WSP IN GUATEMALA

TOWARD A SECURITY POLICY FOR DEMOCRACY

Project GUA/99/022

Consultation Report
Systematization of the development of the project, and lessons learned

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November 2001 – February 2002
Introduction

The goal of this report is to organize and evaluate the development of the project “Towards a democratic security policy” (POLSEDE), led by the Latin American Faculty of Social Sciences (FLACSO) – Guatemala, the Guatemalan Institute for Development and Peace (IGEDEP) and War–Torn Societies Project International (WSP). The project began in October 1999\(^1\) and is currently in the conclusion phase. Those responsible for the project as well as the agencies that have financed it acknowledge the need to balance putting the project into practice, of which the final report will be a part, and the goal of “documenting the experiences of the implementation process (...) so as to enrich the operative knowledge of the participating institutions (...) and the potential use of the participatory investigation-action methodology for other issues and geographic areas.” The goal is to move towards the “operative systematization of the project via the study of the resulting reports and other documents, as well as interviews of those involved, in order to document each phase of the project’s implementation process”\(^2\).

To comply with these objectives, the consultation team referred to relevant documentation from the project and also performed a series of interviews with several of the participants, following an interview selection criteria to represent the diverse participant profiles. Additionally, with the goal of determining lessons learned and expectations of their influence, several meetings were held.

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\(^1\) With a preparation phase of approximately six months.

\(^2\) The terms of reference for the consultation are in quotes.
with Guatemalan analysts, members of the project team and various functionaries within the United Nations in Guatemala and donor countries. Finally, three of the four consultation team members attended the project’s internal systematization and evaluation meeting in Antigua, Guatemala on November 8 and 9, 2001. The project’s coordinating team and associated investigators, minus one, participated in the meeting, whose relevant conclusions have been incorporated in this document.

The result of these activities is reflected in the present report, which begins with a description of the context surrounding the project. The second part of the report highlights the objectives of POLSEDE and its links with the goals of the Peace Accords -- more specifically, with the Agreement on the Strengthening of Civil Power and the Function of the Army in a Democratic Society -- signed in Guatemala between the Government of the Republic and the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Forces (URNG). The third part of the report centers on the project’s development phase, on the difficulties encountered and how these were addressed. In the fourth section, the report closely analyzes the POLSEDE methodology, which, it is important to mention, constitutes one of the project’s main features, together with, obviously, the theoretical-normative results. The fifth and sixth sections of the report quantitatively describe the project’s activities, and are complemented in the seventh section by a qualitative analysis that is mainly a result of the interviews performed during the consultation. The eighth section evaluates the relationships between the project and the United Nations agencies that are involved: UNOPS and UNDP, according to the terms of reference. An important section, the ninth, discusses the lessons learned in the

3 A list of persons interviewed by the evaluation team is found in the documentary annex.
development of the project. In this section, the report also analyzes the project outputs – the emitted documentation as well as external activities. The tenth section includes thematically grouped summaries of critical consideration and general conclusions. The last section includes a bibliography of works used in the report’s elaboration. Given the large quantity of material produced by the project, the document appendix has been included only in the CD-ROM version of this report.

The consultation team wishes to add that because of pending elements that are important for a complete picture of the project (some final documents, the final evaluations of some involved actors and a greater perspective with which to evaluate the impact), it will be necessary to include an addendum to the present report -- to be ready by the end of the first trimester of the coming year (2003).

The members of the consultation team would like to thank the Project Director, the Academic Coordinator, the management team and the many persons interviewed for their cooperation and disposition in assisting in the positive conclusion of this undertaking.
1. The context of the POLSEDE project

It is undeniable that the “military question” has been a determinant element in recent Guatemalan history. However, it is convenient to review this fact when analyzing a project like POLSEDE, its achievements, and anticipated mid- and long-term consequence for the complex relationships between Guatemala civil and political society.

This is particularly true because the organizational development of the country’s political institutions has been greatly effected by the role of the army as the principal, and often the only, element in the state apparatus. Following the abrupt end of the “Democratic Spring” in 1954, the weakness of the State, or its use as a more instrument by an elite more interested in preserving and expanding its own social privileges than constructing a national legal-political framework, created conditions for the “military overflow” into what has been termed a “racist- agricultural State” (Rodés, 2001: 156).

These circumstances have led to the consideration of the Guatemalan State as a “weak state”, with corresponding implications for political, economic and cultural development of an extraordinarily complex and fragmented society in the process of converting to a modern society.

Based on this, the hypothetical construction of an organized nation is complicated by some social sectors’ (few in number but economically powerful) use of the state apparatus to maintain their privileges via diverse forms of

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5 An analysis on the Army’s role in the political life of the country can be found in, among others, Gabriel Aguilera Peralta and Edelberto Torres–Rivas (1998), Bernardo Arévalo de León (1997) and Héctor Rosada Granados (1998).
authoritarianism that were unchanged in the transition to an electoral democracy. That transition began in the middle of the armed internal conflict, with the convocation of the National Constituent Assembly (1984). Because of its very nature, the controlled transition to democracy that began with elections for the Assembly failed to define the role of the military institution within the new institutional democracy created from the Assembly. In other words, while the transfer from military governments to legitimately elected civilian governments meant a significant change in the Guatemalan political system, a combination of authoritarian attitudes and practices endured, which gave the Army a possibility of intervention not in line with the democratic regime under construction. In the words of Bernardo Arévalo (2001:3), it is a question of “the action of resigning from government without renouncing power.” From that moment forward, the formal legality of civilian governments did not diminish the central role of the State’s (military) core in the daily formulation of political action.

The Peace Accords, and particularly the Agreement on Strengthening Civil Power and the Function of the Army in a Democratic Society (AFPC), compose the first complete outline of a State reformulation based on a democratic state, of which the Arévalo-Arbenz governments offer an imperfect but apt reference.

Indeed, beyond marking the end of the armed internal conflict, the Accords outline a new political organization while at the same time establish a new model of interaction and legitimization between the Guatemalan political organization and Guatemalan society – for the first time considered in its complete and complex reality.
The AFPC\textsuperscript{6} called attention to a continuing dysfunction -- ten years after the elaboration of the \textit{Political Constitution of the Republic} and the initiation of freely elected civilian governments. The agreement signaled a need to define the essential responsibility of defending the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the nation and the need to elaborate a Security Agenda; defended reforms to the legal code; and adjusted regulations, structures and procedures to the new circumstances of peace and democracy. More specifically, the AFPC limited the role of the Armed Forces to national security (though it did not forbid its collaboration in other areas); anticipated a new military doctrine -- effectively, a new defense policy; reallocated Army resources and property; and supported new education and training systems. A particularly sensitive topic due to its role in the armed internal conflict, was that of intelligence services. The AFPC, in addition to creating civil institutions responsible for investigation, prevention and action, also designed political control mechanisms to avoid the excesses of the past.

Clearly, the AFPC intended nothing less than to outline the modernization of the Armed Forces by redefining their functions – now democracy-oriented since the end of the armed conflict – and to establish the preeminence of civil power by creating institutions and promoting standards for defining and controlling what is prohibited to the State in a democracy: the monopoly of legitimate coercion.

Despite some analysts’ evaluations, the Peace Accords are unquestionably a state pact that should have been regarded as a basic action plan while the government strove to efficiently complete each one of the peace agreements programmed

\textsuperscript{6} As indicated by its title, the AFPC addresses two inter-related issues: the new role of the Armed Forces and improved civil society performance. The latter aspect, save where it is linked to the relationship between legitimate political power and the Army, is not considered within the Project or this evaluation.
within a timeline, and whose authentication was the duty of the United Nations Verification Mission for Guatemala (MINUGUA).

Whether because of conceptual distance from the political culture of the Guatemalan elite, operative incapacity of government circles, or manifested or hidden desires to avoid completing and verifying the accords, it is clear that while governments posterior to the signing of the peace have formally included the Accords in their political agendas, they have, minimally, developed priorities differing from those determined by the accords.

Periodic reports from the UN Secretary General have politely pointed out the failure to accomplish the Accords and the subsequent debilitating effects that has on the consolidation of the peace process. Organized sectors of civil society and the international community have also raised their voices and demanded that the state apparatus fulfill the agreements and adjust its activities to the letter and spirit of the accords.

2. Project objectives

Hence, three years after the signing of the AFPC, its fulfillment was minimal\(^7\). The reformist impulse of the Peace Accords had been depleted as a combined result of involved authorities’ diminished political will, resistance from diverse areas of affected sectors and the emergence of new issues on the political agenda. Immediate priorities overshadowed strategic priorities. In the case of the AFPC, an additional problem was the general nature of the agreements and the ambiguity of some details. Furthermore, the literalness of the AFPC illustrates

\(^7\) Aside from the UN Secretary General reports previously mentioned, refer to Bernardo Arévalo (2001: 4) and Susanne Jonas (2000, passim).
the signatories’ limited understanding of the topic, necessitating additional interpretive effort and, on some occasions, serving as an excuse for noncompliance. Despite the agreement’s apparent inclusion of all politically relevant issues, certain aspects remained undefined, probably due to characteristics of the negotiation itself. Additionally, there was no operative method that would give viability to the agreement, abstraction made from the intentions of involved institutions and actors.

These circumstances gave rise to the “War-torn Societies” Project (WSP), supported by the United Nations Institute for Research and Investigation on Social Development (UNIRISD) and other international institutions, in 1994, in Guatemala and three other countries: Eritrea, Mozambique and Somalia. This is the origin, though distant both historically and methodologically, of the POLSEDE project, which is currently being evaluated.

The convergence of perspectives (the fundamentally Anglo-Saxon theoretical approach belonging to international bureaucracy and the methodology of participatory investigation -- considered minor and often marginal within the social sciences) and the countries taken as examples, give context to the limitations and strengths of the commitment.

Without considering the African cases, the first analysis of the Guatemalan case and its successes and difficulties are expressed in a text by Edelberto Torres-Rivas and Bernardo Arévalo de León: *Del conflicto al diálogo: El WSP en Guatemala.* (From conflict to dialogue: the WSP in Guatemala) Guatemala, FLACSO-UNIRISD, 1999. 343 pp.
Toward a Security Policy for Democracy

The AFPC’s general character and relative influence on Guatemala’s political environment gave rise to the attempt at creating more intense connection with the political agenda of the country and one of its key points, strongly emphasized by the peace agenda stemming from the accords.

Indeed, the complexity of civil-military relations and their impact on the construction of democratic institutionality constituted privileged ground for the development not only of solid academic reflection, but also an extensive and penetrating dialogue; this would finally crack the watertight compartments that had traditionally enclosed Guatemala’s security function, a key element of the state structure.

The essential link between scientific investigation and political-social dialogue permitted the creation of a modified methodology of participatory investigation-action. Additionally, thematic consolidation around security and its democratic reform as established in the accords lent sufficient depth of field to the new intellectual experience.

From the very beginning, the project coordinating team confronted a “crisis of material legitimacy.” This would diminish as the actors sensed that the work area being delineated concerned everyone and that diverse perspectives had no other effect than to lend a sense of individuality, therefore facilitating the construction of a future.

Consequently, the project began with limited human resources. There were an insufficient number of civilians with professional competence in the area of defense, and not even the military functionaries had expertise in the area -- despite the fact that for decades they were attributed with it monopolization.
Under such circumstances, the fact that the dialogue was consolidated and continued for close to two years is in itself a success to add to the credit side of the project. An even greater success is a document stemming from the dialogue, which, though rough, constitutes an initial and valuable addition to the project’s implementation and should form (if the project continues) the foundation for future undertakings of even greater scope.

The POLSEDE project arose, therefore, as an initiative designed to break the paralysis in the conversion of the armed forces and, more generically, to offer a conceptual outline for a democratic security policy. In the words of the project itself, the general objective was

“To contribute to the consolidation of a democracy and governability in Guatemala through the focused attention on two main issues: the systematization and expansion of the institutional process searching to adapt military functions to the requirements of a Democratic State of Law, and the development of the corresponding Security Policy.”

