film viewing sessions • 150 people attending the IRDP film festival 	<p>4 total</p> <p>2 total</p> <p>> 500</p> <p>YES</p> <p>--⁷</p> <p>YES</p> <p>> 12</p> <p>100</p>

⁷ Due to the decentralization policy each district is now visited separately