DIALOGUE FOR PEACE

Somali Programme

Dialogue Not Guns

Promoting Security and Stabilisation Among the Communities of South-Central Somalia
Acknowledgements

Front cover photo: Young people have suffered disproportionately from the long years of political fragmentation and civil warfare in south-central Somalia. Any practical peace-building solutions will have to directly engage young people and youth groups across the region and provide alternatives to life by the gun.

Back cover photo: Young boys play football at Adado Primary School as security improves during the Mudug-Galgaduud reconciliation process, April 2006.

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The Dialogue for Peace

How WSP International and its three partners are working to consolidate peace and support better governance across the Somali region

Rebuilding a country after conflict is about far more than repairing damaged buildings and re-establishing public institutions. Fundamentally, it is about restoring the people’s trust and confidence in governance systems and the rule of law, rebuilding relationships at all levels, and providing the population with greater hope for the future. These processes are all critical to the consolidation of peace and security in fragile post-conflict situations. When they are neglected, the threat of conflict re-emerging is very real.

In this sense, state-building and peace-building are potentially contradictory processes – the former requiring the consolidation of governmental authority, the latter involving its moderation through compromise and consensus. The challenge for both national and international peacemakers is to situate reconciliation firmly within the context of state-building, while employing state-building as a platform for the development of mutual trust and lasting reconciliation. In Somali region, it goes without saying that neither of these processes can be possible without the broad and inclusive engagement of the Somali people.

WSP International – recently renamed the International Peacebuilding Alliance (Interpeace) – launched its Somali Programme in the northeastern part of Somali region known as Puntland in 1996. It subsequently expanded its programme to Somaliland in 1999, and to south-central Somalia in 2000. Working with highly respected local peace-building institutions established with the programme’s support – the Puntland Development Research Centre (PDRC) in Garowe, the Academy for Peace and Development (APD) in Hargeysa, and the Center for Research and Dialogue (CRD) in Mogadishu – WSP has employed a highly successful ‘Participatory Action Research’ methodology to advance and support interlinked processes of peace-building and state formation. WSP’s experience in the Somali region over the past decade indicates that the understanding and trust developed through the PAR methodology can help to resolve conflicts directly, while at the same time building consensual approaches to address the social, economic and political issues necessary for a durable peace.

As well as groundbreaking research throughout the Somali region, the Dialogue for Peace programme has provided unique opportunities for the three partners to engage with each other in collaborative studies and shared projects. In 2004, the CRD and PDRC teams agreed to combine their efforts in a jointly-managed peace-building programme. While managing its component of the Dialogue independently, the APD has continued to collaborate with the other two institutions on key technical and methodological issues. Over the past two years, the three partners have met regularly with WSP’s Somali programme team to plan and coordinate their respective activities, as well as with a ‘Dialogue Support Group’ comprising the programme’s donors at the European Commission, DfID, USAID, Switzerland, Sweden, Norway, Finland, Italy and Denmark.

The Dialogue’s consultative process has involved extensive consultations with all sectors of society, from national-level political and business leaders to local elders and community leaders, youth and women’s groups, NGOs and civil society organisations. Its Participatory Action Research has provided for an inclusive, consensus-oriented dialogue led by local actors and facilitated by Somali research teams based at each of the partner institutions. The discussions have been documented in written and video form, and every effort has been made to engage the local media and disseminate the findings as broadly and objectively as possible.
Initial consultations by each partner institution were based upon detailed ‘actor and conflict mapping,’ which enabled the programme to identify local and regional priorities for dialogue, as well as respected leaders to guide and promote the dialogue process. At the Project Group meetings held in November 2004 by PDRC and CRD in Nairobi and by APD in Hargeysa, several areas of focus, or ‘entry points,’ were agreed upon for research and discussion in each area. For APD, the focal areas were: democratisation; decentralisation of governance; and resource-based conflict. The PDRC’s areas of focus were: democratisation; public fund management; consolidation of the Mudug Peace Agreement; and reconciliation. The CRD’s focal areas were: security and stabilisation; the roles of the business sector and civil society in peace-building; and reconciliation.

At the outset of the main ‘consultative phase,’ Working Groups of primary stakeholders were established to guide the work on each focus area and to develop plans of action. The groups’ activities included: information gathering and analysis; the identification of key local, regional and national actors whose views or engagement would be required; consultations through interviews, workshops, informal and formal meetings at local, inter-regional or national levels; and the engagement of resource persons to provide particular expertise on complex issues. Extensive consultations over a period of a year or more were essential to ensure sustained public interest and to raise key issues to the level of political decision-makers. Each of the partners also organised regular forums for public discussion of topical issues of concern, as well as engaging in informal liaison as a means of conflict prevention.

This report forms part of a final series of publications designed to formally ‘package’ the findings of these consultations – both as a record for those involved, and as a formal presentation of findings and recommendations to the national and regional authorities and their supporters. Together with a short documentary film on each of the focal areas, it is also hoped that these publications will provide a practical platform for the sharing of lessons learned during each of these groundbreaking consultations.

In response to requests from different stakeholders, including members of the different governance structures, the Dialogue for Peace also set out to take its ‘research-for-action’ beyond the stage of recommendations to include more material contributions to peace- and state-building. One example was the reduction of tensions in Sool after a high-profile exchange of prisoners between Somaliland and Puntland, following extensive behind-the-scenes mediation supported by the APD and PDRC. To ensure that such practical hands-on support will continue into the next phase of the Dialogue, WSP has also initiated a comprehensive programme of managerial training, technical capacity building, and fundraising support at each of its partner institutions. And of course, it is continuing to provide practical opportunities for the three institutions to meet together and with other like-minded organisations in order to support other initiatives to foster long-term peace for the Somali people.

The current socio-political context in south-central Somalia has been changing rapidly since early 2006. This report presents the situation in that area from 2004 to early 2006 and the participatory action research conducted by the Center for Research and Dialogue during this period.
1. Introduction

Security has traditionally been defined as “protecting the territorial integrity, stability and vital interests of states through the use of political, legal or coercive instruments at the state or international levels” (International Peace Academy). In the post-Cold War era, this definition has been broadened to cover military or non-military threats that may lead to conflict, and thus jeopardize the security of a country’s citizens or communities – as well as the territory and interests of the country itself.

In Somalia, the security sector has its roots deep in the colonial period, when the administrations used the security forces to protect their interests through the widespread oppression of the Somali people. After Independence, several civilian-controlled security institutions were started to serve the security interests of the state as well as society at large. But during the military regimes that followed, Somalia’s security services were once again reduced to serving the interests of the country’s political and military elite – and came to be regarded as enemies of the citizens they were established to serve.

Before the collapse of the Siad Barre regime, the state was served by a strong military force built with support from the Soviet Union as part of its Cold War strategy. Until its disastrous defeat by Ethiopia in the Ogaden War of 1977 – after the Soviet Union suddenly switched sides to back Ethiopia – the Somali army was one of the strongest in sub-Saharan Africa. The defeat, however, heralded the beginning of the decline in the country’s central military power, and the spread of internal conflicts – leading to the formation of dozens of opposition movements, each with their own heavily armed militia. Nevertheless, Barre remained in power throughout the 1980s, capitalising on the Cold War to access support from the United States.

Somalia’s recent history has also been marked by the passage of several notorious security institutions. In the post-colonial years, the national security services became an instrument of political persecution, including its well-documented role in rigging the 1969 parliamentary elections. After the military took over, the most feared of the security institutions was the National Security Services (NSS), established in 1970, which became the state’s principle instrument for suppressing critics, dissidence and civil liberty. Other prominent security apparatuses included the Socialist Party Investigators (Baarista Xisbiga), the Vanguards of the Revolution (Guul-wadwadayasha), and the Military Intelligence (Hangash).

Each of these institutions served to oppress the Somali people at different social and political levels. The Baarista Xisbiga was established to address ideological ‘anti-revolutionary’ elements, largely within government circles. The Guul-wadwadayasha dealt with subversion at the grassroots, while the Hangash dealt largely with military and police officers. However, there was little in the way of clear demarcations between their operations, and they often targeted the same ‘dissidents’. The emergency law was applied by the district and regional committees on security related cases against citizens, and their oppression was sanctioned by the Special Security Court – the highest judicial authority in the land – which played a prominent role in upholding the supreme power of the military regime.

The collapse of the Barre regime in 1991 led to the disintegration of all these bodies, and an ominous security vacuum in which people began to take the law into their own hands. The situation was made worse by the huge quantities of arms left behind by the regime, which found their way straight into civilian hands. The first cost was felt at home, where young people freely brandished semi-automatic weapons with little
knowledge of their proper use or devastating consequences. As well as hundreds of accidental shootings, vendettas became commonplace, with the slightest differences between young men often leading to fatal shootings. Criminals also had a field day, looting, robbing and raping without fear of legal repercussions.

After two years of persistent conflict, with virtually every public and private resource invested in inter-clan warfare, the arrival of UNITAF and UNOSOM in 1993-95 gave new hope to the war-ravaged communities of south-central Somalia. While UNITAF’s mandate was to “provide a secure environment” to humanitarian relief operations, UNOSOM was sanctioned to disarm the warring militias, as well as to assist in reviving the judicial and security forces. Although it would ultimately prove a doomed mission, the security of the south-central regions did improve under UNOSOM, with most areas from Middle Shabeelle to Lower Jubba and Gedo seeing temporary or partial disarmaments of their “freelance militias.” UNOSOM also provided secure passage of relief supplies and reopened major ports and airports – although it gained little control in the lawless streets of Mogadishu.

