Community-based Peace Processes in South-Central Somalia

This study is dedicated to the memory of Engineer Mohamed Hassan Kulmiye, peace activist killed in Belet Wein on 22 June 2008, and to his work in promoting peace and reconciliation for the Somali people.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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This research study was made possible by the generous contributions of the interviewees, Working Group, peer reviewers, and colleagues at the Center for Research and Dialogue in sharing their unique experiences as well as historical documentation and photographs.

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The study is a draft chapter in a forthcoming publication representing the findings of the peace mapping study.
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<tr>
<td>BBC</td>
<td>British Broadcasting Corporation</td>
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<tr>
<td>CRD</td>
<td>Center for Research and Dialogue</td>
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<td>ICRC</td>
<td>International Committee of the Red Cross</td>
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<td>ICU</td>
<td>Islamic Courts Union</td>
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<td>IGAD</td>
<td>Intergovernmental Authority on Development</td>
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<td>IRDA</td>
<td>Inter-Riverine Development Agency</td>
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<td>JVA</td>
<td>Jubba Valley Alliance</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non Governmental Organization</td>
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<td>NRC</td>
<td>National Reconciliation Commission</td>
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<td>PDRC</td>
<td>Puntland Development Research Center</td>
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<td>RRA</td>
<td>Rahanweyn Resistance Army</td>
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<td>Somali National Alliance</td>
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<td>SPM</td>
<td>Somali Patriotic Movement</td>
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<td>SRC</td>
<td>Somali Revolutionary Council</td>
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<td>SSDF</td>
<td>Somali Salvation Defence Force</td>
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<td>TFG</td>
<td>Transitional Federal Government</td>
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<td>Transitional Federal Institutions</td>
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<td>Transitional National Government</td>
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<td>United Nations Office for Project Services</td>
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<td>USP</td>
<td>United Somali Party</td>
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<td>WSP International</td>
<td>War-torn Societies Project International - subsequently known as International Peacebuilding Alliance (Interpeace)</td>
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**PREFACE AND METHODOLOGY FOR THE PEACE MAPPING STUDY**

**Working to consolidate peace and support better governance across the Somali region**

The Dialogue for Peace

Rebuilding a country after conflict is about far more than repairing damaged buildings and re-establishing public institutions. Fundamentally, it is about rebuilding relationships at all levels, restoring the people’s trust and confidence in governance systems and the rule of law, and providing the population with greater hope for the future. These processes are all critical to the consolidation of peace and security in fragile post-conflict situations. When they are neglected, the threat of conflict re-emerging is very real. In this sense, state-building and peace-building are potentially contradictory processes – the former requiring the consolidation of governmental authority, the latter involving its moderation through compromise and consensus. The challenge for both national and international peacemakers is to situate reconciliation firmly within the context of state-building, while employing state-building as a platform for the development of mutual trust and lasting reconciliation. In the Somali region, neither of these processes can be possible without the broad and inclusive engagement of the Somali people.

Interpeace (formerly known as WSP International) – launched its Somali Programme in the northeastern part of Somalia known as Puntland in 1996. It subsequently expanded its programme to Somaliland in 1999, and to south-central Somalia in 2000. Working with highly respected local peace-building institutions established with the programme’s support – the Puntland Development Research Center (PDRC) in Garowe, the Academy for Peace and Development (APD) in Hargeisa, and the Center for Research and Dialogue (CRD) in Mogadishu – Interpeace has employed a highly successful ‘Participatory Action Research’ methodology to advance and support interlinked processes of peace-building and state formation. Interpeace’s experience in the Somali region over the past decade indicates that the understanding and trust developed through the PAR methodology can help to resolve conflicts directly, while at the same time building consensual approaches to address the social, economic and political issues necessary for a durable peace. The Dialogue for Peace programme has provided unique opportunities for the three partners to engage with each other in collaborative studies and shared projects across their borders – such as this peace mapping study - while managing their respective components of the Dialogue independently. The three partners meet regularly with Interpeace’s Somali programme team as well as with a ‘Dialogue Support Group’ comprising the programme’s donors.

**Methodology of the Peace Mapping Study**

In January 2007, Interpeace and its Somali partner organisations began a study of peace initiatives in the Somali region as part of Phase II of the Dialogue for Peace Programme. The study complements the “conflict mapping” exercise undertaken in partnership with the World Bank in Phase I of the programme. No comparable study of peace initiatives in the Somali region had yet been undertaken, despite the numerous reconciliation processes in the Somali region since 1991, at local, regional and national levels. While some of these have failed to fulfill expectations of resolving violent conflict, others have provided a basis for lasting stability, peace and development but are unknown beyond their immediate context. Interpeace and its partners consider that there are valuable lessons to be learned from these initiatives for both Somali and

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1 Conflict in Somalia: Drivers and Dynamics, World Bank report based on research by CRD, PDRC, APD and the Centre for Creative Solutions (Hargeisa), 2005.
international policy makers, in terms of key factors that influence their success, sustainability or failure, and in terms of the relationship between peace processes and state building.

The overall aim of the study was to enhance current approaches to and capacities for reconciliation and the consolidation of peace - both in the Somali region and in other contexts – by studying and drawing lessons from local, regional and national peace initiatives in the Somali region since 1991. The specific objectives were to:

- Document key local, regional and national peace initiatives over the past 16 years in the Somali region (including those that may have failed to achieve the anticipated results);
- Identify key factors that influence successful peace initiatives and factors that may undermine the sustainability;
- Synthesise lessons learned from these reconciliation initiatives for the way forward;
- Study the relationship between peace initiatives and state building in the Somali region

The study was designed with four phases, facilitated by Mark Bradbury in collaboration with the Interpeace Somali program team, with the field research undertaken by the three partner organisations. During the preparatory phase the three organisations established their research teams and compiled inventories of peace meetings in the Somali region. Following a workshop in April 2007, at which a research framework and a work plan for the study was agreed, the researchers conducted literature reviews, interviews and group discussions to develop a historical Overview of peace initiatives in their respective areas. This research was reviewed at a joint workshop, before undertaking a third phase of detailed research on case studies while the Audio Visual Units of the organisations prepared films (in Somali and English) to accompany the research and reach a wider audience. Additional support was provided by a number of colleagues2 and the CRD also undertook research on internationally sponsored national peace conferences in collaboration with Professor Ken Menkhaus.

In the series of workshops that marked the transition between the project phases, the researchers received training in designing a research framework, analytical tools, interviewing techniques and comparative learning3. Information was gathered through individual interviews and group discussions with people who had been involved in or witnessed the events, many in the places and communities where the peace conferences took place.

In line with Interpeace’s Participatory Action Research (PAR) methodology, Working Groups of knowledgeable individuals were convened in each region to provide guidance and comment on the research. Many of the interviews were recorded on audio tape and film and now comprise a historic archive of material on Somali peace processes, together with written documentation on the meetings, including copies of signed peace agreements. Finally, the research reports were peer reviewed before being completed.

This report forms part of the final series of five publications presenting the findings of the peace mapping study – both as a record for those involved, and as a formal presentation of findings and recommendations to the national and regional authorities, the broader Somali community, and international policy makers. Together with the short documentary films that accompany the reports, it is hoped that these publications will provide a practical platform for the sharing of lessons learned on peace and reconciliation initiatives in the Somali region.

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2 Mark Bradbury, Abdirahman Raghe, Pat Johnson, Janet Oeverland, Ulf Terlinden, Mohamed Hassan Ghar, Michael Walls, and Rita Glavitza.
3 Resource people included Dr Justin Willis of the British Institute in Eastern Africa and Andy Carl of Conciliation Resources
Overview of Peace Initiatives in South-Central Somalia

This section overviews the local peace initiatives in south-central Somalia between 1991 and 2007, covering the 11 regions of South Mudug, Galgadud, Hiran, Middle and Lower Shabelle, Benadir, Middle and Lower Jubba, Gedo, Bay and Bakool, and identifies some of the conflict dynamics and trends that underpin the diversities and complexities of the local peace initiatives.

A brief history of the violent conflict in South-Central Somalia since 1991

The collapse of the Somali state was a gradual process that began over a decade before the final demise of state authority and institutions in 1991. After Somalia's eventual defeat in the Ogaden war with Ethiopia in 1978, a series of opposition movements with clan affiliations emerged with the aim of toppling Siad Barre's government. One of these was the Hawiye-dominated United Somali Congress (USC) established in Rome in 1989, whose activities began with mobilization and armed opposition in the central regions and culminated in the capture of the capital, Mogadishu, in January 1991. In the absence of a clear political agenda, a leadership dispute arose almost immediately, with the USC splitting into two factions headed by Ali Mahdi and General Mohamed Farah Aydiid respectively. The devastating four month civil war that followed in Mogadishu from November 1991 resulted in the deaths of over 30,000 people, the displacement of thousands more, and the virtual destruction of what was left of the capital (Drysdale, 1994, p. 38).

No political alternative emerged to save the country from the disintegration of its political, economic and social institutions. Rather than the rebellion that had been waged to topple the Siad Barre regime ending with the defeat of the government forces, it degenerated into ferocious conflict between rival factions that ravaged the whole of south-central Somalia, with competition between clan-based militia for control of the valuable resources of Mogadishu, Kismayo, sea ports, airports and other key public assets. Throughout south-central Somalia, looting and criminality by armed gangs and militia led to massive displacement, eventually resulting in a catastrophic famine that claimed an estimated 250,000 lives (Hirsh and Oakley, 1995).

In early 1992, the UN Security Council established an arms embargo on Somalia and in April formed UNOSOM I, which was expanded by UNITAF in December 1992 as a US-led humanitarian intervention “Operation Restore Hope”, deploying 30,000 peacekeepers to southern Somalia to end the fighting and respond to the war-induced famine. Following the Addis Ababa accord of March 1993, UNITAF was dissolved and handed over to multinational UN peace keeping forces, UNOSOM II, in May 1993.

From 1993-95, the intensity and frequency of the armed conflict decreased overall, in part due to the relative security and stability that followed the establishment of UNOSOM bases in the main conflict areas of Mogadishu, Baidoa and Kismayo. UNOSOM forces cantoned heavy weapons in the areas they controlled (but did not carry out the anticipated disarmament programme). Nevertheless, their presence deterred the clan-based militia from further violence and extortion of the local population. UNOSOM also sponsored over a dozen local, regional and national reconciliations, stimulating some hope for the restoration of governance and peace, but repeated efforts by UNOSOM to broker a national peace agreement between the different factions failed.

When UNOSOM withdrew in March 1995 having failed to revive Somalia's collapsed state, there were widespread fears that the disastrous clan-based factional war of 1991-1992 would engulf the country again. However, although violent conflict continued, the clashes became shorter, more localized, and generally

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4 For further details, see the Overview of National Level Peace Processes
less intense. Business entrepreneurs who had benefited from the massive cash injection and employment opportunities during UNOSOM emerged to challenge the warlords and protect their business interests. The private sector and nascent civil society organizations developed to fill many of the gaps in service delivery left by the collapse of the government, particularly in the sectors of education, health services, telecommunications, and remittances.

In June 1995, General Aydiid, then chairman of the Somali National Alliance (SNA), declared that he had formed a ‘broad based government’ [this had a Somali name] and was elected president by his coalition. This triggered a split with his former ally, Osman Atto, who declared himself the new chairman of the SNA. Fierce fighting followed between the forces of Aydiid and Atto in Mogadishu and near Kismayo, in which hundreds of people died. General Aydiid himself was killed in these confrontations on 1 August 1996.

Earlier, in November 1995, the forces of General Aydiid occupied Bay and Bakool regions, inhabited predominantly by the unarmed Mirifle clans. In response, the occupied community established the Rahanweyn Resistance Army (RRA) and waged an insurgency against the occupying Aydiid forces, ultimately liberating their territory in 1999 with the help of Ethiopian forces.

The conflict over the resource-rich territories of Kismayo and the Juba regions intensified in 1999 with the formation of the Jubba Valley Alliance (JVA) of the Marehan clan and the Ayr, Habar Gidir sub-clan, who joined forces against General Morgan’s faction, the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM). The JVA defeated General Morgan’s SPM forces and captured Kismayo town in June 1999.

Throughout this period, international efforts continued to broker agreements between the rival factions and restore a government to Somalia. Neighbouring states, aware of the political and security impact of the lawlessness and violence in Somalia on their own constituencies, were key players, beginning with the first Somali national reconciliation initiative in 1991 organised by Djibouti. A series of externally-sponsored national reconciliation initiatives followed but produced little by way of sustainable national institutions, instead aggravating social divisions and political fragmentation.

After almost a decade of strife, the Arta national peace conference in Djibouti in 2000 achieved some level of dialogue and reconciliation but the Transitional National Government (TNG) formed through this process failed to follow through on the reconciliation efforts begun in Arta. With the TNG weak and increasingly irrelevant, the IGAD-sponsored Somali National Reconciliation Conference began in Kenya in 2002 with the aim of forming a new transitional government to succeed the TNG when its mandate expired in 2004. After two years of intensive negotiations, the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) was established in late 2004. However by the time the TFG returned from Kenya to Somalia in May 2005, it had already split into two factions, led respectively by the TFG President and his Prime Minister and by a group of Mogadishu-based Ministers, creating further confusion and uncertainty in the context of south-central Somalia.

During the period of the peace talks in Kenya from 2002-2004, two new dynamics emerged that were critical to the evolution of governance in south-central Somalia. The first related to the concept of federalism, a key component of the Transitional Federal Charter agreed at the Kenya-based reconciliation conference. The prospect of federalism was a factor in new rounds of violent sub-clan conflict in Hobiyo, South Mudug region, and in Herale, Galgadud region, and in Lower Juba region, as groups competed to gain more land in anticipation of the formation of federal states.

5 Formed at Goobweyn in June 1999
6 The Sodere and Cairo conferences of 1997 produced agreements to form government structures but these did not translate into realities on the ground.
Overview of Peace Initiatives in south-central Somalia

The second significant dynamic was the emergence of the Islamic Courts, as powerful new players in Somalia. The first court had been established in 1993 in Medina district of Mogadishu to fill the power vacuum left by the collapse of the state and the inability of local warlords to establish viable administrative structures. Other courts followed and some, such as the well-known North Mogadishu Islamic Court established in 1994, are credited with remarkable improvements in local security and enjoyed the support of the business community for that reason.

In the power vacuum (and relative calm) in Mogadishu from 2002-2004 due to the absence of many of the Mogadishu-based faction leaders from the capital while they attended the peace talks in Kenya, an umbrella organisation of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), comprising Mogadishu’s seven Islamic Courts, was formed in the capital in 2004. It evolved rapidly into a coordinated and organized force with significant military capacity (Barnes and Hassan, 2007).

The political stalemate within the TFG continued through 2005 and on 18 February 2006, a group of four Mogadishu-based former faction leaders, now TFG Ministers and key members of the TFG Mogadishu Group, together with a well-known businessman from north Mogadishu, announced the establishment of the ‘Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism’. The coalition claimed their intention to “clean up the terrorists hiding in Mogadishu”, referring to the Islamic Courts. Four months of heavy fighting between the forces of the Alliance and the ICU followed from February to May 2006, resulting in over 300 deaths. The ICU defeated the Alliance, took control of Mogadishu on 5 June 2006, and over the next six months extended their control over most of south-central Somalia, with the exception of Bay and Bakool regions where the TFG was now based. In December 2006, Ethiopian forces allied with the TFG to launch an offensive against the ICU, which resulted in uncounted deaths and the defeat of the Courts, leaving the TFG and Ethiopian forces in control of south-central Somalia by early 2007.

Local governance structures in south-central Somalia

Despite the failure of internationally-sponsored efforts from 1991 onwards to re-establish viable national governance institutions for Somalia, several local governance systems emerged in south-central Somalia following local and regional reconciliation initiatives. These were organized largely by local communities and took place in all parts of the country, fostering relative stability and peaceful co-existence between different communities at local level. A number of these regional and local reconciliation initiatives are summarized below (see Inventories of Regional and Local Reconciliations by Region, and Timelines of Peace Initiatives by Region).

1. UNOSOM-supported regional and district administrations, 1993-1995

UNOSOM supported the establishment of regional and district administrations, together with reconstituted police forces, in parts of south-central Somalia, including Hiran, Lower and Middle Shabelle, Bay and Bakool regions. However UNOSOM’s departure before these institutions had become effective and self-sustaining meant that although several local administrations continued, for example in districts of Hiran and Benadir, they were predominantly nominal entities, unable to provide governance or deliver services.

2. Local and regional administrations established by faction leaders

A number of powerful faction leaders set up local administrative structures in the territories they controlled, for example in Lower and Middle Shabelle and parts of Middle and Lower Jubba regions. These administrations levied taxes and provided desperately-needed security but no public social services.
3. **Community-based local governance systems**

Local communities in a number of areas succeeded in establishing governance systems through consultative processes involving the traditional and religious leaders and other local stakeholders, for example in Guri’el, Galgudud region. In Haradhere, the community-based initiative and the administration established under UNOSOM worked together under the guidance of local elders.

4. **Local administration through clan-based Islamic courts**

Clan-based Islamic courts controlled a small number of constituencies in south-central Somalia, for example in north Mogadishu and Belet Wein, with a focus on the provision of security. These initiatives were financed primarily through business groups associated with the respective (sub) clan and gained the acceptance and support of the general public through filling the vacuum of governance and security created by the collapse of the state.

5. **Local governance mediated by local traditional and religious leaders**

Communities in areas without formal or structured administration relied on the traditional governance and mediation of their traditional and religious elders, who took the lead in resolving local conflicts and maintaining some level of stability in their constituencies.

Furthermore, over 90 local peace initiatives were undertaken since 1991 through traditional conflict mediation and governance systems under the guidance of traditional clan elders, Islamic scholars and other key stakeholders in the absence of a functional national government, with varying degrees of success (see the Inventories and Timelines below). In contrast with the documentation available on the series of national reconciliation processes, very little is known about these local peace initiatives, which have played a critical role in managing conflict and governance amongst the war-weary communities of south-central Somalia over the past two decades.

**Traditional governance systems**

While international support focused on efforts to restore a national government, communities relied heavily on the traditional indigenous systems of governance to regulate social interaction in the absence of the state. This is based on a combination of customary law and Islamic Sharia law, dating back to the pre-colonial era. The colonial administration and the subsequent Somali government did not endeavor to build on this indigenous governance system but instead introduced a new form of western-style governance. Nevertheless the traditional governance system persisted in all parts of Somalia, most effectively in rural and pastoral communities, guided by three sets of xeer based on the dominant livelihoods in the respective area:

- Agricultural Customary Law (Xeer Beereed)
- Pastoral or Nomadic Customary Law (Xeer Xooleed)
- Agro-pastoral Customary Law (Xeer Xoolo-beereed)
- Fisheries Customary Law (Xeer Badeed/ kalumeysato)

With the collapse of the institutions of the state, urban populations also relied predominantly on customary law and Sharia to regulate social interaction.

**The traditional conflict resolution process**

Somali customary law is one of the mechanisms for managing conflicts between and among clans. The foundation of traditional agreements is based on codes designed to prevent conflict and avert escalation of violent clashes when these arise over resource sharing, land disputes, and other issues.

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7 See also Traditional Governance in South-central Somalia, CRD Brief Report for the World Bank, Draft Report, March 28, 2005, p.6-7

8 The Somali term xeer refers to a set of rules and obligations or a social contract that regulates the interaction among Somali clans and communities.
Typically, a conflict resolution process is either mediated directly by the traditional elders of the two parties in conflict or by a third party would involve the following steps. The traditional elders of the respective groups make contact to share information on the crisis and take measures to contain the escalation. These may include a cessation of hostility (colaad jooin), disengagement of forces (kala rarid/ kala fogaayn) and ceasefire (xabbad jooin). Once the immediate violent conflict is contained in this first phase, the elders from the confronting parties meet directly or through a third party to examine together the issues involved and the root causes of the conflict, and identify appropriate steps to be undertaken towards reconciliation, based on the existing customary laws between the two groups.

If the elders have reached a common understanding, they propose mediation to the parties in conflict in a public meeting at which they present their views on the root causes and their grievances. But if the traditional elders fail to reach an agreement, then a third party accepted by both groups will propose a mediation process. With the consent of the parties in conflict, the traditional leaders or the arbitrating leaders will appoint a neutral technical committee to examine the root causes of the conflict more thoroughly, investigate who instigated the violence, and ascertain the impact in terms of loss of lives and property.

Once it has completed its fact finding mission to gather information and collect evidence, the technical committee uses the same traditional customary codes to prepare a proposal for appropriate remedial action, which typically include punitive penalties to the offending party and compensation to be paid for loss of life and property. This is presented to the traditional (arbitrating) leaders for their review and endorsement. Then the parties in conflict are called again by the traditional elders and the technical committee and informed of the outcome of the technical committee’s fact finding mission and the decisions reached.

**Impact of the civil war on traditional governance institutions**

Since 1991, traditional elders played a critically important role in mediating and regulating the interactions within and between local communities. While this was also the case under the government, their role extended significantly to fill the vacuum of authority created by the collapse of the state and the ensuing civil war and lawlessness.

However the conflict dynamics in south-central Somalia also created powerful clan-based faction leaders who undermined the authority of the traditional clan leaders. The top-down approach employed in internationally-sponsored peace processes reinforced this through their focus on armed faction leaders as primary interlocutors and “representatives” of their clan constituencies.

The traditional structures were also undermined by the proliferation of “traditional” elders. The Siad Barre regime and, subsequently, politicians and faction leaders encouraged this trend as a means of ensuring clan support. Another factor was the fragmentation and distrust within the main clan families, which led smaller sub-clans to identify their own traditional leaders.

Traditionally, clan elders were seen as responsible for ensuring the peaceful co-existence of the local communities and resolving local conflicts. However the circumstances of the civil war led a number of traditional elders to mobilise their clan militia for inter- and intra-clan fighting and to side with their kin even when they were the aggressors.

Another feature of the civil war period in many areas was the breakdown of xeer between pastoral and agricultural communities. In the pre-colonial period and before the collapse of the Somali state, traditional customary law (xeer) would be applied to resolve conflicts and ensure equity between agricultural and pastoral communities. Both communities were obliged to abide by these regulations or risk intervention by
the state. However imbalances in the arming of different (sub) clans during and after the Siad Barre regime typically left agricultural communities at a military disadvantage compared with those relying on pastoralism. Conflicts often occur between these two livelihood groups based on differing needs with respect to natural resources but, in the absence of law enforcement mechanisms, the weaker party may forfeit its rights under traditional law. One example is in the small village of Dari Salaam in Afgoi district, Lower Shabelle region, which is inhabited by predominantly by the Geledi sub-clan of Digil clan. It is surrounded by other agricultural villages and the pastoral communities of Abgal (sub-clans of the Hawiye) and Garre (sub-clans of the Digil and Mirifle). When pastoralists are the aggressor in a clash, the agricultural community will tend not to ask for a meeting to discuss the issue because they expect little recompense from the more powerful group. However if the aggressor is from the agricultural community, the traditional mechanism is applied and compensation paid to restore the peace. This approach has been in operation in the Dari Salaam area since the collapse of the state and has ensured some level of stability as a mechanism for containing conflict though it is does not represent genuine reconciliation and is based on an unequal relationship between the communities.

A particularly damaging effect of the civil war was the undermining of the xeer that protected vulnerable groups (Birmageydo, “those who are spared from the spear”), which includes women, children, the elderly, senior elders and religious leaders, and those on peace missions. Repeated violations of the traditional protection mechanism has weakened this important function of traditional governance and resulted in the deaths in many violent conflicts of those who would normally be considered “safe from harm”.

**Birmageydo “spared from the spear”**

Historically, the term ‘Birmageydo’ referred to a prohibition on cutting down highly valued trees because of the fruit, traditional medicine or shade they provided for people and livestock. The term also covered the protection of livestock used by the family as a means of transport or to provide milk for the children. Birmageydo has its roots in Islam, which prohibits the killing of these vulnerable groups caught in wars and also prohibits the cutting of trees and slaughter of animals without purposeful meaning.

During periods of social conflict, the term gained a wider meaning to encompass social groups who by xeer are to be “spared from the spear”. These are the traditional and religious leaders, women, children (Mato), those on peace missions (Ergo), Magan (guests), travellers (Socoto) and in-laws (Xidid).

**Mapping local peace initiatives**

As indicated above, since the collapse of the state over two decades ago, the relative stability and coexistence of communities within the fragmented conflict dynamics of south-central Somalia rest almost entirely on the success of locally-initiated reconciliation initiatives. A unique feature of these local peace initiatives is use of the bottom-up approach where local level leaders, often the traditional leaders, are the initiating and driving force. The bottom-up reconciliation process is fundamentally people-centered, advocating peace from within affected communities and requiring changes from the local people in order to achieve peace and reconciliation (Nuredin Netaby, 2007).

The mapping of local peace initiatives in south-central Somalia between 1991 and 2007 identified over 90 local reconciliations, predominantly initiated by traditional elders and funded by the stakeholder communities (see Annexes 1 and 2 for inventories and timelines of local peace initiatives by region).

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9 Focus Group Discussion with elders from Dari Salaam and neighbouring areas held at Ugaas Buube farm in Dari Salaam village, 16 November 2007

10 Abdulkhadir Acorna, Soyaalka Soomaaliya, Dhaqankii Dhulka Hooyo, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, 2005, p.130-131
Table 1 Number of local peace initiatives by region, 1991-2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regions</th>
<th>Number of initiatives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Central regions (South Mudug and Galgadud)</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hiran</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gedo</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle Jubba</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower Jubba</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bay &amp; Bakool</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle Shabelle</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower Shabelle</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benadir</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The variation in the number of peace initiatives in different regions appears to reflect the number and complexity of relationships between the clans and sub-clans, the relative wealth of resources, and the level of impact of national politics.

For example, nearly 40% of the local initiatives took place in Lower and Middle Jubba regions, which are inhabited by more than 19 Somali clans and endowed with rich agricultural and pastoral resources. The regional capital of Lower Jubba, Kismayo, with its seaport has national political and economic significance as the second most important city after the national capital of Mogadishu. In contrast, only 13% of the local peace initiatives took place in the central regions of Galgadud and South Mudug, which are inhabited by a less diverse range of clans and have fewer natural resources to stimulate competition or attract incoming clans.

The likelihood of a local peace process being initiated may also be affected by the relative military dominance of one clan in the territory and the influence of national level politicians or business figures that may facilitate or obstruct local initiatives (see also below under Selection of the Case Studies). Some of the other factors influencing the overall frequency of local initiatives during successive periods from 1991-2007 are described below.

Table 2 Frequency of local peace initiatives from 1991-2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Number of initiatives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1991-96</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997-03</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004-early 2007</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1992-96

During the period of deployment of the UNITAF and UNOSOM peace keepers (1992-1995) a number of attempts were underway to restore governance, encouraging many communities to embark on local peace initiatives. Eight local and regional reconciliation processes were concluded in south-central Somalia with a significant positive impact on the lives of thousands of people. The key initiatives were:

- 1993 Mudug peace agreement between Habar Gidir and Majeerteen clans;
- Kismayo peace conference in 1994;
- Hirab peace meeting at Kaah Hotel in Mogadishu in 1994;
- Bardhere peace conference between the Digil and Mirifle clan and the Marehan clan in 1993
1997-2003

In contrast with the general trend of fewer reconciliation processes during this period, a series of peace initiatives were undertaken amongst the indigenous Digil and Mirifle communities in Bay and Bakool regions after the RRA ended Aydiid’s occupation in 1999, with over five significant local reconciliations concluded in this period.

