

**UNITED NATIONS REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL CIVILIAN CAPACITIES.
RESULTS OF A CIVIL SOCIETY SURVEY.
Interpeace – 22 December 2010**

Executive Summary

This report is a contribution to a broader UN-led reflection and wider consultation about the type, quality, expertise and availability of civilian experts to support the immediate capacity development needs of countries emerging from conflict. There is particular interest in mobilizing more capacities from 'the Global South' and from women.

It summarises the responses of 34 civil society organisations, twenty two from 'the South' and twelve from 'the North'. Most of the respondents work on inclusive political processes, basic safety and security and core government functionality. About two thirds of the respondents had some meaningful working experience with the UN. The survey questionnaire asked civil society organisations to share observations and views on 1) what they see and experience in their own programmatic environments, 2) international assistance actors and in particular on the UN, and 3) the added value of human rights, gender and capacity-development expertise in their areas, and how possible gaps in this regard can be addressed.

1. Important actors.

The responses signaled that national and international actor as well as international experts are all important. Some respondents stress the primacy of the national actors – given the critical importance of local ownership. International actors have added value to bring but the message is to do it in partnership with national actors. For the national/local actors it is vital that international –including regional- actors work coherently and in harmonized ways. The lack of coherence, coordination and complementarities between the international assistance actors is a much repeated theme throughout the responses. With regard to national/local capacities, the message is that the capacities of the national state institutions and civil society need to be strengthened both, but also their willingness and ability to work together. The provision of funding by international actors is appreciated, inasmuch as it is without bias.

2. Critical capacity gaps.

The questionnaire and its accompanying documentation did not clarify how 'capacity' can be understood. Minimally at least three different understandings are possible: resources (money, numbers of people, time – a more quantitative expression of 'capacity'), knowledge and skills (a more qualitative expression) and power (another qualitative expression).

Some answers referred more to the conditions in the country and its internal socio-political dynamics as *obstacles* rather than to 'capacity gaps' as such e.g. ongoing power contests and/or a lack of a strategic and longer-term vision also by the national authorities. Similar observations recur to explain why certain capacity gaps persist. These observations are important because they signal that all problems and obstacles cannot be overcome by 'capacity strengthening' in the limited sense in which this is often understood i.e. through providing more resources (quantity) and developing competencies (e.g. through training, mentoring, advisory services).

Various responses pointed at certain sectors/themes of work, with notably the 'security sector', 'gender' and 'inclusive political processes' most often referred to. A number of other responses highlight gaps in 'competencies' (knowledge, skills) and in 'power', e.g. a lack of competencies among both international and national actors to design, manage and facilitate inclusive political processes, or a lack of power to early on and effectively counteract escalations of violence.

But many respondents also pointed at the tendency to neglect and sideline a lot of especially national and local actors who could and should contribute. This reflects a perceived generalized inability of the international community to *engage* with 'local' capacities, a repeated message throughout the responses to the whole questionnaire. This lack of engagement is also reflected in and leads to a perceived systemic lack of structured and sustained investment in the development of professional capacities both in the national public sector and the non-profit sector. One respondent referred to this as being 'THE gap'!

In addition there is a perceived inability in enriching and adapting 'national' approaches with and to more 'local' conditions and dynamics.

Many respondents attributed the persistence of the capacity gaps to the interests, attitudes, institutional cultures, policies and programming, management practices and resource allocations of notably the international actors. This covers a wide range of issues, central ones among which are: outsider driven, top-down approaches; blue print 'solutions' with little attention to the specific national and local contexts and dynamics; short-term 'quick fix' projects rather than the sustained engagement that is required for peacebuilding; an infatuation with quick and visible 'results'; mechanical management of what are inevitably complex and not totally controllable processes; no planning at the outset for local ownership and sustainability; absence of any effective learning; and funding practices that are often an obstacle to sustained engagement and for smaller and local civil society organisations.

Various sectors or areas of work were seen as not receiving enough assistance, notably peacebuilding and violence reduction as a whole; governance; justice and law enforcement; economic revival; and on the whole the development of knowledge and skills. A few respondents referred to the education sector and the health sector, notably mother and child and reproductive health care.

3. UN capacity shortcomings.

The UN came in for quite some criticism. Central criticisms referred to its state-centric orientation which makes it too obliging to the national governments' views; the inability to work as one UN team behind a common vision for the UN in a country; its counterproductive bureaucracy; its staffing (too many costly internationals and not enough national experts and in more senior positions); the quality of its personnel (technical and functional competencies but not so competent when it comes to implementation; and often with a perceived lack of context understanding and cultural and conflict sensitivity); its 'liberal-peace' model and the inability to adapt programming to the specific dynamics in any given place; and a perceived distance from local civil society and the local communities. All together this becomes an impediment to the strengthening of local capacities and stronger local ownership.

4. Awareness and capability of the international community to draw on local expertise.

Though the question invited reflection on the international community in its diversity, the responses overwhelmingly continued to focus on the UN.

Whereas various respondents felt that the international community/UN is both aware and capable of drawing on local expertise, many others felt the opposite. Even those who initially replied positively tended to point out that 'aware' and 'capable' does not mean it also happens in practice. The dominant feeling is certainly that local expertise is by no means widely recognized and drawn upon. On the contrary the international community/UN are seen as having a tendency to over-rely on internationals.

The following recommendations were made on how this can be improved:

- delegate much more decision-making power to the field level;
- minimum quota for the employment of local talent; fill more top posts with nationals;
- donors to earmark a percentage of their country budgets for support to local peace builders – but allowing them to develop their own strategies;
- involve early on all sectors of society and not only the government in the development of major public policies and strategies, and work with longer time frames to allow broader and more genuine participation;
- make a greater and concerted effort to identify local peace activists; involve them in developing and updating the conflict analysis including the various more local conflict dynamics;
- develop close ties to grassroots structures and increase and deepen local participation in the planning, implementation and evaluation of projects;
- do a robust baseline capacity assessment rather than assuming local capacities will be weak, and develop more local training capacities;
- invest in the strengthening of a strong local capacity, of both the state and civil society, and in their ability to work together;
- work more with regional actors and initiatives;
- enable and encourage more local ownership and responsibility.

5. The value of international experts.

The question did not specify who is actually referred to with 'international experts': are it shorter-term consultants – as several respondents seem to have interpreted the question; are it international staff that is seconded to national entities often for a medium-term period; or are it international staff working for an international agency within a given country, typically also for a medium- to perhaps longer term period?

Responses were mixed. Several respondents were positive about international experts, and felt their contribution could be enhanced if they were allowed to remain engaged with a process rather than limited to often one-off contributions. Many other respondents however were skeptical and critical, finding their contributions often mediocre. This was then a consequence of these experts exhibiting the same shortcomings that the international institutions are often perceived as suffering from: a short-term and quick fix logic, 'one size fits all' and 'cut and paste' approaches not hampered by adequate insight into the specifics of the dynamics playing out in a given environment, and more general shortcomings such as a lack of sensitivity and skills about conflict dynamics and peacebuilding or gender. The inability to communicate in the local language was often mentioned.

