Bridging the Gap in the Inter-communal Negotiations

An island-wide study of public opinion in Cyprus
SECTIONS

• SECTION A: Sense of Identity
• SECTION B: Towards a Conclusion of the Talks
• SECTION C: The Internal Aspects of the Talks
• SECTION D: The International Aspects of the Talks
• SECTION E: Confidence Building Measures
• SECTION F: Opportunities for Convergence
SURVEY PROFILE

- **Sample Size:** 1000 Greek Cypriots and 1000 Turkish Cypriots
- **Sampling Process:** Multi-stage Random Stratified Sampling
- **Method of Data Collection:** Face to Face Interviews with a Structured Questionnaire at Homes of Respondents and in their Native Language
- **Period of Data Collection:** 17 March – 14 April 2011
- **Project Team:** Spyros Christou, Ahmet Sözen, Erol Kaymak, Alexandros Lordos
- **Questionnaire Design:** Through a participatory process which included key stakeholders from both communities
- **Field Work:** Symmetron Market Research for Greek Cypriots and Prologue Consulting for Turkish Cypriots
SECTION A

SENSE OF IDENTITY
Cultural Origins and Dispositions to Motherlands

The vast majority of Greek Cypriots consider that they have Greek cultural roots. However, a significant number of Greek Cypriots do not consider Greece to be their ‘motherland’.

Among Turkish Cypriots large majorities consider they have Turkish cultural roots and that Turkey is their motherland.
Cultural Origins and Dispositions to Motherlands Over Time

Tracking responses over time, we note an upswing in self-identification in terms of ethnic cultural roots among both Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. On the other hand, Greek Cypriots are less likely to display a trend towards considering Greece their motherland than Turkish Cypriots are to consider Turkey theirs.
Cypriotness

For both Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, the modal response is to self-identify as Greek Cypriot or Turkish Cypriot, as opposed to more exclusive ethnic or national identities. Significantly, few Greek Cypriots consider themselves Greek only. A significant number of Greek Cypriots claim to be Cypriot only. By contrast, Turkish Cypriot responses clustered around Turkish Cypriot identity. Relatively few considered themselves Cypriot only.
Identity over Time

The tendency among Greek Cypriots is to increasingly self-identify as mostly a Cypriot. Among Turkish Cypriots there is also a similar trend. Overall however, compared with Greek Cypriot responses, relatively few Turkish Cypriots self-identify as mostly Cypriot.
SECTION B

TOWARDS A CONCLUSION OF THE TALKS
To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements regarding prospects for a solution of the Cyprus Problem? (Greek Cypriots)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
<th>Somewhat Agree</th>
<th>Neither Agree nor Disagree</th>
<th>Somewhat Disagree</th>
<th>Disagree / Strongly Disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>We should assert our rights as the Greek Cypriot community, even if it means that members of the other community will be negatively affected</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I try to look at the Cyprus problem, both from the point of view of Greek Cypriots and from the point of view of Turkish Cypriots</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Our community’s leadership is sincere in working towards a mutually acceptable solution</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>We should work for a realistic solution that can be achieved quickly, because delaying will only make the situation worse</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>We should insist for an optimal settlement, even if it takes many years to achieve</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Turkish Cypriot leadership is sincere in working towards a mutually acceptable solution</td>
<td>86%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Asserting Rights: Greek Cypriot views on negotiation strategies**

Greek Cypriots believe their leaders should assert Greek Cypriot rights. Significantly, Greek Cypriots do not believe that the Turkish Cypriot leadership is working for a mutually acceptable settlement. On the other hand, a majority of Greek Cypriots also stress the need for a ‘realistic’ settlement in the near future.
To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements regarding prospects for a solution of the Cyprus Problem? (Turkish Cypriots)

We should insist for an optimal settlement, even if it takes many years to achieve 11% Strongly Disagree / Somewhat Disagree

We should assert our rights as the Turkish Cypriot community, even if it means that members of the other community will be negatively affected 14% Strongly Disagree / Somewhat Disagree

We should work for a realistic solution that can be achieved quickly, because delaying will only make the situation worse 22% Strongly Disagree / Somewhat Disagree

I try to look at the Cyprus problem, both from the point of view of Turkish Cypriots and from the point of view of Greek Cypriots 27% Neither Agree nor Disagree

Our community’s leadership is sincere in working towards a mutually acceptable solution 34% Somewhat Agree / Strongly Agree