Some of the reasons for the reduction in the number of local reconciliations recorded in this period appear to relate to the withdrawal of UNOSOM in 1995:

- Less external support for local and national reconciliations;
- Fewer resources to compete over or to fund violent conflict and associated reduction in intensity and frequency of conflict;
- Thriving cross-clan business networks that had accumulated wealth from UNOSOM contracts, became independent of the clan-based faction leaders, and provided alternative livelihoods for hundreds of youth;

Other factors related to:

- Emergence of (sub) clan-based Islamic courts, providing a level of security to the local constituencies and averting large-scale violent conflict;
- Strengthened role of Somali civil society in advocacy for peace, reconciliation and protection of human rights.

2004-2007

This period includes the latter stages of the IGAD-sponsored national peace talks in Kenya and the formation of the TFG in late 2004. A series of local reconciliation processes were initiated in anticipation of the establishment of a national government or, subsequently, under the broad auspices of the TFG. In other cases, local initiatives were responding to outbreaks of conflict due to the changing power dynamics at national level, including the debate over federalism at the national conference and the confrontations between the TFG and the ICU.

Typology of the local peace initiatives in south-central Somalia

The nature of the local initiatives are considered below in terms of the level of the process (local or district, regional, or involving more than one region); the focus (social, local politics, resources); and other dimensions such as the timing, factors affecting its success or failure, and its impact.

Levels of the local peace initiatives

Local and sub-regional initiatives

The local peace initiatives normally involve communities in a village, town or district and address localised conflicts within a clan or sub-clans in the immediate area. An example is the conflict between Afia and Abtisame sub-clans of Gaalje’el clan over revenge killings and rape, which spread to Belet Wein town with the destruction of property in the western part of the town inhabited by both communities. Clan elders, religious leaders, business people and civil society from the area supported a reconciliation agreement between the two parties, concluded at Buqda-Aqable village near Bulo Burti, in 2005, which still holds.

Regional initiatives

Reconciliation processes involving two or more regions represent a significant investment by the respective communities and can have concomitant positive impact for many people when they succeed. An early
example was the 1993 Mudug peace agreement between Habar Gidir clans in Galgadud and South Mudug and Majeerteen clans in north Mudug, which ended large-scale confrontations of militia across this clan border.

Another significant regional peace initiative was the Kismayo conference in 1994, sponsored by UNOSOM and supported by the political factions of the SNA, SPM and SSDF, with representatives of all nineteen clans from Middle and Lower Jubba regions participating (with the exception of the Absame sub-clan which signed the agreement later).

The Bardhere peace conference in 1993 was initiated by elders of the Digil and Mirifle clan in Bay and Bakool regions and the elders of the Marehan clan, and supported by UNOSOM. Serious fighting between the two communities in 1991-92 had resulted in heavy casualties, mistrust, the breakdown of trade, and incessant conflicts over pasture and water resources. Since the agreement was signed the communities have co-existed harmoniously with the Bardhere agreement as the reference for any issues that arise between them.

A significant regional peace conference amongst the Hawiye clan was held in Belet-Weyn from October 1998 to June 1999, organized and hosted by a well-respected titled traditional elder, the late Ugas Khalif of the Hawadle clan. Over 650 clan representatives participated, of which 150 represented the Hawiye sub-clans of Hiran region. The aim was to foster reconciliation within the Hawiye clan and with other clans, as a fundamental step towards national reconciliation. In its final stages, politicians contested the leadership of the process and the initiative failed. Nevertheless, the conference succeeded in enhancing trade between the regions and between sub-clans, building local capacity to organise and finance peace processes, and demonstrating the potential of bottom-up reconciliation processes.

More recently, the reconciliation process from February 2006 to February 2007 between Sa’ad and Saleman sub-clans ended the protracted violent conflict between the two groups in Galgadud and South Mudug.

**Focus and nature of the local peace initiatives**

As described below, the majority of local peace initiatives are social, addressing conflicts over shared land, pastoral resources, or related clan revenge killings. Local peace processes that are political or relate to power-sharing have primarily been addressed through the formation of local administrations, for example in Middle Jubba under UNOSOM or in Gedo region under the auspices of the TFG.

**Traditional issue-based local reconciliations**

Most local reconciliation processes are mediated by traditional mechanisms and relate to conflict in rural communities over land disputes (especially in settlements or villages), access to shared grazing or water sources, and agricultural land. In most communities, an established xeer has evolved between the co-habiting groups in the area to govern relationships and access to communal resources. Generally, traditional issue-based conflicts were handled successfully by clan elders through customary law, xeer, with any clan member (or clan) who challenged the elders’ arbitration being subject to contempt and punishment by the other clans concerned (*Maraado-Ta’siir*).

> “All local conflicts in Bay and Bakool regions were resolved by the *Malaqq* and clan elders before the emergence of the RRA [Rahanweyne Resistance Army of the clan indigenous to the area]”

*Malaq Moallin Muktar, prominent Digil and Mirifle clan elder, Baidoa*

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11 Interview in Baidoa, May 2007
Traditional issue-based conflicts increased significantly in number and complexity during and after the civil war due to the breakdown of other mechanisms for regulating social interaction, mass displacement of people, incursions by armed groups, and increased availability of weapons. The imbalance in the acquisition of weapons by different communities living together resulted in the stronger clans or sub-clans dominating militarily weaker communities and taking a larger share, or all, of resources that had traditionally been for communal use. Since even weaker (sub) clans generally had access to some weapons, violent clashes often resulted.

An example is the issue of ownership of the village of Kulan Jareer, near Baidoa, and its surrounding grazing land, which has traditionally been shared by the Jiron and Hadame sub-clans of the Digil and Mirifle clan. In the early 1990s, the two groups clashed in a power struggle over ownership of the village and grazing. Traditional and religious leaders and women mobilized to support a reconciliation process to restore harmony, which was concluded successfully in 1994 at the neighbouring village of Labatan Jirow.

**Local politics-based reconciliations**

Reconciliations relating to power-sharing emerged during and after the civil war period, focusing on formation or control of the local or regional administrations and strategic resources. The high stakes and number of players involved mean these initiatives present significant challenges to mediation.

For example, a meeting in Buuale in 1994 attended by representatives of all the clans of Middle Jubba region together with veteran politicians aimed to resolve differences and form a regional administration but ultimately no agreement was reached.

Another example is the 1996 Garbaharrey conference among the Sade clans, which was intended to establish unity among them and to form a local administration. Sade clan elders and leaders of the armed faction, the Somali National Front (SNF), were the key players but failed to reach agreement. The following year a peace conference at El Adde village near Bulo Hawe, worked towards a power-sharing arrangement between the SNF and the armed group, Al-Itihaad Al-Islami, but also ended in failure.

Despite the challenges, some local initiatives to address power-sharing arrangements have made progress, with associated benefits for the local communities. For example, in 1994, UNOSOM sponsored a meeting of the political factions of the SNA and the SPM at Mugambe village, near Kismayo, resulting in agreement on power-sharing.

A recent example of a significant reconciliation process at regional level is the Wajid Peace Conference in 2006, through which the agreement reached between the two political factions concerned led to social reconciliation between the clans, with positive implications for the national process. Conflict arose within the Digil and Mirifle clan following the accord reached in Yemen in early 2006 between the TFG President, Abdullahi Yusuf, and the then Speaker of the Transitional Federal Parliament, Sharif Hassan, that the TFG would relocate to Baidoa. One wing of the RRA, led by Haabsade, was closely associated with the “Mogadishu-based Ministers” group of the TFG and opposed relocation of the TFG to Baidoa (rather than the capital, Mogadishu). Intense fighting erupted between the two wings of the RRA led by Haabsade and Shaati-Gaduud respectively, which degenerated into a wider clan conflict involving most of the Digil and Mirifle sub-clans. The Malaqyo, Asharaf clan elders, religious leaders, intellectuals and women groups intervened and sponsored a political reconciliation between the rival RRA factions at Sarmandhere village.

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12 Sade sub-clans are part of the Darod clan family and include Marehan and Facaye sub-clans
13 Asharaf is one of the Digil and Mirifle clans. It is traditionally respected as a religious community that never fights, instead often mediating between other conflicting communities.
which concluded successfully. The second phase of the reconciliation process was organized for all three leaders of the RRA at Wajid, followed by a regional meeting of all the sub-clans of the area, to consolidate unity and peace amongst the Digil and Mirifle clan community. The successful outcome of the process enabled the TFG to relocate to Baidoa, hosted by all factions and communities in the area, and provides an interesting example of a local political reconciliation process transforming into social reconciliation between the communities.

The diaspora and local peace initiatives

In the early period of the civil war, the Somali diaspora played a role in fuelling the clan-based conflict through providing funds and moral support to their respective clan factional leaders. However this trend changed when local business groups, who had also contributed significantly to the clan-based conflict and faction leaders, became powerful in their own right and refused to continue their financial and moral support. Generally, the diaspora followed suit and their role in perpetuating conflict reduced significantly. According to the findings of the study, the role of the diaspora in local reconciliations is also negligible.

There are however notable cases in which the diaspora took the lead in mobilisation or financial support for local reconciliations. The diaspora of the Marehan clan from Gedo have sponsored and co-financed over five reconciliation processes with the Marehan clan. Other examples include the significant support provided by the Absame diaspora for the series of Absame reconciliation processes held in Marerey, near Jilib, in 1997 and the moral and financial support from the Hawadle and Murasade diaspora for the Mahas and Elbur reconciliation processes in 2006-7. In the latter case, diaspora members of the Murasade and Hawadle formed a group in London to engage the elders and Ugaasyo of the two sub-clans in Mogadishu, Belet Weyne, Elbur and London, subsequently sending two of their members to participate in the conference in October 2007 while also providing $10,000 towards the costs of the process and commitments for support for implementation and consolidation of peace in the area. The constructive engagement of the diaspora group had a substantial impact on the morale of participants and was identified as a key factor in the success of the talks.

Factors in the success or failure of local peace initiatives

In focus group discussions and interviews conducted for this research, the following factors were identified as critical to the success of many local peace initiatives:

1. The use of traditional governance systems;
2. Confidence of the communities in judgments issued by their traditional elders;
3. Commitment and impartiality of the mediators;
4. Acknowledgement by communities of the impact of conflict ("war-weary");
5. Commitment of the parties in conflict to reach a solution;
6. Presence of a recognized authority, the TFG;
7. Absence of international interventions;
8. Implementation of appropriate and reasonable compensation for losses;
9. Effective dissemination of the peace accord and follow-up;

14 Focus group discussion for a number of Malaqis and elders of Digil and Mirifle clan, organized by CRD in Baidoa, 20 May 2007
10. Social punishment (*Ta’sir*) for individuals or groups who refuse to abide by the agreement reached by the community.

11. Immediacy of payment of diya and compensation for losses.

The following were identified as factors contributing to the failure of local initiatives:

1. Lack of good leadership;
2. Continuing cycles of revenge killings;
3. Perception of lack of impartiality of the mediators;
4. Lack of full community participation and awareness raising, including engagement of women, elders, civil society networks, and religious leaders;
5. Lack of inclusion of the local or regional authority;
6. Failure to accommodate competing interests;
7. Failure to fully investigate or understand the root causes of the conflict (basing judgments on false information about the nature of the conflict);
8. Breaches of the agreement, failure to monitor its implementation;

Some of the common challenges to the local initiatives in the Somali traditional context are summarised below.

- **Denial of responsibility (*Gar-diiddo*)**
  The first step in the reconciliation process is acknowledgment of responsibility and confession by the aggressor, even if accompanied by an excuse for the incursion. In the Somali cultural context, this is critical for the success of traditional conflict resolution and is the first question to be presented before addressing other fundamental issues. The declaration of responsibility, “I am an aggressor”, by the respective party is seen as representing more than a third of the path to a solution. If the responsible party declines to confess as the aggressor, the reconciliation initiative usually fails at this early stage as the other side will perceive itself to be despised and marginalized and an impasse results. Traditional penal codes are applicable to the person, group or clan who commits *Gar-diiddo* (denial of facts).

- **Imbalance of power**
  A significant imbalance of power between the parties in conflict can also produce an impasse in reconciliation efforts, if one group sees itself as militarily dominant and able to subdue the opposing group rather than engage in conflict resolution. The past two decades has seen fierce competition between communities in some areas to accumulate heavy weapons and become the dominant force in their area. In these circumstances, the group may impose unreasonable conditions, provoke confrontations or otherwise act as spoilers in the reconciliation process.

- **Discrepancies in local codes of customary law**
  The local variations in traditional customary law in pastoral and agricultural communities can be problematic for conflict resolution, particularly when the traditional code appropriate for the agricultural community has a negative impact on the needs of the pastoral community or vice versa. Similarly, incidents may be perceived differently by and have different impacts for the pastoral and agricultural communities.

One example is the traditional law of some agricultural communities that the first step towards reconciliation in which they have been the aggressor is to bring a lamb to the conference tree (where the peace initiative begins) as an offering for having committed an offensive act (*Sabeen-xiri*). However this can be misunderstood by the pastoralist community as an act signifying that they are being seen as inferior, triggering escalation of the clashes.
• Emergence of new freelance forces
During the prolonged period of chaos and lawlessness in the country, a number of clan-based faction leaders, politicians and business people formed armed militia to further their own interests. They also promoted new “traditional elders” who lacked legitimacy within their own community and undermined the existing system of traditional leadership.

A prominent chieftain in Beledweyn, Dahiye Uulow\(^\text{15}\), described how, prior to the collapse of the state, the only existing power in the rural communities was that managed through the traditional chieftains and elders, supported by the government security institutions. The effectiveness of the traditional customary law and codes of behaviour was weakened by the emergence of the “merchants of war” during the civil war, who used “divide and rule” tactics within the clan elders for their own agendas. He identified the mix of political conflicts with traditional mechanisms as undermining the latter and contributing to stalemates in local (and national) reconciliation processes, as well as generating conflict within the (sub) clan itself.

“The emergence of armed warlords and business people during the anarchy of the civil war period is the primary reason for the failure of attempts to settle local Somali conflicts”
Chief Dahiye Uulow, a prominent chieftain in Belet Wein

• Absence of systems of reinforcement for traditional actors
In each of the regions covered in this study, a common feature identified in research interviews and focus group discussions was the need for a functional authority as a pre-requisite for effective and sustainable reconciliation at both local and national level. In the absence of viable security institutions, no reconciliation can be effectively implemented and sustained.

This is linked to the emergence of the armed faction and business leaders (above), who can undermine the decisions reached through the traditional conflict resolution mechanism, while the traditional elders lack the means for reinforcement of the peace agreement on behalf of the community.

• Weak conflict prevention and poor recording of peace initiatives and agreements
One weakness in the traditional conflict management system is poor information sharing and monitoring of tensions that may erupt into violent conflict. This means the system is not effective for conflict prevention. Another challenge is poor recording of previous local reconciliation processes, peace agreements and lessons learned in the community, as the system relies on oral reference and agreement. Many traditional elders are not literate and the only system employed is the ancestral process of oral memory. While this has been one of the strengths of the system, through reinforcing the authority held by senior traditional leaders, it can also present challenges for dissemination of the peace accords throughout the communities concerned. The use of written and/ or audio-visual records of agreements improves the historical record and, potentially, wider dissemination through the community.

**Selection of case studies from south-central Somalia**

A frequent casualty of the collapse of formal governance structures is traditional systems of management of shared public resources. Conflicts over these communal resources can become protracted and difficult to resolve in the absence of mechanisms to reinforce community-based agreements over their use. The first case study, the Idale Peace Initiative, examines the violent conflict that was triggered by a breach of the local agreement regulating use of communal water catchments in the village of Idale, near Qanshadhere district in Bay region, inhabited predominantly by the Yantar and Hubeer sub-clans of the Digil and Mirifle

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\(^{15}\) Focus Group discussion, Belet Wein, May 2007
The conflict resulted in nearly 100 deaths and recurred several times, despite the intervention of the 30 crowned titled elders (Malaqis) to broker ceasefires. Ultimately a ceasefire was agreed in 2006 through the backing of representatives of the TFG for the mediation brokered by the Malaqis with the support of religious leaders and civil society.

The second case study, the reconciliation process between the Jijeele and Gaalje’el clans in Hiran region, provides an example of the way in which national level dynamics can impact locally, triggering latent tensions between different communities. Because the violent clash between the two groups occurred in Belet Wein town, the capital and economic hub of the region, it had an immediate impact on other clan. Another feature of the process was the constructive role played by the dominant clan in the area, who initiated and supported the reconciliation as a respected honest broker.

In other cases the resolution of community-based conflicts may be complicated and obstructed by the politicization of the local dynamics through remote control by politicians and business people with clan affiliations in the area, as a way of demonstrating their power and influence. The third case study focuses on the reconciliation process between the Sa’ad and Saleman sub-clans of Mudug and Galgadud regions, which was eventually initiated successfully with the support of the national political and business figures affiliated with the area. The protracted violent conflict between the two sub-clans (from the Habar Gidir clan of the Hawiye clan family) had a serious socio-economic impact in the area and beyond, through impeding a key trade route. The use of heavily armed vehicles and sophisticated satellite telecommunications by clan militia indicated funding of the conflict from outside the local communities. Although the immediate stakeholders (the inhabitants, their elders and the local business community) called for reconciliation, it was only possible to proceed when national figures affiliated with the area were effectively engaged. This process is also one of the few local peace initiatives that took place in these central regions since the collapse of the state.