Another factor that contributed to improved security during this period was the fact that most of the clans’ and warlords’ heavy weapons were moved to remote locations to avoid confiscation by UNOSOM. Even normal citizens who kept AK5s for their personal safety usually hid them for fear of the incoming forces. This experience is highly relevant when considering mechanisms for disarming a population that has experienced over a decade and a half of continuous insecurity and lawlessness.

The withdrawal of UNOSOM in March 1995 did not cause open confrontations among Somalis, as many people had assumed. Instead, in south-central Somalia the situation reverted to clan-sponsored security, in which local elders devised laws and enforcement bodies for their particular areas. During this period, the Islamic Courts emerged in Mogadishu and many other parts of south-central Somalia to provide basic security and punish crimes of looting and carjacking. In some parts of the country, clan-based authorities were assisted by local businesspeople in promoting rudimentary systems of law and order. Despite these basic achievements, however, fighting between warlords continued to generate widespread insecurity in many of the southern regions, particularly Kismayo, Bay and Bakool, and Hiiraan.

In August 2000, the creation of the Transitional National Government in Djibouti revived hopes for the restoration of the central security forces and judicial institutions that south-central Somalia had so long been without. Despite a widespread will to see such institutions restored, however, progress was painfully slow. The formalities of constituting a national police force, military and custodial corps, and a formal structure of national courts were hampered by in-fighting within the new government. In the security vacuum that followed, old criminals once again began to flourish, and guns once again ruled much of the south. The efforts of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), formed in 2004 as an outcome of the IGAD-led Somali National Reconciliation Conference in Kenya, to form security institutions have suffered from similar problems – more recently exacerbated by ongoing tensions between the TFG and the Islamic Courts.
**Weapons of Mass Distribution**

One of the main legacies of the Cold War in Somalia has been a huge build-up of arms from the Soviet Union and the United States, as well as a bloated army, which was estimated to number over 120,000 men by the early 1980s. This powerful army depleted the country’s meagre resources, with estimates that nearly 60% of the national budget of the former Republic of Somalia was used for military purposes. This highly militarised environment also meant that there was a large stockpile of weapons in the country when the state collapsed in 1991. The disbanding of the army, and its numerous arms depots, created a huge supply of weapons that even a decade-long civil war could not exhaust. In this lawless environment, hundreds of heavily armed clan militias and freelance gangs brought anarchy to much of south-central Somalia, and created an environment in which violence and human rights abuses flourished.

Over the past 15 years, arms markets have thrived in Mogadishu and elsewhere, fuelled by fresh supplies of munitions from Ethiopia, Eritrea and other neighbouring countries. Although civil conflicts have subsided and their intensity abated, and despite the arms embargo established by UN Security Council Resolution 733 in 1992, weapons have continued to flow freely into Somalia from a number of different sources. In May 2006, the panel of experts monitoring the UN embargo reported an increase in the amount of arms arriving in the country, as well as a “widening circle of states” providing military support to different groups in violation of the UN arms embargo.

In 2004, the German aid agency GTZ estimated there were more than 70,000 armed militia members operating in south-central Somalia. These armed groups generally comprise faction-based militias, which support senior political leaders, business militias, which provide security for commercial interests, Sharia court and clan-based militias, which may be mobilised to defend clan interests, and freelance militias.

There is a widespread perception among Somalis that demilitarisation will be a critical prerequisite for lasting peace. Most of the key players involved define demilitarisation as a slow, carefully thought-out
process through which armed groups and individuals are disarmed, demobilised and reintegrated into their communities. Past experience suggests that successful demobilisation in Somalia will have to be locally driven and owned (Menkhaus, 2004) and will require a coherent strategic framework that engages all armed parties. In south-central Somalia, this issue remains one of the highest priorities for discussions on security and stabilisation. The civil war has produced a variety of armed groups with different interests, each of which has played a role in the conflict – and will have to play a role in consolidating peace and establishing governance.

In the absence of an enforceable rule of law, Somali citizens have increasingly reverted to traditional xeer law and Sharia law, as well as more brutal forms of justice such as revenge killings. Both the “divide and rule” tactics of the Barre regime and the long period of anarchy during the early and mid-1990s also served to erode traditional conflict resolution mechanisms, which had proved so important for resolving inter-clan conflicts in the country.

**Building Security Institutions**

From its very first discussions in Nairobi in December 2004, the National Project Group formed by the Center for Research and Dialogue (CRD) and the Puntland Development Research Centre (PDRC) to guide the Dialogue for Peace process, with the support of WSP International, identified viable security and judicial institutions as a vital prerequisite for the return of long-term security and stability in Somalia. With the widespread fear of “security operations” engendered by the Barre regime, not to mention the military backgrounds of many senior figures within the TFG, it is clearly essential that members of the public be given a say in what type of security institutions should be created in Somalia – as well as what bodies should be established to provide civic oversight.

Experience indicates that demilitarisation alone is not enough to create a safe and secure environment in the absence of systems and mechanisms to safeguard personal and national security. One of the threats facing the consolidation of peace and security in Somalia are the various independent or “freelance” armed groups operating in many rural communities. It will clearly be essential to involve leaders and civil groups from such communities in designing practical and realistic solutions for a nationwide demilitarisation programme, as well as the national- and regional-level institutions to build and protect the country’s future security.

If legitimate and accountable security institutions can be formed through a process of inclusive public participation, they will not only serve to reduce and prevent outbreaks of violent conflict and criminal activity in Somalia, but will also help to create the long-term security and stability that are so vital to lasting peace and social and economic development.
2. Methodology

2.1 Research Selection

In early 2004, a team of researchers from the Center for Research and Dialogue conducted an extensive consultation with various actors and stakeholders in many parts of south-central Somalia. Through this consultative process, the team met with a broad range of actors and stakeholders in an attempt to identify and prioritise issues of national concern. In these meetings, the team was able to build a realistic picture of the needs and priorities of different sections of Somali society, as well as to build the trust and confidence of the major actors they would be approaching in subsequent phases of the process. Upon conclusion of the consultation exercise, CRD identified the principal issues that need to be addressed in the Dialogue for Peace. Among the issues identified for further research, Security and Stabilisation emerged as one of the critical priorities for south-central Somalia.

At a meeting held in Nairobi on December 2nd-4th 2004, the National Project Group endorsed Security and Stabilisation as a ‘key entry point’ for future research, in-depth analysis, and public debate. Several factors were presented as reasons for undertaking further research and discussion on security issues in south-central Somalia, including:

- The threat posed to public security and peace-building initiatives by independent armed groups

People from south-central Somalia have suffered from the effects of the civil war through loss of human lives, devastation of farmlands, loss of livestock, looting of assets, huge population displacement, and the influx of large numbers of internally displaced people (IDPs) into towns and safer areas. As a result of the civil war and prevailing lawlessness in the region, criminality and banditry constitute a constant threat to public security.

- The need for legitimate and stable security institutions as a prerequisite for achieving sustainable peace

Following the disintegration of national security institutions with the collapse of the central government, law enforcement has been largely in the hands of powerful armed groups and political elites drawing on clan support. Various attempts to reconstitute these security institutions have failed, primarily due to the lack of genuine political reconciliation and coordinated support. Security, peace and development cannot be visualised and maintained without the institutions to sustain them. For this reason, it is imperative that the government establishes legitimate and effective security institutions with the full participation of the Somali public.
The need for support in developing viable Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration initiatives

There remain large numbers of militiamen and armed groups operating throughout south-central Somalia. To launch a national DDR programme as a part of efforts to enhance public security, the government will need to engage the Somali public, give serious consideration to their ideas and concerns, and raise public awareness of the various issues and consequences associated with DDR. It is also important for both the government and the Somali public to be informed of the valuable lessons that can be learned from the DDR programmes that have been implemented in other African countries, as well as from the processes that have been undertaken with considerable success in re-establishing law and order in Somaliland and Puntland since 1991 and 1998, respectively.

Formation of the Working Group

The formation of the Working Group is an integral part of WSP's Participatory Action Research methodology, which aims to empower local communities and foster a sense of public ownership in the Dialogue for Peace programme. Following the endorsement of the key entry points during the National Project Group meeting in December 2004, working groups were elected to guide the research and deliberations on each entry point across south-central Somalia. Members of the Working Group on Security and Stabilisation consisted of a broad cross-section of security professionals, elders, religious leaders and former military officers, as well as representatives from various NGOs, women’s groups and other civil society organisations concerned with issues of security.

2.2 Key Issues

One of the major challenges faced by communities in post-conflict Somalia is the insecurity of human life and property. As a first priority for the reconstruction and development of countries emerging from conflict, it is important to consider seriously how the government can be supported in addressing security issues effectively, through a coherent approach that simultaneously tackles issues of governance, law and order, and socio-economic development. An integrated approach to conflict prevention and development through the rebuilding of the security sector according to inclusive principles is more likely to succeed than one that seeks to pursue different dimensions in isolation, or to impose new security arrangements on different political or armed groups without the involvement of their communities. The aims of such an integrated approach should ultimately be to:

- Enhance the security and stability of the country;
- Strengthen state and governance structures; and
- Support broad-based reintegration and economic development.

Experience suggests that effective security arrangements must be based upon a genuine political process of consultation and negotiation, with representation from all concerned groups and external support provided...
within a common strategic framework (e.g. according to the OECD/DAC guidelines on the security sector). From lessons learned in other conflict and post-conflict countries, the basic principles for rebuilding security institutions will include:

- A ceasefire arrangement among all parties to the conflict;
- A balance between consensus and coercion in the approach towards disarmament;
- Inclusion of all armed groups and key stakeholders in the process;
- A credible and representative consultative process to substantiate broad-based commitment to the return of the legal process, based either upon the peace agreement or any other appropriate legal process (such as an interim constitution or parliament where one exists);
- Where a parliamentary system is operational, establishment of legislative procedures and a framework to guide parliamentary oversight of the process;
- Interim security arrangements tied to political developments/negotiations;
- Defined roles and functions for each party (Somali and international);
- Technical capacity building in specific required skills.

