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Interpeace – CENAP

BURUNDI PEACEBUILDING PROGRAMME

[PROGRAMME EVALUATION, FINAL REPORT]

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LIST OF ACRONYMS:

APDH -	Association pour la Promotion des Droits Humains
BINUB -	Bureau Intégré des Nations Unies au Burundi
CDCPA -	Commission de désarmement de la population civile et de lutte contre la prolifération des armes légères et de petit calibre
CENAP -	Centre d’Alerte et de Prévention de Conflit
CENI -	Commission électorale nationale indépendante
CNDD-FDD -	Conseil National pour la Défense de la Démocratie-Forces de Défense de la Démocratie
FRODEBU -	Front pour la Démocratie au Burundi
IRDP -	Institut de Recherche et de Dialogue pour la Paix
MSD -	Mouvement pour la Solidarité et la Démocratie
NGO -	Non-governmental Organisation
OAG -	Observatoire de l’Action Gouvernementale
OLUCOME -	Observatoire de Lutte contre la Corruption et les Malversations Economiques
PACAM -	Plan d’Action Commun d’Appui aux Medias
PAR -	Participatory Action Research
PSG -	Programme Support Group
RPP -	Reflecting on Peace Practice
RTNB -	Radio Télévision Nationale du Burundi
UPRONA -	Union pour le Progrès National

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY:

In October 2007, Interpeace and CENAP began a partnership for peacebuilding in Burundi with the goal of “reinforcing Burundian capacities to strengthen and consolidate lasting peace”.

Activities in support of this goal have included the following:

Preparatory Phase (July through October 2007) - for strengthening of the financial, administrative and programme capacity of the local partner, CENAP, including personnel recruitment and training, as well as equipment purchase, and development of programme documents.

1st Phase: Priority-mapping (October 2007 – October 2008)

The objective of the First Phase was to map the threats to peace and stability using participatory approaches. The CENAP team began in October 2007 conducting wide consultations with a representative sample of the Burundian population with the goal of identifying obstacles to lasting peace. Consultations involved more than 78 Focus Group dialogues with more than 2200 participants. Audiovisual research was an important part of the process. Focus Group dialogues were filmed and projected to other Focus Groups for stimulation of further dialogue. A ‘Country Note’ report of the findings, and a video documentary, were also produced. In October 2008, the findings were presented to a National Group, made up of more than 200 people representing the full diversity of Burundian society. The National Group selected 4 priority issues from amongst the peacebuilding challenges that had been identified through the consultations. The issues selected were Disarmament of Civilians, Poverty and Unemployment, Elections, and Transitional justice.

2nd phase: In-depth research and dialogue on the 4 priority issues (October 2008 – March 2010)

The objective of the Second Phase was to engage Burundians in a broad-based dialogue on the priority peacebuilding issues and, then, in the design of consensus solutions. The process was comprised of two main areas of activities which were intertwined. The first area was participatory-action research conducted with 4 Reflection Groups made up of experts in the 4 priority areas. Their task was to look into reports, surveys and experience in other countries in order to find possible solutions to the identified obstacles. The second area of activities, carried out in parallel, included dialogue meetings, organized and facilitated by the CENAP team in locations around the country, to collect solutions proposed by Burundians, and to test ideas stemming from the Reflection Groups. The goal of this twofold process was to find solutions that were operational, adapted to the Burundian context, and acceptable by the majority of the people. As with the First Phase, audiovisual recordings of Focus Group dialogues were made and shared with other groups, to widen the dialogue.

The CENAP researchers collected as much data as possible on the 4 themes through consultations at the Commune and Province levels, and in the Diaspora. They also interviewed 31 experts, participated in relevant seminars and conducted desk research. More than 1077 people participated in 45 dialogue meetings at different levels during the Second Phase. Four short videos (one per theme), and four draft reports, were produced summarizing the research findings. The research findings were presented to 180 participants of the National Group in March 2010. The National Group was then asked to prioritize

solutions (recommendations) coming out of the research findings. They chose the following as their priority recommendations:

- Disarmament: Declare a new grace period for voluntary surrender of weapons without granting compensation.
- Unemployment: Establish close relationships between the education system and the corporate world
- Elections: Set up a dialogue mechanism and a training programme for political parties
- Transitional Justice: Collect and protect the traces of past events (through collection and protection of archives, recording of testimonies...)

The programme will now move to a Third Phase that will aim at informing and influencing decision makers to support the proposed solutions and to work for their implementation.

Relevance and Added-Value:

There are clear indicators that programme-initiated **Dialogue Groups** (also called Focus Groups) brought Burundians together across ethnic lines and other lines of division in a collaborative effort to address challenges to peace. The inspiring model of unity in diversity, provided by the CENAP Team, played a vital role in opening up this dialogue. Focus Groups based at the grassroots (Communal Groups), and Reflections Groups composed of mostly urban 'experts', all expressed appreciation for the programme's intent to ensure that dialogue include a wide cross-section of Burundian society. This, and the long-term nature of the programme's commitment to dialogue, stands it in favorable light with participants and civil society members in comparison with other national dialogue programmes.

The emphasis on **Participatory Action Research** (PAR) played an important role in shaping the respectful listening posture which facilitated the open dialogue which, in turn, characterized the programme. The use of **Audiovisual** tools and methodology also played an important role in stimulating dialogue, quickly bringing divergent points of view to the fore, and inviting reaction and further dialogue. Participants affirmed that they had learnt and changed. One Researcher described the methodology as "perfect".

With regards to the **Research Findings**, a widespread consensus was successfully built and the findings were viewed as relevant and important by almost all of those who participated. This guided consensus-building process worked in a way which did not, however, always facilitate the identification and prioritization of Key Driving Factors¹ of the Burundian conflict. (The issues were key issues to Burundians, but may not be the most important issues with regards to effective peacebuilding.) This is most true with regards to the issues of Unemployment and Under-Employment. It is debatable whether Unemployment is a factor which, once addressed, will make the most efficient and effective contribution to sustainable peace in Burundi. The tension between stakeholders designing their own programme, and the need to create a programme which is both effective and efficient, is an important tension and should be addressed.

¹ Factors which can have a direct negative or positive effect on a conflict, and are directly linked to escalation or de-escalation.

In addition, opportunities to orient Research Findings towards action were not always capitalized on. The most striking example is Burundi's 2010 elections. Relevant and interesting findings vis-à-vis elections in Burundi had not been brought to bear on the ongoing electoral process.

Efficiency:

The programme was very demanding and fast-paced. It required, and received, tremendous (over-time) commitment on the part of the programme team. (One effect of this was the decreased level of participation of team members in other civil society organizations.) The relatively short timeframe also had some limited influence on the number of sites visited and consultations made over the course of the programme. The Team was not always able to carry-out scheduled return visits to some of the Communal Groups. This influenced the dialogue process, both its vertical social dimensions (i.e., between Communal levels and Reflection Groups), and its depth (i.e., sustained trust-building within Dialogue Groups). (Interpeace notes that this challenge was not unexpected, and is addressed in Phase 3 planning.) With regards to the horizontal (cross-sectoral) dimensions of the dialogue process, both the audiovisual tools, and the diverse membership of the Reflection Groups and the National Group, contributed to a remarkably effective process in a remarkably efficient time span.

Influences, Impacts and Sustainability:

While it is generally agreed that it is still early in the programme's life to be evaluating impact, both influence and even some impact are already apparent. The establishment and building of capacity of an effective peacebuilding team (CENAP) is, in itself, an important contribution to long-term sustainable peace-building efforts in Burundi. The Team has already exercised important influence as a role model for peace and dialogue within the Burundian context. Seeds of dialogue have been planted across and between sectors and regions of Burundi, and with the Diaspora. The degree to which these seeds bear fruit, however, depends greatly on the frequency of dialogue opportunities. Participants who only participated in one or two Dialogue Groups, one or two years ago, did not consider themselves to be part of a dialogue group, but instead described their relationship to the programme as being that of "invited guests".

One of the programme's tangible impacts to-date grows from action-oriented consensus built around the question of disarmament. Consensus around the question of a new "grace period" for disarmament is serving as a tool for the CDCA (Disarmament Commission) and the Vice-President of the Republic to push for the introduction of necessary new laws on disarmament. Other interesting and unexpected areas of impact include examples of problem solving and conflict resolution at the Provincial level (political conflict and land-based conflict), as well as the implementation of recommendations for a national Memorial Day as a result of the participation of one key individual in consensus-building dialogue around the issue of Transitional Justice.

Crucial to the success of the programme will be the continuing broadening of ownership of the programme to fully include CENAP and, subsequently, an even wider group of Burundian stakeholders. The programme's Theory of Change is based on the idea that "if Burundian stakeholders have ownership of an inclusive dialogue process, solutions will be found and action will be taken to overcome obstacles to peace". While there are indicators that CENAP staff and Reflection Groups have fully owned the programme, it is not as clear that this is the case with the Communal Groups. As with the questions of efficiency and impact, a direct correlation also seems to exist between the number of dialogue meetings attended and the sense of ownership. The role of per diems in encouraging / discouraging ownership is

mixed, at best, with a possibility that per diems are contributing to ownership issues at the grassroots level. Ownership transfer is still a work in progress and these are still 'early-days'.

Also, crucial to the successful implementation of the programme's action-oriented recommendations, will be the successful mobilization of more "weighty" local Burundian organizations/individuals for collaboration with CENAP, as they continue to attempt to influence top-level national leadership with regards to the programme's recommendations. While CENAP is well-suited to play a strategic role in the facilitation of truly national dialogue and peace-building, their strengths would be complemented by closer association with organizations/individuals with additional 'convening power' at a national level.

Overall Assessment:

It is difficult to adequately convey the enthusiasm of programme participants when asked about the CENAP/ Interpeace programme. "Professionalism" was a word which came up often, and was used to summarize CENAP's exceptionally well-balanced ("neutral") Team, their excellent organizational, facilitation and analytical skills, their remarkable work ethic, and their genuine commitment to dialogue. These qualities were appreciated by participants at the grassroots, and the national level, alike. They give CENAP a certain 'consensus power', an ability to speak to and across all sectors of Burundian society. The combination of this 'consensus power' with Interpeace's thoughtfully-designed dialogue and research model, produces a relevant and very well-performed programme.

The biggest challenge to this programme will be in the transition to action. This is the point at which some of the programme's weaknesses may come to bear: the strategic identification of Key Driving Factors and related recommendations; slight but significant institutional differences between the two partner organizations; CENAP's relatively weak 'convening power', and a potential lack of sustainability that could result from weak ownership at the grassroots level, and among Dialogue Groups other than the Reflections Groups.

One of the most impressive aspects of the programme and the partnership, however, is the partnership's commitment to collegial dialogue, analysis, understanding and problem-solving. The Evaluator is confident that challenges noted above will quickly find their consensus solutions.

Recommendations:

1. Immediate Targeted Dissemination of Research Findings and Recommendations
2. Sustained Dialogue and Research 'Rooted' at the Grassroots
3. Functional Feedback Mechanisms between Tiers
4. Establish a Steering Committee for Follow-up of Recommendations
5. A Fresh Approach to Mobilizing Political Will
6. Establish Mechanisms for Engaging Opportunities
7. Examine Additional Creative Partnership Options between CENAP and Interpeace
8. Continue to Clarify the Programme to all Concerned
9. Apply Systems Thinking for Strategic Impact
10. More clearly define Impact and Measure it

1. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

1.1 *Introduction*

(based on Evaluation Terms of Reference, see Appendix 1)

This is the first external evaluation of the Interpeace – CENAP Burundi Peacebuilding Programme since its inception in October 2007. The Interpeace-CENAP partnership is just completing Phase Two of what promises to be an ongoing programme.

Interpeace is an international NGO, created in 1994, to provide innovative approaches to solving deep-rooted conflict around the world.² CENAP is a Burundian NGO, created in 2002 to contribute to sustainable peace, through analysis of the political, social and economic context, early warning, and building and strengthening peace.³

The overall goal of the Burundi Peacebuilding Programme is to reinforce Burundian capacities to strengthen and consolidate lasting peace⁴. Interpeace and CENAP believe that this will only be achieved by enabling the people of Burundi to identify and find solutions to their own problems and by opening channels so that solutions can be heard and acted upon by Government and other key stakeholders. They also believe that ownership of the process by the Burundian stakeholders will result in ownership of the solutions, which is crucial if the solutions are to be implemented.

The Programme, to date, was divided into the following two phases:

Preparatory Phase (July – October 2007)

This phase sought to strengthen the financial, administrative and programme capacity of the local partner, CENAP, in preparations for the beginning of programme activities.

First Phase: Priority-mapping (October 2007 – October 2008)

The objective of the First Phase was to map the threats to peace and stability through participatory approaches. The CENAP team began in October 2007 by conducting wide consultations with a representative sample of the Burundian population with the goal of identifying obstacles to lasting peace. In October 2008, the findings were presented to a National Group, made up of more than 200 people representing the full diversity of Burundian

² Interpeace, “Annual Report 2009”, p. 6.

³ CENAP, « Manuel de Procedure Administrative et Financiere », 2008.

⁴ This is the overall goal as stated in the Project documents (2007 and 2009). It is not the overall goal stated on the Terms of Reference of the Evaluator, which was “to help build trust and collaboration between Burundians and create an environment favourable to stability, development and sustainable peace”.

society. The National Group then selected 4 priority issues from amongst the peacebuilding challenges that had been identified through the consultations. These issues were:

- Disarmament of civil population
- Poverty and unemployment
- Elections
- Transitional justice

Second Phase: In-depth research and dialogue on the 4 priority issues (October 2008 – March 2010)

The objective of the Second Phase was to engage Burundians in a broad-based dialogue on the priority peacebuilding issues identified, and in the design of consensus solutions. The process was comprised of 2 main areas of activities which were intertwined. The first area was participatory-action research conducted with 4 Reflection Groups made up of experts in the 4 priority areas. Their task was to look into reports, surveys, and experience in other countries in order to find possible solutions to the identified obstacles. The second area of activities, which was carried out in parallel, related to dialogue meetings that were organized and facilitated by the CENAP team in areas around the country in order to collect solutions proposed by Burundians, and to test ideas stemming from the Reflection Groups. The goal of this twofold process was to find solutions that were operational, adapted to the Burundi context, and acceptable to a majority of Burundians.

The CENAP researchers collected as much data as possible on the 4 themes through consultations at the Commune and Provincial levels, as well as in the Diaspora. They also interviewed experts, participated in relevant seminars and undertook desk research. The research findings were presented to the National Group in March 2010. The National Group was asked to choose priority solutions. The programme will now move to a Third Phase that will aim at informing and influencing decision makers about the proposed solutions and to work for their implementation.

Because this evaluation is being conducted at the end of the programme's Second Phase, it will be a key opportunity to draw lessons from the first two phases before beginning the Third Phase. The evaluation's first purpose, therefore, is learning.

The primary objective of the evaluation is to assess whether or not the first two phases of the Programme have reached the outcomes set by Interpeace and CENAP:

- An effective peacebuilding team that is capable of delivering research-based and action oriented dialogue process that contributes to the consolidation of peace in Burundi ;
- A culture of dialogue and trust that engages the different sectors of Burundian society in collaborative efforts to address challenges to peace;
- Broad consensus on key peacebuilding challenges and on basic principles, strategies and goals to overcome them.

The secondary objectives of the evaluation are the following:

- To draw lessons from the first two phases of the Programme and to give recommendations for the Third Phase
- To identify important lessons learnt and innovative practice for more general consideration across Interpeace programmes
- To check the relevance of the Programme
- To evaluate the partnership between CENAP and Interpeace

1.2 Context

(based largely, but not exclusively, on CENAP-Interpeace Annual reports)

Burundi has only recently emerged from a 15-year civil war, a war that began in 1993 with the assassination of the first democratically-elected President and has only recently ended, with the signing of an accord between the government and the last remaining rebel group (FNL-Palipehutu) in December 2008. The peace process, which began in 1997 under the leadership of Tanzanian ex-President Julius Nyerere, has been a long and arduous journey. A landmark step along the way was the free, fair, transparent and peaceful 2005 election process. These elections brought ex-rebel group, CNDD-FDD into power. The period also saw the successful integration of ex-rebels and former government security forces into a new National Defense Force.

The period heralding the beginning of this programme (2007) was marked by deterioration in the security situation due to stalled peace talks between the CNDD-FDD government, and the FNL-Palipehutu rebels. Divisions within the ruling CNDD-FDD party, itself, came to a head in February 2007 with the dismissal of the party's President, Hussein Rujabur, and his subsequent imprisonment in April 2007. (He remains imprisoned at the time of writing.) Accusations against the government, including the arbitrary arrests of journalist and political opponents, corruption and clientelism, were attributed to Rujabur. His departure, did not, however, cause political tensions to abate. Between March and November 2007, the two main opposition parties, FRODEBU and UPRONA boycotted parliament, causing it to be paralyzed. The situation was eventually resolved with the integration of FRODEBU and UPRONA members into the Cabinet, in accordance with the Burundian Constitution.

Insecurity remained a major theme in the first half of 2008, with continued attacks between FNL-Palipehutu and the national army, including shelling of parts of Bujumbura in April 2008. On March 8th, 2008, grenades were launched into the houses of 3 MP's, former CNDD-FDD members, who, together with 43 other MPs, had signed a letter to the UN Secretary-General asking for the protection of the UN and blaming the Burundi Intelligence Services

("Documentation") for being the instigators of a rash of political crimes that were shaking the country. The security situation improved after the signing of a ceasefire between the government and the FNL-Palipehutu in May 2008 and the FNL-Palipehutu's return from 20 years of exile during the same month. A cantonment process begun for the demobilization of the FNL-Palipehutu fighters was the source of continued tension, however, with hot debate over the numbers of fighters slated for demobilization, the integration of FNL-Palipehutu members into government, and the demand that the FNL strike reference to the 'Hutu' ethnic group, from their official name. Resolution was achieved, and an accord was signed between the two parties on December 4, 2008. Meanwhile, however, renewed fighting in the eastern DRC attracted some of Burundi's demobilized combatants, with more than 600 of them reported to have joined Laurent Nkunda's CNDP army. This insecurity did not, however, have a palpable effect on the Interpeace / CENAP peacebuilding programme, with the exception of a few delayed meetings.

The political situation in 2008 remained tense. Parliament was once again paralyzed between January and June, after the dismissal of 22 members of the CNDD-FDD party, as well as the Vice-President of the National Assembly, Alice Nzomukunda (also CNDD-FDD). The dismissed members were required, by the Constitutional Court, to quit parliament, a decision which was the source of considerable controversy. The second half of the year was marked by new tensions between the government, opposition and civil society, with the arrests of unionists, journalists, and opposition party members including the President of MSD (Alexis Sinduhije) and 37 of his supporters. Government clamped down on meetings and public demonstrations, and implemented an ordinance requiring official authorization before meetings or demonstrations could take place. The ordinance was revoked in November, but political parties continued to complain about harassment at the Communal and Provincial levels even after the ordinance was revoked.

The early months of 2009 saw continued discussions and discord between the government and the (newly re-named) FNL with regards to political positions, restructuration of the FNL as a political party (separate from its military wing), and the cantonment / demobilization process. FNL ex-combatants were reintegrated into the security and defense forces (2100 into the Army, and 1400 into the Police) with 5000 other ex-combatants benefitting from a socio-economic rehabilitation programme. General dissatisfaction with the process meant among ex-combatants meant that they were vulnerable for recruitment by opposition parties.