**Simplified clan diagram for the Hawiye clan family**

*Note: this is a simplified version of the Hawiye clan family lineage, extracted from a partial and simplified lineage chart of the five main Somali clan-families (adapted from Ken Menkhaus, 2004, page 24). See below under Idale Case Study for a simplified clan diagram of the Rahanweyn clan family.*

```
Hawiye

Gaalje’el  Hawadle  Duduble  Abgal  Karanle  Gugundhabe  Habar Gedir
  (Murosade)

Bade-Ade  Jijeele  Jidle  Makane

Harti  Wabudhan  Wa’esli

Agonyar  Warsangeli  Abkor

Da’oud  Rer Matan  Mohamed Muse
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A number of other groups include Bantu, Benadiri, Barawans, sometimes known generically as minority groups, generally stand outside Somali kinship lineage but may have adopted status within a Somali clan.
Overview of Peace Initiatives in south-central Somalia

Relocation of TFG to Baidoa
TFI & TFG formation in Kenya
Arta Conference
Mahaday & Bio Adde Conference
Adale Conference
Adale (Celmurug) & Conference
Mahaday Conference

Timelines of peace initiatives by region, 1991-2007

Middle Shabelle Region Timeline (1998-2007)

External Events
Bay & Bakool Region Timeline (1991-2007)

External Events

- UNITAF arrived
- UNOSOM
- UN Evacuation
- Aydiid Occupation
- RRA Formation
- EL NINO
- Cairo Conference
- Aydiid occupation ended
- RRA Association
- Arta Conference
- RRA Split
- TFG formed and in place

Events:

- 1991
  - Misra Conference
- 1992
  - Baradhere Conference
- 1993
  - 20 Jirow Conference
- 1994
  - Dodale Conference
  - Hudur Conference
- 1995
  - Luq Conference
- 1996
  - Sarmandhere Conference
- 1997
  - Togarhoos Conference
- 1998
  - Idale Conference
  - Bur Dhuxunle Conference
- 1999
  - Wajid Conference (Feb 2006)
- 2000
  - Gude & Baidoa Conference
- 2001
  - TFG formed and in place
- 2002
- 2003
- 2004
- 2005
- 2006
- 2007
Overview of Peace Initiatives in south-central Somalia

Lower Juba Region Timeline (1991-2007)

External Events

- UNITAF arrived
- UNOSOM
- UN Evacuation
- Cairo Conference
- Arta Conference
- TFG formed and in place

Baradhere Conference
Kismayo Conference
Kismayo (Canjel Village) Conference
Kismayo International Airport
Jamaame (Kamsuma Village) Conference
Jamaame (Bangeyni Village) Conference
Kismayo Conference
Kismayo (Gubbokibir)
Kismayo Kaamiirron Conference
Kismayo (Janay-cabdala Village)
Kismayo (Mayonde village) Conference
Kismayo Conference
Gude & Baidoa Conference
Jilib (Gelib) Conference
Kismayo Berhani Conference
Kismayo Berhani Conference
External Events

- UNITAF arrived
- UNOSOM Starts
- UN Evacuation
- Cairo Conference
- Arta Conference
- TFG formed and in place
- Jowhar Conference
- Mukeyle village in B/Burte conference
- Buq-Aqable Conference
- Beletweyne Conference
- Bulo-burde Conference
- Bulo-Burte In Raso Village Conference
- Mahas Conference
Overview of Peace Initiatives in south-central Somalia

Central Regions Timeline (1994-2007)

External Events

- UN Evacuation
- El Nino
- Cairo Conference
- Arta Conference
- TFG formed and in place
- Gaalka’yo Conference
- Dhusamareb Conference
- Gelinsor Conference
- Hobyo Conference
- South Gaalka’yo & Adado Conference

Timeline:
- 1991
- 1992
- 1993
- 1994
- 1995
- 1996
- 1997
- 1998
- 1999
- 2000
- 2001
- 2002
- 2003
- 2004
- 2005
- 2006
- 2007
The Search for Peace

Lower Shabelle Region Timeline (1991-2007)

External Events

UNITAF arrived → UN Evacuation → UNOSOM → El Nino → Cairo Conference → Arta Conference → TFG formed and in place


Mubarak Conference → Mubarak Conference → Qorylie Conference → Afgio Conference

Darsalam Conference → Barawe Conference → Qorylie Conference
Overview of Peace Initiatives in south-central Somalia

TFIs & TFG formed in Kenya

UNOSOM Starts

Cairo Conference

Arta Conference

TFIs & TFG formed in Kenya

11

Gedo Region Timeline (1991-2007)

External Events


UNITAF arrived

UNOSOM Starts

El Nino

Cairo Conference

Arta Conference

Relocation of Government to Baidoa

Bardera Conference

Garbaharey Conference

Garbaharey Conference

B/hawa Conference

El Adde Conference

Garbaharey Conference

Garbaharey Conference

Elwak Conference

Garbaharey Conference

Garbaharey Conference

Garbaharey (Raysqode vilage) Conference
<table>
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<th>Conference</th>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Stakeholders</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Nature of reconciliation</th>
<th>Focus</th>
<th>Funding</th>
<th>Role of external actors</th>
<th>Previous research references</th>
<th>Recorded agreements, media coverage, film</th>
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**Central Regions Peacemapping Inventory**

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### Overview of Peace Initiatives in South-Central Somalia

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**Middle Shabelle Peacemapping Inventory**

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**Lower Shabelle Peacemapping Inventory**

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<td>Written and film</td>
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**Key Roles**: Elders of two clans, JVA authority (Hiraale, Waldire, Ahi Yase).
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<td>Elders of two clans, JVA authority, Brava district authority</td>
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<td>Community co-existence</td>
<td>CRD</td>
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<td>JVA and Brava district authority</td>
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<td>Elders of Sade clan, CRD staff, TFG fact finding mission, Ethiopian delegation.</td>
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**Gedo Region Peacemapping Inventory**

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### Bay and Bakool Peacemapping Inventory

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<tr>
<td>Xudur</td>
<td>Local</td>
<td>Hademe &amp; Afgad (Ogaden)</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>Social</td>
<td>Land ownership dispute</td>
<td>Community</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Solved land conflict and sharing land resources</td>
<td>Elders and politicians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dodale</td>
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<td>Garre &amp; Elay</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>Social</td>
<td>Mutual killing and revenge</td>
<td>Community</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Integration of two clans and Trust</td>
<td>Elders and religious leaders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luq</td>
<td>Two regions</td>
<td>Marehan, Malinwene and Gawawin</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Social</td>
<td>Revenue sharing from check point</td>
<td>Community</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Sharing the income of the check point</td>
<td>Elders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sarmaan and Wajid</td>
<td>Local</td>
<td>Harin and Leysaan</td>
<td>2004-2006</td>
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<td>Unification of RRA factions and reconciliation of the clans supporting the factions</td>
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<td>Limited</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>Elders and women from Digil and Mirifle (Note: Connected to RRA in Wajid conference)</td>
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<td>Togaar Hoos</td>
<td>Local</td>
<td>Dabare and Luwaay</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Social</td>
<td>Ownership of farm land</td>
<td>Community</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Ceasefire, sharing of farmland</td>
<td>Elders and religious group</td>
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The Search for Peace Conference Level Stakeholders Dates Nature of Reconciliation Conflict Focus Funding Role of External Actors Recorded Agreements, Media Coverage, Film Impact Individuals and Groups Who Played Key Roles
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<td>Sharing of salt lake at Aagarar</td>
<td>Community</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Ceasefire, Solution still binding</td>
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<td>Local</td>
<td>El Qode and Boqol Hore</td>
<td>7-11-2006</td>
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<td>Community</td>
<td>Limited</td>
<td>Media coverage</td>
<td>Temporal settlement</td>
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<td>Local</td>
<td>Hubeer and Yantaar</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Social</td>
<td>Ownership dispute of Idale Village, (Idale water catchment is main source of conflict)</td>
<td>Community</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Media coverage</td>
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A CASE STUDY OF THE IDALE PEACE PROCESS

Introduction

The violent conflict that erupted in Idale area in Bay region in 2004 had a tremendous social and economic impact on both the immediate and neighboring communities. The traditional titled elders of the Digil and Mirifle clan family, the Malaqyo, and prominent religious and community leaders strived on several occasions to stop the fighting and facilitate dialogue through peace initiatives. This study focuses on two of these peace efforts, the Elay-led process in November 2005 and the talks initiated by the National Reconciliation Commission (NRC) in January 2007, which together produced an accord that has enabled the communities in conflict to re-integrate and re-establish peaceful co-existence. Of particular interest is the contrast between the Elay-led process, which took place in the absence of a national government or effective administrative structures, and the NRC process, which was carried out after the arrival of the Somali Transitional Federal Government in the area. The study therefore provides interesting contrasts in terms of process management and output. In addition, the study explores issues relating to land ownership, a key source of conflict in Somalia, in the absence of a functioning government. The case study also demonstrates how a local conflict can escalate from an incident between two individuals into broader (sub) clan conflict and draw in other communities. Finally, the Idale initiative provides an example of the way in which politicians can become positively engaged in local peace initiatives as a way of enhancing their position in the eyes of the public and the political milieu.

Background

Idale is a small village in Baidoa district of Bay region on the main road from the regional capital of Baidoa and almost equidistant from it and the key towns of Qansahdhere, Dinsor and Burhakabe. Many trucks use Idale as a stopover when travelling through Dinsor to Bardhere and Middle Juba Region. As well as being an important local transport hub, the village is endowed with land suitable for both agriculture and pastoralism. The sandy soil (dooy) provides good grazing pasture and attracts a large livestock population in the rainy seasons, when the village becomes a centre for business and livestock transaction. About 13-15 kms beyond the village, the rich soil (adable) is typical of riverine agricultural land. Before the violent conflict in Idale, the population, mostly practising agro-pastoralism, was estimated at about 1,200-1,500 people but is currently only about 800 people16.

Historically, Idale area was inhabited by the Elay sub-clan of the Sideed clan of the Digil and Mirifle clan family but subsequently other Digil and Mirifle sub-clans and other clans were attracted by the resources of the area. Today, the predominant clans are the Hubeer and Yantaar sub-clans of the Sagaal clan of Mirifle, who are believed to have migrated from areas between Belet Wein district and Tieglow around 150 years ago17 and are together called “Labadhahood” (meaning the two groups from Daha, Belet Wein and Tieglow), with their linkage further strengthened by a long tradition of inter-marriage. Other clans living in the village include the Geeledle, Hadame, Jilible and Jiroon sub-clans of the Digil and Mirifle clan family.

16 Interviews with elders from Idale, August 2007
17 Interview with Sheikh Mustafa Mukhtar, chairman of Idale village, 3 August 2007, at the village
In common with other Somali pastoral and agricultural communities, traditional conflicts developed in the area over use of water sources and boundaries of agricultural and pasture land. However the communities had established customary law (xeer) to regulate their interactions and co-existence, which was the reference point for resolution of conflict. The specific xeer relating to the community water catchments (war) is a well-established arrangement with a long history (see box).

The Rahanweyn (also known as the Digil and Mirifle) is one of the major Somali clan families and live mostly in the inter-riverine regions of south-central Somalia. The Mirifle is divided into the Sagaal “nine” (including Hadame, Hubeer and Yantaar) and the Sideed “eight” (including Harin, Leysaan and Elay). The Digil is divided into seven clans, the Todobadi aw Digil (including Geledi, Dabare and Garre).

In common with other Somali pastoral and agricultural communities, traditional conflicts developed in the area over use of water sources and boundaries of agricultural and pasture land. However the communities had established customary law (xeer) to regulate their interactions and co-existence, which was the reference point for resolution of conflict. The specific xeer relating to the community water catchments (war) is a well-established arrangement with a long history (see box).

**Traditional Management of Water Catchments (Xeerka Warta)**

A traditional management structure regulates the construction, use and maintenance of water catchments for both pastoral and agricultural communities. According to the tradition for the Digil and Mirifle clan family, the xeer specifies:

- **Aw (warta awshe):** The Father (or “chairman”) of the catchments is a traditional title that is normally inherited but can also be appointed by the community.
- **Sagaale:** Water committee in charge of the day to day activities of the warta.
- **Gob:** Executive member(s) of the water committee
- **Yagoor or Fatiiro:** Community members that participate in the construction and maintenance of the war and have the right to use it. Those outside the community of the war should get permission from the war management to use it.
The Idale conflict between the Hubeer and Yantaar sub-clans arose over use of the water catchments built in 1972 by the former government, which have held water every year since then (with the only exceptions being 1985 and 2007 when the rains failed) and are sufficient to water over 5,000 heads of livestock a day.\(^\text{18}\)

The immediate trigger for the conflict related to a rule that no one can bathe or excrete in the catchments. In early 2004, a nomad from the Hubeer sub-clan bathed in the precious water source, despite the warning from a man from the Yantaar sub-clan that he would kill him if he did so. The nomad went ahead, was shot, and later died from the wound. The incident was not addressed immediately and fighting erupted between the two sub-clans, resulting in one of the most prolonged and devastating conflicts within the Digil and Mirifle clan in Bay and Bakool regions to date.

The fighting began in March 2004, recurred more than five times, and only ended in late 2006 after causing the death of 106 people from both communities, destruction of underground food stores that would have sustained the village population for years, and complete disruption of community life in the area. In the final confrontations the whole village was burned to ashes. A particularly devastating component of the conflict was that the vulnerable members of the community (*birmageydo*), who are normally protected under traditional customary law, were not spared, including the elderly, women, children, and in-laws. The milking cows or goats that provide for the children, and the burden camel that transports women and children in times of crisis such as drought or war, were also killed, which violates another Somali code of war (see the textbox in the Overview for elaboration of the meaning of *birmageydo*).

The underlying tensions that were triggered by the incident at the water catchments appear to relate to competition that had developed between the communities in Idale, where the Yantaar sub-clan constituted the majority of the population and surrounding villages were populated predominantly by the Hubeer sub-clan, particularly centred in Roobay village. As Idale village had flourished over time, many of the Hubeer business people had to depend on Idale for business deals. The tensions and struggles for control of Idale erupted over the incident at the water catchment.

**Trends of conflict in Idale Village**

In the early years after the collapse of the state, the communities in Bay and Bakool regions, including Idale village, are generally seen as having suffered the worst of the impact of the civil war. The area suffered a series of invasions by different clan-based militia factions in 1991-92, with the militia of the defeated government army of Siyaad Barre and subsequently the militia of General Aydiid’s USC faction occupying the area by force and compelling most of the inhabitants to flee to Baidoa, Dinsoor and as far as Mogadishu. Having been historically marginalised in Somalia, the Digil and Mirifle clan communities lacked the military organisation to defend themselves against the other clan-based militia, who occupied their territory, looting and destroying both individual and community property and food stores. Their military vulnerability, coupled with the drought in 1992, led to the devastating famine in Bay and Bakool regions.

The intervention of UNOSOM helped to stop the violence and from 1993-1995 Bay and Bakool regions, including Idale village, were generally stable and free of conflict. However, from 1995 to the present, these regions have been affected by several periods of armed conflict.

Between early 1995 and June 1999, both regions were again occupied by Aydiid’s forces. The clan-based militia of Aydiid’s faction, the Somali National Alliance (SNA), took over Bay and Bakool regions by force.
a few months after the withdrawal of UNOSOM, disbanding the regional administration – the Digil-Mirifle Governing Council – that had been established and other emerging local institutions. Influential Rahanweyn politicians, business people and prominent leaders fled from Baidoa to nearby towns and villages where a series of meetings were held on how to respond to the new dynamic. With their diaspora also engaged, an agreement was reached on the need for an armed Rahanweyn resistance movement to free the regions from Aydiid’s forces and provide local leadership and protection to the community. The Rahanweyn Resistance Army (RRA) was formed on 13 October 1995 at Jhaffey village, west of Baidoa, under the chairmanship of Colonel Hassan Mohamed Nur ‘Shatigaduud’ and an executive committee. The RRA raised funds locally and from abroad and mobilized the local communities to participate in the struggle against the occupying forces. The RRA also received military support from Ethiopia. A long bloody struggle ensued for over 3 years, forcing much of the local population to flee again. Finally, on 6 June 1999, the resistance, with Ethiopian military backing, defeated Aydiid’s forces and asserted overall control, establishing systems of local governance under the auspices of the RRA. Displaced people from Idale and other areas began to return to their villages and farms and resume their disrupted social and economic activities.

In 2000, there was another short-lived round of conflict following the formation of the Transitional National Government (TNG) in Djibouti. Some prominent members of the RRA headed by leading Yantaar and Hubeer politicians joined the TNG and established their base in Idale, where they had strong links. However, the majority of the RRA leaders opposed the new TNG and considered the Idale village as caasi kaay (a “refuge for renegades”) and drove the group out by force.

Finally, in late 2006, Idale was the main theatre for large-scale and heavily armed confrontations between the forces of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), backed by Ethiopian forces, and the Islamic Courts Union (ICU).

Although many regard the creation of the RRA in 1995 as a necessity brought about by Aydiid’s occupation of the two regions, in the process the formerly peaceful and hard-working Digil and Mirifle community became heavily armed and exposed to the culture of violence. This is seen as contributing heavily to the death toll and the level of devastation and displacement in the subsequent internal (intra-RRA) conflict in the area in 2000. The availability of weapons is also seen as a major factor in the increased frequency and devastation of local disputes, such as the Idale conflict.

**Idale timeline**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>UN Evacuation</td>
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<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>UNITAF</td>
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<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>UNOSOM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>Aided Occupation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>RRA Formation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Aided Occupation Ended</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>TFG fight with ICU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Hubeer &amp; Yantaar fight</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>RRA Split</td>
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<td>2000</td>
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<td>2001</td>
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<td>2006</td>
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<tr>
<td>2007</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

19 Eden Booray (Yantaar), Nur Aliyow (Hubeer), late Col. Abdiwahab (Geeliedde) and Shino Moallin Nur (Hadame) were amongst the RRA members who went to Idale. Interview with Abdulkadir Shure
Peace initiatives to resolve the Idale conflict

Preliminary peace initiatives

A series of efforts were made to resolve the recurring Idale conflict and to reconcile the two sub-clans from December 2004 onwards, of which the primary initiatives were:

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<th>Main peace initiatives to resolve the Idale conflict</th>
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<td>Parliamentarians-led peace initiative, Xawaale Barbaar village, 1 January 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elay-led peace initiative, Qansaxdhere, 2 April, 2005</td>
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<tr>
<td>IRDA-led peace initiative, preparation from 1 January 2005, implementation 1 August 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Digil and Mirifle <em>Malaqyo</em>, peace dissemination, February 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Reconciliation Commission-led process, Baidoa, January 2007</td>
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</table>

The first of these was initiated by *Malaqyo* (plural of *Malaq*) of the Sagaal sub-clans of the Mirifle clan in December 2004 at Xagar village and attended by over 100 people from the two parties in conflict, including *Malaqyo*, religious leaders and representatives from other neighbouring communities. The discussions focussed on the deaths in the fighting and lost or expropriated properties, such as livestock, houses and the underground crop stores that are valuable assets for agricultural communities. Agreement was reached on a cessation of hostilities (*colaad joojin*), which was meant to last fifteen days as the first stage in the process but was broken within that period by killings in distant villages by militia who were, most likely, not informed of the peace process. As a result the fighting resumed. Subsequently the same *Malaqyo*, religious leaders and other local stakeholders met again at Xagar village with the same objectives and process but increased representation (with over 200 people attending) and more extensive mobilisation. Again, oral agreement was reached on a cessation of hostility of 15 days, but was soon dishonoured by one party killing innocent people from the other side. The fighting that resumed was even more brutal and damaging than previously.

These initiatives focussed only on the impact of the fighting, such as the killings and raids on livestock, while the root causes of the conflict remained unaddressed. There were also doubts amongst many of those interviewed about the seriousness of intent of the elders involved to resolve the conflict as discussions did not go beyond the stage of a cessation of hostilities (which anyway failed).

“The peace initiatives before the Elay-led effort failed mostly because some elders in mediation process were not honest (*daacad*), and also some neighbouring communities were spoilers of the process they were meant to lead to success.” *An elder in Idale village*

By this time, the recurrence and impact of the conflict in Idale was drawing the attention of the Mirifle business community, politicians, intellectuals and every sensible person from the area, particularly as concerns grew that the conflict could become a regional issue affecting the wider Mirifle community. Intensive discussions ensued among Mirifle social groups in the country and abroad, including among the politicians who had been attending the Somali National Reconciliation conference in Kenya, many of whom were still in Nairobi. After a series of consultations, agreement was reached for the *Malaqyo* to work together with the parliamentarians and politicians from the area to broker a lasting peace agreement between the two sub-clans.

Ten MPs and a number of other delegates arrived from Nairobi in January 2005 while the *Malaqyo*, religious leaders, women peace activists and civil society representatives came from Baidoa and beyond to meet
in Xawaale Barbaar village, near Idale. The conference differed from the two previous attempts in that the underlying conflict over ownership of the village was raised, though it was neither discussed nor resolved. Because the issue was seen as too complex and thorny to address immediately, agreement focussed instead on a 60 day ceasefire, Gaashaansib (“put down the shield”) in the hope that the TFG, still based in Nairobi, would relocate to Somalia within this period and intervene to complete the peace process. In the event, the TFG did not relocate to Baidoa at this stage, the ceasefire was broken, and the community’s hopes for the return of peace were dashed for the third time.

**Issues of land ownership**

Some of the problematic issues underlying the questions of land ownership in the Somali context relate to rights of residence, access, for use by livestock, for agriculture, as well as rights to buy or sell land and property. Under Siyaad Barre, the government nationalized all land in 1975, nullifying customary property rights: all land belonged to the state. In contrast, customary law recognizes those who have historically inhabited, farmed, or grazed their livestock in different areas but, in some cases, these customary rights have been undermined since the collapse of the state, for example, through forceful occupation by groups with greater military power than the traditional inhabitants.

Land and property rights also bring other potential benefits such as the ability to raise taxes, greater control over economic resources, and political influence on local councils. These factors relating to control of territory can engage the interest of local politicians aiming to broaden their influence, including at national level.

**The Elay-led peace initiative**

In April 2005, the next attempt to resolve the crisis was initiated by thirty-seven Malaqyo, elders and religious people from the communities of the surrounding towns and villages of Qansaxdhere, Ufrow, Duurey, Eemad, Burhakabe, Bardale and Tooseweyn at a meeting in Qansaxdhere.

While the previous attempt had been organized by elders of sub-clans related to the sub-clans in conflict, this initiative was led by elders from a sub-clan outside the immediate conflict, the Elay sub-clan. (The Hubeer and Yantaar sub-clans are from the Sagaal clan and the Elay sub-clan from the Sideed clan of the Mirifle clan family.) This generated confidence that they could be neutral and honest peace-makers in the conflict. Furthermore, the Elay are believed to be the earliest settlers of the fertile adable land of Bay region, including Idale village, and therefore could be trusted to identify true ownership of the area in dispute.

The Elay sub-clan is believed to be the traditional historical owner of adable land (carro boorow), as reflected in the old saying “Arro Boorow ay leh? Elay” (“Who owns the fertile red land? Elay owns it”).

Both organizers and participants included the neighbouring clans that were potential spoilers of any agreement between the Hubeer and Yantaar sub-clans.

The Elay elders set out from Burhakaba, travelling to Baidoa to mobilize other communities and engage all clans living in or neighbouring the conflict area and with any potential interest in the Idale conflict. All these stakeholders were represented in the mediation committee. Women’s groups and other peace activists in Baidoa played active roles in this mobilisation process and, although they were not allowed to sit in the meeting (gogosha), women engaged as a pressure group and witnesses of the mediation process.

Each of the two communities in conflict selected a committee (Guddi) of twenty elders to represent them in the dialogue. The reconciliation process followed the traditional procedure as described below:
• Three chairmen (Shirguddoon) and a secretary were appointed.
• The parties in conflict expressed their commitment publicly to accept the mediating committee’s judgement (Qoordhiibasho or Walaayo-dhiibasho).
• Dialogue was opened between the two parties to present their cases and concerns, with enough time allocated by the shir for the groups to make their respective counts of deaths, livestock raided, and other properties and assets lost through acts committed allegedly by the opposing party.
• A fact-finding mission was conducted in September 2005 by the mediation committee with delegates from the two parties to Idale village and other disputed areas. They saw the wells, water catchments, farms, pastureland, burned houses and damaged mosques and met with the other communities in Idale area to identify the truth about the claims made by the two parties in conflict, the Hubeer and Yantaar.
• After the assessment mission, the committee began its reflections for decision-making on the violent conflict and the issue of ownership of Idale village.

During this process, the mediation committee asked the following questions:
• Who planted the oldest trees in the village?
• Who owns most of the water catchments around the village?
• Who built the oldest mosques?

All agreed that the answer was the Yantaar and the committee based its subsequent decisions on this. Its tough conclusions attempted to address the underlying cause of the conflict, which had not been tackled in the earlier failed peace initiatives. The main points in the decision were:

1. The initiator and aggressor in the conflict was the Hubeer.
3. The land where the Idale village is situated belongs to the Yantaar sub-clan.

The decision was signed by thirty-three members of the mediation committee but the four elders from Qansaxdhere declined to sign because their clans were allied to the Hubeer sub-clan. Neither of the two parties in conflict signed and the meeting ended.

Having learned that most of the farms belonged to the Yantaar sub-clan and most of the old trees were planted by them as well, the mediation committee affirmed that their decision was based on Shari’a law that states “land belongs to those who till it”. But, since one party did not accept the decision, it was not an all-inclusive agreement. The ceasefire broke down and further killings ensued between the two parties. However the initiative was critical because for the first time the “untouchable” underlying issue was explored and progress was made towards resolution of this recurring conflict.

**IRDA-led peace initiative, January 2005**

In late 2004, intellectuals from the Hubeer and Yantaar sub-clans began meeting in Nairobi to discuss the conflict in Idale, the failed peace initiatives, and what could be done to achieve a more reliable and action-oriented initiative to end the protracted conflict. The group included the management of a local organization, the Inter-Riverine Development Agency (IRDA), based in Baidoa and a group of peace supporters from Idale and Qansaxdhere areas. IRDA was delegated to approach international donors to raise funds for a peace process but, first, IRDA returned to the community Malaqyo, religious leaders and influential people to get their approval in writing for the initiative. The Canadian International Development Agency agreed to support the proposal through IRDA, which began its preparatory activities on 20 January 2005 with the establishment, in consultation with the Idale stakeholders, of the Project Community Committee (PCC).
The committee consisted of two elders each from the Hubeer and Yantaar sub-clans and three Asharaf\textsuperscript{21} elders from Dinsoor, which was selected as the operational centre for the process because of its perceived neutrality for the two communities in conflict. Three members from IRDA were assigned to facilitate the peace process and assist the committee.

The initiative was launched at a point when the conflict was not active but tension and mistrust were high. The committee and IRDA conducted a series of shuttle diplomacy missions and consultations with the two parties at their own bases to foster understanding of the proposal before convincing the two parties to agree to the mediation of the Hubeer, Yantaar and Asharaf elders. The first phase of the peace conference was held at Hawaala Barbaar (the stronghold of the Hubeer sub-clan) from 3-5 March 2005 with 120 people from the two parties attending. Agreement was reached to postpone the controversial core issue of the conflict and focus on implementation of other points in the accord, including the ceasefire.

The second and final phase of the reconciliation process was to be convened at Hagarkaa village of the Yantaar sub-clan in early June 2006. However, IRDA was not able to mobilize the required funds in time and by early July the emergence of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) had reached Idale area, affecting the framework of the process. The peace accord was breached in November 2006 when a Hubeer militia killed a Yantaar and revenge killing followed.

**National Reconciliation Commission-led peace initiative**

The National Reconciliation Commission (NRC) was established by the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and the Transitional Federal Parliament as part of the Transitional Federal Charter in 2005 with the task of facilitating reconciliation throughout the country. The commission began its work by sending a mission to Idale on 23 November 2006, consisting of: five members of the NRC; four Malaqyo of Bay region; four prominent religious leaders from Bay region; and five members of the Hubeer and Yantaar.

The first objective was to establish a cessation of hostilities of fifteen days: this was agreed and signed by prominent elders from each sub-clan. The next step was for each party to send a fifteen member delegation to Baidoa to engage in dialogue and reconciliation between the parties and to end the three year old conflict through a solid and effective peace agreement.

Soon after the end of the period of the cessation of hostilities, heavy fighting erupted at Idale village\textsuperscript{22} and its environs between the forces of the TFG, with Ethiopian military support, and the ICU. The entire area became a battlefield, compelling the local population to flee to other villages and Baidoa town. The NRC extended the cessation of hostilities for a further ten days in the hope that the military confrontation would be rapidly concluded and although it did not, the period of the second cessation of hostilities ended without any incidents between the two sub-clans. This was taken as a signal that the authority of the NRC was recognized by the two communities in conflict (although the large-scale military confrontation between the TFG and Ethiopian forces and the ICU in Idale and its environs was certainly another factor).

The NRC opened the dialogue process in Baidoa in a meeting attended by selected prominent persons from the wider Mirifle community: Malaqyo, religious leaders from Baidoa, the delegations of fifteen prominent people from the two sub-clans in conflict, and representatives of neighbouring clans. Politicians associated with the concerned communities and women’s peace groups were actively engaged in mobilising support and pressuring the parties for a final consensual agreement.

