THE SEARCH FOR PEACE
Somali Programme

A Synthesis Report of the Peace Mapping Study
Acknowledgements

The Search for Peace

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The Search for Peace series

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<tr>
<td>APD</td>
<td>Academy for Peace and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARS</td>
<td>Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia</td>
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<tr>
<td>AVU</td>
<td>Audio Visual Unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>CRD</td>
<td>Center for Research and Dialogue</td>
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<tr>
<td>EPRDF</td>
<td>Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOMOG</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>GCCC</td>
<td>Garowe Community Constitutional Conference</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICU</td>
<td>Islamic Courts Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>IGAD</td>
<td>Intergovernmental Authority on Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>IGADD</td>
<td>Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>LAS</td>
<td>League of Arab States</td>
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<tr>
<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organisation of African Unity</td>
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<tr>
<td>OIC</td>
<td>Organisation of Islamic Conference</td>
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<tr>
<td>PAR</td>
<td>Participatory Action Research</td>
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<tr>
<td>PDRC</td>
<td>Puntland Development Research Center</td>
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<tr>
<td>RRA</td>
<td>Rahanweyn Resistance Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAMO</td>
<td>Somali-African Muki Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>SNA</td>
<td>Somali National Alliance</td>
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<td>SNM</td>
<td>Somali National Movement</td>
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<td>SNPC</td>
<td>Somalia National Peace Conference</td>
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<td>SNRCS</td>
<td>Somalia National Reconciliation Conference</td>
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<tr>
<td>SNU</td>
<td>the Somali National Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>SRSG</td>
<td>Special Representative of the Secretary General</td>
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<tr>
<td>SSA</td>
<td>Somali Salvation Alliance</td>
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<tr>
<td>SSDDF</td>
<td>Somali Salvation Democratic Front</td>
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<tr>
<td>TFG</td>
<td>Transitional Federal Government</td>
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<tr>
<td>TFI</td>
<td>Transitional Federal Institution</td>
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<td>TFP</td>
<td>Transitional Federal Parliament</td>
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<td>TNC</td>
<td>Transitional National Council</td>
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<td>TNG</td>
<td>Transitional National Government</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNOSOM</td>
<td>United Nations Operation in Somalia</td>
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<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
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<td>USC</td>
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Preface and Methodology for the Peace Mapping Study

The Dialogue for Peace
Working to consolidate peace and support better governance across the Somali region

Rebuilding a country after conflict is about far more than repairing damaged buildings and re-establishing public institutions. Fundamentally, it is about rebuilding relationships at all levels, restoring the people's trust and confidence in governance systems and the rule of law, and providing the population with greater hope for the future. These processes are all critical to the consolidation of peace and security in fragile post-conflict situations. When they are neglected, the threat of conflict re-emerging is very real. In this sense, statebuilding and peacebuilding are potentially contradictory processes – the former requiring the consolidation of governmental authority, the latter involving its moderation through compromise and consensus. The challenge for both national and international peacemakers is to situate reconciliation firmly within the context of statebuilding, while employing statebuilding as a platform for the development of mutual trust and lasting reconciliation. In the Somali region, neither of these processes can be possible without the broad and inclusive engagement of the Somali people.

Interpeace (formerly known as WSP International) – launched its Somali Programme in the northeastern part of Somalia known as Puntland in 1996. It subsequently expanded its programme to Somaliland in 1999, and to south-central Somalia in 2000. Working with highly respected local peacebuilding institutions established with the programme’s support – the Puntland Development Research Center (PDRC) in Garowe, the Academy for Peace and Development (APD) in Hargeisa, and the Center for Research and Dialogue (CRD) in Mogadishu – Interpeace has employed a highly successful ‘Participatory Action Research’ methodology to advance and support interlinked processes of peacebuilding and state formation. Interpeace’s experience in the Somali region over the past decade indicates that the understanding and trust developed through the PAR methodology can help to resolve conflicts directly, while at the same time building consensual approaches to address the social, economic and political issues necessary for a durable peace. The Dialogue for Peace programme has provided unique opportunities for the three partners to engage with each other in collaborative studies and shared projects across their borders – such as this peace mapping study - while managing their respective components of the Dialogue independently. The three partners meet regularly with Interpeace’s Somali programme team as well as with a ‘Dialogue Support Group’ comprising the programme’s donors.

Aims and Methodology of the Peace Mapping Study

The Peace Mapping study was carried out from January 2007 by researchers from the Academy for Peace and Development (APD) in Somaliland, the Puntland Development Research Center (PDRC) and the Center for Research Development (CRD) in south-central Somalia, as part of the Dialogue for Peace Programme supported by Interpeace. It complements an earlier ‘conflict mapping’ exercise by the same organisations with the World Bank (World Bank, January 2005). No comparable study of peace initiatives in the Somali region had yet been undertaken, despite the numerous reconciliation processes since 1991, at local, regional and national levels. While some of these have failed to fulfil expectations of resolving violent conflict, others have provided a basis for lasting stability, peace and development but are unknown beyond...
their immediate context. Interpeace and its partners consider that there are valuable lessons to be learned from these initiatives for both Somali and international policy makers, in terms of key factors that influence their success, sustainability or failure, and in terms of the relationship between peace processes and state building.

The overall aim of the study was to enhance current approaches to and capacities for reconciliation and the consolidation of peace - both in the Somali region and in other contexts – by studying and drawing lessons from local, regional and national peace initiatives in the Somali region since 1991. The specific objectives were to:

- Document key local, regional and national peace initiatives over the past 16 years in the Somali region (including those that may have failed to achieve the anticipated results);
- Identify key factors that influence successful peace initiatives and factors that may undermine their sustainability;
- Synthesise lessons learned from these reconciliation initiatives for the way forward;
- Study the relationship between peace initiatives and state building in the Somali region

The study was designed in four phases, facilitated by Mark Bradbury in collaboration with the Interpeace Somali program team, with the field research undertaken using Interpeace's Participatory Action Research (PAR) methodology. The research teams compiled inventories of peace meetings in the Somali region; developed a historical overview of peace initiatives in their respective areas; undertook selected case studies; before the final peer review of the studies. The Audio Visual Units (AVU) of the organisations also prepared films to accompany the research. Additional support was provided by a number of colleagues1 and the CRD also undertook research on internationally sponsored national peace conferences in collaboration with Professor Ken Menkhaus.

In the series of workshops that marked the transition between the project phases, the researchers received training in designing a research framework, analytical tools, interviewing techniques and comparative learning2. Information was gathered through individual interviews and group discussions with people who had been involved in or had witnessed the events, many in the places and communities where the peace conferences had taken place. Working Groups of knowledgeable individuals were convened in each region to provide guidance and comment on the research. Over two hundred people were interviewed during the course of the study. Written documentation on the meetings and copies of signed peace agreements were collected and many of the interviews were recorded on tape and film. This now comprises a historic archive of material on Somali peace processes, a resource for those involved, and for national and regional authorities, the broader Somali community, and international policy makers.

The Study

Research was undertaken on 11 peace processes (see table below) published in five volumes. Volume II provides an overview of the internationally mediated peace processes since 1991 and examines three important conferences in detail. Volumes III to V examine some of the key Somali-led peace processes since 1991. This synthesis report collates the key findings of the other four studies. Five films accompany the regional studies (see references section). Each volume is a stand-alone report, of interest in its own right. Together they illustrate the complexity of the context and richness of these processes and provide a practical platform for the sharing of lessons learned on peace and reconciliation initiatives in the Somali region.

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1 Mark Bradbury, Abdinahan Raghe, Pat Johnson, Janet Oeverland, Ulf Terlinden, Mohamed Hassan Ghani, Michael Walls, and Rita Glavitza.
2 Resource people included Dr Justin Willis of the British Institute in Eastern Africa and Andy Carl of Conciliation Resources.
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Map of Somalia, 1991
Introduction

Conflict assessments have become common practice among organisations working in countries in conflict, in order to understand the drivers and dynamics of armed violence, to assess risks and to develop appropriate responses. Less common are assessments of how societies adapt to conflict and how people attempt to manage their security and reconstruct viable ways of life. Yet, perhaps, understanding the conditions and processes (and the costs) by which people reduce conflict and make a return to less violent ways of life possible should be an equally important starting point for diplomatic interventions and for foreign aid policies.

Since 1991, when the Somalia state collapsed, numerous foreign diplomatic, military and statebuilding interventions have failed to deliver security and restore a functional state. During the same period there have been multiple Somali-led initiatives, some of which have succeeded in providing a basis for recovery and development. Few of the Somali-led processes are known about beyond their immediate context and none have been subject to systematic study. Over a decade ago the anthropologist, Bernard Hellander, noted that “while so-called top-down approaches continue to dominate the thinking of external bodies’ intervention in African conflicts, the alternatives remain poorly defined and insufficiently researched” (Hellander 1995: 1). In fact, with some notable exceptions, there has been surprisingly little research done on either “top-down” or “bottom up” processes of conflict resolution and peacemaking in the Somali region. This study aims to rectify this by documenting, analysing and drawing lessons from the multiple local and international peace processes in south-central Somalia, Puntland and Somaliland.

In a country which has become a by-word for seemingly endless political disorder and humanitarian crises, an analysis of ‘peace dynamics’ rather than ‘conflict dynamics’ reveals a society adapting to state collapse, managing conflict, and establishing systems of governance. The Somali region, as several analysts have observed, is not simply a lawless and ungoverned land but one where communities have forged a variety of systems to provide security and law and order and to facilitate economic activity (ICG 2002). This study has recorded 90 local peace meetings in south and central Somalia alone since 1991. As such, the study provides an alternative history of the Somali region for the past two decades.

Objectives and Scope of the Study

There are many reasons for documenting and studying local and internationally sponsored peace processes. The repeated failure of international diplomacy to secure an end to the conflict and the relative success of local processes to reduce levels of violence in some areas points to a dichotomy between local and international processes. To understand the reasons for this and to enhance current approaches and capacities for peacemaking in the Somali region, the study sought to address some key questions:

• Why have international diplomatic initiatives in the Somali regions been unable to establish a functional government and revive a state?
• How do Somali communities deal with their need for security and governance in the absence of a state?

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4 See for example, Farah and Lewis (1993); Bradbury (1994); Bryden & Farah (1996); Menkhaus (1999)
5 In this study the ‘Somali region’ includes south-central Somalia, Somaliland and Puntland.
Why have local peacebuilding processes in the Somali regions proven to be more sustainable than international ones?

**Peace Mapping**

This peace mapping study is a comparative study of Somali-managed peace meetings (shirarka nabadka) and internationally sponsored and mediated reconciliation conferences concerned with ‘national’ or ‘state-level’ governance and regional and international security. The study focuses on processes in which protagonists have held direct talks to agree measures to prevent, de-escalate or terminate violent conflicts and, in many cases, to establish institutions of governance. Public peace conferences are, of course, only one of many types of initiatives aimed at resolving conflicts in the Somali region. Civic action to control militia or remove roadblocks, collaborative development projects, human rights advocacy, rule of law and democracy programmes all seek to influence the course of a conflict. These kinds of initiatives, which are often sponsored by international agencies through ‘civil society’ organisations, and described as ‘grassroots’ and ‘bottom-up’ processes, can be distinguished from indigenous processes that are traditional and socially embedded (Menkhaus 1999). This study focuses primarily on the latter.

A key premise of the study is that instead of viewing Somalia as a ‘fragile’ or ‘collapsed’ state that can be rebuilt through foreign aid, a more productive starting point is a deeper understanding of the actual context. As the study illustrates, local peace processes and peace meetings have been a distinctive feature of the Somali region since the state collapsed and they have a legitimacy and authenticity based on public participation and the moral authority of social institutions and customary law. In the absence of government, they have played a critical role in conflict management and governance, leading to the restoration of law and order and public administrations in Somaliland and Puntland, and to the de-escalation and mitigation of conflict in south-central Somalia. The case studies provide insights into the workings of authority, power and identity in Somali society and the social mechanisms that maintain order. They demonstrate the strength of Somali mechanisms for conflict management and resolution and illustrate how, without a state, local groups have negotiated forms of cooperation and cohabitation, and how violence has been contained and security managed. They also challenge simplistic analyses, such as a static view of clan identity or that resource-based conflicts are simply about scarcity rather than about systems of land tenure.

An important rationale for the study was to explore the disconnection between indigenous peace processes and internationally sponsored ones, and to assess opportunities for combining state and non-state approaches to conflict management. The case studies reveal many differences between local and international peacemaking processes. For example:

- The focus of traditional conflict management is generally oriented towards restoring and sustaining social relations, while internationally led processes are focussed on restoring state institutions.

- National level peace processes in Somalia, as elsewhere in Africa (Brickhill 2007), have typically relegated security to a paper ceasefire agreement and, without the necessary mechanisms for joint security management in place, have relied on enforcement to re-establish a state monopoly over the use of force. This is both impractical and unrealistic in the Somali context and contrasts with local processes, which give attention to de-escalating violence through confidence building security arrangements, in order to create a sustainable basis for the community-based integration of fighters.

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6 The term “peace mapping” has been used by others to describe the exercise of documenting the work of organisations involved in conflict prevention, management and peacebuilding. See for example the Searching for Peace publications of the European Centre for Conflict Prevention, documenting examples of local efforts to prevent and resolve conflict and de-escalate violence http://www.conflict-prevention.net/.


8 Studies of indigenous or traditional peace making practices elsewhere in Africa include: the people-to-people processes in Sudan (see Bradbury et al, 2006); the Mato-Oput among the Acholi in Uganda (Pam 1997), the Gacaca traditional justice system in Rwanda.
• While local conflict resolution processes can sometimes conflict with international norms of justice, the existence of legal pluralism (parallel customary, religious and secular law) needs to be taken into account when re-establishing judicial structures.

• Internationally sponsored processes struggle to achieve local legitimacy because international payments to delegates to sit in peace conferences outside Somalia goes against the principles of reciprocity and mutuality that are key elements of reconciliation in Somali society.

• While the studies of Somali-led processes emphasise that reconciliation needs to be grounded in the sphere of social relations and local communities, several also conclude that locally established peace accords require government support (at least at local level) to be sustained.

In the Somali region, competition over control of the state is only one dynamic to be considered amongst several. Clan chauvinism, commercial competition, religious ideology and foreign strategic interests can all be drivers of conflict. In the vacuum of a single state authority, a hybrid political order has developed in which governance and security are provided by a mix of traditional institutions, modern governmental authorities, religious bodies, private militia, and transnational enterprises, supported by international organisations. In this context the conventional state-centric model of peacemaking between a government and opposition parties has limited applicability. A deeper understanding is therefore needed of how the Somali conflict interacts with global processes; how violent conflict is managed in the absence of the state; and how reconciliation efforts can be grounded in the sphere of social relations and local communities.

Finally, local peace processes challenge the nature of statebuilding supported by the international community in Somalia. Since 1991, the Somali state has been rolled back and governance and security management decentralised. Local peace processes have played a role in this. The decentralisation of governance and the formation of new polities challenge international policy makers and Somalis alike to rethink the architecture of a Somali state, and to reconsider the relationship between statebuilding and peacebuilding.

The Challenges of Research and Analysis

The study presented many challenges to the researchers. For example, most of the cases studied are historic processes and in the case of Somaliland and Puntland took place over a decade ago. Some key individuals involved in the processes have since died and these events are interpreted through a historical lens informed by contemporary developments.

For analytical purposes, the study set out to develop a ‘typology’ of local peace meetings but it became clear that most meetings dealt with a range of political, social and economic issues, reflecting the holistic nature of local and traditional peace making (Boege 2006). In a society where social relations are organised along lineage lines rather than hierarchically, it can be difficult to distinguish ‘levels’ and there are often close links between ‘local’ and ‘national’ peace processes, with each impacting on the other. Local peace processes were therefore examined from two aspects: a geographic and administrative perspective (local, district, regional, or multi-regional); and a substantive one (social, politics, resources). The researchers further distinguished two types of local processes dealing with ‘social’ and ‘political’ conflicts. While recognising that all conflicts are at some level political, the intention was to distinguish those processes concerned overtly with governance and constitutional issues of power-sharing and the formation of public administrations and those, particularly in south-central Somalia, concerned with civic disputes over land, pastoral resources, revenge killings, and law and order.
The study also intended to identify factors affecting the ‘success’ and ‘failure’ of processes but although general principles and approaches can be extracted from the case studies, identifying matrices of ‘success’ was more problematic. For example, the many variables involved (such as timing, resources, quality of mediation, and external influences) make it difficult to pinpoint reasons for success and failure. In some processes, the outcomes did not necessarily reflect the initial objectives. And, critically, ‘peace’ is a relative concept. The view of internationally sponsored processes that peace is restored when there a democratic government holding a monopoly over security does not necessarily coincide with local imperatives to restore social relations (Mac Ginty 2008). The boundaries between conflict and peace are often blurred and what is considered a successful process between two parties can impact negatively on a third. Indeed, some peace processes are clearly exercises in creating alliances, for the gain of some and at the expense of others. The very nature of ‘peace’ therefore reflects prevailing power relations. Even when harmonious relations have been restored between two communities, politically vulnerable groups can continue to experience violence. Equally, the collapse of a peace process can still have positive outcomes. For example, the 1999 intra-Hawiyte conference held in Belet Wein did not achieve a lasting political settlement, but it did improve inter-regional trade and local organisational capacities.

Cross-cultural translation is a further challenge. The language of Western peace and conflict studies used to describe traditional Somali approaches to peacemaking does not adequately capture the Somali worldview. Not all indigenous activities are traditional and a characteristic of traditional approaches is that they are contextually embedded, unlike modern approaches that aim at universal applicability. Therefore, drawing out general characteristics of traditional approaches to conflict resolution can be, as Boege (2006) has argued, contrary to the very spirit of traditional approaches. This is a potentially huge area of research in itself that cannot be addressed fully here. This study’s contribution is to produce a glossary of Somali terms for reconciliation, peacemaking, and conflict resolution (see Annex 1), which, together with the case studies, illustrates the elaborate concepts of peace and the sophisticated nature of peacemaking in Somali society.

A Note on ‘tradition’

Concepts of ‘tradition’ and ‘custom’ and ‘indigenous’ are contested and caution is required in using them to describe local peacemaking practices and processes. The ‘traditional’ institutions and practices vary considerably within Somali society (Gundel 2006) and, like any other society they change. The office of ‘elder’, for example, has gone through significant adaptation during the course of the war. As the case studies illustrate, local peacemaking can involve innovation and is often most effective when combining traditional and ‘modern’ practices and technologies, by, for example, utilising the skills of educated professionals or using satellite phones to facilitate communication.

The case studies underline that it is important not to romanticise traditional practices as something inherently good. Many Somalis view tradition as a conservative dynamic that enforces conformity and authority structures and can conflict with internationally accepted norms of human rights and gender equity. Some traditional actors are considered corrupt and to have brought the moral authority of their institutions into disrepute. Naming a process ‘traditional’ can also lend it unwarranted legitimacy. Furthermore, while the track record of local peace processes is better than that of international ones, traditional approaches have failed to prevent or end violent conflict in many areas. The case studies illustrate the importance of context in understanding where and when processes do and do not work. For the purpose of this study, ‘traditional’ and ‘customary’ are used interchangeably and denote that a practice or a norm has a long local heritage while ‘indigenous’ refers to local Somali-inspired and -managed activities and processes.

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9 The National Reconciliation Congress in Mogadishu in July 2007 is an example. Many Somali elders were involved in the Congress, which ostensibly aimed to promote reconciliation. But because it was organised by the Transitional Federal Government and funded by foreign donors, it was perceived by many Somalis as a rally to reinforce the authority of the TFG rather than a reconciliation conference.
Introduction

The Search for Peace

For over two decades, Somalis and the international community have struggled to find ways to manage, contain, and ultimately resolve the political crisis in the Somali region. This has involved two distinct and often contrary approaches to conflict resolution and statebuilding, often distinguished simplistically as ‘top-down’ internationally driven processes, and ‘bottom-up’ or ‘grassroots’ Somali-led processes. While both are concerned with governance and law and order and reconstituting a Somali state in some form, there is a dichotomy of goals, reflecting different analyses and assumptions about the nature of the Somali crisis. Internationally-sponsored peace processes are driven to some extent by the welfare needs of Somali populations, but primarily by concerns about the impact of state collapse in Somalia on international security. As the US Secretary of State Madeline Albright explained in 1993 at the launch of the second United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II), the objective of the international community was “nothing less that the restoration of an entire country as a proud, functioning and viable member of the community of nations.” (Jan 1996: 3). This has remained the primary aim of the international community’s engagement in Somalia, which has used a range of international instruments to try and contain, manage and resolve the crisis and has made statebuilding the cornerstone of peacebuilding.

Some Somali-led processes are also concerned with statebuilding, and are not isolated from international dynamics. But their primary concern is with societal relations and establishing internal political order and security. In contrast to international peace processes, advocates of the so-called ‘bottom-up’ approach argue that establishing inter-community cooperation and internal political order and security is a prerequisite for statebuilding.

Neither the top down nor bottom up approaches have succeeded in restoring the Somali state and a functional government. By analysing and by comparing and contrasting international and Somali-led peace processes this study seeks to understand why.
The Context of Internationally Sponsored Peace Processes

For over two decades international diplomatic, military and development interventions have failed to resolve the political crisis in Somalia and to deliver security and a functional national government that has broad local acceptance. In 2007, when the research for this study began, the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) appeared likely to join this list of failed administrations, having been responsible for generating some of the worst violence in Somalia for over a decade. The peace mapping study assesses the reasons for the consistent failures of international diplomacy in the Somali region.

