IRDP / INTERPEACE PEACEBUILDING DIALOGUE & RESEARCH PROGRAMME : EXTERNAL EVALUATION

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The Institute of Research and Dialogue for Peace and the international organisation Interpeace have a partnership programme in Rwanda which has as its main objective to contribute to the construction of peace through the establishment of neutral political space which is used to debate on issues related to peace building. Rwandans at all levels of society, and both inside and outside the country, have been engaged in this national dialogue. An inclusive, participatory process has led to the identification of five priority themes, including the ideology of genocide, the rule of law, and models of democracy appropriate to Rwanda. Further discussion and research on these themes has engaged all levels, from academics to high-ranking officials, religious groups, the private sector, the military, representatives of civil society, and rural communities who include genocide survivors, families with members in prison accused of crimes, and those who fled in 1959 or 1994 and have returned. When discussion and research lead to consensus, the resulting recommendations serve as the basis for advocacy of change in policies and structures.

On the basis of document study, interviews with approximately 35 people, and visits to two of its activities in an urban and a rural area, this evaluation reaches a very positive conclusion:

The IRDP/Interpeace programme has made a significant and strategic contribution to the possibility of building peace in Rwanda. It has selected activities, participants, and strategies which have real influence, and a combined impact greater than any one of its elements.

This positive assessment is supported by those interviewed, virtually without exception. Some were uncertain whether it was perhaps too soon to assess impact. Yet all viewed this programme as having succeeded in making a neutral space in which people of all viewpoints were willing to engage in dialogue. IRDP/Interpeace has established itself as an interlocutor, described in terms such as credible, neutral, objective, and accepted. It has been particularly adept at identifying important issues which were controversial or taboo, yet which needed to be discussed in order for Rwanda to progress in the direction of peace-building, and at engaging those at elite and decision-making levels in dialogue. It has dared to open difficult themes, and has managed to inform and include the full range of actors, from the base to the high political levels.

At the same time, respondents were concerned that the programme may be becoming less strategic in its choice of themes, more focused on practical projects or on lobbying to get its recommendations implemented, and therefore not continuing to prioritise its distinctive position and advantages. There was some anxiety lest the programme be the victim of its own success, too caught up with activities to do the strategic thinking that contributes to its delicate navigating of the complex socio-political situation.

Findings include observations about the present programme, dilemmas, and possibilities for future action. The evaluators offer a number of recommendations, including:
• Continue as catalyst: preserve dialogue space for strategic discussion of important issues
• Pilot: try new things, and support other organisations to do what is already established
• Convey what you do more vividly and more creatively
• Help others to use the successful methodology, but do not try to run projects everywhere
• Focus on issues crucial to peace-building

FINDINGS OF EVALUATION

CONTEXT

The relevance and feasibility for a peacebuilding programme in Rwanda were being explored in 2000-2001. Although experiencing greater security, the situation in Rwanda at the time remained sensitive. It was also a time of important policy debates and policy changes.

In 2000-2001, the country was peaceful. The movement of infiltration stopped in the north and solidarity camps were established to sensitize the returnees on how important the peace was. It was during this period that the Commission for Demobilization was established because the size of the army had to be reduced and because the majority of the returnees were ex combatants of the Habyarimana army who took refuge in the forests of the Democratic Republic of Congo.

During this period, all the commissions such as Unity and Reconciliation Commission, the Human Rights Commission, the Electoral Commission, and a commission for constitutional reform were established. The Commission for Unity and Reconciliation aimed to work closely with all categories in the society to mobilize them in order to give the new direction the country has to go to avoid a new genocide. The new leadership used that institution, which elaborated policies which brought people together and talked about what happened in 1994 and why it is a need to prevent it from happening again. The first national conference on unity and reconciliation took place in that period where for the first time the diaspora was invited; some of them decided to abandon their status of refugees. It was important for IRDP to expand that programme to other categories of Rwandan society.

The constitutional reform was initiated to prepare the first elections at the local level. Indeed, in 2000 – 2001, a decentralization policy started to be implemented, which gave more power to the base especially for human and resources management; The aim of this policy was to have policy decision makers not far from the community and to have more participation of the beneficiaries in the design, the implementation, the monitoring and evaluation of the programmes.

This led to the first elections of local leaders after the 1994 genocide. Those who were 18 years old and above were invited to elect their leaders at the ‘cell’ (‘cellule’) level (1999). The approach used for those elections was to queue behind the candidates and those with more people were voted. This was a big event because the last elections took place in 1990 for the Members of Parliament and for the President. The last elections of local leaders had been before 1973. Very few people in the community remembered those.
During this period there was a big controversy between Africa Watch, other international human rights defenders and the official reports on human rights. The Rwanda Human Rights Commission was established to balance those different reports.

It was during that period that Gacaca started to be implemented. Gacaca was a community based approach to dispute resolution and for reconciliatory justice. At the time there were still 120,000 prisoners causing a huge cost to the government but also awaiting a processing of their cases. Thousands of genocide perpetrators were in jail waiting for their trial; others who were suspected were remaining free and lived side by side with victims of genocide. The Rwandan courts could not ensure proper trial to all prisoners. Gacaca hearings were set up all over the country to deal with the large majority of suspects seen as followers rather than active leaders of the genocide. Society was fragile and there were too many taboos. With the initiation of Gacaca, some people fled the country, others decided to eliminate the witnesses and the genocide survivors, some people decided to revenge and killed the genocide suspected. At that time dialogue was impossible on 1994 events. IRDP was created with the general aim of reducing the gap of mistrust between members of the same society. The IRDP programme was also created to provide more space for other categories of people to give their thoughts on human rights and justice in Rwanda and to help the society break the violent silence.

This was also a period of changes in the strategy of the international assistance actors. Donors were more ready to fund the country’s development through budget support and no longer through national and international NGO’s. In order to have access to donors funds, the government of Rwanda in 2000, initiated the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP), the National Programme of Investment, the Vision 2020 which were the base for the development of Rwanda. There was a big participation of the population to define the new direction of the country. NGO staff were understandably unhappy with this change in the donors’ funding strategy. It also had an impact on the role of international NGOs, which used to serve as platforms for Rwandans to express their political concerns. The IRDP programme was not consciously initiated to counter this situation, but did intend to create political space for people to talk about their concerns and peacebuilding needs.

Finally, President Bizimungu was removed in March 2000, which created a political crisis and some key politicians decided to go into exile. This had an impact on people’s thoughts of new leadership. Pasteur Bizimungu was put in jail a few months after this move. The IRDP programme also sought to facilitate dialogue between people from different political background.

**PERTINENCE**

Overall, the programme was seen as highly pertinent and effective in contributing to the building of peace in Rwanda.

The broad objective itself was accepted as valid and important. The intermediate objectives changed over time, as was to be expected, and there was general agreement that peace-building is on-going and that this programme is indeed making a contribution.

The programme was described in terms such as fresh, inclusive, open. Those interviewed said that it had begun at a delicate moment, which turned out to be opportune because the programme dared
to try things others did not dare to do. In particular, the focus on dialogue about socio-political issues was seen as daring and effective. By opening a space for dialogue and helping to create a culture of dialogue, respondents reported, this programme has addressed a key need in the country, and has done so effectively.

“This is the most interesting initiative in Rwanda, with big questions and real impact.” --- an international donor

Among those interviewed, there were three programmes broadly seen as addressing peacebuilding and dialogue: the National Commission for Unity and Reconciliation (NCUR,) the Centre for Conflict Management (CCM) at the university in Butare, and the IRDP / Interpeace programme. This evaluation focuses on the IRDP / Interpeace programme. It was seen by those who know it as more participatory in its methodology and more politically independent than NCUR, more participatory and less academic than CCM. Broadly, we found that people who have had some involvement with this programme have no difficulty in describing its distinct advantages over the others, while those who have not been involved understand it to be similar in self-description to NCUR and presume that the two cover more or less the same territory. This difference is part of a larger issue of how IRDP / Interpeace conveys what this programme is about, an issue which will recur later in this report.

The programme began at an opportune moment, not too early, yet at a time when this kind of open discussion was not practiced. The analysis on which the programme is based was seen as correct, identifying issues which concerned people at the time, and which were not being discussed. This had partly to do with the IRDP’s ability to establish immediate credibility through its leaders and committees, and partly to do with the methodology introduced by Interpeace and adapted by IRDP. The process of ongoing analysis became its own guarantor: because it was an open, inclusive process of discussion, followed by research which was seen as objective, with careful and visible documentation, the results as well as the process were accepted as trustworthy.

There was general appreciation of the research themes. There was trust in the National Group process which identified and prioritised them, and in the working groups and steering groups which engaged in research and advocacy for them. At various levels, respondents indicated that they had pressed to add additional themes which seemed important. The themes chosen first (e.g., the ideology and denial of genocide, the disputed history of Rwanda, issues about democracy and rights) were seen as fundamental, delicate, and viewed at the time as taboo. This programme dared to open these topics for discussion. As the process unfolded, these themes were expanded and combined with others and more themes were added. Most of those interviewed were positive about this, while several mentioned that not all themes were equally strategic or important, and some of those recently developed were the sorts of thing government ought to be dealing with routinely. In this respect, the choice of themes feeds into a larger discussion about the strategic focus of this programme, which will come up again in this evaluation.

**DIALOGUE AND PARTICIPATORY ACTION RESEARCH**

Interpeace introduced its programme into Rwanda with stated objectives of providing a neutral space for dialogue in which Rwandans could arrive at a consensus on priority issues facing their
country and how to address them, in a participatory methodology.\(^1\) It stated the critical preconditions, and implied a way to measure results\(^2\), as:

- the existence of social and political space for dialogue
- the readiness of main actors to engage (as an opportunity, not a distraction)
- the willingness of government to leave the space ‘unencumbered’

The methodology of participatory, multi-stakeholder dialogue and of participatory action research had been used and developed by Interpeace and its partners in other countries\(^3\), and was made available to IRDP and its staff, who adapted it to Rwandan realities.

From the beginning, observers expected it would be difficult, if not impossible, to build a safe neutral space for dialogue, in a society still constrained by genocide and division. It was seen as essential that the programme act as a catalyst, a credible and trusted interlocutor holding a neutral space, independent of government yet not an opponent of it. Interviewees agreed, really without exception, that the programme has been very successful at this. It has created and held the neutral space for dialogue, through clubs and fora, and has involved in it all levels of Rwandan society, from farmers on the hillside to decision-makers in government, economy, and political opposition.

As one member of a local dialogue club pointed out: “It was important to begin without consensus, without even thinking about consensus, but seeing whether we could say openly what we thought. Then, we could debate, disagree, set priorities, and eventually work toward consensus.”

Staff of the programme who act as facilitators are masters of the methodology, encouraging people of diverse opinions to participate, and drawing out commonalities and areas which need further debate and perhaps research. The methodology has been adaptable enough so that it suits Rwandan culture and realities, while gaining acceptance of the commitment to inclusive dialogue\(^4\). Staff facilitate about half the sessions of the village dialogue clubs; the others are led by the club’s facilitator, or by members who take it in turn to be facilitators themselves. In this respect, the methodology is being assimilated and passed on.

In effect, the programme combines real dialogue spaces with what might be thought of as virtual spaces. There are five dialogue clubs at village level, which have been meeting twice a month for three years or more, bringing together the full range of viewpoints, from genocide survivors to former soldiers and those accused of participation in genocide. There are 50 dialogue groups in schools, in various parts of the country. There are also fora for dialogue at higher levels of society, bringing together government and political opposition, civil society, human rights activists and bankers, academic analysts and journalists. Each of these structures involves a limited number of people, and each is geographically specific, based in one village or school, or in the capital. What weaves these together, and engages others in the dialogue, is the creative use of video-technology

\(^1\) Adapted from: IRDP / Interpeace Plan d’activités, 2003.
\(^3\) For more detailed description, see Appendix: MODULE 2 Strategy-principles-roles.
\(^4\) Internal evaluations of the dialogue programmes outline the development of the methodology and the interplay between the expectations of staff and participants.
to record, document, and disseminate the dialogue. This has enabled the involvement of the diaspora, scattered among African and other cities, and regarded from the beginning as a crucial actor in the situation. Several speakers said that they had been reluctant to speak at the beginning, but seeing others speak out on video made them want to put a different viewpoint. Interviews with the diaspora revealed that they were astonished to see people inside the country speaking so freely. People in the village clubs were surprised that the diaspora included both extreme and moderate views. Influential people were surprised at the diversity of viewpoints and the level of analysis coming out in dialogue clubs. Seeing others speak freely on video convinced many people that it was safe to speak freely, and possible to engage in debate with people of very different views and backgrounds.

IRDP has carved out a role for itself as a neutral catalyst and facilitator of dialogue, able to propose interesting questions and to engage people of diverse background and opinions in this dialogue. A key issue, perhaps the key issue at the beginning, was whether IRDP would be able to position itself as independent of government, yet not part of any opposition, but as a catalyst and facilitator. It did this initially by emphasising the importance of Rwandans facilitating this discussion about their common situation, and persuading government as well as everyone else that such open, inclusive discussion was necessary in order to build peace. Once dialogue was established, IRDP became the catalyst of research: not just the exchange of opinions, but rigorous and objective research.

"IRDP has shown itself to be, not just neutral, but well-informed and well-connected," according to one government interviewee.

The programme did not stop with dialogue, but continued through the process of identifying obstacles to peace, prioritising the most important factors, facilitating participatory research and discussion, and finally facilitating discussion to reach consensus, both on the factors and on possible ways to address them. A programme which merely brought people together, a 'talking shop,' would not have continued to attract busy people over so long a time, said many participants.

EFFECTIVENESS OF STRATEGIES

1. The Process.

The strategy relies strongly on dialogue between different groups of people who are in different categories. IRDP established a free space for debate and dialogue. People were invited to say what they think on themes. This strategy was based on full participation.

When IRDP started this programme, it was after the genocide, where approximately one million people died, and three million fled to neighbouring countries. The majority of the refugees returned in 1998. There was a transitional government. The people suspected of committing genocide were arrested and put in prison; other families had had members killed; others were involved in "revenge" attacks. There was a strong suspicion that people from these different experiences could not talk each other. Yet these are the very kinds of people IRDP involved in its dialogue programmes and fora. To implement this programme, over time IRDP put in place a set of participatory structures which include a National Group, Working Groups, Steering Committees, Dialogue Clubs, School Clubs and a Board. These structures include different categories of people and this strategy was
efficient to reach the goal which was to allow people to talk and to solve problems of the moment. The quality of people and the number of participants were the indicators of the success. Indeed, there were historians, economists, genocide victims, and suspected genocide perpetrators, families whose members are in prison, high-ranking politicians, army and police. All these actors need to talk about peace, reconciliation and the future of the country. The research aims to understand the causes of these conflicts and to involve everyone in the debate and the search for solutions.