This general purpose was first defined as the will to “contribute to forming the necessary measures that would lead to a Democratic Security Policy”. Therefore, in what was an important innovation, the creation of a multi-sector investigation extended the debate beyond its traditional possession by the military sector. This led to two results: the encounter of socially relevant and habitually distant -- when not in conflict – sectors and institutions, and the strengthening of the issue of democratic security on the country’s public agenda. The overall goal was to politically unclog the AFPC implementation and facilitate its achievement.\(^8\)

\(^8\) In the project’s own words, the goal was “to bring together diverse actors from government, academic and social sectors involved in the issue of civil-military relations and the development of the AFPC; to strengthen joint analysis and discussion around diverse aspects of the issue, particularly those related to the implementation of the AFPC and those that maintain the topic of
Another important goal was to resolve the lack of civilians trained in the area of state security, and particularly in those aspects that fall within the functions of the army. Guatemala lacked people trained for positions related to the deliberation and execution of defense policy in the broad sense. As illustrated by other transitions from authoritarianism, a chief obstacle in the consolidation of democracy is the availability of specialists able to contribute to the development of public issues involving areas that, due to characteristics of military or civil-military authoritarian regimes, have been monopolized by officials in the armed forces. In other words, despite the AFPC obligation to modify the constitution and eliminate the prerequisite of active military official status for the position of Defense Minister, the possibilities of a successful civil-military relationship in public security policy formation was severely limited by the absence of qualified civilians. The project addressed this key topic and, perhaps without intending to, hypothetically became a pilot plan to provide the Guatemalan State with the human resources it had lacked. Though not a direct objective, the additional training of citizens and groups in key aspects of security policy is in itself a highly important goal. The latter is true especially in the context of a crisis in the so-called centric-state paradigm of security. The tendency, while still advancing in a muddled manner, is toward social appropriation of the mentioned problem.

3. Project expression

the redefinition of the military in a democratic society on the political agenda; to facilitate the development of inter-sector consensus around the various aspects of the civil-military question and particularly around the effects and interpretations of the AFPC; and to permit the formation of policy proposals necessary for the development and implementation of the AFPC, the redefinition of military functions and consequently, the development of a Democratic Security Policy.”

9 An obligation whose fulfillment has thus far been hindered by the negative result of the April 1999 popular referendum on Constitutional reform.
The initiative for the project’s design and later direction corresponds to Bernardo Arévalo de León, who clearly perceived a weakening in the fulfillment of the aforementioned AFPC. Arévalo de León, in addition to being a FLACSO analyst of defense issues and the author of a key essay on the role of the Guatemalan armed forces, is also a member of the organizing team for the WSP in Guatemala\textsuperscript{10}. Therefore, he possessed an understanding of the issues and experience in what would later be the POLSEDE methodology. He assembled a coordinating team, initially including Carlos Ramiro Martínez and Ana Glenda Tager, and designed the first draft of the project. The idea was presented to FLACSO\textsuperscript{11} as well as to WSP, which, together with IGEDEP, constituted the institutional foundation that supported the initiative. However, the ultimate support came from the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) in Guatemala, whose then Resident Representative Lars Franklin and subsequent project directors María Noel Baeza and Patricia O’Connor, took on the project with enthusiasm. The UNDP made the necessary arrangements to gain the support of a solid group of donors who pledged the financing needed to initiate the POLSEDE project. The UN Office for Project Services (UNOPS) also

\textsuperscript{10} Guatemala’s political transition and the signing of the peace accords have been accompanied and/or continued by various inter-sector dialogues. In many ways, the POLSEDE project is a continuation of that: the fact that some POLSEDE participants also took part in other dialogues enabled a substantial sharing of lessons learned. At one point in the development of the project, the Peace Secretariat proposed converting the project into a partite commission, similar to others created by the accords. However, the preference of the majority was to maintain the original format.

\textsuperscript{11} The Latin American Faculty of Social Sciences (FLACSO) – Guatemala, signed a contract agreement (UNOPS/GUA-99-025-FF) with the Guatemalan unit of the UN Office for Project Services within which it was agreed to support and facilitate the implementation of the preparatory assistance stage. This support, which was extended for the length of the project, was manifested by the assistance of UNOPS human resources, the provision of physical installations, the use of the Documentation Center, the support of the Technical Information Unit, and general logistic support during inter-sector Work Group meetings.
supported the project’s development, according to that office’s area of expertise\textsuperscript{12}.

Parallel to the acquisition of resources, the coordinating team also realized the corresponding actions to involve the rest of the participants who were responsible for the bulk of the investigation and debate oriented towards the production of the project documents. Some obstacles needed to be overcome. Given the methodological and policy characteristics of the POLSEDE project, the various work groups included state representatives, academic institutions, non-government organizations and at-large participants who, because of interest in and knowledge of the issue, were able to add value to the project. This consciously chosen broad participation in the project gave rise to certain indirect rejections, which were invalidated by the firm position of the coordination team and one organization in particular. Some invited persons ultimately declined to participate, arguing that discussion of democratic security should be exclusive to “civil society”, an attitude not only contrary to the project philosophy, but also scientifically and politically incorrect.

The main challenge was to integrate the armed forces, without which the project would lose much of its significance. The coordinating team had to confront certain reservations in light of the army’s perception that the project included

\textsuperscript{12}The POLSEDE project was the first UNDP initiative in the area of military and security policy issues in Guatemala, cooperating and complementing the verification activities delegated to the UN Verification Mission in Guatemala in an effort to accomplish the fulfillment of the AFPC. The UNOPS functions in the area of administration and implementation of projects, supporting developing nations and nations in transition in their search for peace, social stability, economic growth, and sustainable development. In Guatemala, the UNOPS has and has had responsibilities with projects connected to: the War-torn Societies Project, the Truth Commission, the project to strengthen the Presidential Administrative and Security Secretariat, the Strengthening of the Judicial College, the program of Support for the National Civil Police within the framework of constructing a new public security structure and corresponding policy, and the Institutional Assistance Program for Legal Reform that gives technical assistance to the Congress of the Republic on legislative areas related to fulfillment of the Peace Accords.
little more than previously elaborated conclusions and that the initiative could be detrimental. The proposal made to the armed forces maintained that while the methodology was not negotiable -- and therefore the army’s participation could be antagonistic and/or disqualified -- the results were undefined. Nonetheless, any proposal resulting from the project had to agree with the principles established in the AFPC. Additionally, it was clearly stated that consensus was obligatory in the deliberation phase as well as in the approval of the documentation, which eliminated suspicions that exclusively numeric or majority/minority criteria would be used in the decision-making process.

The obligation to apply the POSEDE methods and objectives and the inclusion of those civil authorities most engaged in the peace process contributed to the elimination of initial resistances\textsuperscript{13}. The army finally agreed to participate before the project was made public, and after six meetings with the Ministry of Defense\textsuperscript{14}. Nonetheless, as will be seen, the attitude of the armed forces representatives in the different work groups characterized, from the very beginning, the bulk of the POLSEDE dynamic. In the course of the investigation and debates what was detectable in the previous phase became obvious: the presence of two dissimilar attitudes within the army. These attitudes were initially related to the army’s participation in the project, and later, to the inclination to accept the tone and content of the results.

\textsuperscript{13} These authorities saw the project as an opportunity to promote a policy that the government, for internal reasons, had not wanted or been able to confront.

\textsuperscript{14} However, it was necessary to postpone the third Project Group meeting due to the Defense Ministry’s original refusal to attend. With the aid of the government, a new opportunity was given.
Finally, the project included the following sectors and individual representatives:

Table 1. Project Participants

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<th>Government of the Republic</th>
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<tr>
<td>Presidential Administrative and Security Secretariat (SAAS)</td>
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<td>Presidential Strategic Analysis Secretariat (SAE)</td>
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<td>Peace Secretariat (SEPAZ)</td>
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<td>Ministry of Defense (MDN)</td>
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<td>Interior Ministry</td>
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<td>Ministry of Foreign Relations (MRE)</td>
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<td>Presidential Human Rights Commission (COPREDEH)</td>
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<td>Congress of the Republic</td>
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<td>Academic Centers and Civil Society Organizations</td>
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<tr>
<td>Association of Social Investigation and Studies (ASIES)</td>
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<td>Association for the Advancement of Social Sciences (AVANCSO)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Center of National Economic Investigation (CIEN)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Latin American Faculty of Social Sciences (FLACSO)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Myrna Mack Foundation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Central American Institute of Political Studies (INCEP)</td>
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<td>Institute of Education for Sustainable Development (IEPADES)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Institute for Political, Economic and Social Studies (IPES)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Institute for International Relations and Investigations for Peace (IRIPAZ)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Center of Legal Action for Human Rights (CALDH)</td>
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<td>Security in Democracy (SEDEM)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Faculty of Political and Social Studies, University Rafael Landívar (URL)</td>
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<tr>
<td>School of Political Science, University of San Carlos of Guatemala (USAC)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Center for Urban and Regional Studies (CEUR), University of San Carlos of Guatemala</td>
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<tr>
<td>Guatemalan Institute for Comparative Penal Science Studies (ICCPG)</td>
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<td>Center for Guatemalan Studies (CEG)</td>
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<th>At-large participants</th>
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<tr>
<td>Gabriel Aguilera Peralta</td>
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<td>Virgilio Alvarado Ajanel</td>
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<td>Roberto Ardón</td>
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<td>Antonio Arenales Forno</td>
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15 Soon after the beginning of the project, the Ministry of Foreign Relations ceased to participate.
16 Participated briefly.
17 Joined the project after its initiation.
18 Some individuals discontinued their participation, for various reasons.
Two aspects relative to the list of participants are immediately obvious. First, that the list of state institutions is almost complete, with the exception of the legislative branch. According to information from those responsible for the project, all efforts geared toward greater involvement of the Congress of the Republic, via the involved commissions (Defense, Interior, and Legislative Points) resulted futile. Nevertheless, the engagement of consultants who functioned as liaisons between POLSEDE and parliamentary commissions partially overcame the implications of the absence of those with the ultimate power to promote the necessary legislative modifications derived from the project’s conclusions.

The second important aspect is that the list of non-state participants includes people who in some way have knowledge of and/or have expressed interest in the project’s focus. Any at-large list, in contrast to state institutions that are definable, is open to interpretation according to the old criteria of “everyone who is, is here” (or: who is here, is here), though it could have been that “not

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19 For thematic reasons, incorporating members of the judicial power was unessential. However, the jurisdictional control of intelligence activities required subsequent activities with said power. See infra, “Learned lessons”.

20 Originally, the Ministry of Defense was the only commission invited. The usefulness of inviting the other two was later acknowledged.
everyone who is, is here “ (or: not everyone who should be here is here), as some interviewed participants mentioned. Of course, there is a notable lack of political parties, combined with the institutional absence of the Congress that weakens, at least a priori, the project’s final influence on the elaboration of the public policy its inspires. However, the criteria of those responsible for the POLSEDE, used to decide not to include political parties, should not be too quickly ignored. Previous experiences similar to the WSP in Guatemala, where the ruling party did not participate and the opposition had at least minimal participation, revealed the high risk that a voluntary and neutral space for debate would be perceived as a rejection of government policy. POLSEDE decided that, save the participation of all relevant parties – unrealistic given their minimal institutionalization, it was best not to include any and therefore avoid any perception of party bias 21.

4. The methodology: participatory investigation / action.

The election of the methodology was not arbitrary. Any epistemological consideration should take into account two facts: the “high levels of social fractionalization and polarization” and the persistence of a “precarious institutionality [expressed] by the difficulties of formulating sustainable and coherent political policies” (Arévalo, 2001: 1). Both facts – but not exclusively – constitute typical post-conflict situations. In light of this, a methodological tool proven effective in similar circumstances was employed: participatory investigation-action (PIA).