Although the overthrow of the government of Mohamed Siyad Barre in 1991 appeared sudden, the collapse of the Somali state did not happen overnight. As Brons (2001) has pointed out, in failing to contain violence and provide security for its citizens, the Somali state under Barre had already ‘failed’ before it ‘collapsed’. There is no single causal explanation for state collapse in Somalia but contributing factors include: the legacies of European colonialism followed by Cold War geo-politics; a schismatic kinship system; contradictions between a centralised state and a pastoral culture; a predatory government; and the cumulative impact of decades of armed conflict. Some analysts locate the beginning of Somalia’s violent disintegration in the 1977-78 Ogaden war with Ethiopia and its aftermath.

In the aftermath of the war, Barre used increasingly repressive measures to retain power, thus undermining a sense of nationalism and generating popular grievances. In a context of economic decline, political, military and business leaders who were excluded from the patronage networks of the narrow clan-based regime moved outside the state and its formal economy. Some turned to their own clan constituencies to organise rebellions. The Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) formed in 1978 and the Somali National Movement (SNM) formed in 1981 launched separate insurgencies from Ethiopia in Somalia’s central and northwest regions. The violent power struggle was projected along clan lines and the fragmentation of patronage networks laid the basis for the violent warlord politics that followed the overthrow of the regime in January 1991.

At this time in the 1980s the Cold War was waning and international diplomatic energy was consumed by the Iranian Revolution, the Lebanese war, and the Soviet war in Aghanistan. Consequently, little diplomatic effort was expended on containing the escalating conflict in Somalia. The introduction of IMF liberalisation policies in the 1980s eroded state patronage networks and weakened state capacity. When the Cold War ended the international community disengaged, the regime’s authority dissipated, and the state moved from failure to collapse.

Once the Barre regime was overthrown, the clan-based forces that had fought it failed to agree on a new government. The factions in Mogadishu and the south fractured, resulting in a destructive civil war in the capital and a humanitarian catastrophe in the inter-riverine areas. But with international attention consumed by tumultuous events in Eastern Europe and the 1991 Gulf War, the initial response of the world’s powers to events in Somalia was one of indifference. The apparent reluctance of foreign governments to intervene in these early years was, in retrospect, later recognised as a “missed opportunity” that contributed to the intractability of the conflict (Sahnoun 1994).

The longevity of Somalia’s state collapse is unique. But, in the early 1990s, civil wars, especially in Africa, appeared to be part of an emerging post-Cold War international world order. The doctrines and instruments designed during the Cold War to deal with international peace and security proved wanting in dealing
with an ‘internal war’ characterised by fragmented and predatory authorities. When the UN eventually did intervene in 1992, the response was ill-judged.

**The Goals of International Engagement**

The primary goal of international engagement in Somalia since 1991 has been to re-establish a government that can address both the internal and external consequences of state collapse. The internal aspect concerns the ordering of society within the boundaries of the state. The external dimension relates to the need for Somalis to have a voice in international affairs, which has been lacking for two decades and the perceived threat that the lack of government poses to international and regional security through, *inter alia*, piracy, jihadism, international migration, or disease.

**Patterns of International Engagement**

Since 1991, there have been numerous international diplomatic interventions to end the civil war, to contain and resolve the political crisis in Somalia, and to re-establish a state. The different forms and instruments of engagement used reflect both the evolving Somali context and the interests of external parties (see volume II for a more detailed history). They include the imposition of an arms embargo in January 1992; humanitarian and development assistance; mediation between *de facto* political leaders; peacekeeping and peace enforcement by the UN and by the African Union; military surveillance; and, most recently, military intervention by a neighbouring state. A range of international organisations and governments have been involved in mediation at different times including: the UN, AU, IGAD, Arab League, US, European Community, Ethiopia, Egypt, Kenya, Yemen, and Saudi Arabia. Foreign diplomatic initiatives have swung between regional states, the UN and the EC. Each has brought their own, often competing, interests - humanitarian need, human security, statebuilding, to the so-called ‘global war on terror’ - that shape the nature of diplomatic responses and the policy framework.

In 1991, with the entire diplomatic community evacuated from Somalia and international attention focussed on the first Gulf War, the first diplomatic initiatives in Somalia fell to regional governments. In June and July, the government of Djibouti hosted the leaders of six armed factions to talks - the SSDF, the United Somali Congress (USC), the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM), the Somali-African Muki Organisation (SAMO), the Somali National Union (SNU) and the Somali Democratic Movement (SDM). But the Djibouti I and Djibouti II conferences failed to end the increasingly violent conflict between General Mohamed Farah Aideed and Ali Mahdi Mohamed for the leadership of the USC. It took another year of intense conflict, the lives of some 250,000 people (Hansch et al., 1994), and growing concern at the cross-border consequences of the war before the international community re-engaged diplomatically in a meaningful way.

In 1992, twelve months after the government of Siyad Barre had been ousted, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) imposed an arms embargo on Somalia. A UN mediated ceasefire between Ali Mahdi and Aideed followed, signalling international re-engagement in Somalia. From then until 1995, Somalia was the object of intense diplomatic engagement and the first military and humanitarian intervention in the post-Cold war era - UNOSOM. From a neglected disaster 12 months earlier, Somalia had become a testing ground for new instruments to manage international security threats in what US President Bush had proclaimed a ‘new world order’. UNOSOM was unprecedented in its scale, cost and mandate of peace enforcement (authorised under Chapter VII of the UN Charter) but ended in ignominy, failing to end the conflict or establish a functional government for Somalia.

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10 The SNM declined to attend.
The UNOSOM experience had a profound impact on the way in which the international community subsequently responded to other complex emergencies, in particular the failure to act to prevent the 1994 Rwandan genocide. In Somalia itself, foreign powers became reluctant to engage politically in Somali affairs for half a decade. In place of UNOSOM, the Secretary General established the United Nations Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS) in April 1995, which maintained a low level of diplomatic engagement with Somali leaders, civic organizations and regional states. The diplomatic leadership passed to the neighbouring states of Kenya, Ethiopia and Djibouti, supported by the UN and Western donor countries, and in particular, the European Union (EU), which became the single most powerful donor in Somalia.

Chapter VII of the UN Charter gives regional organisations the primary responsibility to mediate conflicts of member states. As Western governments disengaged from Africa after the Cold War, these regional bodies were delegated increased responsibilities\(^1\). In 1996, the mandate of the renamed Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD)\(^2\) in East Africa was revised to include conflict resolution, giving it formal responsibility to promote peace and security in Somali affairs. But IGAD lacked the capacity to promote reconciliation and, in practice, regional states continued to intervene at will. Their engagement has been driven as much by their own security and economic interests as by a concern to end Somalia’s political turmoil and divisions between these neighbours have become an increasing hindrance to reconciliation in Somalia (Healy 2008).

The Somali-inhabited territories of the Horn of Africa are of strategic importance for regional governments. As a result of the colonial division of the Somali territories, Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti all have significant Somali populations within their boundaries\(^3\). Since the 1960s, Somali governments efforts to claim the Ogaden region of Ethiopia and the Northern Frontier District of Kenya led to several wars, the most disastrous being the 1977-78\(^4\) war over the Ogaden. Since 1992, Ethiopia has regularly intervened militarily in Somalia either to weaken militant Islamist groups with designs on the Ogaden or to strengthen the hand of its favoured allies among the Somali factions\(^5\). Egypt and its Arab allies have viewed Somalia as a counterweight to Ethiopian regional hegemony and its control of the Nile waters. This rivalry between regional states has been played out in their support for different Somali clients and rival mediation efforts, exemplified by the Sodere and Cairo talks in 1996 and 1997.

In 1996 Ethiopia, under the umbrella of IGAD, hosted a meeting of Somali factions in the town of Sodere in Ethiopia. The meeting, which lasted several months, led to the formation of a National Salvation Council (NSC) and an agreement to hold further meetings in Bosasso. Leading figures in the talks included Colonel Abdillahi Yusuf and Ali Mahdi, but they were boycotted by Hussein Aideed’s *salballar* (“broad based”) government and the government of Somaliland. Within a twelve months Egypt hosted another meeting in Cairo to try and forge an agreement between Hussein Aideed’s government and the NSC. This time the conference was boycotted by Abdullahi Yusuf and therefore also failed to produce a comprehensive agreement. This led to the creation of two regional administrations – the Benadir administration in Mogadishu with a chair that revolved between Hussein Aideed and Ali Mahdi, and Puntland Federal State of Somalia, incorporating the North East Regions, to which Abdullahi Yusuf was elected president in August 1998.

The Sodere and Cairo talks underlined the influence of competing regional and international interests in Somalia. Some have argued that Ethiopia’s main interest in Sodere was to forge an alliance against Hussein

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1. Also apparent in the lead role in Liberia and Sierra Leone of ECOMOG (Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group)
2. The Inter-governmental Agency on Drought and Development (IGADD) was renamed IGAD. The member states are Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda and Eritrea (from 1993 until it suspended its membership in 2007).
3. Somalia’s flag depicting a five-pointed star represents the colonial division of the Somali nation into French Djibouti, British Somaliland, Italian Somaliland, the Ogaden (Ethiopia), and the North Frontier District (Kenya).
4. Some trace contemporary animosities between Somalis and Ethiopia as far back as 16th century campaigns of Ahmed Gran (Ahmad ibn Ibrihim al-Ghazi), who brought three-quarters of Abyssinia under the power of the Islamic Kingdom of Adal.
Aideed’s government, which was accused of collaborating with Ogadeni insurgents and Islamic terrorists, and to legitimise Ethiopian military engagement in Somalia (see Volume III). On the other hand, the formation of the Benadir Administration, which won the backing Egypt and Libya, revealed an interest among allied Arab states to counter-balance Ethiopia’s influence in the region. Their engagement also highlights two different approaches to state building in Somalia, with Ethiopia favouring a federalist model and Egypt favouring a unitary and centralised state.

In 2000, there was a step change in international diplomatic efforts led by the new President of Djibouti, Ismail Omar Guelleh, who hosted the Somalia National Peace Conference in the small town of Arta. The ‘Arta process’, as it is commonly known, achieved an important breakthrough. By adopting the so-called ‘4.5 formula’ for proportional representation of Somali clans in government, it produced a power-sharing agreement to establish a Transitional National Government (TNG), with a Transitional Charter for government, and a significant degree of national legitimacy. The TNG became the first Somali authority since the fall of Siyad Barre to fill Somalia’s seat at the UN and at regional bodies, but, critically, it failed to win the backing of Ethiopia or the confidence of the donor governments. Opposed by an alliance of faction leaders backed by Ethiopia, it did not produce a government of national unity and public support waned amid accusations of corruption.

The ‘4.5 formula’

The ‘4.5 formula’ allots an equal number of places to each of the four major Somali clan-families (Rahanweyn, Dir, Hawiye and Darod) with a half place allotted to minorities and women. It was first adopted at the 1996 Sodere conference where broad agreement was reached on relative clan size and territorial rights (Mukhtar 2007). The idea of dividing state power among the clan-families dates back several decades (Abu Hamza 2000) and the concept for the ‘4.5 formula’ itself appears to have originated at the Nationalities Institute in Addis from discussions on ethnic federalism in the 1980s (Interpeace 2009).

The clan-based formula for apportioning representation continues to generate controversy. Those who oppose its use maintain that the clan is a form of social - not political - organisation and that there is no objective means to differentiate between majority and minority viewpoints, for which the only available measures are military power, wealth, and the geographical coverage of the clan. Furthermore, clan political interests are narrow and conflict with those of a democratic nation state. Others favour using the clan as a basis for political power-sharing during the transition from prolonged conflict to a more democratic political system. They argue that this is the only form of social association to which all Somalis belong, and it can provide checks and balances in the political system. However, as discussed below, its use does not provide a panacea.

The dramatic change in the international political context following the attacks on mainland USA in 2001 had an immediate impact on Somalia, boosting existing regional security concerns, and again changed the nature of international mediation. In the climate of heightened international insecurity, Western governments became exercised by the phenomenon of ‘collapsed’ or ‘failed’ states as a potential source of transnational terrorism. Somalia was identified as a potential haven for Al Qaeda associates (Rice 2003). Western governments responded by freezing the accounts of Somali financial institutions thought to have links with Al Qaeda, including Somalia’s largest money transfer company Al Barakat. A regional system of military surveillance was established and covert US operations were carried out in Somalia to capture individuals accused of links with Al Qaeda. For the first time since the early 1990s, Western diplomatic efforts and finances were mobilised behinds a new IGAD initiative to reconcile the TNG and its Ethiopian-backed adversaries. In late 2004, after two years of protracted deliberations in Kenya, the Transitional Federal
Government (TFG) of Somalia was formed, with Abdullahi Yusuf as president. From its beginning, the TFG was riven by internal divisions and struggled to establish a government in Somalia. Its very existence was threatened by the rise of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU)\(^\text{16}\) that rapidly took control of large parts of south-central Somalia in 2006.

In December 2006, Arab League failed to establish an agreement between the TFG and the ICU. With the ICU (supported militarily by Eritrea) threatening a jihad against Ethiopia, Ethiopia, with US support, intervened militarily and installed the TFG in Mogadishu. In early 2007, a small contingent of African Union peacekeepers (AMISOM) was deployed to Mogadishu to protect the Transitional Federal Institutions (TFIs) in advance of a proposed UN peacekeeping operation. But further efforts by the TFG and Ethiopia to impose their authority through force provoked violent resistance from a mixture of Mogadishu-based clan militia and the remnants of the militant wing of the ICU, including al Shabaab ("the youth" in Arabic). During 2007 fighting between the TFG and the 'resistance' (Muqawaama) caused the deaths of several thousand civilians and the displacement of up to 700,000 from Mogadishu. During his four years in power, Abdulahi Yusuf’s government failed to implement any of the transitional tasks set out in the Transitional Federal Charter and, by inviting Ethiopia to intervene militarily, it lost any semblance of legitimacy.

The Ethiopian military presence in Mogadishu starkly demonstrated the problem of regional governments intervening in Somalia. It served to intensify the conflict by providing the militant Islamists who spearheaded the resistance with a common platform. Amidst a worsening humanitarian crisis and with no prospect of Abdullahi Yusuf’s government becoming established under Ethiopian protection, the diplomatic initiative swung back to the UN. By late 2008, mediation efforts had enabled an Ethiopian exit and a complete overhaul of the TFG - and the Joint Security Agreement between the TFG and opposition forces in November 2008 provided the first serious frame of reference for security negotiations in Somalia since the IGAD-led process had begun in 2002. In January 2009, the parliament was expanded to incorporate opposition and Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed (former head of the ICU) was elected the new president. Although elements of the opposition (ARS-Eritrea and Al Shabaab) rejected the election, the Somali public welcomed the withdrawal of Ethiopian troops and appeared cautiously supportive of the peace agreement and a negotiated approach to restore security.

Case Studies of Internationally Sponsored National Peace Processes

The Centre for Research and Development researched three internationally-sponsored national peace processes since 1991. The study, published as volume II of this series, provides an overview of international mediation in Somalia since 1991 and examines in detail the 1993 Addis Ababa Conference on National Reconciliation; the Somalia National Peace Conference held in Arta, Djibouti in 2000; and the Somalia National Reconciliation Conference held in Eldoret and Mbagathi in Kenya from 2002 to 2004. The study analyses the organisation of the peace conferences, the substance of the meetings, vexed issues of representation, the challenges of mediation, and the influences of foreign governments. It highlights constraints to international mediation and suggests ways of making it more effective.

The UN-brokered Conference on National Reconciliation, Addis Ababa 1993

On 27 March 1993, fifteen of the warring Somali parties gathered in Addis Ababa under the auspices of the UN and signed an agreement on disarmament and security; rehabilitation and reconstruction; the restoration of property and settlement of disputes; and the establishment of a two-year transitional authority. The last committed the fifteen factions to a national reconciliation process and a procedure for establishing a Transitional National Council, to be selected by district councils formed through a grassroots dialogue.

\(^{16}\) Also known as the Council of Somali Islamic Courts (CSIC)
The Conference on National Reconciliation was the first significant internationally mediated peace conference, staged nearly two years after the government of Barre was overthrown, and its impact has, arguably, been the most far-reaching of the national reconciliation conferences. The stakes were huge for Somalia and for future peacekeeping operations around the world. Scheduled as a precursor to a humanitarian pledging conference, and in advance of a UN security resolution to expand the UNOSOM mission in Somalia, the Addis Ababa Agreement formed the centerpiece of the political strategy for reconciliation and statebuilding for the UN operation. Had the Agreement succeeded, Somalis would have been spared two decades warfare and state collapse, and international support for the emerging doctrine of multilateral peace enforcement would have been strengthened. But the agreement was not implemented as a violent dispute emerged between the UN and faction leaders, notably the powerful faction leader General Mohamed Farah Aideed, who wanted greater control over the selection of district councils. This conflict derailed the UN mission. US forces were withdrawn after taking heavy casualties. They were followed by other foreign forces and the operation was scaled down and eventually withdrew in 1995.

The failure of the Agreement and the UNOSOM mission provoked a backlash against UN peace enforcement that contributed directly to international inaction in the Rwandan genocide of 1994 and took years to rectify. The failure of the Addis Ababa Agreement and of the US-led UNOSOM mission meant that Somalia became a pariah for the UN and some foreign governments for several years, during which time the EC effectively took over from the UN in leading international engagement in Somalia. The Addis Ababa Agreement is also significant for highlighting important lessons about national reconciliation processes in Somalia. Some aspects of the Accord reflect intractable and unavoidable problems of reconciliation in Somalia: others constitute mistakes that have been avoided in subsequent Somali peace processes, still others (such as the agenda and representation) continue to be debated in current peace processes. One crucial and fateful decision had concerned the question of who had the right to represent Somalis at the negotiating table. By opting to recognize 15 clan-based factions at the peace talks, the UN tipped the scales towards militia leaders and weakened civic and traditional authorities. This affected the political trajectory of the conflict and subsequent peace talks.

The Djibouti-hosted ‘Arta process’, 2000

The Somali Peace and Reconciliation Conference held in the town of Arta in Djibouti in 2000 was the initiative of the newly elected president of Djibouti, Ismael Omar Ghelle. The ‘Arta process’, as it has become known, achieved an important political breakthrough in producing a power-sharing agreement to establish a Transitional National Government (TNG), that enjoyed a significant degree of acceptance in the country and reoccupied Somalia’s seat at the UN and other international fora. This was due, in part, to a novel peace process that involved a comprehensive process of preparatory consultation with clan elders, civic leaders and business people, beyond the usual faction leaders. Although unarmed groups were accommodated in earlier peace processes, such as Addis Ababa in 1993, the Arta process provided the first opportunity for them to play a significant role as decision makers. Its location in Djibouti gave the process a Somali flavour, and it demonstrated that it was possible to engage and sustain a high level of public interest in peace talks hosted outside Somalia through effective use of the media and cultural drama. Its dedicated satellite TV channel provided a remarkable level of outreach through daily broadcasts, even into rural areas and the diaspora. The adoption of the ‘4.5 formula’ for proportional representation of Somali clans in government provided a mechanism for addressing the problem of representation.

In Somalia, however, the TNG did not follow through on the reconciliation efforts begun in Arta. The conference took place in the context of emerging administrations in Somaliland and Puntland and the

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17 A significant contribution was the Menu of Options study (1996)
‘liberation’ of occupied territory in Bay and Bakool regions. The revival of a central government reversed the trend towards decentralised governance, threatening the power-bases of powerful political leaders. The peace process had engaged opposition figures from Somaliland and Puntland and the absence of many of the key armed faction leaders made the new government vulnerable to ‘spoilers’. Shortly after its formation, the TNG was opposed by an alliance of faction and political leaders, known as the Somali Restoration and Reconciliation Council (SRRC). The SRRC was backed by Ethiopia, concerned about the role and influence of the militant group Al-Itihad Al-Islamiya within the TNG, which had made irredentist claims on Somali-inhabited land in Ethiopia. The TNG also failed to win the confidence of donor governments. Ultimately, it became associated with Hawiye clans of Mogadishu and the business class and failed to extend its control beyond a small part of the capital. Public support for it waned amid accusations of corruption and clannism.

**The IGAD-led ‘Mbagathi process’ from 2002-04**

The IGAD-led reconciliation initiative hosted by Kenya in Eldoret and Mbagathi from 2002-04 represented the first sustained effort by regional states to broker peace in Somalia. Its management by the frontline states of Djibouti, Ethiopia and Kenya aimed to mediate the negative impact of conflicting regional agendas. The design of the process included a flexible timeframe (similar to the Arta peace talks in 2000); scope for comprehensive discussions on substantive core conflict issues rather than an exclusive focus on power-sharing; and pragmatic recognition of existing and *de facto* entities; and the involvement of both armed and civic actors.

The mediators of the talks, however, made a crucial decision early on to legitimise faction leaders as the *de facto* decision-making body, thus disenfranchising other delegates. Representation was consequently a continuing source of contention. The talks did not involve the Islamic courts or the business community from Mogadishu, contributing to disconnection from evolving dynamics in Somalia. In contrast to Arta, there was little investment in media coverage of the conference so that people in Somalia did not feel engaged. Despite good intentions, little attention was devoted to substantive discussion on core conflict issues and instead the talks regressed to the familiar zero-sum, ‘winner takes all’ approach to the Somali crisis.

The talks culminated in the endorsement of a Transitional Federal Charter and the establishment of the TFG, based on the ‘4.5 formula’ that had been employed at the Arta talks, with a five year mandate to implement transitional tasks. An important innovation from Arta was the inclusion of these transitional tasks in the Charter, which involved furthering national reconciliation, establishing security, and drafting a constitution. Pressure from a group of faction and political leaders had reversed the model of a unitary state agreed at the Arta talks in favour of the federated state espoused by the SRRC. This was backed by Ethiopia, who, from the outset, played an active role in steering the Mbagathi talks towards the formation of a government led by its allies and willing to address its state security concerns. Through the Mbagathi talks, the international community invested millions of dollars in the longest and most expensive reconciliation effort to date. But, although security was a key concern of frontline states and of Somalis, the TFG still emerged without any coherent security and stabilisation strategy for Somalia, reinforcing the perception that the international agenda for Somalia remains primarily one of ‘containment’.
Analysis and Lessons from Internationally Sponsored Peace Processes

Constraints to International Mediation

The studies of internationally sponsored peace processes highlight a number of critical constraints to international mediation in Somalia.

