

Valuing the collective sacrifice of independence in the consolidation of democracy in Timor-Leste



"We can have democracy in this country, or we can have great wealth concentrated in the hands of a few, but we can't have both."

National Working Group Report

on the priority issue of

Individual and Party Interests over the National Interest

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The Programme of Research and Dialogue for Peace (PRDP) is a joint peacebuilding initiative between the Centre of Studies for Peace and Development (CEPAD) and Interpeace. PRDP has been working countrywide to engage Timorese from all sectors of society to define and elaborate upon priorities for peace and the consolidation of democracy in Timor-Leste.

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Glossary and Abbreviations

DA/AD	Democratic Alliance
ADITLA	Associação Democrática Integração de Timor-Leste à Austrália
AMP	Parliamentary Majority Alliance
APODETI	Timorese Popular Democratic Association
ASDT	Timorese Social Democratic Association
CAVR	Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation in Timor-Leste
CEPAD	Centre of Studies for Peace and Development
CEDAW	Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women
CNRT	National Council of Timorese Resistance
CPD-RDTL	Popular Defense Committee - Democratic Republic of East Timor
CPLP	Community of Portuguese Language Countries
CTF	Commission of Truth and Friendship
DFG/FGD	Focus Group Discussion
DPR	People's Representative Council (Indonesia)
FALINTIL	Armed Forces of National Liberation of East Timor
FONGTIL	NGO Forum
F-FDTL	Timor-Leste Defence Forces
FRETILIN	Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor
GAM	Martial Arts group
GDG	Global Development Group
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IEAD	Evangelical Assembly of God
IFES	International Foundation for Election Systems
ISF	International Stabilization Force
JSMP	Judicial System Monitoring Programme
CAC	Anti-Corruption Commission
KERASAKTI	Martial Arts group
KKN	Corruption, Collusion and Nepotism
KOTA	Klibur Otas Timor Asuwain (Political Party)
KORK	Martial Arts group
KPPHAM	Indonesian Investigative Commission into Human Rights Violations in East Timor or Indonesia's Human Rights Commission
KR	Regional Conference
KUNGFU MASTER	Martial Arts group
UN/ONU	United Nations
NGO	Non-government organization
PAR	Participatory Action Research
PD	Democratic Party
PDHJ	Ombudsman for Human Rights and Justice
PGR	General Prosecutor
PNTL	National Police of Timor-Leste
PRDP	Programme of Research and Dialogue for Peace
PPT	People's Party of Timor
PSD	Social-Democrat Party
PSHT	Martial Arts group
RAJAWALI	Martial Arts group
RDTL	Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste
SEPI	Secretary of State for the Promotion of Equality
SPSC	Special Panel for Serious Crimes
STP-CAVR	Post-CAVR Technical Secretariat
TAEKWONDO	Martial Arts group
TCF	The Charitable Foundation

Executive Summary

Stabilizing the peace: a foundation for robust democracy

While the path since independence has been unsettled, Timor-Leste is now focusing on the transition from post-conflict reconstruction to sustainable peace as a foundation for the consolidation of democracy.

Much more than elections

The democratization process in Timor-Leste is more complex than the mere transition to electoral democracy in 2002. Successive political crises and cyclical violence have highlighted deep divisions and unresolved issues. These issues date back to the period before, and during, the struggle for independence.

Challenges ahead: consolidating modern democracy

Eight years after independence, democracy is still not firmly rooted in what is one of the world's newest states and among the poorest in Asia. Disenfranchised youth, marginalized rural communities, lack of public trust in law and order institutions, weak accountability systems, widespread corruption, political impunity and a deep disillusionment with the speed of development all represent the ongoing challenges to the consolidation of democracy in Timor-Leste.

Playing a key role in encouraging the democratization process

Supporting this process is the Programme for Research and Dialogue for Peace (PRDP), a joint initiative between Interpeace, an international peace-building agency headquartered in Switzerland, and the Centre of Studies for Peace and Development (CEPAD), a Timorese non-government organisation (NGO) located in Dili.

An initiative set up in response to the 2006 crisis

PRDP was established in Timor-Leste in 2007 in response to the violent political crisis of 2006; a crisis which revealed the fragility of the young nation and the challenges it faces since independence.

Building lasting peace: over 900 Timorese involved in the First Phase

From 2007 – 2009, PRDP's First Phase initiated countrywide consultations throughout Timor-Leste, involving over 900 people from all sectors of society at community, regional and national levels in an effort to identify and broaden the understanding of the complex challenges to peace. The research findings of this phase were published in the report "Timor-Leste: Voices and Paths to Peace." This report was then discussed at a National Forum in August 2009, where some 200 representatives from the Government, Opposition, defence and security forces, civil society organizations and ordinary citizens debated and identified the most pressing issues on which to focus in the future.

Timorese identify four issues of main concern

Four national priorities were identified through an inclusive and collaborative consultation process countrywide. Participants at the first National Forum prioritized what they felt should be addressed first in order for the country to move forward in the transition to sustainable peace.

Participants identified the following four priority issues:

1. The promotion of individual and party interests over the national interest;
2. The need for a common narrative on the history of the resistance and the occupation;
3. The ineffective formal judicial system and the culture of impunity; and
4. Corruption, Collusion and Nepotism (KKN).

Second phase: addressing these priority issues

PRDP is now in its Second Phase of implementation to support the formulation of ongoing solutions and policy recommendations for peace.

Countrywide engagement: the development of this report

This National Working Group Report represents the culmination of extensive consultative work and research on the first priority issue of the *promotion of individual and party interests over the national interest*. Close to 400 participants countrywide engaged in open and frank discussions to present a range of challenging, yet collaborative and critical, opinions on this issue. Through a cause-and-effect analysis, members of the National Working Group identified and formulated recommendations, solutions and approaches as a set of proposals, which were broadly consulted with the Timorese people through district Focus Group Discussions held countrywide from May – August 2011. They are presented in this report as a set of proposals. The research findings indicated that:

1. There is confusion concerning the concept of democracy

Participants cited the misunderstood concept of democracy within Timorese society as negatively affecting constructive participation in the political and public sphere.

2. Transparency and accountability are seen to be lacking

The perceived erosion of ethics in Timorese society and poor transparency and accountability in Government are seen as major factors contributing to patronage and political clientelism. These issues are also seen to negatively contribute to the politics of exclusion, where political egotism and 'arrogance' dominate the political space and redistribution of state resources. These practices are seen to be highly detrimental to the Timorese nation-state as a whole and a cause of intense frustration and resentment.

3. Apparent absence of institutional "checks and balances"

It was further acknowledged that the mechanical and institutional "checks and balances" established so far by the Timorese Government have failed to adequately ensure the redistribution of political power following independence beyond the sphere of a number of well-connected individuals.

4. Impunity and political elitism inhibits the consolidation of democracy

The current status quo of patronage and political elitism in Timor-Leste strongly inhibits the consolidation of democracy in the post-conflict period.

Ideas into action: two recommendations to be put forward for enactment into policy

As a result, the National Working Group, with support from Focus Group Discussion participants across the 13 districts, formulated two recommendations deemed most critical for consideration and implementation into national policies and programmes:

1. The promotion of active citizenship

In an effort to promote active citizen participation in the political space beyond the period immediately surrounding elections, the first recommendation for the establishment of a permanent civic education campaign is to develop and promote civic responsibility in conjunction with citizenship as an educational means of unifying the Timorese nation-state. It is anticipated that the civic education campaign will encourage responsible citizenship and equip both the governed and the governor with the knowledge and skills to support and respect democratic rules and norms.

2. The promotion of an ethical society through a specific body

The formation of an 'Independent Society of Ethics' to act as both educator and guarantor of a minimum standard of ethical political and social behaviour within Timorese society is also proposed. This initiative is designed to complement the first recommendation with a mandate to provide citizens with the opportunity to discuss and put forward community issues across all governance structures.

PRDP's Second National Forum: validation and enrichment of the research findings

In the culmination of this research process, CEPAD and Interpeace convened PRDP's Second National Forum on the first priority issue of the *promotion of individual and party interests over the national interest* on 25 November 2011. At this event, National Working Group members, together with district Focus Group Discussion participants, presented PRDP's research findings and recommendations for consideration and validation to key stakeholders within Timorese society, including state authorities, the international community and Timorese citizens from throughout the 13 districts.

Group Promoting Change: The Way Forward

As a result, participants at the Second National Forum provided CEPAD through PRDP with a new mandate to facilitate the formation of an advocacy commission, or so-called "Group Promoting Change" to mark the first step in taking the recommendations forward for implementation as policy at the national and district levels.

The ultimate goal: creating an active and responsible civil society in Timor-Leste

The overall objective of the recommendations is to launch and sustain reform in response to the distinct political challenges of the *promotion of individual and party interests over the national interest* so that a degree of vertical bottom-up accountability occurs to encourage and empower ordinary citizens to be pro-active in promoting changes from the local level, in the hope that this will also help improve horizontal accountability across state institutions.

It is anticipated that the proposed recommendations, when well designed and implemented, will contribute to creating an environment in which civil society is active and knowledgeable of its economic, social, political and cultural rights responsibilities, and can monitor and hold the Government accountable.

***The implementation of the two recommendations
would mark a clear step in the right direction for the
consolidation of peace and democracy in Timor-Leste***

1.0. Context and Introduction

"We can have democracy in this country, or we can have great wealth concentrated in the hands of a few, but we can't have both."¹

Post-independence Timor-Leste has been characterised by successive political crises which have posed major challenges to efforts of democratic consolidation. A closer look at the post-conflict political dynamics (1999-present) suggests that the country's violent past (400 years of Portuguese colonization and 24 years of Indonesian military occupation) remains an influential historical factor in the post-independence socio-political context, with the potential to deepen political polarization within today's society and jeopardize the country's national unity.

Timor-Leste's post-conflict social structure seems to reflect different identity groups formed during the period of struggle for independence (1975-1999) to either resist or support the Indonesian presence. Indeed, the formation and function of different groups and movements during the period of resistance and occupation (ritual arts groups, martial arts groups, clandestine groups, armed resistance groups, the diplomatic front etc.) was useful and convenient in the context of building different fronts to effectively resist the Indonesian presence. However, the absence of a programmatic vision and the challenge to respond to the post-conflict social demands and needs of these groups during the post-independence period has turned them into disenfranchised and excluded groups vulnerable to political manipulation during political crises.

This historically-based merger of differing identity groups has given rise to a complexity of social demands and political challenges as the country's majority faces deep poverty and social inequality. This has prompted many to object and to feel that the collective sacrifice made by the Timorese people for the country's independence has been devalued and undermined by the socio-political and economic interests of a small group of individuals who are politically well-connected and positioned.

Likewise, the post-conflict notion of political authority is perceived on the basis of the individual's historical involvement and role played during the resistance period. While this perception is rightfully based on the grounds of an individual's historical participation and contribution to the country's independence, the destabilizing effect of such sensitivity seems to be twofold:

- i) internal conflict arising from the struggle for political power and the competition for recognition and ownership over core historical narratives and identities amongst the Timorese leadership; and

¹ Justice Louis D. Brandeis, quotes about Democracy, <http://www.brandeis.edu/legacyfund/bio.html>

- ii) the institutionalisation of a political patron-client relationship between the bureaucracy and the locally well-connected clique, with the potential to deepen poverty and social exclusion as the interest of a small group takes precedence over the interest of the majority.

Timor-Leste has experienced a major crisis every two years in the post-independence period, with the most serious bringing the country to the brink of virtual state collapse in 2006. Politically, the divisions within the Timor-Leste Defence Force (F-FDTL) and disintegration within the Timor-Leste National Police (PNTL), combined with the ineffective function of the judiciary and other state bodies serving to maintain law and order, led to a near total breakdown of the state system.²

The 2006 political crisis clearly revealed the fragility of state apparatus to maintain peace and security, and underlined the importance to engage both citizens and the nation-state in a constructive dialogue to ensure the development of a democratic governance structure that is effective in holding the political elite accountable to the law and to the population. Similarly, the 2006 crisis also highlighted the imperative of civil society to actively engage in the democratic process beyond the period immediately surrounding the elections.

This report is largely the result of countrywide consultative research on the issue of the *promotion of individual and party interests over the national interest*. This research was conducted in an effort to understand the reasons why the Timorese nation is faced with this serious issue, and explore the means to address it by bringing the voices of all groups and people consulted into a wider arena of open debate and dialogue. The following report is intended as a summary of the critical research, opinions and proposals obtained during the national and local consultations carried out by the Centre of Studies for Peace and Development (CEPAD).

1.1. Background

The Programme of Research and Dialogue for Peace (PRDP)

The 2006 crisis moved the Centre of Studies for Peace and Development (CEPAD), an independent national NGO, in conjunction with Swiss-based peacebuilding agency, Interpeace, to establish the Programme of Research and Dialogue for Peace (PRDP) in 2007. The aim of this initiative is to contribute to the creation of a climate in which Timorese are better equipped to identify and address the most pressing obstacles to lasting peace and understand the origins and the dynamics of conflict. PRDP does so by engaging Timorese citizens and key stakeholders in constructive debates and dialogues to critically assess the

² In 2007, Timor-Leste was listed by The Fund for Peace in the 'Failed States List 2007.' Accessed online at <<http://www.fundforpeace.org>>

most prominent challenges to sustainable peace with the objective to collectively propose Timorese-designed and –owned, durable solutions.

From 2008-2009, PRDP conducted consultations throughout the 13 districts of Timor-Leste in order to identify peace-related issues as experienced within Timorese society. Over 900 key stakeholders were consulted during this process.

Throughout the First Phase, district Focus Group Discussions, countrywide multi-sectoral consultations and regional conferences followed to set 33 priorities that provided the agenda for PRDP's first National Forum in 2009. The empirical research findings were then published in the report *Timor-Leste: Voices and Paths to Peace*. This national event brought together over 200 key actors from all walks of Timorese life, including the leadership of the four sovereign organs of the State:

- H.E. Dr. President José Ramos-Horta, joint recipient of the 1996 Nobel Peace Prize;
- President of the National Parliament, the Right Honourable Fernando Lasama de Araujo;
- Deputy Prime Minister José Luís Guterres (also Member of the CEPAD General Assembly);
- Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, the Right Honourable Antonino Gonçalves (also Chairman of the CEPAD General Assembly); and
- Mr. Mari Alkatiri, Secretary-General of Fretilin and former Prime Minister 2002-2006.

Participants selected four priority issues deemed most critical to the achievement of sustainable peace in Timor-Leste:

1. The promotion of individual and party interests over the national interest;
2. The ineffective formal judicial system and the culture of impunity;
3. The need to conduct a thorough historical review of the resistance and the occupation; and
4. Corruption, Collusion and Nepotism (KKN).

The National Forum consequently provided CEPAD with the mandate to continue its work and to concentrate on the four priority issues individually for further research and articulation.

The consultations carried out during the Programme's First Phase indicated that, while adherence to democratic processes and structures is important, Timorese feel deeply frustrated with democracy because as a political system, it is yet to enable the State to respond to the people's social needs and demands.

Furthermore, Timorese expressed overall dissatisfaction with the services they have individually experienced within the public sector.³ The findings also revealed that the poor performance by the State is partially due to the fact that state institutions have been dominated by the interests of a small, Dili-based political elite and NGOs who are linked to society largely through practices of patronage and political clientelism.

The same research findings suggested that if democracy is to take hold in Timor-Leste, it will require well-informed and active citizens who understand how to voice their interests by using the appropriate mechanisms to do so. This is only possible through the promotion of sustainable and constructive engagement between citizens and the nation's leaders using participatory and broad-based dialogue processes to openly discuss and debate issues of key importance to the Timorese people.