21 In any case, at least four individual participants and three organizational representatives are linked with political parties. Despite their participation in the project being independent of their political affiliations, this did allow some level of contact between POLSEDE and the parties.
The origin of PIA can be traced back to the 1960s in Latin America, associated with what was then considered a crisis in the social sciences. As defined by its defenders, participatory investigation, in its original format, “is a methodological approach inserted into a strategy of defined action. Investigators are involved in a collective process of production and reproduction of the knowledge necessary for social transformation. It is also an emerging paradigm within the critical social sciences that is described as alternative, with original epistemological and methodological premises. It is a political movement in Latin America that involves intellectuals in alliance with the ideological cause of the popular classes, of the proletariat or the masses in their struggle to change the asymmetric and oppressive power relations between hegemonic and subordinated social groups. It is a compound process of investigation, education and action” (Gabarrón and Hernández, 1994:5).

The operational method itself is perhaps excessively pretentious and contains a political objective that, with minimal consideration, is hardly adequate for the circumstances of post-conflict reconstruction where the search for consensus is an indispensable strategic necessity. Nonetheless, stripped of its original intentions and reduced to its methodological essence – the social construction of knowledge for consensual change – participatory investigation-action has been proven very useful in situations of social breakdown and weak institutionality. At the same time, these circumstances make the formulation of publicly beneficial proposals difficult -- circumstances where shared investigation supported by academic knowledge could be very effective.

Such was the opinion of the UN Research Institute of Social Development (UNRISD) and the Program for Advanced Studies in Strategy and International Security (PSIS), who further understood the convenience of applying PIA at the
macro-social level in the formulation of viable proposals for a national agenda, and not limiting it to its previous use: in the narrow scope of a specifically determined issues relevant to the explicit problems of concrete communities. Another, no less important objective was the creation of conditions for the better use of external resource flows employed in the reconstruction of societies emerging from armed conflicts. The end result, as previously mentioned, was the Worn-torn Societies Project (WSP).22 Also mentioned above, the WSP experience in Guatemala gave rise to the possibility of extrapolating the methodology for consideration of democratic security in the country and as an impetus for the AFPC. The inherent flexibility of PIA led to the assumption that there would be no difficulty in adapting the methodology from the consideration of the general problems of societies emerging from war to a specific issue on the national agenda of change and reconstruction.

The advantages were notable, as mentioned in the description of the project objectives (a methodology is doubly valuable when it attains its own objectives, additional to those for which it is being applied) and will be outlined in the section on lessons learned.

5. Project development: quantitative analysis

In its concrete application to POLSEDE, the PIA focus was broken down as follows23 (taken from Arévalo, 2001: 11–13).

22 For more regarding WSP, see Kane (1999), WSP (1999), Stiefel (1999). Arévalo (2001: 6–7) details the principal differences between the original PIA and that used by WSP. The case study of Guatemala from the WSP methodology is found in Edelberto Torres Rivas and Bernardo Arévalo de León, eds. (1998).
23 Following is a description of the principal activities developed by the project team and the work groups, as well as those activities of complementary character. Included is a summary of the issues confronted, with the understanding that their complete analysis corresponds to the section of lessons learned.
A. *Preparatory Phase (June-August 1999)*\(^{24}\):

1. Foundation, by FLACSO, IGEDEP and WSP International of a neutral academic-political platform, organically independent from each of the above organizations and directed by a Coordinating Team with experience in security sector reform issues as well as the application of the WSP focus. The Coordinating Team included Bernardo Arévalo de León, Carlos Ramiro Martínez and Ana Glenda Tager, with the administrative support of Neli de Sicán and Lucky de Gento.

2. Consultations with various political and social actors with the goals of guaranteeing the necessary space for development of the project and building necessary trust.

3. Identification of different political and social actors directly involved with the topic, and an initial round of consultations concerning the various perspectives of the issue.

B. *Preliminary Investigation Phase (September-April 1999):*

1. Elaboration of the draft of *Foundation for the consideration of the military question in Guatemala*, as a conceptual framework for the project and a preliminary diagnostic of the country’s civil-military relationships.

2. Formation of the Project Group, composed of 35 multi-sector social actors (civilians, military personnel, government and civil society, academics and politicians), invited via institutions and at-large. The group incorporated current and retired members of the armed forces, and representatives of human rights organizations, academic investigation centers, institutions linked to the former insurgency and the business sector. The

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\(^{24}\) In this phase, the project was denominated *Military conversion and strengthening of civil power in Guatemala*. The preparatory phase allowed for greater definition of the potential for dialogue and the identification of basic consensus superior than the existent capacity to make them viable.
first project work group meeting took place on 6 December 1999 (see meeting minutes in the document appendix).

3. Discussion of the project’s conceptual framework and identification of the general investigation agenda, composed of five specific intervention points: a. conceptual foundation; b. security concept and agenda; c. military doctrine; d. democratic controls (separated into intelligence system reforms, security institutions, and civil participation); e. Military function.

4. Creation of multi-sector work groups focused on each topic. The coordinating team provided each group a document containing the agreed upon “key points” relative to each investigation. During the Third Plenary Session (6 April 2000), project members approved the key points (included in the CD-ROM appendix) and the general agenda of the project.

C. Participatory Investigation-Action Phase (since May 2000):

1. Formulation of the investigation team and assignment of one or more investigators to each work group whose primary task is the contribution of theoretical elements and participant dialogue.

2. Election of a member from each work group to function as moderator for group discussions and liaison between the group members and the assigned investigator.

3. Elaboration, by each group investigator, of the investigation agendas and timelines for each topic, and their approval by the work group.

4. Elaboration, by each group investigator, of the corresponding work documents.

5. Investigation and formulation of basic consensus.
With the conclusion of this last phase, the following summarizes each work group’s activities and complementary actions\textsuperscript{25}.

**Work Group I: Conceptual Framework**

Investigator: Bernardo Arévalo de León  
Moderator: Carlos Ramiro Martínez  
Sessions held\textsuperscript{26}: 15

Description of activities: The document *Foundation for the consideration of the military question in Guatemala* served as a point of departure for the group’s work. The document provided key definitions that were used to construct concepts that unified the group’s reflections and debates, and also supplied an analysis of the circumstantial considerations under which the project would operate. The use of the document to prompt work group discussion was not anticipated, particularly because the text was an original proposal offered by project organizers, that is, it was an already completed investigation. However, the official representation of the armed forces presented objections related to structure and scope of the document, leading to the decision to form an ad-hoc group. Work was begun on 18 May 2000 and a consensus regarding the document was presented during the 17 August 2000 plenary session and was approved after a few minor modifications. Nonetheless, changes in the Defense Ministry’s representation resulted in a request to reopen discussion of the document. After diverse

\textsuperscript{25} Additional to the activities detailed in this section, it is important to mention the POLSEDE members’ elaboration of a selected bibliography, included in the document appendix. Similarly, along with other activities, the director and other project team members presented and reported on the project content. See POLSEDE (2000-2001). Regular contact with supporting institutions, donors, and UN system are not detailed.

\textsuperscript{26} In each case, the closing date for documentation was 31 October 2001.
discussions with group members, project organizers consented to the request\textsuperscript{27}. Some institutions that had not previously participated took part in this new phase of the debate. It was decided to divide the document into two parts: \textit{Conceptual Framework: Foundation for consideration of the Military Question} and \textit{Society, State and Army in Guatemala at the beginning of the 21st Century}. The first part, the Conceptual Framework, was approved by consensus during the 12 June 2001 work group meeting and was presented and approved at the 31 July 2001 plenary session. The second document was approved in the 25 July 2001 work group meeting, and will be presented during the next plenary session programmed for 16 November 2001.

\textbf{Work Group II: Security Concept and Agenda}

Investigator: Guillermo Pacheco, through December 2000, followed by Héctor Rosada Granados
Moderator: Patricia González
Sessions held: 37

Description of activities\textsuperscript{28}: The group began meeting on 22 May 2000, using the document \textit{Security Concept and Agenda} as a foundation. The document contains an analytical framework and a series of initial indicators for the elaboration of a security agenda. Notable within the document, aside from changes in the concept

\textsuperscript{27} The reopening of the debate took place during a seminar on 26 and 27 March 2001. Some participants considered that doing so, despite having previously reached unanimity, was actually an illustration of the project’s determination to facilitate consensus, despite the risk of setting a negative precedent that appeared to grant veto power. In fact, in group II, an alternative document by Defense Ministry representatives was not taken into account by the other participants, leading to the Ministry’s renunciation from discussions.

\textsuperscript{28} Aside from the regular activities, the group has continued to meet with other members of the project, particularly with those of group 5, due to the evident thematic relation they shared. The
of security over time, is an analysis of the State’s role as a regulator of the indicators that should be established for the security sector. The document includes the current debate on the possibility of replacing state-centric security with a new paradigm based on the concept of “human security.” After defining basic concepts, in October 2001, the content of what could be the security agenda for Guatemala was discussed. The domestic effects of the new international setting originating from the terrorist attacks in New York were also analyzed. The group’s documents are pending plenary session approval.

**Work Group III: Military Doctrine**

Investigator: Mauricio López Bonilla  
Moderator: Marco Antonio Barahona  
Sessions held: 33

Description of activities: work began on 30 May 2000, studying the doctrinal elements that have defined the activity of the Guatemalan army in recent decades. Likewise, the group proceeded to evaluate the Military Doctrine presented by the Government of the Republic at the end of 1999 and design reform proposals and recommendations for the elaboration of the future doctrine. The project understand that when the AFPC refers to the need for a new doctrine, it is actually referring to a new “defense policy”, though the term “doctrine” continues to be used conventionally.

A debate of particular interest led to the definition of the different doctrinal phases of the army, established as follows: process of institutionalization of the group also analyzed the security and defense matrix presented by the Government of the Republic.

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29 As with group II, thematic connections with group V have influenced collective reflections.

At the beginning of June 2001, the group presented a new document according to the second part of the established agenda, which included a reinterpretation of the military doctrine, a revision of the significance of its fundamental aspects and a recommendation for the elaboration of the new doctrinal vision. This document continues to be discussed and revised.

**Work Group IV: Democratic Controls**

Investigators: Rodolfo Robles (Myrna Mack Foundation) and Manolo Vela (FLACSO)

Moderators: Iduvina Hernández and Julio Balconi

Sessions held: 27

Description of activities\(^{30}\): Group members, who began work on 24 May 2000, reached consensus on reforms to the country’s intelligence system, including the principles that should guide actions, the most adequate structure and control and sanction mechanisms in the case of deviation or excess. The group also considered means and areas of civil participation as an intersecting component in the design and institutionalization of the desired national intelligence system.
During the month of November 2000, the group finalized the elaboration of a document on intelligence system structure and careers that was then given for further discussion to the technical group. At the beginning of February 2001, proposed modifications to the following documents were discussed: Guidelines for the Study of State Intelligence in Guatemala; General Criteria for Intelligence System reform in Guatemala; and Guatemala: Fundamentals of the Intelligence System. All of the documents were approved in later sessions\(^3\). At the 31 June 2001 plenary session, the group ratified two previously approved documents. The first was Democratic Intelligence System Controls in Guatemala, which includes various areas of supervision that should function within a state of Law: internal, parliamentary, judicial and citizen controls. The second approved document was Organic Structure and the Intelligence System Profession in Guatemala. Having concluded the deliberations and reports on the intelligence system, the group is considering, as per the investigation agenda, methods of institutionalizing security.

This group has the greatest expectations of final effectiveness, and of the existence of some inclination on the part of the Government of the Republic to accept the working document as a foundation for the legislative initiative that would regulate the structure and career of the national intelligence system.

**Work Group IV-A: Civil Intelligence**

Investigator: Rosa María Wantland (IEPADES)

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\(^3\) Associated with the activities of the group were the International Seminar on Experiences of Intelligence System Reforms and Supervision and Control of the Intelligence System, about which further information is given *infra*.