2.   Representative and participatory structures.

From the start IRDP created a Board that includes 12 people from Church organizations, Governor of National Bank, Senator, mayor of district, representative of Diaspora from South Africa, Lecturer of National University of Rwanda, Ombudsman, and consultant.

Members of the board are politically influential, this means that they play the role of advocacy of all the ideas which facilitate the implementation of the recommendations at high level. The Board includes representatives of religious groups, which groups are the majority in the country. The audience of religious groups reaches more than 90% of the population. If IRDP wants to maximize its outreach, this is a very important network in Rwanda. The Board also includes members of the Senate who play the role of advocacy based on recommendations which come from the national groups. This is very strategic, because all those high government officials can add value to IRDP work in terms of reaching more high rank people. The Board includes one university lecturer and this brings in input from an academic perspective. All the documents are shared by members of the board before being disseminated to other IRDP customers. The role of the professors is to make sure that researches are well-documented and conclusions are accurate. The board includes a local authority representative who knows very well the IRDP approach, which can be a tool for community development

The board discusses all the working documents, such as strategic plans, plans of action and financial and technical reports. The board helps IRDP as an advisory body. The board has in its mandate to protect political space, it gives the correct information to different actors on sensitive subjects and the results of research are disseminated to others who may use them. However, board members are busy with other tasks and do not themselves have enough time for more interaction and influence to take forward the recommendations

Since late 2003 the IRPD programme has a “national group” which is the decision – making and orientation body. It is composed of almost 200 representatives of the different segments of the Rwanda population, the diaspora and the international community, who meet at the end of every phase of the programme in order to validate the results of IRDP’s work and to provide the programme with guidance about the next steps.

During the second phase of the programme5 – called the in-depth participatory research and dialogue phase – which lasted from 2004 to 2005, IRDP created 5 working groups made up 30 members each and chosen among the National Group members for their expertise and reputation. The Working Groups helped IRDP’s team to conduct the research on the five priority peacebuilding issues that were chosen by the National Group in 2003. The working groups have a role of helping to do a deep analysis of the priority themes. Its members include mainly experts, whose contribution

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5 For a more detailed description of the Rwanda programme’s sequencing and structure, see appendix: ‘The Phases of the Rwanda’ and ‘Architecture of the Rwanda Programme’.
adds value to the discussions. In terms of different institutions they belong to, they come from the Senate, universities, President’s office, Civil Society, Demobilisation Commission, Parliament, Ministries and the High Court. Working and sub-working groups have the same composition of people, but more specialized in their fields. Their contributions are in two domains: information from the institutions they represent to inform IRDP, and the dissemination of the results of the debate from Working Groups and Sub-Groups.

The consultants from inside the country who in general are from University have high calibre, some of them are visiting professors, others are in freelance. Unfortunately, some academic experts have other work to do and don’t have enough time to support IRDP researchers.

In 2004, IRDP supported the creation of 5 more permanent “dialogue clubs” who are from the rural population and are helped by IRDP to create fora of debate in order to rebuild the social fabric at the local level. The composition of the dialogue clubs is much diversified, and their involvement has had considerable impact among decision-makers. Indeed, the participative approach is very appropriate for use by local leaders with the decentralization policy. This requires situation analysis by the community, where issues, constraints, and opportunities are analyzed and the community is invited to find solutions to their problems.

Still, the critical mass is small, which reduces the possible impact at the grass-roots level. However, expanding to have more groups would markedly affect the existing programme; in our view, it would lessen the impact and increase the management burden. At the high level, participation in the fora is diversified and represents the major players among the decision makers.

During the third phase of the programme, which started in 2006, IRDP set up 3 Steering committees, which are responsible for ensuring that the recommendations from the research and dialogue process are implemented by decision makers. Members were chosen for their capacity to influence decision-makers and their expertise on the issue at stake. Some are university lecturers.

In 2007 IRDP also initiated 50 School Clubs who meet every month to debate about democracy and tolerance.

3. Participants Focus the Agenda – and take Ownership.

Annex 3 provides a succinct summary of the various phases of the Rwanda programme so far. What is important however is to understand the underlying logic of the process: society-wide consultations (2002-2003) in an initial ‘issue-mapping phase’ presented an opportunity for Rwandans to initiate a national debate. The research theme distilled the many issues into 14 themes which then were presented in November 2003 to a ‘national group’.

This in turn selected among the 14 five priority themes, namely:

- Genocide in Rwanda,
- Economic Development in the Face of Challenges Posed by Poverty,
- The Role of the History of Rwanda in the Genocide,
- The Rule of Law and Justice in a Context of Repeated Conflicts,
• The Model of Democracy Appropriate to Rwanda.

Each priority theme was then substantively developed based on the research conducted by a sub-working group with an IRDP researcher. Each sub-group was composed of a maximum of three people who are experts in each identified field. Those people occupy different high positions in government, political opposition, private sector, civil society. There are IRDP research papers which are the results of the discussion from different Working Groups. Unfortunately, there is still a weakness: a delay in publishing results due to major delays in receiving pledged funding in 2006-2007 and difficult in finding an acceptable translator, and this is a major complaint from IRDP participants. Summary results already appear on the IRDP website, though not everyone has access to the internet.

The participants in the national group subsequently debate the recommendations of the Working Groups and reach a consensus before going to the next step, which is the implementation of the recommendations or the identification of new areas for iterative research-dialogue.

In brief, the content of the programme emerges from the participatory procedure followed.

Nowadays IRDP team members can gather ideas from the larger number of participatory structures that have been established in recent years, and also use these ideas to support research. The number of people who participate in IRDP programme has also been gradually increasing. There are now 50 debating clubs in schools which cover 1,500 people; 210 people are in the rural dialogue clubs, 30 people in steering committees, 150 people in working groups, and 15 people in sub-working groups, 200 people in the national group. (Obviously some people may be members of or participants in more than one forum).

4. Engaging Rwandans in the Diaspora.

IRDP estimates to have reached 1,000 Rwandans living abroad (in Canada, USA, Belgium, France, Switzerland, Germany, Uganda, Kenya, South Africa, Mozambique, Senegal and Zambia). Reaching Rwandans in the diaspora was deemed critically important because they were not in touch with the evolving climate in Rwanda itself, and of course also because much of the political opposition resides abroad. Diaspora work however is very resource intensive, in terms of money and time.

5. Audio-Visual as Tool.

IRDP uses an interesting tool which is audio video inside the country from the base to the national level, and outside the country with Rwandese diaspora, to collect thoughts and ideas on the priority themes. Audio-video technologies were an excellent tool to stimulate dialogue; all the people contacted were unanimous. Indeed, people in the countryside have a chance to communicate their ideas to politicians through films and video and vice-versa. Those technologies allow people to see other people’s behaviour, and sometimes cause them to change their attitudes in the debate. They see how freedom of speech can reduce tension between antagonists, how people speaking on video can reduce the numbers of taboo subjects. For the diaspora, audio-video techniques gave a chance to the opposition to talk and to communicate with people inside the country. In general, audio-video helps to break the silence and to go into real debate on sensitive issues in the country.
6. Relationship management.

IRDP has good working relationships at all different levels of the structure: with public institutions, civil society, private sector, religious groups and at the same time operates independently, which makes IRDP uniquely able to respond to the crucial issues of Rwanda society. Indeed, in the steering committees, there are representatives of the President’s office, senators and members of parliament, mayor of the district, academicians, demobilization commission, and the high court. Most of those co-operators are among the decision-makers and are called to help in the implementation of the recommendations. Most of the interviewees from the civil society, private sector, and religious groups said that IRDP has excellent relationships with the public institutions, and at the same time operates quite independently, which makes IRDP uniquely able to respond to the crucial issues of the Rwanda society.

The effectiveness of communications can be improved. In general the communication is done primarily through the structures, from the board to dialogue clubs, and the debate is the tool. Reports are compiled by IRDP staff; however those reports have not yet been published, which is unfortunate. Those who participate in the debates and in research programs are complaining that there is no feedback. They say they don’t know what IRDP is doing with that information. For the communication with the international actors, IRDP does it through reports, meetings, visits and audio-video for diaspora. This way of communication is very good because the targeted audience can easily be reached.

7. Partnership.

Interpeace is the major partner of IRDP; it was instrumental in establishing IRDP as a Rwandan organisation able to act as a neutral interlocutor. Interpeace played an important role at the beginning of the programme. They visited all the high government officials and spent a whole year to design the vision and the mission of the programme. IRDP identified the initial candidates for a Rwandan team, notably Jean Paul Mugiraneza, Prof. Pierre Rwanyindo, and Dr. Naasson Munyandamutsa. In the early stages, Interpeace started by exposing the cases of post conflict countries and the methodology they use to create space for dialogue. The key Rwandans then decided to build a team and to start the program in Rwanda.

Although Interpeace continues to ‘accompany’ IRDP, IRDP is clearly a Rwandan institution. Indeed all the actors are Rwandese from the grass-roots dialogue clubs to the top policy decision-makers. IRDP with its participants treats Rwandan problems and brings Rwandan solutions.

Partnership was well done indeed. IRDP has had a good working relationship with Interpeace, which has international experience in conflict management and brings in its methodology of free and open debate, which is efficient in the context of Rwanda. IRDP is committed to this, and all like the methodology, especially the researchers.

Interpeace has brought its international experience which currently extends to Timor Leste, Aceh-Indonesia, Burundi, Guatemala-Honduras-EI Salvador, the Somali regions (Somaliland, Puntland,

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6 Common usage in this field is to refer to organisations as partners. Individuals are referred to as participants, counter-parts, co-operators, or even members.

7 For a more detailed description of this methodology, see Appendix: MODULE 2 Strategy-principles-roles.
south-central Somalia), Israel, Palestine, Liberia and Guinea Bissau. From an original ‘consumer’ of the collective experience, IRDP has now become a ‘provider’ and ‘resource’.

Even though it works closely for fundraising, Interpeace gives the necessary freedom to IRDP for programme design and implementation within Rwanda.

While Interpeace accompanies the programme to the formulation of recommendation step, it leaves the Rwandan team and participant fully in the lead regarding the implementation of the recommendations.
INFLUENCE, IMPACT, AND SUSTAINABILITY

Many of those interviewed for this evaluation commented that it was difficult, and perhaps too soon, to expect to find evidence of real impact which could be attributed directly and uniquely to the IRDP / Interpeace programme. Nonetheless, many did believe that the programme had influence, and at times even a fairly direct impact, on the overall situation.

In the early stages of this programme, a key issue was whether it would be possible to work independently and foster space for debate in a political climate which was seen as narrow and restricted. Relationships between staff and government representatives have not always been smooth, but they have developed over time, through perseverance in exploring issues and facing differences of opinion.

The opening of a neutral space for dialogue and debate was seen as having impact both at the base and at decision-making level. Most people said that there was no such tradition in Rwanda, even before modern conflicts, so changes could be seen clearly. It may be appropriate to use the indicators described in the earlier section on Dialogue: the existence of dialogue space, the willingness of actors to engage, and government’s willingness to leave the space ‘unencumbered.’ All of these were noted by people interviewed in the course of this evaluation. Many of those interviewed reported that, when this programme began, government tended to be quite sceptical of disagreement and dissent, and resistant to the notion that public disagreement about political issues could be useful. At all levels, people could see that disagreement is now somehow normal and to some extent accepted, and can lead to agreement rather than violence. Busy people do continue to engage in dialogue and fora, and to serve on the structures and committees of the programme. Government has not ‘encumbered’ the space, has not closed it or constrained it. Many observers believe that there is still insufficient space for dialogue and disagreement within Rwanda, and that government is suspicious of it. Most of those interviewed believed that this space has expanded considerably, and attribute this change in part to the IRDP / Interpeace programme. Government representatives interviewed said that they have found a degree of debate and disagreement useful.

It is not clear that there is now a truly open atmosphere for political debate in Rwanda, but it is clear that the situation has changed during the time this programme has operated. Nor is it clear that the current opening would be sustained, if, for example, IRDP ceased to function, or if political circumstances changed dramatically. Some of those interviewed at grass-roots level thought that the space for dialogue could not continue without IRDP, while those closer to decision-making either were not sure or responded that “in theory” the space should be sustainable without IRDP. Nonetheless, most respondents asserted that IRDP has had this impact, and that it has changed the overall situation somewhat.

Different kinds of impact and influence are mentioned, depending on each person’s own background and involvement with the project. They cite improved relations between vertical levels (local, district, national) as well as better relations across horizontal divisions of experience and viewpoint.

"Local authorities now consult members of our dialogue club. They want to know our views when they are preparing for meetings at the district level. And they asked us to facilitate a dialogue on peace. The local authorities also use this methodology in ‘ubudehe’ consultations."
This programme is seen as having considerable influence on political decision-makers. It has done this by involving them (in fora, research groups, and its Board) as well as by engaging influential people in the steering committees, who in turn act as advocates for IRDP with decision-makers whom they know well. By keeping those at political levels informed, by providing them with research results and the full spectrum of views of the population, and by conveying the real consequences of policies without publicly denouncing anyone, IRDP has made itself trusted and influential.

Those interviewed offered several examples of impact. On research themes such as genocide-denial and population growth, for example, (both seen as taboo subjects,) IRDP has gathered views, consequences on the ground, careful research, and examples from other countries, with the result that these issues are now the subject of cabinet papers, laws, and other processes. While it may not be possible to say that IRDP alone had this influence, it is certainly said that IRDP alone opened these topics for debate in a way which encouraged people to discuss them and politicians to deal with them. The programme was seen as having made a particular contribution in fostering de-centralisation, which is now acceptable to government and being implemented.

According to one interlocutor from civil society: “The methodology allows IRDP to broach themes others wouldn’t dare, like the ideology of genocide. My organisation tried and failed, but IRDP treated it as a phenomenon, described it and its consequences on levels we had never seen, which led to clarification of the law.”

The current phase of this programme, which includes advocacy on the basis of agreed recommendations, is the one which generates the most disagreement. Some of those interviewed see this as essential, bringing all the dialogue and research to fruition in influencing political decisions. Others commented that there are too many recommendations, on more ordinary political topics than those initially identified, and that IRDP ought to confine itself to what it does best: maintaining dialogue and research on delicate but strategic themes. Some of those interviewed believed that the programme is risking its credibility and its objectivity by having a lobbying activity (even though IRDP states clearly that it does no lobbying, but facilitates members of the steering committees to do it.) Those in government generally appreciate this phase, since it corresponds quite directly to their own work, and assists them to do it better. Overall, there is not a great deal of criticism of this aspect, but there is some discomfort, and a fear that the programme will lose either its strategic focus or its hard-won credibility.