Establishment of the National Independent Electoral Commission (CENI) was also fraught with difficulty. Political division continued over the subjects of the electoral code and the elections schedule, with the question of the sequencing of the elections becoming the primary issue of contention. In contravention of the Constitution, the ruling party proposed that elections begin with the Presidential election. (The Constitution requires that the Presidential vote follow a Communal vote.) The attempt seemed to be motivated by concern that a change in local administration could have a negative influence on the vote during the Presidential elections. After pressure from the international community, however, agreements on this and other issues were resolved and a new electoral code was adopted in September 2009, with

Presidential elections scheduled to follow Communal elections. The international community pledged US \$43 million and the UNDP was chosen to manage the fund. In December the CENI announced the elections schedule: communal election on May 21st, presidential election on June 28th, parliamentary election on July 23rd and election at the hill level on September 7th. Civil society and NGOs began civic education, and a campaign for the issuing of National Identity Cards was begun.

The 2009 period was also marked by growing distrust between the government, opposition parties, civil society and the UN. Although international pressure resulted in the release of the MSD President, and Jean-Claude Kavumbagu, editor of the online press agency Net Press, at the Commune level, arrests continued to occur. During the second quarter of 2009, opposition party activities and meetings were banned in 15 of Burundi's 17 provinces (see Section 2.4 below). In April 2009, Ernest Manirumva, Vice-President of OLUCOME, a civil-society organization fighting corruption, was assassinated at his house during the night. Both the Ministry of the Interior, and the Intelligence Service publicly threatened civil society organizations, accusing them of destabilization of the country. Civil society organizations were required to obtain permission from the Ministry of the Interior before organizing meetings. (This requirement was also applied to CENAP when they initiated meetings with the Burundian Diaspora in Europe.) Emerging internal divisions within the FNL were widely blamed on an attempt by the CNDD-FDD to weaken FNL opposition. Other opposition parties complained of harassment during the organizations of meetings, and the Kayanza Governor was accused of being responsible for the death of a man under his detention. Tensions reached a peak when the Minister of the Interior de-registered FORSC, the largest platform of Burundian civil society organizations. The Minister cancelled his decision after coming under intense national and international pressure.

Despite this general mistrust, however, progress was made with the establishment of a Forum of Political Parties, at the closing of the BINUB-led "Cadres de Dialogue" project. The Forum's objective is to encourage dialogue and dispute resolution between parties. In December 2009, a UN Group of Experts produced a report on the DRC, accusing the Burundian Intelligence Service ("Documentation") of trafficking arms and gold with the Rwanda rebel movement, the FDLR. The Burundian government denied the accusations, but did not offer any explanations for the accusations. It was in this context that the government asked for the withdrawal of the Executive Representative of the UN Secretary General, Youssef Mahmoud. Mahmoud was the third consecutive UN representative to be expelled by the Burundian government.

A civilian disarmament campaign was also launched in 2009, encouraging people to turn in weapons in exchange for non-monetary compensation. October marked the end of the campaign. The campaign does not seem to have had a significant impact on insecurity and banditry. Armed robberies and grenade attacks continued to be reported daily, especially in the Ruyigi, Muyinga, Bubanza, Ngozi, Makamba, Rutana and Cankuzo provinces. In December, 2 people were killed and a dozen injured in a grenade attack at the Bujumbura central market.

In May 2010, with the country now fast approaching Communal elections, there has been a flurry of political activity, including the registration of an FNL splinter party, FNL-Iragi rya Gahutu Remy. Presidential candidates have been named, voter registration has taken place, and party campaigns have begun. A number of clashes have occurred between youth supporters of political parties, and most notably between the CNDD-FDD and FNL youth. One of the worst of these incidents was in Busoni, Kirundo, one of the target Communes of the CENAP-Interpeace programme. Other noteworthy developments include the arrest of 16 government soldiers, including 2 officers, on accusations of destabilization of the country on January 29th. While the incident was originally presented as an attempted coup d'état, it was later reframed as an internal problem within the army. Accusations of division within the army continue to circulate.

A November 2009 UN Report cites the following key factors in an analysis of the risk that the upcoming polls will present to Burundi's fragile peace:

- Widespread illegal weapons
- Well-organized youth wings
- The Possibility of Contested Elections
- Divisions within the police and army
- Intimidation of Opposition by Authorities
- Rule of Law still "under construction"
- Failure of Reintegration / Availability of Dissatisfied Demobilized Ex-Combatants
- Dissatisfied Returnees around Land Conflicts

According to the Pretoria-based Institute for Security Studies, Burundi is "a classroom example of a country at potential risk of election-related violence."⁵

1.3 Evaluation Methodology

The evaluation drew on several known evaluation approaches:

Outcome Evaluation, whereby the Evaluator attempted to identify observable change that occurred as a result of the programme, including both quantifiable outputs (i.e., numbers of participants, diversity of participants, and number of meetings), and qualitative *outcomes* (i.e., consensual agreement around issues, new relationships)

Collaborative Enquiry, whereby the Evaluator also attempted to use Focus group discussions, and individual interviews, as a joint learning opportunity for funders, programme partners, and participants alike. Collaborative enquiry activities included:

- the presence of CENAP staff during Focus group discussions

⁵ IRIN, "Burundi: Analysis: Upcoming polls to test Burundi's fragile peace", November, 2009.

- collaborative 'Reflecting on Peace Practice' (RPP) analysis of the Burundi Peacebuilding Programme, looked at questions such as the programme's theory of change, the relationship between programme activities, outputs, and overall goal, and, the systemic dynamics between the priority issues identified;
- presentation, discussion and review of evaluation findings with CENAP, Interpeace and the donor group

Data collection and analysis was done over a period of about four weeks and included document review, interviews, focus groups discussions, observation, surveys/questionnaires and database analysis. (see Appendix 2 – 'Work Plan') The application of these methods can be roughly summarized as follows:

Document Review – of programme documents, reports, participants lists etc (see Appendix 3 – 'Documents Reviewed')

Interviews – 36 interviews took place with key individuals from the donor group, Programme Support Group (PSG), 4 Reflection Groups, Thematic Groups and the National Group, as well as CENAP, IRDP and Interpeace staff, and members of the Diaspora (see Appendix 4)

Observation – including the Second National Group meeting, the CENAP evaluation meeting, CENAP facilitation during Focus Groups, and video material,

Focus Groups – meetings with a total of 95 members of 5 Focus Groups in five locations around Burundi for participative evaluation of the process; the Evaluator was accompanied by a CENAP researcher for logistical and translation purposes, as well as to provide an opportunity for the CENAP Researcher to participate in 'Collaborative Enquiry';

Database Statistics – CENAP database output was obtained for the 5 Focus groups involved in the evaluation, and examined for relevance

Surveys / Questionnaires – a brief, simple survey / questionnaire was used to test the diversity of Focus Groups participating in the evaluation, as well as their views on the programme's findings and relevance (see Appendix 5)

Limitations that may undermine the reliability and viability of the evaluation results include:

- ✱ Challenges inherent to evaluating conflict prevention and peacebuilding activities, including:
 - the highly politicized environments in which activities take place
 - the small pool of experience, approaches and standards against which peace programmes can be evaluated
 - the challenge of quantifying the 'unquantifiable' (peace!)

- ✱ Challenges inherent to the use of an external evaluator, including
 - language limitations / communication issues related to the use of a translator
 - perceptions regarding the identity of the evaluator (potential funder? 'spy'?)
 - the limited time within which a complex programme must be understood and appreciated

- ✱ Non-respect of the original Work plan – The Evaluator did not conduct Focus Group meetings with the Reflection Groups, but limited herself to individual interview with the Presidents of these Groups, as well as 1-2 other members of each Reflection Group. (The Evaluator was originally anticipating meeting/observing the groups during a CENAP-organized meeting for evaluation; these meetings did not take place as scheduled, during the period of the evaluation)

2. FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS

2.1 Programme Output

The Burundi Peacebuilding Programme output to date can be summarized as follows:

Preparatory Phase (July – October 2007)

This phase sought to strengthen the financial, administrative and programme capacity of the local partner, CENAP, in preparations for the beginning of programme activities:

- Collaborative development of a programme document (Interpeace & CENAP)
- Assessment of CENAP's institutional framework and necessary adaptations (provision of additional human resources, equipment and skills)
- Recruitment of 6 new Personnel
- Training of CENAP Personnel on Interpeace methodology and techniques including: 3 training workshops, and a 3-week testing exercise in the field
- Purchase of office and audiovisual equipment
- Training of finance and administrative manager in Nairobi on financial rules and regulations, and QuickBooks accounting
- IT support from Nairobi office to set up peer-to-peer networks, and internet
- Establishment of a medical fund for CENAP staff

PHASE 1: Priority-Mapping Phase (October 2007 – October 2008):

This is commonly referred to as the “First Phase” in programme jargon. This “First Phase” sought to answer the question, “What are the obstacles to lasting peace in Burundi?” Activities reported during this phase included:

Focus Group Dialogue:

- 50 Communal and « Colline » Groups in 17 provinces (see Map 1)
- 17 Provincial (2nd Tier) Groups
- 11 Thematic Groups
- 1 National Group (200 participants)

The views of about 2200 participants were collected through these activities.

Research and Dialogue Products:

- Introduction of a database designed for the programme, input and analysis of all First Phase data
- Production of a summary document called the “Country Note”
- Production of a documentary video
- Selection of four priority challenges to peace, by the National Group, including:
 - Disarmament of the Civil Population: How to mobilize the population regarding disarmament initiatives? How to reconcile the government’s disarmament policy with the population’s concerns regarding insecurity?
 - Poverty and Unemployment: Which creative innovations could address the issue of unemployment? What are the obstacles?
 - Elections: How to manage the pre-election and election periods in order to ensure a smooth process? What mechanisms can be put in place in order to ensure that election winners and losers accept the results and don’t prevent public institutions from functioning?
 - Transitional Justice: What are the deep causes of the lack of consensus on transitional justice mechanisms? How to prevent tensions from arising from the transitional justice process? How can the national process of transitional justice build on local initiatives of reconciliation?



MAP 1: Locations of 50 Communal Focus Groups during the First Phase⁶

⁶ CENAP, Powerpoint presentation, 2008

PHASE 2: In-depth Dialogue and Research Phase (November 2008 – March 2010):

This phase is commonly referred to as the “Second Phase” of the programme. It sought to facilitate research and dialogue in a way that would allow consensus to be built on solutions to the priority challenges to peace. Activities and output of this phase included:

Focus Group Dialogue:

- 12 Communal Groups (273 participants)
- 17 Provincial Groups (399 participants)
- 11 Thematic Groups (146 participants)
- 5 Diaspora Groups (79 participants)
- 1 National Group (180 participants)

Working Group - Research and Dialogue:

- 4 “Reflection Groups” (Disarmament, Unemployment, Elections, Transitional Justice)
(15-17 members / group (see Appendix 5)(each group met 7-8 times)

Interviews: 31 interviews of Resource People

A total of about 1172 people participated in dialogue and research activities during the Second Phase of the programme. (As in the First Phase, some individuals participated in more than one type of group, or had already participated in the first phase.)

Research and Dialogue Products included:

- 4 short videos, giving a sampling of the views of a cross-section of Burundian society on the 4 priority issues and corresponding solutions
- 4 draft reports, discussing the 4 priority issues and action-oriented recommendations
- National Group prioritization of recommendations, including:

Disarmament:

1st - Declare a new grace period for voluntary surrender of weapons without granting compensation. Support this action with a strong community outreach initiative involving religious denominations, administrative officials and local elected officials

2nd - Implement cells of community security to support community policing and administration in the hills

3rd - Strengthen the security of weapons in the hands of the defense and security bodies and continue to train these bodies in order to make them institutions that are professionally reliable and that provide reassurance for the population

Unemployment:

1st - Establish close relationships between education system and the corporate world (by promoting entrepreneurship in schools, organizing visits from entrepreneurs in schools and competitions to award the best students projects, creating youth clubs for entrepreneurship where students would learn how to develop projects, carry out market research, draft CV, etc.)

2nd - Create the National Job Observatory (that would be responsible for establishing a dialogue framework on the challenges that undermine the labor market; an effective information system on job and professional training for youth; and serving as support for decision-making, contributing to the definition, evaluation and improvement of job policy measures)

Elections:

1st - Set up a dialogue mechanism and a training programme for political parties

2nd - Set up mechanisms for public evaluation of the leaders' performances

3rd - Allow public funding of political parties but only if they base their action on political programmes answering the population's concerns

Transitional Justice:

1st - Collect and protect the traces of past events (through collection and protection of archives, recording of testimonies)

2nd – Identification and protection of common graves

3rd - Identify and institutionalize a day of commemoration of all victims and a common memorial

Engaging different sectors of Burundian society in Dialogue

An important Output objective in both the First and Second Phases of the programme was to involve Burundians at all levels and in all sectors of society, and to “create inter-sectoral networks of actors capable of engaging in dialogue”.⁷

CENAP/IP applied detailed criteria for the selection of participants at each level and at each interval of the research and dialogue process, including all of the Focus groups (Communal,

⁷ Interpeace, Burundi Programme Document 2009 -2011, p. 13

Provincial and Thematic), National group meetings, and the Reflection groups. These criteria included the diverse participation representative of:

- ethnic belonging
- political belonging
- civil society
- returnees
- displaced
- Batwa
- youth
- women
- demobilized
- local associations
- local elected leaders
- Bashingantahe (elders)
- church leadership
- ex-political prisoners
- Public Service – Administration, Justice, Defense, Security

CENAP has also been careful about ensuring diversity amongst their own staff. The CENAP programme team represents an exact balance between the two major ethnic groups in Burundi, as well as a range of geographical origins. Five of the twelve CENAP staff members are women.

Data extracted from the CENAP database for 1231 participants in 52 Focus Groups, shows diverse participation across gender, age, occupation, ethnic, and political lines. (This was also confirmed by a survey done during the course of this Evaluation)(see Appendix 6). Sectors that were recognized as being underrepresented through database analysis were subsequently invited to Thematic group dialogues. These included youth, police, military and ex-combatants. (CENAP took the initiative of adding a Thematic group for youth, after noting their underrepresentation in the data.) Thematic groups met during both the First and Second Phase of the programme. They included:

- Demobilized combatants
- Repatriated refugees
- Displaced people
- Unionists
- Civil Society Organizations
- Religious Leaders
- Students
- Women
- Army
- Police
- Urban youth

CENAP and Interpeace were also careful to establish objective selection criteria in their choice of Communes for participation in the Focus Group dialogues. These criteria included a range of Communes that were both central and on the periphery, Communes that had a particular experience of conflict and Communes that were not known for conflict.

Programme participants appreciated the inclusion of Batwa (more present during the First Phase), and noted that even the physically handicapped were invited to offer their views. Focus groups at the “Colline” level, often under a tree, also offered open and spontaneous opportunities to collect the views of the rural population without interference from local authorities or associations who sometime overly exerted their influence on the content of the discussions.

Networking of this diverse group of participants took place through a complex process by which CENAP first took the question of “obstacles to peace” to Communal level focus groups, Provincial groups and thematic groups, using a participative approach to issues mapping. The Research Team then took a list of more than 100 obstacles to peace and clustered the list down to 14 priorities, based on the degree of consensus expressed around each of the obstacles identified. These 14 priorities were taken to a 200-member National Group meeting, made up of a cross-section of focus groups (50%), plus additional key actors. The (1st) National group then selected four priorities from among the list, based on a prioritization/voting process.

Four Working Groups called “Reflection groups” were then established, including a diverse group of 15-17 experts and interested parties. Reflection Groups were tasked to find entry-points for further analysis of the priority issues, and to identify recommendations for action around the priority issues. Each Reflection Group worked closely with one CENAP researcher on one of the priority issues. The Reflection Groups met 7-8 times over the course of one year (2009), to reflect on information provided by the Researcher, ask questions, provide information from their own expertise, and work towards a report and concrete implementable recommendations. Questions and recommendations from the Reflection Group were taken back to Communal, Provincial and Thematic groups for further input and refinement. This was also supplemented by individual interviews where necessary. Results were shared on a quarterly basis with a group of donors and other interested parties from the international community known as the Programme Support Group (PSG).

The resulting findings were presented for further input and prioritization of recommended “solutions” during a second National Group meeting in March 2010. An important part of the whole process was the use of video footage showing a range of perspectives expressed during the Focus Groups and some individual interviews. Through these videos, participants in different regions of the country were able to listen to and appreciate the views of a diverse cross-section of the population, not necessarily represented in their Focus Group.

The programme has clearly established a network of relationships between these different levels and different groups as a result of this process. Video footage shows evidence of

remarkable candor and openness on the part of programme participants, and willingness to engage in dialogue. The National Group meetings are also strong indicators of the existence of an inter-sectoral network of actors capable of engaging in dialogue. Participants to the National Group meetings represented a very wide range of actors, including top political and military officials, to rural dwellers from some of the most remote locations of Burundi. National Group participants and particularly those from the Communal Groups were consistently amazed and delighted by the mix of participants.

Several participants did, however, question whether the demographics of the National Group meeting were not skewed towards the interests of an elite majority from Bujumbura, and suggested a larger percentage participation of the “grassroots”. They further clarified that this does not mean the rural middle-class, but the rural farmers themselves. (Results from the Evaluation Questionnaire showed a large percentage of rural administrators and other government workers (37%) among the Focus Group participants interviewed, and a lower percentage of farmers than would be expected (34%).)(Appendix 5) Other participants expressed similar concerns about difficulties the facilitators experience when there are too many high-ranking officials monopolizing the conversation and the impediment this can be to fruitful dialogue in both Reflection Groups and the National Group.

Further discussion of the relevance, impact and sustainability of this dialogue can be found in Sections below.

Consensus on Priority Challenges to Peace

An additional emphasis within the programme Outputs which deserves particular attention is the concept of “consensus”:

Consensus, by definition, is an “agreement in judgment or opinion reached by a group as a whole”⁸. Consensus does not necessarily begin with a majority opinion, but must eventually achieve the ‘support of a group as a whole’. The process described above, a process of broad-based dialogue reflecting a wide range of opinions, and bringing a diverse cross-section of actors to eventually converge around the identification of findings, *together*, is very conducive to consensus-building.

For many of those interviewed, however, including some CENAP staff, there was, nonetheless, a tendency to understand the results of the First and Second Phase of the programme, as representative of the majority opinion of Burundians, something to be submitted to, and not something to challenge if you are not in agreement. Typical comments included that of one Reflection Group member who described the results as “the opinion of the nation”⁹. While Interpeace, itself, does not claim that “consensus” achieved through the programme represents the “weight of majority opinion”, this nuance is not as well understood by participants, readers

⁸ <http://www.thefreedictionary.com/consensus>

⁹ Interview with Diane Gahimbare

of the Research reports, and possibly even by CENAP staff, themselves. And, in the absence of a more nuanced understanding of how choices were made, and their limitations, there is a tendency for the priorities that are chosen to become ‘self-fulfilling prophecy’, with participants ‘buying in’, confident that they represent the opinion of the nation.

