Bridging the Gap in the Inter-communal Negotiations
An island-wide study of public opinion in Cyprus

SECTIONS

- **SECTION A:**   Sense of Identity

- **SECTION B:**   Towards a Conclusion of the Talks

- **SECTION C:**   The Internal Aspects of the Talks

- **SECTION D:**   The International Aspects of the Talks

- **SECTION E:**   Confidence Building Measures

- **SECTION F:**   Opportunities for Convergence

SURVEY PROFILE

- **Sample Size:** 1000 Greek Cypriots and 1000 Turkish Cypriots
- **Sampling Process:** Multi-stage Random Stratified Sampling
- **Method of Data Collection:** Face to Face Interviews with a Structured Questionnaire at Homes of Respondents and in their Native Language
- **Period of Data Collection:** 17 March – 14 April 2011
- **Project Team:** Spyros Christou, Ahmet Sözen, Erol Kaymak Alexandros Lordos
- **Questionnaire Design:** Through a participatory process which included key stakeholders from both communities
- **Field Work:** Symmetron Market Research for Greek Cypriots and Prologue Consulting for Turkish Cypriots

SECTION A

SENSE OF IDENTITY

To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements regarding national and cultural identity?

Greek Cypriots

Turkish Cypriots

I consider myself to have Greek cultural roots
- 4
- 5
- 92%

I consider Greece to be my mother country
- 33%
- 14%
- 54%

I consider myself to have Turkish cultural roots
- 6
- 6
- 88%

I consider Turkey to be my mother country
- 9%
- 9%
- 83%

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

☐ **Strongly Disagree / Somewhat Disagree**   ☐ **Neither Agree nor Disagree**   ☐ **Somewhat Agree / Strongly Agree**

Cultural Origins and Dispositions to Motherlands

The vast majority of Greek Cypriots consider that they have Greek cultural roots. However, a significant number of Greek Cypriots do not consider Greece to be their 'motherland'.

Among Turkish Cypriots large majorities consider they have Turkish cultural roots and that Turkey is their motherland.

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"To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements regarding national and cultural identity ?" over time

I consider myself to have Greek (Turkish) cultural roots: Somewhat Agree / Strongly Agree

- Greek Cypriots: May 2008: 85%, October 2009: 88%, May 2011: 92%
- Turkish Cypriots: May 2008: 80%, October 2009: 77%, May 2011: 88%

─■─ Greek Cypriots   ─▲─ Turkish Cypriots

I consider Greece (Turkey) to be my mother country: Somewhat Agree / Strongly Agree

- Turkish Cypriots: May 2008: 78%, October 2009: 74%, May 2011: 83%
- Greek Cypriots: May 2008: 52%, October 2009: 53%, May 2011: 54%

─■─ Greek Cypriots   ─▲─ Turkish Cypriots

Cultural Origins and Dispositions to Motherlands Over Time

Tracking responses over time, we note an upswing in self-identification in terms of ethnic cultural roots among both Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. On the other hand, Greek Cypriots are less likely to display a trend towards considering Greece their motherland than Turkish Cypriots are to consider Turkey theirs.

Self-identification as:

	Only a Greek (Turk) and not at all a Cypriot	Mostly a Greek (Turk) but also somewhat a Cypriot	A Greek (Turk) and a Cypriot to the same degree	Mostly a Cypriot but also somewhat a Greek (Turk)	Only a Cypriot and not at all a Greek (Turk)
Turkish Cypriot	9%	14%	53%	20%	5%
Greek Cypriot	2%	3%	45%	31%	20%

■ Turkish Cypriot   ■ Greek Cypriot

Cypriotness

For both Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, the modal response is to self-identify as Greek Cypriot or Turkish Cypriot, as opposed to more exclusive ethnic or national identities. Significantly, few Greek Cypriots consider themselves Greek only. A significant number of Greek Cypriots claim to be Cypriot only. By contrast, Turkish Cypriot responses clustered around Turkish Cypriot identity. Relatively few considered themselves Cypriot only.

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Self-identification over time

Greek Cypriots

- 55% (May 2008, A Greek and a Cypriot to the same degree)
- 48% (October 2009, Only / Mostly a Cypriot)
- 50% (May 2011, Only / Mostly a Cypriot)
- 42% (May 2008, Only / Mostly a Cypriot)
- 45% (October 2009, A Greek and a Cypriot to the same degree)
- 45% (May 2011, A Greek and a Cypriot to the same degree)
- 4% (May 2008, Only / Mostly a Greek)
- 7% (October 2009, Only / Mostly a Greek)
- 5% (May 2011, Only / Mostly a Greek)

May 2008 · October 2009 · May 2011

- ■ Only / Mostly a Greek
- ▲ A Greek and a Cypriot to the same degree
- ▲ Only / Mostly a Cypriot

Turkish Cypriots

- 56% (May 2008, A Turk and a Cypriot to the same degree)
- 62% (October 2009, A Turk and a Cypriot to the same degree)
- 53% (May 2011, A Turk and a Cypriot to the same degree)
- 24% (May 2008, Only / Mostly a Turk)
- 20% (October 2009, Only / Mostly a Turk)
- 25% (May 2011, Only / Mostly a Cypriot)
- 20% (May 2008, Only / Mostly a Cypriot)
- 18% (October 2009, Only / Mostly a Cypriot)
- 22% (May 2011, Only / Mostly a Turk)

May 2008 · October 2009 · May 2011

- ■ Only / Mostly a Turk
- ▲ A Turk and a Cypriot to the same degree
- ▲ Only / Mostly a Cypriot

Identity over Time

The tendency among Greek Cypriots is to increasingly self-identify as mostly a Cypriot. Among Turkish Cypriots there is also a similar trend. Overall however, compared with Greek Cypriot responses, relatively few Turkish Cypriots self-identify as mostly Cypriot .

