CSOsand the IDPS- POLICY BRIEF 5.

ASSESSING PROGRESS IN IMPLEMENTATION:
THE PARIS DECLARATION AND THE FRAGILE STATES PRINCIPLES.

September 2011.

I. The Paris Declaration and the Fragile States Principles.

The Paris Declaration was signed in 2005 to address a range of problems that were decades in the making. It holds out a vision for greater aid effectiveness and ultimately for development without aid. It set out 5 guiding principles for development cooperation and 12 indicators of progress[i]. It provided a practical, action-oriented roadmap with specific targets to be met by 2010.

The 2007 Fragile States Principles derive from the recognition that fragile and conflict affected situations pose particular challenges. They supplement the Paris Declaration but also extend the framework for aid effectiveness to include conflict-sensitive aid, whole of government approaches, and policy coherence in the political, security and development spheres. They emphasise the wider agenda of peacebuilding, statebuilding and conflict prevention, as well as the cross-cutting theme of non-discrimination. They are essentially directed at the 'development partners' i.e. the assistance providers.

The relevance of the FSP continues to be affirmed on different grounds:

- *Numbers of people affected and volume of aid allocated*: Roughly 1.5 billion people live in fragile states, in environments of recurring and violent crises (WDR 2011). The number of countries suffering from conflict and fragility remains high and the dire consequences of fragility manifest themselves locally, regionally and globally, negatively affecting development results. Countries in situations of conflict and fragility continue to attract about 30% of total annual DAC official development assistance (ODA), as well as significant attention from other development partners.

- *Particular governance characteristics*: Concern about aid and effective engagement in fragile and conflict-affected situations fundamentally relates to situations where one or more of the assumptions about national government capacity, objectives, effective control and legitimacy do not hold. (…) A concern with 'aid effectiveness' as a basis for international engagement here needs to be supplemented by a more fundamental concern with the effectiveness, accountability, responsiveness and legitimacy of the institutions of the state. Traditional development frameworks, such as the Millennium Development Goals or poverty reduction strategies, fall short of providing an adequate basis for effective action to address the challenges of conflict-affected and fragile states. In these situations the international engagement must have an agenda of 'state-building' (which involves not just the capacity of the state but also its legitimacy and accountability) next to one of increasing aid effectiveness. State-building in such context is profoundly political and has to be a conflict-resolving and peacebuilding process.[ii]

This Briefing Paper summarises key findings of the recent evaluation of the implementation of the Paris Declaration[iii] (2011) and of the monitoring of implementation of the Fragile States Principles (PSP). The latter included a baseline survey in 2009 that covered six countries, and a progress monitoring survey in 2011 that was conducted in 13 countries. It also looks at the recommendations of the FSP surveys.[iv] It often takes text directly from the reports.

II. The Evaluation of the Implementation of the Paris Declaration.

The Paris Declaration is grounded in five mutually reinforcing principles:

- **Ownership:** Partner countries exercise effective leadership over their development policies and strategies, and coordinate development actions.
- **Alignment:** Donors base their overall support on partner countries' national development strategies, institutions, and procedures.
- **Harmonization:** Donors' actions are more harmonized, transparent, and collectively effective.
- **Managing for results:** Managing resources and improving decision making for development results.
- **Mutual accountability:** Donors and partners are accountable for development results.

The overall purpose of the evaluation was to assess the relevance and effectiveness of the Paris Declaration, its contribution to aid effectiveness and ultimately to development effectiveness. It inquired into three main questions:

a. What are the factors that have shaped and limited the implementation of the Declaration reforms and their effects? (*the declaration in context*)
b. What improvements have been made in aid effectiveness as targeted in the Declaration? (*contributions to aid effectiveness*)
c. What contributions have improvements in aid effectiveness made to sustainable development results. (*contributions to development results*)

Following is the summary of the main findings.