Experience in several African countries and elsewhere indicates that three distinct phases are needed for a sustainable process: a ceasefire negotiation process, resulting in a formal agreement that can be monitored; interim security arrangements, which are critical for building confidence and engaging local communities; and preparation for and implementation of a comprehensive peace agreement, which includes development and training of police and armed forces, means to control arms, a national DDR programme, and the establishment of roles for local and national authorities in the control and oversight of the agreement. The overall aim is to create and re-establish confidence in the rule of law, with the full involvement of both the public and the parliament, which has a critical role for oversight in developing policies and financing the process.

In the Somali context, this process remains in its very early stages. Although the armed groups who attended the IGAD-led Somali National Reconciliation Conference in Kenya signed a Cessation of Hostilities in Eldoret, Kenya, in October 2002, there have been many violations (during the peace talks and since) and new armed groups have emerged that were not signatories to the agreement. In addition, the Cessation of Hostilities is weaker than a formal ceasefire agreement, which can be monitored and includes mapping and disclosure of forces. So far, no formal ceasefire agreement has been reached that could be monitored as the first step in a comprehensive peace process.

Clearly there are significant challenges of insecurity to be addressed in the volatile and fluid context of south-central Somalia. Within the extensive area of Security and Stabilisation and, given the broader political limitations, two principal issues were identified for in-depth consultation and engagement of the Somali people: the rebuilding of national security institutions, and progress towards a comprehensive programme of demilitarisation.
During the course of the Dialogue for Peace programme, the CRD hosted an extensive series of public workshops, expert consultations, and high-profile meetings on various issues of security and demilitarisation in the regions of Benadir, Lower Shabeelle, Hiiraan and South Mudug. The Center has also produced and distributed a variety of reports and press releases on the outcomes of its various forums. Although the nature of the forums and the type of participants have differed widely, at least 475 people have directly participated in these meetings – with the proceedings followed by an estimated 1.5 million Somalis through the local media and Diaspora websites.

By engaging such a significant proportion of the general public, the Dialogue for Peace has helped to empower communities throughout south-central Somalia to speak out on issues affecting their security – and has in the process helped to develop platforms for collaborative action on specific security and stabilisation matters. The following chapter lists some of the key activities and achievements of the first phase of the Dialogue, which took place between May 2004 and March 2006. In addition, some of the activities supported by the CRD in 2003-04, prior to the initiation of the Dialogue, are included, as they provided a crucial foundation for the Center’s extensive engagement with civic groups and other key stakeholders in the area of security and stabilisation.

The Audio-Visual Unit and Local Media

Among the largely illiterate population of rural south-central Somalia, the CRD's Audio-Visual Unit (AVU) plays a critical role in disseminating the objectives and achievements of the Dialogue for Peace programme. The AVU also participates in the planning of CRD activities and public forums, prepares materials from its historical archive to stimulate discussions at such gatherings, and creates short documentary films to capture the highlights of all events held on security and related issues. As well as disseminating the outcomes of these events to a wider public, these films have proved particularly useful in introducing sensitive issues that participants might otherwise have felt uncomfortable discussing.

Over the past three years, the CRD's Audio-Visual Unit has produced five major documentary films on security and demilitarisation in Somalia, which have been shown on public television as well as to expert audiences. The films provide a unique no-holds-barred picture of the ‘security crisis’ facing south-central Somalia, together with the reflections and recommendations of experts enlisted under the Dialogue for Peace. The AVU’s productions include an in-depth examination of the prospects and options for DDR in Somalia, an enlightening exposé of the security in Mogadishu, and a very well-received film on the brutal consequences of the war for thousands of Somali women.

The CRD has gone to great lengths to ensure that the local media is kept abreast of the findings and achievements of the DfP programme, in order to keep the public informed of its progress. Regular reports are sent to all the major media organisations, informing them of the different groups participating in each activity and the outcomes and recommendations of each. The larger public gatherings have attracted broad and comprehensive coverage, with, for example, the Mogadishu Forum in June 2005 broadcast live by seven FM radio stations – enabling a significant proportion of the populations of Mogadishu and Middle and Lower Shabeelle to follow the proceedings as they occurred.

In general, the Somali media is dynamic and innovative, and has evolved rapidly in south-central Somalia with the potential to reach mass audiences, particularly through the radio. Although it is a powerful means
for public mobilisation, however, many local journalists are young and lack training in professional guidelines for reporting. There have been frequent criticisms that the Somali media shares the general tendencies of mass Western media to focus predominantly on violence rather than on peace. Initiatives that have averted or resolved conflict tend to get less coverage and on occasion the media has been used to mobilise communities to raise militia to fight (but rarely to stop fighting). The CRD recognises the power of the media and the importance of engaging journalists in the civic process of the Dialogue for Peace in order to foster their role in the consolidation of peace.

### 3.1 Setting the Scene: Capacity Building and Engagement with Civic Networks

In addition to its main research programme, the CRD/WSP Dialogue for Peace has focused on building the capacity of local NGOs and CBOs involved in peace-building and reconciliation activities. Civic networks and women's organisations have been playing critical roles in raising awareness and mobilising citizens to tackle some of the serious security challenges in Mogadishu and elsewhere in south-central Somalia (as described below). Somali human rights organisations undertake the (often dangerous) role of monitoring human right violations. And the dynamic Somali media, as indicated above, can provide an effective channel for the dissemination of key peace messages.

The CRD's capacity-building work began in early 2003 in support of efforts to address the serious problem of kidnapping faced by the citizens of Mogadishu. During 2003-04, prior to the start of the DfP’s main phase in December 2004, the CRD had already conducted an extensive training programme for an umbrella of 20 local women's organisations, the Coalition for Grassroots Women's Organisations (COGWO), as well as a number of peace activists. COGWO is involved in the social, economic and political empowerment of women and works closely with women’s groups throughout south-central Somalia. The training programme, supported by the National Endowment for Democracy, focused on providing practical training in modern techniques of conflict resolution, peace-building and advocacy. In total, the programme is estimated to have reached 750 members from COGWO’s NGOs, affiliated women’s groups, and youth organisations in Mogadishu between July and December 2003.

**Kidnapping Forum, January 2003**

Once a tactic used almost exclusively against expatriates, kidnapping by the early 2000s had begun increasingly to target Somalis. Victims were nearly always people perceived to be able to pay a ransom: big businessmen, staff of international organisations, or locals who had just sold a piece of land or a house, and were known to be in possession of large sums of cash. Poorer people could also be vulnerable, if it was known that they received regular remittances from abroad, as were people embroiled in business disputes. And someone defaulting on a payment or a loan reimbursement might experience the kidnap of a family member – taken as a way of ‘reminding’ them to pay up.
By late 2002, an average of five people were being kidnapped in Mogadishu each week, according to records kept by local human rights organisations. In response to the growing fear generated by this wave of kidnappings, CRD organised a public forum to discuss the scourge, which attracted a broad range of local leaders, police officers, members of the Islamic Courts, women’s groups, and civil society organisations. The forum was also well attended by local journalists, who disseminated the proceedings broadly through the newspapers and radio stations, which continued the debate in their columns and programmes. The forum was directly credited with a dramatic reduction in kidnapping incidents, which had fallen to negligible numbers in Mogadishu by mid-2004. From the high rates of kidnapping in late 2002, reported cases were down to 46 between July 2004 and July 2005, and dropped to 17 cases in Mogadishu between July 2005 and July 2006, according to figures from the Dr. Ismael Jumale Human Rights Organisation.

Establishment of Neighbourhood Watch Networks, since January 2004

As part of the capacity-building programmes in Mogadishu, the CRD collaborated with other civic organisations to provide practical exercises on community-based policing to assist in the creation of 13 ‘mini neighbourhood watch’ networks in different districts – the first time such networks had been established in the capital. The networks provided a practical and critical alternative for the Mogadishu public, who were suffering from rampant insecurity, kidnappings and killings at a time when armed political factions that had carved up the city could not provide security to the public at large. The formation of these initial 13 networks provided the foundation for an extensive community-based security structure, which continues to provide a vital and highly visible ‘watch-and-report’ service in at least 10 of the city’s 16 districts.

Conflict Resolution Workshop, March 2004

In March 2004, the CRD held a training workshop on conflict resolution and peace-building for 60 participants involved in Mogadishu’s neighbourhood watch schemes. The trainees – community leaders, neighbourhood watch network leaders, and women’s peace group members – were accompanied by District Commissioners from each of the city’s 16 districts. As a result of the workshop, several neighbourhood watch groups were expanded, improving the security situation in many parts of the city. The workshop provided an impartial venue for the different stakeholders to jointly develop a common platform and action plan for improving the security situation in Mogadishu – an approach that set the scene for future community-driven security initiatives.

Training of District Commissioners, September 2004 - February 2005

Following the success of the initial COGWO training, the CRD provided technical support to the NGO group in training members of the 16 district administrations in Banadir. The training programme, which took
place in their respective districts, helped to increase public awareness on security-related issues and local peace-building initiatives to new levels throughout the communities of Mogadishu. It also served to further strengthen and expand the emerging neighbourhood watch schemes, which have subsequently played a critical role in reducing levels of insecurity and violence across the capital. In its 2005-06 annual report, the Dr. Ismael Jumale Human Rights Organisation reported significant declines in rapes and kidnappings across Mogadishu – both attributed to the success of the neighbourhood watch and administration training.