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International Peacebuilding Alliance
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SECTION B

TOWARDS A CONCLUSION OF THE TALKS

To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements regarding prospects for a solution of the Cyprus Problem? (Greek Cypriots)

Statement	Strongly Disagree / Somewhat Disagree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Somewhat Agree / Strongly Agree
We should assert our rights as the Greek Cypriot community, even if it means that members of the other community will be negatively affected	19%	10%	71%
I try to look at the Cyprus problem, both from the point of view of Greek Cypriots and from the point of view of Turkish Cypriots	21%	11%	68%
Our community's leadership is sincere in working towards a mutually acceptable solution	20%	15%	65%
We should work for a realistic solution that can be achieved quickly, because delaying will only make the situation worse	25%	13%	62%
We should insist for an optimal settlement, even if it takes many years to achieve	31%	11%	57%
The Turkish Cypriot leadership is sincere in working towards a mutually acceptable solution	86%	8%	6%

Legend:
- Strongly Disagree / Somewhat Disagree
- Neither Agree nor Disagree
- Somewhat Agree / Strongly Agree

Asserting Rights: Greek Cypriot views on negotiation strategies

Greek Cypriots believe their leaders should assert Greek Cypriot rights. Significantly, Greek Cypriots do not believe that the Turkish Cypriot leadership is working for a mutually acceptable settlement. On the other hand, a majority of Greek Cypriots also stress the need for a 'realistic' settlement in the near future.

To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements regarding prospects for a solution of the Cyprus Problem? (Turkish Cypriots)

Statement	Strongly Disagree / Somewhat Disagree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Somewhat Agree / Strongly Agree
We should insist for an optimal settlement, even if it takes many years to achieve	11%	11%	78%
We should assert our rights as the Turkish Cypriot community, even if it means that members of the other community will be negatively affected	14%	9%	77%
We should work for a realistic solution that can be achieved quickly, because delaying will only make the situation worse	22%	16%	62%
I try to look at the Cyprus problem, both from the point of view of Turkish Cypriots and from the point of view of Greek Cypriots	27%	11%	62%
Our community's leadership is sincere in working towards a mutually acceptable solution	34%	26%	41%
The Greek Cypriot leadership is sincere in working towards a mutually acceptable solution	78%	13%	9%

Optimal settlement: Turkish Cypriot views on negotiation strategies

The vast majority of Turkish Cypriots think that negotiations should be pursued with a view to achieving an optimal settlement and to assert Turkish Cypriot rights. Against this, a majority also think that a realistic settlement should be reached in the nearer term. However, mirroring the view of Greek Cypriots, Turkish Cypriots do not believe the other community's leadership is sincere in working toward a compromise settlement.

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Alianza Internacional para la Consolidación de la Paz

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Assertiveness, Empathy and Sense of Urgency: A factor analytic approach

Assertiveness

Turkish Cypriots	14%	24%	37%	25%
Greek Cypriots	20%	26%	43%	11%

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

- 🟧 Very low assertiveness
- 🟨 Low assertiveness
- 🟩 Moderate assertiveness
- 🟫 High assertiveness

Empathy

Turkish Cypriots	22%	20%	39%	18%
Greek Cypriots	19%	22%	49%	11%

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

- 🟧 Very low empathy
- 🟨 Low empathy
- 🟩 Moderate empathy
- 🟫 High empathy

Sense of Urgency

Turkish Cypriots	25%	61%	14%
Greek Cypriots	27%	34%	39%

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

- 🟧 Prefer to wait for optimal solution
- ⬜ Ambivalent
- 🟩 Prefer feasible solution now

Assertiveness, Empathy and Sense of Urgency: Three independent dimensions

A factor analysis of responses to statements regarding negotiation strategies reveals three dimensions of political thinking that are largely independent of each other. Assertiveness – the extent to which respondents support the political causes of their own side – is high in both communities, but especially so among Turkish Cypriots. Empathy – the extent to which respondents reach out to encompass the concerns of the other community – is also high in both communities, despite the apparent contradiction with assertiveness. As for sense of urgency, Greek Cypriots tend to prefer a feasible solution now while Turkish Cypriots tend to be ambivalent over the proper timing of a settlement.

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Assertiveness, Empathy and Sense of Urgency: A cluster analysis

| Cluster	1	3	2	8	4	6	7	5
Label	High Assertiveness, High Empathy	High Urgency	High Assertiveness	Low Urgency	High Empathy, Low Assertiveness	Low Empathy	Low Empathy, Low Urgency	High Urgency, Low Assertiveness
Description	Group members tend to be Turkish Cypriot, low education. Trending towards Yes vote in a future referendum.	Group members tend to be Greek Cypriots. Trending towards Yes vote in a future referendum.	Group members tend to be Turkish Cypriots, low in education. Trending towards No vote in a future referendum.	Group members tend to be younger, high in education. Trending towards No vote in future referendum.	Group members tend to be Turkish Cypriots, younger, high in education. Trending towards Yes vote in a future referendum.	Group members tend to be Turkish Cypriots, younger, high in education. Trending towards No vote in future referendum.	Group members tend to be Greek Cypriots, educated. Trending towards No vote in future referendum.	Group Cypriots tend to be Greek Cypriots, older, male, wealthier. Trending towards Yes vote in future referendum.
Size	22.2% (434)	15.7% (306)	13.6% (266)	12.6% (245)	11.1% (217)	11.0% (214)	8.1% (159)	5.6% (110)
Inputs	Assertiveness / Empathy / Urgency	Assertiveness / Empathy / Urgency	Assertiveness / Empathy / Urgency	Assertiveness / Empathy / Urgency	Assertiveness / Empathy / Urgency	Assertiveness / Empathy / Urgency	Assertiveness / Empathy / Urgency	Assertiveness / Empathy / Urgency