a. The Declaration in Context: The Paris Declaration was initially interpreted and applied as a technical, bureaucratic process, thereby risking losing the political and wider societal engagement needed to bring change. 'Aid' needs also to be placed within the context of a rapidly changing globalised world. But even in 'normal times', in every aid receiving and donor country, aid programmes are subject to different influences, actors, forces and events that are more powerful than the direct objectives, interests and resources of aid programmes themselves. *Assumptions about the potential role of aid remain exaggerated, particularly in donor countries.*

Most aid-receiving countries have now employed and embedded Declaration-style improvements, not just to manage aid better but because they serve the countries' national needs, e.g. the introduction of better financial management, public procurement or accountability. The momentum of change has been sufficiently resilient to hold up through political changes and crises of various kinds.

In comparison with aid-receiving countries, the Declaration's reform objectives are less demanding for donors and their capacity for implementing change is greater. Notwithstanding, progress among donors has been uneven and generally slow. Some of the key constraints for donor agencies turned out to be: a lack of coherent policies or structures; a focus on compliance and a risk-averse culture; the overcentralisation of many donor and aid agencies' systems and decisions running counter to alignment with country systems; disconnects between corporate strategies and the aid effectiveness agenda and weak organisational incentives: changes in organisational status or headquarters location:

capacity constraints and staff reductions; and delayed organisational reforms and budgetary pressures arising from the financial crisis.

Among other recommendations, the evaluation suggests that the centre of gravity need to be partnerships at the country level. It also speaks explicitly to the risk-averse culture in many donor administrations, further enhanced by the increased concern about accountability for public spending in the current financial crisis. "*But to try to avoid all risks in development cooperation is to risk irrelevance*." The evaluators argue that there are ways to promote a realistic public understanding of the uncertainties and risks of development and aid work and how to handle and learn from them. It also holds that the new approaches to development cooperation are in reality no more risky than tightly controlled traditional projects, and that there are sound ways of managing the risks in the new approaches while also enhancing development benefits.

b. Contributions to Aid Effectiveness: Overall the Paris Declaration has made significant contributions to aid effectiveness by clarifying and strengthening norms of good practice thus legitimising and reinforcing higher mutual expectations, contributing to movement toward the 11 outcomes set in 2005, improving the quality of aid partnerships based on stronger levels of transparency, trust and partner country ownership, and supporting rising aid volumes (in combination with the MDGs). But it has not so far reduced the overall burden of aid management as was hoped.

For many partner countries the most important constraints relate to the complex, long-term challenges of capacity development. Yet they could do more to identify priorities for strengthening capacities in targeted areas. Though there are striking exceptions, donors have generally shown less commitment to make the necessary changes in their own systems. Most have set high levels of partner country compliance as preconditions for their own reforms rather than moving together reciprocally and managing and sharing risks realistically. Donors are also left vulnerable to uninformed policy changes, e.g. when governments or ministers change. The evaluation suggests that multilateral agencies may have greater freedom to apply some good practices e.g. in making multi-year aid commitments, and are more insulated from short-term political pressures.

c. Contributions to Development Results: There is much evidence that the Declaration contributed to more focused, efficient and collaborative aid efforts, particularly at the sectoral levels. The strongest evidence is in the health sector, which the evaluation examined in most depth. There is evidence that aid and aid reform have made at least some contributions to the long-term strengthening of institutional capacities for development and of social capital.

Yet the evaluation also finds that there is *little progress in most countries in giving greater priority to the needs of the poorest people,* particularly women and girls. This disconnect drives home the essential precondition of a powerful and sustained national commitment to change. Without this, aid and aid reforms are limited in their capacity to address entrenched inequalities.

Finally, the evaluation shows that no single aid modality (e.g. budget or sector support, programmes or projects) will automatically produce better development results. A mix of aid modalities has continued to make sense for all partner countries and donors.

d. Overall Conclusion. Overall the evaluation finds that, compared with the aid situation 20 to 25 years ago current practice presents a global picture of far greater transparency and far less donor-driven aid today. Of the five Paris principles, it finds that 'country ownership' has advanced farthest, with 'alignment' and 'harmonisation' progressing more unevenly, and 'managing for development results' and 'mutual accountability' advancing least.