The changing nature of conflict: One of the challenges to mediation is the changing nature of the Somali conflict, which makes it difficult for diplomats to track and respond to developments. Between 1988 and 1991, the war changed from a political conflict between the government and one main armed opposition – the SNM – to a much more complex and fluid conflict, with armed groups mobilized on clan lines and competing over resources rather than the state power alone. The massive destruction of social and economic infrastructure, asset stripping, and forced displacement resulted in mass starvation among unarmed and vulnerable Somali communities. The political process was characterized by state fragmentation, the mushrooming of factions and the localization of political authority. There was little incentive for faction leaders and warlords profiting from plunder and extortion to sue for peace or uphold peace agreements. The intervention of UNOSOM, at best, served to freeze the conflict and shore up the power of the factions, so that for much of the period from 1995-2000, the country was in a state of “no war, no peace” (Hellander 1995).

Over time, there was a slow and uneven process of political stabilization and consolidation leading to the emergence of several competing political blocks in Somaliland, Puntland, Bay and Bakool regions, and Benadir (Mogadishu). This was driven by a demand for greater regulation and security and was supported by an economic revival, with inter-clan and inter-regional patterns of cooperation facilitating trade and commerce. This period also witnessed the emergence of new civic and politico-religious movements, which were reflected in the Arta peace process and the creation of the TNG in 2000.

In the early 1990s, Ethiopian concerns with the presence of Al Itihad in Somalia had led them to taken military action inside Somalia to destroy it in 1996-97. These security concerns were exacerbated after 9/11. The advent of the so-called ‘global war on terror’ pushed Islamic politics to the fore and escalated the involvement of international and regional powers in a violent struggle with Islamist and neo-nationalist forces. Military force became one of the tools of choice of foreign powers to manage the crisis in Somalia as counter-terrorism operations and statebuilding coalesced into a single strategy (Quaranto 2008). The ‘global war on terror’ created a permissible environment for overt external military intervention, which became a major driver of conflict in 2006 and placed severe constraints on options for international mediation.

Mediation in a collapsed state: State collapse creates some unusual problems for mediators. The absence of government removes a key actor with whom mediators normally engage. The existence of established and rooted regional polities in Somaliland and Puntland presents fundamental challenges in approaching Somalia as a unitary state within a single diplomatic framework. The forced displacement of populations, the occupation of territory, and the destruction of the capital Mogadishu as a cosmopolitan city, means there is no urban centre that is considered a ‘neutral’ venue to host a national government.

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18 The US had also bombed Khartoum in response to the 1998 US embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania.
An agenda for peace: Intrinsically linked to the changing nature of the conflict is the question of what issues a peace processes can and should address. The agenda for the 1993 Addis conference was the subject of considerable debate, with some Somali groups pressing for it to include accountability for war crimes, occupation of land, and compensation for lost lives and stolen property, while others sought a narrower agenda focusing on power-sharing and revival of the state. The UN mediators were primarily interested in ensuring that the talks would produce a blueprint for the huge task of building a transitional government, along with a charter, a civil service, and a road map for elections within two years.

Subsequent reconciliation conferences have faced a similar dichotomy, only ever partially addressed at Arta. The culture of impunity for violations of the Cessation of Hostilities during the IGAD-led Mbagathi process echoed wider concerns amongst the Somali public and international observers over war crimes allegedly committed by parties to the talks (and subsequently senior members of the TFG) and the lack of a transitional justice component in the process.

After two decades of impunity for crimes against humanity and the ‘recycling’ at different conferences of many of the leaders responsible for them, the peace accords between these leaders carry little credibility with the Somali public. Equally, their presence weakens the legitimacy of governments in which they play prominent roles. Support for those governments by the international community is seen as demonstrating a lack of seriousness of support for reconciliation and good governance. The absence of a transitional justice component in internationally sponsored initiatives, such as the Mbagathi talks, contrasts with Somali-led processes in which reparation is fundamental.

Reconciliation and power-sharing: Although several of the national conferences are called ‘reconciliation’ conferences, their primary focus has been on securing power-sharing agreements, rather than reconciliation. The 1993 Addis Ababa conference was a hastily organised ‘quick fix’ meeting, lasting only a few days, in which the emphasis was on establishing a power-sharing deal that would enable the UN to establish a UN mission. In this short conference, there was no place for reconciliation. In the Arta talks of 2000, the formal agenda was again concerned with power-sharing, although space was created for reconciliation as an informal parallel activity. The Mbagathi process aimed to address core conflict issues before moving to power-sharing arrangements, but this was quickly undermined by prioritising the interests of the Leaders Committee.

The nature of the state: At the heart of the Somali crisis is an unresolved issue of the nature of a future Somali state. This is apparent in an ever-changing framework for negotiation. The 1993 Addis Ababa conference introduced the idea of regional autonomy, the need for broad political consultation through district councils, and decentralised governance. This reflected both the impact of the civil war and offered an alternative to the highly centralised state experienced for the previous twenty years. In the early 1990s, this approach failed because its implementation threatened the growing power of the warlords. The trend towards decentralised governance evolved during the 1990s, leading to the emergence of autonomous and semi-autonomous polities like Somaliland and Puntland, and other potential regional entities in the inter-riverine regions of Bay and Bakool, and in Benadir. These developments briefly enjoyed some external support in the late 1990s from Ethiopia and some donor countries that sought to encourage the so-called ‘building-block’ approach through ‘peace dividends’ of aid. The Arta process, backed by Djibouti, went against this trend by reviving the notion of a unitary state. The failure of the TNG contributed to the declaration in favour of a federal structure for government early in the Mbagathi process. The on-going debates over the constitution of a future Somali state – be it unitary or federal - are grounded in a combination of internal Somali clan agendas, external foreign security agendas and, increasingly, religious ideological agendas.19

19 Ethiopia has been consistent in promoting the federal model similar to its own, not least because it dilutes the threat Ethiopia perceives from Somali nationalism.
**Representation:** Neither the TNG nor the TFG administrations achieved popular acceptance in Somalia. This is in part due to the seemingly intractable problem of ‘representation’, both in formal peace talks and in government. Since 1991, factions have multiplied at every peace conference. Four armed movements (SNM, USC, SSDF and SPM) claimed victory over Siyad Barre in 1991, six participated in the first Djibouti conference in 1991, and fifteen in the Addis talks in 1993. Twenty-six factions attended the 1996 Sodere talks in Ethiopia, while over thirty faction leaders attended the Safari Park Consultation in Nairobi in January 2004. The multiplication of factions has contributed to a persistent dilemma of how to determine legitimate and authoritative representation in internationally sponsored processes.

At the same time, because representation has tended to be based on a mixture of clan, military and financial power, externally sponsored peace conferences have generally served to strengthen the prestige of ‘warlords’ and political elites. Indeed, with the possible exception of Arta, the same elite are recycled at each conference, providing little opportunity for alternative leaders to emerge. Many of these delegates have in fact lacked strong constituencies and had only tenuous control or influence over the territories that they claimed.

The privileging of these armed actors is deeply unpopular amongst Somalis and at the Mbagathi talks, for example, a group of respected academics, professionals and traditional leaders headed by the former Prime Minister Abdirizak Haji Hussein (1964-7) appealed to the international community to “cease the legitimisation of illegitimate entities [faction leaders]” (ICG 2004). However, efforts to exclude them have met with resistance. The Arta process engaged unarmed civic actors in a more substantial way than previous national peace process, but because it did not engage the armed faction leaders or the Puntland government, it faced considerable armed opposition and was unable to establish itself inside Somalia.

In recognition of this, the Mbagathi process was designed to engage both armed and unarmed actors as well as official representation by Puntland. The direct involvement of the frontline states ensured the engagement of two broad factional alliances (supported respectively by Ethiopia and Djibouti) and space was to be created for the full participation of unarmed and civic actors through a commitment by armed leaders to a cessation of hostilities. However, the weakness of the agreement and failure to establish a mechanism to monitor violations (rendering it defunct only days after it had been signed) coupled with the legitimisation of a leaders’ committee as the de facto highest decision making body undermined the position of unarmed actors and skewed representation in favour of the dominant factional alliance.

The ‘4.5 formula’, which apportions representation by clan-family, was an attempt to settle the issue of representation and was utilised at both the Arta and Mbagathi talks but provided no panacea. One effect was to shift the competition to a lower level of clan segmentation and many clans at Arta had to resort to an arbitration committee to adjudicate the sub-clan selection of parliamentarians. The Mbagathi talks demonstrated how faction and political leaders can influence the selection of individuals with whom they have an alliance, even if they do not represent the views of their clan. Similarly, the make-up of Abdulahi Yusuf’s government also demonstrated that proportional representation is more likely to produce a ‘coalition’ government than a government of ‘national unity’.

Traditional, religious and business leaders were well represented at Arta, but they were largely excluded from the Mbagathi talks, contributing to the disjunction between the peace talks and unfolding dynamics inside Somalia. Engaging traditional authorities in the selection of representatives can imbue a peace process with a level of popular legitimacy, but the selection of traditional leaders can pose problems. Traditional elders...
are often poorly placed to handle complex issues of government, and can be co-opted by factions. At Arta, certain clans created new titles for elders to represent clans previously represented by another elder\textsuperscript{21}. In the worst cases, competition for places at peace talks can stimulate violent struggles within lineages.

Finally, women’s formal participation in politics has increased over time through allocation of reserved seats at foreign-sponsored peace conferences and in parliaments. However, there is still only minimal recognition of the influence and abilities of women by either political or traditional leaders, whether at national or Somali-led processes. The Arta conference set a precedent by establishing a quota of seats for women in the national parliament. This system was retained at Mbagathi, but the quota was reduced from 25% of seats to 12%, and even this was not respected in the selection of MPs.

**Peacebuilding and statebuilding:** In the past two decades, Somalia has twice caught the attention of foreign governments concerned with the threat that ‘fragile’ and ‘failing states’ are thought to pose to international security. In the early 1990s, the humanitarian crisis in Somalia provoked an unprecedented military-backed humanitarian intervention aimed at ending famine and restoring a state. A decade later, concerns focussed on the potential threat that this ‘ungoverned space’ posed as a haven or incubator of transnational terrorism and criminality. The absence of a functional state has sustained the international imperative to build one because the international threat - and social control, law and order, and economic growth - can only be envisaged in the presence of a state. Accordingly, the end goal of international mediation and peacebuilding in Somalia has always been the re-establishment of a sovereign government, based on an assumption that its capacity to govern and its capacity to establish security can be built through coordinated bilateral and multilateral assistance programmes.

This approach has proven to be problematic. First, statebuilding and peacebuilding are not synonymous but rather are potentially contradictory processes – the former requiring the consolidation of governmental authority, the latter involving its moderation through compromise and consensus. Accordingly, statebuilding has proven to be a highly conflictive process and, as the case of Somaliland illustrates, peace is not just achieved simply by declaring a state. Second, the statebuilding imperative means that achieving nominal agreement on power-sharing, the revival of government institutions, and the establishment of security and law enforcement services are identified as the real measures of success, rather than reconciliation, good governance and welfare provision. Third, and perhaps most fundamentally, although the revival of the state is considered crucial by international diplomats, it is perceived as a threat by many Somalis who have experienced the state as an instrument of oppression and predation by those in control. This is also reflected, for example, in the demonstrated willingness of civic and business leaders to finance local and inter-regional peace processes but not national processes\textsuperscript{22}, which some have actively opposed when this is perceived as challenging their interests.

The case studies of internationally sponsored processes each highlight the fact that finding ways to reduce the threat that a revived central government poses to some constituencies is a vital task. In theory, an effective transitional charter or constitution that delimits the authority of the state would help to address this concern. However, Somali political figures have shown a consistent disregard for charters and constitutions and a tendency to maximise state authority, reinforced by the emphasis of international donors on the establishment of a government rather than the transitional nature of the entity emerging from the peace process. Thus, for example, public confidence in the newly formed TNG was rapidly undermined by its failure to sustain the spirit and momentum of the modest progress made at Arta in social reconciliation. This was compounded by questionable financial management of the donor support received by the TNG.

\textsuperscript{21} This issue also occurs in Somali-led process, such as the 1998 Garowe conference (see Volume IV).

\textsuperscript{22} In the late stages of the Mbagathi talks in mid-2004, the business sector made a contribution of $25,000 to the talks, a token sum given the wealth of some Somali businesses.
In contrast, the TFG received substantial donor support, but failed to undertake any of the transitional tasks through which it might earn legitimacy.

Finally, while the revival of the state is considered essential by foreign governments, the international capacity and political and financial commitment to actually build one has always been inadequate.

**Setting precedents:** The importance of adequate preparation and the impact of uninformed decisions on the outcome of talks were starkly apparent in the participation of faction leaders in the 1993 Addis Ababa, which contributed to the proliferation of factions in subsequent talks. In the Mbagathi process, the declaration of intent to form a federal government was taken after only two weeks by a small group of faction and political leaders, and subsequently became a key source of contention during the two-years of talks. Another example was the legitimisation by mediators of faction and political leaders by the endorsement of a ‘Leaders Committee’ with effective veto power over the conference, marginalising other delegates and undermining the intended framework for the process.

**Domestic spoilers:** Mediation is based on a diagnosis that war and its underlying causes can be addressed through dialogue. This takes no direct account of the war economy and incentives to perpetuate the conflict. As long as powerful actors continue to benefit from statelessness, an unregulated and untaxed war economy, the trade in small arms, and the occupation of land and real estate, the Somali crisis will not be ‘ripe for resolution’.

While it is clear that individuals and groups who perceive a peace process to be against their interests and needs will seek to undermine it, an important distinction can be made between legitimate political opposition and others who perceive a process to be against their interests and needs. The latter ‘situational spoilers’ may be open to influence to reshape their perceptions of their interests. The Arta process included key business figures, who were unrepresented at the Mbagathi talks. An important parallel effort was made to redress this through a series of dialogues with business leaders when the Mbagathi process was revived in mid-2004. The business leaders acknowledged some of the ways in which they had exploited and benefited from the prolonged state collapse, specifically through unregulated trade, while also challenging the mediators and faction leaders on their commitment to establish a broad-based government that could foster peace. Somali-led processes make a conspicuous effort to engage influential stakeholders, notably including the business community, precisely in order to accommodate their interests and ensure their buy-in for the outcome, a clear lesson for internationally sponsored initiatives.

**Security and stabilisation:** Issues of security and public safety remain the pre-eminent concern of most Somali communities and of foreign governments. Yet in national peace processes, security and stabilisation have been barely addressed as serious strategic issues. Instead, they are typically included through technical additions to political agreements between the main parties, with little concern for the critical issue of consensus-building and transitional security management. In each of the cases studied, the mediators failed to address the critical issue of transitional security managements, meaning that the armed parties did not engage in processes to negotiate and develop interim joint security responsibilities. The poorly drafted Cessation of Hostilities agreement in the Mbagathi process lacked implementation mechanisms, verification and monitoring arrangements, or supervisory institutions, and was unsustainable, while violations of the agreement undermined ongoing political negotiations.

The dispersal of military capacities in Somalia indicates that it is essential to ensure that there is a negotiated approach to security management and a phased approach to the establishment of security forces. Based on their past experience, there is widespread resistance by Somalis to a state monopoly on the use of force. Attempts to impose this model are likely to generate opposition. Nevertheless, this state-centric
model has been the only one used by international powers at national-level peace talks. Significantly, this is in stark contrast with the Somali-led processes, which employ consensus-based approaches allowing for joint security management. This strategic approach, based on collective responsibility, offers a more realistic transitional security management system for Somalis. The UN-sponsored Joint Security Agreement in November 2008 was the first serious attempt in successive national peace processes to address the critical question of security sector governance during the transitional phase through a negotiated ‘joint security’ approach.

External spoilers, proxy wars: Even when there is willingness for dialogue, conflict can be driven by forces over which Somalis have no influence. Antagonism between Ethiopia and Eritrea, Ethiopia’s overt military intervention in late 2006-08 and Eritrea’s military support for armed opposition groups, and US counter-terrorism strategies have all become drivers of conflict and obstacles to peace in Somalia. Without finding a way to navigate these external drivers, it will not be feasible to end Somalia’s internal conflict in any sustainable way.

Inconsistent support for mediation: Effective diplomacy requires a long term and sustained commitment. This has frequently been lacking in the Somali context and its effectiveness has been undermined by incoherent and often contradictory policies towards Somalia. For example, the Arta process and the TNG were opposed by Ethiopia, in part because they engaged opposition figures from its allies Somaliland and Puntland and were supported by its strategic rival, Egypt.

The IGAD-led Mbagathi process represented the first sustained effort by regional states to broker peace in Somalia, by reconciling the TNG (supported by Djibouti) and the opposition SRRC (backed by Ethiopia). However, hopes that Kenya would moderate the conflicting regional agendas proved unfounded and the state security agendas of individual frontline states continued to be key drivers in the process. The initiative – and President Yusuf’s TFG - garnered an unprecedented level of financial coordination amongst western donors, but suffered from fundamental design flaws and a lack of legitimacy, exploited by Eritrea’s support for armed opposition to the TFG. Contributing factors were the low-level of regional and international political engagement, in contrast with the Sudan peace talks also being hosted by Kenya from 2002 or the sustained South African commitment in Burundi. The absence of unified support for mediation efforts and competing foreign agendas can be easily exploited by those parties with no interest in a settlement.

Externally situated and funded: Peace processes that are hosted and paid for by Somalis inside Somalia have proven more effective than externally located and sponsored processes. However, security constraints and the lack of a neutral venue means there is no obvious place to hold a national peace conference in Somalia.

The Arta process has been the most successful to date in navigating the challenges of externally located peace talks through a venue in Djibouti and in a cultural setting familiar to Somalis. The location facilitated an informal parallel process of ‘side meetings’ at the houses of leading elders or politicians to discuss and resolve issues and advise delegates. The Arta process also demonstrated that, even when talks are externally situated, a high level of public interest can be sustained through effective use of media. The daily satellite TV broadcasts enabled members of the public to pressure their representatives, albeit long distance. Both the ‘side meetings’ and extensive public outreach are key features of Somali-led processes that have frequently been neglected in internationally led peace talks.

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23 As noted above, the National Reconciliation Congress in Mogadishu in July 2007 was considered by many Somalis to be a rally to reinforce the authority of the TFG rather than a reconciliation conference.
But none of the national peace processes have engaged in effective public outreach to ratify their outcomes. This is in direct contrast with local processes, where public engagement and wide dissemination are recognised as critical to the legitimacy and sustainability of peace accords, often entailing enormous effort on the part of local communities.

**Time pressures:** The 1993 Addis Ababa conference was a short-lived ‘quick-fix’ meeting. The combination of time pressure and external political pressure gave individuals an opportunity to renge on their agreement on the grounds that it was “forced” on them. This is a familiar dilemma for mediators – if delegates are not pressured, the talks might never reach a conclusion, yet pushing the agenda risks participants reneging. The Mbagathi process was the longest to date, taking place over two years, although little of this was devoted to substantive discussion. The process required a series of pushes\(^24\) before any substantial issues were resolved. Somali-led peace processes, in contrast, typically take the time needed to reach a resolution, and benefit from community pressure to conclude an agreement. An externally driven, located and funded process lacks such pressures.