This understanding of consensus, was, also, slightly muddled by the introduction of ‘voting’ into the process during the identification of priority obstacles over the course of the first National Group meeting. The final choice of four priorities was made based on a process during which participants were asked to prioritize 10 possible priority issues. Participants were asked to rank their preferred priorities, with 10 points being given to their first choice, 9 to their second choice, and so on, for all of the 10 priority issues. (According to CENAP staff, participants experienced considerable difficulty in understanding this process.) The fact that a significant number of participants only ranked their first four priorities means that some of the choices did not get the additional points that they would have received for being 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th or 10th priority in the overall tabulations. (Appendix 7 includes the original tabulations and illustrates how the final rankings could have been different if there had been consistency in tabulation of ranking of the priorities.) If the tabulations had been done in a consistent manner, there is a (small) possibility that land issues could have obtained the most “votes”, and been selected in lieu of one of the other themes. On the other hand, if only the first four priorities are tabulated for all of the voters, and the 5th through 10th choices are not included, it can be confirmed that the four priority themes retained for research, were indeed the choice of the majority of National Group members. (see Appendix 7)

So, while it appears that the choices of the majority of National Group members were, in the end, probably reflected in the results of the processes described above, in light of the excellent and thorough process that proceeded the selection, it seems unfortunate that the identification of priority obstacles to peace in Burundi, was eventually decided by inconsistent arithmetic and a poorly understood ‘voting’ process. It bears mentioning, however, that a National Group debate to validate the results of the voting process immediately followed the vote. Participants were also reassured that issues such as land, could be picked up in later phases of the programme. While these subsequent steps were definitely helpful, the voting process itself appears to be a weak link, in what was otherwise a thorough process of consensus-building involving a significant cross-section of Burundian society.

Financial, Administrative and Programme Capacity:

Among the objectives of the programme, and particularly during the Preparatory Phase, was an objective that aimed to strengthen CENAP’s capacity to do peacebuilding programmes. The following are some brief comments on areas of administrative and technical capacity which received support from the programme, under the objective of capacity-building:

The quality of the videos, the Country Note, and draft reports on the four themes is described as very good and excellent, with many requests for Kirundi translations of the documents.

The quality of the facilitation of Focus Groups, National Group and Reflection Groups is also consistently described as excellent:

“I have no advice for this team. I just wish more organizations worked like they do----How did CENAP get all of the best staff in Burundi? And the way they work together as a team is fantastic. Even the accountant and the cameraman are given an opportunity to express themselves.”---Anne-Marie Bihirabake, BINUB

“If we had ten more like them, Burundi would be fine!”----Senator Caraziwe

It is difficult to fully capture the enthusiasm with which all interview participants (without exception) spoke of CENAP’s excellent technical capacity.

The data base also proved to be an important addition to the CENAP programme for the First Phase, making it possible to process a tremendous amount of data in a more objective manner. It was appreciated. A database for the Second Phase arrived when a significant amount of data had already been collected, and Researchers no longer had time to do the data entry. They also found this second (new) database more complicated, but suspect that it might be even more useful (have more helpful features) in the long run, if it was introduced in a timely manner.¹⁰

The backlog which existed when the video database was introduced meant that it has never been fully exploited. Only about 20 hours of the more than 400 hours of footage that has already been recorded, has been entered in the database. Given their current workload, the Audiovisual Researchers are not confident that they would have sufficient time to keep up with data input, even if there was not a backlog.

CENAP was audited by international auditor KPMG for both 2008 and 2009 fiscal years, with no serious matters arising. The most significant matter concerned occasional delays in the receipts of transfers due to delays caused by the banks.¹¹ There were no significant budget variances between 2009 budget and actual.¹²

Interpeace sees capacity-building for local partners as a unique contribution of Interpeace. Providing external trainers for internal workshops, preparing workplans together, fundraising and attending meetings together in both Burundi and in Europe, are all part of this contribution.

These outputs are all consistent with those described in the 2007 and 2009 Project Documents. The programme has satisfied its objectives with regards to Programme Outputs.

¹⁰ Group Discussion, Igor Rugwiza

¹¹ KPMG, 2008 Audit, p. 13

¹² Interpeace ECA Monthly Financial Coversheet, January 2010

2.2 *Relevance and Added Value*

Programme and Methodology (Dialogue and Research)

Despite the presence of other actors active in facilitating dialogue processes in Burundi, and despite a wide spread feeling among donors and NGO's that obstacles to peace are already known, both the Programme and its Methodology are consistently viewed as relevant and adding value, by all of those interviewed:

There are clear indicators that programme-initiated **Dialogue Groups** (also called Focus Groups) brought Burundians together across ethnic lines and other lines of division in a collaborative effort to address challenges to peace. According to one CENAP Researcher, "space" exists in other peace programmes in Burundi, but not with this mix of people.¹³ (More details of the profile of this mix are available in Section 2.1 above.)

Space also exists in other peace programmes, but not with this quality of facilitation. Commune Groups describe how during their first Dialogue Group meetings, they found themselves together as Hutu, Tutsi and Twa but that all of their differences "disappeared".¹⁴ Many credited the CENAP Team for this, and spoke of how the facilitators (Researchers) made them feel at ease. "The 'Esprit de CENAP' took over, and we didn't even feel the influence of government representatives [or anyone else]----we were all equal."¹⁵

They also spoke of learning from the model that CENAP provided for them:

"Even if you really tried, you couldn't identify a bias amongst the facilitators. It's what makes them very competent"¹⁶

"The team always got along well together, despite their diversity....I reflected a lot on this...It contributed a lot to the work they were able to do."¹⁷

"CENAP's greatest strength is their personnel. We need to build on these people."¹⁸

Focus Groups based at the grassroots (Communal Groups), and Reflections Groups composed of mostly urban 'experts' in the field, all expressed appreciation for the idea that dialogue be carried back and forth between these different levels (tiers) of the process. There was a sense of empowerment among Communal and Provincial Groups based on the idea that CENAP was their "porte-parole". And, conversely, representatives of civil society in Bujumbura, appreciated

¹³ Interview with Benoit Birutegusa

¹⁴ Busoni Focus Group

¹⁵ Interview with Sylvie Hatungimana

¹⁶ Busoni Focus Group

¹⁷ Interview with Diane Gahimbare

¹⁸ Interview with Anne-Marie Bihirabake

the fact that their ideas developed in Reflection Groups were taken back to the grassroots communities. For some, this was what made the programme original.----“It was a living research. It was extraordinary”¹⁹ Reflection Group participants expressed amazement at the fact that the CENAP team wouldn’t change the ideas coming from the participants, but would incorporate them as they were.

Lukas Probst, Associate Peace and Governance Advisor to the United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB), also noted that, in comparison with programmes like the BINUB “Cadre de Dialogue”, the CENAP programme had a much different [more inclusive], and more fruitful approach to the full cross-section of civil society. According to Lukas Probst, the longer-term, more guided [structured] approach to dialogue adopted by the Interpeace / CENAP programme was what made this possible.

Much of the above can be attributed to effective communication of Interpeace’s values and principles during inception and follow-up training activities. These values are expressed in the programme through an emphasis on **Participatory Action Research (PAR)**, to an increasing degree over the life of the programme.²⁰ Participatory Action Research is defined as “research which involves all relevant parties in actively examining together current (problematic) action in order to change and improve it. It is active co-research, by and for those to be helped....whereby those to be helped, determine the purposes and outcomes of their own enquiry”.²¹ The emphasis on **Participatory Action Research (PAR)** throughout the programme played an important role in shaping the respectful listening posture which facilitated open dialogue. Participants shared that they “really felt respect from the team” and really appreciated this respect.²² Participants repeatedly spoke of learning from the methodology: “In our Reflection Group there was cohesion and understanding.---We were teaching each other. We learnt a new method of working”²³

The inclusion of **audio-visual tools** as part of the PAR approach also contributed greatly to the added-value of the programme. Members of the Burundian Diaspora, otherwise reluctant and suspicious of this unknown CENAP initiative, described how easy it became to open up and talk about difficult issues, after having seen others talking about the same issues on camera. The CENAP Audio-visual researchers describe a “snowball effect” that happens, in what seems to become a competition between those on film to become increasingly more transparent. Participants in a Communal Group in Mutimbuzi, rate the audio-visual experience so highly that they describe the recorded dialogue as their “contribution to peace in Burundi”. The methodology is “perfect”, according to one researcher.²⁴

¹⁹ Interview with Anne-Marie Bihirabake

²⁰ Group Discussion, Liberate Nakimana

²¹ Wadsworth, Y. (1998), What is Participatory Action Research?

²² Interview with Marcelline Mawazo

²³ Interview with Abbe Elie Rutwe, Ruyigi

²⁴ Group Discussion, Igor Rugwiza

PAR's value-added to the programme, appeared to have been primarily through Interpeace's integration of more general 'Participatory Action' principles into their overall approach. PAR, itself, was only formally introduced to the CENAP team in November 2008 in preparation of work with the Reflection Groups. When it was introduced, the CENAP team noted that they were made aware by the trainer that they had not actually been applying PAR in its most Orthodox form but that work with Reflection Groups would provide an opportunity to do so. The PAR trainer pointed out to the CENAP team that as long as they continued to consider themselves (and refer to themselves) as the principle researchers, they were not really doing PAR! During attempts to apply the methodology in a more orthodox form during work with Reflection Groups, the CENAP Team found themselves frustrated when it took 5 months for some of the groups to understand the methodology. The Team described it as "time wasted", for the team and admitted to eventually taking back some of the research direction. (The Team still refers to themselves as the Researchers!)

The challenge with implementing PAR was not limited only to time pressures, though. CENAP researchers also noted that once Reflection Group members embraced the principle that they were the "experts", responsible for determining the 'purposes and outcomes of their own enquiry', they refused to believe that they could ever be mistaken in their opinions, a phenomenon which made consensus-building an increasingly difficult challenge! Members of the Team felt that, while PAR contributed to making the programme relevant, it was most effective (and efficient) when *not* applied in its 'most orthodox' form.²⁵ Researchers eventually resorted to providing considerably more structure and input to Reflection Group meetings than they had originally intended. [The Interpeace team also notes that there are many applications of PAR and that they did not intend it to be applied in its 'orthodox' form. It is also not the intention of the Evaluator to recommend that PAR should be introduced in its purest form.]

Similar confusion as that experienced in Reflection Groups was also expressed by participants at other levels (Communal, Programme Support Group (donor group), and even Reflection Groups) with regards to process within their Dialogue Groups. Some noted that "we gave [CENAP] all the information we could, but we didn't understand why we were giving it"^{26,27}. The relevance of the programme and possibly the effectiveness of the methodology could benefit from a clearer understanding of the process by the participants.

One Researcher spoke of recognizing traces of the Programme and Methodology in his own Burundian culture. He described how the neutral role of the researcher, including the focused listening, required retention and subsequent management of "data", were all qualities promoted among the traditional Bashingantahe (elders) of Burundi.²⁸ This model is very likely the point of reference for both Researchers and participants, accounting for the easy way in which the CENAP team moved into the neutral listener role, but also accounting for some of the later more guided approach to the process, once Researchers became more comfortable with

²⁵ Interview with Liberate Nakimana and Charles Ndayiziga

²⁶ Interview with Diane Gahimbare

²⁷ Interview with Tracy Dexter

²⁸ Interview with Benoit Birutegusa

their own understanding of the process. Perhaps there are aspects of this cultural understanding of “research” that could constitute a specifically Burundian approach to participatory action research.

Research Findings and Resulting Recommendations

Most of the research findings, described in Section 2.1, were described as relevant by most of the interview participants. The findings were also very similar to those identified by the BINUB “Cadre de Dialogue” programme (with the exception of the research focused around “Elections”, probably due to the high number of politicians involved in the BINUB process).²⁹ A BINUB staff member and Reflection Group President, Anne-Marie Bhirabake, noted that “at BINUB we stay at a very general level. Problems remain gigantic and it becomes impossible to tackle them.” The Interpeace/CENAP research findings make it possible to think about specific strategies for intervention.³⁰

International participants in evaluation interviews also found the findings to be relevant and capable of being implemented. A few exceptions to this included:

- The notion of providing capacity-building for political parties if they base their programmes on a democratic vision is “an oversimplification and a bit naïve”³¹
- Concerns that a new “period of grace” for disarmament, would be without compensation – “Compensation is definitely necessary.”³²
- Land should be a cross-cutting issue; how can it be built in?³³
- Questions about whether Transitional Justice is really “the priority of priorities” on the part of ex-patriate participants³⁴---[It is also interesting to note that this was the issue most often forgotten when Commune level participants were asked to recap findings.]
- Concern that use of the term “Elections” to describe the obstacle to peace, communicates the idea that it is elections themselves which are a problem, and not the way that these elections take place³⁵

Information emerging as part of the research that supported the eventual “findings” constituted much of the value-added by the research process. New ideas like that of an “Employment Observatory”, were the greatest value-added for some. Others have already incorporated new insights on the priority issues into their political analysis. (The Chargée d’Affaire of the Netherlands Embassy Office, began to share ‘interesting’ information that she

²⁹ Interview with Lukas Probst

³⁰ Interview with Anne-Marie Bhirabake

³¹ Interview with Lukas Probst

³² Interview with Tracy Dexter

³³ Interview with Tracy Dexter

³⁴ Interview with Jeannette Seppen

³⁵ Interview with Vibeke Soegaard

had heard ‘somewhere’ regarding the reluctance of political parties to share their programmes with their members because of fear that their ideas would be stolen. The Evaluator was able to then remind her that this was information that she had acquired through CENAP research.) Everyone interviewed, at every level, was able to name at least some piece of the research which had proven of particular interest or value to them.

However, despite what seems to be considerable general appreciation for the research findings, it is not clear, both by definition and by observation, that all of the research findings (issues and recommendations) have the “punch” of Key Driving Factors of conflict. This seems particularly true with regards to the issue of Unemployment and Under-Employment. Unemployment is never mentioned in the Context analysis provided in Interpeace / CENAP’s programme documents or reporting. It also does not appear in analyses such as that of the UN IRIN report in Section 1.2 above. In questionnaires administered to 95 Focus Group participants during the Evaluation process, unemployment also registered the lowest amount of support as a key obstacle to peace, with only slightly more than 52% of the respondents giving full support to its relevance.

TABLE 1: Percentage Agreement of Focus Group Respondents on Key Issues identified by the Programme

Priority Issue	Percentage of Agreement with 4 Priorities					
	Busoni	Bugendana	Ruyigi	Mutimbuzi	Rumonge	TOTAL
Elections	89%	85%	94%	71%	59%	86%
Disarmament	79%	81%	88%	71%	53%	75%
Transitional Justice	63%	65%	50%	53%	65%	60%
Unemployment	58%	58%	75%	24%	47%	52%
# of Respondents	19	26	16	17	17	95

* Percentage was calculated based on the number of respondents of the total (95) who fully support the selection of this issue as being a ‘priority obstacle to peace in Burundi’.

If ‘Unemployment’ had been reframed as ‘Unemployment of Demobilized youth’, perhaps the issue would become more relevant. The presence or absence of widespread unemployment is not, however, a Key Driving Factor of conflict.

In response to these observations, Interpeace has asked the question whether ‘focusing on Key Driving Factors from the beginning would make the programme more effective?’. Maud Roure, from the Interpeace Team, describes the need to adapt to the context and the issues which a society is ready and willing to face:

We see in our older programmes that the issues chosen by the National Group evolve over time and that they choose issues that are more and more key to the conflict. This

has to do with the credibility and the legitimacy that the Programme and the team are gaining, with what the political space will allow and with the participants' readiness to look into sore spots. Focusing from the beginning of a programme on Key Driving Factors that would be chosen by the team but that would not come from the consultations and the National Group meeting, could also be counterproductive if it resulted in turning the participants and the authorities against the programme, triggering destructive discussions and "doing harm". However in order to make sure that the Programme stays relevant and that participants do not become over cautious, the team constantly needs to gauge the limit between what is acceptable and what is not and to keep pushing the envelope.³⁶

In other Interpeace programmes, this more cautious approach has probably been necessary. This does not however appear to be the case for the Burundi programme. In conversation with Focus Group participants it was often reiterated that Burundi is an open society where there are no longer "taboo" issues, including ethnicity. While this is probably not entirely true, it is probably true that present-day Burundi has sufficient political space that if the question of Key Driving Factors was turned back to the Dialogue Groups and National Group meeting, the groups would almost certainly be able to name enough (if not all) of the Key Driving Factors that the programme would have sufficient entry-points, without Interpeace / CENAP having to impose choices on the process. The missing link seems to be an attempt to make the concept of Key Driving Factors understood to the Dialogue Groups, Reflection Groups and National Group. Once the concept is understood, the principles of participative enquiry should still stand with participants responsible for determining the 'purposes and outcomes of their own enquiry'.

An important issue arising for many programme participants with regards to Research Findings was the question of the timely dissemination of the findings. As time passes, research findings will usually become less and less relevant. This was a question raised often with regards to recommendations around Elections. Participants recognized that the programme recommendations were long-term, but felt that the research and findings from the research could also be very relevant during the immediate 2010 electoral process.

A common observation by those attempting to explain the Research Findings was that "everything is connected to everything else".³⁷ (A manifestation of this was the difficulty that researchers noted keeping Reflection Group participants on topic. Participants tended to drift easily from one topic to another (i.e, from disarmament to unemployment) easily making the links between the two). Despite this, little or no work was done to try and understand the interrelationships and dynamics between priority issues, and, the impact that the 'solutions / recommendations' might have on these interrelationships. When this was done during a (too brief) introduction to RPP Systems Analysis during the course of evaluation activities, links between the issues became apparent, with factors such as exclusion and leadership, easily

³⁶ Written response from Maud Roure

³⁷ Interview with Jeannette Seppen

emerging as priority factors (possibly Key Driving Factors?). This is an important exercise which can help to confirm the relevance of programme entry points and the relative importance of the priority themes as Key Driving Factors within the conflict system. It can also help to identify gaps (i.e., ethnicity?), as well as leverage points, for working change within the system. The potential impact of certain action-oriented recommendations, as well as the potential impact of Dialogue and Research as an activity in and of itself, could be clearly seen in the brief system's analysis done by the CENAP Team. The analysis merits further and deeper reflection, with regards to the interrelationship between issues defined as "obstacles to peace", with regards to impact of recommendations on these systems, and even with regards to the impact on the system of the Dialogue and Research activities themselves.

An additional aspect of Systems Analysis which could potentially serve to strengthen the relevance and value-added of the programme, would be attention to Key Driving Factors *for peace*. Systems diagrams should also be developed for factors related to peace, and, if possible, the points of interaction and connection should be diagrammed between conflict systems and systems of peace.³⁸ Interpeace and its partner in Nimba (Liberia) have already explored reflection and sharing on 'common ground', or connectors within the Liberian context.³⁹ This can provide important insight about opportunities for intervention, as well as ensuring that action-oriented recommendations 'do no harm' to positive forces for peace within the society in question.

Third Phase Design

In order to remain relevant, a number of suggestions emerged with regards to design of the next and Third Phase of the programme:

There seemed to be widespread consensus around suggestions for a Third Phase. All agreed that CENAP should be the primary actor with regards to carrying the research findings forward. With the exception of Interpeace staff⁴⁰, few seemed concerned about possible contradictions between the role of neutral interlocutor and advocate. According to almost all interviewed, a Third Phase should include an element of continued research, as well as an advocacy role vis-à-vis the existing recommendations.

An ongoing research role was generally seen as an opportunity to pick up some of the issues which had been 'dropped' in Phase Two, so that they could benefit from similar research as was applied to the four priority issues identified during Phase One. Amongst these were land issues and women's issues. One evaluation participant suggested that CENAP's excellent research skills would be most appropriately directed towards direct implementation of recommendations that require research, such as the Transitional Justice recommendation for the collection and protection of archives, and especially recording testimonies.⁴¹

³⁸ p.16, CDA, Reflecting on Peace Practice – Advanced Training of Consultants and Advisers, 2010.