Generally, this programme is seen by its staff, participants, and others as surprisingly successful in bringing about change. It is seen as having direct impact in changing attitudes and in increasing tolerance of different opinions. Whether these changes will endure is less easy to say at this moment.

The impact on the diaspora is quite clear, according to one participant who is now living in Europe: “We learned that we differed among ourselves, and that we could change.”

It has also had an influence on certain specific political issues, including institutional change, such as contributing to the establishment of commissions on aspects of the genocide, and influencing the possibility for political parties to organise at sectoral level. These are seen as likely to be sustained.

Perhaps the greatest influence is cited in the domain of socio-political discourse. The programme began at a time when people felt that many topics were too delicate to discuss, whether for fear of reprisals or of opening old wounds. Now, it seems possible to debate these issues, and perhaps
even arrive at a consensus about what to do about some of them. The effect of this is to make space for discussion, to focus attention on doing something together about critical problems, and to make the notion of disagreement a respectable, responsible part of civic participation.

“We are seeing a will to create political opposition, even within our party, because of these fora, discussions, and neutral space,” according to one participant from government.

Similar changes have taken place at the local level e.g. in the dialogue clubs. Its members were not able to talk at the beginning, but through the experience later on were able to be honest and raise the real issues as they experienced them. It is said that some victims were able to forgive and some of those suspected have asked to be forgiven, which is, of course, what the parallel process of gacaca courts is all about.

Many of these impacts and influences were envisaged and hoped for in the development of the programme. Others have been unexpected, even to the senior staff and Board. It is in the nature of peace-building programmes, particularly if they are based on excellent analysis and strategy, that they make their participants more active, confident, and autonomous, and thus that they have unexpected as well as expected impacts.

**ADMINISTRATIVE ISSUES**

1. **Human Resources**

   In 2002, IRDP started with two staff and gradually grew up to 15 staff in 2007 of whom 8 are researchers, one Director and two deputies. The staff also includes one audio-video technician, one administrator, one accountant and one administrative assistant. The second deputy position (responsible for the administration and finance) was opened and fulfilled recently.

   Human resources are very unbalanced considering the volume of work. At the beginning, there was no problem but currently, the same researcher works on two themes, has to accompany dialogue clubs, steering committees, has to reinforce the fora which don’t have permanent staff. Monitoring of the implementation of the recommendations and other tasks which came in the third phase have put more pressure on researchers and this is a handicap for the implementation of programme. In order to respond to those constraints, IRDP has restructured the organization and appointed a second deputy director. All the work is made collectively, though each researcher is responsible for one theme. IRDP also has put effort into a planning exercise. That is why there is a triannual plan of action, an annual plan of action, a tri-month plan of action, a monthly plan of action and a monthly monitoring plan of action which helps the staff to monitor every week the implementation of activities. For the monitoring of activities, all the planning documents help to provide for a good monitoring system. However, because the variables are qualitative, it is difficult to find good indicators. The coordination is well done because each staff knows what he or she has to do, the terms of references are clear and the timetable for each activity is well defined. Yet activities get sometimes delayed because of the volume of the work of researchers, which affects the deadline for results delivery. The question is: Do we reduce the number of activities, or do we hire more staff?

2. **Financing and Finance Management.**
The Rwanda Programme over the years has received funding from nine donors: Sweden (Sida), Norway, USAID, European Union, Belgium Embassy, Swiss Cooperation, US Embassy, Japan and UNDF/UNDP. A majority of the funding comes through Interpeace which plays an important role in the fund-raising because of all its international background. IRDP now also directly raises and receives direct funding. Yet Interpeace continues to play an important role in maintaining (at times minimum) cash flow during the periods of waiting for funding decisions and disbursements.

For the budget, the most serious constraints have been periodic cash flow problems. To a degree Interpeace has been able to help maintain at least the minimum required cash flow. Funding delays however led to delays in several activities that were planned for the 3rd phase, such as dissemination of the research findings, further engagement of the diaspora, and the building of the Peace Centre.

Interpeace helps to build networks with the donors and with peace-building programmes in other countries. Interpeace does the internal audit every two months, provides training and software for accounting, and reviews monthly financial reports, which helps IRDP to be strong and transparent in financial accounting, which gives a good image and credibility to IRDP vis a vis the donors.

3. Assets.

The physical institution is not appropriate for the current situation, particularly for audio-video development. The audio video room is hot because of computers running eight hours a day, so it is better to find a cooling system as soon as possible. The offices are too small to motivate discussions with high level people. People contacted complain that the conference room is inappropriate and poorly furnished. Because the expected results came from the groups discussions, actors suggest a more comfortable conference facility for their productivity. The solution suggested by the staff is to build a peace centre; that is why a fund raising is important to increase resources.

For the logistics, there are two four-wheel-drive vehicles, which is not enough to implement all the field work they conduct, to monitor the dialogue clubs and the income-generating activities. A third is expected which should be enough for the implementation of the programme. For equipment, the computers are too old.

4. Partnership in Capacity-Strengthening.

Interpeace provided support to IRDP in tri-annual planning, reviewing all the documents and translating those for Geneva and Nairobi. Interpeace attends all the support group meetings where IRDP meets donors and helps in mobilisation of funds. Interpeace also pays a role in strengthening IRDP’s capacities in finance and HR, communication, result-based management, reporting, etc. In general, Interpeace provides technical assistance.
From the Board to School Clubs, the dialogue clubs, to the school clubs, the provincial and the districts forums, the national forums have not been created in one go. Indeed at the beginning, there was a consultation of the population through focus group discussions on the source of the conflict based on research base data in 2002 – 2003, at the end of 2003, there was the first national group which defined the five priorities issues to be debated and discussed based on participatory research and findings. In 2004 IRDP created 5 working groups who helped IRDP to conduct research in the participatory way. In 2004, people living in rural areas expressed their interest to have dialogue clubs at their level to build social fabric. In 2005, the national group requested IRDP to encourage key actors to include course on tolerance, democratic principles and practices in their educational programmes. IRDP set up 50 clubs in 25 secondary schools. In 2006, the National Group requested IRDP to have a steering committee of which the main responsibility was to make sure that the recommendations from research and discussions are implemented by the decision makers.
SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE

In addition to being generally enthusiastic about the programme, many of those interviewed also had suggestions for its future. Broadly, they wanted this programme to continue and to get bigger, though there were contradictory pieces of advice. The following sections will group the suggestions, and conclude with some of the dilemmas mentioned.

EXPANSION: DO MORE OF THE SAME THINGS

There were a variety of suggestions which essentially involved continuing with the same activities, while multiplying the people involved. They included:

- A dialogue club on every hill, or in every district
- More fora, and more of them outside of Kigali
- More fora, on different themes, and involving more administrators and implementers as well as decision-makers
- Target young people more

EXTENSION: BROADEN THE ACTIVITIES AS WELL AS THE TARGET GROUPS

Others suggested ways to extend the programme into new areas, including different kinds of dissemination:

- Extend the programme to district and local authorities, taking up themes appropriate to their work.
- Use radio call-in shows to confront different views.
- Buy a radio or television station and use it for dissemination, or use private radio and TV.
- Disseminate results and ideas in ways that do not require reading (Radio soap opera? Comic books? Film festival?)
- Involve participants in exchanges with other countries.
- Add practical projects (e.g., economic development, reconciliation).
- Try *ingando* for a longer time, like a 2-week summer school, with ongoing discussion.
- Go beyond research to changing systems and mentalities.
- Get the base communities doing their own lobbying.
PARTNERSHIP / TRAINING: DISSEMINATE THROUGH OTHERS

Another group of suggestions involved IRDP having greater impact either through partnerships or by passing its methodology along to other organisations, so that more is accomplished without IRDP having to expand. This has not generally been a feature of the programme, in part because of the commitment to a distinctive approach which might be difficult to pass on to others with any guarantee of its being pursued at such a high standard. Nonetheless, many of those interviewed believed that disseminating the methodology was a key strategy for achieving more without infinitely expanding the programme.

- Train / pass the tools on to NGOs, local authorities, and the government commission NCUR, so that they can run dialogue clubs, income-generation programmes, or fora.
- Create a civil society organisation to disseminate the methodology and train others to use it.
- Do practical projects (income-generation, development projects) through partners who already do this well.
- Join government in a focus on poverty reduction.

EXPANDING IS RISKY

Around half of those interviewed were concerned that extending or expanding the programme might bring about a decline in the quality of it. The credibility, objectivity, and success as a neutral interlocutor would be difficult to pass on to new partners or large numbers of new staff. Simply continuing the existing programme seemed to many people to require more funding and more personnel, and even this was seen as a risk. As a consequence, a few said: Don’t expand, don’t add anything, just focus on your unique niche.

- Concentrate on dialogue, financing others’ initiatives, political influence, and reflection for politicians or for universities / schools. Don’t lose your focus or risk losing credibility by doing development projects or direct lobbying.
- IRDP is needed for the most controversial or neglected themes; don’t waste time or risk your credibility with issues anyone can work on. Differentiate between issues which need deep research, and those which need to be opened up for broad discussion at the base.

DILEMMAS

This evaluation has revealed some issues which are not easily resolved, but which are of some concern to the evaluators, as well as to those interviewed. They fall broadly into three areas.

1. The existing programme is very distinctive and very much valued. People want it to continue, and to grow, but only if it can continue with the same high quality: independent, credible, strategic, well-led, well-facilitated. It is desirable for more people to benefit, yet essential not to risk losing the excellence of the programme.
2. The programme is seen as having a distinctive ‘comparative advantage:’ its ability to identify and frame themes which need to be explored, its capacity to create and sustain neutral dialogue spaces, and its ability to engage and influence political decision-makers. Already, the programme is seen by some as diluting this advantage:

♦ By working on more abstract / generalised themes, or issues which could be managed by others (poverty, the budget, job training)

♦ By engaging in income-generation projects, in which it does not seem to have expertise or comparative advantage, but which take institutional time and energy away from what no one else is doing

♦ By moving from discussion and research to specific recommendations, and then lobbying for them, with the risk that decision-makers see IRDP as a political opponent or just another lobbyist

3. Generally, the development of the programme has been to add new activities and structures, without ending any of the previous ones. Unless the organisation is to expand forever, strategic decisions need to be made about priorities, and specifically about the distinctive focus of the IRDP / Interpeace programme. A clearer strategic focus should also make it easier to describe activities in ways that others can more easily understand.

It is understood that these are the dilemmas of success. Because of its distinctive methodology, IRDP consults widely and draws its priorities from the process of consultation and discussion. Its participants pressure it to expand because they trust the organisation, and they see the expansion as the next logical step in building upon the work they themselves are engaged in. If the programme were to stand still, it might very well decline.

Nonetheless, the programme and its leaders have a responsibility to focus all this energy and enthusiasm according to a strategic vision. In the past, IRDP has been daring in its choice of issues for discussion, careful in its management of neutral space, and delicate in navigating social and political realities. This is what many of its participants and supporters are looking for now.

LESSONS LEARNED

Ultimately, the staff and participants of this programme will be the people to determine what lessons have been learned. However, this section will list some of those observed by the evaluators or mentioned in the course of interviews.

- It is possible to build a safe, neutral space for dialogue, even after genocide, even in what many would consider a ‘restricted context.’

- Building safe space requires great care and delicacy.
  - Selecting a partner organisation, or building one
  - Selecting leaders and original staff who are balanced and credible
  - Consulting, informing, and involving influential decision-makers
- Developing appropriate methodology and structures
- Deciding at which level to begin, with which issues
- Selecting participants for dialogues and fora
- Deciding how to use results of discussions and research

- Mixing people from different parts of society enriches dialogue and debate, if it is done well.
- It is possible to use video-technology from the beginning, even in dialogue groups which do not yet trust each other.
- 'Virtual' dialogue spaces can be shared by people in different localities, through the use of video-technology. This also enables people from the base to communicate with those at high level, and vice versa.
- When people see others expressing themselves through video, they believe it is possible, and want to do it themselves.
- Participatory processes really are difficult to predict and even to describe. Yet conveying accurately what is happening is important to the acceptance of the programme, particularly when only a limited number of people can participate.
- Making a space and culture where mistrust can be expressed, diminishes the mistrust.
- Controversial issues take time to discuss. People sense that they need to do this, but may not want to try. Consensus may not be possible, or may not be the goal.
- Decision-makers react most positively to new information and criticisms which are presented quietly, not in public, and with evidence to back them up. The evidence can come from research, public opinion, or testimony as to consequences, or from a combination of these.
- Informing people in advance of your intention, what you mean to do and why, does help to gain acceptance of controversial issues.
- By daring to open discussion on subjects which are seen as taboo, dialogue programmes can make the topics acceptable for debate, and thus give back to the people of the society the sense that they can limit the scope of what is taboo.

ANALYSIS OF STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES

We will analyse strengths and weaknesses of this programme, based on comments of those interviewed, study of documents, observation, and the use of conceptual frameworks outside the IRDP / Interpeace methodology. This section will begin with other conceptual frameworks, and move on to a systematised analysis.
OTHER CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORKS

This section brings in conceptual frameworks outside Interpeace and IRDP to assess the influence and impact of the programme.

STRATEGIC EFFECTIVENESS: APPLYING RPP CRITERIA

What follows is a matrix and then five criteria of effectiveness, produced by Reflecting on Peace Practice\(^8\) (RPP), based on five years of study and research on peace programmes in some 30 countries. RPP produced this matrix to show its conclusions about what makes peace programmes effective, or ineffective. On the following pages, the diagrams show a mapping of the IRDP / Interpeace programme in research and dialogue on the RPP matrix.

Reflecting on Peace Practice observed that peace programmes generally tried to bring about change by targeting either “More People” (that is, the mass of people in the society, through programmes that engaged more and more of them) or “Key People” (that is, those who were particularly influential with respect to a particular issue or problem – often political decision-makers, but sometimes clergy, armed groups, refugees, or other groups.) This is the left-right division on the matrix. Some programmes operated at the level of individual or personal change, often changes in attitude or behaviour. Other programmes tried to bring about socio-political change, either by changing group attitudes and behaviours, or by changing structures and systems. This is the up-down division on the matrix.

Ultimately, societies moving out of war and into peace will need to work in all the quadrants of the matrix. However, no individual programme can be expected to do everything. What, then, are the most effective ways for peace programmes to work?

RPP concluded that the most effective programmes were those which did not remain at the level of individual / personal impact, but aimed to have an impact on socio-political change, including structures and systems. This did not mean that programmes had to target politicians only. On the contrary, any change in structure would be only a surface change unless it persevered until it had an impact on people’s individual and social attitudes and behaviours. Wherever a programme began, it was more effective if it had a strategic plan to influence change at all levels.