The Greek Cypriot leadership is sincere in working towards a mutually acceptable solution 78% Somewhat Agree / Strongly Agree

Optimal settlement: Turkish Cypriot views on negotiation strategies

The vast majority of Turkish Cypriots think that negotiations should be pursued with a view to achieving an optimal settlement and to assert Turkish Cypriot rights. Against this, a majority also think that a realistic settlement should be reached in the nearer term. However, mirroring the view of Greek Cypriots, Turkish Cypriots do not believe the other community’s leadership is sincere in working toward a compromise settlement.
Assertiveness, Empathy and Sense of Urgency: A factor analytic approach

A factor analysis of responses to statements regarding negotiation strategies reveals three dimensions of political thinking that are largely independent of each other. Assertiveness – the extent to which respondents support the political causes of their own side – is high in both communities, but especially so among Turkish Cypriots. Empathy – the extent to which respondents reach out to encompass the concerns of the other community – is also high in both communities, despite the apparent contradiction with assertiveness. As for sense of urgency, Greek Cypriots tend to prefer a feasible solution now while Turkish Cypriots tend to be ambivalent over the proper timing of a settlement.
### Assertiveness, Empathy and Sense of Urgency: A mosaic of political values

A cluster analysis of responses to the three dimensions of assertiveness, empathy and sense of urgency reveals a complex mosaic of political values. Some groups conform to existing stereotypes, while others are surprising. Groups that are characterized by a low sense of urgency or low empathy trend towards No in a future referendum. High assertiveness is not necessarily problematic for a future referendum, so long as it is accompanied by equivalently high levels of empathy.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cluster</th>
<th>Label</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Inputs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>High Assertiveness, High Empathy</td>
<td>Group members tend to be Turkish Cypriots, low education. Trending towards Yes vote in a future referendum.</td>
<td>Assertiveness, Empathy, Urgency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>High Assertiveness, Low Urgency</td>
<td>Group members tend to be Turkish Cypriots, low education. Trending towards No vote in a future referendum.</td>
<td>Assertiveness, Empathy, Urgency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>High Urgency</td>
<td>Group members tend to be Greek Cypriots, low in education. Trending towards Yes vote in a future referendum.</td>
<td>Assertiveness, Empathy, Urgency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>High Empathy, Low Assertiveness</td>
<td>Group members tend to be Turkish Cypriots, younger, high in education. Trending towards No vote in future referendum.</td>
<td>Assertiveness, Empathy, Urgency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Low Empathy</td>
<td>Group members tend to be Greek Cypriots, educated. Trending towards No vote in future referendum.</td>
<td>Assertiveness, Empathy, Urgency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Low Urgency</td>
<td>Group members tend to be Turkish Cypriots, younger, high in education, Trending towards No vote in future referendum.</td>
<td>Assertiveness, Empathy, Urgency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Low Empathy, Low Urgency</td>
<td>Group members tend to be Greek Cypriots, older, male, wealthier. Trending towards Yes vote in future referendum.</td>
<td>Assertiveness, Empathy, Urgency</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cluster</th>
<th>Size</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>22.2% (434)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>13.6% (266)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>15.7% (306)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>11.1% (217)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>10.0% (174)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>11.0% (214)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>8.1% (159)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>5.6% (110)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Legend:**
- Assertiveness
- Empathy
- Urgency
Vote in a potential future referendum:

- I would certainly, or almost certainly vote ‘No’: 14% Turkish Cypriot, 31% Greek Cypriot
- I currently lean towards a ‘No’ vote, though I might at that time sway towards a ‘Yes’ vote: 9% Turkish Cypriot, 11% Greek Cypriot
- I am currently just as likely to vote ‘Yes’ as to vote ‘No’: 43% Turkish Cypriot, 35% Greek Cypriot
- I currently lean towards a ‘Yes’ vote, though I might at that time sway towards a ‘No’ vote: 10% Turkish Cypriot, 10% Greek Cypriot
- I would certainly or almost certainly vote ‘Yes’: 24% Turkish Cypriot, 13% Greek Cypriot

Outcome of a referendum remains in the balance

The most frequent response to intended vote in a hypothetical future referendum is “as likely to vote yes as to vote no”. This is true of both Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots. Overall, the number of committed “no” voters among Greek Cypriots is relatively high at 31%. By contrast, the percentage of committed “yes” voters is relatively high among Turkish Cypriots at 24%.
Greek Cypriots trending towards "no"; Turkish Cypriots trending away from "no"