³⁹ Written response from Koenraad Van Brabant

⁴⁰ Interview with Johan Svensson

⁴¹ Interview with Abbe Athanase Nsabimana

The advocacy role was generally seen as beginning with widespread dissemination of existing recommendations. Immediate action should include letters to all of the relevant authorities (even before 2010 elections), and ‘freeing’ someone to be in constant communication with the ‘right’ people. (This is particularly important with regards to the recommendation for an extended period of grace for disarmament, endorsed by the First Vice-President during the Second National Group.) It should also include the creation of a Steering Group, or “another team” comprised of people with influence in relevant fields for follow-up of the recommendations. Targeted dialogue groups should be established involving key actors vis-à-vis the recommendations. A Senator suggested that one of these targeted dialogue groups should include elected leaders and the Executive, in order to push the Executive to express themselves on these issues.⁴²

Maintaining dialogue with the grassroots throughout the process should be an important element of a Third Phase programme. The suggestion of Antennas at the grassroots level was suggested by several Communal and Provincial groups. One participant suggested a “Suggestion Box” (virtual or physical) through which the network of actors could be in more constant contact.⁴³

The CENAP Director suggested that identification of a few Communes for deep and sustained dialogue, and with connections to the 2nd (Provincial Tier), and national decision makers, would be the most appropriate way forward. He emphasized the need for the Communes to find solutions for themselves. The success of these Communes will then become a role model for exportation to other Communes....and people will say “we did it ourselves”.⁴⁴

During a “Reflecting on Peace Practice” (RPP) Matrix mapping exercise, the CENAP team noted that they are currently lacking activities and specific objectives with regards to Key People able to affect socio-political change (Appendix 8). Interpeace notes that this is one of the main areas of focus for the Third Phase, but which had not yet been reflected on in depth at the time of the Matrix mapping exercise.⁴⁵

Mobilizing political will for socio-political change will also present a real challenge during the Third Phase. It was generally recognized that in-depth analysis of political will, and appropriate strategies for mobilization, will need to wait until after the results of this year’s elections. Current analyses, however, reveal a great deal of mystification and perplexity surrounding the issue of mobilizing political will. The sentiment that “we don’t know why decision-makers do what they do here”⁴⁶, was expressed often. One diplomat confirmed that, “Most parties [in Burundi] take little advice”.⁴⁷ Shouting from the rooftops doesn’t work, and neither does silent

⁴² Interview with Senator Caraziwe

⁴³ Interview with Abbe Elie Rutwe, Ruyigi

⁴⁴ Interview with Charles Ndayiziga

⁴⁵ Written response from Johan Svensson

⁴⁶ Interview with Jeannette Seppen

⁴⁷ Interview with Jeannette Seppen

diplomacy. BLTP has brought in high level envoys and still not succeeded in getting ‘buy in’. Often they have not even succeeded in getting participation.⁴⁸

Based on this rather gloomy perception of political will, however, it was also suggested that the most relevant recommendations are those that can be put into practice by the dialogue participants themselves.⁴⁹ Regardless, CENAP must create a public debate around the issues and related recommendations. This could be done through the media, which obviously has the most widespread influence, but could also be done through projection of the films, and other CENAP-organized large events.

One creative solution for mobilization of political will, successfully attempted by BINUB, was to involve Burundians who had formerly wielded power but were now “out of the game”. Through successful mobilization of these individuals, BINUB brought them back into the game. They also relied heavily on mid-level actors with whom they had partnered, but who had subsequently grown into political power.

Some evaluation participants expressed concern about CENAP’s capacity in terms of implementation, especially with regards to their power to mobilize the most important political actors.⁵⁰ They suggested that more visible civil society organizations, such as OLUCOME and OAG be mobilized by CENAP for support and lobbying around the programme’s recommendations. Others suggested that programming be done together with the Programme Support Group, or even that the larger National Group (or a version of it), be brought together and asked, “Who will do what?”

2.3 Efficiency

Time Frame

Both the Interpeace and CENAP teams describe the two year programme as being very “squeezed”, particularly during the Second Phase. Because of a certain degree of skepticism among donors surrounding the need for ‘another dialogue programme’, as well as the relative openness of Burundian society, it was felt that results could and should be obtained very quickly.⁵¹ Work plans needed to be modified several times, and were very full, something which also had funding implications. And while most of the outputs were realized, a few cutbacks (i.e, in the number of Communal Groups visits, number of researchers per visit) were required. An attempt was made to hire a fifth researcher, but a suitable candidate was not forthcoming. Interpeace rightly noted that if more time was associated with more meetings, it might provide more understanding and assimilation of the process.⁵²

⁴⁸ Interview with Tracy Dexter

⁴⁹ Interview with Lukas Probst

⁵⁰ Interview with Col, Nibizi

⁵¹ Interview with Johan Svensson

⁵² Interpeace, Quarterly Report, Jan-Mar 2009

Participants expressed a range of views around the question of the time frame within which the programme took place. Some Reflection Group members noted that more time would have been helpful, citing the need for more field visits.⁵³ The Kamenge Communal Administrator noted that although the process was inclusive, it was definitely too short a process to build real trust between different groups.⁵⁴ In contrast, other participants described the process as too slow, and spoke of their frustration at sitting and doing research, while, in the meantime a Disarmament programme was already being implemented, or elections were already being prepared. It is not evident that the CENAP Team made any particular effort to respond to this pressure for more immediate results during the first two Phases. With discussion of a Third (implementing) Phase, however, participants expressed that the process has now become more clear and the waiting for action, less frustrating.⁵⁵

The most difficult aspect of the limited time frame for the CENAP team, however, was the intensity of the work and the demands it made on their own professional and family lives. The lack of any additional time meant that some of CENAP's own networking activities were curtailed. It also meant that the Team no longer had any time for additional activities which might build their own personal capacity, or the capacity of other local Burundian organizations. (Several researchers have been obliged to leave organizations in which they used to play important roles.) All Team members complained of having little family time. The Audiovisual researchers, in particular, shared the intensity of editing months of work, in just one month after the completion of field work. This was complicated, at times, by the late arrival of video equipment purchased for the programme.

Despite these challenges, however, all of the activities were implemented (see Section 2.1) and implemented with diligence and efficiency.

Role of Audiovisual Tools

Audiovisual tools played a significant part in contributing to the efficiency of the programme. Communal groups visited during the course of the Evaluation who had only participated in the First Phase, and who had not had contact with CENAP for up to 2 years, would have difficulty remembering the details of their Focus Group dialogues, but they did not forget the existence of the audiovisual equipment, or the purpose for which it was intended.⁵⁶ The videos quickly and effectively communicated CENAP's mission and purpose to all who saw them. As noted above, use of the audiovisual equipment also produced a "snowball" type effect, encouraging more and increasingly frank dialogue around specific issues. The videos were also efficient in terms of moving dialogue towards consensus. There is little doubt that the editing choices of the Team (including the Audiovisual Researchers), were as important in bringing consensus as

⁵³ Interview with Diane Gahimbare

⁵⁴ Interview with Kamenge Communal Administrator

⁵⁵ Ruyigi Provincial Focus Group

⁵⁶ Mutimbuzi Communal Group

their facilitation skills. (As a Team they made many difficult editing choices, choosing to leave out some of the most controversial material for the protection of both individual and the programme, and looking for other footage which expressed the same opinions in different language, and which served to illustrate points made in the written documents.⁵⁷) Videos also were a tool for making sure that voices from the grassroots were heard even during National Group meetings, when the individuals themselves were sometimes present, but less inclined to give their opinion. Several participants have underscored the archive that the video footage is becoming, archiving current events in Burundi, and preserving an understanding of the past.

The videos should and could still, also play important roles in disseminating the recommendations that have emerged from the dialogue process. Despite agreeing to pay the National Television and Radio of Burundi (RTNB), for a showing of the video documentary produced at the end of the First Phase, the RTNB, at the last minute, refused, saying that they “respect the politics of the President”. As the programme had already received a letter from the President’s office acknowledging the relevance of the programme and its findings, the decision by the RTNB was most peculiar. An alternate station (Tele Renaissance) was subsequently paid to show the video, after which they showed two more viewings (without payment by CENAP), based on public demand.⁵⁸ This was, however, a one-time event.

Though the effectiveness of the audio-visual methodology cannot be denied, certain associated risks should not be underplayed. If the political climate in Burundi were to change, some of the video footage could, potentially, expose certain individuals to some risk. The question of participants comfort level at having their opinions so widely and publicly posted was posed to a large number of interview participants (more than 50). Only one participant expressed any concern. Others, including Senators, Colonels, and demobilized, were very comfortable, and even a bit giddy at their new found stardom. The one participant who expressed concern also remembered CENAP as having introduced the filming with the promise that the videos were for internal use, and would not be seen on public television.⁵⁹ The participant was still comfortable with CENAP’s use of the video on television, as long as it was being used for the original purpose. He shared that “sometimes we say things because there is such a feeling of ‘family’ during the facilitations, but we wouldn’t say these things if we knew they were going somewhere else, or might be taken out of context.”

Role of Reflections Groups

It is not entirely clear that Reflection Groups, considered to be the flagships in the PAR methodology, were always very efficient with regards to research goals. It was noted above that some of the Reflection Groups experienced difficulties in assimilating the methodology, and understanding their role, for up to 5 months. Reflection Group facilitators and participants also noted that dialogue in some of the Reflection Groups was handicapped either by extremely

⁵⁷ Interview with Igor Rugwiza

⁵⁸ Group Discussion - CENAP Team

⁵⁹ Interview with Abbe Elie Rutwe, Ruyigi

polarized viewpoints, or by high-profile participants who consistently monopolized the dialogue. (This was not the case with all of the Reflection Groups.) Researchers also shared the difficulties that the Groups had in focusing sufficiently to identify entry-points from among multiple choices. CENAP Researchers were required to “take things in hand”.⁶⁰

The Reflection Groups were, however, efficient in other respects. There are several indicators that the Reflection Groups played an important role in building awareness about the programme, mobilizing participants for the National Group, and moving the National Group towards consensus. It is possible that, in some groups, the Reflection Groups were considerably more efficient for relationship building and as Consensus-builders.

2.4 Influences, Impacts and Sustainability

While it is generally agreed that it is still early in the life of the programme to be evaluating impact, there are multiple indicators of influence and even some early indicators of impact, which merit highlighting. These influences and impact will be considered relative to the overall goal of the programme which is to “to reinforce Burundian capacities to strengthen and consolidate lasting peace” and to the desired outcomes.⁶¹

Outcomes desired include^{62,63}:

- An effective peacebuilding team that is capable of delivering research-based and action-oriented dialogue process that contributes to the consolidation of peace in Burundi
- A culture of dialogue and trust that engages the different sectors of Burundian society in collaborative efforts to address challenges to peace
- Broad consensus on key peacebuilding challenges and on basic principles, strategies and goals to overcome them.

The Theory of Change⁶⁴ that undergirds programme activities, as described by CENAP is that “if Burundian society is engaged in inclusive dialogue, solutions will be found and action will be taken to overcome obstacles to peace”⁶⁵ or “if Burundian stakeholders (including Key People⁶⁶) have ownership of an inclusive dialogue process, solutions will be found and action will be taken, to overcome obstacles to peace”.

⁶⁰ Interview with Charles Ndayiziga

⁶¹ Interpeace, Project Document, 2009- 2011

⁶² Interpeace, Project Document, 2009-2011

⁶³ Additional outcomes were defined on a 2007 Project Document. These have not been included as they were not on the Terms of Reference for the Evaluation

⁶⁴ A Theory of Change can be described as, “We believe that by doing x (action) successfully, we will produce y (movement towards peace), CDA, “Reflecting on Peace Practice – Participant Training Manual”, 2009.

⁶⁵ Interview with Charles Ndayiziga

⁶⁶ Key People are people who have direct influence on a conflict, to stop it, or make it worse.

An Effective Peacebuilding Team

Indicators of the establishment of an effective peacebuilding team and its influence and impact are many. Some of these are mentioned under Section 2.1 in the discussion on Financial, Administrative and Programme Capacity. Members of the Team are now also occasionally sought out as experts for contribution to other research and dialogues events. Team process observed during their debriefing on the 2nd National Evaluation, as well as during interviews, and an RPP Training workshop, also showed indicators of participative, consultative, inclusive and consensual process. According to some, competent facilitators are a very rare commodity and a great resource for Burundi, for longer term national dialogue and research.⁶⁷ The CENAP Team is made up of just such competent facilitators.

A Culture of Dialogue engaging Different Sectors

Dialogue is central to the Theory of Change subscribed by this programme.

It was clearly established in Section 2.1 that dialogue has taken place, and that it has engaged a wide cross-section of Burundian actors. The question that remains to be asked is ‘what has been the influence and impact of this dialogue, especially with regards to strengthening and consolidating lasting peace’?

For some, this dialogue process has provided opportunities and opened space that had not previously existed, noting that this was the first time that they’d talked openly about ethnic groups and political parties.⁶⁸ Others claimed to have learnt things about their country and its history that they didn’t know before. Others established new relationships. Party members from opposing political groups were seen to carry on conversations over tea-breaks, where there had previously been no communication. Many participants expressed surprise at previously unheard views expressed on video, or during National Group meetings, and built on that surprise to make their own contribution and move dialogue forward.

A strong example of the impact that the dialogue process has had can be found in the inclusion of the Diaspora Focus Groups in the process. Some members of the Diaspora who initially demonstrated suspicion and fear, with regards to both CENAP and each other, have since become some of the programme’s most important contributors to dialogue. After CENAP eventually succeeded in convincing Diaspora participants to come to an inter-ethnic dialogue meeting, the participants committed to continuing the dialogue amongst themselves.⁶⁹

Dialogue was particularly well sustained, where participants had an opportunity to come back to the conversation on a more regular basis. Reflection group participants not only spoke of

⁶⁷ Interview with Lukas Probst

⁶⁸ Database, 2007

⁶⁹ DiasporaFocus GroupInterview

benefitting from the dialogue, but also spoke of moving forward in their own thinking as a result of the dialogue. A member of one of the Reflection Groups describes how the experience of coming to consensus in her Reflection Group inspired her to believe that all of Burundi could experience the same----“We could speak the same language about our problems, if we were in dialogue. We [in the Reflection Group] were all changed by this experience”⁷⁰

The impact was less apparent as the frequency of dialogue opportunities decreased. Participants who had only participated at the Communal level (especially the First Phase) had difficulty remembering the Focus Group event, and the dialogue that had taken place. (Some did, however, describe new relationships formed as a result of the meeting.⁷¹) Frustration was expressed by Communal Groups and even Provincial Groups with regards to the fact that they had not had any further opportunity to continue in the dialogue process, and that they were not receiving feedback on their contribution. In all of the locations visited, representatives from Communal Groups to Provincial Groups or National Groups had not had either the initiative or the opportunity to report back to their Communal Groups. Communal group members who's interviews appeared on the National Group video presentations were unaware of this (though delighted), and a strong request was made for dissemination of these videos, and final reports, by all of the Communal and Provincial Groups visited over the course of the evaluation.

The CENAP Director is sensitive to this and describes this as the area that needs the most improvement. Because of the need to select and limit the number of priority issues, concerns at the local rural level were lost, sometimes in favour of the priorities identified by interests of national level decision makers participating in the National Group. The CENAP Director describes the reduction of this dialogue space as causing him “pain”. “On the hills is where the real dialogue happens”, he says.⁷²

One interview participant also cautioned about aiming for a “culture of dialogue”. Burundi has gone through several phases of relative openness and diminished space, with regards to dialogue. It may be that, “people will just try it out”.⁷³ In several of the programme reports, references are made to “seeds of dialogue”. This may be a more realistic understanding of the influences and impacts noted above, a fact that does not, in any way negate the importance of the dialogue that has already begun.

Interpeace also recognizes that sustained dialogue within a Focus Group is not possible through the one or two planned meetings scheduled for Focus Groups during the First and Second Phases. They are planning to include more sustained dialogue as part of the Third Phase, possibly through a facilitation mechanism that would make it possible for Focus Groups to meet even when CENAP is not present to facilitate.

⁷⁰ Interview with Diane Gahimbare

⁷¹ Mutimbuzi Focus Group

⁷² Interview with Charles Ndayiziga

⁷³ Interview with Tracy Dexter

Interpeace is also aware of the weakness in the feedback mechanism which allows Communal and Provincial groups to follow activities happening at the National level. At the beginning of the programme, Interpeace asked that representatives of the Focus Groups who attended National Group meetings be given the responsibility of sharing what happens at Provincial Focus Groups, and National Groups, with their Communal Focus Groups. CENAP felt that this would be too risky, fearing that some of the representatives might use the occasion for political purposes, or otherwise distort the results of the Provincial and National level meetings. Now that CENAP better knows representatives at the field level, Interpeace says that they would like to address this issue. Although there is almost always distortion as a message grows distant from its source, giving responsibility to these representatives for feedback, the advantages that this feedback would have provided with regards to establishing a culture of dialogue, as well as encouraging a deeper sense of ownership (see 'Ownership and Sustainability' below), would almost certainly compensated for any additional efforts that would have to be made later to correct misinformation. (The Evaluators observation was that the feedback during Evaluation Focus Group meetings was, for the most part, remarkably well done. This is especially significant because the representatives were asked to present the feedback with no prior warning, and with no preparation.)

Action-oriented Consensus

As a result of the new relationships and dialogue established, the programme also aims for consensual decisions for relevant action on specific issues.

Section 2.1 above describes some of the process around consensus-building. Results of both Phase 1 and Phase 2 appear to enjoy consensus, and, perhaps surprisingly, given the relative newness of the programme, the influence and impact of this consensus is already beginning to make its self felt.

The endorsement of the First Vice-President of the recommendation for an additional “period of grace” for disarmament, during the closing of the Second National Group meeting, may be the most important indicator of impact that the programme is already having. Both the Vice-President of the CDCPA (Commission for Disarmament), and the office of the First Vice-President of the Republic, confirmed the fact that the results of the dialogue and research, and especially proof of the consensus around it, have been the key factor in motivating a movement for a new law that would allow for this “period of grace”.⁷⁴

Other indicators of influence include the submission of programme results and documents to bodies with decision-making responsibility in areas related to the priority issues. Interestingly these documents have been offered for circulation by both CENAP staff, but also by programme participants, and non-participants. The President of the Reflection Group on Unemployment describes forwarding the results of CENAP research to a recent UNESCO survey on education.

⁷⁴ Interview with Col. Nibizi, Rev. Banzubaze

The Evaluator, herself, can attest to the influence that the Country Note had on programme plans within her own organization in 2009.

The extent of the influence and impact of this action-oriented consensus is a very interesting question. When asked about impact, several of the Communal Groups cited government programmes which had come into existence during the same time period as the meetings of their Focus Group, and for which they have, as a result, given CENAP the credit. The 2009 disarmament programme is a prime example. Interviews in three very different regions of the country all (erroneously) gave credit to CENAP for this initiative.⁷⁵

While it seems clear that the disarmament programme was probably not the influence of the CENAP programme, there are other examples of national-level action, identified by the Evaluation, which do seem to have a directly traceable line of influence from the programme. At least two political parties have included an Employment Observatory in the presentation of their party's campaign promises. It was confirmed that at least one of these party's requested details of the recommendation from CENAP before publishing their party platform. In addition, slightly more than one month after the March 2010 National Group meeting which recommended a day of commemoration for victims, a Catholic mass was held for Ntare V, the assassinated King of Burundi, and a Memorial Day and mass was held for Hutu victims of 1972 massacres. One of the organizers of the Memorial Day was a member of the Reflection Group on Transitional Justice. The evaluation was unable to assess the full degree to which other high profile commitments and events such as these have been directly influenced by the dialogue process. It appears, however, that the programme has already had influence and impact above and beyond what would be anticipated at this early stage in the programme's life.

Unexpected Results

In addition to the influences and impact noted above, the programme has also been the catalyst for a number of unexpected results. These include the empowerment and capacity-building of organizations not formally part of the programme. Organizations such as APDH and PACAM have begun using some of the audio-visual techniques after having been exposed to them through the Interpeace / CENAP programme. (In the case of APDH, this was a result of the fact that one of the founding members of APDH is also a staff member of CENAP.)