3.2 Security in the South-Central Regions: Towards a Civic Security Network

At the time of writing (June 2006), there is a level of peace and security in many of the major urban areas in south-central Somalia. However, while clashes between clans have subsided across the region in the past few years, most of south-central Somalia is still branded “off-limits” by the international community, which continues to focus much of its assistance on parts of the Somali region that are more secure (and therefore accessible). In Lower Shabeelle, Middle Jubba and Bay, inter-clan conflicts have noticeably decreased, while Mudug, Galguduud and parts of Gedo are enjoying the benefits of new homegrown security structures. In some parts of Bay and Bakool, particularly in Wajid, Hoddour and Dinsoor, the consolidation of authority by a single armed movement has been largely welcomed by the population, due to improvements in the local security situation. These improvements notwithstanding, the entire region continues to suffer from the widespread destruction of agricultural infrastructure, transport and market networks, which have all been devastated by 15 years of violent conflict.

Workshop to Establish Regional Civic Security Network, Marka, April 2005

In response to the need for a regional dialogue on rebuilding security institutions in south-central Somalia, CRD organised a three-day workshop from April 23rd-25th 2005 in the district of Marka, Lower Shabeelle, 120km southwest of Mogadishu. The workshop aimed to enhance public awareness and launch a broad-based public dialogue on common issues of security and DDR in the regions of Bay, Bakool, Gedo, Middle Jubba, Lower Shabeelle and Benadir. It was hoped that the workshop would also lead to the formation of a network of representatives from each region, to ensure an ongoing inter-regional dialogue on security challenges and solutions across south-central Somalia.

The workshop brought together 75 participants from a broad variety of professional backgrounds, including former army and police officers, traditional elders, civil society groups, and judicial officers from the regional administrations. Local dignitaries included the Deputy Governor and District Commissioners of Lower Shabeelle and the Commander of the Regional Police Force, while the representatives from Bay included a militia commander from Bur Hakaba and the Mayor of Baidoa – two districts with significant concentrations of armed militias. For its part, the CRD aimed to launch and maintain discussions on specific issues affecting security in particular regions, such as the long-running conflicts across the borders of Bay, Bakool and Gedo, political allegiances between militias in Lower Shabeelle and Bay, and the intensive concentration of clan-based militias based in Middle Jubba.

The workshop participants examined the principal factors contributing to the improvement and undermining of security in south-central Somalia, and reiterated the need for the restoration of national security institutions. They also noted with concern the continuing role of “external factors” – particularly the uncontrolled importation of heavy and light weapons – in insecurity in the region. Participants

“As a member of the previous regime, I have been chased away from the district of Marka because many believe I belonged to the ruling clan. But today I am back in Marka, walking freely like any other Somali. This shows how much things have changed since those days.”

– Participant at the Marka workshop
from Bay, Bakool and Gedo lamented the lack of even a symbolic administrative structure in their areas to oversee security-related matters – although some districts of Gedo, notably Garbaharrey, were commended for their recent establishment of local police forces.

Time and again, the workshop discussions returned to the absence of formal legal institutions, which was said to have had a devastating impact on vulnerable groups in south-central Somalia. The CRD provided a brief history of the pre-war judicial system, which prior to 1991 had four unified, but widely mistrusted, types of institution: the Supreme Court, the Courts of Appeal, the Regional Courts, and the District Courts. Until very recently, law and order in south-central Somalia has been provided by different clan-based Sharia Courts, together with more traditional legal authorities – each trying in its own way to restore a modicum of the rule of law to its lawless surroundings.

The prominence of Islamic Sharia Courts in south-central Somalia generated both positive and negative comments from the workshop participants at this stage. Several participants noted that there continues to be some disagreement between Islamic clerics and some civil society over how to integrate secular laws and forms of “Islamic Sharia” into a future legal system for Somalia – and how fair the clan-based Sharia system would be to ordinary citizens, particularly those from minority groups if these courts are not transformed into national institutions that serve the society at large. Other participants pointed out that, in the absence of a national judicial system, the Qadis (Sharia judges) are playing a “dual role,” acting as both the police/prosecutors and judges in the conviction and punishment of criminals. Most participants agreed that the Sharia Court administrators should be better trained in the practice of formal Islamic law, in order to overcome their tendency to lean on “basic interpretations” of Sharia law.

Many participants also pointed out that their regions drew as much, if not more, on traditional customary law, which has always been an integral part of the Somali judicial system. Even under the tight grip of the former military regime, it was noted, customary law continued to hold greater sway than Sharia in many parts of rural south-central Somalia.

The participants were virtually unanimous in the opinion that local courts and police forces should be established in consultation with local communities. As the police would form the “frontline” in defending public safety, they should be formed with the consensus of the people. Likewise, the legitimacy of the police would be dictated by how fair and transparent people perceived the wider judicial system to be.

Several participants also emphasised the need for formal training and sensitive “re-orientation” of the police force, to reflect, in the words of one, “indigenous values and the realities of Somali communities.” For this reason, it was suggested that police training should be conducted by former army officers, rather than by IGAD and AU forces as proposed by the TFG under the “National Security and Stabilisation Plan”. However,
it was agreed that the IGAD/AU programme could have an important role to play in the formation of a new police force, as would the reintegration of some of the current armed militias, given the rapidly advancing age of most former Somali police officers.

Public Outreach: Spreading the Word

Given the great public interest in security issues throughout south-central Somalia, the CRD invited several FM stations from Mogadishu and Lower Shabeelle to carry live broadcasts of the workshop proceedings, which were also widely reported on the Internet. Radio/TV Shabeelle produced profiles of the main participants and reports of the workshop’s nightly debates, while Radio Benadir recorded side-shows in which they brought prominent individuals to discuss specific security issues in their respective regions. Radio Benadir also aired a series of programmes on security after the workshop had ended.

Hiiraan Online, one of the largest Somali Internet sites with approximately 500,000 visitors daily, also carried reports of the workshop proceedings, and compiled a comprehensive profile on the district of Marka (see www.hiiran.com). The Midnimo website (www.midnimo.net), which is popular among Somalis in the Diaspora, also transmitted the proceedings in an audio format, giving all Somalis with Internet access a chance to ‘listen in.’ The CRD received an overwhelming number of email messages from Somalis in the Diaspora who accessed the workshop proceedings through these websites. The Center is now working closely with these and other Diaspora websites to spread the word about the Dialogue for Peace to Somalis at home and abroad.

Outcomes and Impacts

Establishment of Regional Networking

As well as generating new awareness and participation in the Dialogue for Peace programme, the Marka workshop broke new ground in establishing an inter-regional dialogue on issues of security and DDR. In order to synergise their resources, a ‘Core Group’ was elected to encourage further discussions between the participants, and to oversee the construction of a formal network linking the main institutions involved in the region’s security. This group was also charged with ensuring the implementation of specific proposals made during the workshop. Although implementation was inhibited by both the uncertain political dynamics and the prohibitive costs of bringing the network members together, the process did help to establish lasting connections between the participants based upon their shared experiences and lessons learned.

Public Mobilisation and Awareness

The workshop undoubtedly helped to propagate public awareness on the key issues and hurdles facing the rebuilding of national security institutions in Somalia, as well as underlining the importance of engaging civil society organisations in efforts to improve security in the south-central regions.

Proposals for the Draft Mogadishu Blueprint

Many of the ideas generated and recommendations made during the Marka workshop provided useful practical proposals – with the CRD’s technical assistance – for the provisional draft of the Mogadishu Security and Stabilisation Plan. As well as the all-important agreement to engage the business sector in establishing and funding national security institutions, these recommendations included: the need to reengage former senior police officers; the potential engagement of the Islamic Courts as ‘full partners’
in the establishment of security institutions; the critical contribution of functional local administrations to coherent and sustainable security institutions; and further exploration of potential means for the cantonment of heavy weapons outside urban areas in order to enhance security and build public confidence.

3.3 The Mogadishu Security and Stabilisation Plan

There is a long-term myth that holds that the ongoing debacle of Somalia’s political crisis is directly synonymous with the civil unrest in Mogadishu. The contention is that he who wins Mogadishu will automatically win Somalia. As the single largest population and the economic hub of the Somali region, in the centre of the resource-rich south, the city poses particular challenges in the context of the unfolding Somali situation.

Until recently, negotiating the roadblocks and armed gangs of downtown Mogadishu, it was hard to imagine that this city was once known as the safest in Africa. Since the state collapsed in 1991, Mogadishu has remained without official security forces, and security has been precarious across much of the city. Residents travelling across the city have had to negotiate with militias stationed at a variety of illegal roadblocks, where young, heavily-armed men routinely ‘taxed’ the movement of people and goods. The earnings from these roadblocks have only served to encourage the formation of further barriers – creating further lawlessness across the capital and surrounding areas.

A Tale of Two Cities

In March 2005, dissent within the newly-established TFG resulted in a major internal division, with the Mogadishu-based ministers and MPs returning from Nairobi to Mogadishu with the Parliamentary Speaker, while the President and Prime Minister relocated to nearby Jowhar. Two months later, the Mogadishu-based political leaders formally proposed the Mogadishu Security and Stabilisation Plan (MSSP), which provided a schedule for clearing heavy weapons from the city and the cantonment of local militia in training camps on its outskirts. These were seen as positive steps in efforts to return peace and stability to the capital.