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\textsuperscript{21} Asharaf is one of the Digile and Mirifle clans. It is traditionally respected as a religious community that never fights and mediates between other conflicting communities.

\textsuperscript{22} Some key military leaders of the ICU were from Idale and made it their stronghold.
As before, each sub-clan appointed four people to present their case and concerns on their behalf. The major issues were discussed and agreed as follows:

- All losses and damages were presented but it was agreed to forgive past actions based on the expression “Walaagi sanad hore la ha dhaafay lankii sheegada litun” (“The one who claims the issues of last year is a bad person”).
- Movable assets and property belong to his or her legal owner and shall be given back to the rightful owner.
- Land, including Idale village, belongs to Allah but the state will manage it through the municipality.
- The water catchments that triggered the conflict shall be managed by the municipality of the village and their security shall be managed by the police.

A heated debate surfaced between the two parties when the chairmanship of Idale municipal council was to be decided. This is a position of influence, enhancing the political status of the community or sub-clan of the chairman. The mediation committee proposed resolving the matter by drawing lots (qori-tuur) but the Yantaar sub-clan refused as they believe firmly that they are the rightful owner of the village. The deadlock that developed could not be easily resolved. Four prominent and influential religious people from the two clans in the mediation committee interceded bravely, speaking separately from religious and cultural perspectives to their respective sub-clan delegates and convincing them to accept the committee's decision. The sheikhs of the Hubeer sub-clan persuaded their group to withdraw from the contest for the chairmanship and they accepted while the religious elders of the Yantaar sub-clan encouraged their kin to accept the decision even if it entailed giving up the whole village for the sake of peace. This represented a powerful illustration of the importance of the religion and of respected religious community leaders in resolving critical deadlocks.

Following the private consultations and intercession of the religious leaders, the mediation committee released their decision and it was accepted by both parties, with the conference concluding successfully on 15 January 2007 in Baidoa (see annex for the agreement and other relevant documents). The peace accord was disseminated to the people of Idale village and the Digil and Mirifle community through meetings and the local media.

When the NRC and the elders went to Idale to meet the community and disseminate the agreement, an elder who organized the meeting told the people “Minki isiin gubteen, magaar ma yaalo, meysinka martaaqaade, bambaska ka fadheeda” (“You have burned the house - there is no skin [mat] to sit on, what should I offer you to sit on? Sit on the ashes”).

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I lived most of my life in Idale village. I had a family, a house and a small business. The successive wars destroyed our home and business and displaced us to Baidoa. We returned several times to the village when reconciliation or ceasefires were announced but all of them were unsustainable except the last one. During the resource mobilisation by a women’s pressure group for the last peace effort, I was asked to contribute. I had nothing to offer except a new skirt that I had bought a few days earlier for 40,000 shillings. I sold it for 25,000 shillings and gave that as a contribution. Seeing a peaceful Idale once again was more important than anything else.

Khadija Moallin Madjirow, a woman from Idale

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Analysis of the resolution of the Idale conflict

The two peace initiatives organized by the neighbouring clans and led by the Elay Malaqyo and the National Reconciliation Commission respectively are the primary focus of the analysis as the processes are closely connected and contributed together to the successful conclusion of the conflict in Idale.

Conflict and peace dynamics

Tension had been simmering in the area of Idale village since 2000 and the conflict that was triggered by an incident at the public water catchment rapidly deteriorated into a struggle for ownership of the (relatively) valuable resources of Idale village and its environs. Although the two groups in conflict are from the same clan lineage, with their ties reinforced historically by frequent inter-marriage, the violence escalated with the covert engagement of neighbouring clans with their own agendas. The issue of ownership was so problematic that when it surfaced for the first time (during the process led by the parliamentarians), the mediators avoided addressing it directly as several members of the mediation committee were influenced by their own respective clan interests. These included the agendas of some cohabiting or neighbouring clans to weaken or even displace one of the sub-clans in order to have a more dominant role in decision-making in the affairs of Idale village.

The repeated failures and subsequent resumption of fighting in the area, with the associated risk of escalation involving the wider Mirifle clan community, caught the attention of the politicians and intellectuals who had been attending the national peace talks in Kenya and their arrival in the area from Nairobi in early 2005 added momentum to efforts to resolve the conflict. The mission came with its own film crew and generated wide publicity in the local media, which encouraged the community of Baidoa, the regional capital, to mobilise for peace.

Further momentum was provided when the Transitional Federal Government relocated to Baidoa in early 2006. The National Reconciliation Commission prioritised resolution of the Idale issue, which was the only active conflict in Bay and Bakool regions where the TFG was to be based and the only area at the time in which it exercised full authority.

It appears that these factors contributed to the possibility, in the last two complementary peace initiatives, of addressing the underlying issues, with the mediation committees of both these initiatives able to investigate and make decisions on the critical question of ownership of Idale village and its environs.

Actors, management of the process, and quality of the mediation

Although the initiative led by the parliamentarians ultimately avoided addressing the underlying issue of ownership of the village, in part because of divisions within the team according to clan interests, the parliamentarians were credited as being genuine in their intent and avoided adding fuel to the fire. (Some interpreted this as relating to the MPs’ interests in being seen as exercising a positive influence in the hope this would generate benefits in power-sharing arrangements within the Digil and Mirifle community.)

The significant feature of the initiatives led by the Elay Malaqyo and subsequently by the NRC is that in both cases they included not only representatives of the two sub-clans in conflict but also those of neighbouring communities, including those who might have interests in the conflict or its resolution and those who could be spoilers of any peace agreement. These stakeholders played roles both as organisers and participants in the process.

Both the Elay Malaqyo and other elders and leaders involved in the process were respected figures within the broader community. In addition, the Elay sub-clan was seen as being able to play the role of honest
broker, as there were no immediate conflicts of interest, as well as being the historical “owner of the red soil” and therefore able to arbitrate on issues of ownership.

Broad mobilisation for the process was undertaken by the Elay elders visiting neighbouring communities to engage them and by women peace activists and other civic actors in Baidoa and the environs of Idale, ensuring an inclusive process. Subsequently, although the women were not allowed to sit in the meeting itself (as the traditional Somali conflict resolution process is solely managed by men), the pressure group the women formed in Baidoa played a vital role as witness to how the mediation was being managed and in lobbying for a peaceful resolution.

The subsequent peace initiative led by the NRC built on these constructive dynamics. It also had broad representation of respected figures, such as the Malaqyo and religious leaders, and from the wider Mirifle clan rather than being confined only to those from the Hubeer and Yantaar. The women’s groups, other civic activists, and politicians related to the community were again actively engaged in mobilisation and exerting pressure for an effective process with a conclusive consensual outcome.

Some of those who were observers or participants in the series of Idale peace efforts perceived the elders to be more united and determined to resolve the conflict in the final NRC-led process, primarily because the communities were war-weary and possibly also because of the higher stakes (on the one hand, the risk of a widening conflict and on the other, the opportunities presented for the Digil and Mirifle community by the relocation of the TFG to Baidoa).

In both cases, the processes were widely seen as both inclusive and transparent, with open discussion of the issues and local media broadcasts of the proceedings generating public debate and promoting popular engagement. This enabled those concerned with the success of the process to identify potential spoilers and expose them to the genuine stakeholders in order both to prevent damage to the process and to accommodate their interests as far as possible. An example is the allocation of the position of village chief of police to a member of the Geeledle sub-clan, who were not one of the parties in the conflict but have a stake in Idale (see below.)

While both initiatives followed the procedures of traditional conflict resolution – listening to the grievances of all parties and considering their claims in terms of xeer and shari’a - a critical difference in the second process was the potential capacity of the NRC, a government body, to reinforce the accord reached.

**Funding of the process, ownership and legitimacy**

In line with the traditional conflict resolution system, the expenses of the Elay-led process were met by the clans involved through cash and in-kind contributions, which is normally seen as critical to community ownership of the outcome. In contrast, the expenses of the NRC initiative were covered by the TFG.

Nevertheless, the inclusivity of both processes, combined with effective mobilisation of both rural and urban communities, generated a higher level of ownership in both cases compared to earlier initiatives. Both the parties in conflict and other stakeholders were engaged at all stages of the process, with deliberations and negotiations carried out at all levels. This broad representation is also reflected in the arbitration committee for the NRC-led process, consisting of sixteen community representatives and four NRC members. From this it can be deduced there was a high degree of ownership by the communities.

The NRC, as a government body, is not part of the traditional mediation system, but it was seen as playing a reinforcing role that gave the process greater legitimacy and enhanced the commitment of the stakeholders to the accord reached.
Quality of the peace accords, dissemination, follow-up and impact

The meditation committees of both of the peace initiatives under consideration reached separate but reinforcing decisions.

In the Elay-led process, the investigation concluded that the Hubeer were the aggressors and responsible for some of the worst violations of the traditional norms of war in the fighting with the Yantaar who were seen as the victims and true owners of the village. However the mediation team could not reach consensus on this. Consequently, the proposed agreement was never accepted as a peace accord that bound the two communities and compelled them to desist from further confrontations. In line with that, no penalties were defined for violations, although the mediators appealed to elders and influential people in the wider Digil and Mirifle community to support implementation of the agreement. As a result, the process had little immediate positive impact on the divided communities and their shattered social fabric.

The second accord reached through the NRC-led initiative is more explicit and comprehensive. It states that no claims can be made for compensation for deaths, losses or destruction in the fighting and defines ownership of the village as belonging to Allah, meaning that any Somali can live there who has appropriate documentation indicating property ownership in the locality. However it specifies prioritisation of one group, the Yantaar sub-clan, in the administrative management of the village, which is consistent with the discussions in the Elay-led initiative that indicated their ownership of the village. The agreement also determines heavy penalties for anyone repudiating or breaching the accord.

A critical difference between the two processes is that the accord in the NRC-led initiative was reached in a very different social-political environment, namely in the presence of a government (after the relocation of the TFG to Baidoa). This is reflected in the tone of the agreement, which, far from being reconciliatory, is written as an order that begins with penalties for any breaches.

This is also a potential weakness in the accord, which may need to be strengthened at the grassroots level through sensitisation and community mobilisation in order to ensure that the process is sustainable, restores shattered relations, and achieves lasting peace. Although the NRC, the Malaqyo and participants went to Idale to inform the two groups and neighbouring communities of the consensual agreement reached and held a ceremony at which the accord was read out and explained, this was a brief process with no planned follow-up. Consolidation of the accord could perhaps best be achieved through a community-based initiative led by the Malaqyo and social groups from the communities.

Aside from this potential weakness, a fundamental component of the sustainability of the peace accord was addressed immediately after its conclusion through the formation of an inclusive administration for the village, together with establishment of a police station. This was achieved in joint consultations between the Malaqyo, the politicians of the area, and the government, and, in line with the spirit of the accord, the chairmanship was allocated to a member of the Yantaar sub-clan, the deputy chair to a member of the Hubeer sub-clan, and the chief of the police station to another sub-clan in the area, the Geeladle. The village council was formed through an inclusive community consultation process and comprises all clans inhabiting the area, including those who are not part of the Digil and Mirifle clan family, and has been functioning effectively for over six months.

If an inclusive and effective administration is established, we will get peace and prosperity. An elder speaking at a meeting in Idale, 3 August 2007.

24 CRD has been approached by Idale community elders and some parliamentarians to assist them with consolidation of the agreement and this proposal is under review.
Watering livestock at Idale water catchments

Idale elders discuss the peace agreement, focus group discussion, Idale village, August 2007.
The Search for Peace

Family house at Idale village

The Hiran Council of Elders meet every week under trees on the river bank in Belet Wein town to discuss conflict management.
The true spirit of reconciliation - members of the two communities (many of whom are related through marriage) are re-united after the mini-conferences in Bandiradley and El Hur, June 2006

Militia leaders from the Sa’ad and Saleman communities meet in south Gaalka’yo for sensitisation and training in conflict management, April 2006
A woman from the women’s pressure group urges elders at the Adado conference to drop past grievances and focus on the future, 16 February 2007.

The Sa’ad chair and a Salamian elder embrace at the successful conclusion of the Adado conference, February 2007.
The presence and the involvement of the TFG, as an authority in the area, are generally seen as fundamental to the success of the NRC-led process and the sustainability of the accord, which does not differ markedly in essence from the Elay-led effort.

Most importantly, the agreement, and its subsequent manifestation through establishment of an inclusive village council, has had a tangible positive impact on the many members of the Idale community forced to flee to Baidoa and nearby villages and who are now able to return. The two sub-clans have re-established co-existence, using the same market and sharing water sources and grazing land. The returnees have started to rebuild their destroyed houses and businesses, with retail kiosks and teashops visible again along the main road of the village.

Conclusions

Some of the factors identified as critical to the successful resolution of the Idale conflict are:

- Inclusion in the mediation team of prominent, respected and trusted religious leaders able to exert a positive influence on the process;
- Commitment of the elders of the communities in conflict and neighbouring clans to resolve the issue;
- War fatigue of the communities in conflict (and their neighbours);\(^{25}\)
- Active interest of politicians and the business community of the area in resolving the conflict;
- Attention to the issues underlying the immediate conflict;
- Care in addressing the interests of a potential spoiler group;
- Ability to enforce implementation of the accord (in this case through the TFG, which was in a strong position in the area)

The critical juncture in the process, relating to the issue of ownership of the village and land, was resolved in a unique way. Overtly, the issue was deferred by identifying all land as belonging to Allah and managed by the state. However the implicit resolution of this core issue was to provide the chairmanship of the village to the group identified as the historical owner.

An interesting precedent was set in the accord reached, namely that ownership of land cannot be claimed by a clan or a person without property deeds proving legal ownership. While this may be useful for application in similar conflicts, a strong and effective implementing agency is required to enforce such decisions. The administrative structure established in Idale through a consensual community-based process, and subsequently in other parts of Bay and Bakool regions, may be able to reinforce community-based agreements of this nature.

The NRC-led process in Idale is also notable for providing the only example to date of a local conflict resolution led and supported by a national government, the TFG, since the collapse of the state in 1991. Resolutions of over 90 community-based conflicts during this period have been the achievements of traditional and religious leaders, business people, and members of civil society, including women peace activists.

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\(^{25}\) Raised at a meeting of the CPD research team with Idale community at the village on August 4, 2007 review.
THE HIRAN COUNCIL OF ELDERS IN ACTION—CONFLICT RESOLUTION BETWEEN THE JIJEELE AND GAALJE’EL CLANS

Introduction

The violent conflict that erupted in Belet Wein town in June 2005 between two clans, the Jijeele and Gaalje’el, had an immediate and devastating effect on the citizens and businesses in the town and beyond, threatening to destabilise this relatively peaceful area of south-central Somalia. A distinctive feature of the subsequent peace initiative is the striking role played by the Ugaas of the Hawadle clan and the Hiran Council of Elders in mobilizing community support for a swift intervention to end the fighting and establish dialogue. This provides an example of good practice for other traditional leaders and communities.

This case study demonstrates how national political processes and decisions taken by clan representatives at the national level can influence local community dynamics at the grassroots level. The study also illustrates how a powerful third party clan can intervene in an active conflict and facilitate a negotiated peace accord with its own resources through a united, transparent and consultative approach.

Map of the affected area of Hiran region
**Background**

Hiran region is situated in the central part of Somalia, bordering Gaadud region to the northeast, Middle Shabelle to the southeast, Bay and Bakol regions to the south west, and Ethiopia in the west. It consists of the five districts of Belet Wein (the regional capital), Bulo-Burte, Jalalaqsi, Mahas, and Mataban and the sixth district of Budqa Aqable, created in 2007 by the Transitional Federal Government (TFG).

The region covers an area of about 34,000 square kilometres and has the dry climate and terrain typical of regions in the central zone. The Shabelle River passes through it, providing the basis for agriculture in all six districts. Cultivation has increased markedly since the collapse of the state and agricultural produce is traded with Puntland and Somaliland as well as Ethiopia. The region also has good grazing for livestock, on which most of the population depend for their livelihood, including through livestock export to the Gulf. The estimated population of half a million people belong to fourteen clans, with the major clans inhabiting Belet Wein district comprising the Hawadle, Galje’el, Jijeele, Baadiadde and Makanne sub-clans of the Hawiye clan family. Hiran region is renowned for producing a number of prominent national political figures, including the head of the Somali Local Administration who led Somalia to independence, the late Abdullahi Isse, and the first Somali President, the late Aden Abdulle Osman, both of whom came from Belet Wein.

**Trends of conflict between the Jijeele and Gaalje’el clans**

Inter- and intra-clan conflicts are a common phenomenon in pastoral communities, some of which are resolved immediately while others become intractable, with clan alliances and spoilers developing to complicate the dynamics further. The disputes between the Jijeele and the Gaalje’el clans of the Hawiye clan family date back to the colonial administration, which demarcated boundaries for the different clans in the region as a way of giving each clan the right to allow or refuse other clans to inhabit or graze their livestock in the clan’s territory. The first recorded conflict between the Jijeele and the Abtisame sub-clan of the Gaalje’el dates back to the 1960s when the government intervened to resolve the matter by referring to the clan borders established by the Italian colonialists.

The Jijeele and Gaalje’el pastoral communities live in western Belet Wein district on the west of the Shabelle River, with the Jijeele historically inhabiting the northwest and the Gaalje’el the southwest (see the map). However the pasture to the north, including in the Ogaden region of Ethiopia, is richer and more suitable for livestock, attracting the Gaalje’el pastoralists towards the grazing land of the Jijeele. There is a general tendency amongst pastoral communities to migrate towards more fertile pastures, either through negotiation with the indigenous inhabitants or by force. In this case, the Gaalje’el community, including the Abtisame sub-clan, has been moving from the southwest northwards steadily into the Jijeele territory through negotiation over some years.

There are also historical grievances between the Jijeele and one of the Abtisame sub-clan of the Gaalje’el, who live mainly in villages in the area adjoining Hiran and Middle Shabelle regions, around the main small town of Buqda Aqable. Under the civilian government in the 1960s, the Abtisame supported the government party and held prominent ministerial posts such as defence and finance. In return, the Somali civilian administrations established schools in the villages inhabited by the Abtisame, which provided them with educational opportunities for their children who could then further their studies in Belet Wein, the capital Mogadishu, or aboard. Others were part of the labour migration to the Gulf States in the heyday of the 1970s and returned with financial resources to set up in business, particularly in livestock export.

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26 Makanne sub-clan is generally considered to belong to the Hawiye clan family, close to the Jijeele sub-clan. However in the wider Somali context, Makanne is considered to be part of the Gareer-Wiene family.

27 During the Italian colonial period, General Forti, who administrated Hiran region, demarcated territories for each clan in the region. Do we have a date for this?

28 CRD interview with an elder of the Jijeele clan, Omar Aden Farah, in Belet Wein on 28 August 2007
In contrast, the Jjjele lacked both influence in government circles and educational opportunities for their children in their local villages. Historically they have felt at a disadvantage to the Abtisame sub-clan in terms of education, opportunities, and access to financial resources.

The disparities in access to education have been further accentuated by the historical migratory patterns of the two groups. The general trend of the Jijeele community to move towards the good pastures of the northwest into Ethiopia Zone 5 has taken them away from Belet Weine town where schools are situated. In contrast, the Abtisames's migration has been from the southwest towards Belet Weine and into the Jijeele's historical territory. This movement was accentuated after the central government collapsed in 1991 and people were forced to retreat from urban centres to their traditional clan territory. The Abtisame moved in large numbers into Belet Weine and to Buqda Aqable town and the villages abandoned partially or completely by the Jijeele community and were wealthier (though not necessarily better armed). In the late 1990s, the competition between the elite and business people of the two communities became overt with armed conflicts erupting on several occasions.

Another unresolved issue contributing to the conflict between the Jijeele and Gaalje’el communities relates to the perceived role of the Jijeele in an internal dispute within the Gaalje’el. In 2004, problems surfaced between the ‘Aafi and the Abtisame sub-clans of the Gaalje’el, who live together and share the same grazing lands and wells. Reports indicated that the ‘Aafi sub-clan committed a number of offences, including several rapes, obstruction of humanitarian assistance, and refusal to pay diya compensation as specified under customary law. One example was sabotage by the ‘Aafi of the construction of a well by the Abtisame, claiming that “the land for the well does not belong to the Abtisame” whereas the Abtisame asserted that “There has never been a boundary between us” . The ‘Aafi was also competing for the hegemony of western Belet Weine district. During this period of conflict between the ‘Aafi and Abtisame sub-clans, the Jijeele sub-clan was perceived to have allied with the ‘Aafi, which created tension and hostility between the Abtisame and the Jijeele.

It appears therefore that there were a number of underlying tensions that contributed to the eruption of violent conflict between the Jijeele and Gaalje’el clans in 2005. These included: unresolved historical grievances and animosity between the two communities; the perceived threat to the Jijeele of losing control of part of Belet Weine town to the Gaalje’el; and the rapid migration of the Abtisame sub-clan of Gaalje’el into Jijeele territory without their permission.

The incident that triggered the recent violent conflict between the two communities occurred during a period in which the Jijeele had requested the Abtisame to leave their territory. The latter had agreed and the evacuation of the Abtisame people had begun. A number of Gaalje’el clan elders had been sent to Maroodile, about 25 km west of Belet Weine, to talk to the communities, reassure the Jijeele, and ensure no confrontations occurred during the process. However, on 3 June 2005, before the elders reached the Jijeele community at Maroodile, Jijeele militia killed an Abtisame man and injured another, also firing at the peace mission of elders . News of the incident reached Belet Weine town and tension rose between the two communities living in the area and sharing the same market and business centre, ‘Toorobooro’, a long overcrowded strip of shops and businesses.

Over the next two days, many elders and other influential people from the two communities tried to contain the conflict and avert its escalation into the town. Business people and intellectuals from the Dirsame sub-clan of the Gaalje’el called a meeting with members of the Jijeele in Belet Weine, secondary school on the morning of 6 June 2005 to appeal for peace but the Jijeele questioned the neutrality of the Dirsame sub-
clan in the conflict and left the meeting. The Dirsame people asked the broader Gugundhabe clan to take over the “fire-fighting” efforts but before they could intervene, in the late afternoon of 6 June 2005 the Jjeele instigated fighting at Toorobooro market. Although the fighting erupted with little notice or preparation on either side, it caused enormous damage.

The impact of the conflict

The social and economic life of all the communities in Belet Wein was significantly affected by the eruption of violent conflict:

- Deaths of thirty eight innocent civilians in gunfire in the east and west of the town. There were also militia casualties.
- Mass displacement of the civilian population from the conflict area

Civilians left almost all of western Belet Wein, migrating mostly to rural villages, which have no basic services. Some families managed to cross the river to the east or travel via a long sandy road connecting the west and east of the town.

- Emergence of a “green line” between the communities of the Jjeele and Gaalje’el

The conflict resulted in each sub-clan moving to one side of a road that now divides the two groups who had previously co-existed without restrictions.

The history of “green lines” in Belet Wein town

The first “green line” emerged in Belet Wein town in 1991 after the clan-based militia of the USC faction conquered and occupied the town in order to ensure that the critical Belet Wein bridge was not destroyed by the defeated government army. Control of the bridge was handed to militia from the Makanne clan but by early 1992 the bridge had become an important resource through extortion from transport and the Makanne elders removed their militia from the bridge to avoid potential disputes over the extortion money. The “green line” was re-established at the western bridge in 2000 by militia from the Gaalje’el and Jjeele who shared the revenue generated from transport on the bridge. In time, the “green line” became a well-established and lucrative means of extorting money from international aid agencies, which were unable to cross the bridge and instead hired separate cars at both ends of the town (from the Gaalje’el and Jjeele respectively).

The “green line” at the bridge was dissolved during the disengagement of the Gaalje’el and Jjeele militia, as will be seen below. However, the conflict produced a new “green line” between the two communities, signified by the main road from the bridge, which divides the western part of the town into two parts. Each community moved to one side of the road, with families on the “wrong side” selling their houses to move to their new area. Although no militia or checkpoints are positioned on the “green line”, it represents a psychological separation of the two communities. It is notable that the Toorobooro market continues to be shared by the business community of the two clans and is unaffected by the “green line” due to over-riding shared economic interests.
Timeline of the Jijeele and Galje’el conflict trends and peace initiatives

- **Jijeele & Abtisame**
  - 03/06/05: Peace Accord conducted after 6 months
  - 10/6/05: Ceasefire
  - 10-11/06/07: Peace consultation led by Hawadle
  - 12/06/07: Ceasefire
  - 13-14/06/07: Peace dialogue

- **Caafi & Abisame**
  - 06/06/05: Peace Accord conducted after 6 months
  - 06/06/07: Dirsime peace initiatives

- **Hiran Peace Caravan**
  - 10/6/05: Ceasefire
  - 10-11/06/07: Peace consultation led by Hawadle

- **Government (Italian borders)**


- Conflict Trends: Jijeele & Abtisame, Caafi & Sugow, 03/06/05 Jijeele & Abtisame, 06/06/05 Jijeele & Abtisame, 10/6/05 Ceasefire, 10-11/06/07 peace consultation led by Hawadle, 12/06/07 Ceasefire, 13-14/06/07 peace dialogue
The origins of the peace initiative

When the fighting between the Gaalje’el and Jijeele erupted in Belet Wein town, the Hiran Council of Elders, comprising the traditional titled elders (Ugaas) of Hiran region, met to discuss how to end the violent conflict. The Hawadle clan (of the Hawiye clan family), which has its business and assets concentrated in Belet Wein, comprises 40% of the council and has a respected leadership, agreed to initiate a peace process and a group of Hawadle elders were delegated by the Ugaas of Hawadle and the Council of Elders to take the lead.

The effective telecommunication system in the area enabled the Hawadle elders to contact both parties to the conflict and appeal for an immediate cessation of hostilities and dialogue. Both parties responded positively and peace missions were dispatched to invite them for a consultation meeting.

Women peace activists from all the clans of the town played a remarkable role in mobilising the titled elders, the public, the youth and students to engage in the peace process. They prepared and distributed hundreds of white flags with peace messages with the motto “Dagaal Sokeeye Doonimeyno” (“we do not want fighting”). The women approached the militia leaders courageously to beg them to stop the fighting, promising to assist them with seed money to start businesses and for girls to marry.

By the fifth day of the confrontation, on 12 June 2005, the Hawadle community had organised a disengagement force of 450 men led by General Mukhtar Hussein Afrah and including about 50 men from the Makanne sub-clan of the Gugundhabe. That afternoon the forces intervened to separate the militia of the two clans by about 200 metres. One man was killed and another injured from the disengagement forces in the process and the Hawadle clan paid the diya (compensation) to their clans.

The following day, on 13 June 2005, the Hawadle elders who had been delegated to lead the peace process proposed to the elders of the Jijeele and Gaalje’el that separate meetings be held as the first step towards a reconciliation process between the two communities. The peace mission met with the Jijeele group at Bashir Moalin hotel, while the consultation with the Gaalje’el was held at the former regional veterinary centre, both in the west of the town. Both parties consented to the peace initiative and appointed fifteen delegates to represent them in the dialogue process.

The dialogue began on 14 June 2005 at the Hiran Public Library, later moving to the Hotel Medina before concluding four days later at the Library. Both venues are in the area of town dominated by the Hawadle and seen as neutral and secure by both sides. An additional benefit of venue is that behind it is the Shabelle riverbank with its big old trees, where the Hiran Council of Elders meet in the mornings to brief each other and discuss issues that need to be addressed.

The objectives of the peace initiative

The peace initiative aimed to address the question “Sidee Gaalje’el iyo Jujeele u dhaqmeysaan?” (“How do the Gaalje’el and the Jijeele want to live together?”) and in particular how to:

1. Sustain the ceasefire
2. End the hostility between the Jijeele and Gaalje’el communities and restore peaceful coexistence of the two communities
3. Resolve compensation relating to deaths and damages in the conflict
The actors and participants

The participants in the peace process included not only representatives of the two parties in conflict, the Jijeele and Gaalje’el (including the Abtisame, ‘Aafi, and Dirsame sub-clan), but also the Hawadle, the Baadiadde and Makanne sub-clans of the Gugundhabe clan, and other clans living in the district. No clan or sub clan was excluded from the process. Delegations of fifteen elders from the Jijeele and the Abtisame and Dirsame sub-clans of the Gaalje’el represented their kin in the dialogue.

Women peace activists and other citizens were actively engaged in the overall process (see below) although, in line with Somali tradition, they did not participate in the formal mediation.

The mediation committee comprised eleven prominent and influential Hawadle elders from the Hiran Council of Elders.