Note however should also be taken that there are substantial forms and flows of cooperation, perhaps equivalent to one quarter of OECD/DAC donors, that are beyond the current scope of the Declaration and on which reliable data are missing.[v]

III. The Fragile States Principles Monitoring Surveys of 2009 and 2011.

a. An evolving international environment: The authors of the 2011 Survey report argue that the international environment in which the FSP are expected to operate is changing. Four 'game-changing' realities have emerged clearly in recent years:

- *The acknowledgement by policy makers that fragile states require different approaches than more developed countries*. There is also greater focus on international factors that may drive and prolong fragile situations and that require whole-of-government and whole-of-system approaches.

- *The foundation of new partnerships between fragile and conflict-affected countries and their development partners,* mainly in the form of the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding. Fragile states themselves increasingly demand a paradigm shift in the way assistance is delivered and the agenda for international engagement is defined.

- *The current global economic and financial crisis, which is putting pressure on development co-operation budgets and their use.* This is manifested in two ways: first, there is a risk that aid policies will increasingly have to support national policy priorities such as international security, migration and the promotion of trade. Second, there is an increasing demand for aid to deliver immediate benefits and value for money, for reasons of accountability to taxpayers and to win political support for aid in national budget allocations.

- *The increasing presence, relevance of and funding from other actors, which is making strong international partnerships ever more essential*. Middle-income countries are becoming active global players, challenging DAC development partners in two main ways. First, their engagements may not have the same objectives or be based on the same principles for development assistance as those established by the DAC. Second, even where their objectives and principles are similar or complementary, their effective implementation still requires new partnerships for development to be formed, to reduce fragmentation and increase development impact.

THE 10 FRAGILE STATES PRINCIPLES

1. Take context as the starting point
2. Ensure all activities do no harm
3. Focus on statebuilding as the central objective
4. Prioritise prevention
5. Recognise the links between political, security and development objectives
6. Promote non discrimination as a basis for inclusive and stable societies
7. Align with local priorities in different ways and in different contexts
8. Agree on practical co-ordination mechanisms between international actors
9. Act fast… but stay engaged long enough to give success a chance
10. Avoid pockets of exclusion ("aid orphans")

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b. The key finding : The key finding of the 2011 Survey is that most aid actors are neither set up to meet the specific challenges posed by fragile situations, nor systematically able to translate commitments made by their headquarters into country-level changes. While efforts have been made to deliver on agreed commitments, these efforts appear not to have taken full account of the implications of the Fragile States Principles on the ground.

c. Progress for the individual FSP: The 2011 Survey finds that progress regarding some of the principles is "broadly or partly on-track", while progress on others is "party off-track", and on yet others "off-track".

⁕   **Broadly or partly on-track**

Two out of the ten principles are being applied in a manner that can be thus considered: <u>non-discrimination</u> (FSP 6) and <u>alignment of development partner interventions </u>(FSP 7). Even here, there are improvements that could be made. For example, under FSP 6, development partners should strengthen the implementation of their commitments to gender equality and women's participation, and should adopt more programme-based approaches. Under FSP 7, the participating countries express concern about the alignment of the contributions of both DAC and non-DAC development partners with their national plans.

⁕   **Partly off-track**

Four of the FSPs fall into this category: FSP 1 (take context as the starting point), FSP 3 (focus on statebuilding as the central objective), FSP 4 (prioritise prevention) and FSP 5 (recognise the links between security, political and development objectives).

▶   <u>Take context as a starting point</u>**:** Progress in implementing FSP 1 appears to have been limited. Development partners recognise the central importance of 'context' and that an understanding of local political economy realities is critical. Yet they neither conduct regular and systemic analyses, nor systematically share the ones they have undertaken, nor do they necessarily use the analysis as a basis for programming. Instead, international actors still tend to apply "pre-packaged" programming rather than tailoring assistance to local realities.

