Investigating the Future
An in-depth study of Public Opinion in Cyprus
SECTIONS

- SECTION A: Underlying Social and Political Attitudes
- SECTION B: The Peace Process and a Future Referendum
- SECTION C: The Security and Guarantees Dossier
- SECTION D: The Property and Territory Dossiers
- SECTION E: The Governance and Power Sharing Dossier
SURVEY PROFILE

- **Sample Size:** 1,000 Greek Cypriots and 1,000 Turkish Cypriots
- **Sampling Process:** Multi-stage Random Stratified Sampling
- **Method of Data Collection:** Face to Face Interviews with a Structured Questionnaire at Homes of Respondents and in their Native Language
- **Period of Data Collection:** 06th October – 06th November 2009
- **Project Supervision:** Ahmet Sozen, Spyros Christou
- **Research Coordination:** Alexandros Lordos, Erol Kaymak
- **Data Analysis:** Christos Anastasiades
- **Field Work:** Symmetron Market Research for Greek Cypriots and KADEM Cyprus Social Research for Turkish Cypriots
SECTION A

UNDERLYING SOCIAL AND POLITICAL ATTITUDES
Perspectives on Reconciliation (Greek Cypriots)

A very strong majority of Greek Cypriots recognizes that the Cyprus Problem must be solved through a mutually acceptable compromise. A smaller majority additionally acknowledges that they would not mind having Turkish Cypriots as neighbors. Finally, the notion of using violence as a means for achieving political goals is abhorred by the vast majority of the Greek Cypriot community.
A majority of Turkish Cypriots believes that the Cyprus Problem must be solved on the basis of a mutually acceptable compromise. Having said that, opinions are divided regarding the desirability of co-existence with Greek Cypriots in the context of day-to-day life. The use of violence as a means for achieving political goals is opposed by a strong majority of Turkish Cypriots.
National and Cultural Identity (Greek Cypriots)

Greek Cypriots still tend to identify strongly with their Greek cultural roots, but many of them have now abandoned the notion of “Greece as mother country”.
National and Cultural Identity (Turkish Cypriots)

Turkish Cypriots still remain loyal to the notion of “Turkey as motherland”, at least to the extent that a majority of them acknowledges having Turkish cultural roots.
Managing contested identities

Greek Cypriots are equally divided between those who consider themselves more Cypriot than Greek and those who consider themselves Greek and Cypriot to the same degree while few consider themselves to be more Greek than Cypriot. Turkish Cypriots present a more uniform picture, with a clear majority considering themselves to be Cypriot and Turkish to the same degree, and about equal minorities considering themselves, on the one hand, to be more Cypriot than Turkish, and on the other hand, more Turkish than Cypriot.
Values that Cypriots identify with

To the question of which values they would teach their children, Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots agree: High priority is placed on cultivating a sense of responsibility, becoming independent, and learning tolerance and respect for other people. In contrast, both communities place a low priority on cultivating imagination and creativity and in learning to not be selfish.
**Left or Right?**

Greek Cypriots are currently exhibiting a small trend towards the right in a somewhat polarized context with a comparatively weak centre. Turkish Cypriots are more equally distributed, with one third self-identifying as right wing, one third as centrists, and one third as left-wing.
Greek Cypriots display a moderate to high level of trust towards the Judiciary and the Church, a moderate level of trust towards the Government and the Army, and a low level of trust towards Political Parties and the Police.
Trust of Institutions (Turkish Cypriots)

Turkish Cypriots display a high level of trust towards the Army, a moderate to high level of trust towards the Government, the Judiciary and the Police, a moderate level of trust towards the religious authorities, and a low level of trust towards the Political Parties.
Trust of actors involved in the Peace Process (Greek Cypriots)

In relation to the Peace Process, Greek Cypriots primarily trust their own Leader, Demetris Christofias, and the European Union, though it should be noted that even for these actors a significant skeptic contingent exists. In contrast, Greek Cypriots strongly mistrust the governments of the United Kingdom and Turkey.
In relation to the Peace Process, Turkish Cypriots primarily trust the government of Turkey, and to a lesser extent their own Leader, Mehmet Ali Talat. The European Union comes third, though in its case half of Turkish Cypriots declare skepticism. Least trusted is the “Greek side”, as symbolized by the government of Greece and the person of the Greek Cypriot Leader, Demetris Christofias.
SECTION B

THE PEACE PROCESS AND A FUTURE REFERENDUM
Is there desire that the Peace Process should succeed?