However, the Mogadishu security plan was taking place in a polarised political environment, with different approaches being adopted by two highly divergent groups. The President and Prime Minister’s group believed that the government could not function in the chronically insecure capital, and should therefore relocate temporarily to other cities while Mogadishu would be pacified with the support of foreign peacekeeping troops, including troops from the ‘frontline states’ of Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti. The Mogadishu-based leaders, however, maintained that it should be the government’s primary duty to pacify the city, but that this should be done without the deployment of foreign troops – particularly those from frontline states – but instead through a process of negotiation and reconciliation with the armed faction leaders in the city.

Key cabinet members, including former political leaders from Mogadishu, and parliamentarians were among those leading efforts towards the cantonment of militias.
and heavy weapons and the removal of roadblocks within the city and its environs. However, there were clear technical limitations relating to the planning of the overall operations and the establishment of interim security arrangements. Above all, it was seen as imperative to establish an administration for Benadir that would take over responsibility for establishing and sustaining security in Mogadishu.

**Security Institutions and DDR Workshop, May 2005**

On May 4th-5th 2005, the CRD helped to organise a high-profile workshop for some of the key players involved in Mogadishu’s security, including – for the first time – several members of the TFG Parliament, together with district officials and leaders of the neighbourhood watch networks. On the first day of the workshop, the CRD showed the 55 participants a documentary film outlining the level and magnitude of the security challenges facing south-central Somalia. The gathering drew up a number of specific recommendations for the city authorities concerning the importance of political reconciliation and consensus-building as platforms for disarmament, the need to encourage “consensual rather than coercive” disarmament, the avoidance of weapons ‘buy-back’ programmes, the need for amnesties for former warlords, and the importance of broad-based public awareness programmes and forums for public debate on key DDR issues.

**The Mogadishu Forum, June 2005**

Under the title “Nagu raagtaye, yaan loo kala harin” (“It’s too late to wait, we must stand together”), this high-profile consultative meeting on efforts to pacify Mogadishu was widely welcomed and supported by civil society groups across the capital. CRD was one of the principal conveners of the June 6th meeting, which brought together key stakeholders, local politicians, opinion-makers, and civil society groups to discuss issues concerning the security of the capital. The main objectives of the meeting included:
- To review ongoing efforts and commit new resources to the initiative to pacify Mogadishu;
- To seek popular support and the consent of prominent politicians for the initiative;
- To build consensus among the key actors and stakeholders on issues concerning the city’s long-term security.

Chairied by the Parliamentary Speaker, Sharif Hassan Sheikh Aden, the meeting was attended by 72 invited participants, including some of the most prominent opinion-makers and deal-brokers of Mogadishu.
Among them were two former presidents, Ali Mahdi Mohamed and Dr. Abdulkasim S. Hassan, the Deputy Prime Minister, Mohamud Jama Sifir, six TFG ministers, 20 MPs, two respected religious leaders, seven eminent politicians, including the Governor of Lower Shabeelle, nine representatives of business groups, and 24 civic activists.

The day-long forum was both a high-profile event and an inclusive discussion between key decision-makers. It was the first gathering of its kind in which senior politicians, faction leaders, civil society members and businessmen sat together to discuss the long-term security of their city. Many of those present had not met one another for over 15 years and considerable efforts had to be exerted to bring them all together. The meeting was broadcast live on several local radio stations, providing a powerful tool to engage the broader public in the initiative. The meeting came up with several positive agreements and recommendations, including:

- To clear all the roadblocks in and around Mogadishu with immediate effect;
- To develop realistic, integrated and detailed plans and strategies for the Mogadishu Security and Stabilisation Plan;
- To include all relevant stakeholders in the development of the initiative;
- To establish a technical or professional committee to assist the politicians in all technical aspects of the MSSP;
- To ensure the inclusion of North Mogadishu in all aspects of the process, to avoid divisions within the city’s broader community;
- To establish a professional and accountable body to oversee the management and funding of the initiative;
- To develop a comprehensive programme to raise public awareness of the initiative through all available channels;
- To maintain and expand the positive new dynamics in the relationships between the senior politicians of Mogadishu.

At the conclusion of the forum, the MSSP was formally endorsed and a joint statement issued by the politicians and civil society groups (women’s organisations, business groups, professional networks, religious groups, local NGOs and community-based organisations) to both the local Somali and international community (see Annex).

**Outcomes and Impacts**

With the support of the civic movement, all checkpoints in the city were dismantled or circumvented the very next day. At some checkpoints, local women’s groups led efforts to persuade the militias to stand down – haranguing and even stoning those who refused to leave. Over the following days, civic groups redirected traffic from roads where checkpoints were re-erected, in order that no money could be collected and the checkpoints would prove redundant. Removal of the checkpoints not only improved the free movement of people and goods across the city, but was a major symbolic step forward and a moral boost for the entire civic movement of Mogadishu.
The decision of senior political leaders to support the dismantling of checkpoints that had provided one of their key sources of revenue, and to move their militia and heavy weapons out of the city, was interpreted as a significant step forward in improving the city’s security. Although similar declarations had been made – and broken – in the past, the MSSP was seen as a bold new initiative, as it had been instigated not only by the political factions but by a broader group including their colleagues in the government, civil society, the business sector and the wider community.

As a result of the June 6th forum, the decisions reached, and the public ownership they generated, new opportunities opened up to address the security challenges of Mogadishu in a collective way. Women’s groups, empowered by their joint initiatives over the past two years, played a vital role in the process, providing shelter, food and civic education for militia members in the camps, as well as mobilising practical and financial support for the MSSP from the business sector. For their part, politicians and business leaders agreed to remove any roadblocks that reappeared in the capital, as well as those on the crucial trade route between Mogadishu and Afgoye, while senior members of the business community pledged to provide continuing financial support as long as the plan was seen to be effective and transparent.

Meeting on the Stabilisation of Mogadishu, August 2005

Following the groundbreaking Mogadishu Forum, the CRD was asked to provide technical assistance at a meeting attended by over 25 representatives of the business sector, the Islamic Courts, the Civil Society in Action network, TFG ministers and MPs, the Governor and Mayor of Banadir, and the Governor of Lower Shabeelle. The meeting, chaired by Hon. Omar Hashi Adan, focused on providing support for the militias in the cantonment camps, removing the remaining checkpoints in Mogadishu, and establishing a regional administration through a broadly participatory process. In particular, it looked at ways to convince local people to contribute to the MSSP during the continuing political stalemate. Although there was no concrete resolution to this dilemma, the meeting did recognise that inclusive consultations would be critical to keep the momentum of the original Mogadishu Forum going.

The civic movement, with support from the CRD, continued to lobby for the development of a blueprint for the Benadir administration. The committee of

“Earlier it was easy to raise contributory funds for the MSSP, but nowadays it has become very difficult to convince businessmen to make financial contributions without any clear roadmap to end the current political stalemate and to establish a regional administration, through which internal and external support can be channelled...”

– Benadir business leader
Mogadishu MPs led by Muse Sudi concluded its study by recommending the appointment of an expert panel of 6-7 lawyers to prepare guidelines for the formation of a regional administration, until special legislation for the capital city could be passed by the parliament. However, a significant proportion of civil society appeared to see the process as compromised and unacceptable to the broader political groups in the absence of a significant breakthrough in the political impasse facing the TFG. The assassination of the CRD director, Abdulkadir Yahya, at his home in Mogadishu on July 11th, 2005 also had a huge impact on the morale of the city’s civic movement, and compromised its ability to sustain its advocacy in support of a long-term security plan.

The Security and Stabilisation Plan originally envisaged that militia members would remain in the cantonment centres until new security forces could be established. However, in the absence of resolution of the political differences within the TFG, during the six months that the militias remained in the centres, neither a local authority in Mogadishu nor an organised police force was established. Up to May 2006, six of the city’s 45 roadblocks remained permanently removed.

Although further progress in Mogadishu and elsewhere was largely put on hold due to continuing political differences within the TFG through 2005, and evolving dynamics within the city in the first half of 2006, the MSSP provides a valuable blueprint for other areas of the country. The security dynamics in Mogadishu have changed radically following the ousting of armed faction leaders in May-June 2006, but many members of the Mogadishu public continue to believe that the Mogadishu Security and Stabilisation Plan could be successfully adapted by the Sharia Courts which are currently managing security in the city.

3.4 Supporting Local Security through Militia Training

Consolidation of the Medina Peace Agreement

Situated in the southwest of Mogadishu, Medina is by far the largest and most populous of the city’s 16 districts. After it was officially established in the early 1970s, Medina grew to incorporate some of Mogadishu’s largest and busiest industries, including the Mogadishu Power Plant, the Oil Refinery, the UREA Agricultural Fertilisers Plant, the Somali National University, the Benadir Maternity and Children’s Hospital, and the offices of several government ministries. The district also hosts several Western embassies, including the United States Embassy.

After the outbreak of the civil war in 1991, the district became a popular ‘safe haven’ for thousands of ordinary Somalis. But in 1996, the war finally caught up with Medina and it became a hub of armed conflict, with several major factions vying for its control. In a few short years, virtually all the public and private infrastructure was destroyed and the district became a permanent battleground, with four ‘zones’
controlled by different leaders. As a microcosm of the wider Mogadishu conflict, resolution of Medina's faction-based conflict was seen as critical to securing peace in the capital.

On April 22nd 2005, after highly-anticipated negotiations sponsored by local civil society, Medina's warring factions finally signed a groundbreaking peace accord. The deal, the first of its kind in Mogadishu, was signed by the two major armed leaders, Musse Sudi Yalahow and Omar Finish, and coincided with the prospective relocation of the nascent TFG from Kenya. During this period, the main Mogadishu-based faction leaders appeared genuinely committed to establishing a coordinated security infrastructure for their city in partnership with civil society – and particularly with several proactive women's groups (see above).