Assertiveness, Empathy and Sense of Urgency: A mosaic of political values

A cluster analysis of responses to the three dimensions of assertiveness, empathy and sense of urgency reveals a complex mosaic of political values. Some groups conform to existing stereotypes, while others are surprising. Groups that are characterized by a low sense of urgency or low empathy trend towards No in a future referendum. High assertiveness is not necessarily problematic for a future referendum, so long as it is accompanied by equivalently high levels of empathy.

Vote in a potential future referendum:

Response	Turkish Cypriot	Greek Cypriot
I would certainly, or almost certainly vote 'No'	14%	31%
I currently lean towards a 'No' vote, though I might at that time sway towards a 'Yes' vote	9%	11%
I am currently just as likely to vote 'Yes' as to vote 'No'	43%	35%
I currently lean towards a 'Yes' vote, though I might at that time sway towards a 'No' vote	10%	10%
I would certainly or almost certainly vote 'Yes'	24%	13%

■ Turkish Cypriot   ■ Greek Cypriot

Outcome of a referendum remains in the balance

The most frequent response to intended vote in a hypothetical future referendum is "as likely to vote yes as to vote no". This is true of both Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots. Overall, the number of committed "no" voters among Greek Cypriots is relatively high at 31%. By contrast, the percentage of committed "yes" voters is relatively high among Turkish Cypriots at 24%.

Vote in a potential future referendum over time

Greek Cypriots

	January 2009	October 2009	May 2011
Trending towards a 'No' vote	34%	35%	42%
Just as likely to vote 'Yes' as to vote 'No'	44%	39%	35%
Trending towards a 'Yes' vote	22%	26%	23%

- 🟧 **Trending towards a 'No' vote**
- 🔺 **Just as likely to vote 'Yes' as to vote 'No'**
- 🔺 **Trending towards a 'Yes' vote**

Turkish Cypriots

	January 2009	October 2009	May 2011
Trending towards a 'No' vote	38%	47%	24%
Just as likely to vote 'Yes' as to vote 'No'	21%	27%	43%
Trending towards a 'Yes' vote	41%	26%	34%

- 🟧 **Trending towards a 'No' vote**
- 🔺 **Just as likely to vote 'Yes' as to vote 'No'**
- 🔺 **Trending towards a 'Yes' vote**

Greek Cypriots trending towards "no"; Turkish Cypriots trending away from "no"

Responses over time demonstrate that Greek Cypriots are increasingly trending towards voting '"no" in a future referendum, whereas Turkish Cypriots are trending away from "no". These results require further analysis as to underlying causes.

How acceptable or unacceptable do you consider each of the following possible ways to link different dossiers between them? (Greek Cypriots)

| Proposal	Entirely unacceptable	Tolerable if necessary	Satisfactory / Highly Desirable / Absolutely Essential
More territory and villages to become part of the Greek Cypriot state, and more settlers from Turkey to depart from Cyprus, in return for fewer properties to be returned to individual Greek Cypriots in the Turkish Cypriot state	49%	22%	28%
More territory and villages to become part of the Greek Cypriot state in return for fewer properties to be returned to individual Greek Cypriots in the Turkish Cypriot state	53%	18%	29%
Increasing the freedom of Greek Cypriots to live anywhere they wish on the island, in return for greater autonomy and increased competences for the authorities of the Turkish Cypriot state	54%	23%	24%
Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots to be deciding together, through cross voting, on who the members of the presidential team will be, in return for a system whereby the presidency will rotate between a Greek Cypriot and a Turkish Cypriot	56%	19%	24%
Greek Cypriots to freely settle anywhere they wish in Cyprus, including the northern constituent state, and in return Turkish citizens to live and work anywhere in Cyprus without limitations, including the southern constituent state	57%	14%	29%
Reducing the role of Turkey as a guarantor in return for greater autonomy and increased competences for the Turkish Cypriot state	61%	16%	23%

Greek Cypriots relatively skeptical towards "give-and-take" type proposals

Complex packages designed to link dossiers are not very popular among Greek Cypriot respondents, with about half of Greek Cypriots being ready to countenance such proposals and the other half being opposed to their logic altogether. The results imply that complex trade-offs will require robust public campaigns if a referendum is to be won.