A majority of the Greek Cypriot community would like to see the peace process being concluded successfully and leading to a Comprehensive Settlement while a plurality of Turkish Cypriots also espouses the same goal.
Is there expectation that the Peace Process will actually succeed?

In contrast, majorities in both communities have low expectations that the peace process will actually succeed in delivering a Comprehensive Settlement.
Evaluation of alternative Settlement models (Greek Cypriots)

Greek Cypriots would ideally prefer a unitary state but would be prepared to live with a Bizonal Bicommunal Federation. In contrast, Greek Cypriots unequivocally reject a two state solution, a confederal solution or a continuation of the status quo.
Evaluation of alternative Settlement models (Turkish Cypriots)

Turkish Cypriots would ideally prefer a two state solution but would be prepared to live with a Bizonal Bicommunal Federation. Other models for the future (confederation, continuation of the status quo, unitary state) receive lower levels of support without being rejected outright.
Has the agreed Settlement Framework been accepted by the wider public?

As for the agreed basis of negotiations between the two leaders – namely that the settlement should constitute “a Bizonal Bicommunal Federation with Political Equality, as agreed in UN Security Council Resolutions, with two constituent states of equal status and a single international personality, sovereignty and citizenship” – both communities are expressing ambivalence without rejecting it outright. The skeptic contingent is somewhat stronger in the Greek Cypriot community, while in both communities “moderate support” of the framework is a more frequent condition that “strong support”.

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**Degree of acceptance of the principles agreed by the two Leaders for the Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus problem**

- **Greek Cypriots**
  - Strongly Disagree: 21%
  - Somewhat Disagree: 20%
  - Unsure: 20%
  - Somewhat agree: 10%
  - Strongly agree: 28%

- **Turkish Cypriots**
  - Strongly Disagree: 24%
  - Somewhat Disagree: 19%
  - Unsure: 24%
  - Somewhat agree: 13%
  - Strongly agree: 28%
Acceptance of specific elements in the agreed framework (Greek Cypriots)

Greek Cypriots are most positive over the principles of single sovereignty, single citizenship and single international personality, they are ambivalent over federalism, political equality and bicomunality, while they are very skeptical of bizonality and of the notion that there will be Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot constituent states of equal status.
As for the Turkish Cypriots, they are strongly supportive of the principles of bizonality, bicommmunality, political equality, and the notion that there will be Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot constituent states of equal status. At the same time, they are ambivalent over federalism and the principle of a single international personality, and finally they are somewhat negative over the principles of a single citizenship and a single sovereignty.
Negotiating priorities of the wider public

Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots tend to perceive similarly the priority areas where the negotiations should be focusing. Specifically, both communities give first priority to the Security and Guarantees dossier, second priority to issues of Property and Territory, while third priority is given to Constitutional and Governance issues. The only dossier where the prioritization between the two communities significantly differs is the issue of the people from Turkey, which is seen as a priority by a majority of Greek Cypriots - actually their second priority after Security and Guarantees - but is only seen as a priority by one quarter of Turkish Cypriots.
Trending to Yes, or trending to No?

To the question of what they would vote in a future referendum, assuming the negotiations between the two leaders conclude and a settlement plan is drafted, the two communities show a similar orientation. Specifically, about a fifth of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots are committed ‘Yes’ voters, about a quarter of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots are committed ‘No’ voters, while the rest are swing voters who have yet to make a final decision, many of whom are presumably waiting to see the final shape of the deal or the positioning of opinion leaders before making up their mind.
Younger Greek Cypriots are more likely to display an intention to vote No in a future referendum, though even in their case a majority is open to the possibility of voting Yes. The oldest Greek Cypriots, age 65+, are most likely to display an intention to vote Yes in a future referendum.
Among Turkish Cypriots, the oldest individuals, age 65+, are displaying the strongest trend towards a No vote. The younger age groups, aged 18 – 24 and 25 – 34, and the middle age groups, 45 – 54 and 55 – 64 are displaying a comparative openness to the possibility of voting Yes.
Intended Vote in a Future Referendum by Political Party (Greek Cypriots)