\(^{8}\) Reflecting on Peace Practice is a project of CDA, a Boston-based collaborative. It brought together experienced practitioners from all over the world, to combine their experience, case studies, and consultations to derive lessons and conclusions. See: www.cdainc.com
RPP also observed, however, that the vast majority of programmes worked to change individual attitudes, behaviours, and relationships, in the hope that this would bring about socio-political change. This hope was not enough, and programmes depending on it did not have much impact. Effective programmes pushed beyond individual change. Some developed programmes at other levels, to bring about change at the group or structural level. Examples of this would be a human-rights education programme which began with schools, lobbied for a bill of rights for the society, and eventually offered human rights training to police, soldiers and prison officers. Other programmes linked their work to other programmes, so that there was a cumulative impact. The important element was following a **coordinated strategy** to influence more than one area.

The following pages show increasingly complicated diagrams, to illustrate how this IRDP / Interpeace programme targets different parts of society, and how it focuses and links its activities.

The first diagram shows the structures of the IRDP / Interpeace programme. The diaspora, for example, are seen by many as “Key People” because they include many influential people who are not participating directly in peace-building in Rwanda, and who could have a destructive influence. The work with the diaspora deals with them mostly as individuals, so this is placed in the upper right-hand quadrant: Key people, Individual / personal change. The dialogue clubs draw on the grass-roots community. Because they aim to influence group as well as personal attitudes and relationships, they are shown on the left-hand side, addressing both individual and socio-political change. This diagram reveals that, overall, the programme addresses many levels of Rwandan society, and aims to influence many kinds of change, at both individual / personal and socio-political levels.

On the following page are added arrows, to show structures which relate or communicate with others in programme activities. The dialogue clubs, the fora, and the diaspora contribute to the videos, communicate with each other indirectly there, and contribute to the work of the National Group. This shows that the programme does follow up and coordinate its activities and its target groups, aiming for sustainable impact by reinforcing different kinds and levels of change.

Finally, the last diagram shows also the work of the steering committees in influencing political decision-makers. This is a strategy to have structural impact, giving all the activities and target groups the possibility of influence at structural as well as socio-political and individual levels.

It is perhaps worth noting that very few programmes studied by RPP have such a thorough and strategic pattern of targeting constituencies and kinds and levels of change.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IRDP Programme Structures</th>
<th>MORE PEOPLE</th>
<th>KEY PEOPLE</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>INDIVIDUAL / PERSONAL CHANGE</strong></td>
<td>Healing / recovery Perceptions Attitudes Skills</td>
<td>Diaspora</td>
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<tr>
<td>Behaviour Individual Relationships</td>
<td>Dialogue clubs</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>SOCIO-POLITICAL CHANGE</strong></td>
<td>Group behaviour Group relationships Public opinion Social norms</td>
<td>National Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>Institutional change</td>
<td></td>
<td>Fora</td>
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<td>Structural / systemic change</td>
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<td>Steering committees</td>
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IRDP Structures: Activities & influences
Dialogue & research

MORE PEOPLE

KEY PEOPLE

INDIVIDUAL / PERSONAL
Healing / recovery
Perceptions
Attitudes
Skills

Behaviour
Individual
Relationships

SOCIO-POLITICAL
Group behaviour
Group relationships
Public opinion
Social norms

Institutional change

Structural / systemic change

Videos
Dialogue clubs
National Group
Media
Diaspora
Research sub-groups
Board
Fora
Steering committees
# IRDP Structures: Activities & Influences

**Dialogue, Research, Lobbying**

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<th>Healing / recovery</th>
<th>Dialogues clubs</th>
<th>Media</th>
<th>Diaspora</th>
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<tr>
<td>Perceptions</td>
<td>Research sub-groups</td>
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<td>Attitudes</td>
<td>Videos</td>
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<td>Skills</td>
<td>National Group</td>
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What these diagrams show is that this programme is designed in such a way that it could have real impact on peace-building in Rwanda. Whether it actually does have such impact will depend on additional factors. One of these is the strategic importance of the activities and the issues addressed. This brings in the criteria identified by RPP which characterise effective peacebuilding.

**RPP CRITERIA OF EFFECTIVENESS**

A programme promotes peace effectively when:

1. The effort addresses the driving factors, people and dynamics that are key to the conflict.

2. The effort results in a meaningful improvement in relations among groups in conflict. This criterion reflects the importance of transforming polarized (and polarizing) attitudes, behaviours and interactions to tolerant and co-operative ones, as a necessary precondition for addressing the underlying problems and grievances driving the conflict.

3. The efforts contributes to a momentum for peace by causing participants and communities to develop independent initiatives that reduce dividers, increase or support connectors, or address causes of conflict. This criterion underlines the importance of ‘ownership’ and sustainability of actions and efforts to bring about peace, as well as creating momentum for peace, involving more people. Yet not all participant or community initiatives are effective peace initiatives: the more the initiatives reduce the things that are dividers or sources of tension, reinforce things that connect people in spite of the conflict, or address the forces driving the conflict, the more effective they are.

4. The effort prompts people to increasingly resist violence and provocations to violence. One way of addressing and including key people who promote and continue conflict (e.g. warlords, conflict entrepreneurs, spoilers) is to help more people develop the ability to resist the manipulation and provocation of negative key people.

5. The effort results in the creation or reform of political institutions or mechanisms that deal meaningfully with grievances or injustices when these are key to the conflict. To reform or build institutions that are unrelated to the actual drivers of a specific conflict would be ineffective.

6. The effort results in an increase in people’s security and in their sense of security. This criterion reflects positive change both at the socio-political level (in people’s public lives) and at the individual levels as people gain a sense of security. ⁹

RPP does not expect that individual programmes will do everything, or address every criterion. However, if a programme is not designed to do any of the five things listed above, it is less likely to have significant impact in terms of peacebuilding. And, the criteria are seen to be cumulative: a programme which addresses more, is likely to be more effective.

The first and (according to RPP) most important criterion of effectiveness is whether a programme addresses one or more **driving factors** in a society which can cause it to move toward peace or war. Many activities which are needed, are not really crucial in determining whether there is war or

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⁹ This version of RPP’s criteria of effectiveness is reprinted from the OECD / DAC document: **DAC 2007:5**
peace. Vaccinating children and alleviating poverty, for example, are key national needs, but they
do not push people into war. On the other hand, unequal distribution of opportunities or resources,
denial of rights or identity, and refusal to address or even acknowledge discrimination against
particular groups or geographic areas are the kinds of factors which bring about war.

If the IRDP / Interpeace programme is addressing some of the key driving factors of conflict, then its
structure and strategy give it the possibility of real impact and influence. Comments from those
interviewed affirm that, from its beginnings, this programme has been exceptionally good at
identifying key driving factors, and being willing to open up discussion and research about them.
The initial list of five issues includes key factors which will determine whether Rwanda’s future
heads toward peace or war. The IRDP / Interpeace programme derived these issues from
participatory processes, which guaranteed both their authenticity and their acceptance at the next
stage of the programme.

The work of dialogue clubs and steering committees was seen as evidence that the programme also
meets criteria 2 and 3: improving relations between groups, and facilitating people in the situation
(perhaps not entire communities, but groupings of both “More People” and “Key People”) to develop
their own initiatives based on their own analysis.

There is some evidence that the programme is beginning to have an impact on structures (#5),
through its work on genocide, decentralisation, and forms of democracy appropriate to Rwanda.
Those interviewed felt it was still too early to be sure about criteria 4 and 6. The programme could,
in the long term, make a contribution in these areas by helping people to understand the dynamics
of genocide (and thus resist manipulation to violence) and by building the safe space in which
people might feel secure in voicing dissenting opinions, but these impacts are likely to be relatively
small and somewhat indirect.

This framework confirms systematically what has been observed by most of those interviewed:

THE IRDP / INTERPEACE PROGRAMME HAS MADE A SIGNIFICANT AND STRATEGIC
CONTRIBUTION TO THE POSSIBILITY OF BUILDING PEACE IN RWANDA. IT HAS SELECTED
ACTIVITIES, PARTICIPANTS, AND STRATEGIES WHICH HAVE A COMBINED IMPACT
GREATER THAN ANY ONE OF ITS ELEMENTS.

More recently, however, the programme seems sometimes to have slid into issues which were
either more abstract, or more ordinary, but no longer key driving factors. Among the
recommendations emerging from the most recent meeting of the National Group, some continue to
target issues related to genocide, tolerance, and human rights, which are surely still driving factors
here. It is noticeable, however, that the steering committees are charged, not with focused issues,
but with broad areas: education, economics, and legal questions. Many of the recommendations
have to do with educational, legal or fiscal questions which are not wrong or unimportant, but are
not the drivers which will determine whether Rwanda builds peace or not. National archives,
education geared for the job market, irrigation, economic growth, and administrative decisions tied
to laws are examples of policies which are probably very good ones for Rwanda to follow, but they
are more broad, scattered, and ordinary than the issues IRDP took up at its beginnings.

Perhaps this change comes from the very fact that the steering committees involve influential
experts, who tend to notice issues that are important in their areas of expertise. Or perhaps the
change comes when the programme begins to focus on recommendations and implementation,
rather than dialogue and discussion, and the focus is lost in trying to make recommendations which are concrete and relevant.

TARGET GROUPS BECOME ACTORS

One way out of this particular dilemma might be to take into account another fruit of many years of experience in peace-building: Peace-building happens when target groups become actors. One could, in principle, continue more or less forever to work with specific target groups, such as students, peasant farmers, or the diaspora. The programme might be quite sustainable, but it would never quite be peace-building, if the programme staff were the main actors. The indicator that peace-building is taking place is that target groups become subjects, engaging in their own activities with their own target groups. It is not only that they assimilate a methodology, but that they begin using it actively to address issues that result from their own analysis of their situation.

In this respect, the dialogue clubs seem to be beginning to bear fruit. Some of the dialogue clubs have set up clubs for young people, which they themselves are facilitating. Others are moving to replicate the experience for people in nearby areas. These would be good examples of peace-building becoming active in this target group.

If the IRDP / Interpeace programme wished to encourage its target audiences to become actors in their own right, it could continue some of its ongoing activities, and perhaps prioritise others. Its role could, for example, be to facilitate its participants to lobby decision-makers on their own behalf. This could mean dialogue clubs or schools of debate making their own voices heard at local, district, provincial, or national level. In effect, this is what the programme already says it is doing with the steering groups: assembling influential people, and letting them do the lobbying.

ASSUMPTIONS AND THEORIES OF CHANGE

Another factor which helps to determine whether a programme has strategic impact is the set of assumptions or theories of change which underlie the objectives. It is not the case that one theory is valid and another false, necessarily, but that organisations often act according to such theories and assumptions, without actually noticing or testing them.

The IRDP / Interpeace programme has had a number of objectives over the years, and a number of ways of phrasing those objectives. The key objective has consistently been to contribute to peace-building through participatory dialogue in a neutral space.

Given its theory of change (that change comes from participatory processes which allow all views to be heard, and which build consensus in identifying and solving problems of the society), this programme is constrained to accept and act on whatever emerges consensually from the participatory process. This reveals another dilemma: that participatory processes give a higher degree of ownership of results, but they can also focus on what some interviewees called ‘preoccupations’ of participants. Whether the preoccupations are actually driving factors of peace will depend not just on the participatory nature of the process, but on the extent to which participants understand the peace-building focus. Peace-building is concerned, not just with problems in general, whether individual or group problems, but more strategically with issues which may drive people to conflict and violence. The IRDP / Interpeace theory of change will surely
continue to drive this programme to depend on participatory processes for its content. If it is to be strategic as well, it must ensure that those participating in the process understand the driving factors of peace and conflict, and the role of peace-building. This does not mean that IRDP must ignore practical needs of its members and co-operators, but that it will need to find ways to assist with these indirectly, if it is to preserve the capacity to do what only it can do.
SWOT ANALYSIS
We will use a common tool, a SWOT analysis (Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats) to put in graphic form our analysis and assessment of this programme. This serves to pull together a range of findings and observations about the programme.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STRENGTHS: Strategic &amp; Credible</th>
<th>WEAKNESSES: Diffuse</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unique: create political space</td>
<td>Many activities: embrace everything, nothing ever stops</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inclusive: Top to bottom, bottom to top, all views</td>
<td>Much depends on leaders: people came before programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong base of people wanting to participate</td>
<td>Can’t use all the information gathered; not all published or given back to base</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access to influential people</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Methodology well-adapted to Rwanda</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partnership with Interpeace</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enthusiastic, knowledgeable donors</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pilot new things: ahead of everyone else</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OPPORTUNITIES: Pilot Peace-building</th>
<th>THREATS: Demand-driven</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Decentralisation</td>
<td>Pressure to do everything: bigger, more</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access to everyone</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International access: diaspora, donors, other Interpeace projects</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schools of debate: could be influential</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace as subject: real need in 2007 post-conflict situations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pass methodology on, to have more impact</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>How to manage enthusiasm without losing focus</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Participatory process is commitment, but may not focus on peace-building (individuals’ problems)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Losing strategic focus: Do what no one else does</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Interviewees were asked directly about strengths and weaknesses of the programme. Threats and opportunities were deduced from responses to questions about the situation and the programme’s role in it, and from evaluators’ observations.
| Continue to pilot new things, but pass on to others what is working | Process between recommendations & implementation not clear to those outside |
The IRDP / Interpeace programme has many strengths, many of them internal, due to its structure, approach, and personnel. Perhaps the key asset is that it has a distinctive niche or profile. The profile comes from the work, and also makes it possible to do the work. It would not be over-stating the case to say that, at the time this programme began, many people did not believe that it would be possible to create space for dialogue, or to take up controversial and political issues while remaining a neutral interlocutor. That IRDP has done so is its great strength.

Because the programme is unusual, it has unusual opportunities, spaces which perhaps no other organisation could enter, and possibilities which are only just emerging. The opportunities, then, lie in taking advantage of the strengths in a changing world. These include opportunities offered by the partnership with Interpeace, both in the conceptual challenge and support they offer each other, and in the connections to Interpeace programmes in other parts of the world. This partnership helps to sustain IRDP’s capacity to learn and grow.