Other unexpected results include the following spontaneous initiatives for dialogue, problem-solving and peacebuilding:

- ❖ In Busoni, the government had been appropriating land [belonging to opposing political parties], by force. After a Communal Focus Group meeting, the Communal Administrator started to organize debates between political parties at two month intervals. (Catherine, Busoni). In discussion with the local leaders, the government agreed to give the land back.

⁷⁵ Kamenge, Busoni, Rumonge Focus Groups

Now they've stopped taking land by force. "This was helpful for several months, but now things are heating up again.----We asked the 'Focal point' to ask CENAP to come back and help us."⁷⁶

❖ In Ruyigi, tensions were noted between the Provincial Administration and political parties after political meetings were banned in 2009. (The Provincial Administration wanted more detailed meeting plans, including time, date and participants before giving permission for meetings.) During the Provincial Focus Group meeting, the problem was discussed and a meeting date was set for further discussion. The meeting was held, the problem was resolved and tensions abated. The whole process has resulted in new collaboration between the Communes, the Province and the political parties.⁷⁷

❖ In Rutana, the Batwa were complaining that the Administration was not offering land to the Batwa. The Administration explained that they needed to procure national identity card numbers and the situation would be resolved. Focus Group participants recognized that the problem was due to the illiteracy of the Batwa, and offered to help obtain the necessary documents and fill out forms.⁷⁸

❖ In Bujumbura, after the debates CENAP organized with young people, students from public and private universities decided to set up a permanent dialogue group to continue the debates inspired by CENAP and to discuss the challenges facing the country in a constructive way. They held their first meeting in June 2009 on the issues of unemployment and elections. CENAP has given them access to its meeting room for their debates.⁷⁹

❖ In Muramvya, there was a problem between teachers and the Provincial Director of Teaching. The Director was not at the Focus Group meeting, but a meeting participant, after hearing participants' views on the problem, committed to following up the situation, with successful results.⁸⁰

❖ Also in Muramvya, a cooperative bank was created, as a result of Focus Group discussions about unemployment. Others are now attempting to copy it.⁸¹

Ownership and Sustainability

Among Interpeace's working concepts, is the concept of the broadening of ownership, whereby ownership of the programme is first broadened to include the local partner, during the First Phase, and then to include other local Burundian stakeholders, during the Second Phase.

⁷⁶ Catherine, Busoni Focus Group

⁷⁷ Ruyigi Provincial Focus Group

⁷⁸ Discussion Group - CENAP Team

⁷⁹ Interpeace, Report

⁸⁰ CENAP Team

⁸¹ CENAP Team

Interpeace describes their footprint as becoming smaller and lighter, as this ‘broadening’ take place, although it does not disappear entirely.⁸² Ownership is crucial to the Interpeace / CENAP programme because the programme’s Theory of Change is anchored on the concept that, ownership of the process by the Burundian stakeholders will result in ownership of the solutions.




FIGURE 1 - Broadening of Ownership over Time

Several indicators exist showing that ownership transfer is still a work in progress, and is not happening in the orderly way it was imagined that it would happen.

With regards to CENAP’s ownership of the programme: There is little doubt that on an individual level, Researchers and Executive staff have adopted the programme and are fully committed to it. Hours of over-time and personal sacrifices in the interest of the programme are very much a part of the work ethos at CENAP. One Researcher said that at one point in the programme’s life, it became like a “competition of commitment” between the Researchers. When asked about Phase Three options, another Researcher expressed the sentiment that “we don’t want to hand over *our* recommendations to an unknown group. We are the ones who understand where these recommendations came from.”

A strong sense of ownership is also apparent among members of the Reflection Groups interviewed during the Evaluation. When asked if she would change anything in the final draft report, one Reflection Group President responded, “It’s our work. If we’d wanted to change something we would have.”⁸³ Similar sentiments were expressed by others.

The same sense of ownership does not, however, apply to other Focus Groups. Comments gathered during field visits seem to indicate that both understanding of the programme, and ownership, progressively decrease in correspondence with the number and frequency of meetings attended by the group in question. When the Evaluator made reference to the

⁸² Written response from Koenraad Van Brabant

⁸³ Interview with Anne-Marie Bihirabake

Provincial Groups, a member of the Ruyigi Provincial group challenged the very existence of “Provincial Groups”. “You’re calling us a Provincial Group, but we’re not,” he said. “We’re just invited people---we exchange ideas as invited guests----but we are not a permanent group.”⁸⁴ At the Communal level, participants also approached the programme as interested onlookers, with warm memories of the CENAP team but a sense of detachment from the process and its results. When asked whether he would give a report of the National Group meeting to other members of his Communal Focus Group, one participant answered, “Ask CENAP.”

In another sign of weak ownership, the CENAP Team easily admitted that if they did not pay per diems (considered to be high by some, and low by others), they would have very low turn-out to events, especially during initial meetings. CENAP Team members, point out, however, that even if a person is participating in the programme in hopes of receiving a per diem, as long as they are participating fully, and sharing their opinions openly, this does not influence the outcome of the programme. .

The impact of these financial incentives on ownership, however, is not clear cut. The perception that “most people anywhere in the world would seek to get some ‘remuneration’ for their time investment”⁸⁵ is true, except, perhaps, when it comes to dialogue. Deep social dialogue, of the kind that the programme would like to establish, was not traditionally ‘remunerated’ in Burundian society. (The exception to this was the “pot of beer” given to mediators/judges.) Instead, participation in dialogue grew out of an understanding of personal ethics and social security. The fact that CENAP has chosen to refer to programme per diems as ‘food’ and ‘transportation’ allowances is reflective of their own slight discomfort with the concept of per diems. (CENAP staff admitted to having lively debates over the question.) The fact that the amounts given (at the Communal level, at least) are not actually reflective of the costs of food or transportation, means that the allowance is correctly perceived by recipients as what it is: a financial incentive. Although giving per diems is a common practice among peace and development organizations in Burundi, it is also not uncommon for the same organizations to lament a lack of ownership and sustainability within their programme. The act of giving financial incentives may produce a perception of the programme as being something of lesser value than the deep community dialogue and conflict resolution which the programme would aspire to be. The programme runs the danger of being perceived as something that a Burundian needs to be paid to attend; something that they are doing for someone else (i.e., being paid to work in someone else’s field).

This observation does not, however, hold true for students or city dwellers who’s sustenance is defined in terms of compensation for hours of work. In the case of Reflection Group members, or even attendees of the National Group meeting, it is quite reasonable to consider remuneration for time and expenses. The challenge then becomes reconciling the various economic and social sub-cultures of Burundi in a way that is just and constructive. Sustainability of the programme will, however, require more movement towards ownership of

⁸⁴ Interview with Abbe Elie Rutwe

⁸⁵ Written response from Koenraad Van Brabant

the programme, if the programme hopes to achieve its long-term objectives of strengthening and consolidating lasting peace.

2.5 *The CENAP / Interpeace Partnership – Relevance and Efficiency*

The CENAP / Interpeace partnership shows many signs of being both relevant and efficient:

CENAP and Interpeace staff, even when approached separately, express a common understanding of the visions, objectives and even the daily running of the programme. The Director of CENAP describes Interpeace as a ‘real partner’, and not just another donor. “The spirit is there, not just the letter----and, now they’re training us, and we’re trying to own it.”⁸⁶ CENAP Team members agreed that Interpeace shows respect for them, and never imposes on them. This is also true with regards to recruitment. “They give us a lot of freedom”, says the Director. (“Our only problem is the volume of work!”)⁸⁷ CENAP personnel also appreciate the cross-fertilization of experiences that Interpeace offers through connections with other Interpeace programmes (i.e., IRDP in Rwanda). The CENAP Board President expresses deep satisfaction with the results of the work and the methodology introduced by Interpeace. “I’m happy with the programme”, he says. “It’s good for the country.”⁸⁸

CENAP is also a potentially strategic partner for Interpeace. While they do not necessarily have the “weightiness” or convening power of some Burundian civil society organizations, this does not decrease their potential as an effective partner. The attitude and posture of the CENAP Team make them very accessible to the grassroots (getting past some of the stereotypes of Bujumbura intellectuals), and yet, the Team also enjoys what, in the absence of convening power, might still be called “consensus power”: a strategic capacity to speak to and across sectors of Burundian society and to bring these diverse sectors together around common issues and solutions. While several Bujumbura ‘elite’ referred to the CENAP Team as “those youth”, during evaluation interviews, the term was always coupled with expressions of enthusiastic respect. (i.e., “Those youth...will change the country!”). Respect for the CENAP Team’s neutrality, professionalism and ability to speak to all levels of society, and the consensus that has been drawn around the programme, is also opening doors and commanding respect for the Team.

The BINUB Associate Peace and Governance Advisor, Lukas Probst, underscored the strategic importance of the latitude for movement that CENAP enjoys, in a society which gives little latitude for movement to its “weightier” actors. This is perhaps best described using Jean-Paul Lederach’s “Pyramid” for conflict analysis.

⁸⁶ Interview with Charles Ndayiziga

⁸⁷ Interview with Charles Ndayiziga

⁸⁸ Interview with Cyprien Ndikumana




FIGURE 2: PYRAMID DIAGRAM - Levels of Action⁸⁹

The Pyramid (Diagram 1) shows three level of leadership: top leadership, middle-range leadership and grassroots leadership. Each of the levels has certain common features. The top-level elite leaders (military, political, religious) are the primary representatives of their constituencies and are, therefore, highly visible. Middle-range leadership is comprised of those who function in leadership positions, often with national influence, but who are not the primary representatives of key socio-political constituencies. Middle-range leadership has significant connections to both the top leadership, and the constituency that the top leaders claim to represent. Because middle-range leaders have slightly lower visibility, they tend to have more freedom for movement than do top-level leaders. Grassroots leadership includes leaders in local communities who tend to represent the “voice of the masses”, witnessing firsthand the events and emotions driving conflict at a local level.

The Burundian Pyramid has its own “dimensions”. While the base of the Pyramid (grassroots leadership) is very wide, the triangle is low in height (See Diagram 2). The top-level and middle-range leadership is relatively small. (Burundians often refer to ‘a dozen’ top leaders who make decisions for war and peace in Burundi.) The distance between the grassroots leadership and top-level leadership is small. (Many grassroots leaders have relatively easy access to Government Ministers, Party leaders, Religious Leaders and even the President of the Republic.) Middle-range leadership has great facility of access to the top-leaders.

⁸⁹ Lederach, John Paul, *Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies*, 1997, p.39




FIGURE 3: PYRAMID DIAGRAM - Levels of Action in Burundi

These realities have significant implications for the CENAP / Interpeace Burundi Peacebuilding Programme. It means that "middle-level" NGO's, such as CENAP, have much greater access to key decision-makers than do similar NGO's in other contexts. It also means that, while CENAP may not (yet) enjoy significant convening power, the relatively smaller size of the middle-level leadership means that NGO's that do enjoy more convening power (i.e., OAG), are more open to partnership and collaboration than are similar NGO's in different contexts. The Pyramid analysis underscores the importance of involving middle-level leadership, such as Provincial Governors and Provincial-level administrators in the research and dialogue process, as the programme has been doing. And, from a programme perspective, this "squat" Pyramid also means that strategically targeted efforts with grassroots leadership have the possibility of considerably more direct and indirect influence on top-level decision-makers than they may in other contexts.

The analysis also underscores a potential danger though: the relatively small middle-level leadership means that they are more easily singled out and targeted during periods of conflict between civil society (middle-level leadership), and government (top-level leadership). This has certainly been the case during the last several years in Burundi (see Section 1.2 – Context).

CENAP plays their "middle-level" role strategically. It is a relevant and efficient partner for Interpeace in the Burundian context. In the words of one Reflection Group participant, "CENAP has the competence and the confidence of the population."⁹⁰ This role will, however, become increasingly difficult to play as CENAP gains more visibility and continues to accompany the process of implementation of solutions to the obstacles to peace. CENAP will need to make many, carefully chosen alliances with middle-level leadership if they are to continue to enjoy movement within the 'squeezed' space between Burundian top-level leadership and the large grassroots.

⁹⁰ Interview with Abbe Elie Rutwe Ruyigi

Within the bounds of this relevant and efficient partnership, however, lie a few prickly questions regarding institutional partnership, questions very common to programmes of this kind. Various comments from both the CENAP Board and Executive seemed to point towards a need to reassert the Burundian identity of the organization, including its origins and history, and its desire to consolidate its former role in the social fabric of Burundi (while still appreciating the new profile that the Interpeace partnership has also provided). Emphasis was placed on CENAP's former role as the *only Burundian* NGO doing early warning and the profile that this gave them in Burundian society, including regular television appearances, and stature as a point of reference for other Burundian organizations.^{91 92} This assertion of identity may, however, have been speaking more to an underlying need for greater and clearer expression of the separate needs and interests of the two institutions, than of the actual programmatic content of the partnership. Some of these needs and interests include the question of the length of the term of the partnership, and the role of CENAP's Executive Committee in the partnership.

Some collapsing of identities was also apparent during interviews with CENAP staff. When asked whom they work for, CENAP staff hired after the beginning of the Interpeace partnership expressed themselves with some reserve. While the Director was very clear that he works for CENAP, other staff members described themselves as working for "CENAP in partnership with Interpeace"----"It's really the programme we work for", they concluded.⁹³ This is indicative of some of the blurring in the lines of CENAP's own identity, which is described above.

With regards to sustainability, CENAP Executive recognizes, that they would have difficulty sustaining the organization, and particularly the dialogue and research programme, in the absence of funding accessed through the programme with Interpeace. The CENAP Board appreciates the strengthened capacity that has resulted from the partnership with Interpeace, and believes that this increased capacity will enable CENAP to better sustain their own institutional growth⁹⁴, but they do recognize a need to diversify their funding base. They also acknowledge that Interpeace had warned them that this would probably be a 'monogamous' relationship, at the beginning, primarily because of sheer volume of work. This has presented a sustainability dilemma for CENAP, however, a dilemma which is fed by the need to provide quick results to donors, and hence the volume of work.

From the perspective of Interpeace, they have never discouraged CENAP from building other partnerships, and have even assisted them in preparing proposals for potential additional partners. They recognize, however, that, in reality, the scope and pace of the programme are such that it has become very difficult for CENAP to carry out any other activities.⁹⁵ As a result,

⁹¹ Cyprien Ndikumana, Charles Ndayiziga

⁹² CENAP's particular niche in the early warning field was also recognized and affirmed by others. According to Lukas Probst at BINUB, there are currently no other Burundian NGO's doing early warning, and CENAP's contribution would be extremely relevant.

⁹³ Group Discussion - CENAP Team

⁹⁴ CENAP Board – Written response to draft evaluation report, June 2010

⁹⁵ Written response from Maud Roure

CENAP is becoming increasingly reliant on one partner relationship, and although this one partnership (with Interpeace) actually represents a network of partnerships with several large donors and diverse government agencies, CENAP is not confident that they would have equal access to these donors in the absence of Interpeace's mediating role.

A recent visit of Interpeace Founder and Vice-Chairman, Matthias Stiefel, to Burundi during the Second National Group Meeting, provided a much appreciated opportunity for dialogue between Interpeace and the CENAP Board President, around some of the issues raised above. Dialogue around these issues, and others, will continue to form an important part of discussion around the design of Phase Three of the programme.⁹⁶

3. LESSONS LEARNT

In addition to providing a confirmation of the relevance, value-added and impact of Interpeace dialogue and research programmes within the Burundian context, the period of the programme to date, has also seen some specific innovations and experiences which may be of use to Interpeace programmes elsewhere:

Value-Added of Staff Retreats – Quarterly staff retreats involving both Interpeace and CENAP staff produced a wealth of important reflection and collective understanding, as well as serving as an efficient tool for capacity-building and partnership-building⁹⁷

Focus Groupes Collinaires – This was a unique approach to the Focus Group concept whereby CENAP Researchers held open air meetings in public locations, and welcomed any who wished to participate in the dialogue. While these groups were often difficult to manage because there was never a fixed number, they also provided a more relaxed and open dialogue, with a profile of people who would not necessarily be invited in a formal Focus Group. CENAP offered a pot of local beer, to be drunk collectively, as the per diem. Audiovisual researchers estimate that ¾ of the final video footage that was used came from this type of interview.

2nd Tier Focus Groups – Second tier Focus Groups (Provincial Groups) were introduced by the CENAP Team, as a way of accessing important political space at the Provincial level, as well as remaining more closely linked to the First Tier groups (Communal Focus Groups) in the hopes of providing a feedback mechanism. While it is not clear that the Groups were completely successful with regards to the second objective, these 2nd Tier Focus Groups did provide some of the most important immediate results from dialogue (see Section 2.4 – Unexpected Results), as well as creating political space. They have also been responsible for recruiting a number of key figures into the National dialogue process (i.e., governors).

⁹⁶ Interview with Cyprien Ndikumana

⁹⁷ Quarterly Retreat reports, Interpeace / CENAP

Use of a Database – The Burundi Peacebuilding Programme made use of a new database developed specifically for the programme. The database proved extremely useful in the management of a huge amount of data, also allowing researchers to identify some gaps in the programme

Role of Reflection Group Officers – In response to the challenge of remaining neutral, while still managing the participation of some prestigious (at time verbous) Reflection Group participants, the CENAP Team used the Reflection Group Officers (President, Co-President, Reporter), as facilitators of the Reflection Group meetings. CENAP Researchers prepared the meetings with them, but were then able to play a more neutral, listening role (as well as taking sufficient notes). (Some participants have suggested that this would also be a good model for the National Group meetings.)

Frequency of Reflection Group Meetings – Reflection Group Meetings, originally scheduled to take place once a month, were found to be more effective and efficient when the Researcher had had sufficient time to conduct research, and field visits, around questions and recommendations generated by the Reflection Groups. This could sometimes take up to 2-3 months.

Limiting Choices for Prioritization by the National Group – Based on their observation of a National Group Meeting in Rwanda, CENAP introduced voting into the consensus-building process at the first Burundi National Group meeting. Participants were asked to prioritize 10 issues, of which the top four would be retained for further research and dialogue. Researchers found themselves questioning the unexpected results of the voting exercise, based on their prior experience of more than one year of dialogue and research (see Section 2.2 – Research Findings). As a result, during the Second National Group meeting, the CENAP Team only provided a list of those “solutions” that were deemed priority based on prior Reflection Group work and testing in Focus Groups (i.e., they limited the choice to four recommendations for prioritization). This gave more control back to the Reflection Groups (and CENAP) to define the field based on the many months of consultation prior to the National Group meeting, and yet also seek validation and input with regards to suggested changes in wording, and priority choices from the National Group. It also means that if it appears that one of the prioritized selections is no longer relevant, there is still the option of moving to a second or third choice while remaining within the mandate of the National Group.

Partnership with Mid-Level Local Organizations – CENAP’s existing reputation as a well-connected, respected, neutral, relatively small local NGO at the time the programme began, was undoubtedly partly accountable for the ease with which the programme took off. It is also very likely responsible for the fact that CENAP is able to continue to work with national authorities, at a time when some government authorities are actively working to discredit (and even deregister) many other NGO’s who are asking difficult questions about the obstacles to peace in Burundi (see Section 1.2 Context)..