A central message related to the value of international experts inasmuch as they actually transfer knowledge and skills to national/local actors and are themselves willing to listen and learn from local actors. However few international experts are actually seen as actually doing so.

6. The added value of human rights, gender and capacity development expertise.

There was broad and strong agreement that the three issues are very important areas and hence constitute added value – and that civil societies in many countries have a lot to contribute on them.

Regarding both gender and human rights broader observations were also made: the challenge is to understand the specificities of local societies in the face of general principles that are considered 'universal'; too many actors become hesitant about human rights and gender because of the admonition to show 'cultural sensitivity' and hence refrain from addressing them with the local people; there can be religious sensitivities and political constraints and even security threats from militants and religious extremists.

On capacity development it was felt that a tendency persists to see the local population as not having any capacities and in need of being skilled and trained, though someone else felt that there are indeed shortages of national capacities to promote legal and human rights issues and to design and support inclusive political processes.

Finally, one respondent confirmed the importance of all three themes, but felt that the strategies pursued so far needed to be reviewed as they have not delivered the hoped for results.

UNITED NATIONS REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL CIVILIAN CAPACITIES.

RESULTS OF A CIVIL SOCIETY SURVEY.

Interpeace – 22 December 2010

I. BACKGROUND: THE REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL CIVILIAN CAPACITIES.

In his report on *Peacebuilding in the immediate aftermath of conflict* the UN Secretary-General indicated that “a review needs to be undertaken that would analyze how the United Nations and the international community can help to broaden and deepen the pool of civilian experts to support the immediate capacity development needs of countries emerging from conflict.” The report also emphasized the need to map the supply of civilian capacity within and outside the UN against a realistic assessment of demand, to improve coordination and interoperability among bilateral and multilateral efforts to deploy civilian experts, and to find ways to better mobilize capacity from the Global South and among women.

In that context the UN Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO) asked Interpeace to conduct a rapid survey of the experiences, views and suggestions of civil society organisations. This report summarises the results of that survey. Thirty four organisations responded of which 32 filled in the questionnaire. Of the 34, twenty two can be considered from ‘the South’ and twelve from ‘the North’. Of the 22 ‘Southern’ organisations 14 are from Africa, 4 from Latin America and Caribbean, 3 from Asia-Pacific and 1 from the Middle East. More information on the survey itself can be found in Annex 1.

The survey questionnaire (see Annex 2) asked civil society organisations to share observations and views on 1) what they see and experience in their own programmatic environments, 2) international assistance actors and in particular on the UN, and 3) the added value of human rights, gender and capacity-development expertise in their areas, and how possible gaps in this regard can be addressed.

A. RESPONDING ORGANISATIONS REFLECTING ON THEIR PROGRAMMATIC ENVIRONMENTS.

The perceptions and observations of the responding organisations on their own programmatic environment were covered through following questions:

1. What area or areas does your organization specialize in? (choice of 5 sectors)
2. Within your focus area(s) which actors are the most important? (national, international, international experts)
3. Within which areas have you identified critical capacity gaps with respect to the needs?
4. Why do you think these gaps persist? And in which actors do they persist?
5. In your view, are there any areas where there simply is too little assistance provided?

Summary of Replies.

1. What area or areas does your organisations specialize in?

The aggregated areas of specialization of the 32 organisations that responded to the questionnaire (2 responded to the questions in the cover message), according to the five sectors offered, shows the following profile of the areas they are working in. Obviously various organisations are working in more than one sector.

- ▶ Basic safety and security: 14
- ▶ Inclusive political processes: 25
- ▶ Basic social services: 8
- ▶ Core government functionality: 11
- ▶ Revitalised economy: 6

The responses show a clear dominance of organisations working on inclusive political processes, basic safety and security and core government functionality.

Of the 32 who answered the questionnaire, 21 said they had some meaningful working experience with the UN, while 11 said they did not.

2. Within your focus area(s) which actors are the most important? (national, international, international experts)

The responses signaled that all these actors are important. Some respondents stress the primacy of the national actors – given the critical importance of local ownership. International actors have added value to bring but the message is to do it in partnership with national actors. For the national/local actors it is vital that international –including regional- actors work coherently and in harmonized ways. The lack of coherence, coordination and complementarities between the international assistance actors is a much repeated theme throughout the responses. With regard to national/local capacities, the message is that the capacities of the national state institutions and civil society need to be strengthened both, but also their willingness and ability to work together.

Other than the above the respondents mostly listed various *categories of actors* and only occasionally specific ones.

a. National actors.

Government but also political opposition; parliament; armed factions; leaders for peace that have institutionalized national structures to continue the dynamics they energized; political parties; local and municipal authorities; local committees; civil society (including very local entities and informal groups); rural dwellers, traditional elders and village elders; women and women's groups; youth; indigenous people; ex-political prisoners (Palestine); victim associations; media; and the diaspora.

Types of actors mentioned as specifically relevant to security: the army, police, judiciary, the prison system, the public administration and the demobilized fighters;

Types of actors mentioned as specifically relevant for economic revival: the private sector; entrepreneurs; local administrations; and the education sector.

Identified actors mentioned: National Security Council & Office of National Security (Sierra Leone); Governance Commission; Civil Society SSR Working Group; Transitional Justice Working Group; Women's NGO Secretariat of Liberia; and the Justice and Peace Commission (Liberia)

b. International actors:

Respondents referred to various UN institutions (the UN Security Council, UNDP, OHCHR, ILO, UN missions (e.g. MINUGUA, UNOSAL, UNMIL); UNICEF, UNFPA, IOM; World Bank), to regional initiatives and institutions (the African Union, the OAS mission in Colombia; Mano River Union & ECOWAS for Sierra Leone; Sistema de Integración Centroamericana or SICA, Sistema Interamericano de Derechos Humanos with its commission, institute and Interamerican Court of Human Rights; Centro de Estudios para la Justicia de las Américas or CEJA; the UN Latin American Institute for the Prevention of Delinquency and the Treatment of the Delinquent or ILANUD; EU delegations; the Commonwealth; NATO), to international and regional NGOs and international research institutes, think tanks and academia; (such as ActionAid; Peace Direct, INGOs from the Netherlands, Germany, Sweden and Norway, the International Centre for Transitional Justice; international organisations working for the abolishment of the death penalty; the National Democratic Institute; the African Security Sector Network) and to bilateral donors.

Several respondents signaled the importance of international actors as providers of funds and resources, one qualified this with the condition that they be unbiased and/or legitimate in doing so.

c. International experts:

Areas of expertise: Some respondents indicated the thematic areas where international expertise is relevant for their programming environment: negotiation & mediation; governance; DDR/SSSR/ security sector governance including defense issues and border security, gender, fight against torture and extrajudicial killings.

Specific sources of expertise mentioned: DFID and UK advisers; peace research institutions like the Berghof Foundation (Germany); Conciliation Resources (UK); Interpeace (Switzerland); Equal Rights Trust (UK); CREA (India); the Diplomacy Training Programme (Univ. of New South Wales in Australia); and UNOHCHR.