The weaknesses can be seen as a consequence of success. Because the programme has done unusual things very well, there is constant pressure (from within and outside) to continue and to add more. While the objectives apparently continue the same, over time activities are added for what seem logical reasons: The dialogue clubs are successful, so let’s make them sustainable by adding income-generation activities. If people can agree on problems and solutions, these should be made into concrete proposals, presented to government, and perhaps we should be practically engaged in implementing some of them. This process, which is entirely understandable, nevertheless constitutes a kind of erosion of the central focus. Attention is diverted from activities where IRDP has a clear comparative advantage, to activities where it has no real expertise. In addition, the documents seem to involve a great many words, some of which seem to disappear or change meaning over time. Donors, in particular, seem to find organisational structures and written documents difficult to understand.

The threats, which we have characterised as ‘demand-driven,’ involve these same pressures, multiplied by the organisational commitment to participatory and inclusive processes. Because the programme is committed to participatory methodologies, it risks being led away from the strategic peace-building focus to take up problems which are real, but not strategic in terms of peace and conflict.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This is an excellent programme, with considerable impact and influence. It is trusted by those who know it, and fills what is seen as a unique role. However, it seems to be becoming more diffuse in its activities, less strategic in its thematic focus. This section will outline some of Rwanda’s peace-building needs, and suggest options for the programme’s future work.

THE FUTURE OF PEACE-BUILDING IN RWANDA

Building peace is always a challenge, but much more so in a context which has been marked by repeated massacres and eventually by genocide, and trying to emerge from a history of conflict. Stable peace in Rwanda will require many elements. People will have to re-build the torn social fabric, acknowledging the past, caring for its victims, and building trust that they are working together for a shared future. There will have to be changes in group relationships, in attitudes toward each other, and in norms of individual and social behaviour. Institutions and structures will need to be reformed, replaced or invented. The crucial challenge is for the whole society to feel secure that it cannot happen again, that it is no longer possible for genocide to occur in Rwanda. For this, people must know that there are structures in place which will prevent propaganda, killing, and even discrimination. And they will need to feel sure that people can no longer be persuaded or manipulated to kill each other. At three levels: government, social, and individual, changes must take place so that everyone believes that the society will remain fair and peaceful.

IRDP / Interpeace has already played a part in building this peace. The neutral spaces and free exchange of views in this programme are essential in order for other changes to occur, and in order for confidence to be built. Dialogue is necessary, but it is not sufficient. In Rwanda, as in the rest of the world, there seems to be some confusion about how peace can be built. An easy but untested assumption is that building peace means dialogue, and that this means talking nicely to opponents and even enemies, perhaps to the point of accepting past injustice or glossing over hard truths about profound disagreements and distrust. In our opinion, this is incorrect, and will not bring about peace. IRDP’s strategy of building a safe space for political disagreement is an important strategic choice. In the coming years, the role of trusted interlocutor will continue to be needed, together with spaces for frank debate on delicate issues, so that the society can move beyond talk to structural, behavioural, and attitudinal change. Both governmental and non-governmental structures will have a part to play in agreeing new norms, and in testing whether systems and structures are adequate to building peace. IRDP can also play a role in assisting Rwandan society and its government to deepen their understanding of and commitment to the difficult process of building peace.

IRDP / Interpeace will be expected to continue to find a special role for itself, helping Rwandan society to build itself in a new and robust form. It could decide to become an operational agency, putting its energy into implementing activities to meet one of the challenges. Yet the roles of catalyst, facilitator, and pilot will be more needed than ever, to identify and frame emerging issues, to gain public understanding and support for debate and change, and to connect fragmented initiatives for greater synergy and impact.
RECOMMENDATIONS

The following are strategic options to be considered for the programme's future activities, in order to take advantage of new opportunities and to build on its strengths. This list contains alternative suggestions for consideration. It may be found appropriate to adopt some and not others, or to mix and adapt them.

1. Continue to be a catalyst. Seek out emerging themes, new possibilities, issues which are taboo. Preserve the neutral space for dialogue, and use it for strategic purposes. Bring together people of different backgrounds and views to discuss important issues.

2. Emphasise the piloting role of the programme. Do what no one else does. Try new things. When something works, or needs to be multiplied or expanded, work through other organisations, whether NGO, governmental, or other. When something is established, pass it on, or create a ‘daughter’ agency to continue it. Do not continue old, established activities unless they are truly strategic.

3. Look for new ways to convey more vividly what the programme actually does. Use video, radio, television, or other media. Tell stories, using concrete terms. Use graphic frameworks. Give examples. Use fewer abstractions, and try to use them consistently. Hire a creative communications specialist. Consider when it would be appropriate to use media (radio, television, comic books) to influence public opinion and attitudes (“More People”).

4. Preserve the participatory, inclusive methodology, but do not try to extend your activities to everyone. Having five dialogue clubs is fine. It guarantees that the base population has the opportunity to use the methodology, engage in its own analysis and debate, and be part of sharing views across the levels of society. If 100 communities want dialogue clubs, help another organisation (NCUR? NGO? Local authority?) to get clubs started and to learn the methodologies. Do not start 100 dialogue clubs, fora, or diaspora groups.

5. There are logistical and material constraints to the programme’s work which may keep it from being as effective as it might. Through a new centre, or by improving the existing one, better facilities are needed for the discussions and use of video archives. By encouraging others to make use of the archives, this programme can greater impact through synergy. It would also be possible to reach for greater impact on ordinary citizens (the “More People” of the RPP matrix) by using archive materials more widely on mass media.

6. This methodology is useful and important. Teach it to others. Disseminate it. Do it as an activity of IRDP, or set up a ‘daughter’ organisation to do it. Others who work with groups of people, such as churches and local authorities, could make use of it.

7. This is the time for a strategic reflection and re-focusing. It could be internal, or bring in others with interesting views. But it is necessary from time to time to ensure that current and future activities correspond both to the organisation’s own principles, values, and commitments, and to the emerging needs and opportunities in the socio-political situation.
8. Continue to see yourselves as facilitators. Assist groups you work with to make their own, direct links to decision-makers. Dialogue clubs want to be able to lobby local authorities themselves. Diaspora groups do not have a forum to meet regularly and test whether there are contributions they want to make to peace-building. Do this directly, or set it up and hand it over.

9. Focus the process of recommendations and lobbying on themes related to peace and peace-building. If steering committees want to discuss other themes (such as those that are the 'ordinary' business of government,) encourage and facilitate them to do so, but be clear that this is not the special work of IRDP.

10. Confine your activities to your best roles: catalyst, facilitator, neutral interlocutor, pilot. If dialogue clubs wish to engage in income-generation or other new projects, introduce them to development agencies and donors, but do not be directly responsible for such projects.

11. Be a sensitive as well as a neutral interlocutor. On some issues, research will help, and the research and debate methodology will work well. On other issues, research is really not an appropriate approach. On some issues, people will never reach consensus, but they do need to understand each others’ views, so continued dialogue is worthwhile. Help society to distinguish between themes which can and cannot be researched, and themes which can and cannot lead to consensus. And continue to test whether society is changing in such a way as to make it possible to discuss certain issues more profoundly.

12. Build on the research methodology by working with a statistical or survey facility, whether academic or governmental, to gauge public opinion over time. By reflecting back to society how it is changing with respect to critical peace-building issues, IRDP would be better able to gauge the impact of peace-building, including its own programme. Similar initiatives in other countries suggest that this is a powerful tool to help people see variations of opinion within groups as well as changes of attitude and social norm.
APPENDICES

I. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF METHODOLOGY

This programme extends across some six years, from one end of Rwanda to the other, and including diaspora communities in several major cities in other parts of the world. Because the intention was, not merely to evaluate whether it had met its own objectives, but to assess its impact on the socio-political situation, the process of evaluation was quite broad and far-reaching, yet also quite carefully selected. The following points may be helpful in understanding the approach of the evaluators:

- This evaluation was commissioned jointly by IRDP and Interpeace, with one Rwandan evaluator and one international.

- It was requested that the report be written in English, though nearly all the interviews were conducted in French, and most of the activities observed were conducted in Kinyarwanda.

- There was a great deal of preparatory research, reading 50+ documents and viewing a number of video documents of meetings and discussions.

- Lists of individuals to be interviewed were constructed by IRDP, Interpeace, and each of the evaluators. In general, people interviewed had some involvement with the programme (as participants, donors, staff, and analysts or experts in related fields.) In addition, several people were identified and interviewed by the evaluators precisely because they had had no actual involvement with the programme, or were perceived to be critics of it. The list includes several members of parliament, local and national government, as well as representatives of NGOs, embassies, and donor groups. There was a conscious attempt to achieve balance, in terms of gender, ethnicity, politics, and socio-economic standing.

- The evaluators observed at first hand one political discussion in a Kigali forum, and one dialogue session in Kabagali. Because of timing, it turned out to be logistically difficult to engage with school dialogue clubs.

- The process included a number of documents about activities with the diaspora as well as interviews with members of the diaspora in Geneva, though the evaluators acknowledge that it was logistically difficult to include adequately the possible range of views of this constituency.

- There were extensive interviews with staff members in both Rwanda and Geneva, and meetings with groups of staff at the beginning and end of the process.

- This evaluation includes a particular emphasis on Reflecting on Peace Practice and its framework, in order to bring in a somewhat accepted international understanding of peacebuilding and impact assessment. It is well-known in this field that there is confusion about what peacebuilding entails, including whether it is really separate from development,
and scepticism about dialogue programmes in particular. There is also uncertainty and a
degree of scepticism about impact assessment. The evaluators have attempted to be
systematic and clear in their use of terms and the criteria on which assessment is based.

- There was a concluding meeting with programme staff, and one to which donors and related
NGOs were invited.
II. BRIEF BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION ABOUT EVALUATORS

Sue Williams is a special consultant to the Reflecting on Peace Practice programme of the Collaborative for Development Action (USA) and to the Folke Bernadotte Academy (Sweden.) She lived in Belfast, Northern Ireland, for nearly 20 years and has been engaged with conflict and peace processes for 25 years. Since April, 2006, she lives in England.

She was Director of the Policy and Evaluation Unit with INCORE (1998-2000), Director of Policy and Process Skills for Responding to Conflict (1994-1998), and representative of Quaker Peace & Service from 1984 to 1994 in Uganda, Kenya, and Northern Ireland. Since 2000 she has been an independent consultant, specialising in political mediation, in training in conflict analysis, management, and intervention, and in strategic reviews and evaluation of projects. She has worked in support of initiatives in various countries including: Kenya, Afghanistan, Uganda, Senegal, Guatemala, Niger, Myanmar, Colombia, Cambodia, Congo, and Sri Lanka.

She has had no connection with Interpeace prior to this evaluation.

Serge Rwamasirabo is a private consultant who has been working for the past twenty years closely with rural communities, especially in the development sector, with a variety of donors, communities, and successive government from the ‘60’s. Serge Rwamasirabo was exposed to sensitive political issues of Rwandan communities during those years and to the solutions which were brought by different governments.

As a Rwandese, Serge Rwamasirabo went through genocide and post genocide periods and is able to understand changes needed to build a sustainable peace and reconstruction.

Serge Rwamasirabo has been a member of IRDP’s steering committee on the economy and a contributor on solution-driven approaches.
III. The Phases of the Rwanda Programme


Activities:
- Consult the population through focus group discussions on the sources of the conflict and obstacles to peace
- Complete the consultations’ findings with research-based data

Achieved Outputs:
- A Country Note presenting the consultations’ findings regarding the sources of the conflict and peacebuilding challenges facing the country is produced
- A Video documentary showing the process and its results is produced
- The National Group (held in Nov. 2003) selects the priority issues, for which consensus solutions need to be found through which needs further dialogue and participatory research
- The National Group gives a first mandate to IRDP
- The first phase opened up debate in a society that was not used to express its views; it allowed IRDP to gain credibility and legitimacy

2004 - 2005: Dialogue and Research Phase

Activities:
- Conduct Participatory research on the priority issues
- Facilitate Dialogue throughout the country on priority issues and solutions to address them
- Facilitate dialogue within the Rwandan diaspora
- Create permanent dialogue platforms in rural areas called ‘dialogue clubs’ in 5 districts
- Present the consensus solutions to the National Group

Achieved Outputs:
- 5 research reports and video documentaries on the priority issues are produced
- The National Group (held in late 2005 – early 2006) selects the recommendations to be implemented in priority
- The National Group gives a new mandate to IRDP

2006 – 2008: Implementation Phase

Activities:
- Disseminate the research findings
- Encourage through the work of steering committees the implementation of the recommendations stemming from the National Group meetings
- Set up permanent dialogue platforms at the national, provincial, local levels, as well as in 25 secondary schools, and strengthen the dialogue clubs in rural areas
- Conduct additional research on remaining contentious issues
- Build a Peace Centre

Expected Outputs:
- Research findings are published
- Some recommendations are translated into concrete measures by the decision-makers
- 3 national fora, 4 provincial fora, 5 district fora, 50 school clubs are set up and meet regularly
- Dialogue clubs continue their dialogue meetings and start development activities
- The construction of the Peace Center starts (after important delays due to funding problems)
- Research reports and 3rd phase’s results are presented to the National Group to be held in July/August 2008
- The National Group gives a new mandate to IRDP
Architecture of the Rwanda Programme

**National Group**: In the IRDP/Interpeace process, the National Group is the decision-making and orientation body. It is composed of almost 200 representatives of the different segments of the Rwandan population, the diaspora and the international community, who meet at the end of every phase of the programme in order to validate the results of IRDP’s work and to provide the programme with guidance about the next steps.

**Working Groups**: At the end of the issue-mapping phase in November 2003, IRDP asked the National Group to select 5 priority peacebuilding issues among the issues raised by Rwandans during the consultations. The National Group chose the following issues: History and conflicts in Rwanda; The genocide of Tutsi; Efforts to combat poverty; Democracy in Rwanda; and The Rule of Law in Rwanda. The National Group requested IRDP to conduct an in-depth participatory research and dialogue process on these 5 issues in order to come up with consensus solutions. IRDP therefore created 5 Working Groups in 2004 in order to help IRDP’s researchers to conduct the research in a participatory way. The Working Groups were made up of 30 members each, chosen among the National Group members for their expertise and reputation. But for efficiency reason, sub working groups of 3 experts each were created to work on a daily basis with IRDP’s researchers.

**Steering Committees**: The Steering Committees were created in 2006 upon request of the National Group. They are responsible for ensuring that the recommendations stemming from the research and dialogue process led by IRDP are implemented by decision-makers. The Steering Committee members were chosen for their capacity to influence decision-makers and for their expertise in the issues at stake. The recommendations are divided into 3 thematic groups. 3 Steering committees of 10 people each share the 3 groups of recommendations between them. Supported by IRDP, their role is to conduct additional research on the recommendations in order to make them more operational; to present the recommendations to the concerned decision-makers; to identify with them opportunities and obstacles in the implementation; to find ways to overcome obstacles and to set up implementation work plans.