Now in its Second Phase, PRDP is concentrating on establishing National Working Groups for each of the four priority issues identified during the 2009 National Forum, with the aim to identify practical solutions contributing to the consolidation of peace in Timor-Leste. This report describes the consultative process between National Working Group members and Focus Group Discussion participants across the 13 districts to address the issue of the *promotion of individual and party interests over the national interest*.

2.0. Methodology

PRDP adopted a *Participatory Action Research*⁴ (PAR) approach with a clear focus on analysing the *cause-and-effect relationship* between the catalysts of the issue at hand with both the experienced and potential outcomes. The objective of the PAR process is to proactively engage the Timorese people in developing a comprehensive understanding of this priority issue as communities have experienced it at the local, regional and national levels.

The PAR process involved in-depth research and the identification of various hypotheses in order to ensure that all possible factors and considerations were well understood before the commencement of the identification of recommendations for policy consideration. This approach was thus designed to ensure local ownership over the solution process as it prioritizes consensus-building at national and local levels based on a broadly debated body of research and knowledge.

PRDP facilitated a series of meetings and debates with members of the National Working Group primarily responsible for identifying and formulating recommendations and


³ CEPAD and Interpeace, 2010, "Timor-Leste: Voices and Paths to Peace", Dili, Timor-Leste.

⁴ Participatory Action-Research (PAR) was developed in order to render academic research more applicable to the needs of those being studied, and encourage them to actively participate in the research design, methodology and projected outcomes.

approaches as a set of proposals, which were subsequently consulted with Timorese communities through district Focus Group Discussions held countrywide (May – August 2011).

The overall research process culminated in PRDP's Second National Forum on 25 November 2011 on the first priority issue of the *promotion of individual and party interests over the national interest*, in which National Working Group members presented the research findings outlined in this report to key stakeholders at the event to discuss and debate the two recommendations for enactment into policy.

Diagram 1: PRDP research and implementation process



2.1. Formation of the National Working Group

As part of the approach, a National Working Group was established following the recommendations formulated during the 2009 National Forum to further articulate the nature of the first priority issue within the Timorese context. CEPAD was given the mandate to continue and construct further in-depth research structures to provide Timorese communities with the opportunity to reflect more closely and broaden their thinking on the overall picture of the issue in question.

Members of this National Working Group were chosen through strict selection criteria based on inclusiveness and representativeness to ensure that a diversity of interests, opinions and positions were integrated and represented throughout the process of developing a set of proposals and recommendations. The group was thus composed of members representing different political parties, the Catholic Church and Islamic community, youth and women's groups, the Timor-Leste Defence Force and National Police, tertiary education institutions, civil society organisations, the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC), Government, and the Presidency.

2.1.1. National Working Group meetings

Numerous Working Group meetings were held over the course of five months. Meetings initially focused on providing members of the National Working Group with information on the approach and methodology of the process, while simultaneously allowing for members to get to know each other and better understand their role and the nature of the research that was required. In general, participants were familiar with meeting each other in external environments; a consideration that also helped to facilitate frank and thoughtful debates throughout the process.

In subsequent meetings, members of the National Working Group focused on articulating the issue clearly in order to produce the most relevant hypotheses about the causes and challenges that undermine the national interest. As a result, National Working Group members also focused on how to feasibly address these through in-depth research before producing a set of proposals. Links between the issues and their potential or actual causes were discussed and ideas generated about why individual and party interests have been promoted over the national interest, and its possible effects and causes.

The meetings also provided an opportunity for members of the National Working Group to reach a consensus on the selection of at least two factors deemed fundamental to the causes of the issue, requiring further in-depth research to allow for the development of a set of recommendations. A total of 16 key factors, as listed in Table 1, were identified and discussed as possible causes of the problem.

On average, two meetings per month with an attendance of 16 members in each meeting were held. Participants were well-motivated by the topic and moved by the proceedings and the composition of the Group. The approach was seen as an exceptional multi-sectoral process accommodating different views and interests to address an issue that is highly politicized in a politically sensitive period as the 2012 parliamentary and presidential elections fast approach.

2.2. District Focus Group Discussions

Countrywide Focus Group Discussions were incorporated into the approach to ensure a strong connection between the geographical centralization of power in Dili with the districts. This methodology was fully developed during the programme's First Phase⁵ and was adopted to promote a decentralized and consensus-oriented approach by consulting the views of communities in each of the country's 13 districts. The work of the National Working

⁵ During 2007-2009, PRDP created Focus Group Discussions in all of the country's 13 districts, engaging key stakeholders to map and broaden the understanding of the complex challenges to sustainable peace in Timor-Leste. For further information please see CEPAD and Interpeace, 2010, "Timor-Leste: Voices and Paths to Peace", Dili, Timor-Leste.

Group was subsequently complemented and validated through extensive consultation and collaboration with these communities.

District consultations were conducted over five months (May – September 2011) and included over 300 Timorese citizens and 75 interviewees countrywide. Each district Focus Group Discussion gathered between 15-20 participants, who were selected on the basis of representativeness and inclusiveness. These discussions were used in combination with video and semi-structured interviews as a process through which to consult communities in each of the 13 districts for their feedback on the recommendations formulated by the National Working Group.

It is estimated that some 90-94% of the over 300 participants consulted through the National Working Group and Focus Group Discussion(s) expressed their views on different issues raised both at the district and national levels.

2.3 Second National Forum

The overall research process culminated in the facilitation of PRDP's Second National Forum on 25 November 2011, which focused specifically on the priority issue of the *promotion of individual and party interests over the national interest*. At this event, the research findings and recommendations presented in this report were put forward by National Working Group members, together with Focus Group Discussion participants, for consideration and validation to key stakeholders within Timorese society, including state and Government authorities, the international community and Timorese citizens from throughout the 13 districts.

The Second National Forum was undertaken in an effort to bring members from various sectors within Timorese society into an inclusive dialogue on the validity of the research findings and implementation strategies moving forward.

3.0. Situational Analysis

*"Behind every great fortune, there is a crime."*⁶

During the 2009 National Forum, eight Sub-Working Groups were formed under the four thematic areas of Politics, Justice, Social and Economics. These groups assessed and prioritized the 33 issues identified during PRDP's mapping phase. Following two days of substantial debate, participants unanimously selected the *promotion of individual and party*

⁶ Honore de Balzac, French realist novelist in http://www.quotationspage.com/quotes/Honore_de_Balzac/ A variant, "*Behind every great fortune there is a great crime*," has appeared as a quotation of Balzac; but it may have originated in a paraphrase in *The Oil Barons: Men of Greed and Grandeur* (1971) by Richard O'Connor, p. 47.

interests over the national interest as one of the four most pressing obstacles to peace, requiring further examination and analysis through in-depth research.

This issue was perceived as a phenomenon eroding the very social fibre of the country in a context where the politics of patronage appointments and the approval of lucrative tenders to politically well-connected clients within the public service had weakened state institutions and prevented the state from consolidating and projecting its influence both domestically and internationally.⁷

Participants at the National Forum in 2009 agreed that the practices of patronage and political clientelism have often resulted in the misuse of state resources and revenues in the interest of politically well-connected individuals for the retention of political support, to the detriment and exclusion of the interests of the Timorese majority. This has negatively impacted state efforts to provide effective public service delivery and to improve the living conditions of Timorese citizens. The findings of the mapping phase revealed that there is a wave of both disaffection and frustration with the democratisation process in Timor-Leste since the political regime is yet to provide formidable solutions to the problems of the majority in the post-conflict period.⁸

As pointed out during the first National Forum, some participants acknowledged that while patronage and political clientelism are not new phenomena within the political realm, the politically selective access to state resources and public tenders has in fact undermined the process of democratic governance during the country's crucial thirteen-year period in the transition to democracy (1999-2012). Furthermore, participants suggested that these practices have impeded successive governments from ensuring that delivery meets expectations and from effectively aggregating and satisfying social demands that would normally contribute to the process of building national consensus and the development of social compacts.

Consequently, in November 2010, a National Working Group was established with the main objective to address this problem through the articulation of a set of proposals and recommendations carefully researched and consulted with communities countrywide. The results of this research as presented in this report indicate that the opinions expressed at the National Forum in 2009 have largely been reinforced and that the prevalence of political clientelism remains an issue of great concern within Timorese society.

As one representative of the Independent Electoral Commission maintained during a National Working Group meeting,

⁷ CEPAD and Interpeace, 2010, "Timor-Leste: Voices and Paths to Peace", Dili, Timor-Leste.

⁸ District Focus Group Discussion Reports, Mapping Phase, 2007-2009.

*"Political power should really be used as an opportunity for leaders to improve the social and economic situation in the country... however this great chance has been lost and instead we have maladministration and poor transparency to challenge due to their misuse of political power."*⁹

In line with the above statement another participant added that,

*".....leaders have spoiled the opportunity to serve the nation as they have used their position of power to only serve themselves."*¹⁰

Members of the National Working Group expressed strong disapproval in the ongoing practices of political patron-client relationships and maintained that measures to effectively address this patronage system and the politics of exclusion have remained largely unrecognized by development practitioners and donors. Furthermore, participants reiterated the necessity for any programme designed to address these practices to be grounded in a thorough understanding of the country's historical and political factors, which have contributed to the flourishing of the political patron-client relationship in the first place. Participants stressed that such an approach must simultaneously acknowledge the sensitivity and the political nature of the issue; a factor which has made it considerably difficult to break the culture of impunity thus far, since those benefiting from such a system are unwilling to sacrifice accumulated power and financial gains.

Clientelism, as defined by Historian Richard Graham, represents:

*" an action-set built upon the principle of take there, give here, enabling clients [oan sarani] and patrons [aman sarani] to benefit from each other's support as they play in parallel at different levels of political, social and administrative articulation."*¹¹

The results of Focus Group Discussions countrywide revealed the strong consensus that clientelism is inherently undemocratic, as it implies mediated and selective access to state resources and markets from which others are normally excluded, and thus promotes the interests of those who are politically well-positioned and connected over the interests of the majority. More specifically, most district Focus Group Discussion participants highlighted the particularistic use of public resources, the release of public funds and the politics of granting public contracts and jobs as a strategy for patrons to build and maintain political support from clients. The perceived result is a co-dependent power structure with damaging consequences, as clients lose their autonomy as citizens and patrons weaken their authority

⁹ Working Group meeting in Dili, 22 December 2010.

¹⁰ Working Group meeting in Dili, 22 December 2010.

¹¹ Roniger, Luis, (2004) Political Clientelism, Democracy and Market Economy, *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 36 no. 3, April, 353-375.

as state officials; rendering both citizens and leaders operating outside the existing rules and regulations whenever this suits their respective interests.

Overall, as Roniger suggests, the practices of political clientelism,

“... neutralize the system of representation and entitlements, by placing associates and ‘friends’ in strategic positions of public power and control. From this perspective, clientelism is inimical to the institutionalization of public accountability and to mechanisms of administrative control, creating situations of over-employment and under-qualified personnel in the public administration, of biased bidding for public works and over-pricing. Secluded negotiations and private deals involving public resources are typical...”¹²

In hindsight, the country’s current political culture and its bureaucratic and political institutions have been greatly influenced by the legacy of colonial domination and foreign occupation, and the period of UN transitional administration. The administration under the Indonesian occupation (1975-1999) was highly centralized with powerful bureaucratic institutions to seize the territory and destroy the social structures using clientelistic policies of political and social organisation. Subsequently, the UN administration (1999-2002) was unable to replace the heritage of the colonial dynamics and patronage politics with effective representative institutions to prepare and enable the nation to function as a newly established state based on modern constitutional structures.

The Constituent Assembly instituted during the UN Administration in 2000, like Indonesia’s DPR (*Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat* or People’s Representative Council) established following the occupation, was to serve as an advisory body rather than policymaking institution, and to deal with local administrative issues rather than substantive policy matters. Within this context, these institutions were designed to help legitimize and strengthen the authority of the bureaucratic government rather than empowering those elected to effectively represent the interests of the constituency.

As a result, weak governance structures and limited political participation among Timorese citizens therefore have the potential to reduce the interest(s) of the majority to a distinctly electoral issue. This concern, coupled with high levels of unemployment and widespread poverty in a highly divisive society,¹³ may exacerbate an underlying political culture of

¹² Ibid.

¹³ The percentage of the population living in poverty has been estimated to have fallen from 49.9 percent in 2007 to 41 percent in 2009, while the “vulnerable employment” and “underemployment” rates remain high, particularly in urban areas (p. 48). The outbreak of the crisis in 2006 highlighted the mutually dependent relationship between widespread poverty, high unemployment and social (in) cohesion, with a dramatic impact on social and economic progress made during the 2002 – 2005 period. The 2011 National Human Development Report (NHDR) acknowledged the extent to which the crisis affected development: “the non-oil economy contracted by 5.8 percent, delivery of social and welfare services was severely restricted, and unemployment worsened. Data for 2007 indicate that per capita income in the non-oil economy was approximately 20 percent lower in 2006 than in the year of independence, 2002” (p. 14). National Human Development Report 2011, *Managing Natural Resources for Human Development: Developing the Non-Oil Economy to Achieve the MDGs*,

favouritism and political elitism among a select few of politically well-connected individuals in the post-independence period.

During this period, the people of Timor-Leste have seen a concentration of excessive power in the hands of the Executive without regard for the National Parliament and the Judiciary. The National Parliament has often been bypassed and served as a rubber stamp to legitimize the exercise of power by the Executive which, supported by the bureaucracy, has often pre-empted the former when initiating legislation. Similarly, the habit of bypassing independent investigative and prosecuting institutions, including the Judiciary, by political authorities to pardon prominent political figures under criminal investigation has become an accepted norm in Timorese society; where, as a result, adherence to judicial laws and regulations is often determined by one's direct access to the political power structure.

This culture of impunity and political elitism in the public sphere is of particular concern given that the Anti-Corruption Commission (CAC), Office of the Inspector-General and Office of the Ombudsman for Human Rights and Justice (PDHJ) report directly to the National Parliament. Indeed, the recent Acting Audit Court Review on the 2010 State Accounts conducted by the Court of Appeals and presented to the National Parliament on 20 October 2011 has come under heavy scrutiny from local and international actors, who have categorically rejected the audit review's conclusion that the state accounts are "valid" and have subsequently called for greater transparency and information-sharing from the Government on this issue.¹⁴

President Ramos-Horta has echoed these calls for greater stringency in public accountability, requesting the Office of the General Prosecutor, Anti-Corruption Commission and Ombudsman for Human Rights and Justice to fully investigate the audit review's findings in relation to claims that the Government has paid US\$188 million to 'ghosts' without adequate justification.¹⁵

On this issue, Major-General of the Army, Lere Anan Timor, added:

"... Individuals promote their own interests over the national interest because they had previously never dreamed of sitting in a position of power as they do now...and now that they do, they want to make the most of this unique opportunity to accumulate money and not to serve the nation as a whole..."¹⁶

United Nations Development Programme, Accessed on 8 November 2011 at <http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/national/asiathepacific/timorleste/Timor-Leste_NHDR_2011_EN.pdf>

¹⁴ La'o Hamutuk, 28 October 2011, "Acting Audit Court reviews 2010 State Accounts," accessed online at http://laohamutuk.blogspot.com/2011_10_01_archive.html. While Timor-Leste's Constitution allots the function of external audits to the High Administrative, Tax and Audit Court, nine years after the adoption of the Constitution in 2002, this Court has still not been created.

¹⁵ Journal Independente, 14 November 2011, p. 1.

¹⁶ Interview with Major-General Lere Anan Timor, 10 November 2011.