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Cyprus 2015
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How acceptable or unacceptable do you consider each of the following possible ways to link different dossiers between them? (Turkish Cypriots)

Statement	Entirely unacceptable	Tolerable if necessary	Satisfactory / Highly Desirable / Absolutely Essential
Turkish citizens to live and work anywhere in Cyprus without limitations, including the southern constituent state, and in return Greek Cypriots to freely settle anywhere they wish in Cyprus, including the northern constituent state	37%	21%	41%
A system whereby the Presidency will rotate between a Turkish Cypriot and a Greek Cypriot, in return for Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots deciding together, through cross voting, on who the members of the presidential team will be	40%	14%	46%
Greater autonomy and increased competences for the authorities of the Turkish Cypriot state in return for increasing the freedom of Greek Cypriots to live anywhere they wish on the island	48%	23%	30%
Greater autonomy and increased competences for the Turkish Cypriot state in return for reducing the role of Turkey as a guarantor	64%	15%	21%
Fewer properties to be returned to individual Greek Cypriots in the Turkish Cypriot state in return for more territory and villages to become part of the Greek Cypriot state and more settlers from Turkey to depart from Cyprus	76%	11%	13%
Fewer properties in the Turkish Cypriot state to be returned to individual Greek Cypriots in return for more territory and villages to become part of the Greek Cypriot state	80%	8%	13%

Turkish Cypriots open to some tradeoffs

Interestingly Turkish Cypriot respondents were relatively open to tradeoffs related to the exercise of individual rights and freedoms. Crucially a majority is open to an executive model that includes cross-voting and rotational presidency.

However, few Turkish Cypriots are open to linking Turkish guarantees to other values. There is also resistance to territorial concessions.

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SECTION C

THE INTERNAL ASPECTS OF THE TALKS

In respect to the territory issue, and in the context of a Comprehensive Settlement where all other pending issues will be resolved, how would you evaluate each of the following options? (Greek Cypriots)

| Option	Entirely unacceptable	Tolerable if necessary	Satisfactory / Highly Desirable / Absolutely Essential
Some federal areas would be designated: These will not belong to the Greek Cypriot or Turkish Cypriot constituent state, but to the whole of Cyprus and in these areas there would be no primary residence restrictions	27%	21%	51%
Varosha, Morphou and the buffer zone would be returned to the Greek Cypriots, while Karpasia would become a federal area for the use of both communities	42%	23%	35%
Some cantons would be designated: These would be specific small regions in the north which would be a part of the Greek Cypriot state, and specific small regions in the south which would be a part of the Turkish Cypriot state	48%	25%	28%
Varosha and the buffer zone would be returned to the Greek Cypriots, while Morphou and Karpasia would become federal areas for the use of both communities	53%	25%	22%
Varosha, Morphou and the buffer zone would be returned to the Greek Cypriots: In other respects, the current borders will continue to apply	59%	17%	24%
Varosha and the buffer zone would be returned to the Greek Cypriots: In other respects, the current borders will continue to apply	71%	14%	16%
No territorial adjustments would be made: After a settlement, only the current buffer zone would be repopulated while in other respects the current borders will continue to apply	78%	11%	12%

Territoriality and the Idea of Federal Areas: Greek Cypriots

Greek Cypriots are open the idea of federal areas, but less supportive of any particular map or compromise model. Thus, as with other packages the political leadership would have to run public campaigns in the event of a referendum.

In respect to the territory issue, and in the context of a Comprehensive Settlement where all other pending issues will be resolved, how would you evaluate each of the following options? (Turkish Cypriots)

| Option	Entirely unacceptable	Tolerable if necessary	Satisfactory / Highly Desirable / Absolutely Essential
No territorial adjustments would be made: After a settlement, only the current buffer zone would be repopulated while in other respects the current borders will continue to apply	22%	21%	57%
Some federal areas would be designated: These will not belong to the Turkish Cypriot or Greek Cypriot constituent state, but to the whole of Cyprus and in these areas there would be no primary residence restrictions	29%	24%	47%
Some cantons would be designated: These would be specific small regions in the south which would be a part of the Turkish Cypriot state, and specific small regions in the north which would be a part of the Greek Cypriot state	43%	24%	33%
Varosha and the buffer zone would be returned to the Greek Cypriots: In other respects, the current borders will continue to apply	82%	8%	10%
Varosha and the buffer zone would be returned to the Greek Cypriots, while Morphou and Karpasia would become federal areas for the use of both communities	84%	8%	8%
Varosha, Morphou and the buffer zone would be returned to the Greek Cypriots, while Karpasia would become a federal area for the use of both communities	86%	8%	6%
Varosha, Morphou and the buffer zone would be returned to the Greek Cypriots: In other respects, the current borders will continue to apply	87%	7%	7%

Territoriality and Federal Areas: Turkish Cypriots

Similar to Greek Cypriots, a majority of Turkish Cypriots would consider the designation of federal areas. That said, Turkish Cypriots are not open to maps that entail territorial concessions, similar to Greek Cypriots. Thus, the Turkish Cypriot leadership would have to campaign in favor of compromise if a settlement is to be ratified in a referendum.

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How acceptable or unacceptable do you consider each of the following interpretations of bizonality? (Greek Cypriots)

Bi-zonality is an administrative concept, demarking the administrative borders of the respective constituent states only, and cannot be used to justify restrictions on property and residence rights of members of the other community	32%	15%	53%
Bi-zonality suggests that internal constituent state citizenship can be regulated by the constituent states	63%	15%	22%
Bi-zonality means that Turkish Cypriots are entitled to a clear majority of property and population in the northern constituent state	72%	13%	15%
Bi-zonality means two neighboring states coexisting in Cyprus	75%	10%	16%

Legend:
- ■ Entirely unacceptable
- □ Tolerable if necessary
- ■ Satisfactory / Highly Desirable / Absolutely Essential

Axis: 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

Bizonality as an Administrative Concept: Greek Cypriots

Whereas bizonality constitutes a principle of the negotiation framework, a majority of Greek Cypriots remain unreconciled with its elements. Crucially there is objection to Turkish Cypriots retaining a clear majority of property and population in the north.