**Dialogue Clubs**: The Dialogue Clubs were created in August 2004 by IRDP upon request of people living in rural areas who had been consulted during the issue-mapping phase in 2002-2003. The consultations made them realize the advantages of dialogue to rebuild the social fabric at the local level and they asked IRDP to help them create permanent fora for debate that would allow them to continue the debates even when IRDP is not there to facilitate. IRDP created one dialogue club in 5 districts of the country and trained a facilitator for each club. The Dialogue clubs meet twice a month to discuss peace-related issues and problems the community is facing.

**School Clubs**: As a result of a recommendation adopted by the National Group in December 2005 to “encourage key actors to include courses on tolerance, democratic principles and practices in their educational programmes”, IRDP set up 50 clubs in 25 secondary schools of the country, in which students debate every month about democracy and tolerance.

**Board**: IRDP’s Board is made up of 10 persons chosen for their credibility, including religious and political leaders and civil society members, who represent the population’s diversity. Their reputation and role in the society provides IRDP with political protection. IRDP presents its programme of work and budget to the Board every year. The Board provides guidance and support to IRDP by looking at its work with an external eye and providing advice to ensure the integrity of the programme.
IV. INTERPEACE APPROACH:

MODULE 2. STRENGTHENING NATIONAL CAPACITIES FOR CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION. STRATEGY-PRINCIPLES-ROLES. 27 June 2007

Purpose of this Module.

The purpose of this module is to provide a solid introduction to core principles of the Interpeace-style approach, and core roles the programme team will be assuming. In doing so it also puts this in a wider framework that distinguishes between ‘strategy’, ‘principles’ and ‘methodological tools’.

The module so far is presented as material for reading, reflection and discussion. Once again, the issues and key messages can also be brought up in much more interactive ways.

Section 1: An ‘Informal’ Process.

An Interpeace-style peacebuilding or democratisation programme is an ‘informal’ process. We use ‘informal’ here in contrast to ‘official’. An official process is typically one that is initiated and possibly led by the ‘authorities’ or by an external actor with an official status, such as a foreign government, a regional organization, the United Nations etc. Here the ‘legitimacy’ of the process comes from the fact that the actors initiating and supervising it are ‘official’ actors. It is not uncommon for such ‘official’ actors to argue that only they have the ‘authority’ to drive such a process (be it of negotiation, policy review, policy development, decision-making etc.). Even where they are very open to inputs from others that do not have that ‘official’ status, they are still likely to hold that the ultimate decision-making is their responsibility and authority.

Interpeace is not an ‘official’ actor. The programme team / partner(s) are typically also not ‘official’ actors, although some programme teams are actually UN staff. Yet as UN staff they are not in senior ‘decision-making’ positions. In short, these programmes are ‘unofficial’ or ‘informal’ processes.

Is that a weakness? Does it prevent us from having influence, does it reduce our ability to engage with the real decision-makers and to have impact on the actual decisions that are made?

By and large, our experience is that this apparent ‘weakness’ can actually be a strength.

- The fact that the programme / process is coordinated / facilitated by one or more ‘unofficial’ actors makes it easier for the various stakeholders to engage with it. It may actually also be helpful for a government because if they trust the integrity of the process and the team managing it- it can give them an opportunity and provide avenues to engage with a wide spectrum of actors and opinions in society in a process that is not politicized and not or less mediatised, to test ideas and explore options, but that cannot force them to make concessions or compromises if they are not ready for them.

- It also helps to create an atmosphere in which the issues, however sensitive, can be considered and discussed in a more depoliticized manner. In a formal or official process, the different participants tend to come with and stick more to their positions so that the dynamics becomes more one of negotiating and bargaining. Power asymmetries may not
be explicitly referred to in an official process, but typically they are present and everyone is aware of them. And they may be used.

- Finally, it helps to protect the process from the volatility of the ‘surface politics’. A formal or official process sometimes becomes tense, may get stuck or even break down. At such moments, there is still the informal process and the unofficial spaces that we help to create and facilitate, where the various parties / stakeholders can continue to meet and explore the issues.

In short, we believe, and our experience confirms, that such informal processes are not a substitute for, but a very helpful complement to the official, formal processes.

The strategic challenge of course will be to make the informal process relevant to and constructively influential in the formal processes. That, above all, will require great skill in the strategic management of the programme.

Note also that Interpeace-style programmes reject the distinction between ‘state’ and ‘civil society’. Even thought they are not a ‘state actor’ the programme teams have to position themselves in such a way that they transcend these distinctions and can be a space where the various state-actors, other political forces and organised and unorganized social forces can confidently meet.

**Section 2: Managing the Process: Strategy-principles-methodology.**

Objective: Provide a simple framework to clarify the differences, and connections between ‘strategy’, ‘principles’ and ‘methods / methodology’.

It is helpful in planning, managing and periodically reviewing your programme, to distinguish between your strategy (and tactics), the core principles of the approach and the methodological tools at your disposal. The following graph illustrates their interrelationships.
**STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT:** managing political space to achieve real influence and impact.

**APPROACH:** Basic principles – and roles.

**METHODOLOGY:** Tools
- public debate
- Focus group
- Interviews
- Thematic working groups
- Qualitative and quantitative research

*Strategic management:* This will be the trajectory that you are going to try and navigate to have real and constructive influence on the key actors that determine the socio-political dynamics in your environment. This is very context specific and will also require regular
situational judgments and adaptations from you. We come back to this later, among other
places in the section on Managing Political Space.

Core principles and roles: Notwithstanding all the contextual and situational differences between
different Interpeace-supported programmes, there are a number of core principles and roles
that are common to all of them. We emphasise them and protect them because our collective
experience has taught us how essential they are to the strength of the programme and how
their preservation is key to protecting the integrity of the process. We elaborate them in further
sections of this module.

Methodological tools: Some of the tools at your disposal are listed here, e.g. meetings,
quantitative research etc. Others such as video footage or the media will be referred to later in Module

What is important in the above graph is that

- The core principles and core roles are firm and should be protected. They are essential to
  the peacebuilding role and function we seek to play.

- The methodological tools should be chosen by you in function of what you seek to
  achieve. You don’t interview people, or have a debate with a focus group, or do a
  household survey for its own sake. These activities serve another purpose, and it is up to
  you to choose the tool (and the timing of its use) in function of that purpose. But you
  can be a good ‘methodologist’ without using it for peacebuilding purposes. And a
  ‘methodology’ doesn’t make a ‘strategy’.

- The biggest challenge and the greatest skill will be the strategic management. Some of
  that you will seek to plan and implement in a structured way, such as how you position
  yourself, your proactive management of the political space etc. But it is also likely that in
  the course of your programme all sorts of things will happen in your surrounding
  environment that create distractions, possible threats, possible opportunities…and to
  which you will have to adapt proactively and reactively. Without losing sight of your
  larger strategic objectives.

Section 3: Core Principles of the Approach and Core Roles of the Programme Team.

The first set of core principles: consensual-problem solving.

“Problem-solving”: The ultimate goal of our programme is to “help society solve important
problems”. Putting it this way distinguishes the approach from a ‘technical’ one to problem-
solving. It recognizes that the divisions, different perceptions, interests, values around an issue
are part and parcel of ‘a problem’, and often the reason that a problem does not get ‘solved’.
This core principle means that our programme seeks to be practical and, because it focuses on
‘important’ problems, intends to be highly relevant. It also means that we intend to bring
people together not just to have a good talk and a good time together, but in order to
encourage them to practically address a concrete issue. If we want to be very precise in our
language, we need to state that the products of the programme will be consensual ‘proposals’ –
because this being an informal process we typically do not have the authority to decide and
implement.
“Consensus-oriented”: Seeing the differences and divisions in perceptions, interests as part of the ‘challenge’, our programme seeks to facilitate ‘convergence’ of the different stakeholders to the point where they can consensually agree on a proposed action to address the problem. Such agreement can be for the option that everybody ‘can live with’; it is not necessarily the ideal option for everyone or even for anyone. That may mean that compromises are being made by the most powerful participant, but usually also by the less powerful one(s). Consensus-building approaches take time to reach agreements – but the agreements tend to last longer. We should typically not expect ‘quick fixes’.

“Solutions from within”: We believe that solutions have to come and be agreed upon by those that are most directly concerned and will experience the consequences of any decision (or the failure to make a decision). External actors can broaden the horizon by showing additional ideas and options, but should not impose solutions.

The second set of core principles: inclusiveness and real participation.

‘Inclusiveness’: All concerned parties and all key stakeholders to an issue need to be involved and be able to equally contribute to the search for a consensus-solution. We all know that if any significant player is left out, they are unlikely to accept the proposed solution and may become spoilers. They therefore have to be brought in and made part of the process. That is intrinsically delicate and difficult:

- It means bringing in players that are or have been antagonistic and confrontational with each other – sometimes they may even have refused to meet ‘the other’ so far. It may mean engaging a political ‘opposition’ which the authorities are not comfortable about, even an armed opposition group, or bringing together former enemies that used to fight and kill each other.
- It means bringing in more hard line or extreme elements and views which we know may complicate the challenge of finding ‘consensus’. And yet no real progress or solution is possible if they remain excluded and opposed.
- It may mean finding ways of bringing in a group that represents an important stakeholder but that is not formally organized into structures with representation.
- It may mean having to face an obvious actor-group that however is internally itself divided or simply confused, so that it cannot speak even for itself with much of a common voice.
- It may mean involving important players that live abroad, in neighbouring countries or further away in the diaspora.

“Compressing the horizontal and vertical spaces”: This process of inclusion seeks to reduce the distances not only between players at the same societal level (e.g. within the socio-political elite; within the intermediary sector (often called ‘civil society’) or among population groups (sometimes called the ‘grassroots’). It also seeks to reduce the distances between these levels, i.e. between leaders and the population at large, between governors and governed etc. The following graph illustrates this visually.
“Real participation”: The different players don’t come together just to be ‘consulted’ after which a small group then goes and take decisions. We create spaces where all players and participants can fully state their views and arguments and will be listened to; where all can engage equally in the debate, and where all contribute to the search for and consensual agreement on solutions. This is easier said than done: It will mean managing the asymmetries between the participants: asymmetries in power, but also in knowledge about the issue and in confidence. In practice that may require preparatory work with different individual actors and actor-groups to enable them to meaningfully participate.

“Key people & more people”: In every situation there is a complex and variable relationship between ‘leaders’ and their constituencies or the wider populations. We know that ‘key people’ have the ability to change negative dynamics and situations or to preserve and protect positive ones. ‘Leaders’ also can lead their followers in a certain direction. So we need to work with and on key people. At the same time leaders sometimes will not act boldly unless they are confident of wider popular support, or unless there is wide popular demand and pressure on them to change a situation that is felt to be negative. So we also need to work with and on ‘more people’. There are obviously a lot of sensitivities involved in doing so, but ultimately a process like ours can be to the benefit of leaders who do want popular support.

Core roles of the programme team.
"Strategic process management": We seek to create a climate and spaces for socio-political actors from different background and with different interests, to collaborate together to overcome their differences, and find enough common ground to solve problems or at least find a path on which they can jointly move forward to address the problem constructively and non-violently. And all of this in an environment where there is a multitude of other external and internal influences, interventions, pressures, calculations. Sometimes the wider environment in which we operate is relatively 'stable', sometimes it is very volatile. Navigating through these waters with their many currents, while constantly adapting to specific situations but without losing sense of the ultimate direction, is a great strategic challenge and requires a lot of tactical skill. There is no detailed roadmap and on many occasions you will come at a crossroads without signposts. What we then have to find guidance are our core principles, our strategic objectives, and our collective skills and wisdom.

"Managing the political space": The term ‘political space’ refers to different but related things: the individual and group interests of socio-political actors; the individual characters of socio-political actors; the perceptions of threat and the reflexes against perceived threats; the power games; the taboo issues that cannot be talked about; the relative openness there is under a certain regime towards different and dissenting views and their expression... . Our peacebuilding work is not ‘political’ in the sense that we seek power and therefore engage in power games. But if we touch on serious, difficult and divisive issues, it will inevitably be sensitive and therefore become ‘political’. Managing (pro-actively and reactively) the socio-political actors, their sensitivities and dynamics – in order to maintain their trust in the process and the programme team, their respect for the integrity of the process and their acceptance therefore of its (informal) ‘legitimacy’, is a constant challenge.

"Convener": A key role is that of bringing the relevant people from across the socio-political spectrum into the process and at some point(s) also physically together into spaces for constructive dialogues and for collaborative work. That is not a simple task, because why would someone respond to our ‘invitation’ to participate and attend? We clearly need a credible convening capacity, and have to be trustworthy to the whole spectrum of relevant players. It is only those players themselves. At the same time we want to avoid the convener or ‘host’ becoming the star of the event. The process is not about us or our self-promotion.

"Facilitator": A second key role is that of facilitator of all the encounters, meetings, workshops, conferences etc. Yet the ‘facilitation’ role may not be strictly limited to events, but involve a finer ‘facilitation’ of relationships also before and beyond events. This requires extensive facilitation skills, which will be discussed in more detail in Module .

"Researcher": Research in Interpeace-style programmes is not ‘academic research’ but ‘participatory-action-research’ as is explained in more detail in Module . Some programme teams themselves have ‘researchers’, who may also act as facilitators, coordinators etc. Other programme teams look to hire in researchers on a task-specific basis, once the precise topic of research has been collectively identified.

"Coordinator": Any programme involves many people, activities, logistics etc. which have to be prepared and coordinated. That is an ongoing role and task for the programme team, internally and with the many stakeholders involved. Sometimes a programme team does not have to take on all roles or not all the time: it may look for and mobilize others to also act as convener, facilitator, researcher etc, and therefore will focus on coordinating this rather than assuming the function(s) itself.
“Process documenter and reviewer”: A typically forgotten role and responsibility. A lot happens, a lot of challenges are faced and met, a lot of choices are made at smaller and bigger crossroads...and all of that remains in the head of people, who also forget. There needs to be basic documentation not only of the administration of the programme but also of the management / navigation of the programme. That will help in the first place the team itself retain a strategic perspective, it will be very useful for new members joining the team, will be a valuable input for internal reviews and internal / external evaluations.

“Programme / project manager”: You will be working with resources that are limited: not only money, but also people and especially time. As a professional you will want to manage your resources as efficiently and effectively as possible, and you will be asked also by outsiders to demonstrate that you are doing so.

Factors that enable you to play those roles:

“Open agenda”: Many ‘assistance actors’ tend to come with a certain agenda that represents their own interests and competencies and/or what they see as priorities areas. Even though we may ourselves have a fair idea of what the key issues are, formally we typically set out with an open agenda.