Responses over time demonstrate that Greek Cypriots are increasingly trending towards voting ‘‘no’’ in a future referendum, whereas Turkish Cypriots are trending away from ‘‘no’’. These results require further analysis as to underlying causes.
How acceptable or unacceptable do you consider each of the following possible ways to link different dossiers between them? (Greek Cypriots)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option</th>
<th>Entirely unacceptable</th>
<th>Tolerable if necessary</th>
<th>Satisfactory / Highly Desirable / Absolutely Essential</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>More territory and villages to become part of the Greek Cypriot state</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and more settlers from Turkey to depart from Cyprus, in return for fewer properties to be returned to individual Greek Cypriots in the Turkish Cypriot state</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More territory and villages to become part of the Greek Cypriot state in return for fewer properties to be returned to individual Greek Cypriots in the Turkish Cypriot state</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increasing the freedom of Greek Cypriots to live anywhere they wish on the island, in return for greater autonomy and increased competences for the authorities of the Turkish Cypriot state</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots to be deciding together, through cross voting, on who the members of the presidential team will be, in return for a system whereby the presidency will rotate between a Greek Cypriot and a Turkish Cypriot</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greek Cypriots to freely settle anywhere they wish in Cyprus, including the northern constituent state, and in return Turkish citizens to live and work anywhere in Cyprus without limitations, including the southern constituent state</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reducing the role of Turkey as a guarantor in return for greater autonomy and increased competences for the Turkish Cypriot state</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Greek Cypriots relatively skeptical towards “give-and-take” type proposals

Complex packages designed to link dossiers are not very popular among Greek Cypriot respondents, with about half of Greek Cypriots being ready to countenance such proposals and the other half being opposed to their logic altogether. The results imply that complex trade-offs will require robust public campaigns if a referendum is to be won.
How acceptable or unacceptable do you consider each of the following possible ways to link different dossiers between them? (Turkish Cypriots)

- **Turkish citizens to live and work anywhere in Cyprus without limitations, including the southern constituent state, and in return Greek Cypriots to freely settle anywhere they wish in Cyprus, including the northern constituent state**
  - Entirely unacceptable: 37%
  - Tolerable if necessary: 21%
  - Satisfactory / Highly Desirable / Absolutely Essential: 41%

- **A system whereby the Presidency will rotate between a Turkish Cypriot and a Greek Cypriot, in return for Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots deciding together, through cross voting, on who the members of the presidential team will be**
  - Entirely unacceptable: 40%
  - Tolerable if necessary: 14%
  - Satisfactory / Highly Desirable / Absolutely Essential: 46%

- **Greater autonomy and increased competences for the authorities of the Turkish Cypriot state in return for increasing the freedom of Greek Cypriots to live anywhere they wish on the island**
  - Entirely unacceptable: 48%
  - Tolerable if necessary: 23%
  - Satisfactory / Highly Desirable / Absolutely Essential: 30%

- **Greater autonomy and increased competences for the Turkish Cypriot state in return for reducing the role of Turkey as a guarantor**
  - Entirely unacceptable: 64%
  - Tolerable if necessary: 15%
  - Satisfactory / Highly Desirable / Absolutely Essential: 21%

- **Fewer properties to be returned to individual Greek Cypriots in the Turkish Cypriot state in return for more territory and villages to become part of the Greek Cypriot state and more settlers from Turkey to depart from Cyprus**
  - Entirely unacceptable: 76%
  - Tolerable if necessary: 11%
  - Satisfactory / Highly Desirable / Absolutely Essential: 13%

- **Fewer properties in the Turkish Cypriot state to be returned to individual Greek Cypriots in return for more territory and villages to become part of the Greek Cypriot state**
  - Entirely unacceptable: 80%
  - Tolerable if necessary: 8%
  - Satisfactory / Highly Desirable / Absolutely Essential: 13%

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**Turkish Cypriots open to some tradeoffs**

Interestingly Turkish Cypriot respondents were relatively open to tradeoffs related to the exercise of individual rights and freedoms. Crucially a majority is open to an executive model that includes cross-voting and rotational presidency.