The mediation process

The initiative led by the Hawadle elders was consistent with the Somali customary law and the traditional conflict resolution process. The titled elders of the two parties in conflict, the Ugaasyo and Wabarro, fulfilled their traditional role of opening the shir (meeting), legitimizing the accord and later blessing the communities.

1. Preliminary consultations and peace missions, 10-11 June 2005
   The Hiran Council of Elders discussed the impact of the conflict and the most effective way to intervene. The group of Hawadle elders were delegated to take the lead. They undertook Peace Missions to meet with the parties in conflict to urge them to stop the fighting and resolve the conflict. They were accepted as neutral mediators and their proposals for talks were agreed by both sides.
2. Deployment of disengagement forces and cessation of hostilities, 12 June 2005
The disengagement forces intervened effectively as a neutral force and a green zone was established. There were no breaches of the cessation of hostilities, which was a positive indication of the will of the groups involved to make peace. Movement and interaction resumed between people in the west and east of the town.

3. Dialogue process, 13-14 June 2005 (see also below)
The Hawadle clan hosted the dialogue process and covered its costs. When the decision was made by the Hawadle community to intervene in the crisis, the Ugaas and other key people from the Hawadle established four committees to manage the peace initiative. These were:
- Mediation committee, comprising experienced elders to lead the process;
- Technical committee, comprising intellectuals, influential women peace activists and business people, which was responsible for the plans to disengage the militia, and to provide guidance to the reconciliation committee on technicalities such as the number of delegates, venue, and media engagement;
- Fund raising committee, consisting of prominent and respected business people who, together with the Ugaas, raised an estimated $30,000 from the business community and from salaried people, including local staff of international and UN agencies and the Hiran diaspora;
- Women peace activists committee, who were entrusted with mobilization of the Belet Wein community, particularly the women and youth. They also raised funds from their respective constituencies as well as fulfilling their traditional role of managing the domestic logistics.

At the outset, delegates were required to swear that they would speak the truth and work for the common interest of the two communities and the people of the region.

Before commencing the dialogue, the mediation committee proposed two options to the parties in conflict, either that the committee would fulfil its arbitration role and attend all discussions or that the committee would leave the parties alone to resolve the issues between themselves. The parties chose the second option. Deliberations continued for four days.

Although, in keeping with Somali tradition, women were excluded from the formal discussions, women activists pressured the mediation committee to reach agreement at critical points in the dialogue process by sitting at the doors of the venues, the Library and the Hotel, to prevent anyone leaving until an accord was reached.

4. Signing of the peace agreement 17 June 2005
Following agreement between the parties in conflict, the accord was read out at the venue, the Public Library, in front of the traditional titled elders (Ugaayada and Wabarrada31), other traditional and religious leaders, women, youth and community groups, and other members of the public.

5. Dissemination
A large public gathering was held at the old airstrip in Belet Wein town to disseminate the details of the accord reached accompanied by speeches on the value of peace and the consequences of conflict, with appeals to honour the accord. There was wide coverage in the local and Somali media.

6. Follow-up and monitoring
A standing committee of clan elders from the two communities was formed to follow up on implementation of the agreement and provide an early warning system of tensions that might lead to further conflict between the two communities (see below).
The Hawadle community facilitated the overall peace process in a committed and transparent manner and were respected by all parties as a neutral honest broker.

**The quality of the peace accord**

The peace process produced an agreement worked out through consensus by the two parties in conflict and with other sub-clans of the Gaalje’el in the district. It is not clear whether a written version of the accord exists (and none could be found through interviews with those involved, including members of the mediation committee). Nevertheless, consensual agreement was reached and read out at the conference hall at the conclusion of the talks. The main points in the accord are:

- **Land ownership**
  After thorough discussion covering the historical background of the land and the clan borders delineated under the Italian colony, agreement was reached that the Abtisame sub-clan of the Gaalje’el clan (though not other sub-clans of the Gaalje’el clan) shall leave the Jijeel land in Maroodile area, keep its livestock out of the Jijeel grazing area, and return to its traditional territory.

- **Deaths**
  Deaths in the fighting were three people from the Jijeel and thirteen people from the Gaalje’el. Agreement was reached for Gembis (meaning compensation for the balance of deaths was dismissed and forgiven).

- **Lost properties**
  Although the issue was discussed, the emphasis was on the economic impact of the fighting and the implications if it continued. No claims were made or settled.

- **Breaches of the accord**
  *Diya* (compensation) of 82 camels shall be paid for anyone killed after the accord. A fine of 10 million Somali shillings shall be paid for any gun shots not causing death.

**Dissemination, follow-up and impact**

As indicated above, at the conclusion of the dialogue, the peace agreement was read out firstly, on the steps of the venue and secondly, at a large public gathering at the old airport in Belet Wein in which the opposing militia participated together. This ensured that the whole town knew about the accord. The coverage by Somali media (the two local FM radios, Mogadishu radio stations, BBC Somali Service and several Somali websites) also enhanced broad dissemination of the successful process. Subsequently, influential elders from the Jijeel and Gaalje’el clans went to their respective villages to inform the communities about the peace agreement.

However, almost immediately, an incident occurred in the rural area, as recounted by a traditional titled elder.

> After the agreement was reached, a local incident occurred which was immediately resolved. Two nomads from the two clans concerned were watering their livestock at a *waadi* (water source) at a place called Doob Adde. They chatted but soon began arguing and the Jijeel man fired at the Gaalje’el man but missed. Elders rushed to the area and fined the Jijeel clan 2 million Somali Shillings and the case was resolved. In fact the fine was supposed to be 10 million Somali Shillings but because the incident occurred in the rural area, the Jijeel asked for the fine to be mild so that it could be paid on the spot. This was agreed and the matter is closed as if nothing had happened. It worked.

* Nabaddoon Dahiye Uulow speaking at a Focus Group Discussion of members of the Hiran Council of Elders, Belet Wein, 2007
During the period following the peace accord, a number of other activities took place that contributed to wide dissemination and follow-up in the rural areas. Although these were not directly initiated with reference to the reconciliation between the Jijeele and Gaalje’el clans, they served the purpose of promoting the peace accord between the two groups and the wider community.

- **Xaqdhowr Peace Caravan, September 2005**

A local partner, Xaqdhowr, of the Danish Refugee Council, an international NGO, based in Belet Wein organised an advocacy campaign for traditional elders that included facilitating them to travel around key villages and water points to promote peace, human rights and respect for community accords. This included visits to Maroodile and other villages in areas inhabited by the Jijeele and Gaalje’el clans.

- **Hiran Peace caravan, May–June 2007**

The Ugaases of Hiran region agreed in February 2007 to visit collectively all of the hot spots of conflict in the region to use their influence as respected leaders of the people to advocate for peace. The mission covered over 1000 kilometres and included the areas inhabited by the Gaalje’el and Jijeele clans, where both communities were reminded to honour the peace accord and sustain the peace achieved between their communities. The unprecedented presence of the most highly respected traditional titled elders in the rural villages throughout Hiran region, combined with substantial local media coverage, appeared to have a significant impact in promoting peace in the local communities, with the elders also able to provide guidance on pending tensions in some areas. (At the request of the Ugaases, CRD provided technical and financial support for the peace caravan. The ceremonial conclusion took place in Belet Wein on 8 August 2007).

One unintended outcome of the process related to the “green line”. As described earlier, since the early 1990s, Belet Wein has been divided into the east (inhabited predominantly by the Hawadle clan) and the west (inhabited mainly by the Gugundhabe clan) by a political “green line” at the bridge over which armed militia could not cross (although the restriction did not apply to ordinary people and businesses). When the Hawadle disengagement forces passed across the bridge to separate the militia of the Jijeele and Gaalje’el clans, the artificial separation of the “green line” was dissolved, physically and psychologically, enabling free movement across the bridge and reducing the prejudices and mistrust between the populations in the east and west of Belet Wein. (The new “green line” that emerged through the conflict between the Jijeele and Gaalje’el clans remains latent between those two communities although mobility and interaction between the two communities resumed as soon as the peace accord was signed.)

**Funding**

The Hawadle clan covered the entire cost of the peace process, from the first meeting of the Hawadle elders onwards, and including the financing of the disengagement forces to separate the militia of the parties in conflict (and the compensation for the one dead and one injured in that process). The resources were raised by the local business communities, who were intent on ending the conflict.

A number of Belet Wein women’s groups – notably Hiran Women Peace Activists, a local women’s business organisation (ISRAAC) and Hiran Women in Action (HIWA) - played remarkable roles in mobilising community support for the process and raising significant contributions to fund it.

In keeping with tradition, the Jijeele and Gaalje’el each brought she-goats, the Sumal and Sabeen, as well as the camel slaughtered at the concluding phase of the process. The Sumal and Sabeen are two she-goats that the two reconciling parties bring and hand over to the other party, who slaughters them in front of the community to signify “we have reconciled and agreement is reached”.

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The Hiran Council of Elders in Action — Conflict Resolution Between the Jijeele and Gaalje’el Clans

Analysis of the conflict resolution between the Jijeele and Gaalje’el clans

Closer examination of the underlying causes of the immediate conflict provide an illustration of the way in which national level dynamics can impact locally, triggering latent tensions between different communities. Another feature of the process was the role of the Hawadle clan in facilitating the overall peace process in a committed and transparent manner and being respected by all parties as a neutral honest broker.

Conflict and peace dynamics

The conflict between the Jijeele and the Abtisame sub-clan of the Gaalje’el has a long history, dating back to before the civil war and the military and civilian administrations in Somalia. During those periods, the national and community governance structures intervened with minimum casualties and impact.

As mentioned earlier, one of the factors contributing to the conflict in 2005 appeared to be the perceived role of the Jijeele clan in siding with one side (the ‘Aafi) in a previous internal conflict within the Gaalje’el clan between the ‘Aafi and the Abtisame. Although the tensions between the ‘Aafi and the Abtisame manifested in local community-based issues in 2004, the underlying cause appears to relate to more fundamental dynamics within the Gaalje’el clan, namely the distribution of seats at the Arta peace talks in 2000. In this process, the ‘Aafi were not allocated any seats from those designated for the Gaalje’el clan and they perceived bias by the Ugaas of Gaalje’el clan at that time, who was from the Abtisame.
Another contributing factor to the conflict may also have related to the national level political process. During the IGAD-led Somali National Reconciliation conference held in Kenya from 2002-4, the issue of federalism was agreed as the basis for governance. This may have prompted the Jijeele clan to reassert control of their traditional territory before a new federal system was put in place. (The issue of federalism was a key factor in other conflicts that occurred at that time elsewhere, for example between the Marehan and Dir clans at Xerale village and between Sa’ad and Saleman sub-clans of the Hawiye clan family in Mudug and Galgadud regions.)

Furthermore, it was anticipated that the recently formed Transitional Federal Government (TFG) would establish regional and district administrations in the near future and therefore every clan had an interest in being seen to have a real stake in its constituency, as an influential player, and requiring representation in the forthcoming administrative structures. This view is reinforced by reviewing the distribution of seats within the Hiran regional administration formed under the TFG in July 2007:

### Hiran Regional Administration (October 2007)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Clan/Sub-clan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Governor</td>
<td>Hawadle (Ali Madaxweine sub-clan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vice Governors</td>
<td>Jijeele and Gaalje’el (Abtisame sub-clan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Military Commander</td>
<td>Gaalje’el (Abtisame sub-clan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Police Commander</td>
<td>Gaalje’el (Sugow sub-clan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Court</td>
<td>Gaalje’el (Abtisame sub-clan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belet Wein District Commissioner</td>
<td>Hawadle (Abdalla sub-clan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vice Commissioner</td>
<td>Ujeejeen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Head of the Local Government</td>
<td>Hawadle (Aqoon sub-clan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vice Head of the Local Government</td>
<td>Makanne</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Key actors in the process and ownership

A fundamental element for the sustainability of any peace initiative and subsequent accord is the extent to which the parties in conflict “own” the process and its outputs. This does not diminish the importance of the roles of other stakeholders, who may facilitate the process and provide technical and financial assistance, but is nevertheless a prerequisite for success.

Belet Wein town, the regional capital of Hiran region, has enjoyed relative peace and security for a considerable time and is a centre for trade in the immediate area and well beyond. Because the fighting between the two parties in conflict occurred in the town itself, its effect was felt by all communities in terms of social and economic stability. This heightened the urgency felt by the local community to resolve the conflict swiftly and effectively and ensured the active participation by all concerned. The Hawadle clan, who were key stakeholders as peace-makers, participated proactively with a clear agenda to restore peace and stability in the town.

Although the critical discussions took place between the two parties in conflict - the Jijeele and Gaalje’el clans - other clans were included in the peace initiative and sub-clans of the Gaalje’el clan (including the ‘Aafi and Dirsame sub-clans) were among the delegates of the Gaalje’el clan in the dialogue. This was important to ensure issues were addressed fully and to minimise the risk of potential spoilers.

Significantly, the parties in conflict agreed unanimously to all stages of the process (from the cessation of hostilities to the ensuing consultations brokered by the Hawadle community), selected their own representatives for the dialogue without interference from the mediation committee or other stakeholders, and chose the procedure for resolution of the conflict that involved them in direct discussion without the
presence of a third party. Subsequently those overseeing the process accepted their proposals for the accord in full. All of these features of the process contributed to ownership by the parties concerned.

At the macro level, the initiation of the process by the Hiran Council of Elders lent weight and enhanced the confidence of the local community. This inclusive body represents all the communities in Hiran and is well-respected for its management of conflict resolution. Their initiative encouraged the full participation of the Belet Wein community with all the key stakeholders of the district engaged, as reflected in the local funding of the process. Furthermore, the business community from the Jijeele, Gaalje’el and Hawadle clans had an obvious interest in protecting their investments in the town by restoring peace and supported the process financially and by desisting from funding the conflict.

In terms of the quality of the mediation itself, the process was consultative, participatory and transparent. Having established the process effectively, the mediation committee had a very limited role since the two parties engaged in direct discussions without the presence of the mediation committee, who were nevertheless available to intervene if a stalemate had occurred. The committee also performed the oath by which the two communities would honour the accord reached.

Women peace activists played a remarkable, and often unrecognised, role in mobilising the wider community to end the conflict as well as encouraging the elders to engage in a peace-making mission and ensure a fruitful outcome. The former is reflected in the successful fund-raising by the women’s networks while their commitment to the process is symbolised by the women preventing anyone leaving the decision-making forum until a peace accord was reached.

Although the de facto local administration in Belet Wein at that time had no specific role, its members were briefed on the process, welcomed the elders’ initiative, and participated in the dissemination of the accord throughout the town. All of these factors contributed positively to the sustainability of the peace accord.

**Dealing with critical junctures in the process**

The most critical juncture in the process emerged over the balance of compensation due for deaths in the conflict, with the Gaalje’el clan claiming a balance of 10 people. The mediation committee intervened and persuaded the Gaalje’el to agree to Gembis (forgive and forget) in the common interest. The committee promised that future incidents between the two communities would be settled in the same way.

Another potential stalemate arose when the Abtisame (of the Gaalje’el clan) argued that the first killing at Maroodile should be treated separately because the victim was not involved in the fighting (and should therefore not be included in the counts of militia deaths in the active confrontation). There was no way to resolve this other than for the Jijeele clan to pay the diya due. However, this also enabled the elders to convince the Gaalje’el clan to agree to gembis for the Jijeele clan (above).

**Funding**

The peace initiative was driven, sponsored and managed by the community. One of the factors was that the fighting in the town had an immediate devastating impact on business interests and occurred at a time when livestock trading was at a peak. As a result, some of the business groups (including the Abtisame sub-clan of Gaalje’el clan) lost considerable amounts of money due to the interruptions caused by the fighting. The business groups had an obvious interest in restoring peace and stability.

However it is notable that the availability of funding was not a precondition for beginning the endeavour, nor was any appeal made to international agencies or donors for assistance. Instead the process relied on local community capacity and resources, not a new phenomenon for the Belet Wein community (see below).
The risk of financial support from either government funds or international sources is the attendant possibility of attempts to influence the process in line with other agendas. Instead, the respect and trust in which the Hiran Council of Elders is held by the business sector and broader community, combined with their own interest in restoring peaceful co-existence, encouraged full local financial support. This approach enhances both the likelihood of the accord being sustained and the confidence and capacity of the community for self-reliance.

**Quality of the accord**

The strength of the accord is that it was reached by the two parties through a voluntary consensual approach. The accord is very general and seems to have addressed some of the objectives of the peace initiatives and the causes of the conflict for the moment. However there are several crucial limitations in the accord that should be reconsidered and incorporated into a final version. These are:

- There appears to be no written version of the accord nor was anything actually signed by the two parties, meaning the elders’ memory is the only reference.
- The accord addresses the deaths and destruction caused by the conflict in a clear way through “Gembis” (“forgive and forget”) but serious discussion was required on the imbalances of people killed by the two parties before this was agreed, indicating the potential for continuing grievances.
- The issue of ownership of land and pasture is addressed only in a superficial way, without specifying, for example, where the boundary is between the land of the Abtisame and the land of the Jijeele, a critical factor in the accord. That is, although the Abtisame agreed to leave the Jijeele land and return to their original territory, the boundary is not identified (as if it is taken for granted that this is well-known). (Similarly, those consulted for this study did not appear concerned about the details of the separation line between the two communities.)

**Dissemination and follow up**

Because the peace process was an undertaking initiated by the Hiran community structure that represents all clans, the citizens of Belet Wein were aware of the process through their traditional leaders. Dissemination of the peace accord in the town was carried out in two complementary ways that reached, firstly, clan elders and key figures, including representatives of the local administration through an immediate proclamation of the accord at the conclusion of the dialogue. The second wider public gathering at the old airport ensured the general public were informed and was significant in that the opposing militia participated together, as visible testimony to the successful conclusion of the dialogue.

Dissemination in rural areas is equally, if not more, important and was achieved by visits by influential elders from Jijeele and Gaalje’el to brief their respective communities. However, given that the rural communities
were not present during the process of the talks (held in town), the briefing visits would have had more impact if the elders had gone as a joint group, visibly reflecting the peace reached between those who had mobilised the communities for war and were now reconciled.

Wide dissemination was enhanced through regular broadcasts by the two local FM radio stations in Belet Wein, which ensured the local population had access to details of how the process was proceeding as well as its successful outcome. Several Mogadishu radio stations and the BBC Somali Service also covered the events, ensuring wide dissemination of the accord. Coverage on key Somali websites, including Hiran online, ensured the diaspora were also informed.

In Somali tradition the follow-up to an accord is managed through a joint committee of elders from the reconciled parties together with members of the mediation committee, which is entrusted to intervene promptly or report to the elders’ council if any dispute or incident arises between the relevant parties. In this case, the follow-up (or standing) committee comprises elders from the Jijeele, Gaalje’el and Hawadle clans. As indicated above, very soon after the accord was reached, elders had to intervene promptly to defuse an incident between two nomads from the Jijeele and Gaalje’el clans. They did so in a way that was flexible, effective and seen as honouring the spirit of the accord. Incidents in the rural areas, in particular, can put a peace agreement at risk almost immediately and prompt intervention with clear penalties is critical to sustain the confidence in the accord.

For the same reason, dissemination and active support for the accord in the rural areas is an important feature of sustainability. In this case, the two peace caravans led by senior respected elders that took place soon after the peace process are likely to have contributed to promotion of its outcome (even though they were not directly initiated with reference to the reconciliation between the Jijeele and Gaalje’el clans).

**Findings and conclusion**

The following were identified as key factors in the achievements of this process:

- The tremendous immediate impact of the fighting, and in the middle of Belet Wein town, encouraged all stakeholders to support a peaceful resolution.

- The business groups (including a sub-clan of one of the parties in conflict) were particularly hard hit by the fighting and had a significant interest in swift and effective resolution. They played a major role in supporting the initiative.

- One party made significant compromises (forgiving the compensation balance of deaths and evacuating over 100 families from the other party’s territory).

- The hosting clan and the mediation committee were committed to the process and considered impartial.

- The Hawadle clan, which dominates militarily, economically and politically, managed the process and acted informally as the powerful enforcer of the accord.

The case study provides an example of the way in which national processes can affect local dynamics. In particular, the issue of seat distribution at the Arta national peace conference in 2000 for the Gaalje’el clan aggravated existing tensions within the clan and the prospects of federalism arising from the Kenya-based Somali National Reconciliation conference may have contributed to the wish to reassert control over traditional clan territory by the Jijeele clan.

In this respect, the case study demonstrates how decisions made by clan elders on behalf of their clan can trigger conflicts between communities at the grassroots level.
The case study also reveals the role of a dominant clan, the Hawadle, in stopping an active violent conflict and mediating between two less powerful clans, which also mitigated the impact of the conflict on the Hawadle itself. The Hawadle was able to use its forces and resources as a peace-maker by initiating the process and acting as the neutral peace broker for the talks. This provides a useful contrast with the many instances in which key stakeholders of conflict become divided or sympathise with one party, becoming spoilers. It appears that one factor deterring any of the Hawadle sub-clans from acting in its own narrow interests and becoming a spoiler is the uncontested, respected and trustworthy leadership of the Hawadle clan. Another factor is the common interests of the Hawadle in re-establishing peace and stability in the town, the centre of their social and economic activity.

Another interesting feature of the process was that the parties in conflict resolved the issues without resorting to brokering by the mediation committee. Instead the role of the mediation committee was limited to legitimising the agreement the two parties had reached. It is possible that the high level of community mobilisation and the engagement of the business sector, together with the respect in which the hosting clan was held, were all factors in enabling the parties to reach agreement.

Lessons learned from this peace process are:

1. National level processes can trigger conflict at local level
   Decisions reached at national level reconciliation processes and decisions made by elders on behalf of their clan can have unintended and unforeseen impacts at community level.

2. Potential of a dominant clan as peace maker
   A powerful and influential clan with a commitment to restoring peace in the constituency can take the lead in stopping fighting between other clans, play a critical role as an honest and impartial broker, and enforce the accord reached.

3. Constructive mobilisation by women
   Organised groups of women have a significant role in local peace initiatives, for example through community mobilisation for peace, fund raising, and exerting pressure for a successful conclusion. Although they are typically excluded from sitting in the “Shir” with the elders, women can be tremendously effective in pressuring elders and influential figures or groups to intervene in a conflict and subsequently in pressuring the reconciling parties and elders to reach an agreement.

4. Support of the business community
   The role of local business leaders can be critical in desisting from funding conflict as well as in positive support for resolution to end local conflicts, particularly when business interests are threatened.

5. Effective engagement of the media
   When the local media is effectively engaged, media outlets can be a powerful tool to inform the general public who are not directly involved in the reconciliation process of the dynamics and proceedings, increasing the indirect participation of the community in the process. Similarly, the media is one effective means for disseminating the outcome of the peace process to a wide audience, including the diaspora of the constituency.
THE MUDUG-GALGADUD PEACE INITIATIVE BETWEEN THE SA’AD AND SALEMAN CLANS

Introduction

This study examines a complex peace initiative that aimed to resolve one of the devastating and apparently intractable conflicts in south-central Somalia. The violent fighting between the Sa’ad and Saleman communities in 2004-5 caused the death of over 300 persons, the loss of valuable properties, and fractured the brotherly relationship between the two communities. Resolution of the conflict required the involvement at the outset of senior national figures and politicians from the area before the reconciliation process could be actualised at community level. One of the outstanding features of the process was the role played by clan militia leaders to mobilise their communities for peace and pressure their respective elders to compromise in order to reach agreement. Another aspect is innovations in the Somali customary law (xeer), including use of audiovisual material to document the process.

Background

Mudug region was one of the original eight regions of Somalia established at independence and included Galgadud region created in 1973 during the regime of Siyaad Barre. Gaalka’yo, the regional capital of Mudug, has always been an important crossroads between north, south, east, and west and is almost equidistant from Mogadishu, Bosaso (on the northeast coast), and Hargeysa. The town is divided by longstanding grievances between the two clans, the Hawiye and the Majeerteen, which originally co-habited the town. After the 1993 Mudug peace agreement, an uneasy truce prevailed with the two clans dominating south and north Gaalka’yo respectively and since the formation of the Puntland administration in 1998, there have been two distinct entities within Mudug region, with the north allied with Puntland. The boundary of south Mudug lies along the southern portion of the divided Gaalka’yo town.

The regional capital of Galgadud region, Dhusamareb, is 500 kilometres north of the Somali capital of Mogadishu, and 230 south of Gaalka’yo. The region borders Mudug region to the northeast, Ethiopia in the west, Middle Shabelle region in the southeast and Hiran region to the southwest.

The primary livelihoods of the arid and semi-arid central regions are pastoralism (goats, sheep and camels), fishing along the long coastline, and trade, as transport between north and south Somalia passes through this area. The only natural resource is the white salt harvested at the coast for domestic consumption and particular type of stone used for making stoves.

The regions of south Mudug and Galgadud are predominantly inhabited by the Habar Gidir, Abgal, Duduble, Murasade, and Sheikal clans of the Hawiye clan family. A number of non-Hawiye clans also live in the central regions, including the Dir clan family and the Marehan clan of the Darod clan family.
Map of central regions, Mudug and Galgaduud
History and trends of the conflict and its impact

The Sa’ad and the Saleman sub-clans of the Habar Gidir clan of the Hawiye clan family (see clan diagram) have historically co-existed relatively peacefully in the central regions, with isolated incidents resolved by the elders of the affected settlements. The last serious conflict involving these two sub-clans was a territorial dispute over land and villages that took place at “Ada Kibir”, a village on the border between the two clans’ territory, in 1952. 

Although the area was affected by the civil war in the early 1990s, only localised and relatively minor incidents occurred up to the clashes in 2004. However, in contrast with the community dynamics in the neighbouring region of Hiran, for example, the political elites and business people based in the capital Mogadishu and contesting for power exert a strong remote control influence over their clan-affiliated communities in south Mudug and Galgadud regions. Historically, the USC forces led by Aydiid were recruited from the Sa’ad and Saleman communities from this region and many of the prominent politicians and warlords of the past two decades originated from these regions. This has been a major factor in hindering the evolution of local governance structures in these two regions. One of the effects has been the limited engagement of international aid agencies in the central regions, in the absence of rule of law and security structures. As a consequence of these dynamics, the communities can be seen as ‘hostages’ of their urban elites.

Although the security incidents that had occurred in south Mudug and Galgadud regions were localised and small-scale, the cumulative effect of killings, looting of livestock, and disputes over grazing areas that remained unaddressed and unresolved eventually emerged into violent conflict in 2004.

One of the reasons for the accumulation of unresolved incidents appears to be the absence of an established “xeer” (customary law) between the two clans, which would normally provide a basis for the community elders to come together for dialogue and reconciliation. The xeer between two clans defines, for example, the diya (compensation) to be paid in the event of the killing of one clan member by another clan member (for example, 82 camels between the Jijeele and Gaalje’el clans, or 50 camels between the Abgal and the Hawadle clans). This provides the foundation for dialogue and the evolution of ground rules and mechanisms to manage and resolve internal conflicts between communities. However, the wide geographic area and poor infrastructure means that, in reality, members of the two communities in one location have more in common with each other than with other members of their own clan. Historically most conflicts were resolved locally. Possibly a more critical factor in the prolonged period during which these incidents went unaddressed was the absence of a local authority to intervene to resolve the disputes and the “remote control” influence of competition between the Mogadishu-based political leadership of the two clans.