If we want to really make a meaningful contribution to the solution of a serious problem we should not try and pursue all problems at the same time. We advice to focus on maximum five problems on which there is broad-based agreement that they are important ‘divisive issues’ on which it has been very difficult so far to find enough consensus to move forward.

Something can be called a priority because it is ‘urgent’, because it is ‘fundamental’ or both. Building sustainable peace typically requires work on the deeper issues, but sometimes this cannot happen if simultaneously some ‘urgent’ issues are not also addressed. The practical outcome of this is that programme teams in different contexts may be working on very different issues (see the document ‘An overview of programmes and thematic areas of work’ for illustrations of topics thus concentrated on).

An ‘open agenda’ approach is of course challenging: we cannot anticipate what priority areas will be decided upon, nor can we build up ‘thematic expertise’ within our programme teams. But an open agenda approach is critical to allow real local ownership and a ‘mandate’ from the spectrum of national/local stakeholders – and to gain and maintain trust in the programme team.

“Equi-distance”: In order to gain –and maintain- such ability to be a ‘bridge builder’ and ‘convener’, both ‘horizontally’ and ‘vertically’ it is essential that the programme team is perceived as ‘impartial’ or ‘equi-distant’ (perhaps a better term than ‘neutral’ which may have connotations of ‘passivity’) to all major sectors and socio-political forces in the society. In other words, it has to be able to obtain and maintain the trust of all, across divides and antagonisms, and not be perceived as actually being ‘closer to X than to Y’ and certainly not as ‘discreetly fostering the agenda of X or Y’. As situations are dynamic, this requires a constant and active and sometimes proactive positioning and management of perceptions. There will inevitably be periods that the programme team has to engage more intensively with one actor-group or another, which may give rise to concerns about its ‘impartiality’. In the medium-term however, and throughout the process, all participating actor-groups should feel that they have been treated fairly and ‘even-handedly’ and can trust the programme team.

“A properly diverse team”: (see module 3 section 1).
“Transparency”: Certainly at the outset of the programme you will regularly be confronted with reservations and even suspicion. Many people will ask you what the ‘real’ objectives of the programme are; who the team members are and what their personal convictions and loyalties might be; who funds this or may otherwise influence the agenda etc. As we deal with difficult relationships and sensitive issues, also in the further course of the programme there will be new moments of tension and possible suspicion. Moreover, as the programme gains in influence and visibility, you can expect more rumours about it, some of which may have deliberately been put into circulation. We all know that transparency, and especially pro-active transparency (anticipate doubts and suspicions and answer or address them even before they are being voiced), is a strong tool to build and gain trust with. While there obviously will be moments that discreetness is required, and even necessary for a certain ‘success’, your general mode of operation should be one of –pro-active– transparency.

“Broadening ownership”: Over time we want to see an evolution in the sense of ‘ownership’ over the process. Whereas initially Interpeace may de facto have the strongest ownership because it drives the initiation of the process, this becomes quickly shared with the programme team and close (local / national) associates. It is the task of the programme team then to ‘broaden the ownership’ so that the various and diverse national / local actors begin to feel it is their process and begin to take active responsibility for it. In Module we will consider some possible indicators of a broadened sense of ownership.

In all fairness it should be recognized that there is a broadening and not a total transfer of ‘ownership’ of the process, because the programme team and Interpeace retain a responsibility to safeguard the integrity of the process – and also to ensure that the process and those financing it (typically international donors) do not go in totally divergent directions. If the stakeholders and participants in the process drive it in a direction that was not anticipated and beforehand agreed with the donors, we will pro-actively meet with the donors to explain to them what is happening, why this makes eminent sense, and if they accept the arguments, adapt to the course of the programme rather than force the programme to adapt to a past design.

Possible additional roles of the programme team.

“Defusing and mediating conflict”: Where there are very volatile situations with outbursts of violence or a high risk of such, you as programme team may feel inclined or even be called upon to get actively involved to try and defuse tensions and possibly resolve the dispute. You may want to do so because you feel a responsibility as citizen and member of the society. If you are widely seen as an impartial and trustworthy convener and facilitator, you may very well be called upon to be a mediator. There can be very good reasons to get engaged:

- You have the contacts with and trust of all the sides involved in the dispute so you are indeed well placed to try and defuse the tension and facilitate constructive debate rather than confrontation;
- Engaging with the ‘surface problem’ is actually a good entry to then move the process to the deeper underlying issues;
- Not engaging with an acute issue, risks becoming perceived as irrelevant or ‘aloof’ and ‘distant’, and may actually undermine the credibility of the team and/or of the process.
• If the situation really escalates, the conditions under which you can pursue collaborative work on deeper issues simply disappear and the programme would have to be suspended anyway.

Yet at the same time getting engaged is also a very dangerous undertaking:

• Your resources (human, financial but also time) are limited, and it is distraction from the work on the deeper issues. You definitely should not turn or allow yourself to be turned into a ‘fire-fighter’ who is constantly running to douse one fire after the other – not leaving you any time or resources any more for ‘fire-prevention’.

• If something goes wrong, you could be perceived as having taken sides and therefore you would compromise your most precious asset: your perceived impartiality and trustworthiness in the eyes of all actors.

In several contexts our colleagues have felt that such role is not appropriate for them and/or that other actors are better placed and more skilled at playing it (Guatemala, Rwanda). In other contexts, they have felt –sometimes- that they were best placed to play a mediating role and that it would serve the process and enhance the credibility of the team (Somali regions, Palestine).

There is no prescription on what to do, except to very carefully weight risks and benefits in the light of your wider strategy and the need to protect the integrity of the process.

“Think-tank”: Over time a programme team, because of its research experience and research capacities, may come to be called upon for technical-thematic support on certain issues, and may gradually develop into a think tank role. That is more likely to happen in an environment that is institution-poor, i.e. where there are not many or not very effective existing think tank resources – or at least not on a given public policy domain. This is not necessarily an objective for an Interpeace style programme, but it is an indication of how that team / institution has become an asset to the society. It does however have an influence on what the resources of the team / institution are being oriented towards, and particularly on the type of human resources that are being hired: indeed you are likely to start looking for people with a specific expertise, rather than with the general skills of facilitation, coordination, programme management etc.

“Capacity-strengthening of other actors”: You may anticipate that, in the course of your regular programme, you will have to strengthen the capacity of some stakeholders who do not yet have the knowledge, competence and/or confidence to meaningfully participate in a multi-stakeholder process. Unless their capacity is first strengthened, they process could actually confirm and reinforce the asymmetries between different stakeholder groups, which would be counterproductive.

But in a larger sense, particularly in an environment with very limited human and institutional resources (among non-state actors, but possible also in the state sector at national or local level), the programme team may be called upon to strengthen the capacity of other actors beyond the direct requirements of the programme.

That can make evident strategic sense inasmuch as we believe that there need to be many national and local capacities in society that can bring people together across divides and facilitate an effective process of collaboration towards problem-solving. The operational question will be when you can afford to devote sufficient attention and resources to this for a sustained effort, and not be distracted from your own main programme. One option can be to
develop this in due course as a specific sub-component of your larger programme and seek
dedicated financial and human resources for it.
1 Exploratory Phase
   Country programme viability
   Peacebuilder mapping

2 Preparatory Phase
   Programme Development
   Funding Acquisition

3 Preliminary Phase
   (Content)
   Conflict mapping

4 Main Phase
   (Process)
   Establishment of National Group
   Consensus entry points selection

5 Implementation Phase
   (Results)

6 Dissemination Phase
   Documentation and distribution
V. LIST OF PEOPLE INTERVIEWED BY THE EVALUATORS

In Geneva (September 2007):

- Scott Weber: Director-General – Interpeace
- Koenraad Van Brabant: Head of the Reflective Practice Unit – Interpeace
- Jean-Paul Mugiraneza: Former lead researcher – IRDP
- Gonzague Munyazogeye: IRDP’s focal point for engagement with Geneva-based diaspora members
- Edouard Bizumuremyi: Rwanda Embassy – participated in IRDP’s discussions with the Rwandan diaspora living in Switzerland

In Rwanda (October 2007):

- IRDP’s Executive Committee: Professor Pierre Rwanyindo – Director, Dr Naasson Munyandamutsa – First Deputy Director, Immaculée Mukankubito – Second Deputy Director, Emilienne Kabega – administrator
- KAYIRANGWA Bernadette: IRDP’s researcher
- UWINEZA Peace: IRDP’s researcher
- MINANI Faustin: MINECOFIN (Ministry of Economic Planning)
- KABOYI Assumpta: Journalist at Voice of America radio
- Prof. KALISA Mbanda: Ex Chief Education Officer at ISAE Busogo (Superior Institute for Agriculture and Breeding)
- Hon. MPAYIMANA Elie: Senator
- MUSARE Faustin: Office of the President of Republic
- Prof. MBONIMANA Gamariel: Professor at the Rwanda National University
- RUTAZANA Francine: ACCORD Rwanda
- Malin ERICSSON: Second Secretary/ Swedish Embassy
- GASANGERA Wellars: Senator
- Mgr KOLINI Emmanuel: Archbishop of Eglise Episcopale Rwandaise (EER – Rwandan Episcopal Church) and Chair of IRDP’s Board
- Hon. NYIRAMIRIMO Odette: Senator
- Hon. AYINKAMIYE Spéciose: Senator
- Prof. SHIYAKA Athanase: Centre de gestion des Conflits (Center for Conflict Management), Kigali
- Prof. BYANAFASHE Deo: Professor at the Rwanda National University
- Didier Douziech: Swiss Cooperation – Deputy Director
- IYAMUREMYE Régine: Office of the President of Republic and IRDP’s Board member
- Hon. INYUMBA Aloysie: Senator and IRDP’s Board member
- Alexis AFRIKA: Canadian Embassy
- NYINAWAGAGA Claudine: Mayor of Gasabo District (Kigali)
- KANIMBA François: Governor of the Rwanda National Bank and Vice Chair of IRDP’s Board
- KAYIJAMAHE Athanase: IRDP researcher
- MUGENZI Jean-Claude: IRDP’s Audiovisual researcher
- Jerry McCann: Interpeace’s Regional Director for Eastern and Central Africa
- Maud Roure: Interpeace’s Programme officer for the Great Lakes
- Attended a dialogue forum on inadequacy between education/training opportunities and employment needs, Kigali
- Attended a meeting of the Kabagali dialogue club
VI. TERMS OF REFERENCE OF EVALUATION
Termes de référence pour l’évaluation externe du Programme de l’Institut de Recherche et de Dialogue pour la Paix (IRDP) et d’Interpeace

1. Programme IRDP – Interpeace

Contexte du démarrage du programme

Après le génocide, le gouvernement rwandais s’est efforcé de bâtir une nouvelle nation sur les fondations de la démocratie, le respect des droits humains et la promotion socio-économique. Dans cette dynamique de reconstruction, l’IRDP s’est proposé de contribuer à la création d’un environnement favorable à la transformation sociale attendue. L’IRDP, qui se positionne comme facilitateur du débat et comme catalyseur du changement, propose une approche participative comme un aspect fondamental dans le processus de prise de décisions sur des questions d’intérêt national. Le choix de cette méthodologie dans la recherche d’une paix durable est basé sur la conviction que la paix et la confiance ne peuvent être bâties que sur les fondations d’échanges et de compréhension mutuelle et des capacités de collaboration au-delà des divisions sociales ou politiques.

L’IRDP a été créé à un moment où le Rwanda était confronté à divers défis post-génocide:

- un contexte de méfiance et de tensions sociales dues aux violences cycliques du Rwanda,
- l’impératif de réconciliation face au contentieux du génocide,
- des réformes politiques, socio-économiques et juridiques qui ne trouvent pas le consensus de la population
- le manque de ressources humaines et financières pour mettre en application toutes ces réformes.
- les conflits dans la région des Grands Lacs.

Pendant que les autorités rwandaises travaillaient à la remise en route d’un Etat meurtri et affaibli par le génocide (réforme des institutions, décentralisation, mise en place des juridictions gacaca, etc.), l’IRDP s’est efforcé d’engager les Rwandais dans un processus de dialogue visant à répondre à la fois aux besoins de la population de reconstruire le lien social, de réfléchir sur ce qui s’était passé et d’envisager ensemble les solutions pour un avenir meilleur. En effet, face à l’ampleur de la tâche, il était essentiel que les décisions et réformes adoptées au niveau de l’Etat soient soutenues par des efforts de la population en faveur de la paix durable. En outre, au vu de la profondeur des blessures post-génocide, il était crucial que les défis de la reconstruction ne soient pas traités uniquement au niveau de la capitale mais fassent également l’objet de débats dans le reste du pays et parmi la diaspora rwandaise.

Aperçu du programme
C’est dans ce contexte qu’Interpeace et l’IRDP ont lancé le programme en mars 2001. Ce contexte délicat de l’après génocide a déterminé les choix que les deux organisations ont faits quant à l’approche méthodologique et aux principes de travail qui devaient caractériser le programme:

- la légitimité du processus qui dépend en grande partie de la capacité de gérer l’espace politique et le degré d’objectivité dans le traitement et l’interprétation des données.
- la qualité de la participation résultant de la représentativité des institutions et de la diversité des personnes consultées.
- l’appropriation du processus par les Rwandais comme but ultime du processus.

Après mûres réflexions sur la structure du programme et la mise en place du personnel, les activités du programme ont débuté en mars 2002. L’objectif global du programme était d’encourager, grâce à la méthodologie inspirée de celle d’Interpeace et adaptée au contexte national, une participation de la population à la définition des priorités aussi bien politiques que socio économiques et à la recherche des solutions aux problèmes majeurs du pays.


- La première phase, qui a duré deux ans, correspond à la mise en place d’un cadre institutionnel, à l’adaptation et à l’expérimentation de la méthodologie. L’IRDP a pris suffisamment de temps pour informer les acteurs nationaux et internationaux sur son programme et pour tisser des relations de partenariat avec les autres acteurs engagés dans la reconstruction de la paix. L’IRDP a ensuite mené des consultations extensives de la population rwandaise à tous les niveaux pour recueillir ses points de vues sur les causes du conflit et les moyens d’asseoir une paix durable. Les résultats de ces consultations sont consignés dans un premier rapport intitulé «La reconstruction d’une paix durable au Rwanda : La parole au peuple » ainsi que dans un documentaire audiovisuel intitulé « The Truth Heals ». Lors d’une réunion de restitution des résultats des consultations en novembre 2003 à Kigali, le Groupe National (GN) a validé les résultats et identifié les défis à la paix qu’il fallait résoudre en priorité. Ces défis prioritaires sont les suivants :

- Histoire et conflits du Rwanda
- Génocide des Tutsi : Causes, exécution et mémoire
- Efforts de lutte contre la pauvreté au Rwanda
- La démocratie au Rwanda
- L’État de droit au Rwanda.