3. Within which areas have you identified critical capacity gaps with respect to the needs?

Some answers referred more to the conditions in the country and its internal socio-political dynamics as *obstacles* rather than to 'capacity gaps' as such:

- Problematic political processes: the party in power seeks to centralize all power leaving no space to a political opposition; the political opposition largely lacks alternatives and only seeks power;
- Narrow rather than common interests & politicization: civil servants and the police serve the party in power and not the community; some civil servants are unwilling to recognize the legitimacy and capacities within local civil society and among indigenous people and hence not prepared to work together; civil servants giving priority to their own institutional and personal survival rather than the national interest; corruption;
- No real strategic and longer-term approach by the national authorities, who are too focused on the shorter term conjuncture;
- Not enough political will to adopt aggressive social, economic and structural reform policies;
- No clear economic policy; employment opportunities filled on partisan grounds.

Two respondents signaled that there is a problem with how the debate about 'capacities' is framed: The identification of 'needs' gets distorted when it is done by actors that have specific institutional agendas and who function with a results-based management system that is largely internally oriented; and what looks like a 'capacity gap' from one perspective may be perceived as 'incoherent prioritization' from another perspective.

One respondent signaled that there is a problematic distinction between 'conflict' and 'post conflict' and that the labels are not consistently applied even to the same situation. For another the issue is more about how conflict resolution is generally approached: Those best placed to act to prevent conflict or build peace are often ignored or not given enough space and support – local groups are sidelined in favour of support to international actors or in 'national' approaches that ignore the more localised context dynamics and groups. This reflects a perceived generalized inability of the international community to engage with 'local' capacities, a recurrent point throughout the responses.

More specific answers about critical capacity gaps can be grouped as referring to sectors & themes of work; neglected and/or sidelined actors; and gaps in competencies and/or in power. ¹

Sectors and themes of work that are mentioned as showing capacity gaps: the security sector including the reintegration of demobilized fighters (e.g. Burundi, DRC); political dialogue and reconciliation; peacebuilding and civilian conflict management; justice and human rights; local governance and decentralization (e.g. Somalia) ; provision of basic social services to the most vulnerable; reproductive health & sexual violence; economic development (including infrastructure and private sector development; employment for youth); public information and media; gendering work (including addressing violence against women; women income and employment; building trust in electoral processes especially

¹ Among the respondents both global and country-specific actors often pointed at the 'neglected actors' and 'competencies and power' gaps, rather than specific sectors or themes.

among women – but gender is also not only about ‘women’); handling conflict over land and property ownership.

The security sector, gender and to a lesser degree inclusive political processes were most often referred to.

Neglected actors: There are various actors that can or must play a role but tend to be overlooked such as the private sector; the diaspora; victims in transitional justice processes and how to meet their demands for truth, justice and reparation and how to protect them from threat and retaliation. One respondent felt that “many” actors are sidelined during peace processes, partially on the basis that they are *not* perceived as potential spoilers. Another respondent felt that women and their capacities remain inadequately mobilized, and that no enabling environment is created to encourage ownership by women. Continued weaknesses in engendering all the work reappears in responses to other questions.

Competencies and power: A range of responses refer more to qualitative shortcomings, either in terms of competencies, of power or both. Specific instances mentioned were:

- Not a strong capacity to counteract violent escalations in a non-violent and practical approach at an early point (power?);
- Limited ability of civil society to respond to the needs of the people with policies and outputs that make a difference in daily life (competencies? power?);
- There are not enough assistance actors that engage with inclusive political processes (quantity) but also not enough capacities (competencies) of locals/local staff/a larger segment of national civil society to manage inclusive political processes (e.g. that create neutral spaces in which the most critical issues can be addressed and/or that will allow former rebel organisations to join in the political processes in the country); (competencies?, power?);
- In the peacebuilding field there is a lack of facilitation skills among both national and international actors (competencies);
- There are not enough experts that are well prepared (quality) or not many locally available qualified experts to advice on political, constitutional and rule of law dilemmas, and to provide information on peace media, conflict resolution, dialogue processes and non-discriminatory laws (e.g. Fiji)
- Lack of understanding among the international actors about the appropriate roles for national and international actors. Sometimes national actors replace national capacities. This is not the right way (power?);
- There is not enough understanding among both national and international actors about security sector reform and SS governance (including maritime security and border security - Liberia); as well as a need for more technical expertise on the various institutional mechanisms for democratic participation (competencies);
- INGOs use international standards while many local NGOs and CBOs don't even know these standards, regardless of being able to meet them (knowledge);
- Computer skills, basic arithmetic (Sudan) (competencies).

Several respondents referred to the systemic lack of structured and sustained investment in the development of professional capacities both in the national public sector and the non-profit sector, an observation that will come back in the responses to later questions. One respondent referred to this as being 'THE gap'!

4. Why do you think these gaps persist? And in which actors do they persist?

Several respondents again referred to the situation in the country as reason why the gaps persist:

- The root causes of the conflict persist or because violence and insecurity are increasing;
- Resistance from nationalist political actors and dominance of 'power-brokers'; there are actors that benefit from conflict;
- The parties to the conflict have opposing positions on various issues;
- Government authorities enjoying their new power and privileges and forgetting that the civil war was caused by bad governance in the first place – so they repeat exclusionary, venal and repressive practices, which undermine the consolidation of peace;
- A weak political culture, not enough political will;
- Public servants, including in senior positions, that do not have the required competencies;
- Civil society beginning to play the role of a political opposition and the political opposition manipulating some civil society organisations;
- Faith-based groups, political parties, media houses and various civic and pressure groups campaign along divisionary lines without recognizing that such practices could undermine the gains in peace consolidation made so far (e.g. divisive messages during election season);
- Immature and non-professional media but also constraints and pressures on the media;
- A negative public perception of civil society organisations which translates also in weak local public financial support for non-religious work;
- The government has no social policy to help the vulnerable populations become real agents of development;
- Vertical service delivery biased by kin or clan or monetary or political influences;
- Multi-interests of beneficiary groups;
- Lack of initiative and creativity in local society.

The interesting point in these observations about such political and societal reasons why capacity gaps persist, is that they cannot simply be overcome by '*capacity strengthening*' in the limited sense in which this is often understood i.e. through providing more resources (quantity) and developing competencies (e.g. through training, mentoring, advisory services).

Most responses considered the persistent capacity gaps more in relation to the various actors and interveners rather than the situational dynamics in the society under consideration. Few respondents identify specific actors in whom weaknesses would persist,

most see them in all actors, international and national. One respondent signaled that all actors have strengths and weaknesses, and that persistent capacity gaps can only be identified on a case by case basis.

One respondent attributed the persistence of 'capacity gaps' to the fact that the whole capacity debate is framed in an unhelpful way.

Another respondent pointed at the fact that most 'peace research' is actually the study of violent conflict rather than 'states of peace' – hence we don't really understand what it is that sustains peace in a society (The Global Peace Index has developed indicators of peacefulness and assesses countries against those).

Other answers focus more on persistent problems in the 'responses', particularly though not only among the international assistance actors. These can be grouped under: interests; attitudes; institutional cultures; policies and programming; knowledge and learning; specific practices, and resource allocations. Many of those themes will reappear in the answers to following questions.