Divisions based on language (Tetum, Portuguese, English and Bahasa-Indonesian), and the perceived effect this has on access to political power and information, further exacerbate tensions between the political elite and the majority, where the great extent of Government-based information and legislation is disseminated and approved in Portuguese; a language which, while being one of Timor-Leste's official state languages, remains spoken by comparatively few Timorese.¹⁷ This in turn has the potential to polarize groups within society based on language and the role that individuals or groups played in the independence process, and as a result, further deepen the divisiveness between the political elite and its constituents amid widespread poverty and social inequality.¹⁸

Similarly, the heavy reliance of the economy on public sector spending, funded largely by petroleum revenues and assisted by vast donor contributions, is of equal concern given the perceived prevalence of clientelistic and patronage methods to secure both public tenders and gainful employment within the public service. According to participants, strengthening the institutional capacity and accountability of the state apparatus will certainly prove a significant challenge to ensure the wider public benefits from the redistribution of wealth generated from Timor-Leste's oil and gas reserves. Ongoing progress in addressing these challenges is crucial, "since not addressing them adequately could exacerbate or revive factors that have been shown to impact on stability in the past."¹⁹

Indeed, it is this power imbalance between bureaucracy, democratic institutions and local elites that seems to have paved the way for the institutionalization of a patron-client political relationship, where existing "checks and balances"²⁰ have been either ineffective or seen in the eyes of the people as mere compliance mechanisms for the government in power.

Countrywide consultations have revealed that on the basis of patron-client relationships between the bureaucracy and local elites, participants perceived the bureaucracy as the provider of employment, state projects, influence and security for a selected group of clients, including family members, who are well-connected and politically independent from professional merits and/or individual integrity.

¹⁷ The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)'s National Human Development Report 2011 (NHDR) indicated that most estimates put the percentage of Portuguese speakers at "between 8 and 12 percent of the population, although some reports and commentaries have put this as low as 5 percent and as high as 25 percent." National Human Development Report 2011, *Managing Natural Resources for Human Development: Developing the Non-Oil Economy to Achieve the MDGs*, p. 44.

¹⁸ CEPAD and Interpeace, 2009, "Timor-Leste: Voices and Paths to Peace", Dili, Timor-Leste.

¹⁹ More specifically, according to the NHDR 2011, these challenges include "groups exploiting grievances based on continuing levels of unemployment and poverty, discontent within the large youth population sometimes manifest as gang violence, tensions within the security sector, a sense that formal judicial processes are inadequate to guarantee criminal accountability, disputes over unresolved land ownership issues accumulated over decades, and dissatisfaction arising from perceived lack of good governance practices." National Human Development Report 2011, *Managing Natural Resources for Human Development: Developing the Non-Oil Economy to Achieve the MDGs*, p. 7 (6).


²⁰ Current mechanisms of "checks and balances" include the National Parliament, Ombudsman for Human Rights, Anti-Corruption Commission, the Superior Council of Judicial Magistrates, Independent Electoral Commission and the Independent Broadcast Authority.

4.0. Main issues and factors debated

This priority issue proved an incentive to promote lively and constructive debates during which participants expressed their views openly and freely without feelings of intimidation. The issues identified and discussed are as listed below. Some issues were debated in greater depth, while others were merely identified. The PRDP research team intervened where and when possible in order to level the flow of the debates and to provide extra information to the participants when this was needed.

Key issues highlighted by participants in the National Working Group and Focus Group Discussions are summarized in the diagram below:

Diagram 2: Cause and effect analysis



The *cause-effect analysis* methodology allowed participants to clearly articulate the problem through constructive discussion and debate in such a way that a total of 16 key issues were identified and discussed as possible causes and effects on the issue of the *promotion of individual and party interests over the national interest*. National Working Group members had the following to say on each of these issues, which were highlighted as hypotheses driving the ongoing political tensions:

Table 1: Conclusions identified by the National Working Group and District Focus Groups (the cause-effect relationship)

Effect	Causes	Justification and explanation
The promotion of individual and party interests over the national interest	Populism	Members of the National Working Group agreed that <i>"individual interests become the interest of the nation, the ideas and opinions from one person become everyone's, only one person's interest becomes a national interest."</i> National Working Group members intimated that several institutions and structures have been established only to accommodate the interest of certain individuals. For example, on 18 January 2007, the National Parliament approved Decree Law 1/2007 to establish lifetime pensions for former parliamentarians and Government officials. Among other benefits, the pension provides for the lifetime payment of 100% of the individual's salary, to begin as soon as the Member of Parliament leaves office. Furthermore, receipt of the "Lifetime Pension" is not dependent upon length of service, nor must members of Parliament wait until the national retirement age before it is guaranteed. ²¹
	Political egotism and arrogance	National Working Group members identified 'political egoism' as significantly contributing to the reinforcement of individual and party interests because it has prevented political leaders from honouring the collective sacrifice made during the resistance, where instead they have focused on their own past suffering. Indeed, it has been widely argued by academic and social commentators that Timor-Leste lacks a strong social basis for growth and development, largely due to the domination of a small, highly centralized political elite which is "not very inclusive." ²²
	Leadership polarization	The nation's interest has been affected by continued leadership polarization because as long as the political elite remain divided, each will continue to govern using a patronage-clientele approach to retain supporters in opposition to others. This was acknowledged by a

²¹ Regimento do Parlamento Nacional, Estatuto dos Deputados, Pensão Mensal Vitalícia dos Deputados.

²² See, for example, Andrew Rosser (2009) *"Timor-Leste's Vulnerability to the Resource Curse: An Assessment"*, University of Adelaide, as quoted in *National Human Development Report 2011, Managing Natural Resources for Human Development: Developing the Non-Oil Economy to Achieve the MDGs*, *ibid*, p. 69.

The promotion of individual and party interests over the national interest		representative from the local Islamic community, who agreed that in fact <i>"...members of former Resistance leaders are divided and they lack coordination..."</i> In support of such view, it was noted by the National Working Group that <i>"... before we were united and everyone made sacrifices... and gave things they had to support resistance, both in the jungle and in the cities. After having gained independence we forget all those things."</i>
	Abuse of power	There is little respect for the separation of powers between the existing sovereign bodies as it is consecrated in the Constitution. Members of the National Working Group pointed out that <i>"... a country ... when governed by populist and revolutionary leaders, overlooks the law; they do as they wish, because they themselves are the law..."</i> This comes as several Government Ministers have been asked to appear before the Court on allegations of corruption; amid further calls from Members of Parliament for the Anti-Corruption Commission to investigate the implementation of previous annual budgets by the National Parliament Secretariat. One member of Parliament went so far as to say <i>"...If not, every day (the Parliament) calls the Government corrupt, but the Parliament itself is corrupt."</i> ²³
	Elite-based political process	Broad-based participation in the political process, which is guaranteed by the country's Constitution, is needed in order to consolidate the democratisation process countrywide. Members of the National Working Group reiterated, <i>"the public needs to be engaged in decision-making processes regarding the country's priorities and the allocation of development resources even in the post-election period."</i> Nevertheless, public political participation appears to be centralized in Dili, with low levels of sustained political engagement beyond the period immediately surrounding the elections. ²⁴ The period following

²³ *Journal Independente*, 16 November 2011.

²⁴ From 2001 – 2005, the National Democratic Institute for International Studies (NDI) in conjunction with USAID focused on strengthening citizen participation and improving governance at the local level through the implementation of a civic education initiative in 77 villages across Timor-Leste. An evaluation of the programme conducted in 2008 indicated that while the initiative had positively contributed to increased public interest in the political process in the lead-up to the 2007

The promotion of individual and party interests over the national interest		elections reveals a politically disengaged public, which allegedly provides the elite with the opportunity to undertake a top-down approach to the detriment of the interests of the majority. Meanwhile, the design and implementation of legislation by the National Parliament to introduce municipal governments in each of the country's 13 districts - in an effort to decentralize decision-making - has been delayed until 2014.
	Privatization of State	<p>There is no clear 'definition' regarding public participation in the development process. The process of decision making on the allocation of development resources is limited to the political elite, and while allegations against the misappropriation of public funds remain unsubstantiated by hard evidence, public perceptions of corruption are widespread and growing.²⁵ Public servants have often been accused of misappropriating State resources for individual and political party gains. In August 2010, the Fatubesi village-head accused the Secretary of State for Energy Politics of distributing solar panels funded by the Government for the promotion of an individual political party. The solar panels had been allegedly marked with the political party's name and attributed to this political party; however the initiative to provide solar power to the district was entirely Government funded and supported.²⁶</p> <p>Working Group members further remarked, "... as it was during the war it was the collective effort that was important and key to securing Independence ... now in the post-conflict independence situation, collective efforts should remain important and require a structure in order to orientate the nation ... but it should not be limited to "big brothers" and "big sisters" only." National Working Group members agreed that</p>

elections, "the lack of accurate information and understanding of the political process and its meaning among all groups in Timor-Leste is still a critical need, as is the political empowerment of women and citizens beyond the elite." USAID, (February 2008) *Elections and Political Processes Program In Timor-Leste: Evaluation Report*, p. 4. Accessed online at < http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PDACL911.pdf>

²⁵ USAID (2009) *Corruption Assessment: Timor-Leste*, Management Systems International, Washington., p. 7. Accessed online at <http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNADQ697.pdf>

²⁶ *Timor Post*, 2 August 2010.

The promotion of individual and party interests over the national interest		individual leaders can determine the path for Timor-Leste to move forward, as long as it accommodates the process of democratization whereby the nation's interest is the result of a broad-based consultation process and not a capital-based interest of certain individuals. Some members said that the formation of state institutions has been prioritized over the importance of political processes and local contexts. Others maintained that the process of fighting for independence and the process of building the nation are not the same and each presents a different situation of its own.
	Privatization of political parties	National Working Group members maintained that political parties should not be used by politicians as an instrument to implement individual agendas. The National Working Group concluded that <i>"...consolidating a political party and defending and promoting its politics should not be synonymous with nationalizing the politics of that given political party when its leaders have gained political power."</i> The widespread misappropriation of State funds for political and individual gains has been well documented in the local media. For example, on 10 August 2010, the Timor Post published an article titled "Members of Government utilize state funding for personal gain," in which public servants were accused of using State vehicles for political party and private activities.
	Misunderstood concept of Democracy	The concept and function of democracy and democratic behaviour is yet to be fully understood by the people. As a result, the Timorese majority are highly susceptible to the imposition of heavy top-down rationales and policy implementation strategies from the political elite. The National Working Group supported this notion, as one member went even further to say that, <i>"in a post conflict country such as Timor-Leste, it is not appropriate to adopt liberal democracy; we should have implemented a semi-dictatorship regime to nurture our mentality because in reality, people do not comply with the local authorities and we cannot punish them because the system is</i>

The promotion of individual and party interests over the national interest		<p>weak." Another member noted, "... maybe our understanding about democracy is still in an infant stage so we tend to ignore everything, everything as long as the interest of our political party is not associated with it." Other National Working Group members underlined the need to acknowledge the understanding that democratic governance is a process and not an end result in itself.</p>
	Political and social antagonism threatening the core social fabrics of society	<p>Political opponents often view each other as 'enemies' based on opposing political views and interests, where those holding positions of power often exclude the views of their opponents to the detriment of the national interest. The National Working Group agreed that the 'opposing' attitude taken by individuals should not be ignored simply for the sake of contradicting political opponents. As one member pointed out, "... in the National Parliament debates there are issues which all Deputies should support and vote in favour for, but often they vote against ... just to reflect their party's interest at work. I agree if they vote against proposals which might only benefit certain individuals, but if the budget is for the necessity of the entire people why should this be voted against?"</p>
	Government maladministration	<p>The promotion of individual and party interests ultimately results in the maladministration of state resources and properties, as power is seen as an opportunity for certain individuals to enrich and improve their social, political and economic situations. Working Group members stated that "... widespread poverty coupled with huge demands to improve personal economies and interest lead to the devaluation of the nation's interest."</p>
	Poor transparency and accountability	<p>Poor transparency and accountability within Government and the public service have contributed to politicians misusing their political power as an opportunity to benefit themselves, their families and their associates. In August 2010, community leaders, including village-heads, from all 13 districts collectively accused the Government of awarding contracts and tenders based on personal connections within the public service. Community leaders lamented the</p>

The promotion of individual and party interests over the national interest		<p>dysfunctionality of the Community Decentralization Development Project due to perceived favouritism to well-connected companies in the bidding process.²⁷</p> <p>Members of the National Working Group noted that <i>"... the absence of an 'audit court' to punish those who commit maladministration makes it difficult for leaders to be transparent and accountable to the people ... and such an absence will render the existing Anti-Corruption Commission ineffective in its performance."</i></p>
	Political dispute over ownership of historical narratives and symbols	<p>Some National Working Group members underlined the misuse of national symbols and historical narratives for personal benefit. National Working Group members remarked that <i>"...historical symbols and acronyms such as CNRT, FRETILIN and FALINTIL have been used for the benefit of a small group, while our grandparents and our parents were killed for these names. Why don't we preserve these historic names for everyone to honour?"</i> Another member added that <i>"a leader is good for a specific context or situation but may no longer be that effective in a new context. Therefore, people need to have humility to recognize that one may no longer be required in a new context and let others lead the political processes."</i></p>
	Patronage and political clientelism	<p>It was highly consensual that the practices of patronage, political clientelism and the politics of exclusion have consolidated the promotion of individual and party interests over the national interest. National Working Group members referred to an 'invisible system' that has been established to supersede democratic processes, where the State has been used as an instrument to promote particular interests. In support of this view, one member noted <i>"... if I hold a position of power, my family members will all have access to jobs even though they do not have the capacity..."</i></p>
	Politics of exclusion	<p>Individuals' 'historical credibility' often takes priority over existing laws in the decision making processes on key issues of public interest. The Executive's decision to bypass the judiciary system and pardon convicted</p>

²⁷ Timor Post, 7 August 2010.

The promotion of individual and party interests over the national interest		<p>criminals is an example of the extent of ruling power located within the small political elite. This acknowledgement has to some extent consolidated the clientelistic approach in governance and promotes the interests of certain groups over the interests of the general public. National Working Group members noted that political privileges obtained on the basis of one's participation, or lack thereof, in the resistance against occupation, while understandable, should not entitle the leaders to overrule the rule of law as this consolidates the power of the elite to the detriment of the public interest.</p>
	Loss of public trust in the state	<p>Most National Working Group members shared the view that individuals holding a position of power have the tendency to consistently prioritize their own interests and those of their families and close associates. In support of this view, one National Working Group member noted that "<i>.....leaders have spoiled the opportunity to serve the nation as they have used their position of power to only serve themselves.</i>" Another member added that this occurs in order for leaders to ensure financial and social security, should they no longer occupy an influential position in the future.</p>
	Perceived erosion of ethics	<p>National Working Group members agreed that the country has seen a radical degradation of individual ethics during the post-conflict period as individuals prioritize their interests and the interest of their parties over the common good. National Working Group members regretted that in times of peace the collective sacrifice made during the war is simply ignored as available positions of power are used as an instrument to benefit immediate family members and/or associates.</p>

4.1. Level of consensus on hypotheses as possible causes

National Working Group members analysed the causes in a visual map depicted above through applying the 'Cause Mapping' method. This approach was undertaken as a means to identify the most effective solutions to prevent or mitigate any further negative impact resulting from the *promotion of individual and party interests over the national interest*.

An entire Working Group meeting was dedicated solely for this purpose and broad consensus was reached that 'Patronage and Political Clientelism' required a special focus of attention and further in-depth research going forward. Through an extensive process involving thorough questioning and problem-solving techniques, this issue was identified as the most prominent factor from the chain of identified causes and effects.

As for the remaining identified relevant causes, members of the National Working Group agreed to cluster them in a way that maintains relevance within the cause-and-effect relationship, as reflected in the 'Cause Mapping' analysis.