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How acceptable or unacceptable do you consider each of the following interpretations of bizonality? (Greek Cypriots)

Bi-zonality suggests that internal constituent state citizenship can be regulated by the constituent states
8% | 10% | 82%

Bi-zonality means two neighboring states coexisting in Cypus
8% | 14% | 78%

Bi-zonality means that Turkish Cypriots are entitled to a clear majority of property and population in the northern constituent state
15% | 10% | 75%

Bi-zonality is an administrative concept, demarking the administrative borders of the respective constituent states only, and cannot be used to justify restrictions on property and residence rights of members of the other community
17% | 11% | 73%

Legend:
- ■ Entirely unacceptable
- ☐ Tolerable if necessary
- ■ Satisfactory / Highly Desirable / Absolutely Essential

Axis: 0% | 20% | 40% | 60% | 80% | 100%

Turkish Cypriots Supportive of Bizonality

Turkish Cypriots, in line with expectations, are strongly supportive of bizonality. That said, there is an anomaly with majorities also reducing bizonality to an administrative border.

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To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements regarding prospects for a solution of the Cyprus Problem?

Greek Cypriots

There are far too many migrant workers from other countries in the southern part of Cyprus
96%

There are far too many settlers from Turkey in the northern part of Cyprus
98%

Turkish Cypriots

There are far too many migrant workers from other countries in the southern part of Cyprus
9% | 18% | 73%

There are far too many settlers from Turkey in the northern part of Cyprus
14% | 11% | 75%

0%   20%   40%   60%   80%   100%

☐ **Strongly Disagree / Somewhat Disagree**   ☐ **Neither Agree nor Disagree**   ☐ **Somewhat Agree / Strongly Agree**

## *Attitudes towards immigrants and settlers*

Greek Cypriots strongly believe that there are too many settlers and immigrants in Cyprus. Crucially, Turkish Cypriots agree with Greek Cypriots that there are too many immigrants and settlers.

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In relation to the issue of citizenship / settlers, how would you evaluate each of the following options? (Greek Cypriots)

All people who came from Turkey after 1974, including their descendents, should return to Turkey after a settlement. The only possible exception is the case of people who have intermarried and their offspring
12% | 10% | 79%

Some people from Turkey could be allowed to stay after a settlement, but only with a residence permit and work permit – not as citizens with voting rights
39% | 26% | 35%

People from Turkey who have already lived in Cyprus for many decades with their families should, after a settlement, be allowed to remain
61% | 20% | 19%

A cap or upper limit of 50,000 persons originally from Turkey to be naturalized citizens of a reunited Cyprus
63% | 18% | 19%

All people in the north are citizens of the future northern constituent state, thus all should be allowed to remain
85% | 9% | 6%

Legend:
- ■ Entirely unacceptable
- ■ Tolerable if necessary
- ■ Satisfactory / Highly Desirable / Absolutely Essential

Axis: 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

Greek Cypriots Skeptical over Compromises on Settlers Issue

Overall, respondents indicate opposition to naturalizing various categories of people in the event of a settlement. Crucially, a large majority of Greek Cypriot respondents apparently consider the current negotiation stance of their leadership unacceptable, where the Greek Cypriot side has suggested that up to 50,000 Turkish nationals be granted citizenship in a reunified Cyprus.

Having said that, there is some flexibility in the context of offering residence and work permits.

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In relation to the issue of citizenship / settlers, how would you evaluate each of the following options? (Turkish Cypriots)

People from Turkey who have already lived in Cyprus for many decades with their families should, after a settlement, be allowed to remain
9% | 12% | 79%

All people in the north are citizens of the future northern constituent state, thus all should be allowed to remain
25% | 13% | 62%

Some people from Turkey could be allowed to stay after a settlement, but only with a residence permit and work permit – not as citizens with voting rights
31% | 17% | 52%

A cap or upper limit of 50,000 persons originally from Turkey to be naturalized citizens of a reunited Cyprus
33% | 18% | 49%

All people who came from Turkey after 1974, including their descendents, should return to Turkey after a settlement. The only possible exception is the case of people who have intermarried and their offspring
60% | 11% | 29%

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

Legend:
- ■ Entirely unacceptable
- ☐ Tolerable if necessary
- ☐ Satisfactory / Highly Desirable / Absolutely Essential

Turkish Cypriots Support Naturalization

In contrast to their view that there are too many settlers most Turkish Cypriot respondents consider that people who have resided for decades should remain in Cyprus after a settlement. The option of giving to the settlers residence and work permits instead of citizenship, is acceptable to Turkish Cypriots.

SECTION D

THE INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF THE TALKS

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for a sustainable
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If a final agreement is reached, how acceptable or unacceptable would you consider each of these countries or international organisations to be considered as guarantors of the new state of affairs in Cyprus? (Greek Cypriots)

Country/Organisation	Oppose	Unsure	Support
The European Union	12%	9%	79%
The United Nations Security Council	16%	11%	73%
Greece	53%	11%	36%
NATO	74%	11%	15%
The United Kingdom	83%	8%	9%
Turkey	85%	6%	9%

Legend: ☐ Oppose ☐ Unsure ☐ Support

X-axis: 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

Potential Guarantors: Greek Cypriots

Greek Cypriots express faith in the EU and UN to serve as guarantors of a settlement. Against this, respondents reject Turkey, the UK, NATO and even Greece as guarantors.