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\(^{24}\) One pressure was to form a government’s before the TNG mandate expired in August 2003; another was sustaining donor funds to cover the costs of a large number of delegates hosted in Kenya.
## Summary of constraints to international mediation and possible responses

The table below summarises some of the constraints to international mediation in the Somali crisis and some of the possible responses to them.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Constraints</th>
<th>Potential Responses</th>
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| **Internal Actors**  | • Enhance contextual understanding  
                          • Build constituency for the process  
                          • Reshape the interests of spoilers  
                          • Incorporate positive aspects of clan politics, such as consensus decision-making, into strategies  
                          • Incorporate culturally appropriate and qualitative selection criteria  
                          • Adopt a state reconstruction model that is non-threatening  
                          • Enhance confidence-building measures  
                          • Effective communication strategy |
|                      | • Sanctions mechanisms  
                          • Region-wide security guarantees by neighbouring states  
                          • Conflicts between regional states need to be resolved  
                          • Somali and regional antagonists need to negotiate or reconcile |
|                      | • Early engagement of experienced credible Somali advisors  
                          • Improved coherence and flexibility  
                          • Transparency  
                          • Targeted international input with professional capacity  
                          • Compatibility of operational procedures and process guidelines  
                          • Sustained commitment  
                          • Strategic understanding and expertise  
                          • Improved coherence  
                          • Sustained commitment  
                          • Professional capacities  
                          • Coordination and commitment  
                          • Transparency |
|                      | • Better analysis, constantly updated re-changing dynamics and shifting alliances  
                          • More flexible approach  
                          • Better understanding of representation  
                          • Better communication strategy |
| **External Actors**   | • Sanctions mechanisms  
                          • Region-wide security guarantees by neighbouring states  
                          • Conflicts between regional states need to be resolved  
                          • Somali and regional antagonists need to negotiate or reconcile |
|                      | • Early engagement of experienced credible Somali advisors  
                          • Improved coherence and flexibility  
                          • Transparency  
                          • Targeted international input with professional capacity  
                          • Compatibility of operational procedures and process guidelines  
                          • Sustained commitment  
                          • Strategic understanding and expertise  
                          • Improved coherence  
                          • Sustained commitment  
                          • Professional capacities  
                          • Coordination and commitment  
                          • Transparency |
|                      | • Better analysis, constantly updated re-changing dynamics and shifting alliances  
                          • More flexible approach  
                          • Better understanding of representation  
                          • Better communication strategy |
| **Process**           | • Incompetence of mediation efforts due to conflicts of interest, corruption, lack of understanding of context and culture, lack of coordination, distance from Somalia  
                          • Lack of focussed attention and expertise to address security arrangements (treated as a less important technical matter rather than a key strategic issue)  
                          • Lack of timely and calibrated support to transitional authorities  
                          • Early engagement of experienced credible Somali advisors  
                          • Improved coherence and flexibility  
                          • Transparency  
                          • Targeted international input with professional capacity  
                          • Compatibility of operational procedures and process guidelines  
                          • Sustained commitment  
                          • Strategic understanding and expertise  
                          • Improved coherence  
                          • Sustained commitment  
                          • Professional capacities  
                          • Coordination and commitment  
                          • Transparency |
|                      | • Better analysis, constantly updated re-changing dynamics and shifting alliances  
                          • More flexible approach  
                          • Better understanding of representation  
                          • Better communication strategy |
| **Analysis**          | • Failure of analysis  
                          • Early engagement of experienced credible Somali advisors  
                          • Improved coherence and flexibility  
                          • Transparency  
                          • Targeted international input with professional capacity  
                          • Compatibility of operational procedures and process guidelines  
                          • Sustained commitment  
                          • Strategic understanding and expertise  
                          • Improved coherence  
                          • Sustained commitment  
                          • Professional capacities  
                          • Coordination and commitment  
                          • Transparency |
|                      | • Better analysis, constantly updated re-changing dynamics and shifting alliances  
                          • More flexible approach  
                          • Better understanding of representation  
                          • Better communication strategy |
Improving the Management of Internationally-led Peace Processes in Somalia

The nature, format and content of internationally sponsored Somali peace processes have changed since 1991 even though the objective has remained largely the same. The shortcomings of ‘quick fix’ approaches like the 1993 Addis Ababa conference are largely recognised. The Ethiopian-facilitated talks in Sodere took several months. The Arta conference in 2000 was preceded by several months of consultations in Somalia. The IGAD-led Mbagathi process took place over two years and included some level of deliberations on substantive conflict issues. In 2008, the UN-led Djibouti process involved a series of scheduled meetings over several months producing a series of agreements, including the TFG-ARS Joint Security Agreement (November 2008), which represents one of the few attempts to address the critical issue of joint security management in a transitional phase.

The experiences of international mediation in Somalia, to date, highlight numerous issues to be considered in the design and management of a peace process. One important lesson is that the design of a peace process is not solely a technical exercise but will have a political impact, potentially producing ‘winners’ and ‘losers’. It is therefore critically important to give as much attention to negotiating the implementation of transitional tasks, including security arrangements, as the political agreement itself.

Improving Mediators’ Understanding of Peace and Conflict Dynamics: The fluidity of the conflict is a critical challenge faced by international mediators and requires a thorough understanding of the context. At the Addis talks in 1993, the combination of weak country knowledge - and institutional resistance in the UN to learning - made external diplomacy at the Addis Ababa talks susceptible to poor political judgements. This was exacerbated by the new phenomenon of state collapse and the unprecedented nature of the UN intervention in Somalia. At the IGAD-mediated Mbagathi talks, there was a similar resistance to input from knowledgeable international and Somali experts (including the Somali Advisory Body of eminent figures, who were to bring political and moral authority and guidance to the process). In both cases, deep knowledge of the context was frequently viewed with suspicion by the lead agencies.

Contextual understanding can challenge streamlined plans of action and can be seen by decision-makers as an impediment to action. But lack of knowledge militates against successful and well-grounded outcomes. In Somali-led processes, the credibility and moral authority of mediators is founded, at least in part, on their understanding of the issues and context. This allows them to suspend a process, if required, to accommodate changes in power dynamics.25

Structure and process: Giving attention to the structure and process is as important as establishing the goals of a peace process. Experience suggests that a fusion of traditional and contemporary negotiation techniques works best. Having a preparatory phase to agree the goals and process is critical for engaging wide public support, while building trust and confidence in the process and the mediators is a precondition for compromise and concessions. In Somali-led processes, the wider community plays an important role as observers, peer reviewers and endorsers, lending the process legitimacy. Creating opportunities for consultation is important in instilling a broader sense of ownership in a process. The media has a critical role to play in this, particularly in extending coverage inside the Somali region for talks convened externally. The use of technical committees can be important to address certain issues but an appropriate balance has to be struck between committees and plenary sessions, since consensus and legitimacy are achieved through the plenary. Experience also suggests that an effective ceasefire is a pre-requisite for political negotiations, and that to be effective, negotiations on security require a series of phases, which cannot simply be reduced to an endorsement of the desired end state.

25 For example, the Mudug-Galgadud process was suspended for nearly a year due to fluctuating power dynamics in the area in 2006. The process was sustained through this period by the communities’ demonstrated commitment in upholding the localised peace accords reached in the early stages of the process (see Volume III).
Agreeing the goals: Preparatory consultations are important for establishing agreement on the end goals of a process, and which issues can (or cannot) be addressed. For example, what should be the balance between reconciliation and state revival? Because the ‘success’ of national talks has tended to be measured in terms of whether a power-sharing deal is secured and a government formed, reconciliation, transitional security arrangements, and important issues such as transitional justice, citizenship rights, federalism, land rights, or an electoral system remain unaddressed. Experience suggests that agreement on fundamental issues, such as transitional security arrangements, is a prerequisite for a sustainable outcome. While national accords cannot resolve all issues, they can establish the institutions and the means to resolve them, such as commissions, a constitution and an electoral system.

Representation: The debate on the most effective and legitimate representation and leadership at peace talks is critical and can become an obstacle to a process. The corruption of the selection process for delegates was a notable problem during the IGAD-led Mbagathi talks. Who sets the rules for the selection or election of delegates in the absence of an elected leadership is problematic; what Menkhaus describes as the ‘founding fathers dilemma’ (see Volume II). Representation has variously been based on armed groups, clans (the ‘4.5 formula’), traditional and religious leadership, civil society, regional authorities, women, minorities, and the diaspora. Whatever criteria are used, they invariably lead to a multiplication of representatives. The factionalised nature of Somali politics would suggest that a form of hybrid representation would be appropriate, incorporating some or all of these actors. The inclusion of civic, business and political leaders is also likely to provide a more viable basis for a competent administration than armed leaders alone.

Decision-making: The system adopted for decision-making is important, whether through consensus, majority voting, or prior negotiation in side meetings. The case of Arta, for example, shows that arbitration committees can be useful in supporting decision-making processes; at Arta, its function was to resolve clan disputes over the selection of delegates and MPs26. It is notable that Somali-led processes typically involve several kinds of committees delegated to guide and provide oversight for different aspects of the peace process, a useful lesson for national level initiatives.

The role of external actors: External actors – sponsors, observers, expert advisers, conference facilitators and mediators – can clearly have a decisive influence on a process. Achieving the appropriate balance between Somali ownership and external stewardship is critical. It is important to determine the appropriate role of externals, whether that is to offer good offices, mediation, arbitration, or specific technical expertise. The international chairperson or convenors of internationally sponsored peace conferences have played a role of power broker rather than mediator. High expectations are placed on them, but they have had limited capacities and resources to work with and are often influenced by domestic agendas. Resourcing a process with effective technical support can be critical; this has been notably absent in the realm of security, but also in other areas such as constitution making or economics. While short timeframes are problematic, it is also challenging to sustain external sponsorship and prevent donor fatigue. In addition, diplomats need to manage not only Somali rivalries but also foreign rivalries that can encourage Somali leaders to go ‘forum shopping’.

Managing dissent: Any peace process is likely to generate ‘spoilers’. Some are intent on sabotaging a process. Most, however, are situational spoilers, whose opposition to a peace process or emergent government arises from the threat they perceive to their immediate interests. Awareness of their interests provides the possibility of adjusting mediation strategies to take account of their needs and may enable

26 The original intention behind the Somali Advisory Group of eminent persons at the Mbagathi talks was to provide political and moral authority for the process as well as guidance on resolution of core conflict issues. In contrast, the veto power of the ‘Leaders Committee’ marginalised other stakeholders and limited participation.
them to engage more constructively. For example, some business people in Mogadishu who had been part of the war economy subsequently backed efforts to restore law and order and security. A third group may be those who support a process but legitimately object to a particular outcome. While they have tended to be treated as spoilers, they might more appropriately be accepted as legitimate opposition. The needs of some opposition forces may be addressed through careful and coherent attention to transitional security arrangements and security governance, a key element in Somali-led processes.

**Implementation:** The implementation of internationally brokered peace accords has been extremely problematic, not least because of intrinsic faults in the design and, therefore, outcome. The comparative success of the ICU in its first few months raises the question as to why it succeeded, where transitional governments have failed. A key factor in its initial success appears to have been a combination of public support, a credible commitment to public safety and security, and military strength. The transitional administrations have made few efforts to build public support and there have been no efforts to publicly ratify the national peace accords within Somalia, as happens in Somali-led processes through means such as ‘peace caravans’ (see below). Neither have oversight committees been created to oversee the implementation of an accord.

While national talks have produced authorities with a ‘transitional’ and finite mandate and a set of transitional tasks to implement, neither the administration nor the international community has treated their authority as transitional or finite.

Although the fiscal realities of Somalia dictate there should be a minimalist government, the need to accommodate all stakeholders has led to the creation of overblown (and financially unsustainable) governments. This then re-establishes a reliance on external resources to sustain the state, militating against the government seeking alliances and public support.

Finally, the critical questions of security governance and integration of security forces during the transitional phase have never been coherently addressed. This contrasts starkly with local processes, which elaborate measures to de-escalate violence, build confidence through interim security arrangements, and create a sustainable basis for community-based integration of militia. Following the UN-sponsored mediation between the TFG and opposition in 2008, the Joint Security Agreement (November 2008) provided the first serious framework for security arrangements and negotiations since the Mbagathi process had begun six years earlier. It provided a minimum framework for addressing short-term ceasefire, medium-term transitional security management, and the longer-term ‘final status of forces’ elements in a sequenced and logical manner. It established a mechanism to plan and supervise the development of a ceasefire process and, for the first time, addressed the critical question of security governance during the transitional phase.

In all of these respects, the Agreement reflects closely the approach and mechanisms used in Somali-led peace processes.

**Summary of Findings of Internationally Sponsored Peace Processes**

- Broad consultation and consensus building are an essential prerequisite for a peace process and public outreach at all levels before, during and after the processes is critical;
- Continuous monitoring of conflict dynamics is necessary to make necessary adjustments to the negotiations and representation is required. Rules and procedures need to be agreed in advance, but flexibility should be built in to be able to respond to changing dynamics;

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27 See Volume II for detailed findings.
• Overwhelming international pressure on mediators and Somali participants is likely to be vital to reach an agreement but can also contribute to pressures to fashion an accord in haste without resolution of core conflict issues or any actual reconciliation.

• Transitional statebuilding arrangements are not a substitute for reconciliation: this remains critically important in the context of Somali culture where acknowledging past wrongs and making reparations for them lies at the heart of traditional peacemaking.

• Failure to address ceasefire negotiations in a serious way leaves peace processes hostage to armed factions. Failure to address transitional security arrangements undermines commitment to the ceasefire process and prevents progress towards stabilisation (with each faction maintaining its military capacity as a guarantee against an eventual monopoly of force by the “winner”).

• An almost exclusive focus on statebuilding reflects the international preoccupation with the need to rebuild the central government, which may serve external agendas more than that of the Somali people;

• Time-frames for talks need to be based on Somali realities, not the needs of external actors;

• Sustained support by external actors is essential and a coordinated and coherent approach is necessary to prevent delegates from ‘forum shopping’;

• Representation at peace talks presents unique challenges in the absence of clear consensus over legitimate representation. This requires exhaustive attention at the outset and may require adjustment as the process evolves. Both armed and unarmed actors (and from all sectors, including traditional, religious, business and civic) are required for an effective and viable outcome. The ‘4.5 formula’ may be necessary but is not sufficient to ensure inclusivity.

• Externally located Somali peace negotiations reduce the ability of representatives to vet positions and proposals with their constituencies, creating serious legitimacy problems (particularly given the issues of representation). Somali political culture demands extensive vetting and consultation in order for agreements to be considered legitimate and binding; similarly, effective public outreach is critical to promote public ratification of the outcomes.

• Vaguely-worded accords invite disputes over interpretation and contribute to political crises (or worse, violent conflict);

• Blueprints for processes culminating in the selection of national leaders cannot be viewed as technical documents. Because they shape political outcomes and help determine “who rules” they are unavoidably zero-sum in nature. Interpretation of these accords are thus extremely sensitive and must be handled as such;

• A sustained emphasis on the transitional nature of the entity – rather than the establishment of a government – can help to promote legitimacy, further reconciliation, and help generate public confidence in governance structures;

• Reconciliation and statebuilding accords which rely on processes of local selection of representatives must address the question of residency and rights lest implementation trigger armed conflict;

• Failure to give due attention to transitional justice perpetuates a culture of impunity and undermines efforts towards good governance;

• Interested external actors are invariably tempted to engineer preferred outcomes of Somali peace processes but external manipulation of reconciliation efforts fuel local suspicions and violent reactions, and are generally counter-productive.
The Context of Somali-led Peace Processes

The failure of international diplomacy in Somalia and recognition by some analysts that power and authority have been radically decentralised has generated interest in indigenous, non-state approaches to peacemaking. While international diplomacy has focussed on re-establishing a sovereign government, there have been numerous efforts by Somalis themselves to end violent conflicts and re-establish local security and systems of governance.

In many parts of south-central Somalia post-UNOSOM, different forms of local governance emerged from locally organised reconciliation meetings that reduced levels of violence and fostered a degree of peaceful co-existence between communities. These included remnants of UNOSOM-supported district administrations; local and regional administrations created by powerful faction leaders, which levied taxes and provided some security but no services; community-based structures formed through consultative processes by clan elders, religious leaders and other local stakeholders; and clan-based Islamic courts that filled a critical security vacuum and enforced law and order with some popular support. Over time business entrepreneurs who had benefited from UNOSOM's huge cash injection and employment opportunities emerged to challenge the warlords and protect their business interests and, in the absence of the government, to fill some gaps in delivery of basic services. There have been many other locally negotiated peace agreements. Some proved short-lived but others have been sustained. One such example was the June 1993 Mudug peace agreement between General Aideed and the SSDF, which established a ceasefire and opened trade routes.

The most stable polities to emerge have been the breakaway Republic of Somaliland in the northwest and Puntland Regional State of Somalia in the northeast, where a high degree of consent has been established between the public and the authorities through consultative peacebuilding processes. In south-central Somalia, efforts to establish administrations have had varying degrees of success (for example, the local councils in Bay and Bakool, the Benadir administration in Mogadishu, and nascent structures in central regions). The ICU, while short-lived, demonstrated the potential efficacy of a locally-led political process, emerging, significantly, from community demands for more effective security. As a response to state collapse and attempts to establish systems of governance that are appropriate to local needs, these polities present challenges to international statebuilding strategies.

The relative success of local processes in containing violence and establishing innovative political and administrative arrangements that can provide some law and order and deliver some public services suggests that an alternative ‘grassroots’ or ‘bottom up’ approach may be more effective in resolving Somalia’s crisis, albeit in a more gradual way. International support for this approach has taken different forms, such as support to indigenous locally driven peace processes; the formation of local administrations; the strengthening of civic welfare, media and human rights organisations; and developmental projects that encourage cooperative relations.

Foreign governments and multi-lateral organisations like the UN, the European Commission (EC), the Inter-Governmental Agency on Development (IGAD) and the African Union (AU) face bureaucratic impediments to engage directly in ‘bottom up’ processes. But at times, under the rubric of peacebuilding, they have pursued both national level and ‘bottom-up’ approaches. In 1993, UNOSOM’s simultaneously engaged with political power-brokers in internationally sponsored peace conferences, while also supporting grassroots constituencies through the formation of district councils. In the late 1990s, Ethiopia and other
foreign governments lent support to what became known as the ‘building block approach’ to state revival in Somalia, which envisaged a federation of regional authorities along the lines of Puntland (established in 1998). In 2000, the Arta process adopted an approach that engaged both civic actors and political leaders.

These local Somali-led processes demonstrate both a demand for security and law and order and a capacity among Somali communities, in the absence of a state, to control and manage conflict, through means such as creation of buffer zones; joint security committees to monitor and make rapid response to violations; and local control over public display of weapons. However, with the exceptions of Somaliland and Puntland, they have not yet led to regional or inter-regional polities that could form the basis of a Somali state and there continues to be a disconnection between these Somali-led processes and international initiatives.

**Case Studies of Somali-led Peace Processes**

For two decades international diplomatic, aid and military strategies in Somalia have been based on an understanding of this collapsed state as an ‘ungoverned space’; a problem to be rectified by restoring a government and state. However, far from being ungoverned, within the Somali region there are a variety of indigenous and modern forms of state governance and globalised forms of organisation (such as religious orders, multinational commercial enterprises, and Somali NGOs) that bring varying degrees of security and welfare. These provide an alternative to the statebuilding templates that have proven inadequate to date.

The Somali-led peace processes and peace conferences examined in these case studies have involved a variety of parties and interests. They have variously been concerned with ending violence, restoring social and economic relations, the return of private property, resource sharing, livelihoods and trade, the creation of security services and institutions of law and order, and governance. The studies highlight some of the drivers of conflict, such as land ownership and resource competition. They describe Somalis drawing on indigenous social institutions, cultural and religious practices, a combination of customary law (xeer) and Islamic law (sharia) and modern practices of conflict resolution to manage conflict and improve security. The studies examine the organisation and structuring of peace meetings, and how issues of representation, mediation and decision-making are handled, and they provide insights into governance processes and structures, leadership, and cultural norms of negotiation and decision-making. Together, they challenge the view of the state as the sole source of security, law and order in society. As such, these local processes are quite different from national peace processes that are concerned with negotiating over control of state apparatus, security and the economy.

The local peace processes researched for this study can appear inconsequential against the realities of regional and international politics and the massive problems of disarmament. Often dismissed as irrelevant by faction leaders whose authority they threaten, they can also be viewed with a degree of embarrassment by educated Somalis and African diplomats as being anachronistic (Menkhaus 1999: 17). But, as the examples in this study illustrate, these Somali-led processes have a better record than international diplomacy in preventing, mitigating and reducing violence; in brokering sustainable ceasefires, organising joint security mechanisms and demobilisation; and in forging agreements on the creation of governance structures. Because they involve communities with common values and leaders with local legitimacy, and combine traditional and modern institutions and practices, these local ‘unofficial’ processes can produce immediate and tangible results.

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28 The Somali term xeer refers to a set of rules and obligations or a social contract that regulates the interaction between Somali clans and communities.
A distinction is made in the eight case studies of Somali-led peace processes between those that dealt with ‘social conflicts’ and those that addressed ‘political conflicts’. Most processes in fact dealt, to different degrees, with both. But the distinction is useful for distinguishing the particular purpose and focus of the processes, with the former mostly focussed on ‘civil’ issues and the latter concerned more with ‘constitutional’ issues of power-sharing and public order.

Although social conflicts involving disputes over natural and economic resources were common before the war, they subsequently increased in number and complexity due to the breakdown in inter-group relations, the mass displacement of people, the occupation of land and property, and the widespread availability of weapons. The imbalance in the acquisition of weapons led to better-armed clans or sub-clans dominating militarily weaker ones. In the absence of a government and a judicial system, some of these social conflicts have been successfully resolved over time - or at least ‘managed’. Through locally financed and organized processes of dialogue, a range of ‘civil’ issues, such as the return of looted property, access to grassing lands, or the opening of trade routes, have been addressed. These processes have taken place at village, district or intra-regional level but can be affected by - or affect - wider dynamics.

Other local peace processes have dealt more directly with ‘political conflicts’, relating to power-sharing and the formation and control of public administrations and strategic resources. In these processes, the focus has been on constitutional issues: that is, agreeing a framework for power-sharing, designing the institutions of governance, agreeing the limits of their powers and responsibilities, and establishing acceptable systems for maintaining security. These have generally been inter-regional processes involving a large number of actors, in which the political and economic stakes are high. Examples of these are the series of peace processes in Somaliland between 1991 and 1993 and the Garowe Community Constitutional Conference that led to the creation of Puntland. They are challenging to local mediation efforts and are more directly influenced by - and have an impact on - wider regional and international dynamics.

**South-central Somalia**

The researchers in CRD have recorded over 90 local peace processes in south-central Somalia since 1991. Very little is known about them beyond the communities concerned and the role they have played in arresting conflict, managing security, and providing law and order during the two decades that the Somali people have been without a functioning government.

The CRD study examines three processes in detail: the Idale peace process between people of the Hubeer and Yantar sub-clans of the Digil and Mirifle (Rahanweyn) clan in Bay region; the peace processes between the Jijeele and Gaalje’el clans of Hiraan region; and the peace process between the Sa’ad and Saleman clans in Galgadud and Mudug regions. The cases describe communities managing conflicts over local resources, how local violence can be fuelled by distant political and commercial contests in Mogadishu and beyond, the importance of committed and respected elders in managing conflicts, and the use of innovative approaches to end seemingly intractable conflicts. The case studies also illustrate the difficulty of separating - both practically and conceptually - social, political, local, and national conflicts. While all three peace processes were, in some respects, dealing with traditional social conflicts over resources, it is clear that they were not immune to external political influences.