Table 2: Group consensus on the two selected causes

Level of Consensus	Issues/Factors	Importance 1-5*
Highly consensual	Patronage Politics: The National Working Group identified and agreed that poor governance, maladministration, lack of transparency and accountability, instrumentalization of political parties, abuse of power, instrumentalization of the State, nationalization of individual interests, and the nationalization of party agendas are interconnected factors inherent to the patronage system.	*****
	The Politics of Exclusion: National Working Group members singled out the politics of exclusion as closely associated with the practice of patronage politics, with identified consequences as moral degradation, political egoism, and perceived lack of political ethics, political 'arrogance,' political marginalization, and political opportunism.	****
General agreement	Political Process: a general agreement was reached on the need to engage the public in broad-based political processes as a means to engage the public and the political leadership in a dialogue to address the issues identified above.	***

5.0. Formulation of policy recommendations for implementation

The overall objective of formulating policy recommendations is to launch and sustain reform in response to the distinct political challenges of the *promotion of individual and party interests over the national interest*. The policy recommendations were developed so that a degree of bottom-up accountability can occur in order to encourage and empower ordinary citizens to be proactive in promoting change from the local level. These recommendations are put forward in the hope that both horizontal and vertical accountability across state institutions will improve as citizens actively engage in the political sphere beyond the period immediately surrounding elections.

The underlying rationale behind the recommendations is to develop direct links between the problem-oriented research process and citizens' participation in democracy, with a focus on improving community knowledge on local problems and their link with national priorities through highlighting the work of the government and the services it delivers.

While the recommendations may not provide the 'magic formula' that will solve the issue in question, participants concluded that, when well designed, the implementation of the recommendations could help both the governor and the governed to institutionalize and protect the ground-rules of democratic administration as citizens learn how to make informed decisions and judgments on key issues important to democratic life.

In an attempt to avoid coming up with a generic list of proposals, this report identifies two in-depth recommendations, which have been designed as a means to proactively engage Timorese citizens in practices of responsible citizenship beyond the existing reactionary state mechanisms established to challenge political clientelism and Government maladministration after the fact.

Due to the sensitivity of the issue, members of the National Working Group cautioned that while the two recommendations present formidable policy considerations in and of themselves, there is nevertheless a need to ensure that these very recommendations are not rendered worthless or fail to obtain domestic political support because of the unfriendly political sensitivity surrounding specific political issues and leadership behaviour. As a result, the following recommendations have been proposed and carefully elaborated upon to ensure traction with the general public, and in particular the Government, the Opposition and key decision-makers.

5.1. Recommendation 1: A permanent Civic Education Campaign

The first recommendation for the establishment of a permanent civic education campaign is to develop and promote civic responsibility as an educational means for unifying the Timorese nation-state.

National Working Group members and Focus Group Discussion participants agreed that the post-independence social demands and cultural changes have produced tensions and conflicts within society that are also reflected in changes to accepted ethical and political values. In this case, the accepted ethical values, norms and practices during the period of resistance and occupation need to be taken as reference to recapture national unity. Moreover, the expressed socio-political concerns that managed national unity during the period of foreign colonization and occupation also need to be properly addressed to foster conditions for communities to learn how to participate in a democracy in the post-conflict period.

As one member of the National Electoral Commission noted:

*"... we need to be educated on the principles of democracy to learn how to play our role as citizens in a democracy. A solid campaign or movement for democracy promoting the principles of democracy and the citizen's role using civic education is a must."*²⁸

Conversely, as previously pointed out, Timorese post-conflict state-society relations are dominated by populism, patronage and political clientelism, with citizens having little effective means of holding government accountable. Both the governed and the governor need to engage each other as rights-bearing citizens to support and respect democratic rules and norms, including resolving conflicts through rule-bound mechanisms rather than as dependent clients and patrons. Undeniably, without the active involvement of citizens in political life, government power can be abused and the political and social rights ideally guaranteed by modern democracy can be limited.

In support of the statement made above, a representative from the President's Cabinet participating in National Working Group meetings, added:

*"... Maladministration and lack of transparency and accountability ... and the politics of exclusion are common practices in our country today even though we have laws and regulations to control those practices in the public administration. What is needed is to socialize those laws and regulations through a civic education campaign to ensure that such practices are restrained in favour of promoting the national interest."*²⁹

²⁸ Working Group meeting in Dili, 22 December 2010.

²⁹ Working Group meeting in Dili, 30 March, 2011.

5.1.1. Justification

Civic responsibility represents a key cornerstone to democracy. A responsible citizen is not merely about voting in periodic elections, but rather a responsible citizen must be able to access and analyse information before taking a position on public issues. This means that a responsible citizen has a duty to ensure and uphold certain democratic values which are written in the Constitution. Those values, as stipulated in the country's Constitution, include justice, equality, participation, human rights, rule of law, privacy, respect for property and patriotism, etc.³⁰ When these values are maintained, a minimum standard of democratic behaviour is ensured, whereby citizens are systematically linked with representatives and leaders to encourage the transparent and accountable use of legitimate public authority.

A civic education initiative as a community-service programme is much needed as a means to promote and encourage a responsible citizenry committed to democratic principles. This would allow citizens to raise their civic awareness and use and develop their civil rights to effectively participate in the country's post-conflict democratization process. Similarly, citizens would be encouraged to learn how the Government represents the purposes, values and principles of democracy as stated in the country's Constitution. Such a civic education campaign also has the potential to address the current fragmentation in Timorese society along political and social lines through the identification and solidification of an overarching Timorese collective identity.

Recognizing the importance of such an initiative, one National Working Group member representing the Catholic church remarked:

*"... it will not matter how knowledgeable a person may be of political ethics if s/he lacks self-awareness and common sense and refuses to work for the common good. The individual's self-awareness is necessary if civic education is to be effective."*³¹

Overall, consensus was maintained that a community-service civic education programme is paramount to providing communities with an opportunity to gain civic knowledge on how the Government represents the purposes, values and principles of democracy. It would provide communities with skills such as critical thinking, information gathering and conflict resolution strategies to actively participate in the public life of the national community in an informed and constructive manner, with a focus on the common good.

³⁰ Constitution of the Democratic Republic of East Timor, Dili, Timor-Leste, 2002.

³¹ Working Group meeting in Dili, 22 December, 2010.

5.1.2. Legal Basis

Section 63.1 of Timor-Leste's Constitution stipulates that:

“Direct and active participation by men and women in political life is a requirement of, and a fundamental instrument for consolidating, the democratic system.”³²

While there have already been various civic education programmes implemented during the post-conflict period, most participants agreed that these programmes were not designed to specifically link an in-depth study of civic behaviour with active community involvement to foster civic responsibility and to directly expose local communities to norms and democratic practices of government.

A community-service civic education campaign could therefore be implemented as an educational programme to link a thorough understanding on the rights and duties of citizenship with active community involvement. The programme could employ participatory-action research with problem-based analyses in an effort to develop the skills necessary for communities to participate effectively in the country's democratization process.

Arguably, with the assistance of the UN and other international peace-building and development organisations, the democratisation process in Timor-Leste following independence has strongly focused on the institutional and functional components of post-conflict democratisation, with less regard for the promotion of national and social cohesion initiatives throughout the districts.³³ Given that these administrative and institutional initiatives have essentially involved power-driven processes located at the Centre, the establishment and consolidation of societal foundations and civic responsibility have remained largely unaddressed to date. Consequently, in light of the responses from National Working Group members and Focus Group Discussion participants, it would appear that any attempt to bring the wider public into a conversation about Timorese national identity and democratic principles following over 400 years of colonization and occupation has largely been ignored and/or unsuccessful, especially at the local level.

This is not to undermine the institutional, functional and electoral gains that the Timorese Government, UN and other external actors have contributed to the democratisation process in Timor-Leste, but rather to emphasize the importance of ownership and the promotion of a collective national identity through responsible citizenship and civic education initiatives.

³² Constitution of the Democratic Republic of East Timor, Dili, Timor-Leste, 2002.

³³ Selver B. Sahin, (2011), Building the nation in Timor-Leste and its implications for the country's democratic development, *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, 65:2, 220-242.

Similarly, National Working Group members also highlighted the need for a renewed emphasis on democracy as an ongoing process beyond initial political liberation. As one participant put it:

*"We have come out from a long and huge process of resisting the occupation, we have come with the idealism of thinking that independence is the final process when in fact we have just begun a new process with its own challenges."*³⁴

Focus Group Discussion participants and Working Group members also emphasized the need for a long-term approach beyond the period immediately prior to elections in the implementation of the civic education campaign. President José Ramos-Horta supported this notion, saying:

*"I agree and have always stood up for civic education to be a permanent action campaign and not a one-off programme with a one to three month duration just before the elections. A three to five year action campaign of civic education is needed until we have ensured the development of a democratic culture; a culture of peace and a non-violent culture – this is what I have always told UNMIT and the Electoral Commission. I certainly agree with the need to implement a permanent civic education campaign for the duration of at least three to five years; a civic education programme that is creative and attractive. There is a need to design a mechanism and incentive that is able to retain people's attention and interest in the programme and this requires taking a marketing approach to civic education."*³⁵

Participants agreed that such an initiative, when well designed and implemented, would help the general population to become responsible citizens and the government learn how to be accountable to its people in a modern democratic political regime. This would be an initiative deserving full political support and donor assistance to develop quality information resources on specific themes to help inform the Government, civil society organisations and donors supporting reform efforts.

With reference to similar campaigns by central governments in comparable post-conflict situations,³⁶ it is proposed that the content of the proposed civic education campaign include information regarding multiparty democracy and the separation of powers between the executive and the legislative branches. Special consideration should also be afforded to citizens' democratic rights *and* responsibilities, with particular emphasis on the interactive and participatory - as opposed to passive - role of citizens beyond national elections in

³⁴ Working Group meeting in Dili, 2 December 2010.

³⁵ Interview with President José Ramos-Horta, 3 October 2011.

³⁶ From 1995 – 1997, the Mozambiquen Government, in conjunction with USAID, launched a grassroots civic education campaign reaching over 265,000 citizens to equip citizens for future effective political participation following the country's first multiparty democratic elections in 1994. Similar civic education programs have also taken place in, among others, the Dominican Republic, Poland, Iraq, Republic of the Sudan and South Africa.

consolidating an effective democratic state system. To this degree, it is crucial that the curriculum include the impartation of both knowledge and skills; indeed, the recognition of basic social and political rights must be accompanied by participative democratic behaviour in order for the process of democracy and national cohesion to succeed.

Secretary-General of Fretilin, Mari Alkatiri, in support of the link between the establishment of a civic education campaign and the promotion of a collective Timorese national identity added:

“Sometimes we take civic education... as the basis for understanding the Constitution. It’s important for everyone to understand the meaning of citizenship. And what does it mean to be a citizen? Everyone understands that becoming a citizen is a constitutional and legal right... however nationalism and patriotism are not ensured by the law and therefore civic education is important for this purpose.”³⁷

To this degree, the permanent civic education campaign also has the potential to identify and consolidate a collective Timorese national identity through the promotion of responsible citizenship for the common good beyond political and social allegiances established through independence process. Indeed, while the subject matter of the permanent civic education campaign remains of utmost importance to the success of this initiative, failure to simultaneously promote a shared sense of Timorese national identity through the process may jeopardize the long-term objective of encouraging a stronger sense of national cohesion. In this sense, civic education provides a positive framework for collective identity and, as such, can act as a strong stabilizing factor in post-conflict societies.

Major-General of the Defence Force, Lere Anan Timor, reiterated this notion, remarking:

“Civic education in morals and ethics is a must; we must instil in the minds of our new generation the spirit of patriotism and nationalism... to this degree, a permanent civic education campaign is very important...”³⁸

Some participants also pointed out that the analysis-based information approach on the unfolding of the political and ethical challenges inherent in the post-conflict situation is underutilized in the ongoing transitional period. This fact has not helped key actors to obtain a better understanding of the current challenges to effectively engage in the policy development process, leaving both citizens and leaders operating outside the rules and regulations whenever this suits their respective interests.

³⁷ Interview with Secretary-General of Fretilin, Mari Alkatiri, 10 October 2011.

³⁸ Interview with Major-General Lere-Anan Timor, 10 November 2011.

As such, it is suggested that civic points of reference be created in all of the country's 13 districts to help provide Timorese with the civic awareness required for becoming responsible citizens and for participating effectively in democracy. This is expected to promote the active participation of community members in the political process at the local level, which subsequently provides local communities with the opportunity to learn public policies and how the policies are formulated or influenced.

The implementation of a civic education campaign therefore has the potential to challenge political clientelism, government malpractice and the politics of exclusion at its core through the establishment and dissemination of agreed-upon 'ground rules' of acceptable (and unacceptable) democratic behaviour. Citizens will then be empowered to hold their elected government and state representatives accountable to a minimum standard of ethical social and political behaviour, which has the potential to narrow the perceived discrepancy between the idealized and actual experiences of democracy in Timor-Leste.

5.2. Recommendation 2: An Independent Society of Ethics

The establishment of an independent society of ethics to create public awareness on the need for ethical behaviour and integrity in public office is also recommended. The development of an ethics curriculum would be important for training purposes to promote accepted standards of professional responsibility so as to ensure vertical accountability between the political power structure and citizens, as well horizontal accountability between components of the state power structure.

The practice of political clientelism has dominated post-conflict state-society relations, undermining any form of meaningful public participation in political processes other than in the period immediately surrounding elections. Political clientelism in Timor-Leste, coupled with widespread poverty and the country's ever-present history of the resistance and occupation, has contributed to a society where citizens as dependent clients have lost their autonomy and the political leaders acting as patrons have weakened their hierarchical power authority in the eyes of their clients. Consequently, both the leadership and ordinary citizens are ill-prepared and unable to distinguish the unethical and illegal distribution of political power from the ethical and lawful.

5.2. 1. Justification

It was highly consensual among members of the National Working Group that it is unethical to ignore the sacrifices made by so many citizens during the struggle for independence due to the interests of a small group in wanting to accumulate power and material wealth to the detriment of the interests of the majority.

As one participant representing the Catholic church in the National Working Group discussions noted:

*"We have failed to value the collective sacrifice made by the people of this country to ensure the country's independence... we have simply neglected our ethics and moral values during the post-conflict period. Had we valued our collective sacrifice we would have prioritised national interest for the common good."*³⁹

In this case it is important to remember that while the democratisation process in Timor-Leste thus far has prioritised the institutional, functional and procedural dimensions of democracy as a strategy for conflict resolution, less attention has been afforded to the relationship between democracy, national cohesion and nation-building for the common good.⁴⁰

Consequently, Selver B. Sahin describes 'nation-building' in Timor-Leste as an essentially indigenous process requiring,

*"...the construction of a shared collective identity which would culturally and politically unite diverse ethno-linguistic and socio-political groups beyond the narrative of five centuries of heroic funu ('struggle' in Tetum) against malae ('foreigner') domination."*⁴¹

To reiterate this point, National Working Group members strongly agreed that the interests of a minority of individuals who are politically well-connected and positioned are secured and favoured over the interest of the poorer majority by and through the practice of patronage and political clientelism. As a result, Timor-Leste's post-conflict society seems to be structured by a set of informal clientelistic institutions labelled by National Working Group members as *"aman-oan sarani,"* literally meaning "god father-god son." This phenomenon describes a patron-client relationship combining the politics of personal rule or "big brother/sister" and clientelistic practices, which have subsequently given way to the formation of a political elite whose interest is well secured to the detriment of the interests of the majority.

As a representative of the Institute of Dialectic Studies remarked:

*"Individuals when holding positions of power tend to create their own network of family and friends as their base to retain the political support needed... this ultimately leads to promoting the individual and group interests over the national interest."*⁴²

³⁹ Working Group meeting in Dili, 2 December, 2010.

⁴⁰ Selver B. Sahin, 2011, loc cit.