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If a final agreement is reached, how acceptable or unacceptable would you consider each of these countries or international organisations to be considered as guarantors of the new state of affairs in Cyprus? (Turkish Cypriots)

Country/Organisation	Oppose	Unsure	Support
Turkey	7%	8%	85%
Greece	29%	18%	52%
The European Union	40%	29%	32%
The United Nations Security Council	52%	24%	24%
The United Kingdom	60%	21%	19%
NATO	62%	21%	17%

Potential Guarantors: Turkish Cypriots

For Turkish Cypriots, Turkey is the most acceptable guarantor of a new state of affairs. Interestingly, Turkish Cypriot respondents were more likely than Greek Cypriots to support Greece as a guarantor.

Importantly, there is potential convergence on a role for the EU, which is not ruled out of hand by Turkish Cypriots.

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Regarding the specifics of any possible treaty or other agreement regarding the implementation of a Comprehensive Settlement, how acceptable or unacceptable would you consider the inclusion of each of the following elements? (Greek Cypriots)

'Rights of intervention' by Greece or Turkey should be abolished altogether on the basis that unified Cyprus is going to be a sovereign country that is capable of taking care of its own affairs
6% 2 92%

It should be made clear that the 'right of intervention' by Greece or Turkey excludes the possibility of military intervention
7% 5% 88%

The EU should set – for all the sides - motives for implementation and penalties for non-implementation, related to EU benefits and participation in EU decision making
8% 14% 78%

A set of guidelines should be agreed in advance by all the sides, clarifying the appropriate response and responsibility for each implementation-related challenge that may in the future arise
21% 22% 57%

'Rights of intervention' by Greece or Turkey should apply for 15 years after the settlement, after which they will expire
66% 19% 15%

'Rights of intervention' should be arranged in such a way so that Turkey will be able to intervene only in the Turkish Cypriot constituent state while Greece will be able to intervene only in the Greek Cypriot constituent state
67% 12% 21%

It should be re-affirmed that the 'right of intervention' of Greece or Turkey can still be exercised unilaterally by one or the other, in case agreement between them proves impossible
74% 11% 15%

Legend:
- ■ **Entirely unacceptable**
- ■ **Tolerable if necessary**
- ■ **Satisfactory / Highly Desirable / Absolutely Essential**

(x-axis: 0%, 20%, 40%, 60%, 80%, 100%)

Security: Abolish Rights of Intervention (Greek Cypriots)

Greek Cypriots are close to unanimous on wanting to abolish guarantor intervention rights in Cyprus. Greek Cypriot respondents were also opposed to transitions or alternative arrangements that retain intervention rights.

On the other hand, Greek Cypriots are open to a role for the EU in overseeing the implementation of a settlement. Similarly, there is support for a set of implementation guidelines.

Regarding the specifics of any possible treaty or other agreement regarding the implementation of a Comprehensive Settlement, how acceptable or unacceptable would you consider the inclusion of each of the following elements? (Turkish Cypriots)

| Element	Entirely unacceptable	Tolerable if necessary	Satisfactory / Highly Desirable / Absolutely Essential
A set of guidelines should be agreed in advance by all the sides, clarifying the appropriate response and responsibility for each implementation-related challenge that may in the future arise	6%	11%	83%
The EU should set – for all the sides - motives for implementation and penalties for non-implementation, related to EU benefits and participation in EU decision making	18%	14%	68%
It should be re-affirmed that the 'right of intervention' of Turkey or Greece can still be exercised unilaterally by one or the other, in case agreement between them proves impossible	26%	21%	54%
'Rights of intervention' should be arranged in such a way so that Turkey will be able to intervene only in the Turkish Cypriot constituent state while Greece will be able to intervene only in the Greek Cypriot constituent state	28%	16%	56%
'Rights of intervention' by Turkey or Greece should apply for 15 years after the settlement, after which they will expire	47%	15%	38%
It should be made clear that the 'right of intervention' by Turkey or Greece excludes the possibility of military intervention	53%	16%	31%
'Rights of intervention' by Turkey or Greece should be abolished altogether on the basis that unified Cyprus is going to be a sovereign country that is capable of taking care of its own affairs	57%	14%	29%

Security: Guidelines Plus Rights of Interventions (Turkish Cypriots)

Interestingly, Turkish Cypriot respondents were keen to see a set of guidelines clarifying responses and responsibilities in implementation phases of a settlement. Significantly, respondents also favored a role for the EU in oversight. On these two points there is convergence with Greek Cypriots.

However, most Turkish Cypriots wish for the right of intervention to be retained.

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If an international conference was held to discuss ways to solve the security and guarantees dossier, to what extent would you find acceptable or unacceptable the presence of each of the following potential participants? (Greek Cypriots)

Participant	Entirely unacceptable	Tolerable if necessary	Satisfactory / Highly Desirable / Absolutely Essential
The Republic of Cyprus			98%
The European Union	4	3	93%
The United Nations	5%	6%	89%
The Turkish Cypriot community	11%	5%	84%
The Greek Cypriot community	12%	3	85%
Greece	25%	15%	60%
Turkey	44%	17%	40%
Russia	60%	9%	31%
France	62%	9%	30%
NATO	63%	11%	26%
China	66%	10%	24%
The United Kingdom	67%	14%	20%
The United States of America	70%	10%	21%

International Conference Participants: Greek Cypriot views

Greek Cypriots prefer an international conference attended by the Republic of Cyprus, the EU, the UN, and the two communities. Many – but not a majority - oppose Turkey's potential participation.