However, few Turkish Cypriots are open to linking Turkish guarantees to other values. There is also resistance to territorial concessions.
SECTION C

THE INTERNAL ASPECTS OF THE TALKS
In respect to the territory issue, and in the context of a Comprehensive Settlement where all other pending issues will be resolved, how would you evaluate each of the following options? (Greek Cypriots)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option</th>
<th>Entirely unacceptable</th>
<th>Tolerable if necessary</th>
<th>Satisfactory / Highly Desirable / Absolutely Essential</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Some federal areas would be designated: These will not belong to the Greek Cypriot or Turkish Cypriot constituent state, but to the whole of Cyprus and in these areas there would be no primary residence restrictions</td>
<td>27% 21% 51%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Varosha, Morphou and the buffer zone would be returned to the Greek Cypriots, while Karpasia would become a federal area for the use of both communities</td>
<td>42% 23% 35%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some cantons would be designated: These would be specific small regions in the north which would be a part of the Greek Cypriot state, and specific small regions in the south which would be a part of the Turkish Cypriot state</td>
<td>48% 25% 28%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Varosha and the buffer zone would be returned to the Greek Cypriots, while Morphou and Karpasia would become federal areas for the use of both communities</td>
<td>53% 25% 22%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Varosha, Morphou and the buffer zone would be returned to the Greek Cypriots: In other respects, the current borders will continue to apply</td>
<td>59% 17% 24%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Varosha and the buffer zone would be returned to the Greek Cypriots: In other respects, the current borders will continue to apply</td>
<td>71% 14% 16%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No territorial adjustments would be made: After a settlement, only the current buffer zone would be repopulated while in other respects the current borders will continue to apply</td>
<td>78% 11% 12%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Territoriality and the Idea of Federal Areas: Greek Cypriots**

Greek Cypriots are open the idea of federal areas, but less supportive of any particular map or compromise model. Thus, as with other packages the political leadership would have to run public campaigns in the event of a referendum.
In respect to the territory issue, and in the context of a Comprehensive Settlement where all other pending issues will be resolved, how would you evaluate each of the following options? (Turkish Cypriots)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option</th>
<th>Entirely unacceptable</th>
<th>Tolerable if necessary</th>
<th>Satisfactory / Highly Desirable / Absolutely Essential</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No territorial adjustments would be made: After a settlement, only the current buffer zone would be repopulated while in other respects the current borders will continue to apply</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some federal areas would be designated: These will not belong to the Turkish Cypriot or Greek Cypriot constituent state, but to the whole of Cyprus and in these areas there would be no primary residence restrictions</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some cantons would be designated: These would be specific small regions in the south which would be a part of the Turkish Cypriot state, and specific small regions in the north which would be a part of the Greek Cypriot state</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Varosha and the buffer zone would be returned to the Greek Cypriots: In other respects, the current borders will continue to apply</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Varosha and the buffer zone would be returned to the Greek Cypriots, while Morphou and Karpasia would become federal areas for the use of both communities</td>
<td>84%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Varosha, Morphou and the buffer zone would be returned to the Greek Cypriots, while Karpasia would become a federal area for the use of both communities</td>
<td>86%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Varosha, Morphou and the buffer zone would be returned to the Greek Cypriots: In other respects, the current borders will continue to apply</td>
<td>87%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Territoriality and Federal Areas: Turkish Cypriots**

Similar to Greek Cypriots, a majority of Turkish Cypriots would consider the designation of federal areas. That said, Turkish Cypriots are not open to maps that entail territorial concessions, similar to Greek Cypriots. Thus, the Turkish Cypriot leadership would have to campaign in favor of compromise if a settlement is to be ratified in a referendum.
Bizonality as an Administrative Concept: Greek Cypriots

Whereas bizonality constitutes a principle of the negotiation framework, a majority of Greek Cypriots remain unreconciled with its elements. Crucially there is objection to Turkish Cypriots retaining a clear majority of property and population in the north.
How acceptable or unacceptable do you consider each of the following interpretations of bizonality? (Greek Cypriots)

- **Bi-zonality suggests that internal constituent state citizenship can be regulated by the constituent states**: 8% entirely unacceptable, 10% tolerable if necessary, 82% satisfactory/highly desirable/absolutely essential.

- **Bi-zonality means two neighboring states coexisting in Cyprus**: 8% entirely unacceptable, 14% tolerable if necessary, 78% satisfactory/highly desirable/absolutely essential.

- **Bi-zonality means that Turkish Cypriots are entitled to a clear majority of property and population in the northern constituent state**: 15% entirely unacceptable, 10% tolerable if necessary, 75% satisfactory/highly desirable/absolutely essential.

- **Bi-zonality is an administrative concept, demarking the administrative borders of the respective constituent states only, and cannot be used to justify restrictions on property and residence rights of members of the other community**: 17% entirely unacceptable, 11% tolerable if necessary, 73% satisfactory/highly desirable/absolutely essential.