⁴¹ Ibid, p. 227 (9).

⁴² Working Group meeting in Dili, 2 December, 2010.

Although some aspects of poor governance in the form of unaccountable political decisions have been addressed at the institutional level, the majority of Focus Group Discussion participants agreed with members of the National Working Group that most of the issues and factors identified and discussed were too politically sensitive, and as such there were yet substantial programmes in place with the capacity to analytically deal with these difficult political challenges from the bottom-up.

As the President of the National Working Group put it:

*"... [In the actual political situation] the interest of one person can easily become the interest of the majority and the wishes of one person can be forced to become the wishes of the majority... history as a collective effort in the context of historical movements and narratives is used for promoting the individual and group interests to the detriment of the interest of the majority, thus excluding many others and creating widespread discontentment."*⁴³

The practices of political clientelism, as seen elsewhere, have the potential to reduce citizens to dependent clients of poor public administration.⁴⁴ Democracy in a post-conflict context should be above all viewed and practiced as a system of interaction between ordinary citizens and their leaders on issues relevant to ensuring good governance in the country. In Timor-Leste, however, as one participant observed:

*"... as long as former revolutionary leaders remain in power, the enforcement of the law will be ineffective as they will do what they wish because they are the law ... and citizens will simply mimic the behaviour of their leaders... History as it is told, and incomplete as it is, has given advantage to one, two or three individuals only as historical leaders with full privileges to justify their actions - some of which are not permissible... In fact our war history had started with 'Liu rais' or traditional petty-kings long before 1975... However as the events of 1974-1975 and beyond became the focus of our contemporary history, this has ultimately given one, two or three individuals the full historical advantage to claim ownership over historical narratives and symbols... and this has left us unable to say otherwise."*⁴⁵

5.2.2. Legal basis

Timor-Leste's Constitution provides the legal framework for the establishment of state institutions in support of good governance. There was a strong consensus among participants of Focus Group Discussions consulted countrywide that while the nature and substance of this recommendation is not in contradiction with the country's Constitution,

43 Working Group meeting in Dili, 2 December, 2010.

44 Mwenda, Andrew M. & Roger Tangri, (2005), "Patronage politics, donor reforms and regime consolidation in Uganda," *African Affairs*, 104/416, pp. 449-467.

45 Working Group meeting in Dili, 2 December, 2010.

the establishment of an autonomous society of ethics needs to be instituted by law with clear mandates, as its overall main objective would be to regulate the public administration and to hold members of the formal political power structure accountable to the public.

The proposed rationale behind the establishment of an independent society of ethics is thus two-fold. Firstly, the body will seek to educate and guide citizens to engage in ethical and honest political and social behaviour. Secondly, the body will have the mandate to regulate public administration practices through the implementation of, and adherence to, new legal guidelines based on agreed standards of integrity and transparency for public office.

Some participants added that for this autonomous body to be effective, it would also require a comprehensive mandate with adequate funding and human resources as well as strong political support. Institutional networks could be contemplated in order to associate such a body with law enforcement institutions as the Prosecutor General, the Ombudsman, the Inspector-General, the Judiciary, National Police, the Anti-Corruption Commission and lawyers. As such, these institutional linkages would have a domino effect on law enforcement departments in breaking the cycle of impunity.

As a strictly independent body with strong political support, this initiative, in conjunction with the first recommendation, has the potential for government officials and public servants alike to regain the trust of the Timorese people through inclusive practices which provide citizens with the opportunity to engage in the democratisation process across all levels of governance.

While executive and legislative support is necessary for the success of the initiative, consensus has not been reached by the National Working Group and Focus Group Discussion participants on the body's source of funding. More specifically, some participants expressed concern that Government funding to support the implementation of this recommendation may result in a significant conflict of interest with the potential to jeopardize the overall proposal.

Nevertheless, as a participant in the Focus Group Discussion in Lautem remarked:

"I want to underline the need for State-based legitimacy as opposed to Government-based legitimacy. A Government's political power is election-based, and therefore limited, and its support may change according to changes in policy by the political party to be in power next.

A new political party in power may contradict the policy of the Government of the day and thus the legitimacy of the recommendation. State granted legitimacy, however, once ensured, will remain even if the Government of the day changes... and when this is the case, a degree of independence is already ensured. Therefore, it does not matter if the funds come

from donors or the Government or the international community because of the supremacy of State legitimacy.”⁴⁶

Some participants, while agreeing with the importance of such an institution, questioned the effectiveness of its implementation and function as there is the potential for such a body to overlap with the work of the existing Office of the Ombudsman for Human Rights and Justice,⁴⁷ Office of the Inspector General⁴⁸ and the Anti-Corruption Commission in promoting ‘good governance,’⁴⁹ unless the nature of its mandate and function are to be clearly designed to make a difference.

Others, like the Remexio Sub-District Administrator, maintained the importance of such a recommendation, saying that:

“... This recommendation is very important ... to help develop this country. Important because to-date the Government has established various commissions including the Ombudsman and the Anti-Corruption Commission as well as an Inspector General to audit each Ministry to ensure the effective implementation of the State’s budget, but we are yet to see any positive progress in this.”⁵⁰

Indeed, even with the implementation of these so-called legislative “checks and balances,” the misappropriation of public resources is still perceived as widespread. In 2011, Timor-Leste ranked 143 out of 183 countries on Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index, slipping significantly from its position of 125 the previous year.⁵¹

⁴⁶ Focus Group Discussion in Lautem, 27 June 2011.

⁴⁷ The Office of the Ombudsman for Human Rights and Justice is an independent institution reporting directly to the National Parliament. In April 2004 the National Parliament enacted Law No. 7/2004, “Approving the Statute of the Office of the Ombudsman for Human Rights and Justice,” which came into force on 26 May 2004. On 16 June 2005, the National Parliament appointed a Provedor as the first holder of the Office and in early July 2005, the appointment of two deputies followed (one focusing on Human Rights and Justice, and another on Good Governance and Anti- Corruption). In March 2006 the Office of the Ombudsman for Human Rights and Justice became functional. With the creation of the Anti-Corruption Commission on 15 July 2009, the role of the Ombudsman to combat corruption was fully revoked and its mandate is now solely to promote and protect human rights and good governance.

⁴⁸ The Office of the Inspector General is the “Government’s body for controlling and supervising Public Administration, and is responsible for controlling the good management of financial, budget and material resources in the services of Public Administration.” Working directly under the Prime Minister, the Statute for the Office of the Inspector-General was approved on 10 June 2009 under Decree-Law 22/2009 to “exercise control in the fields of budget, economic, financial, patrimonial, material resource and human resource discipline, in accordance with the principles of legality, regularity and good financial management, thereby contributing to the legality, economy, effectiveness and efficiency of Public Administration activities.”

⁴⁹ The Anti-Corruption Commission was established with the enactment of Law No. 8/2009 on 15 July 2009 by the National Parliament, with a twofold mission: 1) to undertake preventive action against corruption, and 2) to undertake criminal investigation against cases of corruption. On 22 February 2010 the Anti-Corruption Commission became functional when the National Parliament appointed a Commissioner who was sworn in and took office on the same day.

⁵⁰ Focus Group Discussion in Aileu, 23 May 2011.

⁵¹ Based on aggregate data from 13 institutions, including the Asian Development Bank, Global Insight, World Bank and World Economic Forum, the index seeks to measure perceived levels of public sector corruption on a scale of 0 - 10, where 0 indicates that a country is perceived as highly corrupt and 10 signifies that a country is perceived as ‘very clean.’ With a score of 2.4 in 2011, which is slightly worse than a score of 2.5 in 2010, Timor-Leste’s ranking has slipped significantly from its previous ranking, when it ranked 125 out of 178. Notably, this decline now puts it on par with oil exporters Azerbaijan,

Moreover, the number of cases transferred from these offices to, and processed by, the General Prosecutor's Office remains arguably low compared to the overall number of cases reported.⁵²

This is to suggest that the linear progression of cases reported and prosecuted between the Ombudsman, Inspector General, Anti-Corruption Commission and the General Prosecutor's Office does not facilitate a vertical and horizontal approach to the promotion of democratic behaviour in Timor-Leste. While these offices play an essential role in any functioning democratic society, the results from this research indicate that these reactionary measures do not proactively encourage responsible and ethical citizenship behaviour, but rather function as investigative and prosecutable deterrents after the fact.

When interviewed, the Ombudsman, Sebastião Dias Ximenes, remarked that the main challenge faced by the Office of the Ombudsman is to compel respective institutions and authorities to take adequate measures and action against referred cases following full investigations:

*"...of the total of 170 cases we have fully investigated and referred to respective competent institutions and authorities for action - where some of these cases, for instance, were related to mal-administration, irregularities, injustice and discrimination – however, to-date no action has been taken against most of the referred cases and the authorities concerned in fact have gone quiet about those cases – this is our major challenge."*⁵³

As the 2012 General Elections approach, Prime Minister Xanana Gusmão has called on the Anti-Corruption Commission to investigate government officials on corruption with the objective to show transparency and accountability concerning the current Government's working results:

Mauritania, Russia and Nigeria, who also rank worse than 78% of the countries in the report. Transparency International, 2011, Corruption Perceptions Index, accessed online at < <http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi2011/results/>>

52 When asked about the number of cases the Office of the Ombudsman has received since March 2006, the Ombudsman confirmed that as of 20 September 2011, there was a total of 1,280 complaints registered with the Office. Of these, over 700 were related to maladministration, over 400 concerned human rights violations and, until 2007, over 90 were related to corruption. After full investigations, a total of 170 out of 1,280 complaints were compiled and forwarded to the respective institutions, including the Public Prosecutor's Office, the Police, the Army and individual Ministries for action. In 2010 alone, of the 51 newly reported cases to the Office of the Ombudsman for Human Rights and Justice against maladministration, only three were processed. Similarly, only one third (21) of the 63 new cases reported to the Office of the Inspector General's office in 2010 were processed. United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT), Monthly Governance Report April 2011 prepared by the Democratic Governance Support Unit-DGSU, Dili, Timor-Leste. Report published on 18 May 2011 and accessed on 18 October 2011 at

<http://unmit.unmissions.org/Portals/UNMIT/DGSU/Monthly%20Governance%20Report_April%202011_English.pdf>

As of 2011, CAC has received 60 cases, of which 18 have been fully investigated as related to corruption and the remainder have been linked to maladministration and neglect. Six of the 18 cases of corruption have been referred to the Public Prosecutor's Office under the terms of criminal procedural law. When asked if criminal proceedings will be brought against those six cases, the Deputy Commissioner for the Prosecutor's Office, Manuel Bucar, remarked that the role of the Commission, as per its mandate, is to undertake full investigations only, where criminal prosecution of the cases falls under the jurisdiction of the Public Prosecutor's Office. Interview with the Deputy Commissioner for Prevention of Corruption, Manuel Bucar in Dili on 6 September 2011.

53 Interview with the Ombudsman, Sebastião Dias Ximenes, at the Office of the Ombudsman in Dili on 20 September 2011.

*"It is important for the Anti-Corruption Commission to investigate the wealth of members of the Parliamentary Majority Alliance (AMP) Government... the current Government should not leave the problems to a new Government. Therefore, it is important for the Anti-Corruption Commission to investigate the wealth of all government officials when the AMP Government ends. The Anti-Corruption Commission should be well-prepared to investigate all the Government officials and me, when the AMP's mandate ends."*⁵⁴

Having interviewed the Deputy Commissioner, Mr. Manuel Bucar, over the scope of the Anti-Corruption Commission, he responded that:

*"...it is the duty and competence of the Commission to investigate any citizen against corruption, regardless of who the person is or what position s/he occupies in the public administration."*⁵⁵

Other participants, in support of the formation of an advocacy coalition, pointed out that such recommendations were long overdue. Participants agreed that the current lack of donor-assisted programmes in addressing these kinds of challenges is largely due to a shortage of information through sound problem-based analyses, taking into account the local historical and political factors both during the period of resistance and occupation and the post-conflict era. Participants maintained that certain political actions, while important in a particular period of conflict, can be harmful to efforts of democratic consolidation in the post-independence period.

Similar initiatives have already received marked success in comparable post-conflict situations. In the east-African state of Burundi, the Observatory for Government Action (OAG) was established in 1999 as an independent mechanism for monitoring government actions and commitments in the social, economic and political sectors. OAG represents a network of several local civil society organisations in Burundi, in addition to six journalists and six members of parliament, with a mandate to contribute to the improvement of good governance and government transparency through objective and rigorous information sharing in the public sphere. Similar initiatives have also been undertaken by governments in the Republic of Iraq and the Republic of Uganda to combine civic education campaigns with public administration accountability measures as initiatives to promote and uphold integrity by both citizens and public servants in the public space.⁵⁶

⁵⁴ Journal Indépendante, August 9, 2011, Language source: Tetun

⁵⁵ A Working Group will be established to address the issue of KKN (Corruption, collusion and Nepotism) one of the four priorities identified by the 2009 National Forum as already mentioned above. The issue of corruption is mentioned here in relation to the recommendation made by the Working Group on the establishment of an Autonomous Society of Ethics if this would overlap with the mission and vision of the Commission.

⁵⁶ The Iraqi Commission on Integrity (Col) was established in 2004 as an independent commission within the Government to promote and advance transparent and accountable government through public education and awareness programs. Similarly, the Ugandan Government established the Directorate for Ethics & Integrity (DEI) in 1998 to develop policies in the fight against corruption, with an additional mandate to rebuild ethics and integrity in Ugandan society.

While acknowledging some concerns about institutionalizing an additional state body to address practices of political clientelism and elitism, there was nevertheless a strong consensus that an independent society of ethics could prove a useful means to proactively engage in the discussion and implementation of ethical social and political behaviour within the public sector as a means to compliment the reactionary “checks and balances” already in place.

6.0 Group Promoting Change (GPC) – Outcomes of the Second National Forum

“To make a just, decent society a reality, social justice advocates must meet the on-going challenge of how to be heard so that those who hold power listen and respond. Otherwise, ideas and issues will not be addressed, necessary changes will not be created, society will not be transformed.”⁵⁷

In conjunction with Interpeace, CEPAD convened PRDP’s Second National Forum on 25 November 2011 on the first priority issue of the *promotion of individual and party interests over the national interest*.

National Working Group members presented the research findings outlined in this report to key stakeholders at the event to discuss and debate the two recommendations for enactment into policy. Some 120 participants attended the conference, including representatives from the Government, private sector, civil society and religious organisations, youth, academia and political parties. Importantly, representatives from Timor-Leste’s 13 districts also attended the event in an effort to compress the vertical political space between decision-makers in the capital, Dili, and Timor-Leste’s rural population.

Opening keynote speakers included Dr. José Ramos-Horta, President of the Republic; Mari Alkatiri, Secretary-General of Fretilin; Lere Anan Timor, Major-General of the Timor-Leste Defence Force (F-FDTL); Cristiano da Costa, CEPAD Board President; and Afonso de Jesus, CEPAD Board Member and Deputy Commissioner of the Timor-Leste National Police (PNTL).

To close formal ceremonies, Dr. Aurelio Guterres, Rector of the Timor-Leste National University (UNTL); Kai Sauer, Finnish Ambassador to Indonesia, Timor-Leste and ASEAN; and Jerry McCann, Deputy Director-General of Interpeace, also offered their remarks on both the importance of the PRDP process and need for further articulation of these recommendations going forward.

⁵⁷ Cohen, David; de la Vega, Rosa, and Watson, 2001. *Advocacy for Social Justice: A Global Action and Reflection Guide*, P. 9. Kumarian Press, Inc., Connecticut, USA.