Interests: Actors pursue their own selfish interests and agendas (governmental ones mainly); the UN is too beholden to the national government and hence will avoid anything that could be confrontational;

Attitudes: So many issues are a priority that nothing is a priority; a general tendency to outsider driven, top-down approaches, with outsiders unwilling and unable to reduce their control and empower national actors; external actors come with blueprints, there is no real interest in listening to local actors and no really strong alliances between international and national actors; the rhetoric of local ownership is not matched by practice; the real objective is only restoring stability and not sustainable peace; there is a pervasive (among outsiders but also national actors and even beneficiaries) interest in 'quick fixes' rather than the longer-term processes and engagement that are necessary and inevitable; time lines that are determined by external actors; the way external actors & donors conceive of 'results' which promotes only interventions with rapid and 'sellable' impact (hence e.g. a preference for infrastructure rather than the human resources to operate it); sometimes the national actors have difficulty stepping back and looking at the conflict through a more strategic lens;

Institutional cultures: Too much HQ dominance; internal performance criteria predominate over results on the ground; formalised and institutional approaches simply do not allow a 'human security' perspective that can get down to the level of the individual;

Policies and programming: Conflict analyses are not carried out together with national including 'local' actors; donors impose conditionalities that do not serve the country well; there is too much preference among international actors for larger projects that then become less adaptive to local circumstances and local capacities; there is no real investment in building national/local capacities – international assistance actors are not really interested in investing the time and effort to increase the number and capacities of local peacebuilders;

although there is a widespread acceptance of a 'systems' approach to peacebuilding does not translate into application in practice; there is no planning from the outset for local ownership and for sustainability - too many projects and programmes fold after the emergency phase when local communities are not in a position to sustain them; no proper gender analysis is carried out and even where it has been done there is limited capacity to translate the results into strategic and participatory approaches; there is no involvement of local people including intended beneficiaries in design, implementation and monitoring and evaluation of international plans and programmes; there is a tendency to concentrate projects in the same areas and neglect other areas and people in need.

Knowledge and learning: There are persistent language and cultural barriers; there is often a lack of understanding of the local situation and minimal knowledge of local culture and life among external actors even after years of presence; there is only very limited sharing or transfer of knowledge between international experts and local actors; local NGOs only learn new ways of writing proposals; civilian experts deployed for substantive functions are often poorly prepared and not always qualified; there is no understanding of the need for inclusiveness in political processes; there is no encouragement of reflective and critical thinking and there are no efforts to develop or upgrade a learning system; there are no efforts to properly evaluate and compare the effectiveness and impacts of locally led with internationally led peacebuilding;

Specific practices: The failure of the 3Cs (coherence, coordination, complementarities) is reiterated here. Other responses point at the decontextualised and rigid logframes and annual work plans that are not appropriate to capture and manage complex, inclusive, flexible and context specific and therefore somewhat unpredictable peacebuilding processes. They also point at weak monitoring and evaluation systems and a lack of longer-term follow through of interventions.

Resource allocations: International funding structures are not adapted to supporting smaller local capacities: there is a reluctance to provide core funding, to administer many smaller grants, international donors are too slow to release funds and have a desire to see quick results. There is no effort to get to know wider local civil society beyond the tried and tested usual suspects; the bigger local NGOs start mimicking INGOs and lose the positive characteristics of being local. The perception among these civil society respondents is that too much money goes into the public sector and not enough into civil society – donors should set aside a minimum percentage for civil society investment. Even where funding is available continuous gaps in funding prevent the continuity of projects and processes, leading to the loss of high quality staff and undermining again the emerging peace dividends (e.g. PBF supported activities in Liberia). And expat costs and logistics eat too large a part of the budget.

5. In your view, are there any areas where there simply is too little assistance provided?

One respondent indicated that it is not about quantity but about the quality and *how* things are done. "*There is too little support for the right kind of initiatives.*"

The other responses can be grouped under different sectors and/or themes.

Peacebuilding and violence reduction: This was referred to in terms of: peacebuilding methodologies and skills; early warning and conflict prevention; civilian conflict management; 'human security' being about more than stopping violence; reducing community violence; changing mindsets and attitudes and genuine reconciliation requiring longer-term engagement;

Governance: Specific references were made to the importance of restoring core government functions but with a warning about avoiding excessive centralization of power. Gap areas mentioned were: support to the representative and legislative branch of government notably parliament after elections; the area of fiscal policy but also more capacities especially among civil society actors to understand and analyze a national budget; and in a wider sense strengthening the 'technical' capacities –including of civil society- to analyse policy issues and develop credible public policy proposals with and for the State, and to design and manage processes that help people participate in governance.

Knowledge and skills: There is a perceived lack of support for local advocacy skills and for local 'research' capacities though also not enough capacity to *use* research based information. Generally and at all levels including for the international actors, there is a perceived lack of investment in training and certain not enough development of local training capacities; smaller NGOs have difficulty accessing even the existing training opportunities.

Economic revival: The responses seem to suggest as a sector this receives inadequate assistance. Specific references are made to the need for more assistance for natural resources management; youth employment; industrial development; private sector development and support for very local economic activity as opposed to bigger business;

Justice and law enforcement: The responses referred to human rights; human resources in law enforcement agencies; the fight against transnational crime and terrorism; security sector reform and governance – including the intelligence services (which are seen as also falling victim to the general quick fix attitude and lack of sustained engagement);

Health: Two respondents pointed at a specific area in health provision i.e. maternal and child health; reproductive health;

Education: One respondent added that some measures imposed by the IMF even force the reduction in the number of teachers, another that institutions for higher education tend to remain poorly funded and managed hence do not deliver adequately prepared graduates.

Communications equipment: One respondent noted that many smaller and local CBOs and NGOs don't even have communications equipment.

B. RESPONDING ORGANISATIONS REFLECTING ON THE INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE ACTORS AND SOMETIMES SPECIFICALLY ON THE UN.

The perceptions and observations of the responding organisations on the international assistance actors in general and sometimes on the UN specifically, were elicited through following questions:

1. Have you got any experience in working with the UN system and if yes, are there areas where you believe the UN has capacity shortcomings and how would you describe these?
2. Do you think the international community, including the UN system, is sufficiently aware of the need to draw on local expertise, and is capable of drawing on local expertise? If not, can you describe specific examples and suggest how the UN could improve the way it works in this regard?
3. In your experience, is the assistance provided within your area(s) by international experts an appropriate one? (skills, background, language, approach).

Summary of replies.

1. Have you got any experience in working with the UN system and if yes, are there areas where you believe the UN has capacity shortcomings and how would you describe these?

Number of respondents with experience of working with UN system: 21 (out of 32).

Diverse capacity shortcomings are identified typically in general terms.