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**Turkish Cypriots Supportive of Bizonality**

Turkish Cypriots, in line with expectations, are strongly supportive of bizonality. That said, there is an anomaly with majorities also reducing bizonality to an administrative border.
To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements regarding prospects for a solution of the Cyprus Problem?

**Greek Cypriots**

- There are far too many migrant workers from other countries in the southern part of Cyprus: 96%
- There are far too many settlers from Turkey in the northern part of Cyprus: 98%

**Turkish Cypriots**

- There are far too many migrant workers from other countries in the southern part of Cyprus: 9% (Strongly Disagree), 18% (Somewhat Disagree), 73% (Neither Agree nor Disagree), 0% (Neither Agree nor Disagree)
- There are far too many settlers from Turkey in the northern part of Cyprus: 14% (Strongly Disagree), 11% (Somewhat Disagree), 75% (Neither Agree nor Disagree), 0% (Neither Agree nor Disagree)

**Attitudes towards immigrants and settlers**

Greek Cypriots strongly believe that there are too many settlers and immigrants in Cyprus. Crucially, Turkish Cypriots agree with Greek Cypriots that there are too many immigrants and settlers.
All people who came from Turkey after 1974, including their descendents, should return to Turkey after a settlement. The only possible exception is the case of people who have intermarried and their offspring: **12%** Entirely unacceptable, **10%** Tolerable if necessary, **79%** Satisfactory / Highly Desirable / Absolutely Essential.

Some people from Turkey could be allowed to stay after a settlement, but only with a residence permit and work permit – not as citizens with voting rights: **39%** Entirely unacceptable, **26%** Tolerable if necessary, **35%** Satisfactory / Highly Desirable / Absolutely Essential.

People from Turkey who have already lived in Cyprus for many decades with their families should, after a settlement, be allowed to remain: **61%** Entirely unacceptable, **20%** Tolerable if necessary, **19%** Satisfactory / Highly Desirable / Absolutely Essential.

A cap or upper limit of 50,000 persons originally from Turkey to be naturalized citizens of a reunited Cyprus: **63%** Entirely unacceptable, **18%** Tolerable if necessary, **19%** Satisfactory / Highly Desirable / Absolutely Essential.

All people in the north are citizens of the future northern constituent state, thus all should be allowed to remain: **85%** Entirely unacceptable, **9%** Tolerable if necessary, **6%** Satisfactory / Highly Desirable / Absolutely Essential.

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**Greek Cypriots Skeptical over Compromises on Settlers Issue**

Overall, respondents indicate opposition to naturalizing various categories of people in the event of a settlement. Crucially, a large majority of Greek Cypriot respondents apparently consider the current negotiation stance of their leadership unacceptable, where the Greek Cypriot side has suggested that up to 50,000 Turkish nationals be granted citizenship in a reunified Cyprus.

Having said that, there is some flexibility in the context of offering residence and work permits.
In relation to the issue of citizenship / settlers, how would you evaluate each of the following options? (Turkish Cypriots)

- People from Turkey who have already lived in Cyprus for many decades with their families should, after a settlement, be allowed to remain: 9% Entirely unacceptable, 12% Tolerable if necessary, 79% Satisfactory / Highly Desirable / Absolutely Essential

- All people in the north are citizens of the future northern constituent state, thus all should be allowed to remain: 25% Entirely unacceptable, 13% Tolerable if necessary, 62% Satisfactory / Highly Desirable / Absolutely Essential

- Some people from Turkey could be allowed to stay after a settlement, but only with a residence permit and work permit – not as citizens with voting rights: 31% Entirely unacceptable, 17% Tolerable if necessary, 52% Satisfactory / Highly Desirable / Absolutely Essential

- A cap or upper limit of 50,000 persons originally from Turkey to be naturalized citizens of a reunited Cyprus: 33% Entirely unacceptable, 18% Tolerable if necessary, 49% Satisfactory / Highly Desirable / Absolutely Essential

- All people who came from Turkey after 1974, including their descendents, should return to Turkey after a settlement. The only possible exception is the case of people who have intermarried and their offspring: 60% Entirely unacceptable, 11% Tolerable if necessary, 29% Satisfactory / Highly Desirable / Absolutely Essential

Turkish Cypriots Support Naturalization

In contrast to their view that there are too many settlers most Turkish Cypriot respondents consider that people who have resided for decades should remain in Cyprus after a settlement. The option of giving to the settlers residence and work permits instead of citizenship, is acceptable to Turkish Cypriots.
SECTION D