Similarly, Greek Cypriots reject the participation of permanent UN Security Council members, in contrast to the formal preferences of their leadership on the matter.

If an international conference was held to discuss ways to solve the security and guarantees dossier, to what extent would you find acceptable or unacceptable the presence of each of the following potential participants? (Turkish Cypriots)


Participant	Entirely unacceptable	Tolerable if necessary	Satisfactory / Highly Desirable / Absolutely Essential
The Turkish Cypriot community			98%
Turkey	5	4	92%
The Greek Cypriot community	5	2	93%
Greece	13%	8%	79%
The Republic of Cyprus	26%	5	70%
The United Nations	26%	14%	59%
The European Union	27%	16%	57%
NATO	48%	16%	36%
The United Kingdom	51%	14%	35%
The United States of America	68%	13%	19%
France	85%	10%	5
Russia	85%	9%	6%
China	87%	9%	5

International Conference Participants: Turkish Cypriot views

Surprisingly, a majority of Turkish Cypriots support the representation of the Republic of Cyprus at an international conference, alongside the two communities, Turkey and Greece, the UN and the EU, in contrast to the formal position taken by their leadership on the matter.

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International Peacebuilding Alliance
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SECTION E

CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES

How do you evaluate each of the following measures for increasing cooperation and building trust between the two communities? (Greek Cypriots)

The restoration of religious, historical and cultural monuments that are of significance for each community
- 2 | 3 | 95%

Development and construction on originally Greek Cypriot properties in the north to be put on hold while talks for a Comprehensive Settlement are taking place
- 4 | 4 | 92%

Putting an end to the negative daily statements of political leaders against the other community
- 10% | 11% | 79%

Mutual official apologies to be offered by the leaderships of the two communities for past mistakes and hurts
- 10% | 13% | 77%

Lifting of the restrictions on the use of mobile telephones and the sending of SMS messages while travelling across the Green Line
- 11% | 8% | 81%

The establishment of a truth and reconciliation commission, to investigate for the truth regarding past events and hurts of the two communities, with a view to mutual forgiveness and reconciliation
- 13% | 15% | 72%

The reduction of bureaucratic formalities at crossing points
- 16% | 11% | 73%

The Greek Cypriot community to give its consent for Turkish Cypriot universities to become accepted within the European university accreditation system
- 66% | 19% | 15%

Legend:
- ☐ Entirely unacceptable
- ☐ Tolerable if necessary
- ☐ Satisfactory / Highly Desirable / Absolutely Essential

X-axis: 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

CBMs: Yes to Most, No to Universities (Greek Cypriots)

Large majorities of Greek Cypriots support CBMs to restore monuments. They also wish to see a moratorium on construction on former Greek Cypriot properties. Greek Cypriots are also supportive of processes that uncover the fate of missing persons, and mutual apologies for past mistakes.

However, Greek Cypriots oppose consenting to the accreditation of Turkish Cypriot universities, presumably due to the perceived implications it has for recognition of the Turkish Cypriot state.

How do you evaluate each of the following measures for increasing cooperation and building trust between the two communities? (Turkish Cypriots)

| Measure	Entirely unacceptable	Tolerable if necessary	Satisfactory / Highly Desirable / Absolutely Essential
The restoration of religious, historical and cultural monuments that are of significance for each community	2	3	95%
Putting an end to the negative daily statements of political leaders against the other community	5%	9%	86%
Lifting of the restrictions on the use of mobile telephones and the sending of SMS messages while travelling across the Green Line	6%	6%	88%
The establishment of a truth and reconciliation commission, to investigate for the truth regarding past events and hurts of the two communities, with a view to mutual forgiveness and reconciliation	11%	12%	77%
The reduction of bureaucratic formalities at crossing points	12%	7%	80%
Mutual official apologies to be offered by the leaderships of the two communities for past mistakes and hurts	18%	18%	65%
The Greek Cypriot community to give its consent for Turkish Cypriot universities to become accepted within the European university accreditation system	21%	7%	72%
Development and construction on originally Greek Cypriot properties in the north to be put on hold while talks for a Comprehensive Settlement are taking place	32%	15%	53%

Legend: 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

CBMs: Overall Support (Turkish Cypriots)

Similar to Greek Cypriots, Turkish Cypriots support CBMs generally.

Interestingly, a slim majority also agree with a moratorium on development of Greek Cypriot property, although this is at odds with the official positions of their leadership.

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To what extent would you find acceptable or unacceptable each of the following proposals regarding the issues of Varosha and Direct Trade? (Greek Cypriots)

Proposal	Entirely unacceptable	Tolerable if necessary	Satisfactory / Highly Desirable / Absolutely Essential
Return of Varosha to the control of the Greek Cypriot community	2		97%
Opening of Varosha as an inter-communal area under UN and EU auspices, where Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots can live and work together	16%	16%	68%
Return of Varosha to the control of the Greek Cypriot community, while Ercan airport is placed under EU supervision for direct flights between Turkish Cypriots and EU countries	59%	19%	22%
Varosha to be handed over to UN control, in preparation for the eventual return of its Greek Cypriot inhabitants, while Famagusta port is managed by the Turkish Cypriot community under EU and UN supervision	64%	20%	17%
Opening of Varosha under Turkish Cypriot control, allowing Greek Cypriot property owners to be reinstated	76%	13%	11%
Ercan airport to be placed under EU supervision for direct flights between Turkish Cypriots and EU countries	76%	12%	12%
Opening of Famagusta port for direct trade between Turkish Cypriots and EU	78%	12%	10%
Opening of all ports and airports currently in the northern part of Cyprus, for direct trade and direct flights between Turkish Cypriots and the EU	81%	11%	8%

0%   20%   40%   60%   80%   100%

Return of Varosha, inter-communal zone concept may work (Greek Cypriots)

Greek Cypriots are keen to see Varosha returned to their community's control, ideally under the control of the Greek Cypriot community. Having said that, respondents were also open to the idea of opening Varosha as an inter-communal area of co-operation under UN and EU auspices.