\(^3\) However, during the 31 July 2001 plenary session a series of observations were made, currently being considered by the group.
Moderator: José Antonio Monzón Juárez
Sessions held: 24

Description of activities: This group was established on 5 February 2001 as a natural outcome of group V, after a request by the Government of the Republic (Interior Ministry) expressing the need for primary elements for the development of the Department of Civil Intelligence and Information Analysis (DICAI) foreseen in the AFPC. The group began activities in February 2001, inheriting theoretical and conceptual reflections from its predecessor, and focusing on the operative development of the DICAI.

Once the work agenda was agreed upon, the group’s investigation led to a document titled *Conceptual Framework and Areas of Competence, Intelligence Subsystem for Internal Security*, which included definitions related to democratic security and its roots within public security, as well as conceptual definitions associated with police intelligence activities. The second part of the document considers the application of theory to the circumstances in Guatemala, taking into account current legislation and the AFPC resolutions. A proposed design for the DICAI is in process.

As with group IV, what appears to be a certain governmental inclination leads to the speculation that the group’s efforts have a high probability of influencing the design of public policies.

**Work Group V: Military Function**

Investigators: Gabriel Aguilera Peralta (Through September 2000) and Héctor Rosada Granados
Description of activities: The group, which began activities on 25 May 2000, first focused on the revision and analysis of various models defining the current function of the armed forces, including a comparative investigation of the constitutional foundation and criteria for the institution’s function within other political entities\textsuperscript{32}. Reference texts included the *Agreement on Strengthening Civil Power and the Function of the Army in a Democratic Society*, the process of reforming the organic law of the army and reports from MINUGUA\textsuperscript{33}.

Following the first phase, the group dedicated 2001 to the development of a document including the proposal for a redefinition of the military function in Guatemala.

The activities of the group were partially weakened when, in September 2000, the investigator was named Peace Secretary by the current government, though the dedication of the substitute investigator compensated for the unexpected event\textsuperscript{34}. In December, the new investigator presented the document *The Function of the Army in a Democratic Society* and support material for the discussion, taken from current judicial legislation and various policy proposals (Political Constitution of the Republic, Organic Law of the Army, Law of Support for Civil Security Forces, Framework Agreement for a Democratic Security, the Agreement on Strengthening Civil Power and the Function of the Army in a Democratic Society, the FRG Government Plan, presidential and ministerial discourses,

\textsuperscript{32} This was supplemented by invitations to military attachés of various countries in order to better understand the military function of other armies.

\textsuperscript{33} All of the groups, not only this one, had access to reference materials, details of which are included in the document appendix.

\textsuperscript{34} By mid 2001, the investigator had presented version number 12 of the key document.
Defense Code, Doctrine Manual). A guide for a comparative analysis and discussion of the function of the Army in other countries was also available to the group. In a later phase of deliberation additional reference materials were also incorporated, including international agreements of which Guatemala is a part, such as the Framework Convention on Democratic Security in Central America and the Inter-American Treaty on Reciprocal Assistance.

The objective of the group was to obtain a document of consensus incorporating specific recommendations for functions to be fulfilled by the armed institution as a consequence of democratization and the signing of the peace accords. The anticipated release of the document (May 2001) was not accomplished, but it is pending approval in plenary session. Following this document, the group will develop proposals for institutional and operational conversion, derived from the previously established functions. At the investigator’s request, the work group has considered (at the time of this report) two versions of the second document titled “Contributions for the Modernization of the Armed Forces in the Context of Democratic Security.”

6. Complementary activities

1. International Conference on “Military Function and Democratic Control”

Held in June 2000, this conference was perhaps the project’s most relevant public activity, as much for the topics considered as for the repute of the participants. The conference was organized into four sessions that included case studies and theoretical reflection, according to an agenda that covered new standards of democratic control (session 1), the armed forces facing transformation (session 2), society, state and armed forces in transition (session 3) and democratic security...
and control (session 4). A fifth session was dedicated to the elaboration of prospects and the design of proposals and conclusions. The sessions have been published in book form, with the same title as the conference (Bernardo Arévalo, comp., 2001).35

2. International Seminar on Experiences with Intelligence System Reform and Supervision and Control Procedures

This seminar was held 29 November through 1 December 2000, as support for the activities of group IV and in collaboration with the Justice in Times of Transition project of the University of Harvard. The aim of the seminar was to reflect on the reform, adaptation, and operational processes of intelligence systems in countries such as Argentina, Spain, South Africa, Canada and the United States, among others. The opportunity to compare experiences proved to be of enormous utility for the debate of democratic control mechanisms in intelligence systems.

3. Course on National Defense

The conviction of those responsible for the project that internal weaknesses still existed in the use of analytical concepts and categories related to the armed forces, defense policy and democratic security resulted in a course on the material led by FLACSO36. The course, not restricted to members of the project, included an additional 59 students, of which 14 were Guatemalan army officials, all of whom attended regularly over three weeks (24 September to 12 October 2001). The value of the course is even more evident in light of what seems to be a governmental convocation for the elaboration of a new defense policy,

35 Details of the program and presenters are included in the document appendix.
36 Similarly, the course program is found in the appendix.
originating with a work plan elaborated by the army, and presumably to include various representatives of institutional, academic, and social sectors.

4. Assessment to the Congress of the Republic

The change in members of the Defense Commission of the Congress of the Republic allowed for a more fluid relationship beginning mid 2000 and expressed by POLSEDE’s formation of a dictum regarding the Civil Service Law. Along with a statement of project advancements, a comparative analysis of the civil military services in other countries was presented before the Commission. The relationship between the project and the Commission has been institutionalized via an assessor serving as liaison. Similar results have also been reached respective to the Commission of Legislation and Constitutional Points, which also have an assessor linked to the project.

5. Other activities

Presentations on the evolution of project activities were presented on two occasions to the accompanying commission of the peace accords, focusing on themes related to the compromises within the AFPC.

Project participants also completed two consultation projects. Otto Noack led the first consultation, on the military education system in Guatemala. The second was led by Arnoldo Villagrán, and addressed the non-traditional functions of the Guatemalan army.

Since September 2001, a SWOT analysis (strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats) of those academic institutions and civil society organizations civil
that observe and analyze the state security apparatus has enabled the identification of needs related to their function and contributed to their reinforcement via the design of future actions.

6. Modifications of the original design

There have been various modifications to the original project design. As previously mentioned, the division of work group IV was a result of a request for greater specialization in the design of the DICAI foreseen in the peace accords. The Course on National Defense was effective in expanding the analytical and conceptual abilities of both project members and nonmembers. The Assessment to the Congress of the Republic was another innovation, resulting from, among other reasons, a need to compensate for the lack of involvement of the parliamentary institution in the project development.

A particularly important change affected the project methodology. Given the influence that positive meeting dynamics has on the potential to attain substantial results, on 14 July 2000, POLSEDE decided to hire María Particia González, expert in pedagogy, group dynamics, and meeting organization. This compensated for some moderators’ and investigators’ lack of experience, and facilitated work development. Therefore, the director attended to the political and organizational aspects of the project, the investigation coordinator focused on document generation and the consultant assisted in strengthening the methodology, as well as providing monthly observations of the project’s implementation and additional suggestions\(^\text{37}\).

\(^{37}\) These report are included in the document appendix within the CD ROM version, though particularly relevant information from the reports has been used in the elaboration of this report.
7. Participant evaluation and qualitative analysis

The consultation team dedicated a significant amount of time to acquiring, via interviews with various participants, the elements needed to qualitatively analyze the project fundamentals and its implementation. As mentioned in the introduction, member selection was based on criteria of cross-sector representation so as to have the opinions of at-large members as well as representatives of state institutions and social and academic organizations. This criterion was combined with a second: the level of participation in the various activities. In some cases (i.e. universities and private businesses), incorporation into the project was nominal or defined by a certain passive presence in plenary sessions. The consultation team interviewed a total of 25 members, and also had less formal conversations with several other participants. A common set of questions was used in most cases, results of which are summarized below.

The first aspect that emerges from the interviews is the members’ high level of motivation to form part of the project. The criteria of thematic relevance was decisive in the acknowledgement that the debate on the construction of democratic security was an urgent task for the country in its post conflict phase and also in the adoption of the original motivating factor of the POLSEDE project: stagnation in the implementation of the peace accords. Additionally, several of those interviewed commented that the project opened a window of opportunity for the reintegration and implementation of the AFPC, and achievement of its commitments. Also mentioned was the possibility of creating something akin to a “defense community” that, based on mutual acknowledgment of and respect for individual positions, would give the
Guatemalan political system a nucleus of thematic reflection solidly based on academic principles.

A second interesting aspect to come out of the interviews was the rigor attributed to those responsible for POLSEDE and the supporting institutions. For project members, this rigor was confirmed throughout the development of the project by the exemplary effort of the team in providing materials and organizational support. Additional to these explicit comments, such rigor is confirmed by the low desertion rate of at-large members, the only ones not institutionally committed to participate. According to consultation team calculations, the average participation in the meetings was consistently superior to 60%. This fact is even more notable in that, aside from the investigators, none of the project members received remuneration for their assistance, “not even for parking,” as two members pointed out. Nevertheless, there were suggestions to improve support infrastructure (a particular space for group members, with office materials and a library). Two interviewees mentioned the absence of per diem or allowances as potentially excluding, since it only allowed the participation of professionals supported by their respective institutions or those personally able to absorb the hours “lost” from their regular activities.

In general, project members have expressed a positive opinion of the project’s format of inter-sector integration. Three kinds of suggestions have been made. One is that representatives of social sectors presumably interested and/or affected by the focus of the project should be incorporated into other groups. The second is that the rank of representatives from state institutions should have been greater; even when the representatives’ participation within the groups was

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38 Current army officials constantly emphasized that their opinions were not representative of the official attitude of the Defense Ministry, though in two occasions their opinions were classified as “authorized”.

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meritorious, civilians as well as military personnel were hierarchically very far from the decision makers, resulting in the possibility that the final commitment level of those institutions could be fairly low. The third suggestion, somewhat linked to the second, is that the project should better determine the “point of equilibrium” in the representation, since state presence seemed to be favored “to the detriment of the civil society, in that the schedules of government representatives were considered first when setting meeting dates”\textsuperscript{39}. However, according to some, this did not lessen the perception of FLACSO as an “institution of leftists,” though it is unclear what is meant by this term.

The project format has been the object of deep criticism as related to the representation of non-government organizations and the individually invited participants. Obviously, this criticism comes from those belonging to state institutions. However, the criticism seems to be mostly the result of ideological differences. There is no \textit{a priori} reason to consider an academic “representative” but deny that condition to someone who, from areas outside of the university, shows serious interest and desire in a given issue. In other words, what was questioned was what was said and as such, the legitimacy of who spoke was subject to doubt.

The general impression of the \textbf{methodology} was very favorable, for reasons mentioned above (section 4), to which needs to be added the generalized perception that is was possible to work in an atmosphere of mutual respect,

\textsuperscript{39}The project team indicated that “tying the project to the State” was an unavoidable requisite. From the beginning of the project the invitation to diverse sectors of civil society (academic and investigation centers, as well as individuals) was extensive and multi-sector in nature. However, some institutions and individually invited persons were not interested in a dialogue between the government and the sectors offering the project. Independently of that, the importance and weight of governmental institutions is undeniable, since they are the ad hoc entities for the implementation of public policies, and therefore there was an effort to attract those institutions to the project.
which, appropriately, included the free exercise of the right to disagree. Particularly notable is the long-term nature of the project, which is a break from the national practice of trying to solve the country’s ills in a weekend seminar. The idea of having a lot of time facilitated deep reflection. The experience also demonstrates that time leads to “not losing patience in the confidence building phases.” Nevertheless, others interviewed pointed out that the longer duration incorporated an element of uncertainty; given the country’s weak institutionality, changes in the line of command has snowball effects that alter attitudes of state representatives. When those representatives are not simply relieved of their post, such effects can lead to the reversal of previously reached consensus40. On the other hand, one interviewee suggested a need to extend the project for at least two months in order to allow the final documents to “rest” and to assure that pending details were not finalized prematurely just for chronological reasons.