4. OVERALL ASSESSMENT: Programme Strengths and Weaknesses

It is difficult to adequately convey the enthusiasm of the vast majority of programme participants when asked about the CENAP/ Interpeace programme. The spontaneous praise lavished on the CENAP Team, was truly quite remarkable. "Professionalism" was a word which came up often. "Professionalism" is a relatively rare quality in Burundi, and very much sought after. It summarizes CENAP's exceptionally well-balanced ("neutral") Team, their excellent facilitation and analytical skills, their remarkable work ethic, and genuine commitment to dialogue. It gives CENAP a certain 'consensus power', a strategic capacity to speak to and across all sectors of Burundian society, and to bring them together around key issues and solutions. The combination of this 'consensus power' with Interpeace's thoughtfully-designed dialogue and research model, produces an extremely relevant programme which has been very well-performed.

The biggest challenge to this programme will be the transition to action. This is the point at which some of the programme's weaknesses come to bear: strategic identification of Key Driving Factors and related recommendations; slight but important institutional differences between the two partner organizations; CENAP's relatively weak convening power, and the potential lack of commitment and sustainability that could result from weak ownership at the grassroots level and in Dialogue Groups other than the Reflection Groups. This is especially critical because both CENAP and Interpeace believe that 'ownership of the process will result in ownership of the solutions'.⁹⁸

In addition, there are a number of dilemmas / paradox's exist within the CENAP / Interpeace programme partnership. Some of the dilemmas that have emerged in this report include:

- the question of a need for additional resources for desired continuation and even expansion of the programme during future phases, versus, CENAP's desire for less dependency and more assertion of its own separate identity;
- the need to mobilize 'key people' around 'key issues', versus, the idea that 'real dialogue' happens at the grassroots level
- the need to produce quick results for continuing mobilization of funds, versus, the need for sufficient time and opportunity for trust-building and real dialogue to happen
- prioritization of issues and recommendations by the beneficiaries themselves, versus, the need to provide some direction with regards to what issues can be considered Key Driving Factors
- the need to avoid subjectivity, versus, the pitfalls of depending on a voting process for prioritization of key issues and recommendations

Instead of viewing dilemmas as forcing compromises or short-cuts, these dilemmas, when faced 'head-on' through frank dialogue and serious reflection, could be seen as opportunities for defining new ways forward and interesting new space within the partnership. One of the most

⁹⁸ CENAP and Interpeace, Annual Report, 2009

impressive aspects of the programme and the partnership is the regular commitment to collegial dialogue, understanding and problem-solving, around even the smallest issue. The Evaluator is confident that challenges noted above will quickly find their consensus solutions in the nexus of this creative partnership .

5. RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Immediate Targeted Dissemination of Research Findings and Recommendations

Important recommendations related to pertinent current issues are available and need to be used, while they are still relevant. This does not require wide spread dissemination but limited targeted dissemination to key actors (actors with direct influence on the issue). This can be done in the form of letters and phone calls, and can happen immediately. It could also involve the preparation of pamphlet style Executive Summaries in Kirundi and French, with simple clear messages

2. Sustained Dialogue and Research ‘Rooted’ at the Grassroots

The programme has a special capacity with regards to dialogue and research. Dialogue, of the kind offered by the programme, is clearly appreciated as being both relevant and of added-value in the Burundian peacebuilding arena, and especially when it is oriented towards action. This dialogue should be continued and intensified even as the recommendations are being implemented, at all levels, but with renewed attention to the grassroots level. This is not a negation of the need for ‘weightiness’ at ‘the top’, but a recognition that the ‘weighty’ tree top needs to have strong, deep roots providing it with life. Additional efforts should be made to facilitate grassroots validation (and understanding) of cross-sectoral consensual-decisions, and to continually update conflict analysis from a grassroots perspective. This should be more than a feedback mechanism (Recommendation #3). It should be a mechanism which will aim to empower the grassroots population enabling grassroots leadership to more clearly see and understand their part in actual implementation of recommendations, as well as equipping the grassroots population for increasingly relevant participation in sustainable peace-building in Burundi. This will mean that more dialogue groups should have more meetings, at different levels and in different locations. This could include Focal Points responsible for facilitating regular dialogue with Communal, Provincial or Thematic groups around specific questions relevant to questions / priorities, including those identified by the National Group. It could also include more sustained Thematic groups and dialogue within the Diaspora (European and African).

Financial remuneration and incentives should also be revisited with the lenses of ‘rooting’ dialogue at the grassroots level. This could include reinstatement of meals instead of providing remuneration for meals. (Meals are an important opportunity for informal dialogue and

relationship-building.) It could also include creative options for “investing” in one-off projects (dialogue rooms, audiovisual equipment...) that would build community and promote further dialogue, in lieu of per diems.

3. Functional Feedback Mechanisms between Tiers

Feedback mechanisms between all groups, but especially between the National Group and Communal groups, would significantly improve the cross-sectoral dialogue. This might include semi-regular participation of National group members, Provincial group members, or members of working groups in Communal dialogue groups, and vice-versa. It should also include distribution to all dialogue participants of pamphlets in Kirundi summarizing findings, as well as opportunities for viewing of videos.

4. Establish a Steering Committee for Follow-up of Recommendations

The Steering Committee model used in the Rwanda (IRDP) programme is a good option for the Burundi Peacebuilding programme, with regards to the implementation of recommendations coming out of the research and dialogue process. The Steering Committee would carry forward recommendations for CENAP, in consultation with CENAP, but at the same time with a degree of separateness which would allow CENAP to maintain their neutral image and space. The Steering Committee would be responsible for widespread dissemination of recommendations (through the media), follow-up with civil society, government and key actors. They would have the primary responsibility for creating a public debate around the programme recommendations. They would constitute a local “Friends of the Programme” group, and pick-up some of the role that the Reflection Groups had been playing. The Steering Committee could include some of the more influential members of civil society, with convening power. The Steering Committee would provide an option for CENAP to forge some of the mid-level alliances that will be necessary if they are to continue to enjoy movement within the ‘squeezed’ space between Burundian top-level leadership and the grassroots.

5. A Fresh Approach to Mobilizing Political Will

Look at alternatives to “shouting from rooftops and silent diplomacy”. Examine more closely who has access and influence, and what has actually produced change in policy in Burundi? Are there specific kinds of pressure from specific members of civil society (i.e., business) which has more direct influence? Are there those who have only informal access, but significant cultural or moral influence over political will (i.e., pastors? retired statesmen? family members?) The reflection should also name and/or map CENAP’s particular strengths with regards to access and influence to these individuals and organizations, and build on these. This recommendation is closely linked to Recommendation #2. The possibility that some of these individuals or organizations capable of mobilizing political will are located at the grassroots level or within the middle class, should also be explored. The recommendation is also linked to

Recommendation #4. Looking critically at who is capable of mobilizing political should form an important part of establishing a Steering Committee.

6. Establish Mechanisms for Engaging Opportunities

Opportunities for social change do not always occur according to our calendar and project cycle. The current electoral period in Burundi is one such example, especially with regards to recommendations related to the Elections, validated by the National Group meeting in March 2010. While the steady guided programme that is underway brings respect and integrity to CENAP and Interpeace, in order to maximize impact and efficiency, it will be important to take advantage of opportunities that arise, when and as they arise. This might simply involve more permission for latitude within programme activities, or it might require giving responsibility to a specific body such as a Steering Committee to highlight these responsibilities and suggest (or even take) required action.

7. Examine Additional Creative Partnership Options between CENAP and Interpeace

As the programme matures and moves into new phases, the importance of clarifying questions of identity and relationship become increasingly important. There needs to be a clear understanding of the partnership as a partnership of two separate and independent bodies / institutions. This will require dialogue, specifically between the CENAP Board and Interpeace. The self-identity of each of these partners needs to be understood and appreciated by the other partner, as do the areas of collaboration and partnership where these self-identities overlap. CENAP is a rare find amongst Burundian NGO's and makes an important contribution to civil society in Burundi. Strengthened by well-executed capacity building from Interpeace, it is now serving as a role model for many. In future phases, additional capacity-building for CENAP in areas more closely defined according to their own priorities, would be a relevant and important contribution with regards to Interpeace's goal of lasting peace in Burundi. In the more immediate, this might include expanding the number of personnel, or decreasing the workload of existing personnel, in order to allow for some personnel to focus on maintaining and expanding CENAP's organizational life independent of Interpeace. It might simply mean reducing workloads so as to decrease over-time requirements meaning that existing personnel are more able to participate in extra-curricular civil society activities. This does not necessarily have to imply additional financial commitments on the part of Interpeace.

8. Continue to Clarify the Programme to all Concerned

CENAP / Interpeace should use as many tools as they have at their disposal to explain and explain often, the vision and goals of the programme, its Theory of Change, and related activities. Dialogue participants need to see and appreciate the 'big picture'. This will

at times require more 'directive' facilitation for clarification, and for introduction of concepts other than what is usually prescribed by Participatory Action Research (i.e., for the explanation of Key Driving Factors? Key Actors? A deeper understanding of consensus?....) It is possible that, at times, these different roles (PAR researcher and facilitator) may need to be differentiated according to the needs during a given phase of the programme. The programme should also have a name, something which communicates the vision of the programme. There should also be clarification and consistent use of terms (i.e. Researcher or Focal Point? Dialogue Groups or Focus Groups?). Names carry meaning and weight.

9. Apply Systems Thinking for Strategic Impact

Systems analysis of the research findings would facilitate additional strategic thinking about the relevance of the four priority issues as Key Driving Factors, dynamics between the four priority themes, identification of possible gaps in the analysis of the Reflection Groups, identification of leverage points for intervention, prioritization of intervention, and generally serve as a tool for Researchers and dialogue participants to better focus their participation. Systems' thinking allows for the introduction of new factors over time, and steers the programme away from an (unrealistic) linear approach to the overall goal of sustainable peace. Key Driving Factors *producing peace* could also be identified through the research and dialogue process and system's mapping performed on these Factors for peace, including understanding the point of interaction and connection between Factors for peace, and Key Driving Factors of conflict. Systems mapping would have to be used with care, however, so as not to supplant the spontaneous analysis of participants, the grassroots in particular. In order to facilitate the identification of Key Driving Factors, researchers could encourage participants to name those issues and solutions that will directly produce conflict, or peace (versus the more general question of 'obstacles to peace'), thus facilitating but not usurping the process.

10. More clearly define impact and measure it.

Dialogue groups have been producing change. It is even possible that the programme has been producing significantly more change than the programme team is even aware of. More clearly defining the change that is expected at each step of the programme (more specific indicators of impact), as well as some programme time/personnel allocated to measuring and mapping change, could reveal surprising results. It could also help the programme to better understand the mysteries of mobilizing political will.

APPENDIX 1- TERMS OF REFERENCE

INTERPEACE-CENAP BURUNDI PROGRAMME EVALUATION

I. Presentation of the Interpeace-CENAP Peacebuilding Programme

The overall goal of the Burundi Peacebuilding Programme is to help build trust and collaboration between Burundians and create an environment favourable to stability, development and sustainable peace. This will only be achieved by enabling the people of Burundi to identify and find solutions to their own problems and by open channels so the solutions can be heard and acted upon by Government and other key stakeholders, in order for the entire Burundian society to be involved in the design and architecture of its own future. Interpeace and CENAP believe that ownership of the process by the Burundian stakeholders will result in ownership of the solutions, which is crucial if the solutions are to be implemented.

The Programme has been divided into two phases so far:

1st Phase: Priority-mapping (October 2007 – October 2008)

The objective of the 1st phase was to map the threats to peace and stability through participatory approaches. The CENAP team started in October 2007 to conduct wide consultations with a representative sample of the Burundian population to identify the obstacles to lasting peace. In October 2008, the findings were presented to a National Group, made up of more than 200 people representing the diversity of the Burundian society. The National Group selected 4 priority issues among the peacebuilding challenges that had been identified through the consultations.

The National Group is the validation and guidance mechanism of the Burundi Programme and ensures a wider ownership of the peacebuilding process. The October meeting was its first meeting but the National Group will be convened at every important step of the programme. It represents the diversity of the Burundian society and as such it takes all major decisions regarding the programme's focus and priorities.

The objectives of the October meeting were the following:

- To present the results of the nationwide consultation to the National Group
- To seek inputs from and validation of the results by the National Group
- To select and prioritize the peacebuilding challenges to be addressed

The National Group selected the following priority issues:

- **Disarmament of civil population:** How to mobilize the population regarding disarmament initiatives? How to reconcile the governmental disarmament policy with the population's concerns regarding insecurity?
- **Poverty and unemployment:** Which creative and innovating ways could address the issue of unemployment? What are the obstacles?

- **Elections:** How to manage the pre-election and election periods in order to ensure a smooth process? What mechanisms can be put in place in order to make sure that election's winners and losers accept the results and do not prevent the public institutions from functioning?
- **Transitional justice:** What are the deep causes of the lack of consensus on transitional justice mechanisms? How to prevent tensions from arising from the transitional justice process? How can the national process of transitional justice build on local initiatives of reconciliation?

2nd phase: In-depth research and dialogue on the 4 priority issues selected by the National Group (October 2008 – March 2010)

The objective of the second phase was to engage Burundians in a broad-based dialogue on the priority peacebuilding issues and in the design of consensus solutions to ensure long-term stability. The process is comprised of 2 main areas of activities which are intertwined. The first area is a participatory-action research conducted with 4 working groups made up of experts in the 4 areas whose task is to look into reports, surveys and experience in other countries in order to find possible solutions to the identified obstacles. The second area of activities, which are carried out in parallel, relates to dialogue meetings that are organized and facilitated by the CENAP team in several places of the country in order to collect the solutions proposed by the people, to test the ideas stemming from the working groups, etc. The goal of this twofold process is to find solutions that are operational, adapted to the Burundi context and acceptable by the majority of the people.

In late 2008 the CENAP team set up 4 reflection groups made up of people who have an expertise in one of the 4 priority areas or who are directly concerned by or actively involved in one of these issues. The team also based its selection on the criteria given by the National Group, including criteria of representativeness in terms of ethnicity, political views, religion, gender, age and professional sector. One of the first steps of the research process was to help the reflection groups (RG) to narrow down the scope of the research because the 4 entry points chosen by the National Group were too broad (see below for further details). The exercise was based on the following criteria:

- Relevant vis-à-vis the current context;
- Concrete;
- Feasible within a limited span of time;
- Capable of leading to concrete recommendations;
- Not already addressed by other initiatives;
- For which the program can have an added value.

The CENAP researchers have collected as much data as possible on the 4 themes through consultations at the commune and province levels, as well as in the diaspora, interviews of experts, participation in relevant seminars and desk research. The research findings will be present to the National Group in March 2010. The National Group will be asked to choose the priority solutions. The programme will then move to a third phase that will aim at informing and influencing decision makers about the proposed solutions and to work for their implementation.

II. The evaluation's focus

a. Purpose of the evaluation.

This will be the first external evaluation of the Programme since its inception in October 2007. Because it will be conducted at the end of its second phase, it will be a key opportunity to draw lessons from the first 2 phases before starting the third phase. Its purpose therefore is learning, although the evaluation will also be a mechanism of accountability vis-à-vis the donors of the Programme.

The primary objective of the evaluation is to assess whether or not the first two phases of the Programme have reached the outcomes set by Interpeace and CENAP, i.e.:

- An effective peacebuilding team that is capable of delivering research-based and action oriented dialogue process that contributes to the consolidation of peace in Burundi ;
- A culture of dialogue and trust that engages the different sectors of the Burundian society in collaborative efforts to address challenges to peace;
- Broad consensus on key peacebuilding challenges and on basic principles, strategies and goals to overcome them.

The secondary objectives of the evaluation are the following:

- To draw lessons from the first two phases of the Programme and to give key recommendations on how to strengthen the Programme in the third phase.
- To identify important lessons learnt and innovative practice from the two first phases of the Burundi programme that can be of use by Interpeace and its partners in other programmes. To check the relevance of the Programme
- To evaluate the partnership between CENAP and Interpeace

b. Key questions.

Relevance and added value

1. Are the Programme and its methodology relevant regarding the overall goal of the Programme, which is to reinforce Burundian capacities to strengthen and consolidate lasting peace.
2. Was the initial analysis of the conflict situation and of the post conflict needs of the Burundian society, which was key in the design of the Programme, accurate?
3. Does this programme, compared to previous or ongoing peacebuilding efforts in Burundi, provides added value in terms of the
 - Understanding of the conflict dynamics in Burundi?
 - Mobilisation of social actors in pursuit of 'solutions'?
 - Identification of one or more strategies to address the conflict(s) that have or can get broad social and political support?
 - Strengthening of local capacities?

4. What are or are seen to be strengths of the programme that contribute to its added value (if any)? What are the weaknesses or perceived weaknesses of the programme that either reduce its added value potential or deprive it from added value?
5. Has the combination of 2 components in the programme design (focused dialogue and research) been judicious and effective? Have synergies been created between the components?
6. Is there a sense of 'ownership' of the process so far among the Burundians that have been actively engaged in the project (not just project staff but wider participants)? How does this express itself – or not?
7. Were the research themes and entry points relevant vis-à-vis the Programme's overall goal?
8. What needs to happen beyond the second phase of the Programme to pursue effective conflict transformation and peacebuilding in Burundi and create a sustainable dynamic to constructively address problems and conflicts in the country?

Learning points for peacebuilding in Burundi and other programme countries

9. What can be learned from this first two phases experience before starting the third phase?
10. Are there any key lessons learned from the first two phases that should be considered when starting a new Interpeace programme?
11. Has the Burundi programme developed examples of innovative praxis that can be of interest for other programmes?

Efficiency

12. Are the outputs as envisaged in the original project proposal realized or to what degree? What explains possible variations to the original stated outputs? Were the original outputs realistic in light of the project time frame? Can the originally expected outcomes be expected to be realized in the medium-term given the current results?

13. How efficient was the Programme in creating and maintaining a neutral space for dialogue?
14. How efficient was the Programme in positioning itself as an impartial and acceptable interlocutor and in maintaining this position?
15. How efficient was the strategy to transfer the ownership of the process to a wider range of stakeholders?
16. Has a large and diversified sample of the population been engaged in the process (including through an analysis of the membership of the National Group, focus groups, reflection groups, etc.)?
17. What was the role of the reflection groups in the research?
18. Given the constraints of the project (especially time), has it been implemented with due diligence and with efficiency?
19. What was the role of the audiovisual tool in the dissemination of the programme's results and as a trigger for dialogue?

Influences, impacts and sustainability

20. Has the Programme had influences and impacts on the relationships between the national, intermediary and local levels of the society?
21. Has the Programme had influences and impacts on strengthening the dialogue within the society and on peace and reconciliation?
22. Were there unexpected results?
23. What changes were brought about by the Programme? Are these changes sustainable ?

Relevance and Efficiency of the CENAP/Interpeace partnership

24. Analyze Interpeace's role in the exploratory and preparatory work and in the transfer of ownership of the methodology and programme to CENAP
25. Evaluate the institutional, organizational and methodological support provided by Interpeace throughout the Programme, especially with regards to strengthening CENAP's capacities
26. Analyze the strengths and weaknesses of the CENAP/Interpeace partnership and its role in the Programme's sustainability

III. The methodology

The actual evaluation work will take place in Burundi. Relevant people to be interviewed that are based outside of the country will have to be reached via phone or Skype.

- a. Study of key documents on the CENAP/Interpeace Programme in Burundi which will be made available (including Programme Documents, quarterly

- and annual reports, research reports, mission reports, internal workshop reports, etc.); viewing of video materials from the programme;
- b. Individual or group interviews with the CENAP team
 - c. Individual or group interviews with Interpeace Regional Office team
 - d. If and where possible sit in on meetings, focus group discussions, National Group meetings, etc.
 - e. Individual or group interviews and discussion with people actively participating in the process, including administrative and political authorities, organizations working in similar fields, National Group members, reflection Groups' members, focus group members, diaspora, CENAP Board and donors (in particular the participants in the *Groupe d'Appui au Programme*).