▶   <u>Focus on statebuilding as the central objective</u>**:** While development partners are increasingly committed to statebuilding, their approaches do not sufficiently reflect the need to support government institutions fostering state-society relations. They have not moved beyond "technical" institution building and capacity development to support broader political dialogue and processes. Statebuilding efforts tend to focus on the executive at central level, with less support for the legislature, judiciary and decentralised administrations. Support is often concentrated on formal institutions and "traditional" areas of intervention such as election support, public-sector management and service delivery, while support to civil society organisations in order to foster free and fair political processes, domestic revenue mobilisation or job creation lags behind. In particular, the survey highlighted that engaging with non-state actors and legitimate local organisations to strengthen state-society relations remains a challenge for development partners.A key problem in fragile states is the lack of a strong common vision, shared by society and government, of the role of the state and the priorities for statebuilding.

▶   <u>Prioritise prevention:</u> Joint and systematic efforts to prevent conflict remain weak in comparison with the challenges faced by most fragile states. Effective prevention combines support for early warning systems with swift and flexible early response mechanisms. This is

seldom the case for development partner-supported systems or activities. Moreover, sharing risk analysis appears to be the exception rather than the norm, which prevents effective joint action and focused dialogue with national counterparts.

▶ <u>Recognise the links between security, political and development objectives:</u> While the links tend to be well recognised they are unevenly reflected in country strategies. Whole-of-government approaches designed in development partner headquarters are often poorly understood at country level or deemed impossible to implement due to the perception of conflict principles. Development partners have also not analysed the trade-offs between political, security and development objectives in all countries, and mechanisms for managing trade-offs are limited.

✹ **Off Track.**

Four of the FSPs fall into this category: FSP 2 (do no harm), FSP 8 (agree on practical co-ordination mechanisms between international actors), FSP 9 (act fast but stay engaged long enough to give success a chance) and FSP 10 (avoid pockets of exclusion).

▪ <u>Do no harm:</u> Development partners do not systematically ensure that their interventions are context- and conflict-sensitive, nor do they monitor the unintended consequences of their support to statebuilding. There is limited evidence of mitigation strategies to address e.g. the issues of brain drain (hiring of local staff by development partner agencies), salary differentials for staff employed by government and international actors, and the continued reliance on parallel structures such as project implementation units. Development partners also need to be more alert to the potential negative effects on statebuilding of over-reliance on international non-governmental organisations for basic service delivery, particularly when they act outside of existing national frameworks and are not accountable to the government and end users. Inadequate management of aid flows also continues to be potentially harmful. Poor or deteriorating governance – ranging from corruption to lack of transparency and accountability – is considered to have increased aid volatility. Finally, non-DAC development partners who have bypassed established environmental, human rights or anti-bribery norms such as the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention (OECD, 2011b) have caused harmful side effects.

▪ <u>Agree on practical co-ordination mechanisms between international actors:</u> In spite of the weaknesses in co-ordination between development partners and government, development partners have made limited efforts to agree on practical co-ordination mechanisms among themselves. Development partner co-ordination remains informal in most countries and is almost entirely absent in some. Recipient countries have had to shoulder the burden of co-ordinating a growing number of international actors (DAC and non-DAC members, global funds, foundations, charities and NGOs).

▪ <u>Act fast, stay engaged long enough to give success a chance:</u> Development partners almost uniformly express their commitment to long-term engagement in fragile states, yet aid remains unpredictable and interventions often prioritise short-term objectives, often due to development partners' risk aversion and the fact that humanitarian instruments continue to be used long after the humanitarian crisis is over. Fragility is a long-term problem, and it calls for long-term engagement. Short-term "solutions", supported by development partners, can undermine national ownership, planning and resource management to address longer-term development challenges.