The application of the methodology has led to the reduction of a certain lack of confidence via a broad reediting by project members of what was the negotiation of the peace accords, done in order to strengthen the possibility of consensus. Nevertheless, several of those interviewed pointed out a persistence of certain reservations, of current military personnel as well as representatives of social organizations. Once again, the issue of past conceptions permeated the work groups. According to an active official, the army practices “realpolitik”, such that “when the enemy changes, attitude changes”, a practice some civilians disagree

40 This was actually one of the foreseen risks included in the project document (Section E – risks and measures to minimize risk). “Because the project is an inter-sector dialogue on a delicate issue and brings together social actors responding to different interests and orientations, the project is exposed to variations in the national political climate and to changes in relative positions of the actors. This could modify the disposition to participate in work groups. The task of lobbying state authorities on the one hand, and civil society actors on the other, will help to counteract any tendency towards this.”
with, perhaps because they continue to see the armed institution as it was in the
time of the armed conflict.

The debate structure and the meeting format were generally evaluated as
advantageous. The results of the longer meetings that took place farther than a
day’s travel from the capital were considered particularly positive. Close,
continuous participation helped to clear away differences that had seemed
irresolvable in shorter meetings.

The insistence on consensus for the final approval of the documents is a central
part of the methodology, and it is quite probable that without this requirement,
the level of integration in the project would have been different. In general,
reaching agreement has not been particularly difficult, but some reservations
about the mechanism of consensus have been expressed. For one of the
interviewees, obligatory consensus introduced the possibility of veto (as is
characteristic of consensus) and excessively delays resolutions, partly because of
positions of “groups on two extremes, though few in number and progressively
moving to the center.” Another interviewee proposed the need to establish
“dissent protocols” that would safeguard the integrity of the proposals, opening
the possibility of written expression of differences, which would permit more
rapid advance. It is understood that one goal of PIA is a “rupture” from previous
positions; if there is no space for dissent (which does not mean confrontation), a
return to the original position is possible, regardless of whether members are
bound by the project’s resolutions.

The working documents were positively evaluated. Nevertheless, the
interviewees pointed out three subtleties. The first was denominated “subjective
appreciations” in the analysis of Guatemala’s recent history, that, regardless of
academic foundation, were loaded with value judgements that obstructed progress in joint deliberation. The second was an excess of production (“they are very long documents”) that sometimes leads to a loss of perspective of what is really important. And lastly, there was a certain stubbornness on the part of investigators who considered their documents untouchable, and therefore, there was some resistance to accepting modifications that came out of group discussion. As one of the interviewees said, there was some tendency for the authors to consider their documents “as martyrs that were going to be carved up.” The need to better define the production cycle of each document, from the first draft to the final publication, was also mentioned; it seems there was some uncertainty about this process.

The complementary activities enjoy general approval. The only criticism was of the criteria used by civil institutions in the selection of representatives to attend the Course on National Defense, who apparently were unqualified for the course. Aside from this objection, what is taken from the interviews regarding the complementary activities was the need to expand them. One of those interviewees pointed out that project members should have visited military detachments and institutions. This suggestion was forwarded, but the visits never took place. Another participant mentioned that an effort should have been made to avoid the Guatemalan practice of restricting all intellectually and political stimulating activities to the capital and that this habit should be corrected in the later phase of diffusion and implementation. The use of the university system infrastructure was recommended as ideal for this.

There have been various obstacles, in addition to those previously mentioned. Military personnel, both active and retired, expressed that the subject knowledge
of the civilians involved was initially very weak, and prohibited progress.\textsuperscript{41} However, as the project developed, the conceptual and theoretical weakness was overcome. In fact, some high level officials acknowledged that they had also learned, taking advantage intellectually of civilian participation in the last phase of the project. Nevertheless, the impression of military personnel, shared by some civilians, was that the exercise was more beneficial for the civilians. At the same time, non-government participants interviewed said they found serious incoherencies among and within state institutions, particularly with armed forces representatives. In one case, it was considered that these military discrepancies, with respect to content, were not actually discrepancies but tactical actions meant to jeopardize results and the project’s success and resulted from higher orders and not the convictions of those participating. However, those current military officials interviewed insisted that their support of the project, via their participation in it, was not simple obligation.

In general “a greater formality in the institionalization of the project, with clearer rules is needed.” Among the evidence for this need, according to one interpretation, was that some of the involved institutions never expected the project to have such high quality results. “There was a belief that, as with similar initiatives in Guatemala, the effort would dwindle and end in nothing.” Not being such, the possibility of success “generates invalidating attitudes,” particularly before the possibility that documents coming out of POLSEDE could have legislative impact. Despite what might be assumed, in certain cases the reactionary attitude came from representatives of state institutions. Relative to army delegates, some participants interviewed said that their rejections seemed to come from individual rather than institutional positions.

\textsuperscript{41} Despite their misgivings, all of the civilians interviewed positively evaluated the role of the retired military officers. Aside from their professional contributions, their attitudes were
The majority opinion of the final effectiveness of the project and the transferal of the results to public policy in the short term is somewhat skeptical\textsuperscript{42}. Some of those interviewed said that with the current administration, implementing project results would be impossible and that the uncertainty of the efficacy of the results influenced participants’ opinions. Another interviewee mentioned that “the low profile adopted by the army” would hinder its adoption of the project as part of its own modernization process. Various participants expressed their “surprise”, in the words of one, at the ease in which army representatives have shared and adopted the conclusions related to the new functions that the armed forces should fulfill.

In any case, the majority argued that the real influence of the project documents would depend on what is done after the conclusion of the document production phase. Almost all of those interviewed expressed a need for a later influence period specifically oriented towards public opinion makers, assessors responsible for decision making, and policies that need to be created.

The global situation stemming from the September 11 attacks in the United States have formed part of the interviewees’ reflections. Two positions regarding the attacks can be specified. One, the minority, believes the events weakened the possibility of increasing civilian control of intelligence services, “as is occurring in the US.” The other opinion, more widely shared, is just the opposite -- Guatemala even more urgently needs a definite security policy. Without it, there

\textsuperscript{42} For clarification, the initial objectives did not include this purpose, but rather just “to contribute to the process of public policy formation.” But in the process of the project’s development, expectations increased.
is a risk of adopting an inadequate foreign model, as previously occurred with the National Security Doctrine.

The majority of those interviewed mentioned the value of some form of institutionalization of the group that participated in the project, beyond the conclusion of the project. The accumulated human capital runs the risk of being wasted if from the motivation coming out of POLSEDE or any other institution or platform does not result in formal a continuation of the program. This is doubly necessary when, as has been seen, there are certain doubts about the project’s final effectiveness in the short term and, additionally, international circumstances will certainly impose new challenges -- or perhaps the same ones, but with a different facade -- in the area of democratic security. To respond to those challenges, analytically and with purpose, no one is better prepared than the project members themselves.

8. The project and its counterparts: PNUD – UNOPS, FLACSO, WSP

The project has held the planned follow-up meetings with PNUD and the donor institutions. Also, as established in the project document, the six activity reports (excluding the document appendix) have been presented to UNOPS. Those responsible for the project have expressed satisfaction with the flexibility of UNOPS in relation to the fulfillment of the timeline. Differing from the norm with international cooperation, sometimes too rigid in the demands for strict observance of set time limits, UNOPS understood that a project of this type is subject to inevitable chronological uncertainties and acted correspondingly, with positive results.
Relations between the project and WSP have been equally fluid. The POLSEDE director participated in various follow-up meetings with the central WSP administration in Geneva. On the other hand, POLSEDE could be characterized as a second generation WSP project, in that, differing from previous experiences, the project design and execution has been the exclusive responsibility of citizens of the country that is the object of the initiative. As such, though the relationship between WSP headquarters and POLSEDE was not previously tested, there were no substantial difficulties.

9. Learned lessons

Though it may be repetitive of what has already been mentioned in parts of this report, a summary follows of the principle lessons learned in the project, based on the judgement of the consultation team. As will shortly be seen, the format is varied due to the breadth and diversity of the issues considered, which oscillate from infrastructure problems to the employed methodology.

**Purposes and pertinence of the project**

The first and perhaps most important lesson learned is that those endorsing the project and the financial donors have clearly expressed the political pertinence and historical relevance of POLSEDE. The urgency of the debate on how to construct democratic security and the need to provoke revitalization of the AFPC and implement the commitments within it prove that the choice of initiating the project has been the correct one.

**Project expression: presences and absences**

It is worthwhile to detail here the difficulties that the project initially faced to better understand the participation model that was developed during the
experience and that would eventually determine the pros and cons of the experience itself. Quickly noticeable is the variety of social actors (ideological, organizational, influential) -- both those from the generically referred to “civil society” as well as those from state institutions (and, more precisely, government institutions). As there is no prevailing norm for the formulation of public policy (as mentioned in the theoretical elaboration phases), this characteristic may not be excessively relevant.

If something is mentioned here, it is because the consultation considers it a peculiar element of the “Guatemalan model” in terms of what is defined as legitimate. Even within the most elemental democratic formulas – like those of an electoral democracy – it is recognized that popular will is represented and expressed through political parties that gain their representational power via the ballot box – especially the legislative and executive branches (the latter receives particular emphasis in the strongly presidential regimes).

With this perspective, doctrinal formulation within political parties (and in their colophon, the party system) and policy regulation via the parliamentary majority-minority system, determines public policy formation, its practical application and eventual control both during and following its execution. In theory, this electoral confrontation leads to corresponding sanctions with respect to what is acceptable in the application of policy.

Nevertheless, in a “weak state” there are parallel legitimizing processes, functioning outside of electoral formality, which act as stimuli or impediments to public action. The government institutions’ and civil society sector’s acceptance, with more or less explicit reservations, of a political “no man’s land” forms part of the political system as expressed in public and published opinion. From the
consultation team’s perspective, this is the scenario in which the project is situated, and also which has given rise to criticism of non-government organization representatives and individually invited participants. This criticism obviously comes from a sector pertaining to state institutions, though it seems mostly a result of ideological differences. As previously mentioned, there is no *a priori* reason to consider an academic “representative” but deny that condition to someone who, from areas outside of the university, shows serious interest and desire in a given issue. In other words, what is questioned is what is said and as such, the legitimacy of who speaks is subject to doubt.

A look of the list of participating institutions shows the asymmetric profile of a multi-party dialogue and not, as might appear is some situations, a two-sided debate that reproduces (with other parameters) the old “uncivil” confrontation. This fundamental asymmetry stems from the participatory character of the process and the commitment stemming from that participation. Therefore, while individual participants encounter no limitations, other than their own, to the expression of their propositions, participants from social organizations should regulate their behavior in accordance with parameters established by their individual functions.

As has been mentioned above, the integration of participants into the project has been affected by some polemic questions. The first is the absence, until an advanced phase in the project’s execution, of the Congress of the Republic. Eventually, the congress was indirectly incorporated via consultations to parliamentary commissions. This absence, as previously mentioned, is not attributable to the project itself. In any case, the consultation team finds fault for this absence in the fact that the international community is regularly financing programs to support a parliament whose members, at least those directly
implied, fail to take advantage of opportunities to expand their knowledge of issues over which they must legislate.

With regards to political parties, the consultation team understands the reasons that led to the project directors’ decision not to include them and therefore avoid the possibility of a partisan and biased utilization of the project. Nevertheless, this does not have to necessarily occur. In future projects, the utility of provoking something like a mirror effect should be evaluated. Confronted with their responsibilities and taking part in rigorous debates over public issues could force them to assume their responsibilities according to state criteria and not with their sights fixed on minor quarrels. That may be, however, too much to ask.