THE INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF THE TALKS
Potential Guarantors: Greek Cypriots

Greek Cypriots express faith in the EU and UN to serve as guarantors of a settlement. Against this, respondents reject Turkey, the UK, NATO and even Greece as guarantors.
If a final agreement is reached, how acceptable or unacceptable would you consider each of these countries or international organisations to be considered as guarantors of the new state of affairs in Cyprus? (Turkish Cypriots)

**Potential Guarantors: Turkish Cypriots**

For Turkish Cypriots, Turkey is the most acceptable guarantor of a new state of affairs. Interestingly, Turkish Cypriot respondents were more likely than Greek Cypriots to support Greece as a guarantor.

Importantly, there is potential convergence on a role for the EU, which is not ruled out of hand by Turkish Cypriots.
Regarding the specifics of any possible treaty or other agreement regarding the implementation of a Comprehensive Settlement, how acceptable or unacceptable would you consider the inclusion of each of the following elements? (Greek Cypriots)

- ‘Rights of intervention’ by Greece or Turkey should be abolished altogether on the basis that unified Cyprus is going to be a sovereign country that is capable of taking care of its own affairs. 92% of respondents find this entirely unacceptable, while 6% find it acceptable.
- It should be made clear that the ‘right of intervention’ by Greece or Turkey excludes the possibility of military intervention. 88% find this acceptable, 7% find it tolerable if necessary, and 5% find it entirely unacceptable.
- The EU should set – for all the sides - motives for implementation and penalties for non-implementation, related to EU benefits and participation in EU decision making. 78% find this acceptable, 14% find it tolerable if necessary, and 8% find it entirely unacceptable.
- A set of guidelines should be agreed in advance by all the sides, clarifying the appropriate response and responsibility for each implementation-related challenge that may in the future arise. 57% find this acceptable, 22% find it tolerable if necessary, and 21% find it entirely unacceptable.
- ‘Rights of intervention’ by Greece or Turkey should apply for 15 years after the settlement, after which they will expire. 19% find this acceptable, 66% find it tolerable if necessary, and 15% find it entirely unacceptable.
- ‘Rights of intervention’ should be arranged in such a way so that Turkey will be able to intervene only in the Turkish Cypriot constituent state while Greece will be able to intervene only in the Greek Cypriot constituent state. 21% find this acceptable, 67% find it tolerable if necessary, and 12% find it entirely unacceptable.
- It should be re-affirmed that the ‘right of intervention’ of Greece or Turkey can still be exercised unilaterally by one or the other, in case agreement between them proves impossible. 11% find this acceptable, 74% find it tolerable if necessary, and 15% find it entirely unacceptable.

Security: Abolish Rights of Intervention (Greek Cypriots)

Greek Cypriots are close to unanimous on wanting to abolish guarantor intervention rights in Cyprus. Greek Cypriot respondents were also opposed to transitions or alternative arrangements that retain intervention rights. On the other hand, Greek Cypriots are open to a role for the EU in overseeing the implementation of a settlement. Similarly, there is support for a set of implementation guidelines.
Regarding the specifics of any possible treaty or other agreement regarding the implementation of a Comprehensive Settlement, how acceptable or unacceptable would you consider the inclusion of each of the following elements? (Turkish Cypriots)

A set of guidelines should be agreed in advance by all the sides, clarifying the appropriate response and responsibility for each implementation-related challenge that may in the future arise

The EU should set – for all the sides - motives for implementation and penalties for non-implementation, related to EU benefits and participation in EU decision making

It should be re-affirmed that the ‘right of intervention’ of Turkey or Greece can still be exercised unilaterally by one or the other, in case agreement between them proves impossible

‘Rights of intervention’ should be arranged in such a way so that Turkey will be able to intervene only in the Turkish Cypriot constituent state while Greece will be able to intervene only in the Greek Cypriot constituent state

‘Rights of intervention’ by Turkey or Greece should apply for 15 years after the settlement, after which they will expire

It should be made clear that the ‘right of intervention’ by Turkey or Greece excludes the possibility of military intervention

‘Rights of intervention’ by Turkey or Greece should be abolished altogether on the basis that unified Cyprus is going to be a sovereign country that is capable of taking care of its own affairs

Security: Guidelines Plus Rights of Interventions (Turkish Cypriots)

Interestingly, Turkish Cypriot respondents were keen to see a set of guidelines clarifying responses and responsibilities in implementation phases of a settlement. Significantly, respondents also favored a role for the EU in oversight. On these two points there is convergence with Greek Cypriots.