▪ <u>Avoid pockets of exclusion</u>**:** the uneven geographic distribution of aid, between and within countries, is emerging as a significant concern.

d. Overall conclusion: The Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations seem to have stimulated relatively limited change in international engagement at the country level. According to the 2011 Survey, development partner practice has not improved significantly to achieve better results. The main message of this report is that a significant gap still exists between policy and practice. Development partners need to make a more focused effort to "walk the talk"; ensuring that the adoption of policies at headquarters translates into behavioural change on the ground. This requires greater political efforts to adapt and reform their field policies and practices, reinforced with incentives for change, to ensure they can respond faster and with greater flexibility.

The findings of this survey challenge development partners to complement their focus on results, effectiveness and value for money with a focus on the field-level organisational and paradigm changes necessary for achieving better results. In addition, partner countries have underlined the need for stronger mutual accountability frameworks to guide and monitor joint efforts between them and their international counterparts. Such frameworks should be mutually agreed and results-oriented, reflecting the specific and changing needs and priorities of countries in situations of conflict and fragility.

IV. The Recommendations of the 2009 and 2011 FSP Surveys.

Following is an analytical integration of the recommendations in both survey reports.

FSP1: Take Context as a Starting Point.

Invest in *joint* analysis across donors and across policy communities to identify a shared vision of the path from fragility to resilience and agree common strategic objectives. This is essential if the efforts of the wide range of actors involved – each with different mandates, approaches and resources – are to converge and achieve lasting impact. Whenever possible, this joint analysis should also be shared with government and non-governmental stakeholders in a "*twin pact" between the state and its citizens; between international actors and government counterparts.* Achieving greater consensus on the analysis of context and shared strategic objectives will almost always be difficult, and require consultation and negotiation between all stakeholders. This is an endeavour which requires strong leadership from either national or international actors.

Contexts in fragile settings often change fast and unpredictably, so there is a need for recurrent analysis and adaptation of response. Early warning is not enough and must be backed up by rapid response capacity, with authority to adapt modalities of engagement and reorient spending devolved to the field. Increasingly over time, the analysis and rapid response capacity needs to include local knowledge and strengthen national expertise and capacity for timely analysis. This includes supporting national statistical capacity development.

Understanding of sub-national contexts also needs to improve.

Institutional memory needs to be preserved despite staff changes.

FSP2: Do No Harm.

Analyse global drivers of conflict and fragility.

Incorporate systematic risk impact analysis into the design of interventions to ensure programmes do not fuel conflict, widen social disparities and/or negatively affect statebuilding. Monitor impacts by social group or region. Incorporate lessons learned back into interventions, and encourage staff to invest more time in identifying those practices that contributed to successes and failures.

Respond to governance concerns with greater emphasis on dialogue and adapting aid instruments and modalities, rather than reducing aid.

Accompany the use of parallel structures and salary top-ups with institution-building strategies, plans for transferring aid implementation to regular government institutions and agreed specific timelines for harmonising pay practices. Pay greater attention to the possibility of procuring goods and services locally from national organisations, weighing the potential concerns about fiduciary risk and effectiveness against the positive impact on the local economy and development of local capacity

Provide guidance for private sector engagement in fragile settings *e.g.* due diligence in the natural resource sector.

FSP3: Focus on Statebuilding as the Central Objective.

Orient international objectives to the overall objective of strengthening state-society relations and helping foster a common vision of the role of the state by supporting civil society and local processes or public debate.

Recognise that statebuilding is a fundamentally political process which builds on a domestic political settlement as a necessary basis for a durable state. While the support external actors can provide in the negotiation of a political settlement can be limited, donors can contribute to securing and promoting space for state-society dialogue.

Rather than focus only on support to the executive at central level, adopt a systemic approach to statebuilding, promoting (i) checks and balances between the three arms of government; (ii) constructive state-society relations; and (iii) participation and accountability at the local level. Programmes will need to involve a range of national stakeholders (parliamentarians, audit institutions, judiciary, civil society, political parties) which can contribute to building more resilient states. Political devolution and administrative deconcentration can be an important part of statebuilding and peacebuilding, not just as a means of improving service delivery, but also as a means of involving citizens more closely with the functioning of the state. However, these processes should be supported carefully as they can have unintended effects, especially where central government is weak and politics fractured.