Dependency: One respondent points out that the UN itself is dependent on the member states in whose hands lie ultimately the decisions about what funding will be available for what or where Blue Helmets will be deployed and how many under what mandate. That may make it actually practically impossible to enforce even a Chapter 7 Resolution in the face of local resistance. Particular reference here is made to the failure to protect civilians under threat. In addition the UN in country has to be the official partner of the government which makes it more difficult to integrate alternative analyses and views coming from civil society – as a result it becomes difficult for the UN to be a credible actor in the eyes of society at large;

One UN team: Various responses point to the lack of coherence and coordination within the UN in any given country: different agencies work according to their individual mandates and with their own budgets and without overarching vision of what as UN together they hope to achieve in that place. One response points at the implications of this in terms of the UN's acceptability to play certain roles e.g. the UN needs to understand that if one branch of it engages in military actions, another branch cannot hope to act as a neutral mediator.

Bureaucracy: The UN bureaucracy and too great centralization come in for repeated criticism: It makes the UN actions very slow, unresponsive and inefficient in implementation.

Staffing: Several responses signal that the UN has too many personnel and especially too many international staff – which eat up a large part of the budget. The UN tends to assume that it has sufficient expertise. It doesn't trust local expertise and local institutions. There should be more local expertise and not only in junior positions, and more money and effort invested in strengthening local capacities. In addition the high turnover of staff impedes sustained engagement and sustainability;

Quality of personnel: The quality of the personnel also comes in for criticism: Some respondents feel that UN personnel do not really master the issues on which they have to work. There is also inadequate preparation of international staff regarding the context and culture in which they will be deployed and the dynamics among the actors there. Many are seen as deficient in local cultural and conflict sensitivity. Others see them as having strong technical and functional expertise but weak in implementing strategies, applying local knowledge and monitoring improvements. One respondent felt that women in the UN still face huge challenges.

Peace models: In terms of the broad 'peacebuilding model', there is criticism that the UN applies a fairly generic 'liberal peace' model in all contexts, with little regard for the historical, cultural, political realities of the specific place. In reality it tends to reconstruct some of the problems that contributed to the crisis, such as a political system with an excessive concentration of power at the top. With regard to inclusive political processes, there is not enough attention to local dialogue processes.

Programming: On the more programmatic level, the UN is seen as thinking in linear schemata and generalized categories and hence unable to understand the specific social dynamics in any given place.

Attitudes to local organisations: Local civil society is often 'consulted' but gets involved much too late in a process (e.g. in the development of a Poverty Reduction Strategy) – and without the intention of really integrating diverging opinions. In addition examples were given of a perceived lack of respect for local organisations e.g. repeatedly rescheduling a workshop because some paper hasn't been signed yet; telling a local organization to come back after they had made a long voyage to meet people in a local UN office, because a whole local UN office is going to a meeting somewhere; not communicating about what happened to project applications submitted.

Strengthening local civil society capacities: Often capacity-support projects are short-term and strategies are not long-term but change before they have achieved more durable results; the UN is also weak in starting from civil society in order to create constructive interactions and collaboration with government.

Local ownership: Several respondents point at the gap/distance between the UN and local actors, especially local civil society. The way the UN goes about its business is seen as an impediment to local ownership and to national/local leadership. Even the way the UN approach local security is without involving local communities. As a result eventually people become distrustful of the UN mission.

Impact: Finally, there are also critical comments about the impacts of UN supported work: The social services provided have little impact and are not sustainable.

"The ordinary person in the country would not be able to say what the UN does in the country, as almost no UN project has a direct impact for the population at large."

Only one respondent pointed at a particular area with a capacity gap i.e. in "the coordination and management of national security and intelligence architectures". It was suggested that on this issue the UN should formalize partnership relations with capable institutions – including in the South.

2. Do you think the international community, including the UN system, is sufficiently aware of the need to draw on local expertise, and is capable of drawing on local expertise? If not, can you describe specific examples and suggest how the UN could improve the way it works in this regard?

Awareness in the international community and the UN: 13 out of the 31 who filled in this part of the questionnaire (one respondent did not) felt that there was awareness in the international community, while 16 said there was none. Some of those who said 'yes' still qualified their answer: "Yes but the question is 'how?'; "Yes but this is too often limited, especially in the UN, to national government departments. Much more can be done to engage with civil society." Two respondents replied 'yes and no'. They explained this as "yes in discourse but no in practice" and "we are unsure why there is not more use of local expertise and capacities: is it a lack of awareness or a conscious refusal?"

Capability in the international community: 17 out of the 31 who filled in this part of the questionnaire responded that the international community and the UN are capable of drawing on local expertise, while 14 felt they were not capable. One who said 'no' explained this further in terms of contextual constraints: "Local expertise may not be available because of brain drain or under threat from armed actors or not receive support for their initiatives from the state authorities".

The apparent predominance of the positive replies however cannot be taken at face value. A lot of qualifying remarks suggested that the international community may very well be 'capable' but that doesn't mean that in its actual practices it does draw on local capacities. Indeed, there were many qualifying comments that pointed at a problem within the international community:

- "It is not seen as a priority."
- "The UN is distant, even physically separated from communities and local people."
- "The UN has a tendency to only relate to international 'experts' and local power structures and to ignore the vital role and skills of local civil society."
- "The UN employs local staff only for administrative and junior level work – it is not employing local experts."

- "Small civil society organisations cannot access the UN system because of the bureaucracy and difficult procedures and language barriers."
- "There is a lack of consultation with population groups that are not perceived as 'expert'."
- "They are aware and capable but for an unidentified reason not interested in doing that."

Examples and suggestions on how the UN could improve the way it works in this regard:
Respondents did not give examples but came up with many suggestions on how to improve:

Four general recommendations related to

- the delegation of much more decision-making power to the field level;
- enabling and encouraging more local ownership and responsibility;
- early involvement of all sectors of society - beyond the government - in the development of major public policies and strategies, and a longer time frame to allow more and more genuine participation;
- invest in the strengthening of a strong local capacity, of both the state and civil society, and in their ability to work together.

Other specific suggestions were also offered:

Work with regional actors: Give more visibility to and accompany regional initiatives, and work more with regional leaders to count on their expertise to find approaches and alternatives – with the consensus of relevant stakeholders.

Assess and support-diverse- local capacities: Do a baseline capacity assessment to have a robust basis of appreciation of the nature and extent of local capacities rather than assuming they will be weak; invest systematically in the development of national/local capacities, and also develop more local training capacity; recognize that local civil society is broader than just a few prominent organisations and work with a wider spectrum that will generate different views and proposals – but that is enriching.

Local peacebuilders: Make a greater and concerted effort to identify local peacebuilders and other local groupings and movements for peace; involve local peacebuilders in developing and updating conflict analyses, including the analysis of the very local conflict dynamics; provide a similar coordination platform service to local peacebuilders that OCHA provides to the humanitarian actors; international donors to allocate a certain percentage of their budgets for conflict interventions to the support of local peacebuilders – while allowing these to develop their own strategies.

Staffing: Set minimum quota targets for the employment of local talent and fill more top posts with nationals.

Community-based approaches: Develop close ties to grassroots structures to understand the needs and wishes of local people; involve local community leaders in the analysis and search for solutions; increase and deepen local participation in the planning, implementation and

evaluation of projects; use more local indicators and benchmarks than referring to generic ones and international standards.

3. In your experience, is the assistance provided within your area(s) by international experts an appropriate one? (skills, background, language, approach).