The Idale study examines the attempts to resolve a violent conflict in a small agro-pastoral community that was triggered by the breach of rules regulating the use of a water catchment built by the government in the 1970s. It describes how a single act of homicide escalated into a conflict between the Hubeer and Yantaar clans that killed 106 people, displaced many more, and caused the destruction of several villages. In the early 1990s, this area had been devastated by famine when the politically marginalised and poorly armed
agro-pastoralists suffered waves of looting and occupation by better-armed nomadic clans. Since the formation of the Rahanweyn Resistance Army (RRA) in the late 1990s, weapons have become ubiquitous in the region. The availability of weapons to the population accounts in part for the elders’ inability to prevent the conflict and the high death toll that resulted. A succession of mediation efforts by traditional elders (malagyo) was required to broker a ceasefire that was backed by the TFG, traditional and religious leaders, and civil society. The case illustrates the complexity of dealing with disputed land ownership and the management of formerly public assets in south-central Somalia. It also shows how a peace process can be perceived by parties who are not directly involved as a threat to their rights. Importantly, it also underlines the role that a local government administration, however fragile, can play in enforcing and sustaining a peace agreement.

The case study of the Jijeele and Gaalje’el clans in Hiran region also concerns a conflict between two agro-pastoral clans over rural and urban territory. As in Idale, the conflict was triggered by the homicide of one person, but killed 38 people. The case study illustrates how national politics – in this case the Arta peace process – can impact on local dynamics and how decisions made remotely on behalf of a clan can trigger latent tensions and conflicts at grassroots level. An important feature of the peace process was the constructive role played by the dominant Hawadle clan in the area, whose engagement was prompted by the threat that the conflict posed to the town of Belet Wein (the region’s economic hub) and who initiated and supported the reconciliation.

CRD’s third case study examines a complex peace initiative aimed at resolving a seemingly intractable conflict in Mudug and Galgadud regions in central Somalia between the Sa’ad and Saleman (sub-clans of the Habar Gedir/Hawiye clan family). Violence between these two communities in 2004-05 killed over 300 people, caused the loss of valuable property, and, by impeding a key trade route, seriously impacted on the economy of the area and beyond. Heavy weapons and sophisticated satellite telecommunications were used in the conflict, which was fuelled by power struggles between factional and economic elites in Mogadishu. Their involvement - and that of the diaspora - was therefore required for resolution of the conflict. A memorable feature of the process was the role played by clan militia leaders in mobilising their communities for peace and pressurising their elders to reach agreement. They also supported the establishment of joint security committees to manage the ceasefire agreements, providing a valuable example of effective transitional security arrangements at community level. The case also illustrates the role that civil society organisations can play as a catalyst for a peace process and in its design and management. In this case, CRD was able to play that role because it was viewed as impartial and was able to identify staff with the necessary expertise and credibility from the lineage of the communities of the parties in conflict.

**Puntland**

In Puntland, PDRC researched two peace processes: the 1998 Garowe Community Constitutional Conference that led to the establishment of Puntland Federal State of Somalia and the Burtinle Peace Agreement that resolved a conflict between Majeerteen and Dhulbahante clans over rangelands lying across the border in Ethiopia.

The Garowe conference was clearly a ‘political’ process. The study documents the numerous meetings that took place in the northeast regions of Somalia from 1991 aimed at stabilising the area and establishing an administration and that eventually led to the formation of Puntland in 1998. The study illustrates how governance and development have become localised in Somalia and demonstrates the capacity of Somalis to manage and finance large and complex political processes. It provides insights into the way in which Somali peace conferences are organised and the constructive role that can be played by only limited international support for local processes.
The Burtinle study describes community efforts to address a recurring ‘social’ conflict over pastoral rangelands. The fact that the conflict and mediation took place in Ethiopian territory demonstrates the notional nature of international borders in this region. The study also highlights the long-term nature of some conflicts that originated in the pre-war period. It emphasises the importance of a supportive external environment in resolving local disputes and the complementary roles that traditional institutions and government can play in this. It also highlights the role played by women in the peace process and describes the interesting innovations made in customary law to achieve a settlement.

**Somaliland**

The Republic of Somaliland was declared in May 1991 when the leadership of the SNM revoked the union with Somalia and reclaimed the sovereign independence of the northern regions; a claim that is not internationally recognised. The declaration of independence and the formation of an interim government marked the end of a ten-year war by the SNM against the government of Siyad Barre. However, this did not immediately bring stability. APD’s study describes the way people in Somaliland, through a series of localised and locally-driven peace conferences, restored relations between communities who had fought each other during the war, redistributed stolen property, restored law and order, demobilised militia, and established district, municipal and national governance structures. The study identifies 39 local peace meetings that took place between 1990 and 1997, and examines three in detail: the ‘political’ Somaliland-wide conferences in Burco in 1991 and Borama in 1993, the Erigavo conference in 1993 and the series of ‘social’ peace meetings that preceded it in Sanaag region.

The Burco case study gives a historical account of the conference at which Somaliland’s independence from Somalia was reclaimed - one of the most significant consequences of the collapse of the Somali state. The conference was the culmination of a series of meetings between the northern clans, including some that took place during the war, which ended hostilities and created an environment conducive to reconciliation and social and economic recovery. The decisions made at Burco in May 1991 were pivotal for the subsequent development of Somaliland as an independent polity. The study illustrates that the declaration of intent to establish a government is insufficient to end armed conflict as people in Somaliland subsequently experienced several periods of hostilities.

The Borama and Erigavo conferences built on the agreements reached in Burco but differed from it in several respects. After two turbulent years of ineffective government, the primary aim of the Borama meeting was to establish consensus on a system of government for Somaliland. The outcome was a government based on a power-sharing agreement that fused modern and traditional governance institutions by incorporating elders into the Upper House of parliament. In contrast, the Erigavo conference was less concerned with Somaliland’s national politics and more with the reconciliation of communities in Sanaag region, the restoration of law and order, the free movement of people and trade, reciprocal access to pastoral resources, the return of properties, and the establishment of a regional administration.

The APD study highlights the critical role that elders and other social institutions played in conflict management and statebuilding in post-war Somaliland. These processes, which were locally managed and, for the most part, locally financed, are not easily replicable elsewhere in the Somali region. The circumstances in which they took place and their orientation to establish an independent polity both differed from other Somali peace processes. Nevertheless, the principles and approach underlying these processes bear similarities to those elsewhere in the Somali region and hold lessons for internationally mediated peace processes.

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29 Awdal, Waqooyi Galbeed, Togdheer, Sanaag and Sool regions
Analysis and Lessons from Somali-led Peace Processes

Somali Institutions for Conflict Management and Conflict Resolution

Anthropologists have described how, under subsistence conditions, feuding and warfare can regulate relations between groups and enable communities to adjust to demographic, ecological and environmental changes (Turton 1989) but warfare can only have this function when rules existed to regulate it. In his classic monograph on Somali pastoral society, Lewis (1961) observed that conflict was never far from the surface, as ecological pressures and demographic change generated competition over natural resources but although the probability of conflict was high, Somali society was also rich in institutions and mechanisms for managing it. Disputes over grazing land or water, while violent, typically ended in negotiation and the formation of new alliances. The long-term survival of society lay at the heart of peacemaking, achieved by restoring the balance in social relationships.

The assumption that in the post-colonial state, traditional institutions would give way to modern institutions and practices proved false. Despite the efforts of successive Somali governments to transform a ‘nation of nomads’ into a modern state by co-opting and legislating against customary practices, elders remained authoritative figures at community level and customary law and forms of dispute resolution continued to function alongside secular judicial institutions. Since 1991 during the protracted period of war and state collapse, the authority of elders has been challenged by the emergence of warlords while customary law and codes of war have been violated. At the same time, in the absence of government and in a context where power and authority have been radically decentralised, Somalis have resorted to non-state traditional institutions and customary practices to manage conflict and security and restore cooperative relationships. Clan elders have played an important role in conflict management and local governance, while customary and shari’a law have provided a moral and legal framework for dialogue, decision-making, settling grievances and the reinstitution of law and order and forms of justice.

The studies of local peace processes highlight some of the rich traditions of mediation, reconciliation, and consensus building that exist in Somali society and the rules and institutions for managing conflict and insecurity.

Elders (sing. oday; pl. odayal): In Somali pastoralist society, day-to-day governance is traditionally exercised by lineage elders, who are crucial actors in conflict management as negotiators, facilitators or mediators. In this society without institutionalised leaders, the category of elder is fluid: any adult male can be considered an elder with an equal right to speak in a council. They are representatives rather than executive leaders who are chosen by their clans for their particular attributes, such as piety, knowledge of history, customary law, their powers of oratory, negotiating skills and sometimes wealth. The expectation placed on elders is alluded to in the Somali proverb raganimo dantaa moogibay ku jirtaa, meaning, “Nobility can be achieved by neglecting your own business to focus on the interests of all” (see volume V). Their moral authority and influence derives from being a legitimate representative of their particular lineage group, whose interests they represent and to whom they are accountable. This moral authority is well described by one researcher:

The moral authority of the elder is important. If people listen to them and show them respect, people believe God will be pleased. They are afraid of his curse when he breaks his prayer beads. People believe it is better to do what he says rather than have him break his beads30.

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30 Peacemapping workshop, January 2008
Colonial governments sought to incorporate the indigenous system of governance within the colonial administration and gave the honorific title of ‘chief’ (sing. aqil; pl. aqilo) to heads of a diya-paying group, a practice continued by Somali governments. The diya-paying groups comprise a number of families united by genealogy and marriage ties who are obliged to protect one another and to pay and receive blood compensation (diya) for murder and injuries. As the head of the diya-paying group, an aqil is involved in resolving conflicts amongst his group and with others. Some lineages have more senior titular heads, often an inherited position and known variously as Suldaan (among the Isaaq), Garaad, Islaan or Boqor (among the Darod), Ugaas (among the Hawiye), Malaq (among the Rahanweyn). Traditionally their authority is based on respect rather than executive power and their role is to facilitate and approve agreements rather than negotiate them.

Traditionally, the role of religious leaders (Sheikh or waddad) was one of pastoral care rather than political leadership, although there were notable exceptions such as the 19th century religious leader Sayyid Mohammed Abdulle Hassan. Nowadays they may also play a leadership role in the clan and broader community. In the case of Idale, for example, four influential religious leaders interceded to break the deadlock in the talks, convincing their respective clan delegates to accept the decision of the mediating committee, even though for one party it meant potentially giving up their stake in the village (see volume III).

Businessmen can also play important leadership roles in clan affairs and are often considered elders.

**Assemblies of elders (sing. shir; pl. shirka):** In response to particular needs, elders gather in council (shir) to deliberate on matters affecting the clan. In the absence of government, these have become important instruments of local governance. Their composition can vary depending on the problem being addressed and meetings can last days or months. These are relatively public consultative forums in which all (male) participants, in theory, have the right to speak and in which agreements reached through consensus are strongly binding.

**Council of elders (Guurti, Isimo):** This is the highest form of clan council comprising titled and non-titled clan leaders selected for their knowledge and wisdom. The SNM convened a guurti during their insurgency against the Barre regime to mobilise public support. After the war, it was expanded and incorporated into government as the Upper House of the Somaliland parliament. Among the Majeerteen, a similar council of elders exists, known as isim, but this was not incorporated into the Puntland parliament in order to safeguard its independence.

**Customary law (xeer Soomaali):** Historically, Somali pastoral society was a stateless society without hierarchical administrative offices - but it was not without governance or rules. Law and order was, and is today, maintained through a mixture of customary law (xeer), Islamic law (shari’a), traditional values (caado), and a code of social conduct (dhaqan). Xeer embodies a set of orally transmitted conventions, values and practices that govern the everyday life of the community. This includes reciprocal rights and obligations between kin and clans covering domestic matters, social welfare, political relations, property rights, management of environmental resources, and rules of war, which are negotiated between lineages (tol) by councils of elders (xeer-beeegt) and evolve constantly. Somali customary law is influenced by Islamic law (shari’a), and rules covering diya-payment, marriage practices, and management of property resources are common among all Somali communities. Unlike shari’a, xeer is not universalistic but is specific to relations between and within clans. Furthermore, different xeer exist for the dominant livelihoods systems: agricultural

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31 Adopted from the Arabic meaning ‘knowledgeable’, and implying a man of knowledge
32 Arabic for ‘blood’; mag in Somali
cust
m
i
(\textit{xeer beereed}); pastoral or nomadic customary law (\textit{xeer xooleed}); agro-pastoral customary law (\textit{xeer xoolo-beereed}). If \textit{xeer} is violated during violent conflict (see box below), restitution will be exacted.

In Somali peace processes, customary law can provide a moral and legal framework guiding decision-making and settling grievances, and a peace negotiation can involve the renewal and renegotiation of \textit{xeer}. Local variations in customary law in pastoral and agricultural communities can, however, be problematic, particularly when the traditional code appropriate for the agricultural community has a negative impact on the needs of the pastoral community or vice versa.

\textbf{Rules of war (\textit{xeerka biri-ma-geydada}):} Historically a sub-set of customary law has existed to regulate warfare, in which women, children, peace-makers, religious leaders, the elderly, guests, enemy captives, and the sick were considered \textit{biri-ma-geydo} - to be ‘spared from the spear’ (ICRC/SRCS 1997). Certain weapons and violent practices were prohibited, the looting of domestic economic assets that sustained women and children was forbidden, and public assets like wells were not to be damaged. In communities with common values, these codes of war were sustained through a sense of honour, social sanctions, agreed forms of compensation, and a fear of divine retribution against those who violated them.

\textbf{Killing of biri-ma-geydo}

A particularly devastating feature of the Idale conflict was that vulnerable members of the community, who are normally protected (\textit{biri-ma-geydo}) under traditional customary law, were not spared. These include the elderly, women, children, in-laws, the milking cows or goats that provide for the children, and the burden camel that transports women and children in times of drought or war. In the peace accord to conclude the Mudug-Galgadud reconciliation process, significant \textit{diya} was to be paid for the earlier killing of elders on a peace mission, in order to re-instate the norms associated with \textit{biri-ma-geydo} (The Search for Peace volume III).

\textbf{Reconciliation, restitution and compensation:} Anthropologists have described how in segmentary societies, like Somali pastoral society, the principle aim of conflict management and peacemaking would traditionally have been to restore social harmony in order to ensure community survival (Boege 2006). Since peacemaking was geared towards re-establishing social relations, restitution and restorative justice - rather than retribution or punishments - are the basis for reconciliation (\textit{nabadayn}) and a peace agreement based on compensation or restitution, rather than retribution, is more likely to be sustainable in Somali society. This can involve restoring honour so that two groups can cohabit, agreeing reciprocal access to rangelands to enable people to pursue common livelihoods, or compensating a group for losses incurred during war. The most common form of restitution in the case of homicide is the payment of \textit{diya} (blood compensation) by the aggressor to the aggrieved party. Payment is traditionally made in the form of livestock and is paid collectively by the \textit{diya}-paying group.

In addition to blood compensation (\textit{diya}) there are other forms of restitution: \textit{sabeen} (apology in kind), \textit{rafasho} (showing regret and remorse), payment of \textit{duug} (burial expenses), and \textit{karfan} (cost of the coffin). Another traditional form of restitution is the offer of women in marriage (\textit{godobti}) (see volume IV). When women from the aggressor party in the conflict marry into the aggrieved party, it establishes new bonds of kinship and the prodigy of the union are considered compensation for slain kin. The future orientation of peacemaking does not preclude dealing with the past. In fact, the restoration of harmonious relationships is built on a common understanding of what went wrong in the past. The time needed to negotiate that consensus accounts for the length of some Somali peace processes. Furthermore, if the end goal of peacemaking is to restore and sustain social relationships, a peace agreement need not be a final binding contract but can remain open to renegotiation. However, a delay in the payment of \textit{diya} is taken as demonstrating a lack of respect for the
offended party and is a common factor in the recurrence of conflicts. In order to mitigate this risk, a number of recent local peace accords have incorporated a timeframe for completion of diya payments.\textsuperscript{33}

**Ritual and language**: Poetry, religion, and ritual all have a role in a peace process, helping to facilitate or to seal and sanctify an agreement. In a society where skills of oratory are highly respected, speeches and verbal agreements can carry more weight than written documents.\textsuperscript{34} In the dialogue-based problem-solving forum of a peace meeting, skilled orators can dramatically affect emotions and outcomes. Poetry in particular is a powerful medium in Somali culture that is used to appeal to the emotions and intellect and can transform the atmosphere of a meeting. Social sanctions, such as shaming or the curse of an elder, can be used to pressure recalcitrant parties. Poets and religious leaders therefore often have an important role in peace meetings. Poets draw on history and precedent to get across their points, while the Sheikh seeks inspiration from the Quran.

Somali is an oral culture so there is a particular importance in the language and rhetoric. People know the power of language and twist it to their needs. They take care of the language. Not everyone can talk. They need to be well prepared. Behind language are Somali values, and religion is part of the language. CRD researcher

**Consensus**: Consensus decision-making is a key principle of Somali peacemaking. As the parties in conflict have the power to reject any settlement that they are not happy with, only decisions reached by consensus carry real authority.

**A public process**: Peace processes in Somali society may involve direct negotiations or third party mediation but in either case, they are public processes to which the whole community contributes with food, finance or accommodation. The principle is that as everyone is collectively responsible for the conflict, everyone also has to take responsibility for its solution.

**Mediation**: Most peace processes involve some form of mediation. This may take the form of a joint committee of the parties in conflict, or a third party. The third party may be motivated to intervene to protect their interests or may be invited in. Certain clans, such as the Ashraf in southern Somalia, who are respected as a religious community, are often called upon as mediators.

**Characteristics of Somali-led Processes**

From the eight peace processes examined in this study, it is possible to draw out some common characteristics of Somali-led peace process using a simple analytical framework that considers context (including external influences); objectives (including substantive conflict issues); process (organisation and staging); participation (stakeholders and their roles); economics (financing and impact); changes (the outputs and outcomes or transformations).

**Local Peace Processes in Context**

The prevailing political, economic and social environment is a crucially important variable that can set the agenda and tone for a peace process and influences the outcome. The scale and nature of the conflict, the interests of local communities and the wider community in the country and overseas can all determine the effectiveness of a peace process. The authority of traditional leaders and their ability to broker peace is also influenced by the interests of their own constituency, the causes of the conflict, the relative strengths

\textsuperscript{33} Examples include the Mudug-Galgalud and Burtinle peace accords, see volumes III and IV respectively

\textsuperscript{34} A common orthography for the Somali language was adopted for the first time in 1974.
of the warring parties, levels of militarization and violence, and their relationship with political actors. A significant imbalance of power between the protagonists can also produce an impasse in reconciliation, if one group believes it is able to subdue the opposing group rather than engage in conflict resolution. In such circumstances, a group may impose unreasonable conditions, provoke confrontations, or otherwise act as ‘spoilers’ in the process. Historical relations between groups, property claims and rights, and the capacities of local institutions can also influence the effectiveness of a process. Furthermore, through the diaspora, trade, aid and regional politics, Somalis are exposed to global influences.

In the northwest, the war effectively ended once the Somali Army was defeated (see volume V). This provided a relatively stable setting for dialogue in the Burco conference in May 1991 where Somaliland’s secession was declared. The SNM took little retribution against former adversaries and did not try to occupy the territories of non-Isaaq clans with whom it had a policy of reconciliation, cohabitation and accommodation. As the largest military organisation in the northwest, it could sue for peace from a position of strength. A decade of insurgency, the destruction in Somaliland, and declaration of a government in Mogadishu all placed pressure on the SNM leadership to declare independence. For the Dhulbahante and the Warsengeli, who were under attack in Mogadishu and Kismayo at that time, Somaliland was a safer option and they therefore supported the SNM declaration, although with the formation of Puntland in 1998 the loyalties of these two clans are now divided.

In northeast Somalia, in contrast, the nature of the Garowe Constitutional Community Conference and formation of Puntland Federal State of Somalia in 1998 was influenced by: the absence of conflict; the high degree of clan homogeneity; the dominance of a single political organisation (the SSDF); the perceived threat from other Somali regions; and the failure of another round of internationally-mediated talks in Ethiopia (see volume IV). One of the reasons why the people of the northeast did not opt for independence was their political claim to other areas of Somalia such as Kismayo. In another case, conflict between the TFG and the Islamic courts in Mogadishu in 2007 gave added urgency for Puntland to settle the Burtinle conflict (volume IV).

The study of south-central Somalia concludes that the variation in the number and frequency of peace initiatives in different regions not only reflected the heterogeneity of the clans and sub-clans and the relative value of local resources, but also the impact of national politics. Nearly 40% of the 90 local peace processes recorded by the study occurred in Lower and Middle Jubbama regions, an area of clan heterogeneity and endowed with rich agricultural and pastoral potential as well as Kismayo, the second most important southern city after Mogadishu due to its seaport. In contrast, as few as 13% of the peace initiatives took place in the central regions of Galgadud and South Mudug, which are more homogeneous in terms of clans and with fewer natural resources to stimulate competition or attract incoming clans. In both Galgadud and South Mudug, national politicians and business figures have had a direct influence on the conflicts and peace processes. The presence of the TFG in early 2006, for example, brought greater weight to bear on resolving the Sa’ad-Saleman conflict.

Generally, local peace processes have been less sustainable and wide reaching in south-central regions than in the north and several possible reasons have been proposed for this. It has been argued that traditional institutions had been disrupted more by colonial rule, co-option by government, urbanisation and modernisation, in the south than in the north (Reno 2003). Furthermore, pre-war urban drift, followed by forced displacement and migration, left communities and elders residing in areas that were outside their recognised home territories. During the war, the authority of elders has been undermined by the ubiquity of weapons and the dominance of the military leaders who became gatekeepers for international diplomats and agencies. Another, more convincing, reason is the nature of the war in the south in which large areas of southern Somalia were occupied by clans who had no historical claims to urban real estate and agricultural
lands. Resident elders had to negotiate from positions of weakness and with occupying militia rather than their peers (Menkhaus 1999:13). The occupying militias were interested in extraction through plunder and extortion rather than reconciliation, while their elders had neither the authority nor interest to negotiate peaceful relations with the groups whose lands they were occupying and could potentially lose through negotiation.