Although the Medina accord was welcomed with open arms by the local community, and by the people of Mogadishu in general, the parties involved had not developed an action plan or a ‘roadmap’ to sustain its momentum. Realising this critical gap, the CRD led a series of consultations for the major actors, including the militia leaders, to consolidate the hard-won principles of the accord.

Conflict Resolution Training for Militia Leaders, May 2005

Given the symbolic weight of the Medina Peace Agreement – and its potential ‘spin-offs’ for other districts in the city – the CRD proposed to run a series of workshops to provide conflict resolution training to the armed militias involved, and to integrate them into a formal security force for the district. The Center also offered to assist the local authorities in developing a formal action plan for a unified district administration, and in initiating detailed reconciliation talks between Medina's residents and its two major faction leaders.

The CRD duly hosted a three-day workshop for 62 militia members from the two factions on May 2nd-4th 2005. During the workshop, the leaders freely and openly interacted with each other and developed a common action plan for the implementation of the peace accord. The discussions were also attended by prominent civil society and business leaders, who offered the support of their respective organisations in consolidating peace and security in Medina. Among the specific issues discussed were the expansion of educational opportunities for the district's children and the establishment of new communications, trade and employment opportunities. In return, the militia leaders publicly apologised for the destruction and disruption caused by their activities, and committed themselves to creating a “centre of peace” in Medina.

As well as practical training in modern conflict resolution skills and techniques, the militia members were shown a film portraying past atrocities committed against unarmed civilians by armed militia. In a second film, senior elders from Somaliland conveyed their support to the ongoing community-based peace process in south-central Somalia and shared their own experiences of involving militia leaders in peace negotiations. In keeping with the Dialogue for Peace's commitment to ‘public sharing’ of all its peace processes, the workshop proceedings were broadcast through several local media channels, including Radio Shabeelle and the main Mogadishu newspapers.
At the end of the workshop, the participants drew up a consensual action plan to consolidate the gains made in returning peace to Medina. As part of the plan, a public rally was staged in downtown Medina on May 6th, at which major streets through the district were formally opened to traffic for the first time in over a decade. Following the workshop, the security situation in Medina significantly improved, with cars moving freely between the district and neighbouring areas, and several new business premises opening in the district.

Conflict Resolution Training in Mudug-Galguduud, April 2006

While the recent violent conflicts between the Sa’ad and Saleebaan militias in South Mudug and North Galguduud began in mid-2004, hostilities between the two Habar-Gidir sub-clans date back over a decade. In early 2004, an AU assessment mission described the area as a “no-go zone.” Early in 2005, the situation deteriorated further with armed clashes resulting in an estimated 200 deaths – many of them civilians – and mass displacement and destruction of property. The ongoing conflict significantly disrupted security in the two central regions.

As part of the DfP’s support to reconciliation efforts in Mudug and Galguduud, the CRD, in partnership with the Puntland Development Research Centre (PDRC), organised five days of extensive conflict resolution and mediation training for over 60 Sa’ad and Saleebaan militia leaders in South Galkayo from April 19th-23rd 2006. The workshop followed a comprehensive assessment of the local security situation by the CRD and PDRC in early April, when the two teams travelled from Mogadishu to Galkayo, Bandiradley, Gelinsor and Adaado to interview leaders and members of both sub-clans.

One of the key issues raised during the consultations was a shared concern that the reintegration of militiamen should be a prerequisite for ending inter-clan conflicts in the region. The issue was also raised at a briefing given by WSP and CRD in Nairobi for the SACB peace-building taskforce on April 11th. The following day, a constructive meeting was held with the UNDP Rule of Law programme, which expressed its readiness to support processes toward militia reintegration in the area.

The Galkayo workshop represented a serious test of the two clans’ commitment to reconciliation, with many of the participants expressing frank fears about working with their former enemies. The workshop was facilitated by CRD trainers with a deep knowledge of the area, who offered practical lessons on conflict management techniques, trauma counselling, and attitude and behavioural change. The process was warmly received by the former combatants, who recommended using the same methodology to help other ex-combatants from the area overcome traumas arising from the conflict. The workshop was widely reported on the BBC’s Somali Service and Internet sites (e.g., www.hiiraan.com and www.somaliweyn.com), as well as by major local radio stations, some of which also invited militia leaders to participate in call-in shows on security in the south.

During the assessment phase, the CRD also hosted a number of informal meetings in Mogadishu to brief leaders from the sub-clans on their progress and to reinforce support for the reconciliation process on the ground. The Center reported that positive effects from the Mogadishu meetings were apparent in Mudug and Galguduud, and large delegations from the two sides began to converge in the area to support the process in May.

According to militia and community leaders interviewed by the CRD, the conflict resolution training had an immediate and positive impact on security in the region, with a notable reduction in confrontations and
The Mogadishu Forum venue was so packed there was no room inside for the media who relied instead on a video link and live broadcasts by local radio stations.

Former military officers provide training...

... for the militia at the encampments outside Mogadishu, July 2005.
Sa’ad and Saleebaan militia meet in Ceel Huur during the reconciliation process, June 2006.

The Ceel Huur reconciliation conference provided chances for young militia members to get to know one another.

Moment of reflection between Sa’ad and Saleebaan militia leaders following the reconciliation conference in Ceel Huur, June 2006.
revenge killings between the Sa’ad and Saleebaan and significant improvements in the overall security situation in South Galkayo and parts of Mudug. More details about efforts to support reconciliation in Mudug and Galguduud under the Dialogue for Peace are available in the reports Reconciliation Initiatives in South-Central Somalia (Interpeace/CRD, 2006) and Consolidation of the Mudug Peace Agreement (Interpeace/PDRC, 2006).

3.5 New Security Dynamics in Mogadishu and Parts of South-Central Somalia

The beginning of the Islamic Courts in Somalia dates back to 1993, when the first court was established in Medina District to fill the vacuum left by the collapse of the state and the inability of local warlords to establish viable administrative structures. The widely-known North Mogadishu Islamic Court established in 1994 was credited with remarkable improvements in the security of the area. As a result, new Islamic Courts were established in Belet Weyne, South Mogadishu and Merka. In 2004, a new umbrella organisation, initially known as the Supreme Council of Islamic Courts (SCIC), was formed in Mogadishu, comprising the city’s seven Islamic Courts. Subsequently, chairmen were elected and the Council has been expanded to encompass newly established courts.

The absence from the city of the Mogadishu-based faction leaders attending the IGAD-led Somali National Reconciliation Conference in Kenya in 2002-04 led to a significant power vacuum in the capital – and several notable developments that may not have happened in their presence. Chief among these was the rise of civil society groups – particularly of proactive women’s networks – in the provision of community-based systems to improve security in the city.

From late 2004, the Supreme Council of Islamic Courts became a more coordinated and organised force, and one with a greater military capacity. The warlords-turned-ministers who had once claimed complete control of the capital now had to recognise the arrival of a new political force in the city. On February 18th 2006, a group of four armed ministers and a well-known businessman from North Mogadishu publicly

“By the end of the workshop, the participants were like a group of classmates who had never experienced any hostility between them”

– Iman Jirow, Governor of South Mudug
declared that they had established ‘The Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism.’ The coalition claimed that their aim was to “clean up” terrorists hiding in Mogadishu. However, many of the city’s residents saw the coalition as addressing the needs of foreign forces, rather than those of the Somali people – a fact that severely undermined their support base. The day that the coalition’s statement was released, heavy fighting occurred between its forces and the Islamic Courts in the district of Daynile – with the first of many civilian casualties. When other warlords and businessmen joined the coalition, the stage was set for a new chapter of violent conflict in the capital.

As the fighting escalated, the Islamic Courts Union succeeded in convincing much of the population that the Alliance represented “the enemies of Islam” – and an insidious threat to the sovereignty of their country. The warlords’ popularity was further undermined by their perceived abandoning of the interests of their clans in the name of fighting terrorism – a ‘new interest’ that was also seen to be earning them foreign currency. After intense fighting between February and May, which resulted in over 300 deaths, including many civilians, the Islamic Courts Union defeated the prominent faction leaders. On June 5th 2006, the Courts announced that they were in control of the capital. The ascent of the Islamic Courts has altered Somali politics, providing a new political force in south-central Somalia. Conciliatory negotiations between the Islamic Courts Union and the TFG are required to consolidate security in south-central Somalia.

From the point of view of security, the Islamic Courts have had a very positive impact on Mogadishu, with notable improvements in most aspects of public security. However, the city remains without any formal security or judicial structures – a vacuum that continues to worry many in the civic and commercial sectors. In response to these concerns, several civil society and business groups approached the CRD in late May to facilitate fresh consultations on the need for official security and judicial institutions in the city and the wider region.

Between May 31st and June 5th 2006, three meetings were held involving civil society leaders and prominent businessmen to discuss security trends and opportunities in and around Mogadishu. At the end of the third meeting, the following recommendations were drafted and agreed as basic principles to guide short-term improvements in the security situation in Benadir:

1. A Benadir regional authority must be established;
2. The formation of this authority must be through a process that is inclusive and participatory;
3. The new authority must comprise the existing structures (the local council and the Governor-Mayor), complemented and/or modified with representatives from the Islamic Courts and any other previously excluded group;
4. A short-term Security Committee must be established to address security issues during the transition to stability, i.e. until basic functioning administrative structures are in place;
5. All media releases from the courts must be conciliatory and foster peace and reconciliation among the different actors and stakeholders, including the TFG.