The responses to this question break down into three categories: appreciative; largely negative and 'it depends'.

It should be noted that the question did not specify who is actually referred to with 'international experts': are it shorter-term consultants – as several respondents seem to have interpreted the question; are it international staff that is seconded to national entities often for a medium-term period; or are it international staff working for an international agency within a given country, typically also for a medium- to perhaps longer term period?

Appreciative: There are broad appreciative responses testifying for example to how international experts have genuinely helped with making an approach more context-sensitive and pragmatic. Another response suggests that their assistance is appropriate but that they are actually not sufficiently contracted by the international political actors or the UN – or that they are not listened to by the UN leadership. There is a perceived shortage of expertise with mediation and negotiation. One respondent felt that their value could be heightened if they were not engaged only at a given moment in time, but could remain connected and updated through a longer process – and so see when and how they could contribute over time. Someone else felt them to be appropriate but that there is a need to better monitor and evaluate what works and doesn't work well in using international experts, so that the peacebuilding community could learn and improve regarding their use.

Critical: There is quite a range of skeptical and critical responses, finding the contribution of international experts at best mediocre and fairly superficial and their deployment therefore largely inappropriate. Partially this is because of their one-off or 'hit and run' deployment without continuity or more systematic effort. They typically also have no time to visit less accessible areas. In addition they offer limited value at best because they are seen as often lacking critical skills such as different approaches to peacebuilding-meditation-dialogue; gendered understanding; local language (a point stressed repeatedly) and understandable language (i.e. they speak in jargon the meanings of which are not clear to local actors). Often international experts are seen as having only poor knowledge of the local situation, and hence coming with 'one size fits all' and 'cut and paste' suggestions. Some are seen as simply not caring about the context and deliberately choosing to ignore it. They can be driven by the same short-term and quick fix logic that is a wider problem in international assistance, which keeps them from looking beyond their particular project or task.

It depends: The 'it depends' answers partially relate to the qualifications and commitment of the specific individuals, as per the dimensions just highlighted. But the respondents also focus specifically on the central requirement and objective of 'knowledge and skill' sharing with nationals/local staff, and hence conscious support towards self-reliance. If the deployment of international experts is framed that way, they can be useful, if not it is not appropriate. Many however are seen as not having the skill to transfer their knowledge and expertise to national/local actors.

"We reject the notion that the issue is about developing a large standing capacity of international experts ready to jet in – the real issue is the relationship between international and local peacebuilders with the former inappropriately directing the latter what they should do; the more appropriate strategic approach is to provide support to existing capacities among local groups."

C. RESPONDING ORGANISATIONS REFLECTING ON THE ADDED VALUE OF HUMAN RIGHTS, GENDER AND CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT EXPERTISE IN THEIR AREA – AND CAPACITY GAPS IN ADDRESSING THESE ISSUES.

Do you consider human rights, gender and capacity development expertise an added value in your area? Do you see capacity gaps in addressing these issues?

Summary of Replies.

Whereas the answers to previous questions referred a lot to the issues of capacities, here the answers of the respondents concentrated mostly on human rights and gender.

There was broad and strong agreement that the three issues are very important areas and hence constitute added value – and that civil societies in many countries have a lot to contribute on them.

"Empowering women has significantly helped Rwanda to deal with the post genocide context and helped the country to move on. Human rights remain a challenge in Rwanda, more expertise and assistance is needed in this field. If managed well, it also definitely brings added value."

There were different views however on whether there is actually a shortage of funding for them, or whether these are issues that are relatively well funded. One respondent highlighted that the issues are very important, but that attention should go to the underlying causes that lead to human rights violations and gender inequalities. Another noted that you need to have some basic safety and security before you can really begin to talk about gender and human rights. One pointed out that the three issues mentioned need to be connected to other challenges such as economic revitalization.

Other respondents confirmed the importance of the three issues, but felt that there are also *other areas* that need more expertise and investment, such multi-ethnic co-existence, institution building and post-conflict reconciliation processes.

A range of observations were made on the question of gender: that it is not a women's issue and that more men need to be involved; that gender-based violence is not the only issue to be addressed; that there is a tendency to deal quit mechanically with gender issues; that there remain difficulties with mainstreaming and identifying who is responsible for implementation, and that not enough women can participate around the issues of security and governance. One felt that the empowerment of women leads to better outcomes, at least if that empowerment originates from within the community – it cannot be imposed.

Regarding human rights it was observed that there is a specific need to strengthen the capacities of women and of the judiciary to inform the population at large about the laws and the judicial instruments at their disposal. One respondent felt that the UN could do much more to support and help protect local organisations defending human rights. Another noted that security, justice and human rights are closely interlinked and should be treated together;

Regarding both gender and human rights broader observations were also made: the challenge is to understand the specificities of local societies in the face of general principles that are considered 'universal'; too many actors become hesitant about human rights and gender because of the admonition to show 'cultural sensitivity' and hence refrain from addressing them with the local people; there can be religious sensitivities and political constraints and even security threats from militants and religious extremists.

On capacity development it was felt that a tendency persists to see the local population as not having any capacities and in need of being skilled and trained, though someone else felt that there are indeed shortages of national capacities to promote legal and human rights issues and to design and support inclusive political processes. One respondent felt that capacities could be strengthened in ways that would lead to a better design of development interventions so that these too reinforce the rule of law and promote peace. One suggested that more learning materials should be developed or made available e.g. through new technologies, that would allow local actors to learn and upgrade themselves.

Finally, one respondent confirmed the importance of all three themes, but felt that the strategies pursued so far needed to be reviewed as they have not delivered the hoped for results.

ANNEX 1. THE SURVEY.

In November 2010 Interpeace was approached by the UN Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO) with a request to carry out a survey to bring the views of civil society to the UN Review of how to improve the pool of civilian experts to support the immediate capacity development needs of countries emerging from conflict.

Interpeace saw this as an opportunity for civil society to contribute to on-going changes within the United Nations to improve timely and appropriate support to fragile countries. The recommendations of the Review are seeking to enable a more effective collaboration between the United Nations and Civil Society Organisations (CSOs), thus showing way to a deeper future partnership between the UN System and civil society. Interpeace's work is based on national capacities as the organisation always works with and through local organisations. This is why for Interpeace an important aspect of the Review is also to find ways to better identify and mobilize capacity from the Global South and among women. Interpeace also hopes to encourage better coordination among bilateral efforts to develop civilian capacity and to improve inter-operability so that existing systems can work more effectively in coordination with one another.

The survey questions were designed jointly with PBSO on the basis of the guidelines provided by the Senior Advisory Group of the Review. The survey was sent through email to 120 CSOs that were identified from a list of organisations that Interpeace has reached out to before. The CSOs also included 23 programmatic collaborators or partners of Interpeace.

The surveys were sent out between 6 and 8 December in English, French and Spanish. The cover message contained a small introduction explaining the process and the input sought. The actual questionnaire (in the three mentioned languages – Annex 2 contains the English version) and a background note giving more detailed information on the Review and the survey (Annex 3) were attached as separate files.