The objectives of the Second National Forum were two-fold: firstly, to present the findings from the overall research process on this priority issue, as outlined in this Working Group Report, to participants for discussion and validation; and secondly, to identify potential avenues and strategies, including the **'how'** and **'who,'** required to implement the two recommendations.

Participants at the Second National Forum were actively engaged in the discussion on the justification and legal basis for both recommendations, with the primary objective to bring members from various sectors within Timorese society into an inclusive dialogue on strategies for the consolidation of peace and democracy in Timor-Leste. The content and validity of the research were enthusiastically discussed, with participants gaining strong ownership over the process.

In accordance with the findings of this report, participants prioritized both **political clientelism** and the **politics of exclusion** as key factors contributing to the nationalization of political and individual agendas and overall poor transparency and accountability within the public administration. Moreover, participants pointed towards the perceived degradation of ethics, political egotism and opportunism as associated factors inhibiting the due political and administrative process and subsequently contributing to greater distrust in the public administration. Overwhelmingly, participants at the Second National Forum agreed with the findings of the countrywide consultation process that, due to these factors, Timorese society had failed to value the collective sacrifice of independence in the post-independence period.

The Second National Forum concluded with participants unanimously supporting the research findings and recommendations put forward in this Working Group Report. General consensus among participants at this event strongly reflected those consulted countrywide throughout the research process and were in agreement that taking the recommendations forward would require the formation of a so-called **Group Promoting Change** to persuade key decision-makers to adopt and implement the proposed recommendations.

To summarize the positions put forward by participants at the plenary session, CEPAD Executive Director João Boavida remarked,

*"We can all agree at this plenary session that in order to respond to the negative consequences from ' individual and party interests over the national interest,' there is a critical need to establish a Group Promoting Change, which will be formed with a clear structure and implementation strategy. This implementation strategy must include consideration on the mechanisms and composition of the Group Promoting Change in order to take these two recommendations forward."*⁵⁸

⁵⁸ CEPAD Executive Director, Joao Boavida, 25 November, 2011, Second National Forum, Dili.

6.1 The Way Forward - How

Acting as an advocacy coalition, the Group Promoting Change (GPC) would be responsible for ensuring the sound implementation of the two recommendations at both the national and district levels.

*"...[promoting change requires] a series of actions designed to persuade and influence those who hold governmental, political, or economic power so that they will adopt and implement public policies in ways that **benefit those with less political power and fewer economic resources**."*⁵⁹

Implementation strategies vary widely and, as such, will require further articulation by members of the GPC. Nevertheless, participants at the Second National Forum, like those throughout the entirety of the research process, reiterated that in order for the implementation of the two recommendations to be successful, this process must be facilitated by CEPAD within the overall PRDP program through the ongoing consultation with local communities.

As one participant noted,

*"...forming a [GPC] based on these two recommendations without going through CEPAD would not be effective ... this would be like establishing an institution by starting the process from zero. However, on the other hand, CEPAD has consolidated its programme over a long time and is prepared. Therefore, CEPAD should accompany and facilitate this initiative in the establishment of the [GPC]."*⁶⁰

The implementation process will certainly require **active communication and cooperation** between CEPAD and members of the GPC with their respective institutions in order to ensure an inclusive advocacy coalition that is representative and legitimate in its approach.

Participants at the Second National Forum also reiterated that, in order to be successful, a set of guidelines agreed upon by all GPC members would be necessary to facilitate the implementation process.⁶¹ For this purpose, clarification of the GPC's specific objectives and structure could be articulated through the definition of an organizational mandate.

⁵⁹ Mansfield, Christian; MacLwod, Kurt; Greenleaf, Maron; & Alexander, Poppy; 2003. Advocacy Handbook: A practical Guide to Increasing Democracy in Cambodia, Pact Cambodia, Phnom Penh, Cambodia, p. 2.

⁶⁰ Participant, 25 November, 2011, Second National Forum, Dili.

⁶¹ CEPAD, February 2012, Report on the Second National Forum on the Promotion of Individual and Party Interests over the National Interest, Dili, Timor-Leste.

Similarly, it is also integral that any strategy put forward is designed according to the current socio-political context within which issues regarding the *promotion of individual and party interests over the national interest* is framed.

In terms of identifying adequate sources of funding, some participants at the Second National Forum reiterated that the implementation of both initiatives needs to be undertaken with financial support from the Government, due to the fact that these policy recommendations would be designed to directly complement its overall role in the formation and implementation of public policy. Nevertheless, participants stressed that in order for these two initiatives to remain fully independent from Government influence and intervention, both must receive direct approval from, and submit independent financial reports to, the National Parliament.

As one participant from Oecussi noted,

*"..This initiative is good for all Timorese, as well as good for the Government... the money belongs to the people, therefore the Government has the duty to fund [these initiatives]. However, funding should not come from the Ministry of Finance... but rather funding should be directly approved by the National Parliament in order to remove any pressure, political pressure."*⁶²

6.2 The Way Forward – Who

Participants maintained that the formation of the GPC requires reinforcement through the integration of selected members from interest groups and advocates who are in direct contact with decision-makers. Participants also highlighted the need for GPC members to share the same interest in the issue and have extensive experience in policy engagement and reform strategies.

In agreement with the inclusive strategy of the two recommendations to facilitate access to governance structures at the local and national levels, it was also suggested that representatives from each district also work closely with CEPAD through PRDP to emphasize the importance of a bottom-up approach in the implementation of both recommendations.⁶³

The inclusion of high-level decision-makers at the national level is also imperative to ensuring that the recommendations put forward in this report do not remain within the immediate sphere of responsibility of civil society organizations.

⁶² Participant, 25 November, 2011, Second National Forum, Dili.

⁶³ CEPAD, February 2012, Report on the Second National Forum on the Promotion of Individual and Party Interests over the National Interest, Dili, Timor-Leste.

More specifically, in identifying *who* would be responsible for ensuring the necessary political will and legislative weighting behind this process, participants at the Second National Forum put forward positions within the four sovereign bodies, including the President of the Republic, Prime Minister and President of the National Parliament, as key actors to involve in taking the recommendations forward.

In support of this opinion, one Sub-Working Group facilitator at the Second National Forum noted,

“Today our group decided together that the names put forward here, and publicly read out to the audience for everyone to hear, was only done with the objective that the names of the people mentioned be heard by everyone... We did this so that when we begin to lobby representatives in the Parliament, or in the Government, people will provide support to them, and listen to them, no matter what level of power they represent.”⁶⁴

To this degree, the task of persuading prominent decision-makers should be facilitated by individuals and representatives from key institutions sitting as members in the GPC to advance evidence-informed decisions based on contextual empirical and normative knowledge.

The rationale behind this approach is grounded in the supposition that experts possess the knowledge and skills to not only ensure that the policy positions put forward are both factual and implementable, but also to lend credibility to the GPC’s research and objectives.

7.0 Mandate

Participants reiterated the importance of a **permanent civic education campaign** as an instructive means to promote citizen participation across governing structures at all levels. The intended campaign would be designed to foster a greater understanding of democratic principles in Timor-Leste, while simultaneously helping to identify and strengthen Timorese national and state cohesion in the post-independence period.

As one participant remarked,

“Civic education is required to educate the people on how to be human. With these recommendations we can adequately respond to the promotion of individual [and political parties’] interests over the national interest... Now, if a person receives thorough education in this, then s/he should have the awareness to work for the collective interest.”⁶⁵

⁶⁴ Participant, 25 November, 2011, Second National Forum, Dili.

⁶⁵ Participant, 25 November, 2011, Second National Forum, Dili.

On the formation of an **independent society of ethics**, participants confirmed that such an approach would prove both adequate and justified in improving public awareness on the need for professional responsibility and integrity in public office. It is anticipated that this initiative would act as both educator and guarantor of a minimum standard of political and social behaviour within Timorese society. Ideally, the independent society of ethics would complement the first recommendation with a mandate to provide citizens with the opportunity to discuss and put forward community issues across all governance structures.

“... This Independent Society of Ethics needs to be established in order to assist public servants to know their roles and obligations; to know how to follow the existing rules and laws as they carry out their day-to-day tasks.”⁶⁶

Given that the democratisation process in post-independence Timor-Leste has largely constituted a power-driven process by political elites and international actors thus far,⁶⁷ this approach seeks to promote access by all citizens to democratic power structures and practices, while simultaneously fostering a stronger sense of Timorese national identity.

Moreover, it is anticipated that the proposed recommendations, when well designed and implemented, will contribute to creating an environment in which civil society is active and knowledgeable of its economic, social and cultural rights and can monitor and hold the Government accountable.

While participants at the Second National Forum reiterated the importance of the two recommendations during the Plenary Session, they also expressed their concern over the implementation process of the two recommendations, and put forward a strong desire for PRDP’s research and recommendations to be more than mere ‘talk.’

As Rector of the Timor-Leste National University Dr. Aurelio Guterres noted,

“... this work here must not only be put forward as a report, but rather you must continue to have more meetings to further discuss and think about how these recommendations will be made a reality; to think about how this research will become concrete action.”⁶⁸


Moreover, participants at the Second National Forum provided CEPAD with a new mandate to facilitate the formation of an advocacy commission, or so-called **“Group Promoting Change”** to mark the first step in taking the recommendations forward for implementation as policy at the national and district levels.

⁶⁶ Participant, 25 November, 2011, Second National Forum, Dili.

⁶⁷ Sahin, S.B., Ibid.

⁶⁸ Dr. Aurelio Guterres, UNTL Rector, 25 November, 2011, Second National Forum, Dili.

Diagram 3: PRPD and the implementation process



8.0. Conclusion

The results of research undertaken across the country on the issue of the *promotion of individual and party interests over the national interest* conclude that the current status quo of patronage and political clientelism in Timor-Leste strongly inhibits the consolidation of democracy in the post-independence period.

Working Group and Focus Group Discussion participants, in addition to attendees at the Second National Forum, reiterated that mechanical and institutional “checks and balances” established thus far have failed to adequately ensure the redistribution of political power and Government resources following independence beyond the sphere of a number of well-connected individuals. More specifically, participants cited the misunderstood concept of democracy among both citizens and public servants, the abuse of power and political clientelism, as inherent impediments to the democratisation process.

Prior to the Second National Forum, Working Group members and Focus Group Discussion participants reached a strong consensus on the formulation of two recommendations to be further developed and debated with key stake-holders at the national level.

These two recommendations were identified in an effort to address the current “gap” in both research and policy on responsible citizenship and good governance in Timor-Leste.

Subsequently, participants at the Second National Forum unanimously accepted the two recommendations for the establishment of a **permanent civic education campaign** and the formation of an **independent society of ethics**. Moreover, participants at the Second National Forum also provided **CEPAD with a new mandate to facilitate the formation of an advocacy commission, or so-called “Group Promoting Change” to mark the first step in taking the recommendations forward for implementation as policy at the national and district levels.**

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10.0. Annexes

Annex 1: Selection Criteria of Participants

Based on PRDP's experience, the following are criteria considered for selection of participants in the programme activities:

- Integrity and high respect from the community
- Representation of all groups (political, religious, social, economic, geographic, etc.)
- Personal qualities (ability to set aside personal interests and agendas)
- Acceptance
- Representation from women, youth, elders, religious leaders and minority groups/clans.

A more detailed analysis for participant selection is also used in the context of the programme's different activities, whether at the local or urban levels.

Criteria	DISTRICTS												
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13
REPRESENTATIVES													
Formal Structures													
Government Executives													
Judges													
(MPs)													
District Administrator													
Sub district Administrator													
Xefe de Suco													
Sub-Total													
Informal Structures													
Martial Arts Members													
Council of Elders													
Youth													
Women													
Sub-Total													
Security Forces													
PNTL													
F-FDTL													
UNPOL													
Sub-Total													
Religious Heads													
Parish Priest													
Bishops													
Sub-Total													
INCLUSIVENESS													
Gender													
M													
F													
Sub-Total													

Age														
Youth														
Middle Age														
Elders														
Sub-Total														
Religion														
Catholic														
Other Christian Denominations														
Muslim														
Sub-Total														
Socio-Economic Status														
(Higher status in Community)														
(Medium)														
(Lower)														
Sub-Total														
Level of Education														
(Post Grad)														
(High School)														
Illiterate														
Sub-Total														
Political Affiliation														
UNDERTIM														
ASDT-PSD, CNRT, PD = AMP														
FRETILIN														
PUN														
AD-KOTA-PPT														
CPD-RDTL														
Sub-Total														
Employment background														
Teachers														
(Politicians)														
Farmers														
Business people														
(Civil Servants)														
NGO workers														
Retired														
(Unemployed)														
Sub-Total														
Observers (UN, INGOs, Donors, Embassies)														
National														
International														
Sub-Total														
TOTAL														

Annex 2: List of interview participants

No.	Name	Position	Organization	District	Gender
1	Cornelio da Conceição Gama	Veteran/ President of Political Bench	UNDERTIM, Political party	Dili	Male
2	Afonso de Jesus	Vice Commander	PNTL	Dili	Male
3	Lere Anan Timor	Major-General	F-FDTL	Dili	Male
4	Manuel Bucar	Commissioner	Anti-Corruption Commission	Dili	Male
5	Sebastião Dias Ximenes	Director	PDHJ	Dili	Male
6	Mari Bin Amude Alkatiri	Secretary General	Fretilin	Dili	Male
7	Don Basilio do Nascimento	Baucau Diocese Bishop	Catholic Church	Dili	Male
8	Dr. José Manuel Ramos Horta	President of the Republic	RDTL	Dili	Male
9	Fernanda Mesquita Borges	President	PUN political party	Dili	Female
10	Estanislau Saldanha	Dean	DIT University	Dili	Male
11	Leovilgido Hornai	Director	CNJTL	Dili	Male
12	Nelson Belo	Director	NGO, Fundasaun Mahaein	Dili	Male
13	Josefa Soares	President	Women's Parliamentary Group	Dili	Female
14	Mercio Akara	Director	NGO, Luta Hamutuk	Dili	Male
15	Eduardo Barreto	President of the Political Bench	CNRT, Political Party	Dili	Male
16	Joaninha Doutel Sarmento	Women's representative	NGO, Caucaus	Aileu	Female
17	Tomas Mendonca	Village-head	Local community	Aileu	Male
18	Manuel T. Magalhaes	Youth representative	Local community	Aileu	Male
19	Maria Verdial	Director	NGO, Fundasaun Moris Foun	Maliana	Female
20	Maria Soares de Jesus Rosa	Village-head	Local community	Maliana	Female
21	Salamão da Cruz	Village-head	Local community	Maliana	Male
22	Sabino Araujo Soares	Chief of Operations	PNTL	Maliana	Male
23	Olivio Freitas	Staff member	NGO, Kailalu	Baucau	Male
24	Justino de Sousa	Priest	Catholic Church	Baucau	Male
25	Domingas da Costa Fatima Belo	Women's representative	Local community	Baucau	Female
26	Francisco da costa Lemos	Head of Bauoli Community	Local community	Baucau	Male
27	Luis Aparicio Guterres	Former Baucau District Administrator	Local Government	Baucau	Male
28	Januario Joaquim Soares	Party member	Fretilin	Baucau	Male
29	Olga Matilda da Costa	Director	NGO, Kolega da Paz	Baucau	Female
30	Kamis Miguel Mendonça	Chief of Community Police	PNTL	Baucau	Male
31	Sergio Gusmão de Freitas Belo	President	Ritual Arts	Baucau	Male
32	Aquelina Maria	Gender Focal Point	Local community	Ermera	Female