A fourth meeting sponsored by the CRD took place at the Hotel Ramadan in Mogadishu on June 6th. The top leadership of the Islamic Courts Union, headed by its Chairman, Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, attended the meeting and was given the above recommendations for consideration with the wider Union. Further dialogue was postponed due to the Arab League-sponsored talks in Khartoum between the ICU and the TFG on June 22nd, and again in mid-July when a further round of heavy fighting erupted in Mogadishu. This temporarily shelved efforts to chart a coordinated path for the city’s future security. Nevertheless, further progress has been made and, in August, the port and the airport were reopened for the first time in 11 years.
At present, the powers that control the capital face a number of security and law-and-order challenges, which can briefly be summarised as follows:

- Establishing an effective local administration;
- Establishing formal security structures, including police forces and police stations;
- Delivery of public services and utilities;
- Resolving property disputes;
- Resolving the future of the forces abandoned by the city’s warlords, freelance militias, and staff manning the disbanded checkpoints;
- Establishing protocols and procedures for guiding cooperation and collaboration between the Islamic Courts, civil society organisations, and the business community.

Since the opening of Mogadishu International Airport on July 30th 2006 for the first time in over a decade, commercial aircraft such as Dallol, Juba Airways and African Express are making regular flights.
4. Analyses

Security is a multi-dimensional issue that cannot be tackled from one or two simple standpoints. In Somalia’s post-war experience over the past 15 years, there have been several efforts aimed at addressing issues of security at district, regional and national levels – most of which have largely failed. The few initiatives that have met with success have nearly all stemmed from the efforts of dedicated local communities. In the south-central regions, those areas that have experienced relative stability and security have done so at the behest of the people. The large number of public debates and workshops hosted by the CRD over the past five or six years have underlined the fact that security cannot be viable and sustainable without comprehensive reconciliation and public involvement. This does not mean that security has to wait until reconciliation ends. But the two must proceed together – and with the full understanding and commitment of all the parties involved.

The same is true of the various elements of security. A secure environment cannot be created simply by disarming the people; it is vital, often simultaneously, to reinstate demobilised militias in the productive life of society. For this reason, reintegration programmes must be considered and properly planned before a region embarks upon a disarmament programme. In south-central Somalia, the need for formal security institutions that are far different from their widely resented predecessors will be paramount. In considering the wide range of judicial and law enforcement structures, personnel and training that will be required, it is clear that laying the foundations for the region’s future security will be a very expensive and time consuming process.

The many public forums facilitated by WSP/CRD and their partners also make clear that the vast majority of the population considers security to be the most critical prerequisite for the region’s future development. Major challenges include demobilising existing militias and incorporating certain of their members into new security structures. Existing judicial institutions, such as Sharia and customary courts, and private security companies will have to be accommodated in future security networks. The TFG’s draft National Security
and Stabilisation Plan will have to be revised to reflect the new political and military realities on the ground. While authorities may be tempted to accelerate the formation of a ‘rapid security force’ to maintain the rule of law in south-central Somalia, participants in the Dialogue for Peace workshops stressed the need to engage and incorporate informal and traditional structures that have been providing the only judicial authority in the region for the past decade and a half.

Although there are strong signs of peace and stability returning to most urban areas in south-central Somalia, a number of faction-led conflicts persist and could yet overshadow political discourse in the region in the absence of broader political reconciliation. Most recently, uncertainty about the future is focussed on the need for a negotiated resolution between the TFG and the ICU. In Mogadishu, while the presence of the ICU has brought a new level of stability to the city, allowing for the freer movement of people and goods and encouraging economic integration between clans and communities, the challenges of establishing broad-based governance institutions remain. Even in the absence of large-scale violence, communities throughout south-central Somalia continue to suffer from widespread poverty, food insecurity, and a lack of public institutions to facilitate commerce and trade, as well as general insecurity.

However, against a backdrop of continuing uncertainty and unpredictability, some areas have shown what can be achieved through genuine reconciliation and participation within an agreed political framework. In the regions of Hiiraan, Galguduud and parts of Mudug, the reconciliation efforts of far-sighted community groups and elders, backed by influential political and business leaders, have demonstrated the real possibility of sustained peace and security – and the rapid social and economic benefits they can bring through increased trade and local and Diaspora investment.
5. Achievements and Impacts

Since it began its first phase in May 2004, the Dialogue for Peace programme has realised a number of concrete achievements as a result of its popular public forums, training workshops, negotiations between political, civil society and business groups, and direct interventions in situations of armed conflict. Among the most prominent achievements and impacts of the programme have been:

- The provision of critical technical assistance to the Mogadishu Security and Stabilisation Plan, and facilitation of discussions between local politicians, community leaders, and civil society groups;
- The facilitation of public workshops and expert meetings involving local and regional administrations, senior opinion-makers, security professionals, traditional leaders, businessmen, militia leaders, and representatives of women’s and youth groups;
- The promotion of a greater ‘voice’ for respected and proactive women’s groups and business associations in critical peace-building initiatives, including:
  - Bringing together business representatives and militia leaders in a workshop to consolidate the Medina Peace Agreement;
  - Facilitating a prominent role for women’s groups and local business leaders in the Mogadishu stabilisation process;
  - Promoting the greater involvement of women and business groups in the Mudug/Galguduud reconciliation and peace-building process.
- The training of militia leaders and members involved in ongoing conflict situations in modern techniques and methodologies of conflict resolution, peace-building and mediation;
- Support to the reconciliation process between the Sa’ad and Saleebaan sub-clans in South Mudug and North Galguduud, including conflict resolution training for local militias, informal meetings between the clan leaders, and organisation of the historic ‘Peace Caravan,’ which travelled from the Indian Ocean to the Ethiopian border, carrying peace messages to many villages caught up in the conflict;
- Capacity building of neighbourhood watch networks in Mogadishu through training and public mobilisation, and facilitation to enable civil society groups to participate in the formation of local security structures;
- Evaluation of DDR initiatives for militia groups in Mogadishu, designed to improve the security of the city;
- Empowering the Somali youth by engaging them in peace-building and conflict resolution processes and activities;
- Engagement of local business groups to financially contribute to the Mogadishu Security and Stabilisation Plan.
6. Lessons Learned

The Key Role of Women in Security and Stabilisation

In recent years, a number of groundbreaking events have served to underline the critical role of women and organised women’s groups in the promotion of peace in south-central Somalia. As well as playing a high-profile role in the dismantling of Mogadishu’s roadblocks in 2005, women’s groups have been credited with easing tensions between clans and individual warlords, and facilitating the release of a number of hostages. Around south-central Somalia, local women’s groups are taking a leading role in resolving conflicts, promoting peace-building advocacy and activities, and improving security in their communities. Women’s groups in Mogadishu have organised rallies and lobbies to curb and diffuse tensions between the major warlords of the city. This has been a self-sustaining initiative among women, utilising their leverage as mothers, sisters, daughters and wives. In recent years, the CRD has actively supported the peace-building role of local women’s groups, hosting a number of capacity-building workshops to enhance their advocacy and conflict-resolution skills.

Pioneers of Peace: The Women’s Peace Vanguard

The Women’s Peace Vanguard (Horseedka Nabadda) is a coalition of women’s groups established in 2004 to maintain peace and security and improve the delivery of social services in Mogadishu. Members of the group have largely abandoned old roles fighting with their home-based warlords to work together as ‘peace pioneers.’ As well as organising several high-profile peace campaigns and rallies, the WPV has helped to negotiate the successful release of scores of people taken hostage by armed groups in Mogadishu, played a leading role in the establishment of youth civil defence units in eight districts, supported the reestablishment of neighbourhood watch networks, built a school for IDPs camped in the former School of Military Aviation, and assisted in the reopening of the famous Banadir Hospital for Women and Children. The WPV became a household name throughout Mogadishu in June 2005, when it led efforts to persuade local militias to stand down from an estimated 45 roadblocks around the city – leading to the reopening of several vital arterial roads for the first time since 1991.

Building Local Security through the Sharia Courts

A large number of prominent Islamic clerics in south-central Somalia have established Sharia Courts with the long-term goal of incorporating the Islamic judicial system into a future Somali government. Across the region, there has been growing popular sentiment towards the positive role played by Sharia Courts in the maintenance of public security. The courts have responded quickly and efficiently to problems of crime and insecurity, reinstating judicial structures and effectively prosecuting criminals according to Islamic law. While popular misconceptions may have misrepresented the role of such courts outside Somalia, inside the country they have succeeded in returning a sense of security to many regions that have been vulnerable to...
Lessons Learned

the predations of armed criminal gangs. The judges of these courts include respected traditional leaders and some of the newer Islamic clerics of the community. Some Sharia authorities have performed policing and penal functions, most famously in North Mogadishu. They have also developed several rehabilitation centres, which have also contributed to the improvement of security in many areas. While minority groups and women have weaker representation in the clan-based Sharia courts, they nevertheless also benefit from the overall improvement in the security environment.

A Lesson in Rehabilitation: The Hararyaale Court

Since its establishment in January 1995, during the period when the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations were leaving Somalia, the Hararyaale Islamic Court has gained widespread respect for its work in rehabilitating former criminals and maintaining law and order. In little over a decade, the court has succeeded in psychologically rehabilitating nearly 1,200 adult inmates, including convicted criminals and drug addicts, as well as 50 juvenile delinquents brought in by their parents. While in detention, these youngsters undergo a careful and rigorous programme of physical, mental and religious training, as well as basic schooling. According to one of the court’s senior clerics, the rehabilitation of these former criminals and delinquents has a success rate of over 80%. The cost of the rehabilitation is covered by donations from the parents, the public, and the people who brought the offenders to the court.