Local processes are not isolated from external influences. Somalis have strong global linkages through the diaspora, aid and trade. The deteriorating situation in Mogadishu in 1991 influenced the decision in the north to declare Somaliland independence. The 1993 Addis Ababa conference, which took place in March, a month before the Borama meeting opened in April, reinforced the desire of people in Somaliland to conclude a successful conference of their own. It also convinced Mohamed Ibrahim Egal to participate in the Borama conference, at which he was selected President of Somaliland. The accords reached at Burco and Borama meant that there was a supportive political environment for, and pressure on, the Erigavo conference to succeed.

In the northeast, the successive failures of the internationally led reconciliation processes played a decisive role in political developments. The idea of establishing an administration for the northeast regions had been under consideration since 1991. It was reinforced by agreement on a “bottom-up” approach at the 1993 Addis Ababa conference, and by the concept of the “building block” approach for reconstruction of the Somali state articulated in the “Menu of Options” under discussion from 1995\(^35\). The successful conclusion of the Garowe conference was also supported by technical assistance from donor countries and political support from Ethiopia.

In south-central Somalia, the Arta peace process in 2000 had a direct influence on the Jijeele and Gaalja’al conflict, in particular because the allocation of seats in parliament government is linked to control of territory.

Finally, war weariness cannot be discounted as a factor encouraging parties to make peace. In Mudug-Galgadud, after almost a year and half of violence, the warring communities had exhausted their resources and commitment to fight over territory they had previously shared peacefully. Both the sponsors and mobilisers of the conflict and the militia fighters had reached a stage where they were open to options to end the conflict.

**Objectives and Substance of Local Peace Processes**

The local peace processes examined in this study dealt with a range of issues. Some, like the Garowe Community Constitutional Conference, had clear political objectives to create a public inter-regional administration, while others, such as the Idale process were more focused on ‘social’ issues of reconciliation, resource sharing and livelihoods. Some, like the Sanaag process, combined both. There were also competing objectives, such as between the Sanaag process and the Garowe Community Constitutional Conference, which both made claims to territory in Sanaag region. Although each process dealt with the issues that were specific to the local context and set of relations, some common themes can be identified.

**Security:** Ending or de-escalating violence, establishing public security, and instituting a system of law and order were clear and pressing objectives of most peace processes. Peace meetings were often preceded by a cessation of hostilities, which was reaffirmed and translated into a ceasefire at the conference. Agreements were variously concluded on joint security mechanisms for managing militia, the freedom of movement, rights of return and residence, and sanctions to prevent further killings.

\(^35\) The Menu of Options, a study commissioned by the European Union, explored alternative state architecture in Somalia.
In Somaliland, a break-through agreement on security was reached at the 1992 peace conference in Sheekh, which adopted the principle of ‘ama dalkaa qab, ama dadkaa qab’ (‘each clan is responsible for whatever is committed in their territory’). Agreement on controlling the display of weapons in public and on who has responsibility for providing public security are common outcomes of local peace meetings. This rarely involves physical disarmament. Instead, weapons may be handed to the authorities or put at their service, but there is often an implicit understanding that communities may withdraw their fighters and weapons should the agreements be violated (thereby generating sufficient confidence for the peace accord to be sustained). Other measures to maintain security and build confidence recorded by these studies include the creation of buffer zones and green lines between warring parties, as happened in Burtinle and Belet Wein, the exchanges of prisoners, and the cantonment of militia. Notably, the Somali commitment to consensus in peacemaking processes is reflected in a commitment to joint responsibility and joint management of ceasefires and security. All of these provide rich examples of Somali-led security arrangements that could be usefully applied in national level peace processes.

**Reconciliation:** A key aim of Somali peace meetings is to restore social relations between communities in order to ensure the survival of society. Indeed, traditional conflict management is perhaps most effective where reconciliation is the end aim of a peace process, rather than statebuilding. The process of reconciliation involves the parties controlling the means of violence, demonstrating compromise and tolerance, and accepting each other's co-existence. As CRD note in the study of south-central Somalia (Volume III):

The first step in the reconciliation process is acknowledgment of responsibility and confession by the aggressor...The declaration of responsibility, “I am an aggressor”, by the respective party is seen as representing more than a third of the path to a solution.

In Somaliland, the SNM's military strength meant they could sue for peace from a position of power. However, the SNM policy of non-recrimination against clans who opposed them created an environment where meaningful dialogue could take place and which gave others a role in negotiating the terms of the peace. This approach effectively allowed the weaker parties to assume responsibility for guarding the peace by participating in the joint management of security. In the 1993 Borama and Erigavo conferences, measures to restore social relations were formalised in Peace Charters that reaffirmed the right to life and basic rules for cohabitation and set out the responsibilities of the Guurti for law and order: in effect a new xeer.

Reconciliation commonly involves restitution for the loss of life and property. It can also involve the affirmation of rights of communities and individuals to residence, access to services, rangeland resources and trade, a ban on raiding, and agreed sanctions for those who violate the peace. This may be in line with the established xeer between communities or involve a renegotiation of the terms of the xeer, such as foregoing diya-payment. This occurred in Sanaag, where communities agreed to forgive (duudsi or xalay-dhalay) and forego diya payments because it was too difficult to count and balance the numbers of people killed and because it would have been beyond the communities to pay. This was also the case in Hiran (where it is called gembis) and in the Mudug-Galgadud processes (where it is known as xalay-dhalay).

In the Burtinle Peace Agreement, the calculation for diya payment was increased from the usual 100 camels to 140 camels per man killed. This was then referred to controversially as xeer Harti. The intention was to encourage one party to accept the settlement and reinforce the sense of unity among the Majeerteen and Baharasame/ Dhuulbahante as part of the Harti clan confederation. In Burtinle, use was also made of the practice of ‘marriage exchanges’ (godobtir), which also happened after the 1992 Sheekh conference in Somaliland.
Religion is also an important element of the reconciliation processes. Religious leaders often play an important role in the meetings, shari’a may be used to decide on issues of compensation, and religion provides an important sanction on the accords. A recent feature of several peace accords has also been agreement to address future violations via shari’a (rather than diya) in an effort to end cycles of revenge killings.

A common feature of all the Somali-led processes studied was the incremental approach to peacemaking. In order to achieve a final settlement numerous conflicts, disputes and disagreements between clans involved in the conference first have to be addressed. The peace process in Sanaag region took 18 months and involved many small meetings to resolve disputes between clans and sections of clans before they could convene at a regional meeting. The Mudug-Galgadud peace process included a meeting of militia from the communities in conflict and two ‘mini-conferences’ before a larger conference was finally convened a year after the initiative had begun. In other processes, side-meetings were held outside the main conferences to settle disputes or to secure a consensus in advance of the meeting. In the Garowe Community Constitutional Conference, disputed claims between senior titled elders of the Majeerteen, Dhulbahante, and Warsengeli had to be settled separately in order to include them in the conference and achieve a final agreement.

**Governance:** A key outcome of all the local processes studied were agreements on establishing institutions for governance. At their simplest, this involved restoring social contracts (xeer) between the clans and instituting sanctions for those that break the accord. Mechanisms for monitoring the implementation of the accords and for managing future conflicts were also commonly agreed. In the case of Idale, for example, this involved agreement on structures for managing the water catchments. The large region-wide conferences in Borama in Somaliland and Garowe in Puntland were political processes that produced agreements on power-sharing and a political vision of a future state, articulated in Charters that defined the structure and responsibilities of public administrations and the establishment of public security services.

**Resources:** Economic motivations - to re-establish trade and commerce and restore livelihoods – were important catalysts for these local peace processes. The use and control of land and productive assets, former public infrastructure and utilities, and real estate, were subjects of negotiation. In Somaliland, this included control of public revenue-producing infrastructure like Berbera port, the airports and the roads, communal access to grazing lands, water sources, trade routes and markets. In Puntland, agreements over the administration of Bosaso port and its revenue and the removal of checkpoints on roads to facilitate trade were important outcomes of the deliberations in Garowe. In the cases of Sanaag, Burtinle, Idale, Hiran, and Mudug-Galgadud, the control of, and entitlements to, productive land and water was central to deliberations.

**Structural issues:** Internationally led peace processes have been criticised for not addressing structural or ‘underlying causes’ of the Somali conflict. The local peace processes examined in this study did not explicitly set out to address these either. As has been the case in national-level peace processes, some issues were considered too intractable or sensitive to address at the time and delegates agreed to leave them unaddressed in order to tackle other matters that could be resolved. But, as the Mudug-Galgadud study concludes, unresolved issues can store up problems in the future:
without clarifying which water points and pasture will be shared). Research interviews indicated that the mediators, facilitators and elders avoided discussion of the issue as it was clear to them that agreement could not be reached at that time. If the sharing of these natural resources is not considered at some stage, the accord may be jeopardised in times of hardship, such as rain failure. (The Search for Peace volume III: 100)

Some of these local peace processes should, however, be understood as attempts to address an underlying cause or driver of state failure and conflict, namely the structure and governance of the state. By choosing independence in Somaliland and semi-autonomy in Puntland, people in these regions have altered the constitutional make-up of the former highly centralised and predatory Somali state, which is identified as one of the causes of state-failure. The Garowe Community Constitutional Conference, for example, articulated a clear view that Somalia’s future lay as a federated state and that state reconstruction should be through a ‘bottom-up’ and ‘building blocks’ approach. The Burco and Borama conferences articulated a two-state solution for the Somali people. While most of the local processes studied were parochial in their concerns, the Garowe conference and the Burco and Borama meetings have had a much more significance influence on governance in the Somali regions.

**Participation**

If the Somali-led peace processes studied here did not aim explicitly to tackle ‘underlying causes’ of conflicts, in practical terms the nature of these processes demonstrated the possibilities that could emerge from an alternative type of politics to that experienced for some 21 years under military rule.

Indigenous Somali peace processes are large, lengthy, public affairs, in which the decisions that carry most authority are achieved through consensus. Inclusiveness is an important principle, even if it is not always achieved: for some groups, such as internally displaced populations and women, participation is usually heavily restricted.

The peace processes involve a large number of actors – titled elders, religious leaders, politicians, military officers, diaspora, business people, poets, ‘opinion makers’, women, representatives of the media, civic activists – all with recognised roles to play. There were some 800 delegates at the Borama conference, with a chairing committee of 8 and 150 voting delegates. In the Garowe conference, there were over 450 official delegates. The numbers of official delegates are agreed by the parties in advance according to an established formula, usually based on proportional representation by clan. The meetings also attract a large unofficial contingent of people who may not stay throughout but are part of the constituency to whom delegates can defer. They may not participate in formal sessions but some will contribute through informal mediation, drafting agreements, or mobilising support. In the Galgadud-Mudug process, Sa’ad and Saleman militia leaders played an important role as ‘peace advocates’, having themselves reconciled. The final stage of that process was attended by neighbouring clans who acted as observers, adding weight to its conclusion – a fairly common feature of Somali processes.

Participants bring with them a variety of interests that need to be addressed, or at least acknowledged, for processes to have positive outcomes. The processes and the accords can have an impact beyond the direct protagonists. Parties who are directly involved may view them as a threat and their concerns may also have to be accommodated. In the Idale case, for example, the interests of one clan not directly involved in the conflict had to be accommodated by giving them a position in the local administrative structure. Peace accords are therefore not only about ending fighting but can also ensure a group’s rights are recognised, for example by documenting their participation in the final agreement.
Clans and ‘Parties’: The local peace processes examined in this study have ostensibly been between clans, rather than politico-military parties, and most have been multi-clan affairs. In such cases, the parties are rarely mutually exclusive. Inter-clan marriage is common, particularly between clans living in close proximity. In Sanaag region, intermarriage between clans was an important factor in driving the peace process forward, providing a communication channel between clans and a motivation for restoring relations. Furthermore, peace negotiations have tended to be more fruitful between clan representatives than between politicians or faction leaders. This is because the primary concerns of the communities are civil issues, such as restoring social relations, securing property or access to common resources, rather than constitutional issues of power-sharing or individual ambitions.

‘Third’ parties: Several, but not all, of the local peace processes studied involved some form of third party mediation. The motivation for third parties to intervene can arise from a concern at the impact on the conflict on their community. In the Hiran case study, the Hawadle elders played a key role in mediating between the Jijeele and the Gaalje’el clans, prompted in part by the potential destructive consequences of armed conflict in Belet Wein. The Hawadle clan’s dominance in the region ensured the effectiveness of their mediation, to which the Hawadle Ugaas also brought his moral authority.

Third party mediation can also have significant spin-offs for the mediators and the reconciling parties. The mediation efforts of the Gadabuursi and Dhulbahante in 1992 and 1993 reinforced the sense of Somaliland’s national identity at the time, although this has since been contested.

The potentially constructive role that ‘outsiders’ can perform in mediation is illustrated in the case studies on the Mudug-Galgadud process and the Garowe conference. In the former, CRD played a key catalytic role and were able to do so because they were perceived to a ‘non-aligned’ organisation that could resource a process as well as provide skilled facilitators from the same clans as the parties in conflict. In the Garowe conference, technical support provided by a small group of international resource people and Somali professionals, including members of the War-torn Societies Project (now Interpeace), was a factor in the success of the process.

Elders: Throughout the Somali regions since 1991, clan elders, titled elders and religious leaders have played a pivotal role in all Somali-led peace processes as mediators, as delegates of their clans, or as managers of the process. The role of elders is not without controversy. Some analysts have suggested that the authority of elders is more deep-rooted among northern pastoralists than in southern Somalia due to the different attitude of colonial authorities to them, the greater penetration of the modern state in the south, and the rise of military leaders during the war. Elders do not act alone: their legitimacy arises from being delegates of their clan and their ability to promote peace is determined by the interests of their constituencies and their relationship with other political actors, which can fluctuate. They receive criticism for being conservative and interested in simply maintaining the status quo. They are not above corruption and they are not always a force for peace, especially when their needs or those of their clan are not met. Clan elders and titled elders have proliferated during the war, as clans have fractured and military leaders have appointed elders to further their agendas. Some Somalis believe this has diminished the authority of the institution. The capacity of elders to broker peace can be constrained by several variables including the stage and scale of the conflict. From the evidence of these case studies, however, the institution retains an authoritative role in communities throughout the Somali region - and a vital one in peacemaking.

In Somaliland, the role of clan elders in governance was formalised with the creation of a national Guurti, which played a critical role in the peace processes in post-war Somaliland. In the absence of an effective

36 See also Gundel (2006) for a detailed examination of the contemporary role of elders.
SNM administration, the elders took on many of the tasks of government, resolving armed disputes, mediating grazing and property disputes, demobilising militia, formulating a National Peace Charter and selecting the country’s president. In 1993, the Guurti was formally incorporated into the government as the Upper House of parliament (see volume V). In Sanaag region in eastern Somaliland, the elders succeeded over a period of two years and numerous meetings to reconcile four clans, agree a regional peace accord, and establish a regional administration. This was accomplished mostly with local resources, with some limited, but strategic, financial and logistic support from a few international NGOs.

In Puntland, the Isimo played an important role in the formation of Puntland state in the 1998 in the Garowe conference. It remained independent of the Puntland government, enabling it to play a mediating role on subsequent occasions, such as the 2001 constitutional crisis. Elders have also played a role in mediating inter-regional conflicts, such as those occurring in the territories disputed between Somaliland and Puntland.

In south-central Somalia, clan elders are also key actors in local peace processes. Senior elders (malaqyo) of the Digil and Mirifle were involved in the first mediation initiative in Idale. As described above, in Hiran, the regional council of elders, chaired by the Ugaas of the Hawadle, mediated the conflict between the Jijeele and the Gaalje’el and the final agreement was read out in their presence. In the Galgadud-Mudug process, negotiations were undertaken by the elders.

Although traditional leaders have played a vital part in Somali peace processes, they have not always succeeded in their peacemaking role. For example, elders did little to end the civil war in Somaliland between 1994 and 1996 and it took the intervention of a diaspora organisation to galvanise people towards a resolution. In south-central Somalia, warlord politics, military occupation and external interventions, and the role of religious leaders have limited the authority of elders and on occasion civil actors have taken a more active role in peacemaking.

Leadership: Because peace processes are communal undertakings, the role of individuals or civic organisations in initiating and driving them can be neglected. In all of the processes examined there were individuals who took exceptional risks to their lives and reputations to initiate and drive a peace process. The case study from Sanaag region, for example, describes how one individual crossed the conflict lines undercover to open talks with the opposition (see volume V). There are also several examples of women crossing conflict lines to deliver messages to relatives on either side of the conflict and facilitate mediation. In the Garowe conference, it is widely acknowledged that Islan Mohamed Islan played a vital role as the chair of the conference in sustaining the process, not least through facilitating the resolution of disputes during the conference. Likewise, the Ugaas of the Hawadle used his moral authority in mediating between the Jijeele and Gaalje’el. In the case of the Mudug-Galgadud peace process, militia commanders took critical steps on several occasions to ensure the peace process was sustained and were widely seen as critical in the eventual success of the peace process.

Women: Women have played a role in all the peace processes studied, although this is not always recognised. Their position in society - as daughters of one lineage and often married to another - allows them to act as a channel of communication between opposing groups, most commonly where the conflict is between neighbouring clans. In Somaliland, Puntland, and south-central Somalia, women have organised themselves as strong peace advocates using innovative tactics to mobilise support and pressurise the parties to stop fighting and to continue dialogue when it appears to be faltering. Women have contributed financially to peace conferences and provided essential services, such as accommodation and catering. The financial manager of the Garowe conference estimated that, when women’s labour and provision of
accommodation was taken into account, they funded up to one third of the cost of the conference. In Idale, women raised funds for the initial mediation.

Women have also had an influential role during conferences. In Somaliland, women recited poetry to influence proceedings. At the Garowe conference, a woman poet shamed male delegates into allocating seats for women in the Puntland parliament. Women have sometimes helped to break a deadlock by threatening to shame those in the meeting, for example during the Mudug-Galgadud peace process, when a women's pressure group offered to pay outstanding *diya* on condition that the elders reached an accord.

While women can be important catalysts and supporters of peace processes, they have struggled to find a direct role in negotiations or decision-making due to cultural and religious barriers. Foremost among these is the fact that in this patrilineal society, a woman's ties to both her father's and husband's lineages means she is not considered a representative of a single clan, and therefore cannot be relied on to negotiate on their behalf. Furthermore, some men argue that since it has not been customary for women to participate in such forums, they lack the requisite knowledge of a male elder. However, women's complementary skills and different expectations of peace processes can influence the agenda positively, their support of an agreement enhances its sustainability through their influence over young militia, and they are usually well placed to ensure dissemination through key meeting places such as water points.

**Diaspora:** The influence of the large Somali migrant communities created by the war is felt in many aspects of Somali life. In the early period of the war, the Somali diaspora played a role in sustaining the clan-based conflict by providing funds and moral support to their kin and factional leaders. Although this diminished over time, it revived during the recent Ethiopian military intervention. It is clear that the diaspora has an influence on peace processes by contributing financially, commenting on processes, raising funds to pay *diya*, and participating directly and contributing their skills. However, research for this study indicates that the role of the diaspora in directly supporting peace processes has been generally less extensive than in supporting war or humanitarian appeals. Examples of the latter include substantial funds raised by the diaspora in response to the drought in south-central Somalia in 2004-05 and financial contributions to victims of the violent conflict in 2007 onwards. The Somali media\(^\text{37}\) plays a significant role in mobilising humanitarian funds in the diaspora through publicising the suffering of vulnerable groups, such as women and children. The importance of engaging the (moral) support of the diaspora was recognised in the Mudug-Galgadud process, resulting in a series of briefings in Nairobi and elsewhere. As a result, not only did the diaspora no longer fund the conflict but they have also made considerable efforts to support subsequent rehabilitation in the area.

**Local authorities:** In the local peace processes studied, the dialogue and accords were, for the most part, between clans. However, the influence of local authorities was felt in a number of cases. The Sanaag accord was reinforced by the agreements reached at Borama. Several years later, in a case related to the Sanaag accord, the Somaliland government intervened to prevent a resumption of conflict by making a *diya* payment to fulfil an agreement. In the case of Burtinle, the first efforts by local authorities to mediate in the conflict failed and in the next round of talks, elders had a more prominent role with the government remaining in the background as sponsors and guarantors of the agreement.

In south-central Somalia, the common complaint was the difficulty in enforcing agreements in the absence of government and law and order institutions. The case of Idale in Bay region is interesting in this respect. After numerous failed attempts to resolve the conflict, the matter was passed to the newly formed regional government. Resolution of the dispute over land ownership was achieved through agreement that while all...
land belongs to Allah, it is managed by the government (i.e. the municipality). Although the nascent regional government lacked capacity, it had sufficient moral authority to guarantee the peace accord.

**Media:** In the early 1990s during the peace process in Sanaag region, the BBC Somali Service was used to inform and enhance public awareness of the accords. Since then, the development of technologies for recording, reporting, and disseminating information has given the media an increasingly normative role in peace processes. Peace accords that in the past would not even have been written down are now recorded on audio and film, providing historical records that can be referred to (beyond the memory of senior elders). Through radio, television and the internet, details of the proceedings and accords can be widely disseminated within the region and abroad improving public knowledge. In Puntland, the media played a positive role in the Burtinle peace process, highlighting the need for dialogue. Clearly, print, broadcast and internet media can also play a ‘spoilers’ role through partial reporting (and a propensity to report on conflicts rather than peacemaking).