However, most Turkish Cypriots wish for the right of intervention to be retained.
If an international conference was held to discuss ways to solve the security and guarantees dossier, to what extent would you find acceptable or unacceptable the presence of each of the following potential participants? (Greek Cypriots)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Potential Participant</th>
<th>Entirely unacceptable</th>
<th>Tolerable if necessary</th>
<th>Satisfactory / Highly Desirable / Absolutely Essential</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Republic of Cyprus</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>94%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The European Union</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>94%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The United Nations</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>96%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Turkish Cypriot community</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>84%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Greek Cypriot community</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>85%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The United Kingdom</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The United States of America</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**International Conference Participants: Greek Cypriot views**

Greek Cypriots prefer an international conference attended by the Republic of Cyprus, the EU, the UN, and the two communities. Many – but not a majority - oppose Turkey’s potential participation.

Similarly, Greek Cypriots reject the participation of permanent UN Security Council members, in contrast to the formal preferences of their leadership on the matter.
Surprisingly, a majority of Turkish Cypriots support the representation of the Republic of Cyprus at an international conference, alongside the two communities, Turkey and Greece, the UN and the EU, in contrast to the formal position taken by their leadership on the matter.
SECTION E

CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES
The Greek Cypriot community to give its consent for Turkish Cypriot universities to become accepted within the European university accreditation system

Development and construction on originally Greek Cypriot properties in the north to be put on hold while talks for a Comprehensive Settlement are taking place

Putting an end to the negative daily statements of political leaders against the other community

Mutual official apologies to be offered by the leaderships of the two communities for past mistakes and hurts

Lifting of the restrictions on the use of mobile telephones and the sending of SMS messages while travelling across the Green Line

The establishment of a truth and reconciliation commission, to investigate for the truth regarding past events and hurts of the two communities, with a view to mutual forgiveness and reconciliation

The reduction of bureaucratic formalities at crossing points

The Greek Cypriot community to give its consent for Turkish Cypriot universities to become accepted within the European university accreditation system

CBMs: Yes to Most, No to Universities (Greek Cypriots)

Large majorities of Greek Cypriots support CBMs to restore monuments. They also wish to see a moratorium on construction on former Greek Cypriot properties. Greek Cypriots are also supportive of processes that uncover the fate of missing persons, and mutual apologies for past mistakes.

However, Greek Cypriots oppose consenting to the accreditation of Turkish Cypriot universities, presumably due to the perceived implications it has for recognition of the Turkish Cypriot state.
How do you evaluate each of the following measures for increasing cooperation and building trust between the two communities? (Turkish Cypriots)

- The restoration of religious, historical and cultural monuments that are of significance for each community: 95%
- Putting an end to the negative daily statements of political leaders against the other community: 86%
- Lifting of the restrictions on the use of mobile telephones and the sending of SMS messages while travelling across the Green Line: 88%
- The establishment of a truth and reconciliation commission, to investigate for the truth regarding past events and hurts of the two communities, with a view to mutual forgiveness and reconciliation: 77%
- The reduction of bureaucratic formalities at crossing points: 80%
- Mutual official apologies to be offered by the leaderships of the two communities for past mistakes and hurts: 65%
- The Greek Cypriot community to give its consent for Turkish Cypriot universities to become accepted within the European university accreditation system: 72%
- Development and construction on originally Greek Cypriot properties in the north to be put on hold while talks for a Comprehensive Settlement are taking place: 53%

CBMs: Overall Support (Turkish Cypriots)

Similar to Greek Cypriots, Turkish Cypriots support CBMs generally.

Interestingly, a slim majority also agree with a moratorium on development of Greek Cypriot property, although this is at odds with the official positions of their leadership.
To what extent would you find acceptable or unacceptable each of the following proposals regarding the issues of Varosha and Direct Trade? (Greek Cypriots)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Proposal</th>
<th>Entirely unacceptable</th>
<th>Tolerable if necessary</th>
<th>Satisfactory / Highly Desirable / Absolutely Essential</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Return of Varosha to the control of the Greek Cypriot community</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>97%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opening of Varosha as an inter-communal area under UN and EU auspices,</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>68%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>where Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots can live and work together</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Return of Varosha to the control of the Greek Cypriot community, while</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ercan airport is placed under EU supervision for direct flights between</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkish Cypriots and EU countries</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Varosha to be handed over to UN control, in preparation for the eventual</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>return of its Greek Cypriot inhabitants, while Famagusta port is</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>managed by the Turkish Cypriot community under EU and UN supervision</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opening of Varosha under Turkish Cypriot control, allowing Greek</td>
<td>76%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cypriot property owners to be reinstated</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ercan airport to be placed under EU supervision for direct flights</td>
<td>76%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>between Turkish Cypriots and EU countries</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opening of Famagusta port for direct trade between Turkish Cypriots and</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opening of all ports and airports currently in the northern part of</td>
<td>81%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus, for direct trade and direct flights between Turkish Cypriots and</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the EU</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Return of Varosha, inter-communal zone concept may work (Greek Cypriots)**