Put into effect the lessons of the past in how best to support processes of political competition that foster national cohesion rather than deepen divisions, especially in divided societies where identity politics play a large role.

Support job creation, and domestic revenue mobilisation as one of the main state-citizen accountability linkages. These are a vital element to improve the state's ability to fulfill its functions and derive legitimacy from it, and a way to lessen dependency to often volatile aid. Past efforts to do so have paid off but remain limited in both scope and scale.

Partner countries have made a strong call for country-appropriate governance: appropriate to the political and administrative culture; and appropriate to the current capacity. International actors should aim for systems, structures and approaches that represent the basic set of conditions for a legitimate and functioning state. They should identify the strengths of a society, working with them and strengthening them, rather than trying to import foreign systems. Overall, international actors could be much more sensitive to the endogenous political and social processes in the countries where they work, and how their interventions may affect these.

Move away from the current piecemeal approach to capacity development, paying more attention to system strengthening than to capabilities of particular components, or of individuals. Jointly with national stakeholders, donors should invest in shared assessments of and response to needs, cutting across individual donor agendas and administrative cultures. The joined-up assessments should consider political economy realities, the right balance of basic, technical and leadership skills, and what are context-appropriate approaches. They should also be realistic and not under-underestimate

the time and scope of the support needed, which can be sequenced in stages and should include phase-out strategies.

FSP4: Prioritise Prevention.

Most consultations warned that the root causes of fragility were in many cases still intact. Reconciliation needs to be taken more seriously. Support programmes that build bridges across groups in divided societies, including between elites and ordinary citizens, between region-, clan-based or ethnically defined groups. An enduring culture of impunity, in some countries, was highlighted as being extremely damaging.

Crisis prevention requires a global approach which includes creating economic opportunities, with a particular focus needed on youth. Once security is restored, economic opportunities are among the top priorities of most national stakeholders, yet efforts in this area are extremely limited and fragile states rank lowest in ease of doing business. Investment in private sector development is an essential relay for the short-term labour intensive projects of the immediate post-crisis period. Analysis and programming for youth – often a fast-growing share of the population – could translate into pools of jobs such as the mobile communications industry and cross-border trade, benefitting youth in both in urban and rural areas. Countries endowed with natural resources should be further supported to turn this "curse" into a "blessing".

Co-ordinate and rationalise efforts to support early warning systems within an overall country framework for conflict prevention. Strengthen the link between early warning and early response, and conduct regular evaluations of the effectiveness of support for prevention initiatives.

FSP5: Recognise the Link between Political, Security and Development Objectives.

Explicitly adopt and formalise whole-of-government approaches and 'one UN' strategies for all fragile states, accompanied by clear processes to identify and manage trade-offs between political, security and development priorities. Pooled funding across ministries/agencies are effective ways to promote policy coherence, programmatic coherence and improved impact.

Support partner government institutions to strengthen the implementation of political, security and development objectives at national level through national planning frameworks.

FSP6: Promote Non-Discrimination as a Basis for Inclusive and Stable Societies.

The good results obtained with advocacy for non-discrimination has to be backed up by programming to translate heightened awareness into development results. For example, the role of women as "wagers of peace" has well been promoted by advocacy efforts but this has yet to translate into programming.

Ensure equitable rather than selective support to groups and supporting issues that are central to building inclusive and stable societies, particularly human rights, youth unemployment and people living with disabilities. Move beyond a project-based approach to holistic programming that improves inclusion of vulnerable groups. Make greater efforts to support the availability of data.

Pay greater attention to supporting and influencing government approaches to non-discrimination at a policy level.

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FSP7: Align with Local Priorities in Different Ways in Different Contexts.

While donor country strategies are increasingly aligned to integrated national strategies, alignment must be deepened in operational terms *e.g.* sector-wide approaches and use of country systems. In most contexts, donors should be more robust in applying Paris Declaration and Accra Agenda for Action commitments, including by using proactive, phased strategies that should include a capacity development component and integrate parallel project implementation units into national systems over time, and may initially involve ring fencing; shadow alignment and use of multi-donor trust funds for progressive alignment.