	Guterres				
33	Marcos Soares Martins	Representative	CNRT	Ermera	Male
34	Carlos Martins Soares	Youth Councillor	Youth	Ermera	Male
35	João de Jesus	Representative	PNTL	Ermera	Male
36	Herminha Sarmiento	OPMT Coordinator; Women's representative	Local community	Liquiça	Female
37	Oscar da Silva	Village-head	Local community	Liquiça	Male
38	Maria Antonia de Jesus	Party member	Political party	Liquiça	Female
39	Grigorio N.M. Santos	Representative	Fretilin	Liquiça	Male
40	Anibal R.P. da Graça	Commander	PNTL	Liquiça	Male
41	José Menezes Nunes Serão	Sub-district Government Official	Local Government	Liquiça	Male
42	Rafael Alves Pereira	Representative	IKS, Martial Arts	Liquiça	Male
43	Apolinario Serpa Rosa	School inspector	Education	Lautem	Male
44	Regina de Jesus Ribeiro	Land and Property Unit Representative	Local Government	Lautem	Female
45	António da Fonseca	Village-head	Local community	Lautem	Male
46	Julio Maria de Jesus Canto	Lautem District Secretary	Local Government	Lautem	Male
47	Luis dos Santos Maubono	Coordinator	CNRT	Lautem	Male
48	Aurelio Freitas Ribeiro	Coordinator	Fretilin	Lautem	Male
49	Eugenia Neves da Costa	Victims of 1974-1999 group representative	Victims	Manatuto	Female
50	Clara Ximenes	Women's representative	Local community	Manatuto	Female
51	Simão Ximenes	Party District Coordinator	Fretilin	Manatuto	Male
52	Juliana Henrique de Sousa Boavida Soares	Teacher	Education	Manatuto	Female
53	Hugo Pereira	Teacher	Education	Manatuto	Male
54	Adelino Soares	Village-head	Local community	Manatuto	Male
55	Manuel Soares	Party Secretary General	PD	Manatuto	Male
56	Belarmino Soares Lopes	District Coordinator	UNDERTIM	Manatuto	Male
57	Emidio Amaral	Vice Parish Priest	Catholic church	Viqueque	Male
58	Daniel Sarmiento	Veterans District President	Veterans	Viqueque	Male
59	Veronica Belo	Director	CFS, NGO	Viqueque	Female
60	Alberto Soares	OPL representative	Local Government	Viqueque	Male
61	Evaresto S.	Parish Priest	Catholic church	Ainaro	Male
62	Filomena B. Magno	District Director	Education	Ainaro	Female
63	Cancio da C. Sina	ASD Hatudo Sub-district Administrator	Government	Ainaro	Male
64	Manuel A. Martins	District Coordinator	Fretlin	Ainaro	Male
65	Vitorino do Carmo	ASD	Government	Covalima	Male
66	Francisco D. Luan	Staff member	PNTL	Covalima	Male
67	Cariana Elsa Barreto Amaral	Housewife	Local community	Covalima	Female

68	Francisco Gusmao	Coordinator	PSHT, Martial arts	Covalima	Male
69	Antoninho D. Sarmiento	Coordinator	RMD	Same	Male
70	Julio Guterres	Reporter	Media	Same	Male
71	Joao da Costa	Vice District Commander	PNTL	Same	Male
72	Florindo da Conceicao	Local Government Official	Government	Same	Male
73	Natalia CIS	Nun	CIS	Same	Female
74	Isabel Cepeda Costa	Women's representative	Local community	Same	Female
75	Suni Arnaldo	Youth Counsellor	Local community	Oecusse	Male
76	Arnaldo Sombico	Traditional leader	Local community	Oecusse	Male
77	Jose Antonio S. Martins	CPA and Fretilin member	Political party	Oecusse	Male
78	Alberto Punef	Sub-district Administrator, Oesilo	Government	Oecusse	Male
					Total female: 19
					Total male: 59

Annex 3: List of District Focus Group Discussion participants

Aileu	No	Name	Position	Sector	District / Sub-district	Gender
	1	Mario A . Soares	District Development Officer	Government	Aileu Vila	Male
	2	Xisto Amaral	Sub-district Administrator	Government	Aisirimou	Male
	3	Armando Amaral	Traditional leader	Local community	Aisirimou	Male
	4	Joaninha D. Sarmento	Women's representative	CSO	Aisirimou	Female
	5	Alexandre Araujo	Traditional leader	Local community	Aisirimou	Male
	6	Caitano Reseloe	Sub-village Administrator	Local community	Aisirimou	Male
	7	Afonso Beremau	Community leader	Local community	Suku Hularema	Male
	8	Pedro Soares	IEAD Pastor	Protestant Church	Aisirimou	Male
	9	Carlos A. Araujo	Sub-district Administrator	Local community	Remexio	Male
	10	Manuel T. Magalhaes	Youth representative	CSO	Aisirimou	Male
	11	Paulino de Jesus Araujo	Secretary	Peace House	Aileu Vila	Male
	12	Matias Ramos	Community member	Local community	Aisirimou/Aitahu laran	Male
	13	Domingos do Rego	PSHT member	Martial arts	Suku Hularema	Male
	14	Ponciano Sarmento	PSHT member	Martial arts	Suku Hularema	Male
	15	Tomas Mendonca	Village-head	Local community	Aisirimou	Male
Maliana	1	Suparti Ras Lima	Muslim representative	Islamic community	Maliana Vila	Female
	2	Leobato Dos Santos	PSHT District Coordinator	Martial arts	Maliana Vila	Male
	3	Domingos Lopes	KORK District Coordinator	Martial arts	Maliana Vila	Male
	4	Narciso Godinho	Community member	CSO	Maliana Vila	Male
	5	Joanina Da Costa	Alola Foundation Field Officer	CSO	Lahomea	Female
	6	Sabino Araujo Soares	Government Operation Manager	Government	Bobonaro	Male
	7	Maria Araujo Gomes	Muslim representative	Islamic community	Bairo Sene	Female
	8	Maria Gomes Barros	Community member	Local community	Sub-Dist Bobonaro	Female

	9	Salomao Da Cruz	Odomau village-head	Local community	Maliana Vila	Male
	10	Antonio Santa Cruz	Holsa village-head	Local community	Maliana Vila	Male
	11	Alfredo Moniz da Costa	Sub-district Administrator	Local community	Cailaco	Male
	12	Alarico P. Gomes	Civil Security representative	Local Government	Cailaco	Male
	13	Maria Verdial	FMF Director	CSO	Maliana Vila	Female
	14	Mazia Soares de Jesus Rosa	Rita Bou village-head	Local community	Maliana Vila	Female
	15	Judit Mendes Da Silva	Women's representative	Local community	Sub-Dist Atabae	Female
	16	Domingos Do Carmo	District Secretary	Government	Maliana Vila	Male
	17	Paulino Viegas Tilman	Steering Committee President	Peace House	Maliana	Male
Baucau	1	Kamis Miguel Mendonca	PNTL representative	National Police	Baucau	Male
	2	Duarte Manuel Correia	Substitute village-head	Local community	Baucau, Seisal	Male
	3	Luis Aparicio Guterres	Former District Administrator	Local community	Baucau Vila	Male
	4	Francisco Da Costa Lemos	Former Bahu village-head	Local community	Baucau	Male
	5	Domingos M. Dos Santos	ASDT Coordinator	Political party	Baucau	Male
	6	Olga Matilde da Costa	KDP Director	CSO	Baucau	Female
	7	Ibrahim	Muslim representative	Islamic community	Baucau	Male
	8	Januario Xavier	CCF/Fretilin member	Political party	Baucau	Male
	9	Sergio Gusmao	FESTIL President	Martial arts	Baucau	Male
	10	Ernesto Belo	Traditional leader	Local community	Baucau	Male
	11	Olivio Freitas	Kailalo staff member	CSO	Gariwai	Male
	12	Francisco Xavier	District Secretary	Local Government	Baucau	Male
	13	Domingas da Costa Belo	Women's representative	Local community	Baucau	Female
	14	Albino Da Silva Xavier	President	Peace House	Baucau	Male
	15	Teresinha Da Costa Pereira	LSBE Youth Trainer	Youth	Baucau	Female
	16	Pe. Justiniano de Sousa	Baucau Parish Priest	Catholic Church	Baucau	Male
	17	Celestino Sequeira	Kunfu member	Martial arts	Baucau	Male
	18	Ade	Youth group member	Youth	Baucau	Male

	19	Vergilio Sarmiento	Pazazaran member	Martial arts	Baucau	Male
Ermera	1	Manuel Neves Dos Santos	Farmer	Local community	Ermera,Suku Talimoro	Male
	2	Sebastiao S. de Jesus	PAAS representative	Local Government	Lisapat. Hatolia	Male
	3	Joao Maia de Jesus	PNTL representative	National Police	Gleno	Male
	4	Aquelina Maria Guterres	Women's representative	Local community	Ermera Vila	Female
	5	Antonio Salsinha	Sub-district Administrator	Local Government	Ermera	Male
	6	Marcos Soares Martins	CNRT District Secretary	Political party	Gleno	Male
	7	Florinda Dos Santos	CHT District Chief	CSO	Ermera	Female
	8	Esterlina De Deus	Women's representative	Youth	Atsabe	Female
	9	Ged. M. Carvalho	Journalist	Media	Ermera	Male
	10	Francisco Maria Guterres	Youth group member	Youth	Railaco	Male
	11	Carlos Martins Soares	Youth group member	Youth	Railaco	Male
	12	Higia Xavier A. Dos Santos	Women's representative	Youth	Ermera, Poetete	Female
	13	Maria Tolan	Women's representative	Youth	Ermera Vila	Female
Liquica	1	Herminia Sarmiento	OPMT coordinator	CSO	Liquica	Female
	2	Maria Antonia De Jesus	Women's representative	Political party	Liquica,Suku Loidahur	Female
	3	Ana Maria de J. do Santos	Businesswoman	Local community	Liquica, Dato	Female
	4	Amelia	Businesswoman	Local community	Liquica, Dato	Female
	5	Joana dos Santos	Alola Foundation Field Officer	CSO	Liquica, Dato	Female
	6	Ana Maria G	Alola Foundation Field Officer	CSO	Liquica, Dato	Female
	7	Filomena D. S. Martins	Community member	Local community	Liquica, Dato	Female
	8	Rafael M. de Jesus	IKS member	Martial arts	Liquica, Dato	Male
	9	Anibal R. P da Graca	PNTL representative	National Police	Liquica, Dato	Male
	10	Oscar da Silva	Dato village-head	Local community	Liquica, Dato	Male
	11	Ramuro X. dos Santos	Community member	CSO	Hatuquesi	Male
	12	Augusto dos	CTDL member	Local	Bazartete	Male

		Santos Diogo		Government		
	13	Silveiro Goncalves	Community member	CSO	Liquica, Lauhata	Male
	14	Elisa da Silva dos Santos	Fokupers Coordinator	CSO	Liquica, Dato	Female
	15	Filomena dos Santos Galucho	FMF district staff member	CSO	Liquica, Dato	Female
	16	Gregorio S. M. Santos	Fretilin District Coordinator	Political party		Male
	17	Jose M. Nune Serao	Local government official	Local Government	Maubara	Male
	18	Madalena Vidal Soares	FFHT Director	CSO	Bazartete	Female
	19	Leoninha Gusmao De A	Student	Education	Bazartete	Female
	20	Helio Pereira Lobato	RTTL Journalist	Media	Liquica	Male
Viqueque	1	Baltazar S. Amaral	Veterans representative	Veterans	Lacluta	Male
	2	Maria P. dos S. G	Community member	CSO	Lacluta	Female
	3	Amoro Pereira	ASDT member	Political party	Viqueque	Male
	4	Emidio Amaral	Deputy Parish Priest	Catholic Church	Viqueque	Male
	5	Virgilio de Jesus	CNRT Deputy Coordinator	Political party	Viqueque	Male
	6	Pascoal Gama Martins	PSD Coordinator	Political party	Lacluta	Male
	7	Daniel Sarmento Soares	Veterans District President	Veterans	Viqueque	Male
	8	Domingos Da Costa	Fretelin District Coordinator	Political party	Viqueque	Male
	9	Luciana Guterres	Alola Foundation Field Officer	CSO	Viqueque	Female
	10	Veronica Belo	CFS Director	CSO	Viqueque	Female
	11	Mario Pinto	RTTL Journalist	Media	Viqueque	Male
	12	Alberto Soares	OPL District staff member	CSO	Viqueque	Male
	13	Paulo Soares	ADV staff member	CSO	Viqueque	Male
	14	Lourenca Soares	Community Radio member	Media	Viqueque	Female
	15	Cosme Sarmento	Democratic Party District Coordinator	Political party	Viqueque	Male
	16	Candido da Silva	Sub-district Administrator	Local Government	Ossu	Male
Lautem	1	Idris Luis Freitas	Muslim representative	Islamic community	Central	Male
	2	Felismina dos A. M. Ferreira	Community member	Local community	Kulu-Hun	Female

	3	Luis dos Santos Maubono	CNRT District coordinator	Political party	Home	Male
	4	Juliana de Jesus	FONGTIL District Liaison Officer	CSO	Central	Female
	5	Apolinario S. Rosa	Democratic Party Secretary General	Political party	Kulu-Hun	Male
	6	Castelo Branco	PNTL Investigation Unit member	National Police	Central	Male
	7	Julio M. de Jesus Canto	District Secretary	Local Government	Central	Male
	8	Regina de Jesus Ribeiro	District Director of Land and Propriety	Local Government	Lospalos	Female
	9	Justino Valentim	District Coordinator of Language Studies	Education	Titilari. Fuiloro	Male
	10	Aurelio F. Ribeiro	Fretilin District Coordinator	Political party	Lospalos	Male
	11	Antonio da Fonseca	Village-head	Local community	Tutuala	Male
Manatuto	1	Manuel Soares	Democratic Party Secretary General	Political party	Manatuto Ma'abat	Male
	2	Simao Ximenes	Fretilin District Coordinator	Political party	Manatuto	Male
	3	Belarmino Soares	UNDERTIM District Coordinator	Political party	Manatuto	Male
	4	Lourenco Brindes	Community member	Local community	Laclubar	Male
	5	Joana da Silva	Alola Foundation Field Officer	CSO	Manatuto , Aiteas	Female
	6	Eugenia M. da Costa	OFF / ASE0 Assistant District Coordinator	CSO	Manatuto, Sau	Female
	7	Felix de Carvalho	Youth / PSHT member	Martial arts	Manatuto, Sau	Male
	8	Joanina Soares	Church representative	Catholic Church	Manatuto	Male
	9	Hugo Pereira	Teacher	Education	Manatuto	Male
	10	Juliana dos . H. B. s	Veterans member	Veterans	Manatuto , Aiteas	Female
	11	Adelino Soares	Aiteas village-head	Local community	Manatuto, Vila	Male
	12	Clara da C. Ximenes	Women's representative	Local community	Manatuto	Female
	13	Joaquina da Cunha	PFSDM member	CSO	Manatuto, Vila	Female
	14	Joanita do Rosario	District Youth Coordinator	Local Government	Manatuto ,Vila	Female
	15	Filipe de Carvalho	BELUN District Coordinator	CSO	Manatuto,Vila	Male
	16	Tomas Soares	PNTL District Chief of Logistics	National Police	Manatuto	Male