**Spoilers:** All the cases studied included individuals and parties who had the potential to disrupt the process. Participants in a peace process have different agendas, some of which may be more concerned with enhancing their own position than resolving the conflict. In the case of Idale, for example, the peace process had to accommodate the interests of a key ‘spoiler’ by giving them a position in the local administration. At the Boroma conference, the needs of militia manning checkpoints on the road to Hargeysa had to be addressed to prevent them from disrupting delegations going to the conference. In the Mudug-Galgadud peace process, women, militia commanders, and intellectuals were all involved at different times in challenging those aiming to disrupt the process.

**Peacemaking as a Process**

Traditional Somalia approaches to peacemaking tend to be process rather than product oriented. Somali peace processes are, therefore, invariably long-drawn out, often lasting several months and in the cases of Sanaag and Galgadud-Mudug over a year. All the Somali-led conferences examined in this study were a culmination of several smaller, more localised meetings. The final peace conference and the accord did not themselves produce the peace; such meetings are rarely able to address ‘underlying causes’. It is, therefore, the process leading to the conference at which agreements and consensus are forged - and the implementation of the peace accord - that is important.

In some cases, dialogue starts while the conflict is ongoing. During the SNM insurgency, for example, senior elders of the Dhulbahante held talks with the SNM. Although the primary interest of the parties at the time may have been to form an alliance against the regime, the relationships established helped to mitigate deterioration into clan-based conflict once the Siyad Barre government was defeated.

Some processes are planned and structured from the outset, as was the case with the 1991 Burco conference, the meetings leading to the 1998 Garowe conference, and the Galgadud-Mudug conferences in 2006-07. Other processes are more iterative and open ended, such as in Sanaag region.

First attempts to resolve a conflict frequently fail and a process may be restarted with new strategies and new actors. This can involve some learning from one initiative to the next. The 2007 Burtinle peace initiative was one of a series of efforts to resolve a recurring conflict. In the case of the Jijeele and Gaalje’el conflict, there were three initiatives. The Idale process involved five public meetings (and the conflict has still not been wholly resolved).

The successes of reconciliation and statebuilding in Somaliland in the 1990s are attributed to a sustained focus on resolving issues at a community level before attempting to tackle issues of national governance.
The Somaliland national conferences were prepared through a series of local meetings at which communities were able to resolve outstanding issues between them. Although the outcome of the 1991 Burco meeting itself was not predicted, the preceding meetings established a cessation of hostilities across Somaliland and a common platform for dialogue. These were: in Oog between the SNM/Isaq and the Dhulbahante; in Tulli between the SNM/Isaq and the Gadabursi; in Borama between the Jibril Abkor/Isaq and the Gadabursi; and in Berbera between all the major northern clans. In the case of Sanaag, the first peace meeting that produced a ceasefire took place in late 1990, before the government was defeated, followed by another 13 peace meetings before the 1993 regional conference in Erigavo. While each meeting had a limited objective of reconciling the parties in dialogue, it inevitably led to the next.

Some of the ‘preparatory’ meetings were important in their own right. The 1992 Sheekh conference was significant not only because it ended the conflict over Berbera but also because it produced an agreement on establishing security in Somaliland in advance of detailed negotiations on power-sharing and constitutional issues. The Garowe conference study traces the origins of the idea of a decentralized administration in northeast Somalia as far back as 1991, identifying the Garowe ‘Peace and Life’ conference of December 1993 as a seminal conference where the idea of the Harti unity was mooted. It took five more years and several more peace conferences before the federal state in Puntland was declared.

**The Organisation and Staging of a Somali Peace Process**

Somali peace processes are hybrid affairs involving traditional and non-traditional actors and combining traditions of conflict management with modern conflict resolution practices. Staging meetings peace meetings with several hundred participants requires considerable organisational and management skills and resources. The local processes analysed in this study typically involved the following elements:

**Cessation of hostilities:** Contacts between the adversaries may be initiated by one of the parties with messages carried by relatives - often women – or by a third party. Initial communication may take place at a distance over radios or more commonly today by mobile phones. The elders of each group will share information on the crisis and take measures to contain its escalation. This may result in a cessation of hostility (*colaad joojin*), the disengagement of forces (*kala rarid/ kala fogeyn*) and ceasefire (*xabbad joojin*) (see volume III).

**First contacts:** These may agree a ceasefire, some confidence building measures and agreement to hold a further meeting and the creation of a preparatory committee.

**Preparation:** A preparatory committee will be selected by participating parties or the mediating party and include representatives from all sides. Drawn from elders, professionals, business people, and respected civic actors, including NGO representatives; in none of the cases studied did they include women. The committee’s role is to mobilise people and resources and to prepare the logistics. They may also set guidelines on the number, selection and approval of delegates and other procedures for conducting the conference. Delegates are selected by their clans to speak and negotiate on their behalf.

**Venue:** Somali-led peace processes take place in-country and this proximity enables delegates to consult with their constituencies and be supported by them. The choice of location is important and can influence security, funding and outcomes. The community hosting the meeting has responsibility for providing security and for covering the expenses. The choice of venue can be for practical, political and symbolic reasons. For example, Berbera was chosen as the location for the first multi-clan meeting in Somaliland in 1991 because it was the least damaged of the cities. Burco was chosen for the next meeting because it is mid-way between the east and western parts of Somaliland, with links to Sanaag and to the south. In 1993, Borama
was offered as a ‘neutral venue’ by the Gadabursi who were mediating the talks at Sheikh between the SNM factions. In the northeast, Garowe was chosen as venue for the Constitutional Conference, because of its central location among the Harti clans.

**Chairing Committee:** Meetings are chaired by a committee of elders (*shirguudon*), sometimes from neutral clans and usually led by a senior respected elder. As reconciliation can be dependent on the quality of the mediation, facilitation and management, the character of the chairperson can be fundamentally important. For the process to succeed, the chair should be a trusted and respected person who commands moral authority. At Borama, this role was played by Sheekh Ibrahim Sheekh Yusuf Sheekh Madar, from the founding religious family of Hargeisa. In the Garowe conference, it was Islan Mohamed, one of the most senior titled Majeerteen elders from Garowe. In the Gaalje’el and Jijeele meeting, the role fell to the senior Ugaas of the Hawadle. The 1993 Erigavo conference in Sanaag region was chaired by a respected businessman, Ali Warsame.

**Secretariat:** The chairing committee may be assisted by a secretariat, often comprising professionals and educated individuals who assist in drafting the resolutions and accords.

**Committees:** Numerous committees may also be formed with different functions. When the Hawadle decided to intervene in the Gaalje’el and Jijeele conflict, they established four committees to manage the initiative:

- a mediation committee, comprising experienced elders to lead the process;
- a technical committee, comprising intellectuals, influential women peace activists and business people, which was responsible for disengaging the militia, and providing guidance to the reconciliation committee on technicalities such as the number of delegates, venue, and media engagement;
- a fund raising committee, consisting of prominent and respected business people who supported the Ugaas, and raised an estimated $30,000 from the business community and salaried people, including local staff of international agencies and the Hiran diaspora;
- a women committee of peace activists, entrusted with mobilising the Belet Wein community, particularly the women and youth, to support the process, raising funds, and managing the domestic logistics.

The Sanaag case study describes very clearly the organisation of the 1993 Erigavo conference, which had no less than ten committees. The largest was the preparatory committee, comprising 50 people drawn from each clan. There were also observers, a public relations committee, and a women's group. In the Sa’ad-Saleman dialogue, an Advisory Committee was appointed to monitor and intervene in the process when necessary, and a woman's pressure group. In the Garowe conference, Islan Mohamed created a group of “ten wise men” (comprising an elder and intellectual from each region) to resolve intractable issues that had the potential to disrupt the rest of the proceedings.

**Informal meetings:** While the plenary is the loci for formal decision-making, informal ‘side meetings’ can be equally as important. Often grievances between clans cannot be aired in front of others and time is required outside of the plenary to settle issues in order that a consensus can be reached. These can be occasions to agree restitution, or to form new alliances. One of the innovations in the 1993 Borama meeting was to convene informal forums, where issues could be thrashed out and a consensus reached that could be ratified by the plenary.

**Timeframes:** Without externally imposed deadlines, processes are dynamic and flexible in order to meet the prevailing needs. The processes examined in this study took place over different periods. Borama took three months; the Sanaag process two years. The Garowe conference was unusually short but a great deal of time had already been put into its preparation. The relatively open-ended timeframes for the meetings
allows issues to be adequately dealt with, and for disputes between different parties to be resolved in order that consensus can be reached in the conference plenary. In some cases, such as Borama and the Garowe conference, the Chairs set deadlines on decisions.

**Flexibility and adaptation:** It would be wrong to view these local peace processes using traditional approaches as anachronistic. On the contrary, in response to the prevailing circumstances they can be both dynamic and innovative. Some of the adaptations in the application of customary law have already been noted, such as adopting the principle of duudsi (mutual forgiveness) rather than restitution, and agreeing timeframes for the completion of diya payments. In another example, the agreement signed between the Sa’ad and Saleman in February 2007 stipulated that shari’a law rather than customary law would be invoked in any further killings or breaches of the agreement. Another example of innovation in the Galgadud-Mudug process was the joint convening of the militia from the two communities before the reconciliation conferences had taken place. Normally reintegration takes place after the final accord, but in preliminary consultations, the two communities had identified the engagement of the militia and their leaders in the peace process as a prerequisite for sustainable peace: subsequently the militia commanders were critical forces for peace.

**The Accords:** Agreements reached through consensus carry more authority and are likely to be more sustainable. The need for consensus accounts, in part, for the length of some meetings. In some of the cases studied, however, matters were voted on. All the meetings studied were concluded with written agreements. Each accord had unique features but there are also aspects in common such as: resource-sharing, security arrangements, sanctions against those who violated the accord, individual and community rights over properties and life, the distribution of political and administrative offices, and the creation of committees to oversee the implementation of agreements. In some cases, such as Borama and the Garowe conference, Charters were produced that established an architecture and legal framework for government.

**Dissemination:** One of the critical tasks in a peace process is to communicate and explain the outcomes of the process to the wider community, an especially important consideration when affected communities are spread over wide geographic areas without effective telecommunications. Various methods and media are used. A traditional method used in Hiran and in the Mudug-Galgadud regions was the “peace caravan” (“so’daal nabadeed”) (see box below):
A Peace Caravan from the Indian Ocean to the Ethiopian Border, June-July 2006

During the Mudug-Galgadud peace process, peace accords were reached at the two preliminary mini-conferences at Bandiiradly and at El Hur in May and June 2006. However, the lack of infrastructure and telecommunications in this vast geographical area presented particular challenges for the wide dissemination of the outcomes of the meetings and the accords reached. These included the establishment of joint committees in the conflict zones to sustain community interaction, establish local ground rules to manage the sharing of water and grazing resources, address any other issues arising in the local areas, and monitor implementation of the peace accords.

Women’s groups played an important part in passing news of the peace accords at the water holes and other meeting places and two caravans led by elders were organized. They visited all of the key villages and settlements to brief the communities and pass peace messages, mobilizing community support for the process and covering over 200 kms from the Indian Ocean to the Ethiopian border. The peace caravans concluded with large gatherings at El Hur on 30 June 2006 for the communities living around Hobyo town on the Indian Ocean, and at Qaydaro town on 4 July 2006 for the population in the border area between south Mudug and Ga‘galgadud regions. These positive developments encouraged the diaspora to visit the region in support of the process.

The Hiran Peace Caravan, May-June 2007

At the conclusion of the dialogue between the Gaalje’il and Jijeele, the peace agreement was read out first on the steps of the venue and later at a large public gathering at the old airport in Belet Wein, where the opposing militia participated together. This ensured that the whole town knew about the accord. The coverage by Somali media (the two local FM radios, Mogadishu radio stations, BBC Somali Service and several Somali websites) also enhanced dissemination of the successful process.

Subsequently, influential elders from the Jijeele and Gaalje’il clans went to their respective villages to inform the communities about the peace agreement. Following the settlement, the Ugaases of Hiran region agreed to visit collectively all of the conflict hot spots in the region and use their influence as respected leaders of the people to advocate for peace. The mission covered over 1000 kilometres and included the areas inhabited by the Gaalje’il and Jijeele clans, where both communities were reminded to honour and sustain the peace accord. The unprecedented presence of the most respected traditional titled elders in the rural villages throughout Hiran region, combined with substantial local media coverage, appeared to have a significant impact in promoting peace in the local communities, with the elders also able to provide guidance on pending tensions in some areas.

Implementation: All the peace meetings established committees to oversee the implementation of the agreements reached. In Sanaag, a security committee was created known as ‘the Committee that Uprooted the Unwanted Weeds’ to prevent and act on violations of the accord (Farah and Lewis 1993). In Ga‘galgadud and Mudug regions, joint security committees were established to monitor implementation and make rapid response to any violations. For example, seven months after the final peace accord a serious shortage of water and pasture in the 2007 deyr rainy season, led Sa’ad and Saleman pastoralists to converge in those areas that had received the first rains. Senior elders from the two communities organised a meeting and summoned key local actors to forestall potential clashes from overcrowding and heavy demands on water and pasture. A five-point agreement was reached which was honoured and the season ended without clashes.

It is not possible for participants in a peace processes to control all the consequences and outcomes of a process. It is not uncommon for parties who did not participate in a process or benefit from its outcome
to feel threatened. In Somaliland, the reconciliation meetings in Berbera and Burco sparked violence in Sanaag because the SNM leadership there felt marginalised.

All of the meetings studied succeeded in resolving some issues and produced accords that, to varying degrees, changed the local environment. But agreements were not reached on every issue and some parties left with outstanding grievances. The Borama conference is still viewed as a watershed event in Somaliland but civil war resumed within two years due to grievances over power-sharing that were not settled in the conference. The village of Idale has experienced further conflict since the peace process was studied and further clashes have occurred in the area addressed in the Burtinle peace process. In each region, interviewees identified the need for a functional authority and viable security institutions as a pre-requisite for effective and sustainable reconciliation at both local and national level.

**Local Ownership:** One criticism levelled at internationally sponsored peace processes is that they have lacked Somali ‘ownership’ because they were designed, managed and funded by non-Somalis. In Somali-led processes, the sense of ownership is instilled because the issues addressed are immediate and tangible, there is greater confidence in the representation, and the public invest their own resources in the process. The authority of the local accords derive from the legitimacy of the leadership, the inclusiveness of the process, the use of customary law, and the consensus decision-making process.

**The Economics of Peace Processes**

All the local processes studied were predominantly - but not exclusively - locally financed, with communities raising both cash and goods-in-kind. The investment by people in a process is one measure of their commitment to it, although it can also highlight partial interests in a particular outcome. In most cases, the host community or clan provides much of the finance. In Puntland, the SSDF had resolved to rely on local resources (iskaa wax uqabso – self-reliance) and the Garowe conference was therefore mainly funded through revenues raised in Bosaso port, with the host community of Garowe and extended families in the rural areas also providing generous support. As noted earlier, women had an important role in mobilising resources for the conference.

Financing of the 1991 Burco conference was organised by elders on a clan basis, rather than by the host community who were still recovering from the war. Borama was different, with more investment from the business community based in Djibouti and some international funding. The Erigavo conference received some international funding channelled through a local NGO but the meetings leading up to it were almost entirely locally sponsored. The chair of Erigavo, a wealthy businessman, also contributed.

Business people contributed to funding several of the other peace processes studied. In the Somaliland meetings, the business community provided substantial finance and in the case of Borama, had an influence over the outcome by supporting the presidential candidacy of Mohamed Ibrahim Egal. In the Hiran case study, the business community supported the peace talks for the sake of preserving their businesses in Belet Wein. In the Mudug and Galgadud process, CRD provided very basic costs for delegates at the ‘mini conferences’ while the community contributed resources in different ways. One militia commander, for example, hired 15 vehicles with his own money and local people covered most of the cost of the two peace caravans.

It is striking that the Somaliland peace processes described in this study occurred in the first three years after the war when the economy was still in early recovery. For the Somaliland business community, the need to get the economy running was a great incentive to invest in the conferences. It highlights the capacity of Somalis to raise resources even in hard times and that, free of the accoutrements of international mediation, local peace processes cost less.

All the conferences studied were able to attract some external funding. In Somaliland, the number of external funders grew as international organisations became established there and became more aware of
the potential efficacy of supporting local processes. Thus, Burco had the little external funding, receiving some limited logistical assistance from ICRC. Borama received some direct finance and the Erigavo conference had 12 different donors, although the contributions were small. It is notable, however, that while donor governments and the EC have been willing to fund democratic elections in Somaliland, they did not provide funding for the clan conferences in the early 1990s. By the late 1990s, donor interest in the so-called ‘building block’ approach to state revival in Somalia meant the EC and other donors were more willing to provide technical and financial support to Somali-led processes like the Garowe conference. Indeed, an EC-funded study that generated a ‘menu’ of constitutional options for state revival in Somalia was influential among the Somalis who designed the Garowe conference. However, EC funding for the conference itself was controversially withdrawn when it became clear that the Dhulbahante and Warsengeli would participate in the meeting, raising concerns about the impact on peace and stability in Somaliland. This illustrates the genuine political complexities involved in external funding of local peace processes.

External support can run the risk of undermining community contributions but, provided strategically, it can also be important in defraying costs, notably for the host community. For example, in the Mudug-Galgadud peace process, local logistics and food were provided by the communities but other costs were provided by international donors and managed locally by CRD.

Limiting the financing of a peace processes to Somali contributions can constrain a peace process at times, but it does sustain the sense of local ‘ownership’. If nothing else, it focuses the minds of those taking part in the negotiations. Somalis point out that when the cost of a peace process are borne by people locally, there is greater pressure to take the task of peacemaking seriously, a pressure that is absent in internationally sponsored processes.

### Differences between Somali-led and Internationally-led Peace Processes

The key differences between local Somali peace processes and externally led peacemaking efforts is summarised in the table below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Somali ‘ownership’</th>
<th>Externally driven</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>o locally designed</td>
<td>o externally designed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o locally mediated</td>
<td>o externally mediated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o locally managed</td>
<td>o externally managed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o locally financed</td>
<td>o externally financed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Legitimate leadership and representation, locally selected</td>
<td>▪ Contested leadership and representation (often not locally endorsed)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Sufficient and flexible timeframe</td>
<td>▪ Insufficient timeframe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Located in the Somali region</td>
<td>▪ Located outside the Somali region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Traditional mechanisms of consensus building and conflict resolution</td>
<td>▪ Limited scope for reconciliation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Systems for reparation are fundamental</td>
<td>▪ Conflict resolution mechanisms focussed on ‘quick fix’ power-sharing solutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Use of sanctions against ‘spoilers’</td>
<td>▪ No transitional justice or reparation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Inclusive, involving broad public participation</td>
<td>▪ No sanctions employed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Substantive efforts to disseminate proceedings and outcomes, ensuring popular endorsement</td>
<td>▪ Exclusive, with limited public participation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Transitional mechanisms established to oversee implementation (e.g. joint security committees)</td>
<td>▪ Weak public outreach, no dissemination or attempts at public ratification</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>▪ Emphasis on establishing government rather than transitional entity or the tasks it is mandated to fulfil</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

38 The Menu of Options, ibid
Although each of the processes examined in this study was unique in character, it is possible to distil some common findings:

- In the absence of a government or a political organisation with the capacity to impose peace, traditional systems of governance have proven to be effective in managing conflict, reducing violence, restoring security and forging agreements on establishing public administrations.
- External diplomats and others involved in local peacebuilding must be cognisant of the broader political context within which these talks take place.
- Lineage elders are custodians of customary law and skilled peacemakers. But they work most effectively when collaborating with other civic leaders and professionals. Peace meetings therefore usually involve a fusion of traditional practices and authorities with more modern negotiating techniques.
- Legitimacy of actors, public trust in them, and an agreement on the formula for representation are each crucial to public acceptance of the outcomes of a process.
- The efficacy of local peacemaking processes depends on the existence of communities with common values. They are effective because they address issues of direct relevance to the participants and local community, and the agreement therefore has immediate and tangible benefits.
- Somali traditional approaches to peacemaking tend to be process rather than product oriented. Progress is not necessarily linear. Peace accords are the outcome of multiple meetings and activities and the outcomes need to be understood in terms of the cumulative impact of the process.
- Social reconciliation is an overriding objective of local processes. The social proximity of the combatants can make reconciliation difficult. The principle of forgiveness (duudsi or xalay-dhalay) is therefore perceived by many Somalis as the only way that peace can be achieved and sustained. Often the fundamental causes of violent conflict are not resolved, meaning conflict can recur.
- The traditional conflict management system is poor at conflict prevention and in recording peace initiatives and agreements.
- Women play a crucial role in local peacemaking, providing channels of communication between the warring parties, defusing tensions as peace advocates, mobilising resources and servicing meetings, and disseminating peace accords. Although they are typically excluded from decision-making forums, women can be effective in influencing elders and others to intervene in a conflict and subsequently to reach an agreement.
- Conflict avoidance is often a common element of a local peacemaking. Meetings are configured to avoid controversial issues that can disrupt a process at too early a stage. This can mean crucial issues are left unaddressed.
- The commitment to a peaceful resolution by elites - military leaders, businessmen, and politicians from the communities in conflict - is essential to reduce the violence and support the resolution of the conflict.
- War weariness can be a factor encouraging parties to make peace.
- Rushing talks in Somalia guarantees failure. Local peace processes need to proceed at their own pace, a pace that is often slower than that with which most external diplomats would be comfortable.
- Local peace processes have a strong degree of Somali ownership but can benefit from appropriate external funding and professional expertise, provided by Somalis and international organisations.
- National level processes can trigger conflict at a local level. Decisions reached at a national reconciliation conference and decisions made by elders on behalf of their clan can have unintended and unforeseen impacts at the community level.
- A powerful and influential clan with an interest in restoring peace in their area can intervene to end fighting, play the role of an honest and impartial broker, and enforce the accord.
- Business leaders can play an influential role in peace processes, particularly when business interests are threatened, by sponsoring the peace process or by withdrawing funding from one of the parties.
- The media can be used to keep the general public informed, thus increasing the indirect participation of the community in the process.
- A functional public authority is identified by many Somalis as a pre-requisite for effective and sustainable reconciliation at both local and national level. In the absence of viable, locally accepted security institutions, no reconciliation can be effectively implemented and sustained.