IV. Deliverables

Inception report: Following a detailed briefing but prior to fully engaging in the analysis and interviews, the reviewer will present an inception report of no more than 8 pages, detailing further how s/he will explore the major questions listed above, with a tentative list of the people to be contacted, the criteria for any choice of locations, and a tentative time table.

Draft report: A draft report will be presented to Interpeace and CENAP, and shortly thereafter discussed in workshop format.

Final report: The final review report will be in English and contain findings with analysis and supporting evidence and recommendations. An executive summary of no more than 4 pages will precede the full report. A map, a list of key documents consulted, a list of people interviewed, eventual longer case studies and other detailed materials will be attached in annex.

The report will

- Provide very briefly the background to the Burundi conflicts, and review the efforts to address and resolve them prior to the initiation of this project;
- Separate sections with the findings, analysis and supporting evidence for the main domains of inquiry listed above ("key questions").
- The final section of the report will provide a *reasoned and balanced appreciation* of the overall relevance and performance of the programme indicating strengths and weaknesses. This overall assessment will then be complemented with lessons learned and *specific recommendations* on how conflict resolution and peacebuilding support can further be provided in Burundi and on how to strengthen the third phase of the Programme.
- The annexes will include a list of people interviewed, list of key documents consulted, and possibly somewhat longer case studies. Illustrative case studies should be no more than 2-3 pages, succinctly spelling out the background context, what happened and what resulted from it. They should however also provide substantiating evidence, e.g. in the form of some quotes or testimonies, reference to documents relevant to the case,

observable or observed changes in behaviours, relationships; apparent changes in trends etc.

V. Qualifications

- Previous consultancy and evaluation experience and a track record of delivering against ToR and deadlines;
- A background in peacebuilding / conflict transformation, including meaningful practical experience in one or more real-life contexts;
- Knowledge of Participatory-action research or other participatory methodologies;
- Fluency in French and English, Demonstrated writing skills in English, knowledge of Kirundi is an asset;
- First-hand familiarity with the recent and current context in Burundi is highly desirable;
- Sensitivity to national-international actor dynamics;
- Ability to analyze the Programme with regards to the Burundi context
- Tact and sensitivity: There are evident sensitivities in doing any kind of review: nobody, whether 'staff' or 'management', likes to be 'evaluated' and every person is typically concerned about criticism of her/his performance. In short, the evaluation has to be serious and robust, yet it is also of utmost importance that the overall process is *felt to be constructive by all concerned*. That will require significant tact and care of the evaluator in how the evaluation is presented, how questions are asked, how findings are presented.

VI. Tentative timeframe

- March 22nd: Preliminary briefing on the Programme with Johan Svensson, Interpeace's Senior Programme Advisor, Maud Roure, Interpeace's Programme officer for the Great Lakes, and Charles Ndayiziga, CENAP's Director.
- March 23rd – 25th: Participation in the National Group meeting
- April 2nd : Inception report
- From April 5th to 9th and from April 19th to 30th: review of documentation and interviews
- May 7th : Draft report
- May 14th : Final report; Presentation of the evaluation findings to CENAP and Interpeace (morning) and to the Group of donors (afternoon)

APPENDIX 2 - Work Plan

PHASE	Period	Activity type	Individual/Group	Group type	Location
Data Collection	March 22-24	Preliminary Briefing	IP – Johan Svensson and Maud Roure	IP	Bujumbura
		Observation	National Group	National Group	Bujumbura
		Focus Group	Diaspora Members (4)	Thematic Group	Bujumbura
		Informal Discussion	Communal Admin (Kamenge), Edith, Nuria	Communal Group	Bujumbura
	April 1	Interview / Brief	Johan Svansson	IP	Nairobi
	April 5	Observation	CENAP Team - NG Evaluation	CENAP / NG Evaluation	Bujumbura
	April 6 - 10	Document Review			Bujumbura
		Report Writing (Inception Report)			Bujumbura
	April 7	Interview	Charles Ndayiziga, Liberate Nakimana	CENAP (Director & Research Director)	Bujumbura
	April 9	Focus Group	CENAP Team	CENAP Team	Bujumbura
	April 13	Interview	Peter Woodrow (CDA)	Int'l Consultant	Bujumbura
	April 16	Interview	Jacob Enoh-Eben	PSG	Bujumbura
	April 19	Interview	Prof. Sylvie Hatungimana	RG (Unemploy' t)	Bujumbura
		Interview	Tracy Dexter	PSG	Bujumbura
	April 20	Focus Group	Busoni Commune	Communal Group	Busoni (Kirundo prov)
	April 21	Focus Group	Bugendana Commune	Communal Group	Bugendana (Gitega Prov)
		Focus Group	Ruyigi Province	Provincial Group	Ruyigi
		Interview	Abbe Elie Rutwe	RG (Arms)	Ruyigi
	April 22	Interview	Marcelline Mawazo	PG / NG	Gitega (Gitega Prov)
	April 23	Interview	Vibeke Soegaard	Donor	Bujumbura
	April 24	Interview	Anne-Marie Bihirabake	RG (Elections)	Bujumbura

	April 26	Interview	Cyprien Ndikumana	CENAP Board	Bujumbura
		Interview	Jeanne Gacoreke	Thematic Group (Women, CS)	Bujumbura
	April 27	Focus Group	Rumonge	Communal Group	Rumonge
		Interview	Masumbuko	Thematic Group	Rumonge
		Interview	Diane Gahimbare	RG (Justice), Thematic group (Students)	Bujumbura
	April 28	Focus Group	Matembuzi	Communal Group (1 st phase only)	Matembuzi (Bjm Rurale)
		Interview	Lukas Probst	PSG	Bujumbura
	April 29	Interview	Jeannette Seppen	Donor	Bujumbura
		Interview	Senator Caraziwe	NG member	Bujumbura
	April 30	Interview	Rev. Leopold Banzubaze	RG (Arms)	Bujumbura
		Interview	Col. Isaie Nibizi	RG (Arms)	Bujumbura
		Interview	Abbe Athanase Nsabimana	RG (Justice)	Bujumbura
Data Analysis	May 1	Collaborative Enquiry RPP Tools	CENAP Team	CENAP Team	Bujumbura
Reporting	May 10	Draft Report Presentation			To IP
	May 14	Final Report Presentation	CENAP, IP	CENAP, IP	Bujumbura

APPENDIX 3 - Documents Reviewed:

Project Documents:

Interpeace-CENAP, "Peacebuilding in Burundi – Project Document", 2006

Interpeace-CENAP, "Burundi Peacebuilding Programme – Project Document 2009-2011"

WSP, "Concept Paper – WSP International Programme in Burundi", 2006 (?)

Activity Reports:

CENAP, « Rapport du Mois de Mai 2009 », Bujumbura.

CENAP, « Rapport d'activités du mois de Novembre 2009-12-03 », Bujumbura.

CENAP, « Rapport de Janvier 2010 », Bujumbura

Interpeace-CENAP, "Report – First Training of the Burundi Team", Bujumbura, 17-21 September 2007

Interpeace-CENAP, "Report of 2nd Burundi Programme Workshop", Bujumbura, 15-19 November 2007

Interpeace-CENAP, "Annual Report, 1st January – December 31st 2007"

Interpeace-CENAP, "Annual Report, 1st January – December 31st 2008"

Interpeace-CENAP, "Annual Report, 1st January – December 31st 2009"

Interpeace-CENAP, "Atelier de Préparation de la 2eme Phase", Bujumbura, 10-14 novembre 2008

Interpeace-CENAP, « Final Mission Report, Burundi Programme Workshop », Bujumbura, 14-18 April 2008

Interpeace-CENAP, "Quarterly Report – 1st January – 31st March 2008", Bujumbura

Interpeace-CENAP, "Quarterly Report – 1st April – 30th June 2008", Bujumbura

Interpeace-CENAP, "Quarterly Report – 1st July – 30th September 2008", Bujumbura

Interpeace-CENAP, "Quarterly Report – 1st October – 31st December 2008", Bujumbura

Interpeace-CENAP, "Quarterly Report – 1st January – 31st March 2009", Bujumbura

Interpeace-CENAP, "Quarterly Report – 1st April – 31st June 2009", Bujumbura

Interpeace-CENAP, "Rapport Trimestriel – 1er juillet – 30 septembre 2009", Bujumbura

Interpeace-CENAP, "Rapport Trimestriel – 1er octobre – 31 decembre 2009", Bujumbura

Interpeace-CENAP, « Atelier de Reflexion sur le chemin restant d'ici la reunion du Groupe National », Bujumbura, 5-6 mai 2008

Interpeace-CENAP, « Retraite Aout 2008 »

Interpeace-CENAP, « Retraite de Reflexion sur la 2eme phase », Bujumbura, 26-28 janvier 2009

Interpeace- CENAP, « Retraite 11-14 mai 2009 : CENAP-Interpeace », Bujumbura, mai 2009

Interpeace-CENAP, « Rapport de la Retraite 26 au 29 octobre, 2009 », Bujumbura, octobre 2009

Interpeace-CENAP, « Retraite 8 decembre 2009 », Bujumbura, decembre 2009

Research Reports / Research Findings:

CENAP, « Agenda of the National Group Meeting », Bujumbura, 2008

CENAP, « Agenda of the National Group Meeting », Bujumbura, 2010

CENAP, « Resultat des Votes – Question fonciere », Bujumbura, 2008.

CENAP, « Resultat des Votes – Gouvernance et Etat de droit », Bujumbura, 2008.

CENAP, « Resultat des Votes – Economie », Bujumbura, 2008.

CENAP, « Resultat des Votes – Fragilite sociale », Bujumbura, 2008.

CENAP, « Resultat des Votes – Securite », Bujumbura, 2008.

CENAP, « Travail en Ateliers par theme », Bujumbura, 2008.

CENAP, « Liste des Membres des Groupes de Reflexion », Bujumbura.

CENAP, « Choix Final pour les 4 Perspectives pour la 2eme Phase », Bujumbura 2008

CENAP, « Atelier du Groupe National sur les Obstacles a la Consolidation de la Paix au Burundi – Draft 1 », 08-09 octobre 2008

CENAP-Interpeace, « Defis a la Paix Durable – Autoportrait du Burundi », Bujumbura, novembre 2008

CENAP-Interpeace, « Comment recentrer l'action politique sur les programmes des partis et leurs projets de societe ? – Rapport Provisoire », Bujumbura, mars 2010

CENAP-Interpeace, « Traiter du passe et construire l'avenir : la place de l'histoire dans la therapie collective », Bujumbura, mars 2010

CENAP-Interpeace, « Problematique des Armes Legales et Illegales : Strategies Incitatives pour le Desarmement des Civils », Bujumbura, mars 2010

CENAP-Interpeace, « Defis d'Acces sur le Marche du Travail – Quelles alternatives pour les jeunes burundais ? – Rapport Provisoire », Bujumbura, mars 2010

Organizational Documents:

CENAP, “Termes de Reference pour le Partenariat entre les Groupes de Reflexion (GR) et le CENAP », Bujumbura

Interpeace- CENAP, « Memorandum of Understanding », 2009

Interpeace-CENAP, « Annex to the Memorandum of Understanding – Standard Conditions », 2009

Other Documents / Publications:

Lederach, John Paul, Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies, United States Institute of Peace Press, Washington D.C., 1997.

Rwamasirabo, S. and Sue Williams, “IRDP / Interpeace Peacebuilding Dialogue and Research Programme: External Evaluation”, Kigali, Rwanda, April 2008

APPENDIX 4 - List of Interviews / Focus Groups

Maud Roure

Johan Svensson (Regional Advisor, ECA office)

Nuria Abdullahi Abdi (Interpeace ECA Gender Division)

Koenraad Van Brabant (Interpeace, Geneva – Reflective Practice and Learning)

Group Interview:

Freddy Nkurikiye (Diaspora, Switzerland) (Executive Director of Interafrica)

Aline Ndenzako (Diaspora, Switzerland) (Vice-President, Maison Shalom)

Felix Kubwayo (Diaspora, Belgium)(Pres., Org. of the Burundian Diaspora, BENELUX)

Victoire Mangaza (Diaspora, Netherlands) (Gender Officer, Fondation Tabarana)

Mattias, Communal Administrator, Kamenge Commune

Edith, Niyonsavye, Kamenge Focus Group

CENAP Team: Individual and Group Interviews:

Charles Ndayiziga

Françoise Kabariza,

Tatien Nkeshimana,

Benoît Birutegusa,

Libérate Nakimana,

Serge Ntakirutimana,

Igor Rugwiza,

Carine Nshimirimana

Peter Woodrow (Co-Director, CDA Collaborative Learning Projects)

Immaculee Mukankubito, Researcher, IRDP

Jacob Enoh-Eben (Burundi Country Representative, American Friends Service Committee)

Sylvie Hatungimana, Academic Director, University of Burundi

Tracy Dexter, Country Director, International Alert

Abbe Elie Rutwe, Cure Diocese Ruyigi

Marcelline Mawazo, Director, Ecole Primaire (Mushasha)

Vibeke Soegaard, Head of Mission, Office of the Norwegian Embassy

Anne-Marie Bihirabake, Consultant, BINUB

Cyprien Ndikumana, CENAP President of the Board

Jeanne Gacoreke, President (?), Reseau Femme et Paix

Athanase Masumbuko, Union des Rapatriés Burundais, Rumonge

Diana Gahimbare, Student, National University of Burundi

Lukas Probst, Associate Peace and Governance Advisor, BINUB

Jeannette Seppen, Chargee d’Affaires, Office of the Embassy of the Netherlands

Senator Caraziwe, Senator, Government of Burundi

Rev. Leopold Banzubaze, Vice-President, CDCPA

Col. Isaie Nibizi, Advisor in charge of Security to the 1st Vice-President of the Republic

Abbe Athanase Nsabimana, Priest of the Parish of Buhonga, (Bujumbura Rurale)

APPENDIX 5 – Summary of Evaluation Focus Groups / Comparison with CENAP Database Information

(“Database” figures are drawn from the summary data in the CENAP database for 1231 participants in Phase One activities of the Burundi Peacebuilding Programme.)

LOCATION	Number of Respondents				
	Women	Men	Youth* (under 30)	Unknown	TOTAL
Busoni	4	12	2	1	19
Bugendana	9	16	1	0	26
Ruyigi	3	12	0	1	16
Mutimbuzi	6	11	0	0	17
Rumonge	7	7	3	0	17
TOTAL	29	58	6	2	95
%	30.5%	61.1%	6.3%	2.1%	100%
CENAP DATABASE (1231 participants)	28.1%	72%	4%		

* Respondant Youth (under 30 years) include 4 young men, and 2 young women.

OCCUPATION	Number of Respondents (95)						Data-base
	Busoni	Bugendan	Ruyigi	Mutimbuz	Rumo	TOTAL	
Gov't worker	7	9	6	4	9	35(37%)	25%
Farmer	12	9	2	5	4	32(34%)	n/a
NGO Worker	0	1	3	7	4	15(16%)	n/a
Politician	1	1	4	3	1	10(11%)	1%
Commune employee	1	4	0	3	2	10(11%)	14%
Traditional elder	2	3	1	1	1	8 (8%)	2%
Local elected leader (Hill)	0	1	0	3	1	5 (5%)	n/a
Merchant	0	1	0	1	1	3 (5%)	2%
Unemployed	0	0	1	1	1	3 (3%)	2%
Religious leader	0	0	2	0	0	2 (2%)	4%
Military /police	1	1	0	0	0	2 (2%)	n/a

Student	0	0	0	0	0	0	n/a
Other	0	3	1	1	0	5 (5%)	11%
TOTAL	24	33	20	27	26		1099

Social Category	Number of Respondents (95)						Data base
	Buson	Bugendan	Ruyigi	Mutimbuz	Rumong	TOTAL	
Returnees	9	5	6	7	6	33(35%)	n/a
Displaced	7	6	2	5	2	22(23%)	n/a
Demobilized	2	1	2	1	0	6 (6%)	2%
Ex-prisoners	2	0	0	1	0	3 (3%)	n/a
TOTAL	20	12	10	14	8	64	

Ethnic Category	Number of Respondents						Data Base
	Busoni	Bugendana	Ruyigi	Mutimbuzi	Rumonge	TOTAL	
Hutu	10	13	8	6	11	48 (51%)	54%
Tutsi	3	11	6	3	3	26 (27%)	40%
NO REPLY	4	-	2	2	1	9 (9%)	n/a
Twa	-	2	-	1	-	3 (3%)	4%
Ganwa	-	-	-	0	1	1 (1%)	n/a
Mixed	1	-	-	1	1	3 (3%)	n/a
Unknown	1	-	-	4	-	5 (5%)	1%
TOTAL	19	26	16	17	17	95 (100%)	925

* Percentage is a percentage of the total number of respondents (95 respondents).