In mid-2004, in response to the “war weariness” of the rural communities and the cost to those funding the “unwinnable” conflict, a peace process was initiated to address unresolved differences between the two communities (see below). As part of that process, in November 2004 a group of Saleman elders travelled on a peace mission to Do’oley but were killed en route by Sa’ad clan militia, triggering widespread fighting. Clashes occurred in the rural locations of Do’oley, Bahdo-gabo, Dhegtur, Qaydaro, Bajela, Balli-guled and others areas south of Gaalka’yo and north of Adado co-habited by the nomadic communities of the two clans. Unsuccessful attempts to resolve the conflict resulted in the fighting spreading to affect the two communities over an extensive area from the coastal zone of Hobyo to Da’dher on the Somali-Ethiopian border.

The violent conflict was exacerbated by the politicians, urban community and diaspora of the two groups, who were competing for power and influence over the local rural communities and regions as a feature of

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32 Interview with Sa’ad elder, Iman Jirow, Mogadishu, 25 December 2007
continuing power struggles in Mogadishu with the potential to provide leverage in national level negotiations. They provided funds for the mobilisation of clan militia and weapons, including hundreds of “technicals” (heavy weapons mounted on vehicles), and a distinctive feature of the conflict was the use of “ Thuraya” satellite phones as a means of communication (given the wide geographical area and the absence of infrastructure, including telecommunications). The level of technical sophistication, with militia using technicals and satellite phones, had not been seen before in a clan conflict and fuelled what had begun as an accumulation of isolated incidents over previously shared pasture, villages, and wells until there was extensive death and destruction over a wide area.

Over 300 people were killed and many more injured in the fighting, which directly affected the livelihoods of thousands of nomadic and urban people from the two communities. Hundreds of people were displaced to new settlements that lacked the basic services of water, health facilities, and proper shelter. The local communities were further depleted by the huge funds being raised by both parties for the conflict, draining the financial resources of the urban business communities and diaspora and diverting funds that might otherwise have supported rural livelihoods. The impact was also experienced well beyond the immediate conflict zone. The emergence of road blocks manned by clan militia inhibited free movement of trade and people between south and north Somalia, affecting the cost and availability of food and people's livelihoods as far away as Burao in Somaliland.

The origins of the peace initiative

The first peace initiative in 2004

In mid-2004, a group of elders, business people, politicians and intellectuals from the Sa’ad and Saleman sub-clans met at the Sahafi Hotel in Mogadishu to begin the first formal peace initiative to end the conflicts between their communities in Mudug and Galgadud regions. Following a series of consultations, an agreement was reached and signed by 21 respected representatives, committing them to:

- An unconditional ceasefire
- Establishment of a joint committee of elders to visit the regions to disseminate the accord and monitor the ceasefire
- Mobilisation of the rural communities for a reconciliation conference

The joint committee of 22 elders, led by Iman Jirow, went to the regions to disseminate the ceasefire agreement and prepare the ground for a reconciliation conference between the Sa’ad and Saleman sub-clans. The committee held a planning meeting in Gaalka’yo and met Sa’ad elders there before proceeding to Adado to meet Saleman elders, all of whom agreed to the ceasefire. The joint mission of elders travelled throughout Adado area visiting the conflict zones to spread the peace message and monitor the ceasefire. On their return to Gaalka’yo, they agreed to hold a larger meeting near Do’oley, one of the centres of conflict, with the key elders of the Sa’ad and Saleman clans from Gaalka’yo and Adado areas in order to plan the reconciliation conference. In November 2004, the Sa’ad elders reached the agreed meeting place but the mission from the Saleman clan was intercepted by Sa’ad clan militia who killed five prominent birmageydo members of the peace delegation, elders, religious leaders and the district commissioner of Adado, and injured five others (see the textbox in the Overview for elaboration of the meaning of birmageydo). Only one member of the delegation escaped unharmed. When the shocking news reached the Sa’ad elders, they were unable to intervene and had to return to Gaalka’yo. Fighting erupted throughout the area from Do’oley to Hobyo at the coast, thus ending the peace initiative. Several other incidents, such as the killing of Koranic school students and their teachers, increased the bitterness between the two communities and hindered the resumption of the peace initiative (see the textbox in the Overview for elaboration of the meaning of birmageydo).

33 Although this research was unable to locate the written agreement, all those interviewed agreed on the substance and that the joint mission to Galgadud and Mudug regions was the outcome of the meeting.
The peace initiative in 2006

The protracted nature of the conflict, coupled with serious breaches of traditional rules of engagement in clan fighting, the violent escalation, and the numbers of interest groups outside of the immediate territory, all added to the complexity of the process and indicated that great care would have to be exercised in its resolution.

In 2006 a new initiative was launched by the elders and politicians of the parties in conflict in collaboration with the TFG to resolve the conflict. In pursuit of this a meeting was held on 13 February 2006 at the Prime Minister’s premises at Taar City Hotel in Gaalka’yo attended by:

1. His Excellency Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed, President of the TFG
2. His Excellency Ali Mohamed Geddi, Prime Minister of the TFG
3. Abdirizaq Osman Jurile, Minister of Planning and International Cooperation
4. Osman Hassan Ali “Atto”, Minister of Reconstruction and Public Works
5. Mohamed Mohamud Guuleed “Ga’madhere”, Minister of Rural Development
6. Mohamed Jama Furuh, State Minister for Ports and Sea Transport
7. Ahmed Duale Geelde “Haaf”, Member of Parliament
8. Ali Alass Qareey, Member of Parliament
9. Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, Center for Research and Dialogue (CRD)
10. Mohamed Yasin “Ilkoase” Puntland Development Research Center (PDRC)

The high level representation in the meeting illustrated how seriously the conflict was taken and the importance of the initiative. This related to the broad interests of the TFG and others in stabilising Somalia, which provided a supportive political context for this new initiative. Those present also represented the interests of different clans in the region, notably the leading Sa’ad and Saleman political and business figures. A representative of Interpeace had earlier met the TFG President in Gaalka’yo with members of the PDRC management team and subsequent bilateral meetings took place between TFG officials and colleagues from PDRC and CRD who had been engaged in a series of discussions to prepare the ground for resolution of the conflict.

An agreement was reached to collaborate on a unified approach comprising three phases to be implemented by different groups, as outlined below. Interpeace and its partners (CRD and PDRC) were requested to support the second phase, the reconciliation process.

The objectives of the peace process were to:

- Assist the local communities to determine the appropriate ways of ending their conflicts through dialogue and reconciliation based upon their traditional and cultural practices.
- Promote good governance through bottom-up approaches by stimulating the local community’s initiatives.

The process was designed in three phases:

1. **Phase One:** Ceasefire and disengagement
   This phase was to be implemented jointly and funded by the two clans, the TFG and the Puntland administration and comprised:
   - Ceasefire
   - Disengagement of clan militias
   - Monitoring by a committee appointed jointly by the clans, TFG and Puntland administration
   - Dismantling of road blocks for safe passage of trade and movement
2. Phase Two: Reconciliation process and peace meetings I and II
With the support of Interpeace and its partners CRD and PDRC, it was envisaged that the first reconciliation meeting would take place between the Sa’ad and Saleman sub-clans while the second meeting would include other clans and sub-clans inhabiting the central regions.

3. Phase Three: District council formation in the affected areas
The third and final phase of the process would establish district councils in the affected areas in Mudug and Galgadud regions, with the support of UNDP/UNOPS.34

Implementation of phase one - ceasefire and joint monitoring
From 7-11 April 2006, the political leadership of the two parties in conflict travelled through the villages and nomadic settlements in Hobyo area to promote the agreement reached in Gaalka’yo and to consolidate the progress made in talks in Gelinsoor, Adado and neighbouring areas. The visits by the political leadership of the parties in conflict to the frontline areas to inform the militia about the peace process represented a significant step forward.

On 12 April, TFG Ministers, MPs and a number of traditional elders left for Baidoa to brief the parliament and leadership of the Transitional Federal Institutions (TFIs) on the status of the peace process, holding a joint meeting with the Prime Minister and Speaker of Parliament. There was overwhelming popular support from MPs and the general public. By late April, considerable progress had been made in the ceasefire and disengagement of militia. Despite isolated violations, the ceasefire agreement was holding, largely due to the commitment of the public, the militia and key community leaders. All major roadblocks in Mudug and Galgadud had been removed. The dismantling of roadblocks from the main road to Gaalka’yo, Gelinsoor and Adado had an immediate positive impact on business and trade both south and north of the regions. Overall security had also improved and the security patrols established in some districts, such as Adado, to monitor security were operating effectively.

Phase two, the reconciliation process
A series of activities were undertaken to prepare the ground for the two communities to come together for a reconciliation conference, at which it was hoped a viable and sustainable peace accord would be reached between the Sa’ad and Saleman communities in south Mudug and Galgadud. In turn, it was anticipated that this would pave the way for the formation of district councils in the area as the final stage of the peace process.

Situation assessment and conflict resolution training for militia leaders
In early April, members of the CRD team travelled from Mogadishu to Gaalka’yo and onwards to Bandiradley, Gelinsoor and Adado for an extended process of assessment and interviews with community members. Consultations with a wide range of people from both communities, including political leaders and TFG members, indicated a shared concern that the reintegration of militiamen in the affected areas would be a prerequisite for a sustainable end to the conflict. Following delicate negotiations between and within the Sa’ad and Saleman clans, over 60 militia leaders gathered in south Gaalka’yo from 17-22 April for sensitisation and training in conflict management.

In the assessment phase, efforts were made to ensure that key figures of the two communities were kept informed of the process and to facilitate their support for it. A number of informal meetings were held in

34 As part of the UN’s mandate to support governance in Somalia, the UN Development Programme was leading a project implemented by UNOPS to support district formation.
April in Mogadishu and a working lunch in Nairobi. These gatherings helped to dispel rumours and reinforce support for the reconciliation process on the ground and the CRD team reported that the positive effects were apparent in south Mudug and Galgadud. In May, large delegations of the two clans began to converge in the area to support the peace process.

Confidence building and preparatory mini-conferences, May-June 2006

As part of the confidence building measures, the parties in conflict agreed to hold two preparatory mini-conferences (“Geed-Yare”) prior to the main reconciliation conference, the first for members of the two clans residing in Adado-Gelinsor area and the second for those around Hobyo. The mini-conferences aimed to address some of the critical issues for the local pastoral communities (such as access to water points and grazing lands) and to establish a mechanism to deal with grievances emanating from revenge killings. This was to help consolidate the relative peace in the respective areas following the ceasefire.

1. Bandiradley mini-conference

The first of the two mini-conferences was held in Bandiradley town from 2-6 May for members of the Sa’ad and Saleman communities living in areas from south Gaalka’yo to Bandiradley and Adado all the way to the Ethiopian-Somalia border. It aimed to address outstanding local grievances and enable the communities to prepare for the main reconciliation phase. Sixty influential elders from the two parties in conflict and over 100 observers from other constituencies in south Mudug and part of Galgadud participated. The CRD facilitators used participatory action research methodology to support discussion among the participants on issues relating to the conflict, demonstrating practical tools for conflict analysis, establishing dialogue, negotiation and the identification of shared solutions acceptable to both communities. During the meetings, the elders shared their grievances and explored ways to address them. In conclusion, the elders issued a Bayaan (public statement) addressed to both communities consisting of 12 points articulating their common position on the cessation of hostilities, their commitment to peaceful dialogue, and future collaborative efforts to address the root causes of the conflict. The main points agreed were:

- Re-opening of the main road between Gaalka’yo, Gelinosor and Adado linking north, central and south Somalia;
- Removal of all militiamen and illegal roadblocks from roads leading to water points;
- Formation of a joint elders’ committee to monitor security in the disputed areas;
- Return of IDPs to their respective areas (mainly Gelinosor and Hobyo);
- Agreement on shared use of grazing lands and water points in the disputed areas;
- Future restitution be addressed through shari’a;
- Individuals committing revenge killing to be prosecuted in accordance with shari’a

2. El Hur mini-conference

The second mini-conference was held at El Hur on 23-26 June 2006 for members of the Sa’ad and Saleman communities living in areas from south Gaalka’yo along the coast to Hobyo and was attended by 68 elders from the two clans. It followed a similar process to the first and reached the same outcomes.

The two mini-conferences served the purposes for which they had been held, namely to reduce hostilities between the two groups, encourage integration, and sensitise the communities on the substantial issues to be addressed at the main conference. Both produced similar accords and yielded tangible outcomes, including:

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35 English translation of the original Somali text
• A cessation of hostilities and an effective ceasefire, including an end to killing, propaganda and any other provocations
• Information sharing among the elders, militia and other sections of the community of the two conflicting clans, including women and the youth
• Dissemination of the peace accord to the respective communities within each conflict zone, with implementation to start one week later;
• Sharing water and grazing resources, and a peaceful environment
• Constant monitoring of the peace accord by joint committees;
• Establishment of meeting and information-sharing venues in every conflict prone point, in particular at public gathering points such as water points and rural kiosks;
• Community interaction following the mini-conferences in a step-by-step process, including returning livestock that stray into each other's settlements.

Two committees were established during the meetings that travelled as peace caravans ("so'daal-nabadeed") to their respective settlements to spread news of the peace accord and update their constituencies on the new developments and the proposed way forward. Each committee conducted the dissemination activities over three days, concluding the peace caravans with large gatherings at El Hur on 30 June 2006, for the people living around Hobyo town on, and at Qaydaro town on 4 July 2006 for the population in the border area between south Mudug and Galgadud regions.

Main peace conference at Adado, 7-18 February 2007

The final stage of the reconciliation process, which was to be held in Adado, was postponed due to changes in the political dynamics of south-central Somalia in mid 2006. The key dynamic in the central regions was the emergence of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) and establishment of its administration at Adado, while south Mudug came under the influence of the TFG, backed by Ethiopian and Puntland forces. Despite these challenges, the achievements of the reconciliation process largely held, due to the commitments of the two communities and the prospect of resolving the longstanding disputes between them. Although isolated incidents did occur that could have undermined the process (see below), these did not escalate into wider violence. By late December 2006, the political and security dynamics of south-central Somalia had undergone further shifts and the relative stability in Galgadud and south Mudug enabled the communities to re-focus on the reconciliation process.

Pre-conference activities

After extensive consultations by the facilitating team of CRD with the stakeholders in Mogadishu, Gaalka’yo, and Adado, and with representatives of the TFG and the Puntland administration, it was agreed that conditions were ripe for the next stage of the reconciliation. With assurances from the TFG of its support and the collaboration of its security institutions, preparatory activities for the main conference began.

Two briefing session were held with elders, including traditional elders, businessmen, religious leaders and militia leaders in south Gaalka’yo and Adado (the main urban centres of the Sa’ad and Saleman respectively) before the main conference commenced, with the objectives of assessing the status of the reconciliation process; updating the elders on the outcome of the consultative meeting in Mogadishu; reviewing the implementation of Bandiradley Accord; listening to the violations by each clan after the Bandiradley Accord was signed; and assessing the level of confidence among community leaders in the process.

One of the challenges that surfaced was that nine killings had taken place during the period in which the process had been suspended and this issue had to be settled before the main reconciliation conference could
proceed. Over the following ten days, the CRD team engaged in intensive informal and formal mediation between the two clans, and with TFG officials, travelling between Gelinsoor, Gaalka’yo, Bandiradley and Adado in efforts to bring the two clans back to the process. Ultimately the Sa’ad and Suleman elders were persuaded to deal collectively with the stalemate and to allow amends to be made for the violations by a few individuals. They dismissed eight deaths (four from each side) with an agreement that the TFG would pay the diya of the balance of one death to the Saleman clan (100 camels according to shari’a). This allowed preparations for the main reconciliation phase to begin.

- **Resource mobilization, awareness raising and consultations**

Extensive mobilization was carried out in the most populated locations of the two sub-clans, namely Gaalka’yo, Bandiradley, Gelinsoor, Adado, Godinlabe, Bahdo and Hobyo. The aims were to ensure maximum outreach and impact while at the same time seeking a participatory and collective commitment to the outcomes of the reconciliation process.

Separate meetings were held with the different organs of the communities of the two sub-clans including the local administrations, security chiefs, the religious and traditional figures, and the TFG representatives in the region. The members of the communities were briefed on the overall goal of the reconciliation conference, sensitized on the need for their ownership of the process, and encouraged to maintain a high level of commitment throughout the process and beyond. CRD also facilitated fundraising in the form of livestock and in-kind contributions, which were complemented by contributions from the business community from the region and diaspora groups. During this period, the CRD Director held parallel meetings from 15-20 February with diaspora groups from the region in Stockholm, London, the Hague and Oslo to solicit support and endorsement of the outcome of the process.

- **Mobilization of and consultation meetings with women**

During earlier phases of the reconciliation process, women had demonstrated their potential for mobilization for conflict as well as for peace and their frustration with the traditional exclusion of women from the reconciliation meetings. For example, during the preparations for the El Hur mini-conference in June 2006, a nomadic woman approached the CRD team, saying:

> “Men are the sole decision makers. They meet, discuss and reach peace deals, but they do not inform the community well enough on what they agree. Women and the youth are the true way in for either peace or conflict and their influence is paramount. The women can encourage the militia to put down the gun and reconcile - since the militia are their sons. Meetings should be organised for the women and the youth from the two clans to share their insights and consider their future development rather than giving priority only to men. Women and the youth are the ones who need to know about the ways to end the conflict and the outcomes of the agreements reached so that they can mobilise to support peace and join the advocacy for peace in all the places most prone to conflict.”

*Nomadic woman from Gawan village of Hobyo district*

Also during the El Hur process, the CRD team was alerted that a woman was buying up knives in the local market. It emerged that she had felt humiliated at a local water point by other women and was seeking to mobilize for revenge. CRD responded by organizing a reconciliation meeting for the women in parallel with the traditional (male) reconciliation meeting. It was highly successful and possibly the first time such events have taken place in the Somali context.

Based on these experiences, in February 2007 the CRD team organized a meeting with women’s groups from the two sub-clans in Gaalka’yo and Adado to brief them on the latest developments and consult them
on the best ways of handling the main reconciliation conference. It was agreed that the women from the two groups would select twenty influential women to represent them and participate in the reconciliation conference as a joint official delegation. They would meet with the elders and sit in on all meetings in order to indirectly facilitate and contribute to the process. After the selection, the joint womens group held separate discussions and consultations on the way forward.

- **Security mobilization in Adado district**

In the absence of an effective, reliable authority able to take responsibility for the security of conference participants, it was necessary to address this issue through alternative means. CRD mobilized the dominant Saleman sub-clan in Adado to take responsibility for hosting the conference and held a series of meetings with its representatives, including local militia commanders, youth and women groups, in addition to the traditional chiefs. The discussions focused on the need for precautionary security measures to be in place before, during and after the conference. TFG representatives in the area were also consulted and gave their support and input. Agreement was reached to assign the security of the conference to a joint militia force drawn from the Saleman sub-clan and TFG forces in the central regions and to establish collective security structures to address all security-related issues. A security monitoring group, drawn from traditional elders, youth and women, was identified to assist on security issues.

- **Consultation and discussion with clan elders**

In order to give each side ample time to consider the relevant approaches to address their past grievances and reach a new atmosphere of peace and stability on the basis of Somali mores and customs, each sub-clan engaged separately in a week of intensive internal deliberations. This was to avoid divisions within either of the parties and encourage a unified position among the sub-clan representatives during the main phase of deliberations between the two groups.

- **Establishing Advisory and Chairing Committees**

It became clear that it was imperative to set up a conference secretariat and committees to manage the process and, following consultation with key stakeholders, these were established as follows:

- **Advisory Committee** (Guddi Marjac), comprising respected religious and traditional dignitaries (Culumo, Ugaasyo, Islamic clerics and Suldaamo) to monitor the process and intervene in the event of a crisis or stalemate;
- **Ad hoc Chairing Committee** (Shirgudoon), comprising four prominent elders and four secretaries from the two parties in conflict to manage the process.
- In order to avoid possible conflicts of interest, members of the committees were prohibited from participating directly in the conference proceedings.

**The Adado reconciliation conference, 9-18 February 2007**

The final phase of the reconciliation process took place in Adado from 9-18 February 2007 with more than 230 people attending the conference, including over 80 respected religious and traditional leaders, as well as other influential figures, youth and women from the Sa’ad and Saleman communities. The first session opened with briefings by community representatives, TFG and Puntland officials, the district administration, guests from the neighbouring clans and sub-clans, religious and traditional figures, and the CRD facilitators, all urging the two sides to focus on the benefits of reconciliation for their people and the entire central regions. The emphasis was on the need to open a new chapter for peace, harmonious co-existence and good neighbourliness. During the subsequent deliberations, many heated words were exchanged, while proverbs, poems and stories were used to overcome the difficulties encountered. As proposed by the
advisory committee, discussions focused on three key issues: settlement of the blood vendetta; loss of properties in the conflict; and trust-building measures for the future.

• Settlement of revenge killings (blood vendetta)

This was the most critical and challenging issue to be settled and if no agreement could be reached, the conference would not proceed. The debate over the issue of revenge killings (or blood vendetta) took four days, during which the two parties were first asked to present to the chairing and advisory committees the death toll from the violent conflict. This totalled about 150 people from each side, including innocent women and children. On the following day, each side identified the “unique deaths” (Birmageydo), which numbered 20 from both communities. The third day participants presented their views on how the issue of revenge killings should be resolved. Some proposed settlement on an individual basis through diya (compensation) while others recommended that only the “unique deaths” (Birmageydo) should be accounted for, cancelling out the mass of casualties. The chairing and the advisory committees asked each sub-clan to meet separately to propose a structure for the blood settlement, urging them to provide a realistic solution for presentation on the fourth day.

The two sub-clans appointed their own sub-committees to consider reasonable means of settling the chronic blood vendetta between them in order to move forward. In view of the heavy death toll, the challenges of accounting for each individual death, the long period of grievances between the two sub-clans, and the limited time and resources available, the two sub-committees concluded that it was impossible to resolve the blood vendetta on an individual basis. Instead they recommended that the two sub-clans cancel these past killings based on xeer. This was agreed and the issue of the blood vendetta was dismissed on 13 February 2007.

The important exception to this agreement was the twenty cases of “unique deaths” (Birmageydo). It was considered critically important to maintain these cases as exceptions that must be compensated. The rationale for this was to discourage future revenge killings (and against these protected groups in particular) and reinforce this aspect of Somali customary law. Accordingly, the advisory committee compiled a list of these cases and each sub-clan was ordered to pay compensation to the other in line with Somali traditional culture (100 camels for each death).

• Compensation for property loss

The resolution of the most contentious and complex issue of deaths incurred during the prolonged conflict eased the way for the subsequent discussion on settlement of the loss of properties. Over two days, the participants reviewed the different properties that had been lost or destroyed, including looted battlewagons, destroyed buildings, and stolen livestock.

“The land will always be there, as nobody can move it, but people keep dying in the struggle for land among clans and sub-clans. The dead have got their land [their graves] - what do we want for the living?”

Chief Ali Osman Luudo, motivating the participants to reach compromises on land disputes

In view of the challenges of accounting for the value of property that had been lost or destroyed, the elders unanimously opted to dismiss these cases, while agreeing that properties that had not been lost or destroyed should be returned to their owners without conditions, including both movable (lorries, livestock) and immovable (houses, water sources). It was agreed that the return of property would be implemented through local mechanisms, including setting up joint property dispute committees that will gather the necessary proofs and testimonies in cases of disputed claims.
• Trust building measures in the post-conflict period

The way forward to peaceful co-existence for the two nomadic communities presented particular challenges and the participants discussed this over two days in order to arrive at a common understanding.

Each of the sub-clans proposed a different approach. One argued that rapid reintegration of the two sub-clans was not possible since reconciliation would take time. Hence they proposed land demarcations between them until the victims of violence have recovered from their trauma in order to reduce the risk of retaliations by the scattered armed militia who had lost relatives. The other sub-clan held that land demarcations between the two was unrealistic due to their pastoralist livelihoods that requires constant movement following the rain and pasture for their herds. Therefore, they proposed there should be free movement and access, with the provision that a joint elders’ council and joint local judiciary would be established to monitor and address any wrongdoing.

After intensive discussions and consultations among the elders, the chairing committee and advisory committee proposed the establishment of ground rules and norms to reduce the risk of and address internal conflicts within the two communities. On behalf of the two sub-clans, they decided on a series of actions to pave the way for full reintegration and co-existence.

"The good chief is the one who is devoted to lead his community in a prosperous direction of peace and good neighborhood. Otherwise, he is not a chief but a wrong doer”.

An elder encouraging a constructive approach in the discussion

The role of women in the Adado conference

The group of twenty influential women from the two sub-clans, who had been selected in Gaalka’yo and Adado, held a separate parallel meeting for five days at the district guesthouse in Adado, close to the main conference venue. They discussed the impact of the conflict on the family, women and children, and developed a written position paper in which they described the impact of the violence, pressed for compromise, and called for a peace accord that would guide the two communities towards stability and a better future for all (see Annex 5).

Although Somali tradition excludes women from participating directly in the reconciliation conference, an exception was made to enable the women peace activists to present their position on the impacts of the conflict on the family, the society and the economy of the grassroots community, to remind the participants of the husbands, brothers, and sons they had lost, and of the social infrastructures that had been destroyed. Their intervention and their tough stand in challenging the elders to reach an agreement contributed significantly to the success of the process.

Participants and funding

More than 230 people\textsuperscript{\textit{36}} took part, including over 80 respected religious and traditional leaders, as well as other influential figures from the places inhabited by the Sa’ad and Saleman sub-clans. An influential group of twenty women from the two sub-clans were present as a pressure group to motivate the elders to reach lasting consensus and peace. Respected figures from the neighbouring clans of Marehan, Dir, and the Hawiye sub-clans of Ayr, Duduble, and Sheikhal and representatives of the TFG and the Puntland administration were present as observers.

\textsuperscript{36} The list of participants and committees is annexed
Different phases of the reconciliation process were funded by different parties (as indicated earlier). The first phase (ceasefire, disengagement of the militia and establishment of the joint monitoring committee) was funded by the TFG and the Puntland administration, with the communities contributing with logistics and hosting the delegates.

The second phase, which included extensive travel and shuttle diplomacy, as well as two mini-conferences prior to the main reconciliation conference at Adado, was funded primarily by international donors (Sweden and Norway) through Interpeace and its partners. The hosting communities of the extensive preparatory consultations, the two mini-conferences, and the Adado conference provided contributions in-kind, including livestock slaughtered, milk and other foodstuffs.

During the preparatory stages of the reconciliation in 2006, the business groups in Mogadishu associated with the two communities pledged $20,000 to support the El Hur peace caravan. However, conflict in Mogadishu meant the pledge was not fulfilled and instead the costs were covered through contributions from CRD/Interpeace and the local community.

An interesting pledge was made at a stalemate in the Adado conference during the deliberations on the blood vendetta, when the parties could not agree on a mechanism to settle the diya. The women’s pressure group then spoke up, pledging to pay whatever balance of diya emerged as long as the elders reach a peace accord. In the event, the agreement on gembis (forgive and forget) meant no diya was needed.

The compensation for the deaths of Birmageydo remains outstanding, and was supposed to be covered by the business groups and diaspora of the two communities. Although CRD and others have lobbied for this payment to be completed, the engagement of business groups has been negatively affected by the new dynamics in Mogadishu since April 2007.

Relevance of the location of the conferences

The selection of locations throughout the reconciliation process was considered carefully as an integral aspect of confidence building between the two parties in conflict. The process was initiated in the Sa’ad area of south Gaalka’yo, a strategic location connecting the predominantly Saleman town of Adado to south Mudug and Puntland (which was funding and overseeing the first phase of the process). The training workshop for the militia leaders was also held in south Gaalka’yo, placing the burden of responsibility on the Sa’ad community for the security and protection of the Saleman militia leaders. Bandiradley, the site of the first mini-conference, is on the main road between south Gaalka’yo and Adado (the main urban centres of the Sa’ad and Saleman respectively) and a predominantly Sa’ad area, which commited them to take responsibility for the security of the conference and the Saleman delegates. As it is also close to one of the well-known conflict fronts, organizing the first peace meeting at Bandiradley was intended to convey a strong message that the fighting between the two communities was over and peaceful co-existence was returning. El Hur, a predominantly Saleman town located at the centre of the eastern zone of the Sa’ad-Saleman territory, was chosen for the same reasons, but this time in a Saleman area. The main reconciliation conference was hosted by the Saleman community at Adado and was due to be followed by a larger meeting for a wider group of clans in south Gaalka’yo, but at the time of writing this is yet to be realized.