Another lesson learned in POLSEDE is the need for greater institutional commitment to the development of the potential results. Some form of guaranty of the seriousness with which institutions, especially public institutions, will consider a project of this type is important previous to the initial phase of a project. This is not easy; it is not a matter of simply signing letters of intent or agreements of participation, but rather of political will, which is impossible to guarantee, in part because those who could express such will - assuming it is sincere - are not guaranteed the continuation of their responsibility. Despite all of these obstacles, it is still worth emphasizing the utility of strengthening initial agreements as much as possible and creating follow-up mechanisms, incorporating different institutions and politicians, which would permit the maintenance of previous commitments.

The project has reflected, probably unavoidably, the invisibility of the indigenous community and the strong weight of the capital in everything that occurs in the country. However, it is insisted that this can not be considered a
“defect” of the project. Rather, it is a characteristic, unfortunately, of contemporary Guatemalan history and, therefore, the democratic transition process itself.

As a project that expected to construct itself on a solid academic foundation, the minimal representation of universities is somewhat surprising, since they would be expected to perform an important role in the future development of the project in the case of effective consolidation of the results. Once again, the responsibility for this is not attributable to the project, which invited the San Carlos, Rafael Landívar and Francisco Marroquín universities to participate. The latter refused to take part in the project, and the others failed to entirely assume the commitment. In any case, there is some indication that institutions of higher education are generating interest in the analysis of defense issues, which could lead to positive results in a relatively short time.

The government sector initially appears incomplete, which explains the varying emphasis placed not only on its contributions but also on its continued participation in the tasks. It is difficult to explain the withdrawal of the Ministry of Foreign Relations from a project so relevant, from a modernizing point of view, to defense policy. In the last phase of the project, the consultants were able to see first hand the difficulty of reconciling positions of distinct government entities and the role that military representatives play in these relationships.

In any case, consistent active participation has characterized the project’s development. This demonstrates interest not only in the issue itself but also in contributing to the difficult and conflictive construction of a modern inclusive state and of finding the appropriate role for an armed forces with “overflow” tendencies. The theoretical conclusion within the project have begun to show that
this “overflow”, difficult to place within the model of a modern and democratic state, is not a military characteristic and should be placed within the framework of an unfinished national project.

**The management of debates and elaboration of documents**

The employment of an expert in pedagogical methodology, group process and meeting organization illustrates a very wise decision. In projects of this type, where the method of producing results is though group debate, the benefit seems evident – as the project has demonstrated – of support from an expert who can suggest the appropriate dynamic, orient the direction of discussion and increase joint productivity. Given that the person responsible for moderating is elected by the rest of the group, and for reasons of legitimacy, it is recommended that this continue; nothing guarantees that the person moderating has the methodological tools to be able to assure positive developments in the debate. In any case, it is recommended that once the respective moderators are elected, they receive training, as was originally suggested but never occurred\(^{43}\).

There are also ways to optimize the acquisition of knowledge and increase the quality of the debates. An initial challenge is to reduce the variety of definitions of the concepts being used. In other words, a phase of conceptual immersion is necessary before beginning discussion within the work groups. This aids in providing a shared language with which to construct debates and corresponding conclusions. POLSEDE reacted correctly to the dilemma, via parallel or complementary activities -- but being a reactionary behavior, it is not optimal. Something similar can be said regarding the second challenge, which has to do

\(^{43}\) At the beginning of the previously referred to internal evaluation meeting, there was unanimity in keeping the same mechanism of electing the moderators within each group. However, it was proposed that the election not take place until after having completed some joint activities, so as to be able to determine which people would be adequate moderators throughout the project.
with the performance of the investigators and moderators. Since the normal project session consisted in debates over documents, those who produced the documents as well as those who requested them have a decisive role in the results. It is difficult to act \textit{ex ante} to this “human factor”, but the mechanisms put in practice by the project are sufficient. Supervision by those academics ultimately responsible for the base documents presented by the investigators should be increased. A format should be established for periodic meetings between project directors and investigators, so as to share the progress and impediments and, if necessary, correct the direction of the investigations.

A minor issue, but of certain interest, has to do with the meeting format. As mentioned earlier, the longer meetings held a least a day’s distance from the capital have had a particularly positive effect. Close, continuous participation helped to clear away differences that had seemed impossible to resolve in shorter meetings.

\textbf{The managing team, organization and material resources}

Though only briefly, the consultation wishes to mention the work of the project team, whose performance has been a vital element in the development of the project. Members’ strong leadership and extensive competence has enabled the efficient and effective maintenance of work rhythms and timeframes.

However, it is important to note that in projects as broad as that being analyzed, increasing human resources should be considered. The open character of the structure surely allowed for the incorporation of new members, but the dimensions of the task give rise to a need for a greater number of participants. This would result in a better distribution of task and responsibilities. (And it would also assist in giving members more time to enjoy their personal life.)
The project has always had the internal and external support of the donor institutions, and FLACSO in particular has provided space within its offices for the coordinating team, which further benefited from the proximity of the documentation center; thanks to synergy this is the result of the adjacency of other investigation centers. For reasons of space and comfort, a considerable number of work group meetings have been held in hotels and other public spaces.

While since classic antiquity intellectuals have been able to work under all types of conditions, it is no less certain that improving them could facilitate the flow of ideas and people that a project of this breadth mobilizes.

Perhaps in the area of lessons learned for future activities of a similar length, it would be worthwhile to analyze the utility of independent offices with sufficient space for the permanent team and meeting rooms for work groups. This is just an observation from the consultants, also mentioned in various interviews, and should include an economic study of comparative costs and advantages.

Some necessary corrections for future projects are also mentioned to optimize the efforts and resources invested. It is essential to improve archive and documentation procedures, an area in which POLSEDE has been deficient and which has effected the very process of systematization. Therefore, though not only with the above goal in mind, it would be useful in future initiatives to hold some kind of mid-term evaluation to detect possible problems, material as well as procedural, and to take the necessary time to make any necessary modifications. The evaluation held by the project team together with the investigators at the beginning of November 2001 when POLSEDE was in its final
phase, was enormously useful, but in future PIA experiences, an initial evaluation should take place midway in the project’s development.

**Terms and timelines**

In spite of reaching important consensus – reflected within the various documents – it is necessary to point out the project terms and timelines, which despite the impressive list of meetings held, ended up being changed excessively.

Of course, few projects in Guatemala have taken place over such a long period of time, and, nevertheless, given the previously mentioned conditions for dialogue, the timing has possibly been too tight. This is more noticeable in some work groups than in others, not only from whether the documents were approved on time but also for the distinct depths of content in each of the groups’ texts.

Naturally, time limits are an unavoidable necessity, especially from the budgetary perspective, and a discussion “sine die” does not assure that obstacles, theoretical and practical, will be overcome and lead to a substantial improvement in the project documents. Presenting the issue here is only meant to highlight the difficulties of using the method considering the current circumstances in Guatemala.

If the already mentioned risk that the project’s duration introduces an element of insecurity due to the frequent changes of state representatives, even greater are the beneficial effects of time in allowing for careful consideration and trust building. In other kinds of projects, where this last aspect is not as crucial, it is possible to better adjust the time limits and avoid pressure.
Relation with international organisms and donors

Reference has already been made to the general fluidity, the good communication, and the flexibility that have characterized the relationships between POLSEDE and the donor institutions and assistants. Given the magnitude of the project (both politically and economically), the only remaining doubt in the consultation stems from the question of whether in occasions when the government representation has had difficulty or differences in accepting specific aspects, the hypothetical action of involved international organizations may have facilitated, or not, the resolution of conflicts.

This is a slippery issue that involves the possibility of being considered a form of meddling and as such, its consideration within this report needs to be taken as an exceptional and, of course, transient reference.

The project has served to confirm a serious and unfortunately repeated problem: the lack of coordination that sometimes exists among different international cooperators. The example previously cited of this problem: it is irrational that deputies receiving external finances to improve congressional performance should refuse to participate in the deliberation of key elements on the political agenda, a possibility also financed by the international community.

The morning after: institutionality and influence

Related to regular studies in the field of security and defense, the project is magnificently placed, if circumstances allow, to influence different programs, of which three are clearly highlighted: 1) the institutionalization of graduate studies (in collaboration with universities) in order to address the formation of the
experts that future administrations are going to need (in foreign relations, interior and defense ministries, etc.); 2) intervention in the curricula of specific institutions (i.e. When will there be a professor of defense in the military academy or a professor of security theory in the Police Academy or one of global security in the diplomats’ school?) and 3) the commencement of leading publications on the issue.

It is stressed that these three possibilities (which are not the only ones) allow for effective progress.

Future academic institutionalization of the project seems much more certain, due to the rather expectant attitude of the universities. At the risk of being incorrect, the consultants have detected implications of university involvement in the project, which will become clearer as the objectives and future measures better allow for the analysis of the means of institutional continuity.

Throughout the consultation period, two potentially antagonistic perspectives have been maintained: the status quo (the institutional network) with which the project has been developed, and the concept of a specific institution, the Institute of Security and/or Defense Studies that is a more professional way of bearing witness to the project.

In reality, the two perspectives are compatible; a large community of interested persons and a more restricted group of experts are not mutually exclusive, but allow for mutual reinforcement and feedback. The existence of a professional institute will guarantee answers that state modernization is unavoidably going to need. It is extremely necessary that the forest not be lost for the trees (and vice-versa). Specialization should take place within a framework that allows for
advances in the oft-mentioned institutional reform. Consequently, a strong recommendation is made to formalize the contemplated project that, in least in the medium term, would be financed nationally so that should international cooperation terminate totally or partially, not at all hypothetical, the project would be sustainable.

However, in the short term, the consultation team recommends that the POLSEDE project be expanded so as to increase its final effectiveness. The injection of additional funds, which would not have to be great, directed toward the dissemination of the project results, could exponentially increase its final utility. Lobby sessions with members of congress, preparation of summary documents for distribution, press conferences – all would certainly be favorable. In addition, because of Guatemalan political time pressures, the publication of the documents will occur at the beginning of pre-electoral campaigns for the 2003 elections. Perhaps it would not be too much to attempt an initial agreement among the more relevant candidates that the construction of democratic security is a matter of state policy and should be the object of a national pact or, at least, excluded from the effects of partisan disputes.

This would strengthen the possible final effectiveness of the project and its potential use as a source of public policy. It is not easy, as the majority of those interviewed for this report mentioned. The difficulties are related to other the project objectives: the dissolution of mistrust and the search for inter-sector consensus, at the same time being based on solid technical grounds and enjoying political legitimacy. With reference to the project reports, the consultation team considers there was an agreement over their rigor despite some initial problems, as expressed in this report. As far as legitimacy, the result is less favorable. The term “legitimacy” is used separate from any kind of connotation of value.
Something (a regime, regulation or decision) is legitimate if it is capable of obtaining support. There is not absolute legitimacy (support of everything by everyone) and what matters in this case, from the perspective of the final effectiveness of the project, is the legitimacy that exists among those who make public decisions (government/parliament), and these affected by the decisions taken: the armed forces and Guatemalan society.

Seen this way, the greatest legitimacy seems to come from those groups that are socially active in the area of democratic security, or concerned with it, its formalization and development. Additionally, excepting the position of some representatives of the armed forces, there has been internal legitimization among project members, who mutually consider themselves valid spokespersons for the issues considered. But the absence of political party representatives and delayed congressional interest in the project offset the extent of the legitimacy. This should not be blamed on the project, rather it reflects the weakness of the institutional system of the Guatemalan state. In any case, it is not an irreversible deficiency. The POLSEDE conclusions, their magnitude, and the characteristics of those who have developed the project assure that the project will not remain a mere exercise more or less voluntary and academic.