In the Greek Cypriot community, political parties are already displaying distinct trends in the intended vote pattern of their supporters. AKEL supporters are most likely to favor a Yes vote in a future referendum, then DISY voters, and then EDEK voters, while DIKO supporters are clearly trending towards a No vote in a future referendum.
Intended Vote in a Future Referendum by Political Party (Turkish Cypriots)

In the Turkish Cypriot community, CTP and TDP supporters are trending towards a Yes vote in a future referendum, while UBP and DP supporters are trending towards a No vote. In all cases, significant groups exist within each party that support the alternate viewpoint.
SECTION C

THE SECURITY AND GUARANTEES DOSSIER
If a final agreement is reached, how acceptable or unacceptable would you consider each of these countries or international organisations to be considered as guarantors of the new state of affairs in Cyprus? (Greek Cypriots)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisation</th>
<th>Oppose</th>
<th>Unsure</th>
<th>Support</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The European Union</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>66%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The United Nations Security Council</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The United Kingdom</td>
<td>88%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>98%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Evaluating Potential Guarantors (Greek Cypriots)

In evaluating potential guarantors of a settlement, Greek Cypriots strongly reject the United Kingdom and Turkey, while also tending to reject a potential role for Greece. In contrast, there is tolerance for a possible UN Security Council role and strong support for an EU role in guaranteeing the settlement.
Evaluating Potential Guarantors (Turkish Cypriots)

Turkish Cypriots strongly prefer a role for Turkey in guaranteeing a settlement but not for the other two historic guarantors, the United Kingdom or Greece. As for the UN Security Council, Turkish Cypriots exhibit ambivalence over its possible role, while the same ambivalence is exhibited regarding a possible role for the EU.
**Timetables for Troop Withdrawal (Greek Cypriots)**

Greek Cypriots reject any notion of delayed troop departure for Turkish and Greek troops while in contrast they deem the immediate departure of all Turkish and Greek troops to be absolutely essential. Rejection levels, however, are lower in cases where a brief transition period is proposed.
Timetables for Troop Withdrawal (Turkish Cypriots)

Turkish Cypriots, in contrast, seem willing to tolerate various models of transition, though in fact all related options are controversial to one segment or other of the Turkish Cypriot community. There doesn’t seem to be a solution to this matter, which would involve a symmetrical presence or withdrawal of Turkish and Greek troops, which would simultaneously satisfy a majority of Turkish Cypriots.
SECTION D

THE PROPERTY AND TERRITORY DOSSIERS
Restitution or Compensation? (Greek Cypriots)

Seen as a trend, about 80% of Greek Cypriots favor priority being given to original owners, about 20% are open to both types of solution, while there are almost none who favor priority being given to current users. Beyond this overall trend, however, some differentiations can be discerned on the basis of property type. Specifically, Greek Cypriots are willing to show comparatively more flexibility (*i.e.* possibly accept priority being granted to current users) in cases where public utilities have been built, and in cases of properties being used for commercial purposes or industrial production.
Restitution or Compensation? (Turkish Cypriots)

Seen as a trend, about 50% of Turkish Cypriots prefer that current users should have priority over disputed properties, about 25% are open to both types of solution, and about 25% prefer that priority should be given to original owners. Beyond this overall trend, however, some differentiations can be discerned on the basis of property type. Specifically, Turkish Cypriots in turn are willing to show comparatively more flexibility (i.e. possibly accept priority being given to original owners) in cases of land that is vacant and unused.
"The life before": Strength of memories

Greek Cypriot displaced persons declare that they have strong and vivid memories of life at their original home, and even among those who were too young to have direct memories, parents have tended to fill in the gaps by speaking extensively to their children about life at their original home. In contrast, few Turkish Cypriots maintain strong and vivid memories of life at their original home, while Turkish Cypriot parents do not as a rule speak much to their children about “the life before”.

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Do you have strong memories, direct or indirect, from your life in your original home, before the events of the Cyprus Problem?