Management, facilitation and mediation in the peace process

At the outset, CRD had been requested by the senior leadership of the TFG and parliament, the politicians of the two communities, and other key stakeholders from the area, including elders, religious leaders and business groups, to facilitate the peace initiative. Two members of the CRD research team from the
respective clans and respected in their communities for their knowledge of the history and dynamics of the conflict, were delegated with the task. They were accompanied by a cameraman from CRD’s audio-visual unit who documented the whole process. As well as facilitating the process, the CRD team engaged proactively in providing professional and technical expertise throughout.

The management of the peace conferences was undertaken by committees selected from the two parties in conflict. Mediation and chairing committees were established by the elders through wide consultation. Security, accommodation, and practical aspects of the conferences were provided by the party hosting the conference.

**Conflict resolution mechanisms and xeer**

In general, the communities in the central regions of Somalia are considered to be very traditional, with strong respect for the *xeer*. The indigenous communities have lived together for years and have established procedures for sharing the meagre water and pasture resources and resolving local conflicts that arise over these. Although there is no specific *xeer* between the Sa’ad and Saleman, this peace initiative followed the established Somali *xeer* of conflict resolution, beginning with consultations with elders, interventions to reduce hostility, ceasefire, and concluding with the accord and its dissemination and implementation. Mini-conferences are commonly used as part of this process in cases of widespread conflict between communities separated geographically and/or by socio-economic interests. For example, the Sa’ad and Saleman communities in Bandiradley and Adado area had different issues to address than those in the coastal area of Hobyo and therefore benefited from local reconciliation to address the local concerns and priorities before coming together for the wider reconciliation conference. Furthermore, the process drew on the traditional practice of *xeer* in general terms by applying *gembis* (forgiveness) to cancel the deaths incurred on both sides as well as upholding *birimageydo* as a critical element of the peace accord.

The unusual aspects of this process were the special importance given to the militia leaders and the women. This is outside the traditional conflict resolution approach but was necessitated by the realities on the ground and the proven potential of both groups of stakeholders to contribute positively to the process.

**Phase three of the reconciliation process, district council formation**

At the time of writing, the formation of local district councils in Galgadud and south Mudug regions has not yet taken place. This is due to a number of factors beyond the control and wishes of the local communities, including changes within the TFG that resulted in suspension of its plans for establishing local administrative structures. Another factor is the emergence in 2007 of the self-proclaimed ‘Galmudug State’, which identifies itself as the legitimate authority for parts of the concerned territories, with a role in the formation of local governance but to date is not well-grounded in the local communities. These dynamics have to be addressed before embarking on effective district council formation.

**Analysis**

The peace initiative that began in February 2006, with the ceasefire agreed in April 2006 and two mini-conferences held in May and June 2006, was not ultimately concluded until a year later in February 2007. The way in which the incomplete process was sustained during the six months suspension in the latter half of 2006 reflects the commitment of the two communities to reconciliation.

**Peace and conflict dynamics**

Not only was the process suspended for six months, but the area felt the impact of the turbulent political-security changes during this period. From mid-2006, the ICU emerged as the dominant force in south-
central Somalia and established its administration in Galgadud and parts of south Mudug during the latter half of 2006. Adado became the stronghold for the ICU forces, while south Gaalka’yo became the base for the TFG backed by Ethiopian forces. As a result, the two communities found themselves on opposing sides of the battle between the ICU and the TFG/ Ethiopian forces. In this context, the ceasefire and the joint committees established to monitor the overall security situation could not function as intended.

With the end of the military confrontation between the ICU and the TFG/ Ethiopia in December 2006, the attention of the local communities returned to the reconciliation process and it gained new momentum. One of the outstanding issues to be addressed from this period of upheaval related to killings that had taken place in the interim.

Another dynamic that emerged while the reconciliation process was underway was the declaration of Galmudug state by a group of local and diaspora politicians from the area. The political lobbying for and against the new state dominated most of south Mudug and diverted the attention of some key actors from the peace process. Several protagonists for the state had an interest in influencing the reconciliation process, but were persuaded to leave this in the hands of the community leaders. The issues may arise again when the political process of formation of the local administrations is implemented.

### Dealing with critical junctures

Several critical junctures emerged during the process that had to be managed with care and attention in order to proceed. The first arose over the agenda for the El Hur mini-conference, where the Sa’ad group proposed a similar process to that of Bandiradley (focusing on maintaining the ceasefire, improving local security, and enhancing community integration and sharing of pasture and water sources). The Saleman group wanted to include issues relating to Hobyo town in the agenda as the first matter to be resolved. Others were concerned was that this would generate further hostilities that could deadlock the process and risk resumption of the conflict. After intensive discussion by members of the facilitating team with influential members of the Saleman group, agreement was reached to address this challenging issue at the subsequent reconciliation conference.

The second tough issue proposed for inclusion on the agenda came from the Sa’ad group, who wanted the Saleman to agree to move out of some pastoral land that had been shared before the conflict but was mostly within the Saleman territory. Again, this complex issue was beyond the scope or purpose of the mini-conference. The facilitation team succeeded in mediating a compromise and postponing the question of shared grazing to the main phase of the reconciliation.

Another critical juncture emerged during the preparatory consultations for the final reconciliation conference in Adado namely, how to address the issue of the killings that had occurred during the suspension of the reconciliation process from July to December 2006. During the period when the ICU dominated, four Sa’ad men were killed by the Saleman. When the ICU was defeated and left the area, the Sa’ad killed five Saleman men in revenge. Ultimately the elders of the two communities and other stakeholders concluded that the peace agreements remained valid and these incidents were treated separately. The Sa’ad group insisted that the Saleman had violated the Bandiradley accord while the Saleman group maintained that no accord had been reached there. The CRD team’s audio-visual documentation of all the meetings enabled them to show the film of the reading and signing of the Bandiradley accord by both parties (including some of those who insisted no agreement had taken place)37. This unusual intervention dissolved the crisis and a resolution was reached.

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37 Interviews with the CRD facilitation team, Yassin Salad and Ali Joqombe, Mogadishu, January 2008
**Actors and participation, ownership and legitimacy of the process**

The peace initiative brought in the political leaders and other key actors from the Sa’ad and Saleman clans and other neighbouring clans, at both the national and local level. The inclusion of all of those with a stake in conflict or peace in the area was critical to the ultimate success of the process. Implementation of the process was also inclusive, bringing both the parties and potential spoilers into all stages through the two mini-conferences and subsequently in the main phases of the reconciliation. In addition, members of the diaspora of the Sa’ad and Saleman communities were briefed throughout to ensure their support.

The leaders of the clan militia who had led and organised the fighting received important consideration from the outset of the process and in turn played decisive roles in influencing the elders to compromise and make peace. Their role in the dissemination of the peace accord and the peace caravans contributed significantly to the peace process.

Women representatives of the two communities also made significant contributions to the process, including through the pressure they exerted on the elders for compromise at the main reconciliation conference in Adado.

Although the Puntland administration was not represented directly at the Adado conference, it provided active support to and collaboration with the local community on security issues.

The earlier peace initiative to address the Sa’ad-Saleman conflict in mid-2005 attracted the attention of many influential and well-intentioned individuals from the two communities and from organisations engaged in peacebuilding, but it had to be abandoned when it became clear that dialogue was not being encouraged by the real stakeholders at all levels, from the senior leadership to the grassroots. It was only when all those involved in the conflict made a commitment at the Taar hotel in Gaalka’yo in February 2005 to end the fighting that the peace process could be initiated with any chance of success. At this stage it was a serious undertaking that emerged through the common efforts of the two parties at grassroots level as well as the national political level.

Once there was buy-in by all levels of stakeholders for the process, mediation of the actual conferences was undertaken by elders and respected people from the two communities. Similarly, the members of the advisory committees (Guddiga Marjaca) belonged to the two communities. The agenda for each conference, which was critical to the progress and outcome of the process, was determined by the mediators in consultation with elders and the CRD facilitation team. Security was provided by local militia from the two clans, with the contribution of the TFG and Puntland forces at the Adado conference. The CRD played a neutral facilitator role, providing guidance and professional inputs when required, and also raised substantial donor funds for the process through Interpeace.

**Quality of mediation and management**

The CRD team who facilitated the peace initiative included two members from the respective clans who are respected in their communities for their knowledge of the history and dynamics of the conflict. Their proven commitment to the process and willingness to take risks in order to support resolution of the conflict was rewarded by the cooperation of and trust placed in them by both communities. Whenever misunderstandings or critical junctures arose, the facilitators responded swiftly, drawing on their experience in conflict management and negotiation. The team was involved in intensive shuttle diplomacy at different stages, particularly during the ten days prior to the preparations for the main Adado conference. Intensive formal and informal mediation between the elders of the two clans was also required to bridge
misunderstandings over violations that had occurred since the Bandiradley Accord. This was ultimately successful and agreement was reached to make amends for violations by a few individuals rather than sacrifice the process.

As described above, the elders who mediated the two mini-conferences were nominated from the Sa’ad and Saleman communities in areas heavily affected by the conflict and were people who had a shared history together before the conflict of living side by side and managing minor disputes. They, therefore, shared many good memories, which could be drawn on when discussions became difficult or decisions were challenging. The mediation committee for the Adado conference comprised renowned and influential elders who were appointed by the two communities.

At the outset, agreement was reached on basic principles, such as ensuring respect for the other in discussions, avoiding unnecessary reference to sensitive issues, and sticking to the agreed agenda when reaching decisions. This helped the flow of discussion and minimised tensions. The process began by encouraging the participants to brainstorm together on the negative impacts of the conflict, the period before that when they had lived in harmony, and what benefits reconciliation and peace could bring. This step was thoughtfully managed and was designed to relieve the internal pressure felt by many people, in order that they could find a positive way forward.

During the subsequent process, when decisions on particular issues could not be handled in the larger gathering, smaller technical meetings for selected people were arranged to enable each sub-clan to deliberate the issue and propose a workable decision. This arrangement worked very well.

The formulation of the agenda was a critical component in the process that contributed to its success. In each of the conferences, the mediating elders and the facilitation team focused on issues on which agreement could be reached at that time and postponed controversial topics, such as ownership of disputed water sources, land and villages, to technical meetings that would follow. It was argued that issues of ownership would require detailed discussion for clarification and that, furthermore, an effective national and local administrative system is needed to address and resolve these questions. Throughout, the mediation committee consulted with other influential elders who would be expected to implement the final agreement.

Before any larger meeting, the facilitation team and mediation committee would consult key elders and decision makers for updates on the current dynamics and to explore options that could generate consensus. This enabled the team and the committee to come to the larger gatherings well-prepared and with proposals for the way forward. The documentation of the whole process by the CRD team and audio-visual unit, comprising details of all the deliberations and accords, was extremely useful – and eased a stalemate prior to the Adado conference, as described above.

**Quality of the peace accord(s)**

The agreements reached at the two mini-conferences yielded tangible outcomes, reduced hostilities, and encouraged integration. This set the scene by sensitising the communities for the substantial issues to be addressed at the main Adado conference.

The final accord is generally clear and detailed. It addresses the challenging issues of deaths and destruction of property during the fighting, all of which were dismissed (Gembis). This is a common traditional practice employed by elders and conflict mediation committees but has the disadvantage that people may continue to feel aggrieved about the balance of losses to be forgiven and see the decision as unfair.
The accord states that visible properties (livestock or non-military equipment) are to be returned to their legal owners without any conditions for restitution. The exception is military equipment, such as battlewagons or heavy weapons. The mediators considered that it was too controversial to discuss the ownership of battlewagons, some of which are believed to have changed hands several times while others have been repaired or renovated (or deteriorated), complicating the decision-making. At the same time, the issue of military equipment is very significant for the militia leaders who were one of the primary forces pushing the reconciliation process forward. In order to avoid the process getting stuck on this complex matter, it was agreed that it would be settled in separate meetings after the conclusion of the main reconciliation process and handled in the same way as other properties through local mechanisms.

Though considerable time and effort was exerted to generate the agreement, it focuses only on the effect of the conflict without identifying the primary causes or how these should be addressed in the future, beyond stating that future disputes or criminal acts will be settled shari’a law, which is acceptable to all Somali communities. In particular, the accord does not refer to ownership of land or water sources, which is considered by many informed people to be one of the sources of conflict. In contrast, the agreements from the mini-conferences refer to “…sharing resources, water and grazing land…” (but without clarifying which water points and pasture will be shared). Research interviews indicated that the mediators, facilitators and elders avoided discussion of the issue as it was clear to them that agreement could not be reached at that time. If the sharing of these natural resources is not considered at some stage, the accord may be jeopardised in times of hardship, such as rain failure.

**Follow up, sustainability and impact**

The peace process had immediate beneficial effects for the communities in Mudug and Galgadud regions and beyond, by ending the violent conflict and allowing free movement of people and goods through the area from north and south Somalia. This was subsequently affected, as described above, by the changing political-security dynamics in south-central Somalia in the latter half of 2006. However, despite the challenges, the incomplete reconciliation process held until the final phase of the process could be completed in Adado. Since the Adado accord, local elders from the two sub-clans have remained in regular contact to exchange information on developments in their respective areas. Although a few localised killings occurred in remote parts of the nomadic territory after the Adado conference, these were contained by the elders. This, together with the monitoring by local elders of potential risks to stability in the area described below, point to a high level of ownership by the local communities in maintaining peace in their area.

The diaspora of the two communities have also contributed, supporting the establishment of schools in south Mudug, and a hospital and a radio station in south Gaalka’yo.

The restoration of peace and stability in the area enabled people fleeing the violence in Mogadishu in April-May 2007 to seek refuge in the central regions, which would previously have been extremely difficult.

In September 2007, militia checkpoints appeared on the main north-south trade route, obstructing free movement. Although this was not intended to breach the peace accord and instead related to non-payment of salaries to militia integrated into the TFG forces, elders recognised the potential threat and intervened quickly to ensure the checkpoints were dismantled.

In October 2007, a serious shortage of water and pasture during the deyr (rainy) season led nomads from the two communities to converge from distant settlements in areas that had received the first rains. This

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38 The heavy fighting in Mogadishu in late March and April 2007 resulted in an influx of over 148,000 people into Mudug and Galgadud regions by late April (UNHCR estimate).
increased the risk of clashes due to overcrowding and heavy demands on water and pasture resources. The senior elders of the two communities, including the signatories of the Adado Peace Accord, organised a meeting at Qaydaro on 22 October 2007 for the key local actors to forestall potential clashes. After three days of discussions, the elders and other participants agreed to the following points:
1. A joint committee of ten prominent local figures (five from each sub-clan) was set up at each water point to facilitate and supervise sharing of water and grazing resources in each location;
2. A joint committee of ten local militiamen (five from each sub-clan) was set up at each water point to work with the local committees as security personnel to reinforce the agreed systems;
3. Arms or guns were forbidden at all water points and gathering places with a fine of Somali Sh 500,000 payable by any individual violating this.
Both communities honoured the agreement and the season ended without clashes.

One significant impact of the process is the interest shown by other clans in the central regions to engage in reconciliation, including the Marehan and Dir, and Duduble and Sheikhal all of whom were observers at the Adado conference. They have approached the CRD team for their professional facilitation and strategic opportunities for engagement are being considered.

One important element of the process that remains incomplete is the payment of the diya to both sides for the twenty Birmageydo. The violent conflict, unprecedented displacement of people, and virtual closure of the Bakara market in Mogadishu through most of 2007 have all militated against effective mobilisation of the business and diaspora groups who were to cover this cost. However this presents a serious challenge to the sustainability of the accord. Several more isolated killings have occurred since the signing of the Adado accord and one of the reasons is the long overdue payment of the Birmageydo diya. This indicates the value of stipulating the timeframe in peace agreements for completion of diya payments in order to reduce the risk of “unfinished business”: if the diya is not paid within a reasonable period, it is almost inevitable that further revenge killing will follow.

Finally, it had originally been envisaged that the signing of the accord in Adado would be followed by a wider consolidation ceremony in Gaalka’yo for all stakeholders, including the senior TFG representatives, politicians from the two communities, and members of the Puntland administration who had initiated the process in 2006, as well as by the neighbouring communities. This meeting has not yet taken place due to the considerable time and effort required for effective organisation. During the course of this research, the elders reiterated the importance of the meeting.

**Funding, communication and other features**

In a traditional process, the reconciling communities cover most of the expenses, sometimes with significant contributions from mediating clans in light of the economic burden of conflict on local communities and the resources needed for this kind of undertaking. However, in this instance, with the exception of local logistics and welcoming meals by the local communities, most of the funding was provided from international donors and managed locally by the CRD and Interpeace. This was in part in recognition of the devastating impact of the conflict in the area and beyond. Women activists who became involved in the peace initiative made considerable contributions through fund raising in their respective constituencies and from their own resources (as many women have been engaged in small businesses since the collapse of the state). However the contributions from the business groups and diaspora of the two communities were less than might be expected, although they provided support subsequently for development in the area. Further awareness raising and mobilisation is needed to alert the diaspora of the importance of their contributions to peace, including in contributing to the outstanding diya for birmageydo.
The donor funding was critical in ensuring the process went ahead. The direct involvement of the CRD and Interpeace, with available funds, gave hope to the local population but also generated false expectations among some politicians associated with the area, which required skilful management by the team. The successful outcome of the reconciliation process indicates that carefully targeted external sponsorship, sensitively managed at local level, can assist rather than undermine a local process.

The regular and timely updates of the proceedings of each of the conferences through the local, national and international media and Somali websites helped to ensure widespread dissemination of progress with the reconciliation to the local communities, the wider Somali public, and to the diaspora. The media was actively engaged throughout and, prior to the Adado conference, a committee was established to provide media briefings. The CRD team also provided regular updates for business groups and other influential figures from the two communities based in Mogadishu, since they were stakeholders in the process and a number of them were prime movers in its initiation. Finally, the active engagement in the peace process of the diaspora of the two communities was critical in ensuring their contribution to the restoration of peace as well as subsequent support for development in the area.

**Historical legacy, outstanding characteristics and innovations**

The peace process provided an unusual contrast with the common association of clan militias as being responsible for conflict, insecurity and death. This initiative demonstrated that militia who have fought each other can be one of the prime forces for peace and reconciliation if they are sensitised effectively and engaged proactively in contributing to reconciliation.

One of the key features of the process was that the reintegration of the militia from the two communities was undertaken before the main dialogue and reconciliation conferences. Normally reintegration takes place as a concluding stage, after the final accord. However early on, consultations with a wide range of local people from the two communities, including politicians and members of the TFG, indicated that reintegration of the militia and their leaders would be a prerequisite for sustainable peace in the area.

Another characteristic of the conflict was the attention it attracted at the national level, including the involvement of the TFG president, prime minister and parliamentary speaker as well as politicians from the area. Having officially launched the initiative, they delegated the implementation to the local stakeholders and enabled the process to be managed at community level.

The physical participation of women in the Adado conference was another exceptional aspect of this process. By tradition, women are excluded from sitting in the shir and are expected to share their thoughts and insights via their husbands, sons, brothers or other close relative. At Adado, women not only mobilised for peace through the joint pressure group but also sat in the conference and were given an opportunity to speak, which they used to powerful effect. This innovation of the xeer was applauded by the two hundred male delegates at the final conference.

Another innovation was the use of audio-visual documentation of the process in contrast with the tradition of relying on the elders’ memories and poems. As well as being useful in overcoming the stalemate during preparations for the Adado conference, the film footage has been edited to produce a documentary film (in Somali and English) that is proving useful for sensitisation of the diaspora and with other communities to learn from this experience of reconciliation.
Findings and conclusion

Some of the key factors in the success of the peace process were:

- **Commitment by national politicians from the two communities to resolution**
  The direct intervention by national politicians from the area to initiate a peace process was a critical factor in ending support for and funding of the cycle of violence.

- **War fatigue**
  After almost a year and half of violent conflict between the two communities across a vast area, causing death, destruction, and poverty, both communities had exhausted their resources and commitment to struggling over territory they had previously shared peacefully. The sponsors and mobilisers of the conflict and the militia fighters had reached a stage where all wanted to end the conflict and restore peace (war-weary and unwinnable conflict).\(^\text{39}\)

- **Inclusive and participatory approach and involvement of key players**
  The consultative and inclusive nature of the process enabled the constructive and dynamic engagement of groups of stakeholders who would not normally figure in traditional conflict resolution. This included the courageous role played by the sensitized militia leaders and women’s groups. The commitment and sincerity of key elders and prominent individuals and involvement of the diaspora were also critical.

- **Experienced facilitation and conflict resolution**
  The professional expertise of the CRD\(^\text{40}\) team in conflict management and facilitation was identified by community members as contributing to the successful resolution of the conflict. This included the early successful engagement of the militia leaders in conflict management training (who subsequently gave critical support to the process).

The prolonged nature of the peace initiative, and the changing political-security dynamics during the process, tested the commitment of the communities to peaceful resolution. The ultimate success of the process, and the subsequent dedication of the community leaders to sustain peace, demonstrates the potential for peaceful resolution of apparently complex and intractable conflicts even in challenging circumstances.

\(^{39}\) Interview with Mohamed Ali Raghe, Sa’ad elder involved in the process, Mogadishu, 25 December 2007

\(^{40}\) Interview with Hassan Ahmed Mohamed, Saleman elder involved in the process, Mogadishu, 22 December 2007
# Annex 1  Glossary of Somali terms in peace and war

1. **Aafti**: no man’s land/ buffer zone
2. ‘**Aaqil**: (see Caqil below)
3. **Aarsi**: revenge/reprisal
4. **Adable**: black soil
5. **Afjar**: conclude/bring to an end
6. **Afduub**: taking hostage, kidnapping, abduction, taking prisoner 2. a terrorizing act against someone
7. **Aqbal keen**: acceptance of an idea
8. **Ardaa**: families/ clans share of blood compensation *(mag)*
9. **Arrin keen**: one who initiates an idea
10. **Baad**: ransom, extortion, to obtain property from another by intimidation 2. food (usually referring to fodder for livestock)
11. **Baadisooc**: buffer zone
12. **Baanis (Baaniso)**: boastful/ rhetoric
13. **Baaqnaabadeed**: call for peace
14. **Bariidin**: morning greetings
15. **Baraago dumin**: destroying water reservoirs, demolishing water reservoirs
16. **Barakac**: displacement
17. **Beel**: clan/community
18. **Beero gubid**: setting on fire for farms, burning agricultural fields
19. **Berked sumayn**: poisoning water reservoirs, contaminating water reservoirs
20. **Biliilio**: looting, plundering, robbery, prowling 2. raiding
21. **Birmagaydo**: preserved from harm "spared from the spear"
22. **Boob**: looting, prowling, raiding, pillaging
23. **Boog**: moral wound
24. **Booga dhayid**: healing the wounds, recovering
25. **Caqil (‘Aaqil)**: chief
26. **Caasikaay**: rebel hide out
27. **Cadaawad**: hostility
28. **Ceel-dumin**: destroying water catchments or wells, pulling down water holes
29. **Ciidan kala qaadis**: pulling [fighting] forces apart
30. **Ciribtiir**: genocide, ethnic cleansing
31. **Col**: enemy
32. **Colaad**: enmity
33. **Colaad hurin**: perpetuating conflict, upholding disputes, organizing hostility, encouraging warring sides to fight
34. **Daaqsin**: grazing land
35. **Daacad**: Honest
36. **Dagaal**: War
37. **Dakharo**: injuries
38. **Damaanadqaad**: guarantee, assurance, promise, pledge, certification
39. **Dan**: interest/ need
40. **Dayday**: extorters, freelance militiamen
41. **Debecsanaan**: flexibility
42. **Debdemis**: put off or reduce tension
<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
<th><strong>Annexes 10</strong></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>43.</td>
<td>Dedaa Nabadeed: peace initiative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44.</td>
<td>Deegaan: environment/ settlement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45.</td>
<td>Deganaan: stability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46.</td>
<td>Dhac: robbery</td>
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<tr>
<td>47.</td>
<td>Dhaymo: ointment</td>
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<tr>
<td>48.</td>
<td>Dhexdhexaadin: mediating</td>
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<tr>
<td>49.</td>
<td>Dhul-gubid: set areas on fire, destroy with fire, the act of burning a piece of land</td>
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<tr>
<td>50.</td>
<td>Dhir-jaari: tree cutting, deforestation</td>
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<tr>
<td>51.</td>
<td>Dib u dejin: resettlement, relocation 2. immigration, movement, journey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52.</td>
<td>Dib u heshiisiin: reconciliation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53.</td>
<td>Dii: kill</td>
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<tr>
<td>54.</td>
<td>Diya: blood compensation <em>(mag)</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>55.</td>
<td>Diyo bixin: blood compensation, payment for a person's life</td>
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<tr>
<td>56.</td>
<td>Dood: argument/debate</td>
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<tr>
<td>57.</td>
<td>Dooy: sun soil</td>
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<td>58.</td>
<td>Duko: blessing</td>
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<tr>
<td>59.</td>
<td>Dulqaadahso: tolerance/ patience</td>
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<td>60.</td>
<td>Dulxaadis: overview</td>
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<tr>
<td>61.</td>
<td>Duudsii: dismiss</td>
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<tr>
<td>62.</td>
<td>Ergo: delegation/ envoy</td>
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<tr>
<td>63.</td>
<td>Ergo Nabadeed: peace delegates/ peace envoy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>64.</td>
<td>Fadhi: session</td>
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<tr>
<td>65.</td>
<td>Faq: private discussion</td>
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<tr>
<td>66.</td>
<td>Faraxumayn: the act of molesting, misconduct against someone</td>
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<tr>
<td>67.</td>
<td>Furitaan: opening, divorcing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>68.</td>
<td>Gaadiid: transport</td>
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<tr>
<td>69.</td>
<td>Gaadmo: off guard, surprise attack, unexpected action against someone, quick raid against unaware person</td>
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<tr>
<td>70.</td>
<td>Gablan iyo wiil la'aan: childless, having no baby, without sons</td>
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<tr>
<td>71.</td>
<td>Gadood: strike, mutiny, revolt, to become furious</td>
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<tr>
<td>72.</td>
<td>Gacansarrayn: having upper hand, being victorious, winning the battle/ game</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>73.</td>
<td>Galad: favour</td>
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<tr>
<td>74.</td>
<td>Gammaan: horses and donkeys</td>
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<tr>
<td>75.</td>
<td>Ganaax: penalty, fine, sentence, consequence, punishment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>76.</td>
<td>Gar cadaawe: strict adjudication</td>
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<tr>
<td>77.</td>
<td>Gar Sokeeye: flexible adjudication</td>
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<tr>
<td>78.</td>
<td>Garsoorid: jury verdict, judiciary system, judgment of a case by a court or group of people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>79.</td>
<td>Gar: hearing/ verdict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>80.</td>
<td>Garaad: senior elder <em>(similar to Ugaas or Suldaan)</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>81.</td>
<td>Garawshiiyo: concession</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>82.</td>
<td>Garnaqsi: defend; to justify or vindicate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>83.</td>
<td>Gardhigasho: bringing case to the mediators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>84.</td>
<td>Gar-diiddo: unwilling to accept any ruling</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>85.</td>