Same	1	Miguel da Silva	Community member	Local community	Same	Male
	2	Angelita Seixas	Youth / CNRT member	Political party	Same	Female
	3	Romeo Duarte D. C	Youth / Fretilin member	Political party	Alas	Male
	4	Apolinario Martins	Pastor	Protestant Church	Same	Male
	5	Jaimito Isac	PNTL member	National Police	Same	Male
	6	Jose Mendes Corte-Real	Teacher	Education	Same	Male
	7	Julio Guterres	RTTL Journalist	Media	Same	Male
	8	Egidio Estelita	Teacher	Education	Alas	Male
	9	Lucia Branco	Teacher / OMT member	Education	Same	Female
	10	Susana de Andrade	Teacher	Education	Same	Female
	11	Florindo da Conceicao	Sub-district Administrator	Local Government	Same	Male
	12	Joao da Costa	PNTL Deputy District Commander	National Police	Same	Male
	13	Casmiro Tilman	PNTL member	National Police	Same	Male
	14	Abril dos Reis	Administration representative	Government	Turiscari	Male
	15	Isabel Cepeda Costa	Women's representative	Local community	Manufahi	Female
	16	Abilio Mendes	PSHT member	Martial arts	Manufahi	Male
	17	Madre. Natalia CIS	CIS Nun	Catholic Church	Same, Aidahelu	Female
	18	Agusta da Costa	Women's representative	Local community	Same, umaforme	Female
	19	Alarico dos Santos	Village-head	Local community	Same	Male
	20	Antoninho D. Sarmiento	RMD District Coordinator	CSO	Same, Daisua	Male
	21	Bento de J. Nunes	District Administration Officer	Local Government	Same, Nularan	Male
	22	Julio de Oliveira	Teacher	Education	Same, Nularan	Male
	23	Nazario da Silva	Teacher	Education	Same	Male
	24	Domingos Rodriques	District Youth Coordinator	Youth	Fatuberlio	Male
	25	Livia Maria	SEJD Correspondent	Local Government	Same, Aidahelu	Female
Ainaro	1	Felisberto S. S. Pereira	PSHT member	Martial arts	Ainaro Vila	Male
	2	Manuel A. Martins	Fretilin District	Political party	Ainaro	Male

			Coordinator			
	3	Pedro da Costa Fernandes	ASDT member / veteran	Political party / Veterans	Hatudo	Male
	4	Daninha da Cunha	Local Government staff member	Local Government	Ainaro	Female
	5	Filomena B. Magno	District Director	Education	Ainaro	Female
	6	Reinaldo de Araujo	Traditional leader	Local community	Ainaro	Male
	7	Jose A. de Araujo	Parish member	Catholic Church	Ainaro	Male
	8	Pe. Evaresto S	Ainaro Parish Priest	Catholic Church	Ainaro	Male
	9	Lourenco S	FESTIL Deputy Coordinator	Youth	Ainaro	Male
	10	Vasco G. de Araujo	Sub-district Administrator	Local Government	Ainaro	Male
	11	Cancio da C. Sina	Sub-district Administrator	Local Government	Hato-udo	Male
Suai	1	Teodonino A. de Araujo	DNDR District Coordinator	Local Government	Fatumea/Covalima	Male
	2	Felisberto de J. Amaral	PSD member	Political party	Maucatar/Covalima	Male
	3	Francisco Gusmao	PSHT District Coordinator	Martial arts	Maucatar/Covalima	Male
	4	Maria Olinda	Cruz Minarai Group Leader	CSO	Maucatar/Covalima	Female
	5	Salvador A. C. Vicente	Local Government staff member	Local Government	Fatumea/Covalima	Male
	6	Santina M. A. de Sena	Teacher	Education	Suai Vila	Female
	7	Juliana A. Pires	Teacher	Education	Tilomar/Covalima	Female
	8	Cariana Elsa Barreto Amaral	Housewife	Local community	Maucatar/Covalima	Female
	9	Anastacia de Jesus Membro	Youth group member	Youth	Maucatar/Covalima	Female
	10	Francisco D. Luan	PNTL member	National Police	Fatululik/Covalima	Male
	11	Vitorino do Carmo	Sub-district Administrator	Local Government	Taroman/Fatululik	Male
	12	Luzino do Rego	Sub-district Community and Development Officer	Local Government	Suai, Tabaco	Male
	13	Filipe Cardoso Viera	District Secretary	Local Government	Debos	Male
	14	Alexandre Pereira	Village-head	Local community	Zumalai	Male

Oe-Cusse	1	Henrique Tema	Vizao Cristao member	Protestant Church	Pante Makasar	Male
	2	Julio Cuca	Vizao Cristao Pastor	Protestant Church	Pante Makasar	Male
	3	Zedequias Soares	Assembly Pastor	Protestant Church	Pante Makasar	Male
	4	Paul da Costa	Assembly Pastor	Protestant Church	Pante Makasar	Male
	5	Lucas Falo	PNTL District Chief Investigator	National Police	Oe-Cusse	Male
	6	Nicolas Killan	IPTL Pastor	Protestant Church	Pante Makasar	Male
	7	Suni Arnaldo	District Youth Council member	Youth	Pante Makasar	Male
	8	Arnaldo Sombico	Traditional leader	Local community	Oetulo	Male
	9	Camilio Calo	Journalist	Media	St.Rosa	Male
	10	Paulino Marques	RTTL Journalist	Media	Oetulo	Male
	11	Yohanes Lelan	CJRO Manager	CSO	Padimau	Male
	12	Jose Antonio S. Martins	CPA / Fretilin member	Political party	Oesilo	Male
	13	Jose M. Feno	RCAL Community Radio Coordinator	Media	St.Rosa	Male
	14	Berta Falo	RCAL Community Radio staff member	Media	St.Rosa	Female
	15	Alberto Puneuf	Oesilo Sub-district Administrator	Local Government	Oesilo	Male
	16	Graciano Fuca	Local Government staff member	Local Government	Passabe	Male
	17	Teodoro Sila	Local Government staff member	Local Government	Nitibe	Male
	18	Carlos K. Fallo	IPTL Pastor	Protestant Church	Pante Makasar	Male
	19	Adalberto Elu	Journalist	Media	Pante Makasar	Male
	20	Adelino da Cruz	Local Government staff member	Local Government	Numbei	Male
	21	Mateus Elo	Protestant Church Manager	Protestant Church	Cruz	Male
	22	Dominggos Kolo	Protestant Church Manager	Protestant Church	Masin	Male
	23	Salvador da Cruz	Local Government staff member	Local Government	Numbei	Male

Annex 4: List of participants at the Second National Forum

No	Name	M/F	Organization	Position	District
1	José Ramos Horta	Male	Executive	President of the Republic RDTL	Dili
2	Lere Anan Timor	Male	Timor-Leste Defence Force (F-FDTL)	Major-General F-FDTL	Dili
3	Mari Bin Amude Alkatiri	Male	Fretilin Political Party	Secretary General of Fretilin	Dili
4	Afonso de Jesus	Male	Timor-Leste National Police (PNTL)	Vice Commandant of PNTL	Dili
5	Cristiano da Costa	Male	Government	Vice Minister of Economic and Development	Dili
6	Aurelio Guterres	Male	National University of Timor-Leste (UNTL)	Rector UNTL	Dili
7	Joãna Maria Dulce Vitor	Female	National Electoral Commission (CNE) /Secretary of Priority 1 Working Group	Commissioner CNE	Dili
8	Laura Duarte	Female	Portuguese Embassy	Representative	Dili
9	Syed Raj	Male	UNPOL	Deputy Police Commission UNPOL	Dili
10	Jerry McCann	Male	Interpeace	Deputy General Director	Geneva, Switzerland
11	Hermenegildo Guterres	Male	YPC-TL	Representative	Dili
12	Joanico dos Santos Guterres	Male	YPC-TL/ KKN Working Group Member	KKN Working Group Representative	Dili
13	Syamsul Bahri Ribeiro	Male	CENCISTIL/ Priority 1 Working Group Member	Representative	Dili
14	Euclides da Silva Guterres	Female	Peace Club/ Priority 1 Working Group Member	Representative	Dili
15	Micaela Ximenes	Female	OMP-CNRT/ Priority 1 Working Group Member	Representative	Dili
16	Armindo Tilman	Male	Individual/ KKN Working Group Member	Secretary	Dili
17	Cesaltina Costa	Female	-	Individual	Dili

18	Abilio Belo	Male	Individual	Translator	Dili
19	Mariano da Costa	Male	PSD Political Party/ Priority 1 Working Group Member	Representative	Dili
20	Delicia Ansgaria Barros	Female	Media RLD	Reporter	Dili
21	João Tavares do Nascimento	Male	CNJTL/ KKN Working Group Member	Representative	Dili
22	Celestino Ramos	Male	PSD Political Party / Priority 1 Working Group Member	Representative	Dili
23	José da Costa	Male	Individual/ Priority 1 Working Group Member	Representative	Dili
24	João da Silva	Male	ASDT Political Party/ KKN Working Group Member	Finances	Dili
25	J. Vas	Male	-	Photographer	Dili
26	Mateus Ximenes	Male	University/ KKN Working Group Member	Docent	Dili
27	José de Carvalho	Male	LABEH/ KKN Working Group Member	Representative	Dili
28	Lucas de Oliveira	Male	PD Political Party/ KKN Working Group Member	Representative	Dili
29	Me. Sonia Sangel	Female	Church	Nun	Dili
30	Ozorio Leque	Male	UNDERTIM Political Party/Priority 1 Working Group Member	Representative	Dili
31	Julio Fernandes	Male	ICR/ KKN Working Group Member	Docent	Dili
32	Caetano da C. F	Male	Cabinet of RDTL President	Representative	Dili
33	Antonio Guterres	Male	ISC/ KKN Working Group Member	Deputy Rector	Dili
34	Anunciano Guterres	Male	Dili Institute of Technology / KKN Working Group Member	Docent	Dili
35	Carlito Tilman	Male	Individual /Priority 1 Working Group Member	Representative	Dili
36	Joanito Ronaldo	Male	Media /Radio Klibur	Reporter	Dili
37	Antonio da Silva	Male	Media/ Diario Nacional	Reporter	Dili

38	Domingos da Costa	Male	Media/ Tempo Semanal	Reporter	Dili
39	José Martins S. S	Male	PPT Political Party	Representative	Dili
40	Mericio Akara	Male	Luta Hamutuk	Director	Dili
41	Sigi-Lai	Male	Luta Hamutuk	Representative	Dili
42	Rio	Male	PNTL	Investigation Unit	Dili
43	Nene de Almeida	Male	UNMIT	Representative	Dili
44	Ameju Cruz	Male	Media/ Diario Nacional	Reporter	Dili
45	Jd. Amaral	Male		-	Dili
46	Angelina Sarmento	Female	CNE/Member Board CEPAD	Commissioner	Dili
47	Victoria Maia	Female	Media/ RTL	Reporter	Dili
48	Luís Aparicio Guterres	Male	Ministry of Education	Representative	Dili
59	João Almeida	Male	Media/Journal STL	Reporter	Dili
50	Nelson Belo	Male	Fundasaun Mahein	Representative	Dili
51	Frei Guterres	Male	Fundasaun Mahein	Representative	Dili
52	Cornelio Gusmão	Male	MEFE-TL	Representative	Dili
53	David da S. Xavier	Male	MEFE-TL	Representative	Dili
54	Clementino Maia Pereira	Male	Media/ TVTL	Reporter	Dili
55	Erlinda da Silva. C	Female	Media/ Radio Lian Dame UNPAZ	Reporter	Dili
56	Cris Caetano	Male	TROCAIRE	Representative	Dili
57	Selma Hayati	Female	CAFOD	Representative	Dili
58	Sarah Dewhurst	Female	BELUN/CICR	Program Manager	Dili
59	Ezequiel C. da Silva	Male	CDI	Representative	Dili
60	Julio Sarmento	Male	LABEH/ Membru Grupu Travailu KKN	Representative	Dili
61	Candido Alves	Male	Media/TVTL	Reporter	Dili
62	Damião Pereira	Male	MEFE-TL	Representative	Dili
63	Marcelino Kally	Male	JPC/ Priority 1 Working Group Member	Representative	Dili
64	Abril	Male	Media/ Newspaper Timor Post	Reporter	Dili
65	Manuel da Silva	Male	Media/ Newspaper Independente	Reporter	Dili
66	Americo da Silva Ribeiro	Male	UNPAZ	Student	Dili
67	Cipriano Baptista Ribeiro	Male	UNPAZ	Student	Dili
68	Andre Gusmão	Male	Media/Radio Voz	Reporter	Dili

69	Isabel Cepeda Costa	Female		Gender Focal Point	Manufahi
70	Antonio Alves	Male	MEFE-TL	Representative	Dili
71	Leonia Monteiro	Female	-	Ex. Titular's	Dili
72	Francisca Alves Taolin	Female	Women's Network/ Priority 1 Working Group Member	Advocate	Dili
73	Pe. Domingos Alves da Costa	Male	Church	Rector Seminário Maior Fatu-Meta	Dili
74	Manuel Monteiro Fernandes	Male	NGO Hak/ Secretary KKN Working Group Member	Secretary	Dili
75	Filomena de Oliveira Camões	Female	CNRT Political Party / KKN Working Group Member	Representative	Dili
76	Alvaro Gonçalves	Male	UNPAZ	Student	Dili
77	Etelmina Cardoso José	Female	UNTL	Senado FEG UNTL	Dili
78	Tomas Freitas Siqueira	Male	University	Student	Dili
79	Emilio Barreto	Male	DLO CEPAD	DLO	Liquiça
80	Rafael M. de Jesus Correia	Male	Martial Arts	IKS Coordinator	Liquiça
81	Anibal R. P. da Graça	Male	PNTL	Police Comandant, Sub-District Liquiça	Liquiça
82	Amaro Ribeiro	Male	Veteran	Representative	Viqueque
83	Verónica Belo	Female	C.F.S	Director	Viqueque
84	Florindo De Jesus	Male	DLO CEPAD	DLO	Viqueque
85	Marcos Soares Martins	Male	PNTL	Commandant Sub-District	Ermera
86	José da Costa Martins	Male	DLO CEPAD	DLO	Ermera
87	Aquelina Maria Guterres	Female	Gender Focal Point	Women Representation	Ermera
88	Suni Arnaldo	Male	Youth	Youth Coordinator	Oecusse
89	Julio Cuca	Male	Protestant Affiliation	Pastor	Oecusse
90	José M. Feno	Male	DLO CEPAD	DLO	Oecusse
91	Albino da Silva Xavier (Sakoko)	Male	Peace House	President of Peace House	Baucau
92	Aleixo da Silva Belo	Male	DLO CEPAD	DLO	Baucau
93	Domingas da Costa	Female		Individual	Baucau

	Belo		-		
94	Eugenia Neves da Costa	Female	Association for Victims	Representative	Manatuto
95	Carlito Pinto	Male	DLO CEPAD	DLO	Manatuto
96	Filomena Barros Magno	Female	High-school	Director	Ainaro
97	Pedro da Costa Fernandes	Male	ASDT Political Party	Representative	Ainaro/Hatu-Udo
98	Jose A. de Araujo	Male	DLO CEPAD	DLO	Ainaro
99	Tomas Mendonça	Male	Community	Traditional Leader	Aileu
100	Ilidio Mau Felo	Male	Peace House	President of Peace House	Aileu
101	José Valenté B. D. C	Male	DLO CEPAD	DLO	Aileu
102	Aurelio Freitas Ribeiro	Male	Fretilin Political Party	Coordinator	Lautem
103	Isabel Cepeda Costa	Female		Gender Focal Point	Manufahi
104	Quintão C. Massa	Male	DLO CEPAD	DLO	Manufahi
105	Antoninho Doutel Sarmiento	Male	RMD Manufahi	Representative	Manufahi
106	Maria Verdial	Female	FMF	Director	Maliana
107	Paulino Tilman	Male	Peace House Maliana	President of Peace House	Maliana
108	Laurentino de Jesus	Male	DLO CEPAD	DLO	Covalima
109	Vitorino do Carmo	Male	Member of Government	Sub-District Administrator Fatululik	Covalima
110	Cariana Elsa Barreto Amaral	Female	OMT	OMT Representative	Covalima
111	Pe. Aniceto Maia da Costa, O Carmelitas	Male	Catholic Church/ Priority 1 Working Group Member	Priest	Zumalai