- 61% Yes, I have strong and vivid memories of life at my original home
- 19% A little: I only have vague memories of my childhood there
- 12% Moderately: I have fragmented memories of my life there but they seem very far away now
- 18% Only indirectly, I was not born or too young but my parents have spoken to me extensively about life at our original home
- 18% No, I was not born or too young and my parents haven’t spoken to me much about that time
- 2% A little: I only have vague memories of my childhood there
- 4% Only indirectly, I was not born or too young but my parents have spoken to me extensively about life at our original home
- 33% No, I was not born or too young and my parents haven’t spoken to me much about that time

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Greek Cypriots

Turkish Cypriots
Among Greek Cypriots, memories of life at their original home are almost uniformly viewed as very positive, whereas among Turkish Cypriots different groups report positive, neutral or negative memories of life at their original home.
“And if you get your property back?”...

When asked to consider options regarding their original properties in the context of a settlement, almost half of Greek Cypriot displaced property owners say that they would want the option to use it as their primary residence (though, as will be seen below, this finding should be examined in the context of whether return will be under Greek Cypriot or Turkish Cypriot administration), while one third are interested in the option of using it as a holiday home. Among Turkish Cypriot displaced property owners, only one third say they would use their original home as a primary residence, while one in five would rent their property out for income.
Willingness of Greek Cypriots to return under Greek Cypriot administration

Greek Cypriot displaced persons display a strong willingness to return to their original home, assuming that it is returned under Greek Cypriot administration.
Willingness of Greek Cypriots to return under Turkish Cypriot administration

In contrast, the great majority of Greek Cypriot displaced persons declare that they would not be interested to return to their original home, if it is returned under Turkish Cypriot administration.
SECTION E

THE GOVERNANCE AND POWER SHARING DOSSIER
Electing the Federal Executive (Greek Cypriots)

Greek Cypriots strongly believe that the federal executive should be directly elected by the people, and oppose alternative systems for indirect election of the federal executive, such as through the federal senate or through a college of delegates.
Electing the Federal Executive (Turkish Cypriots)

Turkish Cypriots also tend to prefer the option of a directly elected federal executive, but they remain open to the possibility of a system for indirect election of the federal executive, such as through the federal senate or elected delegates.
Greek Cypriots prefer models of the executive where decisions will be made jointly, such as a presidential council functioning as a collective decision making body or a president / vice president team where decisions will be made by consensus, and reject models which would give unbridled authority at a federal level to any single individual, presumably interpreting as threatening the possibility of a Turkish Cypriot having unbridled executive authority over all of Cyprus for any given period of time.
Decision Making within the Federal Executive (Turkish Cypriots)

To the extent that they accept or reject power sharing in principle, Turkish Cypriots seem flexible over the precise details of how decisions will be made. As a trend, we see about a quarter of Turkish Cypriots rejecting all power sharing models, presumably preferring a two state governance model, then a quarter of Turkish Cypriots tolerating power sharing models as a necessary solution, and finally about half of Turkish Cypriots who actively look forward to having a model of shared governance.
The purpose of the ‘Cyprus 2015: Research and Dialogue for a Sustainable Future’ initiative is to contribute towards a creative and constructive social debate for the long-term sustainable future of Cyprus. By conducting research for action and creating opportunities of social dialogue between relevant stakeholders from both communities at both intra-communal and inter-communal levels, the initiative investigates future perspectives for Cyprus. ‘Cyprus 2015’ aims to explore the opinions, views and thoughts of the public, in both Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities, and develop them into policy proposals.

Within the context of the Cyprus 2015 initiative an islandwide survey, titled ‘Investigating the Future’, was conducted in October - November 2009 with a sample of 1,000 Greek Cypriots and 1,000 Turkish Cypriots, who were interviewed at their homes and in their native tongues. The survey examines several facets of Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot public opinion, including underlying values and attitudes, perceptions and expectations of the peace process, as well as in-depth citizen evaluations of policy options over the critical negotiation dossiers of Security / Guarantees, Property / Territory, and Governance / Power Sharing. The findings of the survey contribute towards the development of a road map for the constructive engagement and participation of the wider public in the peace process, in a way that will enhance the sense of societal ownership – and by extension the long term viability – of any future political settlement.

The ‘Cyprus 2015’ initiative, which commenced in May 2009, is being implemented by the Joint Programme Unit for United Nations / Interpeace Initiatives (JPU). ‘Cyprus 2015’ is being supported by the UNDP-Action for Cooperation and Trust (ACT) programme in Cyprus and the European Commission Representation in Cyprus.