<td>Garyigil: willing to accept any rules</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>86.</td>
<td>Garqaadasho: acceptance of a verdict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>87.</td>
<td>Gawaari dhicid: car hijack, car seizure, car robbery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>88.</td>
<td>Gebogebo: wrap up/ conclusion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>89.</td>
<td>Gashi: grudge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90.</td>
<td>Geed: traditional venue under a tree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>91.</td>
<td>Geed'yare': mini conference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>92.</td>
<td>Geel dhicid: camel looting, robbery of camels</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
93. **Geesi**: warrior
94. **Gembis**: dismissal
95. **Go’aan**: decision
96. **Go’aan qaadasho**: decision taking, determination, taking an action/measure
97. **Gobanimo**: freedom/boldness
98. **Godob reeb**: exchange of women for strengthening peace
99. **Godob**: guilt
100. **Godobtir**: special price for women being jealous
101. **Godobxir**: to console the victim by giving something (bride, money, livestock)
102. **Go’isu taag**: raising a sheet as a white flag in surrender (“wave the flag”)
103. **Gogol**: peace venue
104. **Gole fadhiisin**: make somebody sit before the traditional court or Geed
105. **Gole**: jury
106. **Gorgorton**: bargaining; negotiation
107. **Guddi**: committee
108. **Guddida Qabanqaabada**: preparatory committee
109. **Gumaad**: up-rooting, massacre, butchery, mass murder, mass destruction
110. **Gunaanad**: conclusion
111. **Gurmad**: cavalry/reinforcement
112. **Gurgurshe Qowrac**: killing burden animal as a punishment or in war
113. **Guurti**: elders’ meeting to address an issue, especially pertaining to governance or general well-being
114. **Guuxay**: appreciate
115. **Habaar**: curse
116. **Haladayg**: no concession/dare saying
117. **Hanjabaad**: threatening, intimidating, hostile/frightening
118. **Hantiboob**: property looting, robbery, taking by force
119. **Hanti celis**: property restitution, restoration of property
120. **Hayin, Biyo Ma daadshe**: humble person/obedient
121. **Heshiis**: agreement
122. **Heshiis buuxa**: agreement accepted by all sides, having the means to implement the peace deal in place
123. **Heshiisiin**: conciliation/taking role of reconciliation
124. **Hibasho, Hiirtaanyo**: reminisce about bad event
125. **Hiif**: reprimand
126. **Hub-dhigis**: disarm
127. **Hubka-dhig horta Adigu-dhig**: disarm after the other disarms
128. **Irmaan Qowrac**: kill lactating animal as punishment or in a war
129. **Is afagaranwaa**: disagreement
130. **Is afgarasho**: understanding
131. **Isbaaro**: road block
132. **Isasaamixid**: forgiveness, trustfulness, cooperation
133. **Isa soo horfariisin**: direct talk, convene sides at roundtable for negotiation
134. **Isgacan-qaadis**: shaking hands with each other
135. **Isgacansaarid**: shaking hands with each other 2. fit for fighting
136. **Is qancin**: convince one another
137. **Ishin**: camels and cows
138. **Is mariwa**: deadlock, impasse, stalemate, gridlock, standstill
139. **Is nabad gelin**: give peace to each other
140. **Isu soo dhoweyn**: to narrow differences, enable parties to resolve their problems, convince contesting sides into negotiation
141. **Isu tanaasul**: compromise; give and take
142. **Jajuub**: pressure
143. **Jidgooyo**: ambush, waylay, lie in wait 2. surprise attack
144. **Jifo**: family lineage
145. **Jiri**: extorters, freelance militiamen
146. **Joogid**: presence
147. **Kala bogs**: forgiveness
148. **Kala fogaansho**: widening differences, complicating procedures to make peace
149. **Kala Kac**: standoff
150. **Khaarajin**: unlawful killing, organized murdering, assassination
151. **Kicin dadweyne**: public agitation/ campaigning
152. **Kufsi**: rape, a sexual attack
153. **Kulan**: meeting
154. **Laabxaadhasho**: try to make somebody forgive you
155. **Labadubleyn**: restrain one's hands
156. **Maato-lays**: innocent killings
157. **Madal**: venue, forum
158. **Madaxfurasho**: ransom, extortion
159. **Majo-xaabin**: setback, undermining, destabilizing
160. **Mag**: blood compensation
161. **Magdhow**: compensation, paying back the cost of damage done, refund for losses
162. **Maqnaansho**: absent
163. **Maraado**: punishment for individuals who will not abide by peace agreement
164. **Mudo-Diyo**: fixed time to pay blood compensation
165. **Mart**: guests
166. **Martigelin**: hosting
167. **Mili**: infection
168. **Mooraduug**: deprivation, dispossession, denial of properties
169. **Mooryaan**: extorters, freelance militiamen (same as Jiri, Dayday)
170. **Muddo**: give fixed time
171. **Mudo**: period
172. **Murtiyen**: rationalize/ summarise
173. **Mushxarad**: jubilee
174. **Nabad raadis**: peace searching
175. **Nabad**: peace
176. **Nabadgelin**: give peace
177. **Nabadlii**: peace rejecter/ anti-peace
178. **Nabadoon**: peacemaker/ peace seeker
179. **Nabad sugid**: securing peace
180. **Nabadeyn**: peace making
181. **Odayaal**: elders
182. **Qaadhaan**: material and/ or financial contribution
183. **Qaan-sheegad**: claim for compensation
184. **Qaan**: liability
185. **Qabanqaabo**: preparation
186. **Qaybgal**: participation
187. **Qax**: flee, run away, dislocation
188. **Qolo**: clan X
189. **Qoonsad**: sceptical
190. **Qoordhiibasho**: giving the mandate to the mediation committee
191. **Qorituur**: draw lots
192. **Raas**: sub-sub-clan
193. **Rafiso**: 20% advance of blood compensation given to the victim
194. **Reer**: clan
195. **Samirsiin**: help someone to accept the situation with patience, to be tolerant
196. **Samotalis**: somebody who works for the sake of goodness
197. **Shafshafa**: cures for wounded person
198. **Shir weyne**: conference
199. **Shir**: meeting
200. **Shirguddoon**: chairing committee
201. **Shirqool**: conspiracy, plot, machination, set-up
202. **Soo hoyasho**: giving in, surrendering, yielding, giving way
203. **Sooryo**: food for guests
204. **Suldaan**: higher in rank than chief (‘aaqil)
205. **Sulux**: traditional mechanism of settling disputes, peace making, reconciliation, way of resolving a social dispute through mediation
206. **Sumal & Sabeen**: ram and lamb paid as apology
207. **Tabasho**: resentment
208. **Tashi**: consultation
209. **Tol**: clans binding together
210. **Tolweyne**: the greater clan
211. **Toogasho**: shooting, shelling, gunfire, assassination, murdering, execution
212. **Turxaan bexin**: trouble shooting/ problem solving
213. **Tusaalayn**: examples, offering examples
214. **Ugaas**: senior elder rank (similar to suldaan)
215. **Uurkutaalo**: anxiety
216. **U kala dab-qaadid**: peace shuttling, mediation mission, or coordinating diplomatic message between two parties
217. **Wabar**: senior elder rank (similar to suldaan)
218. **Wada hadal**: dialogue
219. **Wadatashi**: consultation
220. **Waran siib/ Waranjiifis**: lay down weapons
221. **Weerar**: attack
222. **Weer-xidhasho**: trouble shooting
223. **Xaal marin**: redress for losses for wrong doings
224. **Xaal**: apology in kind
225. **Xabad joojin**: ceasefire
226. **Xadgudub**: transgression
227. **Xalay-dhalay**: forgive and forget, to cancel grievances (literally: to have given birth the previous evening – no newborn can hold or have caused grievances)
228. **Xaq**: rights/ entitlement
229. **Xasuuq**: genocide, mass execution, bloodbath, slaughter, annihilation
230. **Xeerbeegti**: jury
231. **Xeer**: customary law
232. **Xeerhoosaad**: by-laws (internal regulations)
233. **Xidhitaan**: closing
234. **Xidid**: in-laws
235. **Xigaal**: close relatives
236. **Xoolo-kala-dhicid**: property looting, robbery, taking by force
237. **Xul**: selected people
238. **Xulashe**: selection
Annex 2  Peace agreements in Idale case study  
(Translated from the original Somali by CRD)

Being the elders, sheikhs and opinion makers of the Hubeer sub-clan as well as the formal deregulation to the reconciliation meeting between the brotherly two sub-clans of Hubeer and Yantaar whose signatures are as below, we declare our endorsement of the agreement to be facilitated by the National Reconciliation Committee.
Being the elders, sheikhs and opinion makers of the Yantaar sub-clan as well as the formal deregulation to the reconciliation meeting between the brotherly two sub-clans of Yantaar and Hubeer whose signatures are as below, we declare our endorsement of the agreement to be facilitated by the National Reconciliation Committee.
Agreement in the NRC-led peace initiative

(Translated from the original Somali)

Somalia Republic
National Reconciliation Commission

Ref: _________________  Date: 15/01/2007

Committee decision concerning Idale

Committees consisting of five sub-clans of the Mirifle clan and known as Sagal and Sideed met at Qansaxadhere district where Yantaar and Hubeer had been fighting for about one year. The reason for the conflict was the ownership Idale village. Each clan claims ownership of the Idale village located on the road between Baidoa and Dinsoor, crossing an area know as Dooy (meaning pastureland). The committee is composed of 37 members representing districts such as Qansaxadhere, Ufrow, Dureey, Eemid, Buurhakabe, Berdale and Tooswayne, and they selected amongst themselves three chairpersons (shirgudoon) and a secretary.

On 12 September 2005 they opened peace dialogue between Hubeer and Yantaar, with each clan represented by 20 persons. The committee listened carefully to the claims of both sides, showing great patience and tolerance. The difficulties of the case meant it was necessary to visit the location where the conflict had taken place. The committee requested the two sub-clans to accompany them and show them what had happened, which was accepted. On 13 September the committee traveled to the disputed area in a mission comprising 20 members from each sub-clan and 37 peace delegates, with one day for travel, another two days to research the facts presented by each sub-clan to the committee. The committee made great efforts to conduct further research, visiting farmlands, wells, water catchments, pastureland and other villages where farms belonging to the Hubeer and Yantaar sub clans were burnt down. The committee saw that Idale village was entirely burnt down, sparing no houses or businesses, whether owned by the rival sub-clans of Digil/ Mirifle or other clans who were also affected. Nothing survived the fire. The particular shock was that two mosques were destroyed, with the holy Koran cut and burned. The committee declared that those responsible had committed a serious violation of Islam.

On 16 September the committee completed its research and returned to Qansaxadhere. On 17 September, both the Hubeer and Yantaar sub-clans placed their confidence in the committee to take the appropriate decision on judging ownership of Idale village. The committee responsible for resolving the Hubeer and Yantaar conflict concerning Idale reached their decision and made the following points:

When the committee reviewed:
1. Both clans are part of the Mirifle clan, notably of the Sagaal and Labadhahood.
2. They are neighbours and have permanent inter-relationships.
3. Idale includes pastureland and both sub-clans have the same livelihoods in the districts they share as Digil-Mirifle clan, including districts Manas, Dharqo, Raama Adoy, Safar- Nolay, Olka-Aan and Idale.
4. The majority of houses, trade, mosques, and planted trees belong to the Yantaar.
5. The farms, wells and water catchments surrounding Idale are owned by the Yantaar.
6. The Hubeer confessed that a well in existence for 86 years was dug by the Yantaar.
7. We listened to testimony that the sub-clan burned Idale in order that it would not to be resettled again and not become pastureland.
8. After listening to the witnesses amongst the people who are members of these communities, the committee took account of the facts and visible evidence and took the following decision.
Agreed decision:
1. The offences of burning Idale village, destroying the mosques and cutting the planted trees were charged as the responsibility of the Hubeer sub-clan.
2. 33 of the 37 members of the committee agreed that the land belonged to the persons who used the land appropriately and carefully in line with Sharia and the community judged that the Yantaar own the productivity of Idale and have the right to manage the village. The rest of the sub-clan accepted the judgment.
3. The committee commanded Hubeer to accept the committee judgments and follow the committee’s decision.

Request
a) The committee requested all religious groups, Malaqyo and intellectuals of Digil and Mirifle to support the decision and implement it with good intention and act in order to stop the conflict.
b) The committee asked that the Transitional Federal Government, particularly those members who are part of the parliament and especially the Ministers of Judiciary and Reconciliation, to give support for the implementation of the decision.

Burhakabe District
1. Sheikh Mohamed Nur Sheikh Hussein
2. Haji Malaq Aadan Abdirahman
3. Malaq Aamin Abdiyow Hussein
4. Malaq Haji Mohamed Malin Ali
5. Malaq Yare Ali Osman
6. Malaq Abdi Salan Sheikh Ibrahim
7. Malaq Osman Yarow Bulle
8. Malaq Sidow Aadan Moalin
9. Malaq Hilowe Hussien Ali Yarow
10. Mohamed Ali Gaab (the chair persons of security)
11. Abdi Rashid Hassan Ali (the vice person of station)
12. Mugwaal Nur Moalin (the chair persons of youth center)
13. Sharif Sheikh Yerow Sheikh Abdulatif
14. Haji Abdulahi Moalin Shati
15. Abdulahi Sidow Sheikh Yerow

Ufrow District
1. Sheikh Haji Abduladif Sheikh Ibrahim
2. Ugaas Hussein Mursal Ma’an
3. Haji Aadan iman Arab
4. Yusuf Moalin Abdow
5. Nurow Warsame Dheer
6. Abdow Qoore Warbuuk
7. Ugaas Isaaq Ibrahim Hassan

Berdale District
1. Sheikh Bayadir Sheikh Abdirahman Bababey

Durey-Eemid District
1. Ali Sheikh Mohamed Nur Sheikh
2. Hassan Mohamed Robow
3. Ibrahim Muqtar Ali

Qansaxadhere District
1. Aliyow Sagaar Mohamed
2. Mohamed Uudey Aadan
3. Mad Isaaq Uburow
4. Cah Jerbey Hassan
Subject: Clarification of reconciliation acceptance

*Malaqyo,* religious groups and intellectuals of Yantaar are the delegates who participated in the reconciliation of the two clans Hubeer and Yantaar as their names signed below. They confirmed that they will be guided by whatever decisions concerning the reconciliation of the two clans is reached by the National Reconciliation Commission who mediate Hubeer and Yantaar clans.

**Names of Yantaar Delegates**
1. Malaq Caliyaw Mahamed Wardhere
2. Malaq Maadey Cabdi Nur
3. Malaq Dadir Macalin
4. Malaq Cabdi Rashid Sh/ Cabdi
5. Malaq Cabdi Rashid Sh/ Mahamed
6. Malaq Husein Aftimo Bulle
7. Oday Arabaw Abdrihman
8. Ahmed Ibrahim Ali
9. Mursal Mohamed Kulan
10. Moalim Abdulahi Qalimow
11. Hashi Cali Yusuf
12. Sheikh Osman Jawarey
13. Ibradim Ali Mursal
14. Sheikh Xasan Omar
15. Haji Mohamed Abdi

**Names of Hubeer Delegates**
1. Ugaas Hassan Shure Mahamud
2. Malaq Aadan Salad Nur
3. Malaq Miris Husein Hassan
4. Malaq Iftin Ali Kusanoow
5. Member Madey Abdi Jirow
6. Member Sharna’arke Abdi Abdirahman
7. Sh.Ibrahim Jibril Aliyow
8. Derow Aadan Mursal
9. Madey Hassan Ali Kus
10. Kalar Maney Abdulle
11. Bukay Ali Aan
12. Armiye Sheikh Abdulkdir
13. Ma’alin Musalim M. Nur
14. Sh. Husein Sh. Ibrahim
15. Ali Yarow Dahir

Abdulahi Osman Du’ale
Vice chairman of Idale and chairman of the National Reconciliation Commission
Somalia Republic

When the period of the agreed ceasefire ended, a violent conflict occurred in Idale between the Federal Government and the Islamic Courts Union, which caused devastation. The delegates were not able to come together in the assigned period and for that reason a common decision was taken to extend the period for another 10 days.

When the second period of ceasefire concluded, a conference was opened at the National Reconciliation centre with the aim of resolving the protracted conflict between the Hubeer and Yantaar (sub)-clans. The participants were specific individuals assigned to end the disputes between the clans, including *Malaqyo* and religious groups selected from the region and delegates representing both sides, with each side comprising 15 members who selected four persons to talk on their behalf.

At the end of the presentations by both sides, the committee needed further information and it was deemed necessary to send delegates to Idale village accompanied by *Malaqyo*, religious groups, and police forces.
They met the neighboring clans and questioned them about the fighting and visited the location where the fighting had started. Subsequently they met members of the two clans and discussed how to solve the conflict. They asked the clans to forget the past and restore their brotherly relationship and to abide by the decisions issued by the National Reconciliation Commission. Both sides welcomed this and promised to accept the decision of National Reconciliation Commission.

Abdulahi Osman Du’ale
Vice chairman of Idale and chairman of the National Reconciliation Commission

Final Agreement National Reconciliation Commission-led Initiative

Somalia Republic

National Reconciliation Commission

Ref: __________________________  Date: 15/01/2007

To: Hubeer & Yantaar clan
Cc: Prime Minister of TFG
Cc: Minister of National security
Cc: Minister National Reconciliations
Cc: The head of Somalia police force
Cc: The head of Bay police forces
Cc: The chairman of Bay region

Subject: The decision on the reconciliation

After listening to the claims of both sides; after listening to the mediators who visited the conflict area; after hearing the testimony of persons on the causes of the conflict; after interviewing the Malaqyo and the religious groups of Bay regions who were well-informed on Idale affairs; after conducting extensive research into the history of the community; the committee formed decisions as follows:

1. The clan who refuses the decision issued by the committee will be liable for a fine of 100,000,000 So. Shillings and if they did not pay within 15 days, they will forfeit 100 camels, and if they did not pay they will be enforced to pay.
2. Idale village was owned by God, then by Somalis, and it will be resided in by every person who is Somali and has documentation [property rights/ deeds].
3. Each person who is a resident in Idale has the right to own legal properties and no one has the authority to take it from him.
4. The person who kills will be killed, and the responsibility of capturing him will be charged to his clan in collaboration with Somali national security forces and if the killer escapes and it is clarified that his clan was involved in this, they will be fined 200 camels - 100 camels in compensation and 100 camels as a fine. If he captured over whatever period, and if it is recognised that his clan was not involved in his escape, they will pay only 100 camels as compensation and capturing the killer whenever he is seen.
5. The committee issues that Idale village chairmanship will be given to the Yantaar clan and the vice chairmanship will be given to the Hubeer clan.
6. No person is entitled to damages incurred during the clashes except those killed during the ceasefire process.

Abdulahi Osman Du’ale
The vice chairman of Idale & chairman of the National Reconciliation Commission
Annex 3  Women's Pre-Conference Communiqué at Adado

(Translated from the original Somali by CRD)

During parallel discussions aimed at reinforcing and articulating durable peace and reconciliation among the Sa’ad and Saleman sub-clans in Adado, the women’s groups from the parties in conflict developed the following joint communiqué:-

1. The continuation of further violent conflict is unacceptable to the women and children as well as detrimental to the environment.
2. The only outcomes for the women from the notorious violent conflicts are: deaths, injuries, rape, displacement, orphans, poverty, trauma, poor health, destruction of all basic social services, and social disintegration. We hold you, as men, responsible.
3. The past events of loss of lives, destruction of property and so on should be dismissed in order to save the rest of the community through a solid foundation of effective local ground rules and structures, including a joint elders’ council, joint security and police in the conflict-prone areas and a joint local judiciary.
4. We remind the warring militiamen that the ones who are dying are they themselves, and not the elders, and they should therefore think carefully and positively about their futures.
5. We, the women, underline our genuine commitment to support the peace process and the outcome of the conference both morally and materially for the communities to live in peace and harmony and to lead them to lasting peace in the region.
6. We, the women groups, request CRD/ Interpeace to prioritize the reintegration of women into the development process since women can and do play a key role in the reconciliation process and in other social issues if assisted.
7. We thank CRD/ Interpeace for their timely and significant intervention in this reconciliation effort and ask them to extend these efforts further into the remaining conflict locations of the region, such as Herale (Dir and Marehan:Darod); Da’dher (Wagardhac:Marehan:Darod and Saleman:Habar Gidir: Hawiye) respectively in order to strengthen and articulate the infant peace and introduce far-reaching development in the entire region.
8. Finally, we recommend the implementation of the following projects: community-based DDR project; women empowerment projects; local structures strengthening project; the provision of basic social services such as education, health and water projects. We also emphasize the need to speed up the implementation of such projects that can contribute to sustainable peace in the area.

Done at Adado, 16 February 2007
Annex 4  Peace Agreement between the Sa’ad and Saleman sub-clans

(Translated from original Somali by CRD)

1. The peace agreement is non-negotiable, with no recourse to past events from now onwards.
2. The long-standing blood vendetta conflict between the two sides is completely dismissed. Abiding by the Somali tradition and cultural context, the two communities opened a new chapter for peace. All forms of properties destroyed in the fighting were also dismissed.
3. Every person is entitled to have access to his/her own property - water pools, houses, plot of land etc - regardless of the properties’ location.
4. Property captured in the fighting is to be unconditionally returned to its owner on the basis of Sharia law, including vehicles, camels and cattle etc. Note: Military equipment, such as battlewagons and guns, are excluded and are dealt with through a technical settlement.
5. The two sub-clans agree to respect and uphold the peace accord and its authentic implementation. They agree to practice Sharia and use this as the basis for settling any crime committed.
6. For effective sustainability and implementation of this historic agreement, the two sub-clans agree to establish a joint elders’ council, a joint local police committee and a joint local judiciary committee authorized to extend this agreement in all the respective areas.

Signed by representatives on behalf of the Sa’ad and Saleman sub-clans on 18 February 2007 in Adado

Names of Participants and Committees at Adado conference

Participants and committees at the conference totalled 231 people comprising:

120 elders from the two sub-clans in conflict;
20 guests from neighboring clans and sub-clans;
15 TFG representatives;
40 women representatives;
10 representatives from the host community in Adado district;
6 members of the conflict resolution committee;
10 members of the facilitation committee;
10 support staff.

TFG Representatives

2. Col. Sa’id Mohamed Salad
3. Col. Mohamed Muse Hussein
4. Sa’id Farah Hassan
5. Tahir Shidine Abdi
6. Abdi Isse Qoley
7. Col. Diriyeh Warsame Ganni
8. Ali Bashi Mohamed
10. Abdi Togane Farah
11. Abdullahi Hashi Warsame
12. Tahir Abdi Wehelie
13. Abdule Wehelie Karshe
14. Mohamed Salad Ahmed
15. Col. Abdullahi Warsame Ambare

Guests from the Neighboring Clans/Sub-clans:

1. Sheik Abdirahman Adan Gelle
2. Chief Adan Warsame Ali
3. Mohamud kulan Geesey
4. Ali Adan Guure
5. Barqadle Awale Keyse
6. Mohamed Adan Kulan
7. Keynan Abdi Hassan
8. Haji Mohamud Mohamed
9. Mumin Ali Abdulle
10. Chief Khalif Adan Wardhere
11. Abdi Adan Wardhere
12. Ali Karshi Adi
13. Bashir Ahmed Mo’alin
14. Abshir Karse Nuur
15. Mahad Mohamed Hersi
17. Fu’ad Adan Abdulle
18. Sharif Fiqi Waadhowr
19. Abdulle Maalin Kaahin
20. Abdulahi Ali Modalib
### Women Groups:

1. Fatima Mohamed Eymow
2. Asha Sheikh Abdirahman
3. Dahabo Ahmed Arab
4. Hadsan lid Ali
5. Halima Mohamud Abdi
6. Booto Abshir Yarow
7. Halimo Yasin Mohamed
8. Leylo Igale Ali
9. Hamdi Mohamed Mohamud
10. Hawo Ahmed Farayamo
11. Hamdi Tahir Mohamed
12. Mohubo Elmi Ali
13. Dahabo Jama Hassan
14. Sahro Mo’alin Hassan
15. Dahabo Sheikh Mohamud
16. Hawo Abtidon Kediley
17. Safiya Adan Mohamed
18. Hawo Mohamed Dini
20. Baydan Ali Habeb
22. Hamdi Ali Geelle
23. Fatima Wardhere Ugaas
24. Booto Ali Hashi
25. Leylo Kulan Awale
26. Hadsan Barre Kheyre
27. Halimo Mohamud Ahmed
28. Warsan Osman Hassan
29. Dheeoh Mohamed Halane
30. Astur Botan Ashkir
31. Halima Omar Mohamed
32. Ismahan Abdulahi Warsame
33. Asli Osman Aybakar
34. Railya Abdulahi Abdi
35. Filsan Sahal Ali
36. Ruqiya Halane Geelle
37. Dhuuh Karsho Igaal
38. Hawo Isman Wehelle
39. Habiba Mohayadin Hilowle
40. Safiya Tahir Mohamed

### Hosting Adado District’s representatives:

1. Abdi Tahir Abdulle, District Commissioner
2. Abdul Ali Adan
3. Abdirahman Mohamud Aadan, Vice DC
4. Hersi Osman Farah
5. Ahmed Mohamud Abdi
6. Abdulahi Warsame Koolis
7. Abdulahi Ali Geddi
8. Ahmed Abdulle Mohamed
9. Tahir Hersi Abdi
10. Mahad Ahmed Dhakalaf

### Conflict Resolution Committee:

1. Chief Tahir Farah Hassan
2. Chief Abdulahi Mohamed Du’ale
3. Sheikh Mohamud Ibrahim Abdii
4. Sheikh Sheikh Abdulkadir Dhegayare
5. Chief Mohamed Hassan Gutale
6. Chief Hassan Sheikh Ahmed Ali
7. Ali Hassan Barow, Secretary
8. Shuuke Abdulahi Abdi, Secretary
9. Feysal Jama Mire, Integration/Communication

### Facilitation Committee:

1. Chief Ali Geddi Abdi, Co-chair
2. Chief Hassan Farah Barre, Co-chair
3. Aweys Ali Sa’id, Vice chair
4. Dr. Abdullahi Hersi Dirshe, Vice chair
5. Ali Dirije Aloore
6. Yasin Hashi Elmi
7. Yasin Mohamed Gaanni
8. Tahalil Mohamed Olow
9. Mo’alin Tahir Farah
10. Ali-Diir Abdi Sheik Mohamud
11. Mohamed Kulmiye Sangamar
12. Abdi Sheik Mohamud Sangamar
13. Sheikh Abdi Mohamed Muhamed

### Elders from the parties in conflict, Sa’ad and Saleman sub-clans:

1. Hussein Abdulle Aw-Ali
2. Mohamed Salad Gurey
3. Abdirahman Ibrahim Kheyre
4. Mohamud Elmi Khalaf
5. Ali Du’ale Gelle
6. Abdullahi Jama Adar
7. Abdullahi Yusuf (Digsi)
8. Tahir Jama Matan
9. Dirraa Adan Ali
10. Ali Dirije Aloore
11. Yusuf Hashi Elmi
12. Yasin Mohamed Gaanni
13. Tahalil Mohamed Olow
14. Mo’alin Tahir Farah
15. Abdi Sheik Mohamud
16. Mohamed Kulmiye Sangamar
17. Abdii Dhoof Shire
18. Hassan Mire Sahal
19. Abdi Salad Dini
20. Mohamed Warsame Isak
21. Ali’sa’id Ahmed Abdulle
22. Osman Abdi Hassan
23. Abdullahi Gutale Hersi
25. Sheikh Abdi Mohamed
26. Ali Osman Nur
27. Mohamed Abdi Nur

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**Annexes**

117
28. Ali Abdi Farah  
29. Osman Farah Hassan  
30. Abdi Ahmed Abdulle  
31. Mohamed Sahal Mo’alin  
32. Mohamud Adan  
33. Abdullahi Mumin Gutale  
34. Adan Abdullahi Omar  
35. Hassan Dhere Guled  
36. Ahmed Osman Geddi  
37. Sheikh Ali Abdi Afrah  
38. Ali Osman Luudo  
39. Abdinur Weheliye Kulmiye  
40. Sheikh Abdullahi Elmi Gaduud  
41. Mo’alin Osman Warsame  
42. Hashi Warsame Abdi  
43. Mataan Diriye Abdi  
44. Ali Afrah Geeddi  
45. Abdullahi Ali Farah  
46. Warsame Abtidoon Omar  
47. Abdi Alinur Qaarey  
48. Ahmed Shire Wardhere  
49. Ahmed Mohumud Abdi  
50. Haashi Ahmed Warsame  
51. Mohamed Guled Keynan  
52. Hassan Warsame Kheyre  
53. Farah Yarow Hassan  
54. Tahir Hers Abdi  
55. Hersi Abshir Ali  
56. Mohamed Ahmed Jim’ale  
57. Muse Dirshe Hussein  
58. Eimi Abdi Hassan  
59. Abdullahi Abdi Mohamud  
60. Mohamud Arab Ali  
61. Abdi Sheikh Ali Guled  
62. Ali Yusuf Abdi  
63. Aabi Yusuf Gulle  
64. Isse Mohamed Gurey  
65. Abdullahi Mohamed Adan  
66. Omar Mohamed Abdi  
67. Mohamud Salad Barqadle  
68. Ali Mohamed Osman  
69. Ahmed Halane  
70. Ahmed Adan Wardhere  
71. Tahir Weheliye Goonyare  
72. Abdulkadir Jama Jim’ale  
73. Sheikhdon Yusuf Sabriye  
74. Abdi Mohamed Yusuf  
75. Haji Ahmed Warsame Farey  
76. Ahmed Abdullahi Ali  
77. Nuur Shire Kheyre  
78. Ahmed Jama Farah  
79. Ahmed Mohamed Dirshe  
80. Chief Ali Guled Roble  
81. Abdulkadir Mohamed Osoble  
82. Mohamed Hassan  
83. Ahmad Hassan Sheikh  
84. Mire Ahmed Roble  
85. Faar Ahmed Hassan  
86. Ahmad Hassan Sheikh  
87. Mire Ahmed Roble  
88. Abdullahi Mohamed Hassan  
89. Nuur Mohamed Billale  
90. Mohamed Hassan  
91. Abdullahi Mohamed  
92. Ahmed Abdullahi Ali  
93. Osman Hersi Jim’ale  
94. Husein Ahmed Afrah  
95. Ahmed Jama Farah  
96. Husein Ali Halane  
97. Ahmed Warsame Afrah  
98. Salad Mohamud  
99. Abdi Mo’alin Salad  
100. Abdullahi Ahmed Barre  
101. Ahmed Salad Mohamed  
102. Hassan Karshke lide  
103. Abdulkadir Mohamed Osoble  
104. Abdisalan Sheikh Mohamed  
105. Hassan Ahmed Karshke  
106. Mohamed Jama Ali  
107. Abdi Warsame Afrah  
108. Abdinzak Ahmed  
109. Abdullahi Ahmed Barre  
110. Mire Ahmed Roble  
111. Ahmed Guled Mohamed  
112. Farah Ahmed Hassan  
113. Abdulkadir Salad  
114. Nuur Mohamed Billale  
115. Mohamed Hassan  
116. Abdullahi Ali  
117. Mohamed Ahmed Hassan  
118. Osman Hersi Jim’ale  
119. Husein Ahmed Afrah  
120. Hassan Ali Halane  

Support Staff  
1. Mrs. Ibado Ali Farah  
2. Miss. Asli Ali Warsame  
3. Miss. Raqyiya Abdirahman Abdulle  
4. Miss. Layla Ayaanle Olow  
5. Mrs. Shukri Halane Keynan  
6. Hussein Mo’alin Ahmed  
7. Ahmed Tahalil Dhore  
8. Feysal Arab Aliyare  
9. Farhan Ibrahim Gure  
10. Abdirahman Mohamed Gelle
## Annex 5  People interviewed for case study research

### Idale case study research

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<tr>
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<td>8</td>
<td>Haji Mohamed Nur-Sabca</td>
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<td>9</td>
<td>Omar Mohamed Nur</td>
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<td>Ali Mursal</td>
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<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Mustafa Mukhtar( Idale Village Chairman)</td>
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<td>16</td>
<td>Ali Abdi Gaa’bey</td>
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<td>17</td>
<td>Ma’nur Macallin Ahmed</td>
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<td>Omar Birkan Moallin</td>
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<td>19</td>
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<td>20</td>
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<td>23</td>
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<td>27</td>
<td>Nuurow Abdirahman</td>
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<td>28</td>
<td>Mad Buule Kalor Maaney Abdulle</td>
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<td>Run Sirad Ali</td>
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<td>Hawa Cali Mursal</td>
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<td>39</td>
<td>Saynab Sharif Mohamud</td>
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<td>Faduma Moalim Ali</td>
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<td>41</td>
<td>Maryam Moalim Isaq</td>
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### Hiran case study research

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<tr>
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<td>Saalah Moallin Aden</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>Col. Abdi Haji Mohamed Hassan</td>
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<td>Ali Jareere</td>
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<td>Nabaddoon Daiye Ulow</td>
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<td>9</td>
<td>Omar Aden Farah</td>
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<td>Abdulahi Abdi Somane</td>
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<td>11</td>
<td>Mohamed Araaraye</td>
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<td>12</td>
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<td>Mulki Abshaw Ibrahim</td>
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<td>17</td>
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<td>18</td>
<td>Mulaho Aadam Abdulle</td>
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<td>19</td>
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<td>Ahado Mohamed Aadam</td>
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<td>21</td>
<td>Bashir Abdullahi Hussen</td>
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<td>Dacar Hersi Hooshow</td>
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<td>23</td>
<td>Ali Abdi Ali</td>
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<td>24</td>
<td>Ahmed Hassan Barrow</td>
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<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Ugaas Hassan Kuimy Waasow</td>
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<td>26</td>
<td>Hassan Elmi Hurre (Dirir)</td>
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<td>27</td>
<td>Yusuf A. Hirane</td>
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<td>28</td>
<td>Abdirashid Osman Abdulle</td>
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<td>29</td>
<td>Ali Dahir Herow (HornAfric)</td>
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<td>Abdi H. Mahamed</td>
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<td>31</td>
<td>Ahmed Amin Abdulle (Lugbuur)</td>
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<td>Osamaan Aden Mahamed</td>
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<td>33</td>
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</table>
Annex 6  Working group and focus groups for the case study research

Focus Group Discussions – location and number of participants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Participants</th>
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<tr>
<td>Baidoa</td>
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<tr>
<td>Belet Wein</td>
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<td>Adado</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Gaalka’yo</td>
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<tr>
<td>Adado</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kismayo</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dani Salam</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mogadishu</td>
<td>20 (all women)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>136</strong></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Guiding question for the Focus Group Discussions

1. What were the major sources of traditional Somalia conflicts before 1991 and how they were solved? (Methodology/ Process).
2. What are the main sources of community conflicts experienced in your area since 91?
3. How much local reconciliation were held in your area (in number) since 1991?
4. What were the impacts of there reconciliation on the local and neighborhood and wider south-central Somalia (social, economic etc)?
5. For each initiative, is/ are there other major events that were affecting it (facilitating, contributing and abstracting it)?
6. What do you think are the key and determinant factors for the success and failure of a local reconciliation?
7. What do you think should be the role of the local and international organizations in local peace initiatives exercise (if any)?

At the end of the focus group discussion in each area, the inventory and timeline for the main local initiatives were developed.

Selection Criteria of the Working Group

- Commitment to the objectives of the dialogue for peace project
- Demonstrate a level of professional experience.
- Be able to provide substantial contribution and support.
- Non-partisan.
- Currently not part of an active conflict in Somalia.
- Ready to devote efforts and time to the success of this project
- Ready to work as a volunteer.

Terms of Reference for Working Groups

- Review with the research team the research outline for the Peace mapping project.
- Review with the research team the action plan and course of the research.
- In collaboration with the research team, develop an action plan for respective key entry points.
- Periodically meet with the research team to review progress.
- Ensure continued participation and consultations in leading or animating the project activities.
- Assist the research team in the organization of meetings and workshops to ensure wider community representation.
- Validate products of meetings or workshops, all formal findings and the research report before being passed for adoption.

Composition of the Working Groups

Professionals; experts; civil society members; women’s organizations; religious leaders; elders
Bibliography


Qasim (Gassem), Marian Arif (2002), Somalia: Clan vs Nation, Mogadishu


This publication was made possible through generous contributions and support from donors.