Strengthen national capacity to plan and implement development strategies, particularly at sectoral and sub-national levels and strengthen national public financial management capacity to enable greater use of country systems and the provision of a greater proportion of budget aid.

FSP8: Agree on Practical Co-ordination Mechanisms.

When there is weak national leadership and capacity, it is all the more reason for international actors to consolidate their approach among them. Provide capacity support to strengthen government-led co-ordination mechanisms and commit to engaging with them.

Division of labour arrangements among donors are notable by their absence, but should be much more widely put in place to help minimise gaps and overlaps, and reduce transaction costs, alongside simplifying sometimes cumbersome donor requirements, relieving a critical strain on already limited capacity. Facilitate agreements on division of labour through dialogue with the government, where possible, and increase development partner harmonisation to reduce government transaction costs.

FSP9: Act Fast…but Stay Engaged.

Consultations have highlighted the need for a long-term focus on statebuilding and peacebuilding and warned against reverting to "business as usual" too soon after the immediate crisis has passed. Fragile states present specific and deeply ingrained problems that are not amenable to a quick fix, and, if unaddressed, create risks of future instability. The risks of international support tailing off too soon, including in the security sector, need to be taken more into account.

Aid continues to be more volatile in fragile states than in more stable environments. Improve the short-term predictability of aid disbursements and provide credible indications of likely longer-term financing, backed by firm commitments where possible. While it is understood that donors must themselves adapt to conditions beyond their control, there are cases in which they should consider signing 10-year partnership agreements with benchmarks for disbursement, and proactive dialogue when benchmarks are not being met.

Develop clear plans for the transition from humanitarian to development financing on a country-by-country basis.

FSP10: Avoid Pockets of Exclusion.

Consider *global* aid allocations in resource allocation decisions. In this respect, increased transparency in reporting forward spending commitments as well as stability in commitments are important steps being taken. Some countries risk being under-aided in relation to their needs. In the current food, fuel and financial crisis, new vulnerabilities emerge, for example in respect of food insecurity. In particular, some fragile states are dropping off donor priority lists and are becoming increasingly dependent on a handful of donors. At the other extreme in some fragile states the need is to reduce excessive fragmentation (too little aid from too many donors).

Most national consultations have prominently raised exclusion of particular groups as a major threat to peace consolidation. Recommendations include: (i) the need to move gradually away from a capital city-centric approach, even if it requires investment in local capacity and higher overhead costs; (ii) the need for much better monitoring of flows to provinces and for disaggregated data on development impact than currently available; (iii) in divided societies, it is vital to ensure that all voices are heard, particular those of marginalised groups. In this sense process matters as much the focus on results. In this context, increase development partner-government dialogue on how to reach out to under-served areas, including by developing or strengthening decentralisation processes.

Increase development partner commitment to support aid information management systems and provide a breakdown of their aid on a geographic basis.

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[i] The progress indicators: http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/57/60/36080258.pdf

[ii] OPM/IDL (2008) Evaluation of the Implementation of the Paris Declaration: Thematic Study - The applicability of the Paris Declaration in fragile and conflict-affected situations. Available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/15/1/41149294.pdf

[iii] The Evaluation of the Implementation of the Paris Declaration in English, French and Spanish, as well as executive summaries in the three languages, individual country and donor agency studies, can be found at: http://www.oecd.org/document/60/0,3343,en_21571361_34047972_38242748_1_1_1_1,00.html.

[iv] Both survey reports are available at http://www.oecd.org/document/12/0,3343,en_2649_33693550_42113676_1_1_1_1,00.html

[v] See Prada et alii 2011: Development Resources beyond the Current Reach of the Paris Declaration, Copenhagen, Danish Institute for International Studies. Available in English, French and Spanish from the same webpage where the evaluation can be found.