The impact of the project, which must move out of the short term and into the medium and long term, is yet to be seen. The “products” of the project, even those that would seem to have immediate consequences, will apparently not reach a high level of influence in the coming months. Perhaps certain characteristic elements of processes of deep change (intellectual, structural, etc.) do not allow for legislative calculations.
It is convenient to underline here that the main element in this slow development is based on commitment levels and the capacity to effect the necessary changes in the governmental system.

Throughout the project consultation, the scarcity of documented information on the subject as well as the opinions of those interviewed influenced in the delay of obtaining results, including those that responded to explicit government demands.

Following the consultation, on the other hand, various government changes occurred, the impacts of which have not been analyzed but certainly maintain the validity of the above questions.

It remains to be seen if in the medium term a convergence between the formal political system (coming from the ballot boxes) and the informal political system (represented, though not exclusively nor totally, by the project participants) occurs, and whether this convergence allows for the transferal of knowledge and the sufficient resolution to convert the proposals into the foundation for the new public democratic security policy. Partial approximations and continuation of the dialogue are conceivable methods to establish the project legacy as part of a new political culture.

There is one issue of utmost importance. It is useless to design an excellent security policy if it can not be included in the concept of the need to construct a democratic state. This is especially true when that need is far from being included as an important point within the various political platforms and is, unfortunately, very far from the immediate concerns of current Guatemalan society, locked into the fight for survival.
The methodology and the potential for its expansion

In hindsight, it is necessary to note that the POLSEDE experience is actually more than just an adaptation of the original method. The emphasis on creating consensus and discarding “micro” scenarios readjusts the initial proposals and, in a certain manner, converts them into the foundation for a “new” project, with the corresponding achievements and limitations.

From a methodological perspective, well systematized and critically analyzed during the internal evaluation seminar, the changes introduced into the Guatemalan project are sufficiently important that in the international arena, WSP should review its theoretical motives and plan its approaches according to the progress of the Guatemalan team, which, of course, should be taken into account if similar experiences are repeated in Latin America or other parts of the world.

From this point of view, the project achievements are measured qualitatively and point to the need for a good dose of reflection over the capacity of the original WSP method. It remains to be seen how the expression of dissent in programs of this nature will be administered in the future, and likewise, the experience in the near future regarding the relationships among government sectors will become an element of considerable magnitude. This is a practical issue, but also one of considerable theoretical and methodological dimension. The consultation team has not come up with magic formulas for dealing with the issue of dissent (mentioned in various interviews) and so proposes that it be put on the discussion table.
In any event, the consultation team has taken the time to closely analyze the positive effects of using PIA as the project methodology. The conclusions are detailed below. The PIA:

1. Supports the meeting of groups and institutions that at some previous point occupied antagonistic positions. The negotiation of the peace accords set precedence in Guatemala for such meetings, but that constructive determination diminished, and three years after the end of the conflict, lack of communication, if not avoidance, seemed to be the keynote of inter-sector relations. Nevertheless, the consultation team has observed that despite the progressive dissolution of mistrust, severe reservations between representatives of state institutions and those of social sectors persist – though perhaps this is unavoidable at this point in time. These reservations are even more evident when the actors get bogged down in discussions over the past without the instruments of objectivity available to the historian. Hence, the sterility of the discussion does not jeopardize the already reached consensus, rather the very project itself. The consultation team realizes that in no case, except when considering the past (remunerative justice and compensation for damages during the armed conflict), are there points on the Guatemalan political agenda that, looking ahead, should originate from such intense previous divisions – therefore these divisions will not create inescapable obstacles for future projects.

2. Permits – a priori – the creation of a feeling of belonging and shared identity among the group members. And this has positive effects on opinion and predisposition toward agreement that can transcend the thematic domain and time dimension of the project.
3. Establishes a sufficiently neutral space for the origin of investigation and debate. The academic rigors demanded of the documents that investigators had to furnish for the participants provided more or less objective reference material, and were enriched by the contributions of the members of different groups. The communication and mutual feedback between the investigator/investigation and the rest of the group are considered unique to the PIA focus.

4. Demands the search for compromise – a central goal in a polarized society – by obligating that all resolutions be approved by consensus. Nevertheless, the lack of way to express dissent makes the investigation and its results vulnerable to veto. If consensus is not reached and there is no possible public means to express disagreement, the result could be irresolvable.

5. Facilitates the dissemination of knowledge and the rupture of spaces previously off-limits to social intervention. As a public good, the contemplation of democratic security, its contents, dimensions and challenges should not be limited to a group of professional experts. It can and should be the cause of ample analysis, as long as such analysis is critical, free of prejudice, and is adopted with constructive determination – so as to be effective.

6. Increases the legitimacy of decision making, particularly by being the result of an inter-sector debate that incorporated politically relevant actors and institutions. However, legitimacy remains the principal challenge of the project, when its conclusions are translated into public policy formation.

Given the success of the POLSEDE experience, which has dealt with a politically difficult issue, perhaps the most delicate of the fragile Guatemalan transition process, there does not seem to be any aspect of the public agenda that could not be considered via the PIA methodology. Perhaps the only exception is in the
process of integrating indigenous groups into the Guatemalan political community and the potential effects that this could have on the territorial expression of the State. At first glance, it seems the starting point is still so far off that there would not even be minimal consensus on what should be considered. Apart from this topic and the previously mentioned historical issue, it is possible to use the PIA methodology to confront the diverse issues on the national agenda.

With respect to geographic transferal, some greater difficulties are found. As previously mentioned, the PIA experience is facilitated, or made necessary, by the weakness of political parties’ capacity to form and articulate proposals – issues – for entry into the public arena and the eventual decision making process. In societies whose democratic representation structure is better institutionalized, the PIA methodology could complement the formal decision making process or serve specifically in cases of intense division between social groups and political parties.

Finally, when designing future projects inspired by the POLSEDE experience with PIA, it is necessary to better specify a final phase, including an individual method and resources, to institutionalize the group that is formed throughout the investigation and that becomes the legacy of the theme undertaken.

Products: increased shared knowledge, complementary activities and completed documents

Furthermore, the weakness of indigenous groups’ social representation is even greater – or has less legitimacy – than that of other groups or sectors. Clearly, these are very subjective opinions based on the perceptions of two of the authors who have lived in the country for three years. The circumstances could change, but many of us fear that they will not in the short term.
The development of the project has let to fulfilling the goal of improving knowledge in the area of security for those who have taken part in the project\textsuperscript{45}. At the beginning of POLSEDE, there were very few national experts. As the project closes, Guatemala now has a substantial group of civilians and military personnel able to rigorously confront tasks related to the public’s function in the issue, carry out social observation, and increase and deepen analysis within academic and investigative institutions. It is necessary in all cases, of course, for Guatemala to have some kind of post graduate studies that would allow the consolidation and expansion of the knowledge acquired. Again, POLSEDE has comparative advantages in the development of such studies and should be taken into account if, as announced, the Masters degree in security and defense becomes a reality.

Perhaps it is premature to speak of constructing some kind of “defense community”, but there is no doubt that based on mutual acknowledgement and respect for individual positions, the project has led to the articulation of a nucleus of thematic examination solidly based on academic principals. This represents a comparative advantage over other areas of the Guatemalan political system, where such nuclei either do not exist or are wrapped within rigid and excluding positions.

In any case, the foundation certainly exists for establishing such as “defense community”. Its consolidation will depend on the level of institutionalization reached following the project and on how the project is received by government entities, particularly by those entities (like political parties) constitutionally called upon to function as the liaison between civil and political society.

\textsuperscript{45} Objectives 3.2 and 4.1 of the project document: “greater comprehension by various sectors of society of the nature of the issue and its implications for the process of consolidating peace and
The academic events that the project has organized, which have included extensive international participation and, in one case, resulted in the publication of the experience, deserve special mention. The ability to compare theories and experiences, from the perspective of the consultation team, is a very important contribution to the project. It allowed for the recognition of focal points and patterns that ran the risk of being lost within the closed framework of internal discussion.

Should these events continue, and given their distinction as illuminating benchmarks in the process of the project, the impact will be even greater, particularly with the continuation of the Course on National Defense, organized by the project in conjunction with FLACSO. The strictly academic design of the course, the network of specialists – national and foreign, the convergence of theoretical and practical arguments, and the general perception that the course was a first step in the undertaking of the project, served to eliminate reservations and disadvantages, acknowledge future development scenarios, and go beyond present perceptions that are, on occasions, discouraging.

**Project products**

The main material results of the project: the set of documents coming out of the different work groups, require separate mention. Throughout the various phases of the project, discussions have led to the elaboration of a considerable body of documents that differ both in tangible aspects as well content. At the start of the democracy in the country.”(...) “greater level of conceptual management of the issues of security and defense by the academic and investigation centers.”

consultation, the majority of the documents had been finished and approved in agreement with the project methodology. Nonetheless, other documents were either unfinished or consensus on them, expected in the period of November 2001 – March 2002, had not yet been reached among the participants.

*The construction of a new hypotheses for defense policy*

Work groups I (conceptual framework), II (security concept and agenda), III (military doctrine) and V (military function) permit a general analytical perception characterized by a decisive fact: the difficulty of approaching, despite the climate for dialogue and consensus expressly adopted by all participants -- an issue that still notoriously affects not only the actors present but also society as a whole.

History, particularly recent history, constitutes a deciding element of the political task at hand and also serves to indicate the sensitivities and perceptions with which the task is approached.

This problem is difficult to avoid and consequently, its mention is not trivial though certainly it exceedingly complicates the adoption of common language and terminology. The “point of view” based on the position from which one lived the armed internal conflict continues to be a differentiating element among the various actors. Much time will have to pass and space be given to historians and other social scientists so these divides may be bridged or decreased and no longer constitute important impediments when designing futures.

Or course, the question is situated in a much more ample arena than that of the project. And though certain deficiencies, not so much methodological as
technical, could be identified within the project, neglecting these does not necessarily lead to a qualitative deficiency in the development of the work.

During the length of the consultation and in various interviews, suggestions were made for future projects, such as: the establishment of a pre-investigation stage of preparatory teaching (including the possibility of a course on this perspective) or the production of a “glossary” to unify the referenced terminology.

Perhaps having had these would have allowed for greater agility. However, it should not be forgotten that in a certain sense the initial documents, earnestly academic and of indisputable scientific value, situated what was not obvious in such a way that, in virtue of the project’s own methodology, it was subject to discussion. Hence, building from the coordinating team’s previously elaborated foundation, group I (conceptual framework) refined its discussions until it had developed two texts (the most accomplished, from the consultants’ point of view). These texts consider, with theoretical standing and a teleological perspective, the global circumstances surrounding the issue, and result in the final documents: “Foundation for the consideration of the military question” and “Society, State, and Army in Guatemala at the beginning of the 21st Century”.

The make-up of the group, not anticipated originally, is a good illustration of the organizational flexibility of the project and of its capacity to adapt to the necessities expressed by the participating actors. At the same time, the development of group activities illustrates the difficulties of forming a common language. What in the academic world would not present difficulties to the attainment of a broad and scarcely questionable accord was seen with reticence by army representatives, who pointed out that behind a generally accepted
terminology existed speculative criticisms of the role developed by the institution in recent Guatemalan history. This is definitely an expression of the persistence of positions derived from the past that have not been completely defeated within the process of democratic transition. However, it is hoped that in the final phase of the project, the cited objection will be amended.

The activities of group II (security concept and agenda), in line with what was previously expressed, have encountered similar stumbling blocks. These serve to illustrate the need to continue the discussion and search for a common realm that does not place itself on a historical plane but rather on one of constructing the theoretical foundation for future institutionalization.

The case of group III (military doctrine) was distinct, and its development allows for the identification of two phenomena:

The first is connected to the above-mentioned difficulties in managing history (beginning with the establishment of parameters for periodization). Because of this, the group lost (or won, according to one’s point of view) an important part of its time in a discussion that should be taken up again in the future, though certainly in other settings.