The following table draws out those factors that support a successful local peace process and those that can undermine one.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Elements of a successful local peace process</th>
<th>Factors that can undermine a local peace process</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>▪ Common values and interest of the parties in conflict to reach a solution</td>
<td>▪ Lack of common values and interest in resolving the conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Inclusiveness of process</td>
<td>▪ Lack of preparation and consultation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Support of broader communities in-country and in the diaspora</td>
<td>▪ Weak leadership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Active interest of politicians and the business community of the area in resolving the conflict</td>
<td>▪ Only partial community participation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Acknowledgement by communities of the impact of conflict (war-weariness)</td>
<td>▪ Exclusive processes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Readiness to compromise</td>
<td>▪ Disputed leadership and representation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Acceptance of responsibility</td>
<td>▪ Denial of responsibility (Gar-diiddo)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Genuinely respected and authoritative leadership</td>
<td>▪ Imbalance of power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Confidence in judgments issued by their leadership</td>
<td>▪ Discrepancies in local codes of customary law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Addressing underlying causes of conflict</td>
<td>▪ Failure to fully investigate or understand the root causes of the conflict and therefore basing judgments on false information and leaving matters unaddressed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Adequate preparation and consultation</td>
<td>▪ Perception of the lack of impartiality of the mediators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Third-party intervention by acceptable committed and impartial mediators</td>
<td>▪ Failure to accommodate competing interests and unmet interests of possible spoilers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Inclusion of respected and trusted religious leaders in the mediation team</td>
<td>▪ Ineffective local authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Combination of traditional governance systems and modern conflict management practices</td>
<td>▪ External influences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Adequate organisational and financial capacity</td>
<td>▪ Inadequate donor support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Attention given to the interests of potential spoilers</td>
<td>▪ Inhospitable external environment (ongoing concurrent conflicts, natural disasters, political changes)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Absence of international interventions</td>
<td>▪ Continuing cycles of revenge killings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Effective dissemination of the peace accord</td>
<td>▪ Lack of inclusion of the local or regional authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Robust mechanisms to follow-up implementation of the accord</td>
<td>▪ A lack of dissemination, monitoring and reinforcement mechanisms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Presence of a recognized authority to reinforce the accord</td>
<td>▪ Unpunished breaches of the accord</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Implementation of appropriate and reasonable compensation for losses</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Agreed sanctions for individuals or groups who violate the agreement</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Conclusions

This study has illustrated the very different nature - and contradictions between - internationally sponsored peace initiatives in Somalia and peace processes led by Somalis. Some of the critical differences relate to fundamental aspects of peace making, such as:

- Effective representation from a range of stakeholders to ensure inclusiveness, and legitimacy of the process and credibility of its outcome;
- Thorough preparation and consultation before beginning the process, including agreement on the agenda;
- Respected and authoritative leadership and mediation of the process;
- Financial and in-kind investment by stakeholder communities in the peace process;
- Effective public outreach before, during and after the process;
- The use of committees with the necessary expertise to assist in the multiple levels of a peace process;
- Agreement on ways to address reparation and the use of sanctions against ‘spoilers’;
- Wide dissemination of accords to ensure transparency, public understanding and acceptance;
- Prioritisation of security and public safety and a consensus-based approach to security management;
- Agreed instruments to oversee the implementation of accords and sanctions for those who violate them.

In all of these respects, Somali-led processes have a depth and breadth that is lacking in internationally led processes in the Somali context – as reflected in the sustainability of the outcomes.

However, some of the strengths of Somali-led processes may not necessarily translate effectively to the national level. As Menkhaus concludes in his study of traditional peacemaking in Somalia (1999: 198), “The capacity of traditional peace-making processes is strongest at the local and regional levels and weakest at the national level”. To what extent, therefore, can local and national processes be constructively linked and their collective impact enhanced?

Since the Somali state collapsed, the primary objective of the international community in Somalia has been to reconstitute the state and establish a functional government so that it can take its place amongst the community of nations. This is driven by a concern for the welfare of the Somali people, but is primarily directed towards containing the potential international threat Somalia is seen to pose as a collapsed state. There is an assumption that the restoration of the state and a government with a monopoly of force will bring order to Somalia and provide an interlocutor that will contain the threat this ‘ungoverned’ territory and its population are perceived to pose to regional and international security. There are several problems with this approach.

First, the on-going conflict in south-central Somalia has not been solely over the state and half the population of Somalia has no memory of a state. Instead, it has involved a plethora of armed factions fighting to control economic resources, monopolies of trade and territory, who care little about states, borders, sovereignty or territorial integrity. These factions, mostly structured along lineage lines, are capable of forming alliances and fracturing within short periods. International diplomacy has therefore been handicapped by a state-centric model of the conflict and mediation.

Second, the statebuilding strategy also assumes public support exists for a revived state. But from its colonial foundations, the state of Somalia was largely constructed and sustained by foreign resources and subject to foreign interests. By the late 1980s, the state was both ineffective and predatory. For many Somalis the prospects of a revived state over which they have no control is perceived as a potential threat.
Third, this attitude towards the state is influenced by the nature of Somali society, which is far removed from modern states in terms of political order and the regulation of violence. In a modern state, for example, the means of violence is monopolised by government. In Somali society, the legitimacy of force and capacity to use it is vested in an elite based in the lineage system, and is regulated by unwritten customary law and other institutions to control violence. This principle is one recognised in Somali peace meetings where communities are first required to take primary responsibility for managing security in their areas before transitioning to the next stage, where, for example in Mudug and Galgadud, joint committees of elders were formed by the two communities in conflict to manage security in their areas (Volume III).

Fourth, international peacemaking has tended to follow established templates: a ceasefire agreement, formalised peace negotiations, disarmament demobilisation and reintegration (DDR), Security Sector Reform (SSR), civil society capacity building, and so on. This tends to reflect the accumulative experience and skills of the mediators rather than the needs of the recipients. In Somaliland, for example, international donors have been much quicker to support a democratisation process intended to consolidate the peace than the inter-clan conferences in the early 1990s that initially brought stability to Somaliland.

Fifth, assumptions regarding the relationship between statebuilding and peacebuilding have led international actors to neglect key elements of peacebuilding, such as the challenges of negotiating meaningful security arrangements, assuming instead that the revived state will address these questions. Somali scepticism and fear of the state is exacerbated by attempts by international mediators to re-establish the state monopoly of force without negotiation or consensus. Moreover, by leaping from a preliminary ceasefire to direct assistance to re-establish state security capacities, the international community removes the critically important stage of building consensus and confidence through joint responsibility and management for security; a process that lies at the heart of Somali approaches to peacebuilding as a whole. Somali peace processes include these essential elements – the buffer zone established in the Gaalje’el and Jijeele reconciliation process and the joint rapid response teams in the Mudug-Galgadud process being just two amongst many examples that this study has identified.

Criticisms of international diplomatic interventions highlight their failure to transcend a top-down bias and their inability to deal with the social and psychological dimensions of conflict. Indigenous and traditional peacemaking may be able to act as a corrective to this. Customary conflict resolution techniques are participatory and mostly operate at the community and local levels that external peacemaking approaches fail to reach. Moreover, many customary approaches to conflict concentrate on truth-telling, reconciliation and the re-establishment of sustainable relationships, aspects of peacemaking that are often overlooked in technocratic peacemaking models. But the ‘traditional’ and ‘local’ are not intrinsically good. International approaches are said to champion universal rights and ethics over localised mores. Indigenous and traditional practices are criticised for contravening the rights of women and minorities and fostering the culture of impunity, for example, through the exclusion of women from decision-making in local processes and diya payment instead of due judicial process. On the other hand, internationally-sponsored processes have consistently involved (and funded) individuals that many Somalis consider to be war criminals, reinforced the elite’s domination of political decision-making, and, most recently, supported military pacification by the forces of a neighbouring country for which there is no accountability.

Just as the analysis of violent conflict has had to overcome a state-centric perspective, so too do approaches to the management of conflict. If one accepts, as this study has described, that mechanisms for the control of violence can exist beyond the state, then the task of statebuilding perhaps becomes less urgent (if more complex), and new political options ensue. Central to these is an incremental approach to both peacebuilding and statebuilding, which reflects the time-sensitive nature of Somali-led processes.
Given the hybrid nature of the Somali crisis, conflict management and peacebuilding should also adopt a hybrid approach, blending traditional approaches, civil society and modern techniques. The potential of local peacemaking also lies in fulfilling some of the stated tenets of peacebuilding and development – that is local participation, empowerment, cultural appropriateness and sustainability (Mac Ginty: 4). A shift in focus in this respect would also address the contradiction between international donor support for the development of civil society over the past two decades, but their failure to protect civic space for civic actors in internationally-led peace conferences.

While disproportionate funding has been provided for international peace conferences and to support the administrations of recent transitional governments, alternative governance arrangements organised by Somalis themselves have not received the same level of attention from the international community, for example, in Somaliland and Puntland. Indeed, despite the rhetoric about Somali ownership, international policy has tended to work against it. As the cases in this study illustrate, the most successful peace and statebuilding processes have to date been crafted from below, rather than imposed from above. The study of local peace processes demonstrates that - rather than trying to engineer statebuilding enterprises - conflict resolution, peacebuilding and support for livelihoods are likely to be more effective when they support existing political orders in the framework of understanding the context.
Annex Glossary of Somali Terms in Peace and War

1. Aafti: no man’s land/ buffer zone
2. ‘Aaqil: (see Caaqil below)
3. Aarsi: revenge/reprisal
4. Adable: black soil
5. Afjar: conclude/bring to an end
6. Afduub: taking hostage, kidnapping, abduction, taking prisoner 2. a terrorizing act against someone
7. Aqabal keen: acceptance of an idea
8. Ardaa: families/ clans share of blood compensation (mag)
9. Arrin keen: one who initiates an idea
10. Baad: ransom, extortion, to obtain property from another by intimidation 2. food (usually referring to fodder for livestock)
11. Baadisooc: buffer zone
12. Baanis (Baaniso): boastful/ rhetoric
13. Baaqnabadeed: call for peace
14. Bariidin: morning greetings
15. Baraago dumin: destroying water reservoirs, demolishing water reservoirs
16. Barakac: displacement
17. Beel: clan/community
18. Beero gubid: setting on fire for farms, burning agricultural fields
20. Biliilqo: looting, plundering, robbery, prowling 2. raiding
21. Birmagaydo: preserved from harm “spared from the spear”
22. Boob: looting, prowling, raiding, pillaging
23. Boog: moral wound
24. Booga dhayid: healing the wounds, recovering
25. Caaqil (‘Aaqil): chief
26. Caasikaay: rebel hide out
27. Cadaawad: hostility
28. Ceel-dumin: destroying water catchments or wells, pulling down water holes
29. Ciidan kala qaadis: pulling [fighting] forces apart
30. Ciriibtiir: genocide, ethnic cleansing
31. Col: enemy
32. Colaad: enmity
33. Colaad hurin: perpetuating conflict, upholding disputes, organizing hostility, encouraging warring sides to fight
34. Daaqsin: grazing land
35. Daacad: Honest
36. Dagaal: War
37. Dakharo: injuries
38. Damaanadqaad: guarantee, assurance, promise, pledge, certification
39. Dan: interest/ need
40. Dayday: extorters, freelance militiamen
41. Debecsanaan: flexibility
42. Debdemis: put off or reduce tension
43. Dedaal Nabadeed: peace initiative
44. Deegaan: environment/ settlement
45. Deganaan: stability
46. Dhac: robbery
47. Dhaymo: ointment
48. Dhexdhexaadin: mediating
49. Dhul-gubid: set areas on fire, destroy with fire, the act of burning a piece of land
50. Dhir-jarid: tree cutting, deforestation
51. Dib u dejin: resettlement, relocation 2. immigration, movement, journey
52. Dib u heshiisiisn: reconciliation
53. Dil: kill
54. Diya: blood compensation (mag)
55. Diyo bixin: blood compensation, payment for a person's life
56. Dood: argument/debate
57. Dooy: sun soil
58. Duco: blessing
59. Dulqaadahso: tolerance/ patience
60. Dulxaadis: overview
61. Duudsi: dismiss/ forgive and forget
62. Ergo: delegation/ envoy
63. Ergo Nabadeed: peace delegates/ peace envoy
64. Fadhi: session
65. Faq: private discussion
66. Faraxumayn: the act of molesting, misconduct against someone
67. Furitaan: opening
68. Gaadid: transport
69. Gaadmo: off guard, surprise attack, unexpected action against someone, quick raid against unaware person
70. Gablan iyo wiil la’aan: childless, having no baby, without sons
71. Gadood: strike, mutiny, revolt, to become furious
72. Gacansarrayn: having upper hand, being victorious, winning the battle/ game
73. Galad: favour
74. Gammaan: horses and donkeys
75. Ganaax: penalty, fine, sentence, consequence, punishment
76. Gar cadaawe: strict adjudication
77. Gar Sokeeye: flexible adjudication
78. Garsoorid: jury verdict, judiciary system, judgment of a case by a court or group of people
79. Gar: hearing/ verdict
80. Garaad: senior elder (similar to Ugaas or Suldaan)
81. Garawshiyo: concession
82. Garnaqsi: defend; to justify or vindicate
83. Gardhigasho: bringing case to the mediators
84. Gar-diido: unwilling to accept any ruling
85. Garyigil: willing to accept any rules
86. Garqaadasho: acceptance of a verdict
87. Gawaari dhicid: car hijack, car seizure, car robbery
88. Gebogebo: wrap up/ conclusion
89. Gashi: grudge
90. Geed: traditional venue under a tree
91. Geed’yare’: mini conference
92. Geel dhicid: camel looting, robbery of camels
93. Geesi: warrior
94. Gembis: dismissal
95. Go’aan: decision
96. Go’aan qaadasho: decision taking, determination, taking an action/measure
97. Gobanimo: freedom/ boldness
98. Godob reeb: exchange of women for strengthening peace
99. Godob: guilt
100. Godobtir: special price for women being jealous
101. Godobxir: to console the victim by giving something (bride, money, livestock)
102. Go’isu taag: raising a sheet as a white flag in surrender (“wave the flag”)
103. Gogol: peace venue
104. Gole fadhiisin: make somebody sit before the traditional court or Geed
105. Gole: jury
106. Gorgorton: bargaining; negotiation
107. Guddi: committee
108. Guddida Qabanqaabada: preparatory committee
109. Gumaad: up-rooting, massacre, butchery, mass murder, mass destruction
110. Gunaaad: conclusion
111. Gumad: cavalry/ reinforcement
112. Gurgurshe Qowrac: killing burden animal as a punishment or in war
113. Guurti: elders’ meeting to address an issue, especially pertaining to governance or general well-being
114. Guuxay: appreciate
115. Habaar: curse
116. Haladayg: no concession/dare saying
117. Hanjabaad: threatening, intimidating, hostile/ frightening
118. Hantiboob: property looting, robbery, taking by force
119. Hant celis: property restitution, restoration of property
120. Hayin, Biyo Ma daadshe: humble person/ obedient
121. Heshiis: agreement
122. Heshiis buuxa: agreement accepted by all sides, having the means to implement the peace deal in place
123. Heshiisiin: conciliation/ taking role of reconciliation
124. Hibasho, Hiirtaanyo: reminisce about bad event
125. Hiif: reprimand
126. Hub-dhigis: disarm
127. Hubka-dhig horta Adigu-dhig: disarm after the other disarms
128. Irmaan Qowrac: kill lactating animal as punishment or in a war
129. Is afagaranwaa: disagreement
130. Is afgarasho: understanding
131. Isbaaro: road block
132. Isasaamixid: forgiveness, trustfulness, cooperation
133. Isa soo horfarisin: direct talk, convene sides at roundtable for negotiation
134. Isgacan-qaadis: shaking hands with each other
135. Isgacansaarid: shaking hands with each other 2. fit for fighting
136. Is qancin: convince one another
137. Ishin: camels and cows
138. Is mariwaa: deadlock, impasse, stalemate, gridlock, standstill
139. Is nabad gelin: give peace to each other
140. Isu soo dhoweyn: to narrow differences, enable parties to resolve their problems, convince contesting sides into negotiation
141. Isu tanaasul: compromise; give and take
142. Jajuub: pressure
143. Jidgooyo: ambush, waylay, lie in wait 2. surprise attack
144. Jifo: family lineage
145. Jiri: extorters, freelance militiamen
146. Joogid: presence
147. Kala bogsi: forgiveness
148. Kala fogaansho: widening differences, complicating procedures to make peace
149. Kala Kac: standoff
150. Khaaarajin: unlawful killing, organized murdering, assassination
151. Kicin dadweyne: public agitation/ campaigning
152. Kufsi: rape, a sexual attack
153. Kulan: meeting
154. Laabxaadhasho: try to make somebody forgive you
155. Labadubleyn: restrain one's hands
156. Maato-lays: innocent killings
157. Madal: venue, forum
158. Madaxfurasho: ransom, extortion
159. Majo-xaabin: back stabbing, setback, undermining, destabilizing
160. Mag: blood compensation
161. Magdhow: compensation, paying back the cost of damage done, refund for losses
162. Maqnaansho: absent
163. Maraado: punishment for individuals who will not abide by peace agreement
164. Mudo-Diyo: fixed time to pay blood compensation
165. Marti: guests
166. Martigelin: hosting
167. Milil: infection
168. Mooraduug: deprivation, dispossession, denial of properties
169. Mooryaan: extorters, freelance militiamen (same as Jiri, Dayday)
170. Muddo: period
171. Muddo-Diyo: fixed time to pay blood compensation
172. Murtiyen: rationalize/ summarise
173. Mushxarad: jubilee
174. Nabad raadis: peace searching
175. Nabad: peace
176. Nabadgelin: give peace
177. Nabadiid: peace rejecter/ anti-peace
178. Nabadoon: peacemaker/ peace seeker
179. Nabad sugid: securing peace
180. Nabadeyn: peace making
181. Odayaal: elders
182. Qaadhaan: material and/ or financial contribution
183. Qaan-sheegad: claim for compensation
184. Qaan: liability
185. Qabanqaabo: preparation
186. Qaybgal: participation
187. Qax: flee, run away, dislocation
188. Qolo: clan X
189. Qoonsad: sceptical
190. Qoordhiibasho: giving the mandate to the mediation committee
191. Qorituur: draw lots
192. Raas: sub-sub-clan
193. Rafiso: 20% advance of blood compensation given to the victim
194. Reer: clan
195. Samirsiin: help someone to accept the situation with patience, to be tolerant
196. Samotalis: somebody who works for the sake of goodness
197. Shafshafo: cures for wounded person
198. Shir weyne: conference
199. Shir: meeting
200. Shirguddoon: chairing committee
201. Shirqool: conspiracy, plot, machination, set-up
202. Soo hoyasho: giving in, surrendering, yielding, giving way
203. Sooryo: food for guests
204. Suldaan: higher in rank than chief (‘aaqil)
205. Sulux: traditional mechanism of settling disputes, peace making, reconciliation, way of resolving a social dispute through mediation
206. Sumal & Sabeen: ram and lamb paid as apology
207. Tabasho: resentment
208. Tashi: consultation
209. Tol: clans binding together
210. Tolweyne: the greater clan
211. Toogasho: shooting, shelling, gunfire, assassination, murdering, execution
212. Turxaan bexin: trouble shooting/ problem solving
213. Tusaalayn: examples
214. Ugaas: senior elder rank (similar to suldaan)
215. Uurkutaalo: anxiety
216. U kala dab-qaadid: peace shuttling, mediation mission, or coordinating diplomatic message between two parties
217. Wabar: senior elder rank (similar to suldaan)
218. Wada hadal: dialogue
219. Wadatashi: consultation
220. Waran sib/ Waranjiifis: lay down weapons
221. Weerar: attack
222. Weer-xidhasho: trouble shooting
223. Xaal marin: redress for losses for wrong doings
224. Xaal: apology in kind
225. Xabad joojin: ceasefire
226. Xadgudub: transgression
227. Xalay-dhalay: forgive and forget, to cancel grievances (literally: to have given birth the previous evening – no newborn can hold or have caused grievances)
228. Xaq: rights/ entitlement
229. Xasuq: genocide, mass execution, bloodbath, slaughter, annihilation
230. Xeerbeegti: jury
231. Xeer: customary law
232. Xeerhoosaad: by-laws (internal regulations)
233. Xidhitaan: closing
234. Xidid: in-laws
235. Xigaal: close relatives
236. Xoolo-kala-dhicid: property looting, robbery, taking by force
237. Xul: selected people
238. Xulasho: selection
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**Peace mapping films**

1. Peace in Somaliland APD/ Interpeace (English) 2008
2. Geeddi Socodkii Nabadaynta Beelaha Somaliland APD/ Interpeace (Somali) 2008

3. Mudug Galgadud Reconciliation process CRD/ Interpeace (English) 2008
4. Geedi-Socodka Dib-u-Heshiisinta Mudug and Galgadud CRD/ Interpeace (Somali) 2008

5. Idale peace process CRD/ Interpeace (English) 2008
6. Nabad Doonista Iidaale CRD/ Interpeace (Somali) 2008

7. Reconciliation between Gaalje’el and Jijeel communities in Belet Weyne CRD/ Interpeace (English) 2008
8. Dib-u-Heshiisibtta Beelaha Gaalje’el & Jijeele ee Beled Weyne CRD/ Interpeace (Somali) 2008

9. The Burtinle peace process PDRC/ Interpeace (English) 2008
10. Geedi-Socodka Nabadda Burtinle PDRC/ Interpeace (Somali) 2008

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