Engaging Local Communities in DDR

During 2004, through informal discussions with UNDP, the CRD proposed a pilot community-based DDR project to be implemented by local organisations in Mogadishu as one way of exploring possibilities for armed youth to engage in peaceful ways of earning a living. Subsequently, in December 2004, the CRD carried out an evaluation of a UNDP-funded DDR project implemented by the Somali NGO SAACID in six districts of the city (Kaaraan, Hamarweyne and Shangani, Huriwaa, Dharkenley, Shibis, and Bermuda), which contributed to a greater knowledge of the processes and benefits of DDR among the target communities. CRD estimated that the project’s training component passed on vital understanding of DDR skills to an estimated 300 local militia members, who also agreed to surrender their weapons as a condition for admission. This policy led to the confiscation of 300 personal weapons – a factor that undoubtedly contributed to the improvement of security in the surrounding districts.

Most of the weapons possessed by criminal gangs and members of the public in south-central Somalia are semi-automatic rifles – most commonly Russian-made AK 47s – which, as the following table illustrates, are still easily and cheaply available in most city markets.

Some of the Weapons Available in the Open Market in South-Central Somalia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Light Weapons</th>
<th>Automatic Guns</th>
<th>Mines &amp; Bombs</th>
<th>Heavy Weapons</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TT-Pistol (Russia)</td>
<td>AK 47 (Korea)</td>
<td>F1 (Russia)</td>
<td>DCK (Russia)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pistol (Belgium)</td>
<td>M 16 (US)</td>
<td>Anti-tank missile (Korea)</td>
<td>Anti-aircraft barrel</td>
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<tr>
<td>Calibre 9 (Italy)</td>
<td>SAR 80 (US)</td>
<td>BTM 1157 (Russia)</td>
<td>ZKU</td>
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<td>45 Revolver (US)</td>
<td>SAR 80 (USA)</td>
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<td>RPG 2 and 7</td>
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<td></td>
<td>G.3 (DKM)</td>
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<td>M69</td>
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<td></td>
<td>M52 (India/DKM)</td>
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<td>106 recoilless anti-tank cannon</td>
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<td></td>
<td>BKM (Russia)</td>
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<td>60, 80 and 120 Mortar</td>
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Source: CRD, May 2004
Involving the Youth in Peace-Building

Young people have been particularly affected by the long years of fragmentation and violence in south-central Somalia. Most have been displaced or forced to join militias; the few who have escaped from dire poverty have done so only through employment in questionable economic activities. There is now a desperate and urgent need to involve young people and support youth groups in peace-building activities.

In recognition of this need, the CRD partnered with UNICEF in early 2004 to develop training modules for educating young people in the development and promotion of community-based peace-building initiatives. The training has since been used to introduce over 300 young people and 100 traditional elders to the concepts, principles and skills of conflict resolution, peace-building and mediation at workshops in Merca, Kismayo and Mogadishu, as well as in Burao, Somaliland, and Bosaso, Puntland.

7. Recommendations

After more than two years of intensive peace-building efforts and behind-the-scenes negotiations, during one of the most complex and unpredictable periods in Somalia’s recent history, a concrete set of recommendations has emerged out of the Dialogue for Peace programme. These can be listed under several specific categories:

The government’s role in peace-building

- Security is an issue that the government alone will not be able to solve. As a critical precursor to social and economic development, it is imperative that the government consults and involves all stakeholders – political, religious, military, civilian and commercial – in negotiations to chart the future for south-central Somalia’s security, which will require a comprehensive strategic framework for the security sector.
- The government must ensure a fair and equitable composition in the formation of its security forces, with a balance between clans and communities that genuinely reflects the composition of the population.

Establishing national security institutions

- Efforts must be initiated as a matter of urgency to re-establish a formal judicial structure, including custodial corps, prisons, and national/regional police forces. Without functioning national-level security institutions, the current state of lawlessness and insecurity is bound to prevail in most of south-central Somalia.
- Current efforts to reconstitute the security forces must be reviewed, made transparent, and incorporated into a broader security sector development strategy in order to avoid suspicion or opposition from smaller clans and minority groups.

Initiating a national DDR programme

- A nationwide disarmament programme should be initiated concurrently in every region of south-central Somalia. Partial or incomplete disarmament could have a serious destabilising impact, and lead to further outbreaks of conflict.
- The DDR programme must be conducted in a completely transparent manner, with the full engagement of the public and utilising a community-based approach, so that everyone concerned and the population as a whole is aware of what is being done, when and by whom.
- Any DDR programme must also provide militia members with training in skills that they can use to sustain themselves productively in their home communities.
Promoting community involvement

- It is imperative that community groups and civil society members are included in the planning and reestablishment of Somalia’s security infrastructure. For the sake of its support and sustainability, this must be a community owned and driven process, which accommodates all stakeholders involved in the conflict and the civilian population at large.

Supporting community-based security

- In the absence of national judicial structures, one practical interim mechanism for restoring security to specific areas are community-based security networks, such as Mogadishu’s neighbourhood watch schemes. Such schemes, when operated and funded by local people, can bring a semblance of security to areas that have been suffering from criminal excess.
- As well as the strengthening and expanding of neighbourhood watch schemes, support should also be provided to other community-based security mechanisms, such as youth awareness programmes, community conflict resolution training, and continued engagement with human rights organisations.

Continuing the dialogue

- The concept of “Dialogue not Guns” should be further promoted through public events and youth-centred activities in order to make it an integral part of the urban culture in Mogadishu and elsewhere. Such activities should also go hand-in-hand with organised peace education and incentives for peace-promoting journalism in order to develop greater collective consciousness of the need for formal law and order mechanisms as vital precursors for social and economic development.

Promoting the role of women

- The role of women in maintaining security needs to be better supported and developed. Greater capacity-building support to organised women’s groups would go a long way to ensuring the broader participation of these groups in the reestablishment of security institutions.

Establishing local/regional administrations

- One of the major recommendations to have come out of the different public forums hosted by the DfP is the link between insecurity and the absence of local administrations. Areas with some form of regional administration tend to enjoy relative security, as these administrations often establish an informal police force and limited judicial structures.
- Such local authorities will invariably require support in terms of capital resources and personnel training in order to rebuild basic judicial structures and police forces.
Bibliography and Further Reading


Humphreys, M. and Weinstein, J.M. *Disentangling the Determinants of Successful Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration*. Earth Institute of Colombia University, February 2005.


Annex

Joint Statement
Mogadishu Security and Stabilisation Initiative
Mogadishu, Somalia
June 6, 2005

1. Members from both the Transitional Federal Parliament and the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia in Mogadishu and former presidents, and members from the Somali civil society organisations, have held a critical Mogadishu Security and Stabilisation meeting on June 6, 2005 at Shaamo Hotel. The meeting was chaired by H.E. Mr. Sharif Hassan Sheikh Aden, Speaker of the Somali Federal Parliament.

2. The undersigned members have participated in this critical meeting (see below).

3. This meeting is a follow-up of the ongoing Mogadishu Security and Stabilisation activities undertaken by members of both federal legislative and executive institutions, in partnership with the civil society organisations. The intended goals of this meeting include:

   - Discussion, assessment and endorsement of the ongoing Mogadishu Security and Stabilisation activities, while at the same time engaging in the removal of all forms of roadblocks inside and outside Mogadishu;
   - The meeting aims to become the launching pad, within the framework of the TFP/TFG, for a much wider national reconciliation effort in Mogadishu and throughout Somalia;
   - The meeting aims to lead to the creation of a neutral political space that bridges the existing gap between members of the Transitional Federal Institutions of Somalia.

4. The Participants

   - Noted with satisfaction the progress achieved thus far with regard to the ongoing Mogadishu Security and Stabilisation activities;
   - Further identified concrete suggestions on the ongoing Mogadishu Security and Stabilisation activities and agreed to collectively support the successes achieved thus far;
   - Urged the leaders of this ongoing process to accelerate the cantonment of heavy weapons and the demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration of armed militia, and noted the imperative role that would be played by the restoration of national security forces;
   - Highlighted the need for the participation of key civil institutions in the
implementation of the Mogadishu Security and Stabilisation Initiative, including: business groups, the Islamic Sharia Courts, civil society organisations, traditional elders and religious leaders;

- Reiterated the need for an environment of mutual understanding and tolerance in resolving the political dispute between members of the Transitional Federal Institutions;
- Expressed their commitment to the realisation of the Mogadishu Security and Stabilisation Plan;
- Acknowledged the need for the immediate removal of roadblocks across the city as a basis for the successful pacification of Mogadishu;
- Expressed their deepest concern over continuing obstructions to the Mogadishu Security and Stabilisation Plan, not only as setbacks to the stabilisation of Mogadishu, but to the whole of Somalia;
- Requested targeted assistance from the international community to support the ongoing Security and Stabilisation efforts in Mogadishu;
- Emphasised the need for ongoing efforts to be taken over by the relevant Government institutions within the framework of the TFG, while the goodwill and inputs of other stakeholders are fully utilised;
- Expressed their appreciation of the selfless efforts undertaken by the Center for Research and Dialogue (CRD) in the preparation and arrangement of this critical meeting.

5. A more detailed report on the proceedings of this meeting will be made available to all participants and other interested parties. The full report will also be made available on the CRD website: www.cdrsomalıa.org.

This statement was witnessed by the following participants in Mogadishu on June 6, 2005:

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<td>H.E. Ali Mahdi Mohamed</td>
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<td>H.E. Abdulkasim Salad Hassan</td>
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