The second, more significant because it concerns the main component the group proposed to develop, is the discovery of the issue’s enormous theoretical deficiency. (This has a positive corollary, if taken adequately into consideration: many of the participants, both civilian and military, considered themselves both interested in and rather uninformed about the topic47).

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47 As diverse civilian and military participants expressed during the interviews.
Of course, it is not a question of attributing the responsibility of the deficiency to the group; rather the configuration of the Guatemalan political culture itself must be inspected. The AFPC approach to the issue is a good reflection of what was recognized in reference to the need for a new military doctrine. Used in a strict sense, the concept of doctrine (conceived of in intra-military terms) has been enormously limiting throughout Guatemalan history. In reality, what was being considered in the peace negotiations was the elaboration of a new “defense policy” (that is, not only a government, but also a state policy).

At the moment of the project consultation, the work of this group was the most behind, chiefly due to the difficulties that have been mentioned and the dead-ends that have resulted from discussions about the past.

**A Guatemalan specification: the question of intelligence services**

The work of group IV (democratic controls) deserves special mention. Very quickly, the group focused on intelligence services, and an extraordinary volume of work evolved into several documents addressing the theme\(^{48}\) -- driven by a previous government commitment to use the group’s documentation as a foundation for legislative initiatives related to the restructuring of the national intelligence system.

Additionally, after receiving a government request (formally very insignificant but reinforced by the systematic participation of representatives of the Interior Ministry in the project) divided itself in order to consider the issue of civil intelligence. Work group IV(a) was formed to address the theme. The basic

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\(^{48}\) Notes for the study of state intelligence in Guatemala; Criteria for intelligence system reform in Guatemala, and; Guatemala: intelligence system foundation.
proposes of the group would relate to the Interior Minister’s expressed determination to fulfill what was established in the AFPC regarding the police intelligence organization. Hence, the project would provide the theoretical framework as well as a text detailing what could become a proposal for an Intelligence Law.

As previously mentioned, the group (and subgroup) have developed substantial activity that is formally expressed in the resulting documents. A deviation from the initial objectives is noticeable upon analyzing them; the substantial element of the objectives seems to center around “democratic controls”, though they could (and even should) subsequently influence state intelligence mechanisms.

From the consultation’s point of view, it was the moment to open a door of opportunity and analyze the possible variables in the construction of a new state model and establishment of transparent communication between the State and civil society. Perhaps the AFPC could constitute, in its entirety, a take-off point for the discussion and later elaboration of modernizing parameters within this perspective. At least this is what is deduced from the document related to the project’s “key points”.

The split, therefore, is surprising, though not because the question of intelligence is not worth consideration. A modern state needs intelligence operations and should organize the appropriate and necessary services for their function. Emphasis is placed on appropriate and necessary and is added to the emphasis on the insertion of intelligence operations within the aggregate of state apparatuses.

49 Almost immediately following the evaluation of the project, changes in the government led to the substitution of the then Interior Minister, Byron Barrientos, by the until then minister of
What organizational dimensions should the intelligence system include in order to overcome the conditions of a weak state and precarious democracy, in which the project is situated?

The consultants’ hypothesis is that the group has begun with the reality of the current state whose structural weakness demands some services that verify what is brewing in the heart of civil society, instead of establishing plans for the construction of a state capable of adequately organizing civil society and, as a consequence of not being on the margin but in the neurological center of civil society, would not depend on entities that, far from strengthening the state, consolidate its weaknesses.

The question certainly has deep roots: from the “eyes and ears” of the weak (and militarized) colonial administration to the subsequent “oreja” (ear, or infiltrator) mechanisms of the republican period.

The emphasis is on non-covert “services”, the need for which is made more evident before the contrary option. It is an imperative need for a modern public service, professionally efficient and politically motivated to serve the public, independent of partisan debate. It is within this framework of “civil service” – previously constructed – that the intelligence function, that which is absolutely necessary, must be placed.

From the perspective of the AFPC, this means, in the first place, the strict limitation of the current military intelligence and second, the construction of a

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National Defense, General Arévalo Lacs. The unknown is whether the new minister would adopt the commitments of the previous minister.
similarly limited civil intelligence. Both should be subject to all of the controls considered necessary.

The subject of police intelligence is another issue. It is linked to the democratic character of the new police force; its key function is to guarantee the free exercise of citizens’ rights and liberties, which principally means the consolidation of strategies for the prevention of risks. This, and no other, is the fundamental idea – based on the letter and spirit of the AFPC – of an organism like the DICAI (naturally, the prevention of crime is including in risk prevention)\(^{50}\).

The work of the group -- which in itself was undoubtedly well done – lacks a sense of proportion. As sometimes the illusion of reason can create monsters, the test of comparison is recommended. Compare the whole organizational network stemming from the documents and policy proposals with the entire state structure and the result will not be “services” as a state within the state (another state within the state?) but rather the state as an appendage of the “services”.

Hence, a last reflection in the form of a recommendation: recover a sense of proportion. Either follow the fundamental lineaments of state reform (as contained within the AFPC) and create a new structural framework – which incorporates “services” (minimal, of course, according to the needs of the new Guatemala) -- or the cure will be worse than the illness, and [the transformation] will fail due to the reinforcement of methods and patterns that everyone has agreed must be overcome and eliminated.

\(^{50}\) With the risk of being mistaken, the consultation believes – though of course, “a posteriori” – that a more open and permanent dialogue with the rest of the international cooperation programs in strengthening public security in Guatemala would have contributed to a better perception of reality.
For this reason, a continuation of the project, focused specifically on public security, is expected in the first trimester of 2002. This will enable the issue to be redirected and situated within the appropriate setting.

10. Final considerations

1. In its development and conclusion phases, the project has generally complied with the anticipated objectives. If the results in section C of the project document (see appendix) are compared with the activities summarized in section 5 of this report, in the area of documents produced there is an almost perfect match between the anticipated and the accomplished. Where there are documents that have yet to be ratified in plenary sessions, they are in advanced stages of elaboration and consensus, and substantial obstacles to their ratification are therefore not anticipated.

2. An added complication that in the short term burdens the final efficiency of the project comes from the failed reforms to the Guatemalan Political Constitution. The negative outcome of the April 1999 popular referendum implied that the functions of the army as established in the constitution would remain unaltered. Despite this, however, the project’s military representation has not resorted to the constitutional mandate as an argument in the debate. In other words, despite the constitutional validity of the Army’s responsibility related to internal security, it would appear that all actors understand the necessity that at some point those functions will adhere only to what is appropriate in a democratic society: external security and the defense of sovereignty.

51 Objective 1, according to the project document, was that of “contributing to the process of formulating the necessary policies for military conversion and security, particularly those related...
3. The anticipated difficulties in developing public policy from the POLSEDE documents do not effect another of the project’s successes: the establishment of inter-sector (state and society, civil and military, academic and public) communication mechanisms for common contemplation and the formulation of proposals. Regular attendance, participation in debates and the search for consensus have comprised the general guidelines that have enabled the project’s high level of productivity.

4. [As mentioned in the section “terms and timeline,”] In spite of reaching important consensus - reflected within the various documents - it is necessary to point out the project terms and timelines, which despite the impressive list of meetings held, ended up being changed excessively. Of course, few projects in Guatemala have taken place over such a long period of time, and, nevertheless, given the previously mentioned conditions for dialogue, the timing has possibly been too tight. This is more noticeable in some work groups than in others, not only from whether the documents were approved on time but also for the distinct depths of content in each of the groups’ texts. Naturally, time limits are an unavoidable necessity, especially from the budgetary perspective, and a discussion “sine die” does not assure that obstacles, theoretical and practical, will be overcome and lead to a substantial improvement in the project documents. Presenting the issue here is only meant to mention the difficulties with the method within the particular current circumstances in Guatemala.

5. Aside from these organizational difficulties, there has been a central problem with the documents as well as the discussions, anticipated before the...
initiation of POLSEDE. Approaches to the recent past from perspectives that are initially quite antagonistic, due to project participants’ experiences, has created some resentment and resistance. This problem is unavoidable, since it is impossible to develop compromises based on two different concepts of the future: that of those who maintain that to construct the future it is essential to understand the past and extract conclusions, and that of those who consider that the challenges of the future are so extreme that everything that would mean reopening wounds is politically inconvenient as well as unproductive and costly. This said, it is necessary to note that although so-called compensatory (or remunerative) justice (with respect to the past) is usually one of the most difficult issues in the consolidation phase of democracy and/or post-war (El Salvador, Argentina, Chile, South Africa...), its consideration within POLSEDE – inevitable, though not a key objective of the project -- has been kept relatively brief. This has created difficulties, though not ones impossible to transcend.

6. One objective of the project was “to contribute to placing the issues of security, defense, civil-military relations and military conversion as issues of importance on the political agenda of the country.” This goal was only partially met, at least in what is referred to as the social visibility of issues related to security – in the broad sense addressed by the project and not as a mere enumeration of common crime. Again, responsibility for this does not fall with the project; there have been difficulties that have prohibited this from occurring. Of all the issues linked to the peace process, it was the fiscal that caused the greatest interest among actors and news media, due to its broad repercussions. On the other hand, in what seems to be a structural deficiency especially among the written media, pertinent issues are pushed
 aside by the more superficial political controversies, and there tends to be little space for deep reflection. It is also true that the need to reach consensus and avoid the hypothetical personal use of the content has led to intentionally keeping the debate within the project setting, a necessary measure that had the effect of limiting the project’s public presence. Through the opinion spaces that some project participants possess there has been more or less dependable news of its advances, along with reflection on open activities like the international conference or the Course on National Defense. It is very probable that upon conclusion of the documents, and if the incipient promotion plan is consolidated and executed, the dissemination of the results will expand and stimulate debate. However, it is best not to be especially optimistic: nothing indicates that the issues that capture the attention of public communicators are going to change any time soon. In any case, that is not especially serious. Given the characteristics of the project’s focus, it would be illusory – and it should be seen whether convenient – to wait for the development of generalized interest beyond those groups and institutions that are directly concerned. It is not necessary to submit to an elitist theory of democracy to argue that that objective will have been reached in the extent that those who create public opinion and those who make decisions decide to incorporate the issue of democratic security into their list of priorities. Additionally, as this report is being finished, a strategy is being designed to disseminate the project contents to a series of public figures, and the political negotiation phase is beginning to focus on obtaining commitments from government authorities regarding any of the results.

7. Of minor consequence, but not irrelevant, is the consolidation of FLACSO-WSP as an institution of reference for, if not exclusive in, addressing issues related to security and defense. This FLACSO-WSP union is not only a guarantee of
precision, but it also contributes to limiting the dispersion of efforts in a
country where, for reasons whose analysis does not correspond to this
document, there are over 3,000 non-government organizations and
institutions. Many of them, sometimes just to survive, specialize in everything
- that is, in nothing - in order to compete among themselves, often
acrimoniously, for waning external financing. The reasons for the offer and
the consolidation of “expertise” is beneficial both to Guatemala and donor
countries.

8. The final conclusion of this Report could be no other than to manifest the
importance of continuing the project and the need to imagine, based on the
project’s experience, a broader system of participation in processes of active
consideration of the (re)construction of the Guatemalan State. This issue is
particularly important for the international cooperation that has been key to
the peace process and its later consolidation. In light of the project results, the
possibility should not be disregarded of continuing to work so that this
consolidation becomes definitely irreversible. The need to establish a follow-
up strategy for the processes and results evolving from POLSEDE should be
taken into account. The Guatemalan State can not ignore that its positive
insertion into the processes of globalization depends less on its international
alignments that on maintaining solid international quality standards that are
not a result of circumstantial postures, but from solid and well-coordinated
public policy. This is the challenge. And in relation to security and defense,
the project has contributed, as few have, to manifesting this challenge.
11. Bibliography

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