APPENDIX 6 – First National Group Meeting (2008) Participants' List

Province	Nom et Prénom	Organisation/Institution	Position/Description
BUBANZA	Gahungu Juvenal	Urwego rw'abashingantahe	umukuru w'intara
	Kabanyana Spès Caritas	Radio Isanganiro	Journaliste Producteur
	NIRAGIRA Isaïe	Admnistration	adm, Com Bubanza
	NITUNGA Génèviève	APRODH	Observatrice
	NYABENDA Pascal	Admnistration	Gouverneur
BUJA-RURAL	Abbé NSABIMANA Athanase	Eglise Catholique	Prêtre
	BARANYIKWA Elie	Assemblée Nationale	Député
	FITINA Jacqueline	Comité des Rapatriés	Membre
	NDARUVUKANYE Zénon	Admnistration	Gouverneur
	Ndinzemensi Fébronie	Enseignante	
	SIBONIYO Ignace	FDN	G2
BURURI	MASUMBUKO Athanase	Union des Rapatriés du Burundi	Président
	MUDOMO Athanase	Enseignant	
	NIYUHIRE Espérance		
CANKUZO	HATUNGIMANA Isaïe	Admnistration	Conseiller de l'Admicom
	Kanani Pie	SAHWANYA FRODEBU	Vice-Président Fédération
	MUDENDE Saturnin	UPRONA	1er Secrétaire Provincial
	NIJEBARIKO Antoinette	Admnistration	Adm. Com CANKUZO
	NIRAGIRA J.Berchmans	Admnistration	Gouverneur
CIBITOKE	HARERIMANA Alice	TR 8	Représentant des femmes
	KUBWIMANA Uzziel	Commune Rugombo	Chef de Zone
	NDAGIJIMANA Firmin	TGI	Juge
	NTABARA Régine	MUSHINGANTAHE	
GITEGA	NZIBARIZA Sertière	UCEDD	Cultivateur
	RUBERINTWARI Fulgence	Cour d'Appel	Président
	Selemani MOSSI	Admnistration	Gouverneur
KARUZI	MISIGARO Michel	FRODEBU	Cadre d'appui
	Ndayishimiye Marie	DUSHIREHAMWE	
	NDAYIZEYE Sylvestre	Admnistration	Gouverneur
	NJEBARIKANUYE Nestor	ABASHINGANTAHE	Enseignant
	Nzeyimana Ally	1er Secrétaire	COMIBU
KAYANZA	MANIRUMVA Mathias	Commune Kabarore	Secrétaire
	NDUWUMUNSI Audace	FDN	3ème Région Militaire
	NDUWIMANA Edouard	Admnistration	Gouverneur
	NDUWIMANA Patricie	Représentante des Femmes	Enseignante

	NZIGAMASABO Désiré	Justice	Juge
KIRUNDO	MASUDI Selemani	Administration	Adm, Com Kirundo
	MUGEMANGANGO J.Baptiste	Conseiller Technique	Conseiller
	NAHIMANA Chantal	COSOME	Membre
	MUVUNYI Juvénal		Gouverneur
	NSHIMIRIMANA Godelieve	COSOME	Membre
MAIRIE	BAGAYA Alfred	PALIPHEUTU-FNL	
	BATUNGWANAYO Bernard	SLEEB	Président du Syndicat
	BIGIRIMANA Prosper	1er Vice-Présidence	Conseiller
	BIRARONDERWA Junior	CJD/FRODEBU	Porte Parole
	BIZIMANA François	CNDD	Porte Parole
	BUKURU Denis	U.B	Professeur
	BUTOYI Richard	FRODEBU	
	CIMANISHATSE Armel	U.E.A	Etudiante
	CIZA Jacqueline		Conseiller Com. Kamenge
	FARIDA Mohammed	RPP	Conseiller
	GACOREKE Jeanne	RFP	Secrétaire Exécutive
	GAHIMBARE Diane	U.B	Etudiante
	GASUTWA Claire	Eglise Anglicane	
	HABONIMANA Ildephonse	FECABU	Assistant Administratif
	HAKIZIMANA Isidore	CICB	Secrétaire Exécutif
	HARUSHIMANA Antoine	OLUCOM	Membre
	HATUNGIMANA Félicien	IPP	Coordonnateur
	HATUNGIMANA J. de Dieu	DHD	Membre
	HATUNGIMANA Sylvie	U.B	Directeur Académique
	INAMUGANURO Marie	BINUB	Fonctionnaire
	KABWIGIRI Charles	UML King	Recteur
	KAMOSO Déo	FDN	Commandant
	KANYAMUNEZA Alice	AJOS	Présidente entente MAIRIE
	KARORERO Alain Désiré	ASOBECO	Représentant Légal
	KAVUMBAGU J. M. Vianney	LDGL	Chargé de l'Info
	KINO JUMATANO	Commune Buterere	Conseiller Collinaire
	MANIRAKIZA Floride	Commune CIBITOKÉ	Conseiller Com
	MANIRAKIZA Raphaël	PARENA	Membre du Comité Directeur
	Manwangari Léon	PALIPÉ AGAKIZA	Porte Parole
	Mbonihankuye Jérôme	Association des Jeunes pour la Non-Violence	Chargé de Relations Publiques
	MIZERO Mireille	1er Vice-Présidence	attaché au Cab
	MPENDUBURUNDI Gilberte	PAPRODEV	Secrétaire
	MPORE Solange	APFB	Membre
	MUBWIGIRI Victor	RBJN	Secrétaire Général
	MUHORAKEYE Elyse	APFB	Membre
	MUNEZERO Chryssie	TV Renaissance	Journaliste
	Ndabarushimana Didier	Conseiller Collinaire	

NDAMUKUNDA Didier	AJECOM	Représentant Légal
NDARUSANZE Nestor	FDN	Commandant ISCAM
NDAYIRAGIJE Régina	U,B	Représentant Général des Etudiants
NDAYISHIMIYE Apollinaire	CEPBU	Représentant Légal Adjoint
NDAYIZIGIYE Cassien	Présidence	
NDIKUMANA Alexis	CIVIC	Assistant de bureau
NDUWAYO Salvator	Commune Musaga	Attaché à l'Administration
NGOWENUBUSA Prime	FDN	Chef des Opération
NIBIZI Isaïe	1er Vice-Présidence	Conseiller Principal
NIHORIMBERE Pascal	CEDAC	Chargé Communication
NIMPAGARITSE Sylvère	Cour Suprême	Juge
NIYITEGEKA Népo	CDCPA	Membre de la Commission
NIYONKURU Céline	Cab, Présidendance	Conseillère
NIYONKURU Jean Claude	Centre SERUKA	Promoteur de la Santé
NIYONZIMA Nestor	APRODH	Assistant juridique
NIZIGIYIMANA Marie Rose	MINEDUC	Conseiller
NKUNDIMANA Révocate	Ligue des Femmes CNDD-FDD	Secrétaire
NKURUNZIZA Christian	CNDD-FDD	
NKURUNZIZA Ernest	Ligue Iteka	
NSHIMIRIMANA Dieuné	SNR	Cabinet
NTAHORWAMIYE Prosper	V-MDPHG	Chef de Cabinet
NTARABAGANYI P.Channel	PNB	Porte Parole
NTIRANYIBAGIRA Louise	HealthNet TPO	Coordinatrice Activités Psycho-Sociales
NYAMUSHIRWA Lyduine	CENAP	
NYANDWI Frédiane	MDNAC	Bureau Informatique
NZOSABA J. Bosco	Administration	
Pili IBRAHIM	STEEB	Membre du bureau Exécutif
Rév. MAHINJA Antoine	EML	Pasteur
Rév.KANANI Barnabé	Eglise Anglicane	Pasteur
RUBANGISHA L Davy	Abacurabwenge	
SHEIK B. SALUM ISSA	Communauté Islamique	Représentant Légal
KANKIKO Norbert	Mairie	Conseiller Socio-Culturel
Ukwishaka Florence	Agent CHUK	FPED
UWIMANA Ruston	DHD	membre
UWINEZA Adélaïde	KAMENGE	Conseillère Communal
Inakarira Odette	Enseignante	CNDD
KABURA Léonie		Citoyenne
KANANI NORMAND	CNDD-FDD	Provincial
NDIKURIYO Réverien	CNDD-FDD	Commissaire Général
NIBOGORA Oscar	FRODEBU	Secrétaire National
NYANDWI Eric		Membre du Conseil

			Com
	HARABARISHIZE Cyrille	Finances	Vérimpôt
	KANYANGE Gaston	DPE	Chef du Personnel
	NDIKUMAGENGE Deus	Admnistration	Conseiller Economique
	NIYONKURU Fiacre	FRODEBU	Président Fédéral
	NSEKERA Renord	Parquet	Substitut du Procureur
MUYINGA	BAMBWASE Pierre	Admnistration	Gouverneur
	KABIHOGO Fatuma	DUKUNDANE	Commerçante
	MUNEZERO Adrien	PNB	
	NDAYISHIMIYE Serges	CNDD-FDD	Provincial
	NININHAZWE Laurent	Enseignant	
MWARO	NDAYISHIMIYE Rénilde	Admnistration	Gouverneur
	NDIKIMINWE Léonard	Leader des Jeunes	Directeur
	NIMPAGARITSE Liboire	EML	Pasteur
	NINGABIYE Winifred	Commune Gisozi	Conseiller Com
	RUHUNA Vénant	Elim Chelismatique	Pasteur
NGOZI	BARASUKANA Prime	TGI	Président
	CIZA Godelive	PAJUD	Secrétaire Provincial
	MAKERA Jean Bosco	Cab. Gouverneur	Conseiller Principal
	MBAZUMUTIMA Stany	Ligue Iteka	Membre
	NSHIMIRIMANA Juma	COMIBU	Conseiller
RUTANA	BARARUFISE Marcelline	Admnistration	Gouverneur
	KWIZIGIRA Claudette	Centre Jeunes	Secrétaire
	NIYONZIMA Janvier	SNR RUTANA	Provincial
	Nkwirikiye Pascal	FRODEBU	
	NTIBAMFASHE Gilbert	PNB	Commissaire PJ
	NZOHABONAYO Sylvestre	PNB	Commissaire Provinciale
	VYARUGABA Innocent	Parquet	Procureur
RUYIGI	Abbé RUTWE Elie	Prêtre	Aumonerie Prison
	BANSHIMIYUBUSA Denis	Bonne Gouvernance	Conseiller au Cab
	BUDARARA Emmanuel		Pasteur
	SABUBWA Aquiline	Ligue Iteka	Observatrice Provinciale des Droits de l'Homme
	SURWANONE Louis	Conseil BASHINGANTAHE	

APPENDIX 7 - Voting Results of First National Group Meeting

The following two tables show two possible scenarios for tabulating "voting" (prioritization) of priority obstacles to peace, during the First National Group Meeting. Participants were asked to prioritize issues, with the issue of most importance to them being given 10 points, and the issue of least importance being given one (1) point. The points given by participants were then totalled and the four issues receiving the most points were retained as the four priority issues. The issues retained and their points tabulated were as follows:

1.	Disarmament of Civilians -	607
2.	Poverty and Unemployment -	557
3.	Management of Election Loss/Victory -	535
4.	Transitional Justice -	496

Confusion in the "voting" process, however, meant that not all of the voting participants gave points to all 10 of the possible choices, and instead restricted their "prioritization" to their first four choices, or even their first one or two choices. (See the highlighted cells in the table below, marking 'missing' votes.) The result of this incomplete process meant that some of the issues (specifically the National Land and Goods Commission, and, Banditry) which might have received additional points, did not receive these points, potentially skewing the results. In Scenario 1 below, maximum additional points have been given to these two issues (numbers in red) with the minimal additional points given to the four issues (above). When these additional points are given it gives the following results: (NOTE: This represents a possible but unlikely outcome.)

1.	Disarmament of Civilians -	607 +
2.	Poverty and Unemployment -	557 +
3.	Management of Election Loss/Victory	535 +
4.	Land Commission	501
	<u>Or</u> Banditry	499

In an attempt to establish the real intentions of the participants, however, a second Scenario is also presented below. In this scenario, only the points for the first four choices are retained for all of the participants. (Points for fifth, sixth, seventh (etc.) choices have been removed from the calculations.) In this scenario, rankings are obtained which resemble the rankings presented during the National Group meeting:

1.	Disarmament of Civilians -	498
2.	Poverty and Unemployment -	416
3.	Management of Election Loss/Victory -	408
4.	Transitional Justice -	319

SCENARIO 1 -

	Gouv./Etat de droit		Economie		Foncier		Sécurité		Social	
PRIORITISATION	Gestion défaite et victoire	Justice transitionnelle	Pauvreté, chômage	Dépendance agricole	CNTB	Pression démographique	Désarmement population civile	Lutte banditisme criminalité	Vulnérabilité manipulation	Traumatismes
Pers. 1	5	8	9	2	1	6	7	3	4	10
Pers. 2		1	10	9	6	8	7	6		
Pers. 3	7	9	6	3	8	2	10	5	1	7
Pers. 4	10	5	8	9	4	3	7	6	2	1
Pers. 5	8	10	9	5	7	1	6	4	3	2
Pers. 6	4	3	9	1	8	2	10	6	5	7
Pers. 7	8	9	7	1	4	6	10	5	2	3
Pers. 8	2	6	8	3	7	5	9	10	4	1
Pers. 9	3	4	8	7	6	5	10	9	2	1
Pers. 10	7	8			9		10	6		
Pers. 11	9	8	10	7	3	1	5	6	4	2
Pers. 12	6	10	5	4	7	2	9	8	3	1
Pers. 13	9	6	5	3	4	1	10	8	7	2
Pers. 14		7	8	9	6		10	6		
Pers. 15	3	4	7	9	10	8	5	6	1	2
Pers. 16	6	5		7	10	9	8	4		
Pers. 17	9	6	10	2	8	1	7	4	3	5
Pers. 18	10	5	7	8	6	1	9	2	3	4
Pers. 19	9	2	5	6	7	1	4	3	10	8
Pers. 20	7	6	8	4	3	2	10	9	1	5
Pers. 21	2	7	8	9	6	1	10	3	4	5
Pers. 22	10	4	8	1	3	2	7	5	9	6
Pers. 23	6	7	3	9	8	5	10	10	2	4
Pers. 24	10	4	7	5	1	6	9	8	3	2
Pers. 25	4	2	7	3	9	1	6	10	8	5
Pers. 26	5	7	10	6	4	9	8	8		
Pers. 27	10	6	9		7		8	7		
Pers. 28	10	6	4	8	7	1	9	3	5	2
Pers. 29	4	5	9	3	7	8	10	6	2	1
Pers. 30	6	5	7	8	1	3	10	9	4	2
Pers. 31	5	8	6	4	7	3	10	9	2	1
Pers. 32	10	7	6	8	1	5	9	4	2	3
Pers. 33	6	8	2	1	9	3	10	7	5	4
Pers. 34	8	2	5	4	9	7	10	3	6	1
Pers. 35	7	3	5	1	9	4	8	10	2	6

Pers. 36	9	7	4	2	5	8	10	6	3	1
Pers. 37	R	R	R	R	R	R	R	R	R	R
Pers. 38	1	4	7	8	2	5	3	10	9	6
Pers. 39	5	1	6	7	8	4	10	9	2	3
Pers. 40	9	7	4	5	8	1	10	3	2	6
Pers. 41	2	3	5	7	6	4	10	9	1	8
Pers. 42	10	9	3	6	2	7	8	1	5	4
Pers. 43	10	9	7		6			8		
Pers. 44	3	7	5	6	4	2	10	8	1	9
Pers. 45		9	7	8	6			10		
Pers. 46	4	3	5	7	6	8	10	9	1	2
Pers. 47	5	4	7	9	8	1	6	10	2	3
Pers. 48	9	4	8	10	6	7	5	2	1	
Pers. 49	4	7		8	3	9	10	3	6	5
Pers. 50	4	10	8	2	9	3	7	6	5	1
Pers. 51	8	5	6	7	4	1	10	9	2	3
Pers. 52	10	2	9	1	3	4	8	5	7	6
Pers. 53	7	6	8	10	5	2	9	3	1	4
Pers. 54	8	7	4	3	5	2	10	9	1	6
Pers. 55	2	6	5	3	9	1	10	4	7	8
Pers. 56	10	1	9	8	2	6	5	4	7	3
Pers. 57	1	4	9	10	5	7	6	8	3	2
Pers. 58	4	7	6	10	9	8	5	2	1	3
Pers. 59	10	7	4	3	6	5	9	8	1	2
Pers. 60	7	6	8	4	9	2	5	10	1	3
Pers. 61	9	8	7	6	4	2	10	5	1	3
Pers. 62	10	9	6	8	5	6	2	3	4	1
Pers. 63	10	6	9		8		7	5	6	
Pers. 64	10	6	8	4	5	9	1	3	7	2
Pers. 65	2	7	8	5	6	3	10	9	1	4
Pers. 66	6	5	3	9	4	7	10	1	2	
Pers. 67	6	1	4	3	7	2	9	8	5	10
Pers. 68	7	9	6	2	8	3	10	5	1	4
Pers. 69	1	4	8	7	9	10	5	3	6	2
Pers. 70	6	7	9	10	8	2	5	4	1	3
Pers. 71		1		10	9			9		
Pers. 72		8	9	7	6		10	6		
Pers. 73	7	8	9	10	4	3	6	5	2	1
Pers. 74	7	2	9	6	8	4	10	5	3	1
Pers. 75	10	7	9	5	1	3	4	8	6	2
Pers. 76	8	7	9	1	10	6	2	4	3	5

Pers. 77	9	4	5	7	8	6	10	3	2	1
Pers. 78	8	7	3	4	10	5	2	6	9	1
Pers. 79	8	5	9	3	4	10	1	7	6	2
Pers. 80	7	10	8	5	6	9	1	3	4	2
Pers. 81	7	6	8	4	5	3	2	1	9	10
Pers. 82	8	7	9	10	4	3	6	5	2	1
Pers. 83	8	10	9	6	1	5	2	7	4	3
Pers. 84	4	7	9	10	6	3	5	8	2	1
Pers. 85	10	9	5	1	7	6	4	2	8	
TOTAL	535	496 (498)	557	456	452 (501)	329	607	447 (499)	272	250

SCENARIO 2 -

	Gouv./Etat de droit		Economie		Foncier		Sécurité		Social	
PRIORITISATION	Gestion défaite et victoire	Justice transitionnelle	Pauvreté, chômage	Dépendance agricole	CNTB	Pression démographique	Désarmement population civile	Lutte banditisme criminalité	Vulnérabilité manipulation	Traumatismes
Pers. 1		8	9				7			10
Pers. 2			10	9		8	7			
Pers. 3	7	9			8		10			7
Pers. 4	10		8	9			7			
Pers. 5	8	10	9		7					
Pers. 6			9		8		10			7
Pers. 7	8	9	7				10			
Pers. 8			8		7		9	10		
Pers. 9			8	7			10	9		
Pers. 10	7	8			9		10			
Pers. 11	9	8	10	7						
Pers. 12		10			7		9	8		
Pers. 13	9						10	8	7	
Pers. 14		7	8	9			10			
Pers. 15			7	9	10	8				
Pers. 16				7	10	9	8			
Pers. 17	9		10		8		7			
Pers. 18	10		7	8			9			
Pers. 19	9				7				10	8
Pers. 20	7		8				10	9		
Pers. 21		7	8	9			10			
Pers. 22	10		8				7		9	
Pers. 23		7		9	8		10	10		
Pers. 24	10		7				9	8		
Pers. 25			7		9			10	8	
Pers. 26		7	10			9	8	8		
Pers. 27	10		9				8			
Pers. 28	10			8	7		9			
Pers. 29			9		7	8	10			
Pers. 30			7	8			10	9		
Pers. 31		8			7		10	9		
Pers. 32	10	7		8			9			
Pers. 33		8			9		10	7		
Pers. 34	8				9	7	10			
Pers. 35	7				9		8	10		


Pers. 36	9	7				8	10			
Pers. 37	R	R	R	R	R	R	R	R		
Pers. 38			7	8				10	9	
Pers. 39				7	8		10	9		
Pers. 40	9	7			8		10			
Pers. 41				7			10	9		8
Pers. 42	10	9				7	8			
Pers. 43	10	9	7					8		
Pers.44		7					10	8		9
Pers. 45		9	7	8				10		
Pers. 46				7		8	10	9		
Pers. 47			7	9	8			10		
Pers. 48	9		8	10		7				
Pers. 49		7		8		9	10			
Pers. 50		10	8		9		7			
Pers. 51	8			7			10	9		
Pers. 52	10		9				8		7	
Pers. 53	7		8	10			9			
Pers. 54	8	7					10	9		
Pers. 55					9		10		7	8
Pers. 56	10		9	8					7	
Pers. 57			9	10		7		8		
Pers. 58		7		10	9	8				
Pers. 59	10	7					9	8		
Pers. 60	7		8		9			10		
Pers. 61	9	8	7				10			
Pers. 62	10	9		8						
Pers. 63	10		9		8		7			
Pers. 64	10		8			9			7	
Pers. 65		7	8				10	9		
Pers. 66				9		7	10			
Pers. 67					7		9	8		10
Pers. 68	7	9			8		10			
Pers. 69			8	7	9	10				
Pers. 70		7	9	10	8					
Pers. 71				10						
Pers. 72		8	9	7			10			
Pers. 73	7	8	9	10						
Pers. 74	7		9		8		10			
Pers. 75	10	7	9					8		
Pers. 76	8	7	9		10					

Pers. 77	9			7	8		10			
Pers. 78	8	7			10				9	
Pers. 79	8		9			10		7		
Pers. 80	7	10	8			9				
Pers. 81	7		8						9	10
Pers. 82	8	7	9	10						
Pers. 83	8	10	9					7		
Pers. 84		7	9	10				8		
Pers. 85	10	9			7				8	
TOTAL	408	319	416	304	289	148	498	279	97	77

APPENDIX 8 - RPP Analysis: Matrix Mapping

(by CENAP Team)

The Burundi Peacebuilding Programme:



Key:

- "Approches PP" - More People Strategies
- "Approches PC" - Key People Strategies
- "Changement Indiv." - Individual / Personal Change
- "Changement Socio-Pol." - Socio-Political Change

Activity	AV – Audio-Visual
	GR – Reflection Group(s)
	GN – National Group(s)

Objective

APPENDIX 9 – Photos



Photo1 - Mutimbuzi Focus Group Discussion



Photo 2 – Individual Interview – Athanase Masumbuko (left)