The recipients were given the option to respond via email, telephone, fax or Skype within one week's time of the sending date. As it turned out responses kept coming in till 20 December. A total of 34 organisations responded, which is a response rate of 28.33%. Two responded substantively but to questions in the cover message rather than by filling out the questionnaire. Hence for a range of questions, the number of informative responses is 32 or 26.66%. Annex 4 shows the list of the 34 organisations that responded and their geographical location. Of the 34, twenty two can be considered from 'the South' and twelve from 'the North'. Of the 22 'Southern' organisations 14 are from Africa, 4 from Latin America and the Carribean, 3 from Asia-Pacific and 1 from the Middle East. Of the 34 respondents, 11 are partners of or collaborating agencies with Interpeace.

It is to be noted that although the exercise focuses on 'capacities' and although a series of sectoral/thematic capacity areas were listed (see Annex 3), no clear definition was given of 'capacities'. Yet 'capacity' is one of those often used terms that people understand in different terms. At the very minimum capacities can be understood in terms of 'resources' (not only financial but also e.g. human resources and time, more a quantitative matter), 'competencies and skills' (more a qualitative matter), but also – a less frequently acknowledged dimension of 'capacity' – as relating to 'power'. You may have the resources

(financial, human, and time) and the competencies and skills to do something – but not the power, and hence feel ‘incapable’ or ‘incapacitated’.

This report is a qualitative and interpretative summary of the responses received. Interpeace believes it faithfully reflects what came out of the survey, but this survey does not claim scientific rigour, neither in the messages articulated in the response nor in the summarizing of the responses.

On the one hand a quick ‘survey’ like this cannot go into detail and hence the answers of the respondents need to be taken at face value. It is not possible to determine whether they are well founded and robust or less well grounded and largely a matter of ‘perception’.

On the other hand many of the questions were fairly broad and invited a qualitative answer. Many of the answers however came in the form of short bullet points that, when put together generate little more than ‘lists’. The answers did not always correspond precisely to the question asked, although they tended to be relevant for the broader subject of discussion. Several respondents did not answer all the questions. However no responses received were disqualified. All substantive messages were included and considered.

Finally, it would be an error of interpretation to weight responses offered to a qualitative question on a quantitative basis i.e. give more importance to those points mentioned most often. A particular point, even if only mentioned by one respondent, can be deemed very pertinent and worthy of being highlighted. This report therefore is –inevitably– an interpretative summary of the responses received.

ANNEX 2. ENGLISH QUESTIONNAIRE.

REVIEWING THE CAPACITIES OF INTERNATIONAL ACTORS IN POST CONFLICT SITUATIONS

United Nations Review of International Civilian Capacities – A Survey of Civil Society Views

What is this survey about?

The United Nations are undertaking a Review of International Civilian Capacities in post conflict situations. Interpeace has been invited to launch a survey to ensure that the voices of those who have the most expertise are included in the Review. This is where we request your support. What capacities (expertise) you think are critical in the aftermath of conflict, where these capacities can be found and where you have identified critical gaps? Answering the survey should not take you more than half an hour. **The deadline for providing responses is Wednesday 15 December.**

Why it is important to make sure your voice is heard?

- This is an opportunity for civil society to contribute to on-going changes within the United Nations to ensure capacities can be deployed effectively and efficiently across the UN family and beyond.
- **An important aspect of the Review is also to find ways to better identify and mobilize capacity from the Global South and among women.**
- There is a need for better coordination among bilateral efforts to develop civilian capacity and to improve inter-operability so that existing systems can work more effectively in coordination with one another. Stronger links between these efforts and multilateral institutions, particularly the UN, need to be created.
- The recommendations of the Review are seeking to enable a more effective collaboration between the United Nations and Civil Society Organisations where and when appropriate.

You will find more information on the Review and the different capacities in the attached background note.

How to make sure your insights are included in the Review?

Please complete the short questionnaire attached. You can provide your answers by **email, fax, telephone or Skype** to the contacts below. If you prefer to respond over the phone or Skype, please let us know and we will arrange a time.

A final report will be shared with all those that have taken part at the time of submission to the UN Review team at the end of December. The report is anticipated to be released in early 2011. **The UN Secretary-General will then seek commitments from member states and partner organizations to support the implementation of the Review's recommendations in an International Symposium in 2011.**

Contacts

Philippe Bartholmé
 EU Relations Officer
Email: bartholme@interpeace.org
Tel: +32 2 230 34 12
Skype: philippe.bartholme
Address: 205 Rue Belliard, box #5
 1040 Brussels – Belgium

Anni Salmia
 External Relations Officer
Email: salmia@interpeace.org
Tel: +41 22 917 87 49
Skype: anni.salmia
Fax: +41 22 917 80 39
Address: 7-9 Chemin de Balxert
 1219 Châtelaine (Geneva) – Switzerland

Questions for the Survey:

Please note that for this questionnaire, “civilian capacities” refers to civilian experts deployed by the UN and other international actors to post-conflict countries to support local institutions. It does not include the military or the police. The UN has identified five areas where assistance to countries emerging from conflict is critical: Basic safety and security; Inclusive political processes; Basic social services; Core government functionality; Revitalized economy. In addition, three longer term cross-cutting areas have been identified: human rights, gender and capacity development.

<p>What area or areas does your organisation specialize in?</p>	<p><input type="checkbox"/> Basic safety and security</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Inclusive political processes</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Basic social services</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Core government functionality</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Revitalized economy</p>
<p>Within your focus area(s) which actors are the most important?</p>	<p><input type="checkbox"/> National actors For example civil society organisations, governmental, please precise:</p> <hr/> <p><input type="checkbox"/> International actors For example international NGOs, regional initiatives, UN agencies, bilateral donors, please precise:</p> <hr/> <p><input type="checkbox"/> International experts</p>

<p>Within which areas have you identified critical capacity gaps with respect to the needs?</p>	
<p>Why do you think these gaps persist? And in which actors do they persist?</p>	
<p>In your view, are there any areas where there simply is too little assistance provided?</p>	
<p>Have you got any experience in working with the UN System (mission where applicable or/and country team)?</p>	<p><input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No</p> <hr/> <p>If yes, are there areas where you believe the UN has capacity shortcomings and how would you describe these?</p>

<p>In your experience, is the assistance provided within your area(s) by international experts an appropriate one? (Skills, background, language, approach)?</p>	
<p>Do you think the international community, including the UN System:</p>	<p>is sufficiently aware of the need to draw on local expertise? <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No</p> <p>is capable of drawing on local expertise? <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No</p> <p>If not, can you describe specific examples and suggest how the UN could improve the way it works in this regard?</p>
<p>Do you consider human rights, gender and capacity development expertise an added value in your area? Do you see capacity gaps in addressing these issues?</p>	

ANNEX 3. BACKGROUND NOTE.

BACKGROUND NOTE

UNITED NATIONS REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL CIVILIAN CAPACITIES

Introduction and Objectives

In his report on *Peacebuilding in the immediate aftermath of conflict* the UN Secretary-General indicated that “a review needs to be undertaken that would analyze how the United Nations and the international community can help to broaden and deepen the pool of civilian experts to support the immediate capacity development needs of countries emerging from conflict.” The report also emphasized the need to map the supply of civilian capacity within and outside the UN against a realistic assessment of demand, to improve coordination and interoperability among bilateral and multilateral efforts to deploy civilian experts, and to find ways to better mobilize capacity from the Global South and among women.