2ème phase : Recherche participative et approfondie (2004-2005)

Ces cinq thèmes ont fait l’objet d’une recherche approfondie par l’IRDP pendant la deuxième phase du programme. Cette recherche était participative en ce qu’elle était menée par un chercheur de l’Institut et par un Groupe de travail composé d’experts et de personnes concernées par le sujet. Parallèlement à la recherche, l’IRDP facilitait des débats sur ces mêmes sujets au sein de la société rwandaise à tous les niveaux ainsi que dans la diaspora rwandaise. La deuxième phase a suscité beaucoup d’intérêt et connu une grande participation. Les résultats des débats et de la recherche ont été soumis à l’appréciation du GN. Par ailleurs, l’Institut a initié

11 Le Groupe National est un mécanisme de la méthodologie Interpeace qui joue un rôle important dans le programme au Rwanda. Le GN est composé d’environ 200 personnes qui sont représentatives de la société rwandaise. Le GN valide les résultats de la recherche et oriente la phase suivante du programme.
5 Clubs de dialogue dans les provinces du pays. Ces clubs rassemblent une trentaine de personnes issues du milieu rural qui se réunissent deux fois par mois pour débattre des 5 sujets de recherche. Ces clubs répondent non seulement au besoin exprimé par la population de perpétuer le débat même quand l’IRDP n’est pas là pour les faciliter mais aussi à la volonté de l’IRDP d’engager plus de Rwandais dans un processus de dialogue. A la suite de ce processus de recherche et de dialogue, des propositions de solutions ont été formulées pour répondre à ces 5 grands défis. Le suivi de la mise en application de ces recommandations constitue un volet du programme de la troisième phase.

3ème phase : Suivi de la mise en œuvre des recommandations (2006-2008)

La troisième phase du programme, qui a commencé en mars 2006, est composée d’activités dont le choix a été dicté à la fois par l’évolution du contexte, par les résultats des phases précédentes et par le nouveau mandat qui a été donné à l’IRDP par le Groupe National. Actuellement l’IRDP intervient donc sur 5 axes:

- La recherche participative additionnelle sur les points restés controversés à l’issue de la seconde phase de recherche approfondie. Les résultats de cette nouvelle recherche servent à alimenter les débats au sein des fora.
- L’extension de l’espace de débat à travers la mise en place de fora de débat aux niveaux national, provincial et des districts, de clubs de débat au sein de la jeunesse scolarisée et non scolarisée ainsi que le renforcement et l’extension de l’expérience avec les clubs de dialogue au sein de la population rurale.
- Le développement d’un centre de production audiovisuelle et de diffusion des messages de paix.
- La publication et la diffusion des résultats du processus de dialogue et de recherche de la 2ème phase.
- Le suivi de la mise en application des recommandations qui ont résulté des phases précédentes.

2. Objectifs de l’évaluation

Cette évaluation externe est la première depuis le début du programme. Elle constitue une étape importante au début de cette troisième phase pour tirer des leçons des deux phases précédentes. L’évaluation s’inscrit dans le cadre de la volonté de l’IRDP et d’Interpeace de répondre du programme devant les partenaires rwandais et les pays qui apportent leur soutien financier au programme. Elle devrait donc présenter un intérêt pour les autorités rwandaises et les acteurs internationaux engagés dans le renforcement de la paix et le développement du Rwanda.

Les objectifs de l’évaluation sont les suivants:

- Examiner si les activités menées au cours des deux phases précédentes ont contribué à atteindre les objectifs fixés par l’Institut et par extension si le programme a contribué à la reconstruction de la paix au Rwanda ; vérifier et valider les influences et les impacts perçus du programme.

Les objectifs secondaires de l’évaluation sont:

- Analyser les leçons que l’on peut tirer des 5 premières années du programme et émettre des recommandations sur des ajustements nécessaires afin d’aider l’IRDP et Interpeace à mieux concevoir leurs interventions futures.
- Vérifier la pertinence actuelle de la vision et de la mission initiales de l’IRDP.
- Evaluer le partenariat entre l’IRDP et Interpeace.

3. Les principales tâches des consultants
Pour chaque phase du programme, les évaluateurs chercheront à mettre en relation le déroulement du processus et le contexte politique. Ils s’attacheront à identifier les résultats, l’effet ou l’impact produits. L’évaluation devra aussi apprécier la pertinence des stratégies et des activités de la troisième phase.

Les évaluateurs rédigeront un rapport écrit et présenteront les résultats de leur travail à l’IRDP et à Interpeace. Le rapport devra comporter les éléments suivants:

- Un bref récapitulatif du programme
- Une évaluation de la pertinence, de l’efficacité et de l’influence du programme, ainsi que de la pérennité de ses résultats.
- Une analyse des forces et des faiblesses du programme et des leçons tirées
- Des recommandations sur les activités futures du programme
- Un résumé des principaux résultats et des conseils/recommandations pour le renforcement de la paix au Rwanda d’une manière générale.

4. Contenu de l’évaluation

Les évaluateurs concentreront en priorité leur attention sur le déroulement du processus en rapport avec le contexte sociopolitique. Les aspects de la gestion du ‘projet’ dans le sens étroit du terme (ressources, équipements, événements politiques, etc.) seront pris en considération par les évaluateurs non en tant que tels mais plutôt pour mieux comprendre les différents facteurs qui ont pu influencer le travail de l’IRDP (contraintes humaines et budgétaires, etc.). Forts de leurs analyses, les évaluateurs s’attacheront à formuler des recommandations sur la manière d’améliorer l’efficacité et l’impact du programme et d’assurer sa pérennité. Les questions à soumettre à l’évaluation sont énumérées ci-dessous mais il reviendra aux évaluateurs de les développer davantage après discussion avec l’IRDP et Interpeace:

4.1 Pour l’objectif principal

Pertinence

- Évaluer la pertinence du programme et de la méthodologie choisie par rapport à l’objectif global de contribuer à la construction d’une paix durable au Rwanda.
- Apprécier la pertinence du programme par rapport aux autres initiatives et mécanismes existants au Rwanda dans le domaine de la paix (Ex. 1. le «Centre of Conflict Management, un mécanisme initié par le gouvernement. 2. Coexistence Network, un mécanisme de la société civile ».)
- Le programme a-t-il été démarré à un moment opportun ?
- L’analyse du contexte et des besoins post-conflit de la société rwandaise, qui a été déterminante dans la conceptualisation du programme, a-t-elle été correcte ?
- L’analyse du contexte a t-elle été une préoccupation à chaque phase du programme IRDP ?
- Évaluer la pertinence des thèmes de recherche choisis par rapport à l’objectif global du programme.

Efficacité des Stratégies

- Analyser l’approche de mise en œuvre du programme par rapport aux enjeux politiques du pays : le choix des thèmes et des stratégies, la planification, l’exécution et la coordination des activités, la production des rapports, la mobilisation des fonds, etc.
- Apprécier le choix des partenaires.
- Analyser les relations entre l’IRDP et les institutions publiques rwandaises
- Analyser comment l’appropriation locale du processus a été encouragée.
- Analyser le degré avec lequel le programme a pu répondre aux demandes d’appui émanant des autorités, des leaders à la base, des organisations communautaires, etc.
- Analyser l’efficacité avec laquelle le programme a réussi à créer et à maintenir un espace neutre de débat.
- Analyser l’efficacité avec laquelle l’IRDP a pu se positionner comme un interlocuteur acceptable et maintenir ce rôle.
- Analyser l’utilisation que l’IRDP fait de son Conseil d’administration dans la gestion de l’espace politique
- Évaluer le niveau de participation de la population dans le programme. Un éventail large et représentatif de la population rwandaise a-t-il été impliqué dans les débats organisés et facilités par l’IRDP ?
- Le programme a-t-il réussi à impliquer la diaspora rwandaise dans le processus de dialogue ?
- Analyser l’efficacité de la méthodologie Interpeace dans la stimulation et la facilitation de dialogue.
- Évaluer le rôle des groupes de travail et, par conséquent, le degré de participation locale dans la recherche.
- Évaluer la qualité de la recherche et l’utilisation des résultats de la recherche dans le processus
- Le programme a-t-il fait l’objet d’une bonne communication envers les différents publics cibles (participants au processus, autorités rwandaises, population, communauté internationale, etc.) Comment les résultats du programme ont-ils été communiqués aux acteurs internationaux ?
- Comment les outils vidéos et les technologies de communication ont-ils été utilisés pour diffuser les résultats de la recherche et pour stimuler le dialogue ?

Influences, Impacts et pérennité

- Analyser les influences et les impacts du programme sur les relations entre les niveaux national, intermédiaire et local de la société
- Analyser les influences et les impacts du programme sur le renforcement du dialogue au sein de la société, ainsi que sur la paix et la gouvernance
- Analyser les influences et les impacts du programme sur le processus de décision politique (tant au niveau national que local)
- Quelle influence les résultats et recommandations de la 2ème phase ont-ils eu ou peuvent-ils avoir dans le processus de reconstruction de la paix ?
- Quels sont les changements que le programme a apportés? Comment ces changements peuvent-ils être durables ?
- Y a-t-il eu des résultats imprévus ?
- Apprécier les efforts du programme pour favoriser la réconciliation et leur impact aux niveaux national et local

4.2 Pour les objectifs secondaires.

Efficience

- Apprécier l’influence du niveau et de la disponibilité des ressources (financières, humaines, logistiques) sur le déroulement du programme.
- Analyser l’adéquation des résultats par rapport aux ressources disponibles (humaines, matérielles et financières) -
- Apprécier le système de suivi et de coordination des activités.
- Analyser la manière dont le programme/IRDP/Interpeace ont réagi face aux difficultés (programmatiques, humaines, politiques, financières)
- Évaluer les forces et faiblesses de l’IRDP et d’Interpeace en matière de gestion de programme
Pertinence et efficacité du partenariat IRDP-Interpeace.

- Analyser le rôle joué par WSP International/Interpeace dans le travail d’exploration et de préparation du programme (contacts avec les autorités rwandaises, partage de l’expérience de WSP dans d’autres pays, etc.).
- Évaluer le soutien institutionnel, organisationnel et méthodologique apporté par WSP International / Interpeace tout au long du programme.
- Analyser les forces et faiblesses du partenariat entre l’IRDP et Interpeace et son rôle dans la pérennité du programme

5. 4. Méthodologie

- Revue de la documentation, notamment les documents de programme pour chaque phase, les compte-rendu d’activités, les compte-rendus de réunions et de fora, la « Country Note », les rapports de recherche thématiques, les documents de planification stratégique, les évaluations internes, les documents audiovisuels pertinents produits par l’IRDP.
- Entretiens individuels ou groupés avec les membres d’Interpeace qui ont collaboré de près avec le programme, notamment Scott Weber, chargé du programme Rwanda au moment de sa création et actuel Directeur Général, Jerry McCann, Directeur du Bureau Régional pour l’Afrique Orientale et Centrale, Koenraad Van Brabant, Reflective Practice Unit, Maud Roure, actuelle Chargée des Programmes Grands Lacs
- Entretiens individuels ou groupés avec l’équipe de l’IRDP
- Participation à des activités du programme (par exemple : forum de débat, réunion d’un comité de pilotage, réunion d’un club de dialogue ou réunion d’un club de discussion dans une école, etc.)

6. Rapport

Les évaluateurs prépareront un bref rapport introductif (ne devant pas dépasser 5 pages) dans les 5 premiers jours de l’évaluation, dans lequel ils précisèrent le calendrier de l’évaluation, la méthodologie qui sera utilisée, les noms des personnes et groupes de personnes à rencontrer, et une liste des documents qui seront passés en revue. Les évaluateurs rédigeront ensuite un bref rapport de mi-parcours (ne devant pas dépasser 10 pages) dans lequel seront mentionnés les progrès de l’évaluation, tout changement éventuel dans le calendrier de départ et quelques résultats provisoires. A la fin du travail de terrain et de recueil des données, les évaluateurs auront 15 jours pour produire un premier draft de rapport. Le rapport final devra prendre en compte les commentaires reçus sur le draft et devra être rédigé dans les 5 jours suivant la réception de ces commentaires.

Le rapport final d’évaluation ne devra pas dépasser 50 pages, sans compter les annexes, et devra comporter un résumé de 5 pages maximum comprenant les résultats de l’évaluation et recommandations.

7. Profil recherché

L’évaluation sera faite par un Consultant international et un Consultant national. A eux deux, les évaluateurs devront avoir l’expérience et les compétences requises comme suivent :

- Expérience dans l’évaluation des programmes de paix ou dans les domaines similaires
- Bonne maîtrise de l’évaluation des impacts de processus complexes, tels que ceux liés à la consolidation de la paix
- Connaissance de la méthodologie de Recherche-action participative ou autres méthodes participatives
- Bonne connaissance du Rwanda
- Capacité d’analyser la dialectique existant entre le programme et le contexte et d’en tirer des conclusions
- Capacité de travailler en respectant des délais courts
- Bonnes relations interpersonnelles
- Bonnes capacités rédactionnelles
- Excellente maîtrise du kinyarwanda (uniquement pour le consultant national), du français et de l’anglais.

8. Responsabilités d’Interpeace et de l’IRDP

Interpeace et l’IRDP seront responsables de :

- Préparer un briefing préalable sur les deux organisations, les principes de base de l’approche ‘Interpeace’ et les grands moments du programme conjoint au Rwanda
- Fournir le soutien logistique nécessaire au Rwanda et en-dehors du Rwanda
- Organiser les rendez-vous avec les personnes à rencontrer
- Fournir la documentation nécessaire

9. Programme de travail (provisoire)

L’évaluation commencera à la mi-avril 2007, elle comprendra 4 semaines de travail de terrain, et le rapport final devra être produit à la fin du mois de mai. L’évaluation aura lieu au Rwanda, éventuellement aux Bureaux d’Interpeace à Nairobi et à Genève, et auprès de membres de la diaspora rwandaise ayant participé au programme. Selon les endroits où il sera nécessaire de se rendre, les évaluateurs pourront se partager les tâches.

| Jours 4-27 | Entretiens au Rwanda avec l’équipe de l’IRDP et les différentes parties prenantes. Participation à des activités du programme (forum de débat, réunion des comités de pilotage, réunion d’un club de dialogue, etc.) Echanges sur les résultats préliminaires. Rédaction du rapport de mi-parcours. 2 jours de repos |
| Jours 33-38 | Rédaction du premier draft du rapport. 2 jours de repos |
| Jours 39-45 | Recueil des commentaires ; rédaction du rapport final ; réunion de restitution |