Greek Cypriots are keen to see Varosha returned to their community’s control, ideally under the control of the Greek Cypriot community. Having said that, respondents were also open to the idea of opening Varosha as an inter-communal area of co-operation under UN and EU auspices.

In contrast, trade-offs of the type “return of Varosha against the lifting of isolations” are met with skepticism by Greek Cypriots, who would need to be convinced of the viability and advisability of such deals.
To what extent would you find acceptable or unacceptable each of the following proposals regarding the issues of Varosha and Direct Trade? (Turkish Cypriots)

Opening of all ports and airports currently in the northern part of Cyprus, for direct trade and direct flights between Turkish Cypriots and the EU

- Entirely unacceptable: 3%, Tolerable if necessary: 5%, Satisfactory / Highly Desirable / Absolutely Essential: 92%

Opening of Famagusta port for direct trade between Turkish Cypriots and EU

- Entirely unacceptable: 5%, Tolerable if necessary: 4%, Satisfactory / Highly Desirable / Absolutely Essential: 92%

Ercan airport to be placed under EU supervision for direct flights between Turkish Cypriots and EU countries

- Entirely unacceptable: 8%, Tolerable if necessary: 7%, Satisfactory / Highly Desirable / Absolutely Essential: 86%

Opening of Varosha as an inter-communal area under UN and EU auspices, where Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots can live and work together

- Entirely unacceptable: 38%, Tolerable if necessary: 18%, Satisfactory / Highly Desirable / Absolutely Essential: 45%

Opening of Varosha under Turkish Cypriot control, allowing Greek Cypriot property owners to be reinstated

- Entirely unacceptable: 43%, Tolerable if necessary: 22%, Satisfactory / Highly Desirable / Absolutely Essential: 36%

Famagusta port to be managed by the Turkish Cypriot community under EU and UN supervision, while Varosha to be handed over to UN control, in preparation for the eventual return of its Greek Cypriot inhabitants

- Entirely unacceptable: 53%, Tolerable if necessary: 17%, Satisfactory / Highly Desirable / Absolutely Essential: 30%

Ercan airport to be placed under EU supervision for direct flights between Turkish Cypriots and EU countries while Varosha is returned to the control of the Greek Cypriot community

- Entirely unacceptable: 70%, Tolerable if necessary: 12%, Satisfactory / Highly Desirable / Absolutely Essential: 18%

Return of Varosha to the control of the Greek Cypriot community

- Entirely unacceptable: 81%, Tolerable if necessary: 9%, Satisfactory / Highly Desirable / Absolutely Essential: 10%

Opening of Ports and Ercan, but Varosha Problematic (Turkish Cypriots)

For the most part, Turkish Cypriots want their ports open for trade and Ercan airport open for international flights. The majority of Turkish Cypriots oppose returning Varosha to Greek Cypriot control even as part of a package. Thus, similar to Greek Cypriots, the Turkish Cypriots would need to be convinced of the viability of any deal. That said Turkish Cypriots are, like Greek Cypriots, relatively open to conceiving Varosha as an area of cooperation.
SECTION F

OPPORTUNITIES FOR CONVERGENCE
Opportunities for substantive convergence: Limited but significant options

While on substantive issues Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots generally diverge, this poll has indicated certain directions which do hold potential for consensus. These tend to be “out of the box” proposals, which are not part of the official repertoire of either side, and which provide practical solutions that everyone can benefit from.
Opportunities to agree on CBMs: A broad range of possibilities

Both communities are quite eager to see progress on CBMs being made, especially where such measures will contribute towards a more positive environment which is conducive to reconciliation. For potential CBMs where a significant minority is opposed (e.g. greater than 30%) intense public debates can be expected in case a decision is made to go ahead with them.