In contrast, trade-offs of the type "return of Varosha against the lifting of isolations" are met with skepticism by Greek Cypriots, who would need to be convinced of the viability and advisability of such deals.

To what extent would you find acceptable or unacceptable each of the following proposals regarding the issues of Varosha and Direct Trade? (Turkish Cypriots)

Proposal	Entirely unacceptable	Tolerable if necessary	Satisfactory / Highly Desirable / Absolutely Essential
Opening of all ports and airports currently in the northern part of Cyprus, for direct trade and direct flights between Turkish Cypriots and the EU	3	5	92%
Opening of Famagusta port for direct trade between Turkish Cypriots and EU	5	4	92%
Ercan airport to be placed under EU supervision for direct flights between Turkish Cypriots and EU countries	8%	7%	86%
Opening of Varosha as an inter-communal area under UN and EU auspices, where Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots can live and work together	38%	18%	45%
Opening of Varosha under Turkish Cypriot control, allowing Greek Cypriot property owners to be reinstated	43%	22%	36%
Famagusta port to be managed by the Turkish Cypriot community under EU and UN supervision, while Varosha to be handed over to UN control, in preparation for the eventual return of its Greek Cypriot inhabitants	53%	17%	30%
Ercan airport to be placed under EU supervision for direct flights between Turkish Cypriots and EU countries while Varosha is returned to the control of the Greek Cypriot community	70%	12%	18%
Return of Varosha to the control of the Greek Cypriot community	81%	9%	10%

Opening of Ports and Ercan, but Varosha Problematic (Turkish Cypriots)

For the most part, Turkish Cypriots want their ports open for trade and Ercan airport open for international flights. The majority of Turkish Cypriots oppose returning Varosha to Greek Cypriot control even as part of a package. Thus, similar to Greek Cypriots, the Turkish Cypriots would need to convinced of the viability of any deal. That said Turkish Cypriots are, like Greek Cypriots, relatively open to conceiving Varosha as an area of cooperation.

OPPORTUNITIES FOR CONVERGENCE

	Greek Cypriots			Turkish Cypriots		
	Unacceptable	Tolerable	Satisfactory	Unacceptable	Tolerable	Satisfactory
A set of guidelines should be agreed in advance by all the sides, clarifying the appropriate response and responsibility for each implementation-related challenge that may in the future arise	21%	22%	57%	6%	11%	83%
The EU should set – for all the sides - motives for implementation and penalties for non-implementation, related to EU benefits and participation in EU decision making	8%	14%	78%	18%	14%	68%
Some federal areas would be designated: These will not belong to the Greek Cypriot or Turkish Cypriot constituent state, but to the whole of Cyprus and in these areas there would be no primary residence restrictions	27%	23%	51%	29%	24%	47%
Some people from Turkey could be allowed to stay after a settlement, but only with a residence permit and work permit – not as citizens with voting rights	39%	26%	35%	31%	17%	52%

Opportunities for substantive convergence: Limited but significant options

While on substantive issues Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots generally diverge, this poll has indicated certain directions which do hold potential for consensus. These tend to be "out of the box" proposals, which are not part of the official repertoire of either side, and which provide practical solutions that everyone can benefit from.

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	Greek Cypriots			Turkish Cypriots		
	Unacceptable	**Tolerable**	**Satisfactory**	**Unacceptable**	**Tolerable**	**Satisfactory**
The restoration of religious, historical and cultural monuments that are of significance for each community	2%	3%	95%	2%	3%	95%
Lifting of the restrictions on the use of mobile telephones and the sending of SMS messages while travelling across the Green Line	11%	8%	81%	6%	6%	88%
Putting an end to the negative daily statements of political leaders against the other community	10%	11%	79%	5%	9%	86%
The reduction of bureaucratic formalities at crossing points	16%	11%	73%	12%	7%	80%
The establishment of a truth and reconciliation commission, to investigate for the truth regarding past events and hurts of the two communities, with a view to mutual forgiveness and reconciliation	13%	15%	72%	11%	12%	77%
Mutual official apologies to be offered by the leaderships of the two communities for past mistakes and hurts	10%	13%	77%	18%	18%	65%
Development and construction on originally Greek Cypriot properties in the north to be put on hold while talks for a Comprehensive Settlement are taking place	4%	4%	92%	32%	15%	53%
Opening of Varosha as an inter-communal area under UN and EU auspices, where Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots can live and work together	16%	16%	68%	38%	18%	45%

Opportunities to agree on CBMs: A broad range of possibilities

Both communities are quite eager to see progress on CBMs being made, especially where such measures will contribute towards a more positive environment which is conducive to reconciliation. For potential CBMs where a significant minority is opposed (e.g. greater than 30%) intense public debates can be expected in case a decision is made to go ahead with them.

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