During the consideration of the report by the Security Council, the GA and the PBC, the UN was mandated to conduct an ‘international review of civilian capacities’ to address the issues identified in the Secretary-General’s report and those raised in subsequent discussions, including:

- The need to **increase the number** of civilian experts available for deployment in the immediate aftermath of conflict, through the UN or other institutions;
- A perceived need for **better coordination** among bilateral efforts to develop civilian capacity, and **stronger linkages between these efforts and multilateral institutions**, particularly the UN;
- The need to **improve inter-operability** so that existing systems can work more effectively in **coordination** with one another;
- A concrete focus on **mobilizing capacity in the Global South**, including clear funding commitments from several major donors;
- The need to ensure that **more women** are being deployed;
- The importance of **national ownership** and the orientation of civilian capacity efforts towards building national capacity.

Within this framework, **the Review intends to:**

- Identify changes that can be made within the United Nations, and articulate what member state support is required to ensure UN capacities can be deployed effectively and efficiently, across the UN family;
- Propose frameworks and policy options for improving inter-operability between the UN, regional entities, and Member States, to support the rapid deployment of effective and appropriate civilian expertise in the immediate aftermath of conflict;
- Suggest ideas as to how to mobilize and organize specific capacities from the Global South and among women, working with Member States, regional organizations, and NGOs – which may include training facilities, clearing-house functions, development of guiding principles and standards, and deployment coordination capabilities;
- Develop ideas as to how to ensure that deployments serve the goal of building national capacity.

The Review is building around a combination of technical analysis and a process that secures high-level commitment, particularly from UN member states. The Review is conducted by a

Review Team, constituted within the UN PBSO and providing support to the Senior Advisory Group. The Senior Advisory Group (SAG) was appointed by the Secretary-General in March 2010 and provides strategic and political guidance to the Review. The Advisory Group is chaired by Jean-Marie Guéhenno, the former Under-Secretary General for Peacekeeping Operations, and includes serving SRSG's and ERSG's as well as representatives from host countries, key research institutions and a civil society representative.

Core Concepts

In order to promote clarity among UN and non-UN actors, the review has proposed definitions around key terms and concepts. The first of these draw on concepts advanced in the Secretary-General's report on peacebuilding in the immediate aftermath of conflict:

Drawing on a 2007 decision of the Secretary-General a conceptual basis for peacebuilding was agreed in the UN system: **Peacebuilding** involves a range of measures targeted to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening national capacities at all levels for conflict management, and to lay the foundations for sustainable peace and development. Peacebuilding strategies must be coherent and tailored to the specific needs of the country concerned, based on national ownership, and should comprise a carefully prioritized, sequenced and therefore relatively narrow set of activities.

The Review focuses on **capacity in the key sectors** for which international assistance is frequently requested in the immediate aftermath of conflict as identified in paragraph 17 of the Secretary-General's report:

- Support to **basic safety and security**, including mine action, protection of civilians, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR), strengthening the rule of law and initiation of security sector reform (SSR);
- Support to **political processes**, including electoral processes, promoting inclusive dialogue and reconciliation, and developing conflict-management capacity at national and sub-national levels;
- Support to the **provision of basic services**, such as water and sanitation, health and primary education, and support to the safe and sustainable return and reintegration of IDPs and refugees;
- Support to **restoring core government functions** particularly basic public administration and public finance, at national and sub-national levels;
- Support to **economic revitalization**, including employment generation and livelihoods (in agriculture and public works) particularly for youth and demobilized former combatants, as well as rehabilitation of basic infrastructure.

For the purposes of the Review **civilian** capacity refers to non-military, non-police capacity in these sectors. The Review does not address civilian administrative, IT and logistics requirements.

Matrix of core capacities

Basic safety and security	Inclusive political processes	Basic social services	Core government functionality	Revitalized economy
Security sector reform	Support to political processes	Social services	Core government institutions	Economic growth
Security sector governance	Mediation, good offices and conflict resolution	Water and sanitation	Executive branch	Employment generation
Law enforcement Institutions	Constitutional processes	Healthcare	Legislative branch	Agricultural
Defence institutions	Elections and electoral processes	Education	Public financial management	Private-sector development
Border protection	Inclusive dialogue	Food and nutrition	Revenue generation (incl. customs)	Industrial development
Transnational crime/counter-terrorism	Conflict management	Shelter	Aid coordination	Natural resource management
DDR	Support to civil society	Reproductive health	Fiscal policy and institutions	Banking and finance
Justice and reconciliation	Public information and media	IDPs and refugees	Monetary policy and institutions	Infrastructure
Transitional justice	Political party development	Urban planning	Public administrative reform	Public works
Judicial and legal reform			Anti-corruption	
Corrections			Procurement	
Security			Local governance and decentralization	
Mine Action				
Protection				
Community violence reduction				
Capacity development				
Gender				
Human rights				

ANNEX 4. TABLE OF RESPONDENTS.

1.	Academy for Peace and Development, Somaliland (APD)	Somalia (Somaliland)
2.	African Women's Development and Communications Network (FEMNET)	Africa
3.	Alliance for Peacebuilding	USA, Canada
4.	Austrian Study Center for Peace and Conflict Resolution	Austria
5.	Berghof Conflict Research	Germany
6.	Biraturaba	Burundi
7.	CCDP - Center on Conflict, Development and Peacebuilding	Switzerland
8.	CENAP – Centre d'Alerte et de Prévention des Conflits	Burundi
9.	Center for research and Dialogue, South-Central Somalia (CRD)	Somalia (South Central)
10.	Centre Résolution Conflits	DRC
11.	Centro de Estudios de Guatemala (CEG)	Guatemala
12.	Citizens' Constitutional Forum	Fiji
13.	ICTJ	Liberia
14.	IDEJEN	Haiti
15.	Individual Expert	Sierra Leone
16.	Institute for Comparative Studies in Criminal Sciences in Guatemala (ICCPG)	Guatemala
17.	Institute for Economics and Peace	Australia, USA
18.	Institute of Research and Dialogue for Peace (IRDP)	Rwanda
19.	Interpeace	Switzerland
20.	KATU – Finnish Civil Society Conflict Prevention Network	Finland
21.	Life & Peace Institute	Sweden
22.	Mujeres en Zona de Conflicto	Spain
23.	Mustakbalna	Palestine
24.	Pakistan institute for Peace Studies	Pakistan
25.	Peace Direct	UK
26.	Programme for research and Dialogue for Peace	Liberia
27.	Propaz Foundation	Guatemala
28.	Puntland Development Research Center (PDRC)	Somalia (Puntland)

29.	Regional Center for Strategic Studies	Sri Lanka, South Asia region
30.	Toledo International Center for Peace	Spain
31.	UPEACE Africa program	Ethiopia
32.	Voz di Paz	Guinea Bissau
33.	World Vision	Worldwide
34.	Collaborative for Peace	Sudan

